Text

Const Project Evaluation for Catawba Nuclear Station.
	ML20023B396
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	10/31/1982
From:	; DUKE POWER CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20023B390	List: ML20023B389; ML20023B396;
References
	NUDOCS 8305050014
	Download: ML20023B396 (202)
	v • d • e

-

i l

Duke Power Company i

[

Construction Project Evdluation j for. l Catawba Nuclear Station !

i

\

t

\ -

/ .

l E POWER , I p

o

- 1 i

T I

e

~

October,19.82 l t

~

8305050014 821230 l PDR ADOCK 05000413 !

A PDR '

. . . .. - --.--. -,. - --...___ - -. ... .-. --.--. _-. -2

- / > -

( - -

, ../i

,/ .

~

,CONSTRUCTION PROJECT EVALUATION FOR

~

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

)' UNITS 1-2 1

p September,27 - October 14, 1982 v

I '.

DUKE ~PONERCOMPANY CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA a

L

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE A. Scope 1 B. Summary 2 i

C. Performance Evaluation 3 Summary D. Response Summary 97

1. Design Engineering 98

2. Construction 122

3. Quality Assurance 142 E. Appendix A 156 l

l l 1. Observation Sheets 157 1

I

Scope The evaluation was a "self-initiated" review of work being done by the Design, Construction, and Quality Assurance Departments on the Catawba Nuclear Station. Personnel conducting the evaluation were employed by Duke Power Company and the Tennessee Valley Authority (see the resumes that follow). Evaluation team members were selected on the basis of their experience in design, construction, and quality assurance. Duke team members had little direct responsibilities for activities at the Catawba site and none in the areas they reviewed.

To prepare the team members for the evaluation, INPO trained key team members in the methodology of the "self-initiated" review. These individuals then trained the other team members.

The evaluation consisted of field observations, interviews, and review of supporting documentation.

NOTE: This evaluation did not include a review and assessment of vendors supplying permanent plant materials and equipment in areas other than HVAC. In addition the evaluation did not include any preoperational testing beyond the testing performed by Duke's Construction Department.

)

1 1

1 SELF INITIATED EVALUATION TEAM MEMBER RESUMES BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT - TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CATAWBA NUCLEAR PLANT - DUKE POWER COMPANY I

la

(1) Paul A. Evans, Principal Mechanical Engineer, TVA - Manager of the Catawba Nuclear Plant Evaluation MS and BS in Mechanical Engineering and registered engineer in the State of Tennessee with 12 years of experience in design and construction of nuclear power plants. From 1970 to 1973 he served various assignments in the Mechanical Engineering Design Branch with responsibility for developing mechanical piping and equipment design criteria for assuring structural adequacy of design and prepared input for safety analysis reports. Responsible for the management of mechanical engineering sections having technical responsibility for the development of design criteria, conducting design reviews, performing specialized technical analyses, and performing evaluations of equipment and structures for seismic and accident loading effects. In addition, he has managed construction control evaluation teams for the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations at three nuclear plants.

(2) H. L. Huggett, Coordinator, Special Projects, Duke Power Company -

Manager of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Evaluation BS in Mechanical Engineering and 12 years of nuclear power plant design experience. Responsible for developing power piping design and equipment design. Supervisor of cost estimating and integrated schedules of nuclear plants under construction. Additional duties included the scheduling and estimating of nuclear capital improvements on existing plants. Present duties include Special Project assignments concerning nuclear engineering and project control.

Ib

(3) Roy D. Anderson, Assistant Electrical Engineering Supervisor, TVA l BS in Electrical Engineering with 9 years of experience in construction of nuclear power plants. He was employed with Alabama Power Company from June 1974 to June 1975. He served as lead engineer at TVA's Watts Bar Nuclear Plant responsible for safety systems from June 1975 to November 1960. He worked on a task force to establish requirements manual and adjust procedures from November 1980 to September 1981, and currently serves as assistant supervisor electrical engineering at Watts Bar.

(4) Marvin R. Belew, Senior Electrical Engineer, TVA BS in Electrical Engineering with 16 years of nuclear power plant design and construction experience. This experience includes 5 years of responsibility for design modifications and maintenance of the Oak Ridge Research Reactor, 1 year of responsibility for writing test procedures and performing preoperational tests for commercial nuclear plants, 4 years of responsibility performing electrien1 engineering design for boiling water reactors (BWR), 5 years supervising of a BWR instrument and control design section, and 1 year as staff engineer with responsibility for the technical review and correctness of all instrument and control design work on

{ TVA nuclear plants.

O IC

a ..

(5) D. T. Clift, Senior Nuclear Engineer, TVA BS degree in Mechanical Engineering with 12 years experience in the design of nuclear plants principally in the mech:c.ical and nuclear engineering disciplines. This experience includes 2 years responsibility for mechanical design of intake pumping station, 6 years responsiblity for the technical administration of the nuclear steam supply system contracts, and 4 years responsibility for safety systems analysis, preoperational test support, and providing engineering support for operating nuclear plants.

(6) Douglas M. Franks, QA Surveillance Supervisor, Duke Power Company BA degree in Economics with 12 years of experience in the nuclear power field. Five years experience were gained in the nuclear navy in operation and maintenance of the nuclear power plant on a nuclear submarine. Two of his seven years experience in the power industry as been directly involved in inspection, supervision, and technical quality ascurance matters. The remaining five years involved directing aucit and surveillance activities during the operating and construction phases of nuclear sites, including development of audit and surveillance programs and technical interface with project management.

1 id

(7) D. L. Freeze, Manager - Oconee Station Support Division, Duke Power Company BS in Civil Engineering and a registered engineer in North Carolina and South Carolina with 16 years of experience in construction of ,

nuclear power plants. From 1967 to 1974 he participated in various assignments in the construction of Oconee Nuclear Station. The last 3 years of that assignment included responsiblity at the site for construction engineering, planning and scheduling, and quality control. From 1974 to 1981 he served as a Project Engineer at the Catawba Nuclear Station responsible for construction engineering, planning and scheduling, and quality control. In 1981 he served as Manager of Construction Services Organization, coordinating department scheduling, budgeting, materials control, and work methods I activities. Presently he is assigned as manager of a construction division responsible for capital improvements and modifications at Oconee Nuclear Station. The two largest of these additions being a standby shutdown facility and a radwaste facility.

(8) Clancy Glidewell, Principal Civil Engineer, TVA BS in Civil Engineering with 23 years of experience in design and construction of power plants. His experience includes 6 years design of concrete structures for fossil and hydroelectric

} facilities, 2 years design of concrete structures for nuclear generating facilities, 6 years supervisor of design unit involved u

in design of nuclear generating facilities civil structures, and 8 years as a structural engineering specialist involved in licensing and design of nuclear generating facilities. Experience includes preparation and/or review of specifications, criteria, procedures, scope documents, scheduling, research and development, resource allocations, reports, and cost.

le

~

s (9) J. R. Hendricks, Jr., Principal Engineer, Duke Power Company l

BS in Civil Engineering and MS in Water Resources Engineering, a Registered Professional Engineer in North and South Carolina, with 11 years experience in nuclear power plant design. This experience includes responsiblity for supervising the development of overall nuclear plant layout and geometry, specification of coatings for nuclear plants, development of hazards analyses, fire protection programs for nuclear plants, and development of environmental requirements for nuclear plants applicable to new and operating facilities.

(10) A. R. Hollins, Jr., Manager of Construction Services, Duke Power Company BS in Mechanical Engineering with 12 years of experience in construction of nuclear power plants, performed welding engineering function for Duke Power Construction at the Oconee Nuclear Station from 1970 to 1974. Supervised the Duke Power Construction welding engineering section at the Catawba Nuclear Station from 1974 to 1977. Senior Quality control Engineer for Duke Power Construction at the Cherokee Nuclear Station from 1978 to 1980. Supervisor of the Duke Power Construction Engineering 4

Support / Restraint Group from 1980 to 1982. Manager of 4

Construction Services for Duke Power Construction 1982 to present.

If ... -.

i.

(11) B. M. Rice, Senior Engineer, Duke Power Company BS in Electrical Engineering with 18 years of experience in design and construction of nuclear power plants. He possesses management and supervisor experience in the design of instrumentation, control, and power systems design and equipment specification, and has extensive experience in licensing, regulatory requirecents, and industry codes and standards.

(12) Glenn Robinson, QA Mechanical Engineer, Duke Power Company BS in Mechanical Engineering with approximately 14 years experience in construction of nuclear power plants. He served 3 years in a mechanical technical support function at Surry for Stone and Webster. He then was employed by the Duke Power Company where he served approximately 3 years in a mechanical technical support role at the Oconce and McGuire sites, and for 8 years in mechanical construction quality assurance at the McGuire Nuclear Station.

(13) M. N. Sawyer, Mechanical Engineer, TVA BS in Mechanical Engineering with 15 years of experience in construction of nuclear power plants. In 1968 he was assigned I various responsibilities in the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Construction Division as a mechanical engineer. In 1969 he was transfered to a new section to write procedures addressing app ( mdix B where he served through 1971. He was then promoted to a supervisor with responsibility for performing preoperational 19

tests on Browns Ferry. In 1977 he was transfered to the l Hartsville Nuclear Plant as a supervisor of the Engineering Services Grcup where he served through 1979. He was then transfered to the Construction Division to form a new organization to handle modifications and additions to operating nuclear plants and is currently serving in that capacity.

(14) P. A. Schrandt, QA Engineer, TVA BS degree in Mathematics with 6 years experience as a quality assurance engineer. This experience consists of four years as the Design QA Engineer for Yellow Creek and Bellefonte Nuclear Plants, one year experience as a materials engineer, and one year on special projece.s. Experience in QA includes development of QA procedures, responses to 50.55e items, review and approval of engineering procedures and specifications, special quality assurance investigations, and numerous committees on 10CFR50, ASME, AWS, and ANSI interpretations.

Previous experience consists of three years as an engineering supervisor in nuclear submarine overhaul, seven years as a senior test engineer in cryogenics on the Saturn V Program, and 10 years I in construction as a senior resident engineer in the aero space field.

1h

(15) H. S. Sheppard, Assistant Construction Engineer, TVA BS in Building Construction with 25 years of experience in power plant construction. From 1958 to 1963 he served as an office engineer with various assignrents in the Office Engineering Unit on a coal-fired steam plant. From 1963 through 1966 he served various assign =ents in the Concrete and Soils Unit. In January 1967 he was promoted to Group Leader for the Concrete and Soils Unit and Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant and served in that position through November 1972. He was then promoted to Supervisor, Civil Engineering Unit at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant where he served through March 1977. In March he was then transfered and promoted to Assistant Construction Engineer, Quality Control Section with responsibility for all inspections at the Hartsville Nuclear Plant.

(16) Stephen P. Stagnolia, Welding Engineer, TVA BS in Mechanical Engineering with 15 years of nuclear construction experience. This experience consists of 5 years with various responsibilities for performing mechanical engineering functions associated with piping installation, condenser erection, equipment startup and test, material receipt inspection, and as Welding I

Engineer and Inspector. The succeeding 9 years he filled various assignments working as a Welding Engineer and Inspection Lead Engineer and as Welding and Inspection Unit Supervisor in charge of all welding and inspection. He currently serves as Staff Supervisor Construction Welding Engineering Staf f responsible for the overall program in the Division of Construction and providing welding engineering services and consultation for the Construction Division.

li

i.

(17) T. F. Wyke, Principal Engineer, Duke Power Company MS in Nuclear Engineering with 21 years of experience in design of nuclear systems and power plants. He worked for 5 years for Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Atomic Power Division, responsible for various assignments in nuclear fuel engineering and performing reactor performance testing. He has 16 years of experience in the Design Engineering Department of Duke Power Company. This experience includes performance of and/or responsibility for work in the areas of radiation shielding and nuclear fuel analyses; mechanical equipment application and fluid system engineering; piping material application; station service system engineering and design, pipe support design, and layout of power piping.

(18) Carey F. York, Manager, Mt. Holly Station Support, Duke Power Company MS in Civil Engineering and Registered Professional Engineer in North Carolina with 16 years experience in construction of power plants. From 1967 to 1974 he was involved in various assignments during the construction phase for the Keowee and Jocassee Hydro Stations. From 1974 to 1980 he served in a staf f position in the construction department, responsible for developing department d

wide policies and procedures standards applying to nuclear construction related to materials, planning and scheduling, welding, earthwork, and budgeting areas. In 1980 he served as Hanger Manager in the Construction Department at the Catawba Nuclear Plant. From 1981 to present he serves as Division Manager for the Station Support Division in the Construction Department.

li

4 l

l

SUMMARY

Introduction l

An evaluation was conducted of design and construction activities

at Duke Power Company's Catawba Nuclear Plant Units No. 1 & 2 during l the period from September 27 through October 14, 1982. The evaluation was initiated by Duke Power Company and was conducted by an evaluation team comprised of senior technical and management personnel from Duke Power Company and Tennessee Valley Authority. The evaluation team utilized performance objectives and criteria developed by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations specifically to support the Institute's sponsoring utilities in this type of evaluation. The plant, which is located in Clover, South Carolina will be two 1145 MWe (Westinghouse)

PWR Units. Unit 1 is about 90% complete and is scheduled to begin commercial operation in 1985.

Statement of Purpose The purpose of this self-initiated evaluation was to facilitate the general upgrading of this plant, and the nuclear industry as a whole, to a higher level of excellence in the design and construction of new facilities. A true appreciation of this effort can best be achieved by a review of the performance objectives, the results, and the corrective actions specific to this evaluation as contained in the body of this report.

j Overall Assessment Within the scope of this evaluation, the team determined that the plant was being designed and constructed by well qualified personnel. Once the facility is completed, we are confident that the plant will perform its intended functions and operate safely.

Certain Strengths were noted as follows:

1. A strong corporate committment to design and construct a safe facility.

2. Construction facilities and equipment are planned for, acquired, installed, and maintained in a manner consistent with projects needs to support quality construction.

l

3. Project scheduling and work planning were in order and are making effective and efficient use of project resources.

4. The procurement of equipment, materials and services was adequate to meet project requirements.

5 The management of project documentation was reviewed and found to provide 2

i a strong base for the plant's operational stage.

6. Management has shown support of training by hiring an outside consultant to review the inplace training techniques and performing a "needs analysis".

7 Quality Assurance and Quality Control functions were performed adequately and independently to support and control the quality of the facility.

Improvements Were Recommended in a Number of Areas: The Following are Considered the Most important:

(DC.1) 1. Procedure for the responsibility, issuance, and control of Design input needs to formalized.

(DC.2) 2. Coordination on Design changes between the design disciplines should be improved.

(DC.4) 3. Formal program is needed to review design documents to assure constructability, s maintainability, and operability.

(QA.3) 4. Managers and supervisors need to be reminded to enforce adherence to all plant policies and procedures.

(CC.3) 5. A Construction program should be implemented for site material control.

(CC.4) 6. Closer control and monitoring of activities conducted by the HVAC contractor (QP.1) is necessary.

(CC.5) 7. Inspection procedures need to be clearer in their definition of requirements.

8. Assessing generic implications of construction problems need to be considered more often.

I (QP 3) 9 Independent assessment of quality related activities should be incorporated into a program.

(TC.1) 10. Methods and procedures used to perform system testing needs to be reveiwed and individual responsibilities need to be more clearly defined.

y r

f

{

2a

l l-1 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SUDIAPJf Construction Project Performance Area Organizational Structure Objective No. OA-1 Evaluator (s)

I, Performance Objective The owner's corporate organization and all other project organizations responsible for the design, engineering, planning, scheduling, licen-sing, construction, quality assurance, and testing of a nuclear plant should provide an organizational structure that ensures effective project management control.

II. Sccee of Evaluation The sccpe of evaluation covered in this area was mainly the Chief Engineers and the Vice President of Design Engineering, the Project Manager and Vice President of Construction, and the Corporate Quality Assurance Manager's office. A total of 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months by two evaluators were utilized to accomplish the evaluation which consisted of interviews, review of documentation delineating organizational structure, and attending meetings where Managers were involved.

2 III. Conclusion The activities evaluated under this performance objective were found to be satisfactory, t

3 j-

PERFORMANCE EVALUATICN

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station MANAGEMENT UNOLVEMENT AND '

Performance Area cnMMTmurNT -n nturymv Objective No. nA_2 Evaluator (s)

I, Performance Objective Senior and middle managers in the owner's corporate office, designer's office, and at the construction site who are assigned functional responsibility for matters relating to the nuclear project should exhibit, through personal interest, awareness, and knowledge, a direct involvement in significant decisions that could affect their responsi-bilities.

II. Sco=e of Evaluation The scope of evaluation included the Project Manager and his immediate staff of the Construction organization, the division Chief Engineers and their immediate staff of the Design organization, and the Corporate Quality Assurance Manager and his immediate staff. The evaluation consisted of interviews, document review of examples of management involvement,and walk-through activities that enabled demon-stration of involvement either before or during the walk-through. Approximately 70 hours8.101852e-4 days 0.0194 hours 1.157407e-4 weeks 2.6635e-5 months were utilized by the total team for this evaluation. .

i l

. Conclusion All managers demonstrated, in general, a good understanding of the activities for which they were personally responsible and maintain an action tracking system for followup. One area for which a weakness was expressed by some managers was the relatively low visibility experienced at the Construction site. In some instances, Managers stated they spend less than 5 percent of their time in the Construction '

area. No finding was developed for this case. With this one exception, the acti- ;

vities covered under this performance objective were considered satisfactory. .

g I

' l 4 ,

t

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SUM _GRY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station THE ROLE OF FIRST LINE SUPERVISORS Performance Area AND MIDDLE MANAGERS Objective No. OA-3 Evaluator (s)

I. Performance Cbjective The project first line supervisors and middle managers should be qualified by' verified background and experience and have the necessary authority to carry out their functional area responsibilities.

II. Sccce of Evaluation The scope of evaluation covered by this objective included craft foremen and supervisors of the Construction Manager's staff and group supervisors in the Engineering divisions and the Quality Assurance Department. The evaluation con-sisted of interviews, walk-through of areas of resocnsibility where appropriate, and documentation review. Approximately 60 hours6.944444e-4 days 0.0167 hours 9.920635e-5 weeks 2.283e-5 months were utilized by all members of the evaluation team.

III. Conclusicn First-1ine managers, in general, were very knowledgeable of their responsibi1itles and demonstrated strong commitment to the program. Uncertainty was expressed in areas where t.he matrix form of management was being irrplemented but was felt to be no more than expected at the stage of imolementation that existed during the evalua-tion. Therefore, it is concluded that activities related to this performance l objective are being conduc;cd in a satisfactory manner.

tt i 5 -

i i

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Ine Role of First Line Supervisors erformance Area and Middle Manaaer Objective No. 0A.3 valuator (s) P Evans /H Huacett V. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices finding -

(0A.3-1) Managers and Supervisors do not always enforce adherence to plant policies and procedures.

(Factual information CC.1, CC.4, CC.5 and PS.1)

P h

i 1

Sa j

l' PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Perfor:::ance Area Desien Incuts Objective No, nr s Evaluator (s) C G1idewe11 I. Perfor:tance Obiective Inputs to the design process should be defined and controlled to achieve comp.lete and quality designs.

II. Sccce of Evaluation The evaluation of this area involved essentially three members of the team. Approxi-mately 46 hours5.324074e-4 days 0.0128 hours 7.60582e-5 weeks 1.7503e-5 months were expended in interviews, document review and research at various locations within the Design office.

.i 1

6 III. Conclusion i The vast majority of activity evaluated under this performance objective was l generally satisfactory. However, there were a number of weaknesses identified that indicated a need to strengthen certain aspects of the organization, i

i 4

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SUPS.ARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Performance Area Desian Inout Objective No. DC-1 C G1idewe11 e Evaluator (s)

IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices Finding No requi rement exists for identifying, tracking and assuring commitments (DC.1-1) identified in the PSAR are met. Design information should be clearly ce defined and controlled.

Finding No control program for defining responsibility for providing Design input (DC.1-2) could be found. Input is usually provided on c request basis.

Finding Design input information is not always provided in a controlled manner.

(DC.1-3) Memorandums serve as the primary vehicle for documenting Design input.

Finding System descriptions and flow diagrams do not always agree as to the (DC.1-4) current requirements. Several system descriptions were observed to lag revisions of system flow diagrams. -

Finding No dccumented program was found for assuring correct application of (DC.1-5) seismic response spectra.

7 s . -

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project

- Catawba Nuclear Station Objective No. DC-1

1. Trerformance Area: Desien Incut (trtle) 2., provice factual information that succons the performance Evaluation Surrmarv

1. From interviews, literature searches, and document reviews within the Civil /

Environmental Division, the Project Management Division, and the Safety Review Analysis and Licensing Division, no requirement could be determined to exist for identifying and tracking PSAR commitments. The Safety Review Analysis and Licen-sing Division does compile a list of commitoents of which they are aware and track them to completion.

2. From interviews, literature searches and document reviews in the Civil / Environmental Division, no control program for defining responsibility for providing Design input could be determined to exist.

3 Personnel interviews within the Civil / Environmental Division showed a very good understanding of existing procedures and in carrying out the requirements of the procedures.

4. Interviews, literature searches, and document revisions in the Civil / Environmental Division showed Design input is provided th' augh memorandums,' specifications, w-intra-and inter-disci,plinary discussions and meetings.

5 A review of Specification CNS-Il08.00-00-0002, Volumes I and 11 and interviews within the Civil / Environmental Division showed no instructions on the use of the spectra contained in the specification existing.

6. Review of Specification CNS-1108.00-00-0002, Volume I and.11, a controlled docu-ment, showed the manuals contained no name, number or unique identifier to assure control of the manuals is being maintained.

7 From personnel interviews and document reviews in the area of support restraint design, no program requirement for conducting constructability, maintainability, or operability reviews was found to exist; however, these areas are considered in the modeling and review of support res t ra i n t s .

8. Personnel interviews and document reviews within the Mechanical / Nuclear Division showed system descriptions / flow diagrams, both controlled documents, are in disagreement.

9 Review of issued Mechanical and Electrical system descriptions showed the two system descriptions did not agree (RHR System).

10. Interviews and document reviews in the Electrical Division showed the Auxiliary Feedwater and the Residual Heat Removal system descriptions for Electrical systems and Mechanical systems do not agree.

8

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAES Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Design input Objective No. DC-1

l. Perfor:aance Area:

(title)

2. Provide factual info:: ::ation that succorts the Performance Evaluation Su::=arv

11. Interviews with personnel of the Electrical Division showed a lack of concern for the system descriptions not being current with Design drawings.

12. The Auxiliary Feedwater Electrical System description does not agree with the elementary electrical diagrams. and the Mechanical System description.

13 Interviews with Electrical Division personnel revealed no program for providing and controlling Design input exists.

14. The individual instrument accuracy information supplied by the Mechanical Instrument and Control Group to the Electrical Equipment Qualification Group for the NUREG 0588 Electrical Equipment Environmental Qualification Report for instrument loops con-taining both mechanical and electrical components are not based on the total loop accuracy. They are based on the system requirements supplied by the mechanical process engineers.

N e

s

. - . . . . . _ =. :_ . . . - . . ~ :- = ~n~~ .-- :: --

_=-- - .

12.-

PERFORMANCE EVALCATICN

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Perfc. :utnce Area DESIGN INTERFACES Objective No. DC-2 D T Clift Evaluator (s) ..

I. Perfor=ance Obiective _ __

Design organization external and internal interfaces should be identified an'd coordinated to ensure a final design that satisfies all input requirements.

II. Sccce of Evaluation The evaluation of the performance objective involved several members of the team.

The evaluation included discussions with responsible engineers, designers and supervisors in the Mechanical, Electrical and Civil Design organizations. Interface documents were reviewed and compared with Design input dat'a for the RHR and AFW _.

Systems. Approximately 50 hours5.787037e-4 days 0.0139 hours 8.267196e-5 weeks 1.9025e-5 months were expended in the evaluation of this objective. _

III. Conclusion The majority of the activities evaluated under this performance objective was satisfactory. However, several weaknesses are identified that indicate a need to strengthen certain aspects of the control of Design interfaces and Design input documents.

I I

i I' 1 l

10 ;

3 I

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Performance Area Desian Interfaces Objective No. DC-2 Evaluator (s)

IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices Finding The process for controlling Design input documents does not require timely (DC.2-1) updating of system descriptions. The RHR and AFW System descriptions are not maintained current with system designs.

Finding Several instances were identified where Design and Design change information (DC.2-2) were not effectively coordinated between the affected organizations.

Several problems were observed involving the exchange of information and control of interfaces between the electrical and mechanical I r, C groups and between support / restraint and piping layout sections.

Finding The following good practice was noted: The Duke data base program (DC.2-3) provides all design organizations an efficient and effective means to identify and locate design information.

11

's .

o PERFORMANCE EVAL'JATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Design Interfaces DC-2

1. Perfo =ance Area: objective No.

(title)

2. Provide factual inforn tion that suceerts the Perfo mance Evaluation S t::=tarv_

1. Review of system design input documents used to provide interface criteria revealed the following:

A. The Mechanical System description and the system flow diagram are identified as the primary Design input documents; however, only the flow diagrams are revised in a timely manner. Most Mechanical Systems personnel interviewed did not feel that the Mechanical System description needed to be revised prior to or in conjunction wi th the flow diagram.

B. Design changes required by DCA(s), VN(s), NPR(s), etc are incorporated into the Design input process mainly through revision of the system flow diagram and direct communication with organizations having a Design interface.

C. The Mechanical and Electrical System descriptions for the RHR System

were found to disagree as to system requirements. The applicable QA procedures (EPR 101 and the Mechanical Systems Group Handbcok, Section 6.0) which govern preparation of system descriptions do not provide guidance for the case of conflicts between Design input documents.

2. A review of the interface between the Mechanical I & C group and the Electrical Equipment Quali fication group for the preparation .of the NUREG 0588 Electrical Equipment Environmental Qualification Report identified the following:

A. The Electrical i & C Group requested information on transmitter required accuracy; whereas, the Mechanical I & C Group provided Instrument accuracy based upcn system requirements (supplied by the process engineer).

B. The instrument total loop accuracy was not considered or addressed due ~

to a breakdown in communications between the groups involved.

3 Interviews and document reviews in the Civil / Environmental Division show the responsibility for Design interface coordination is not clearly defined. However, most of the division personnel interviewed exhibited a very good understanding of who they interfaced with and coordination is conducted through this understanding.

4. From interviews, literature searches and document reviews within the Civil /

Environmentai Division, the Project Management Division and the Safety Review Analysis and Licensing Division; no requirement could be determined to exist for identifying and tracking SAR commitments. The Safety Review Analysis and Licensing Division does compile a list of commitments of which they are aware and track these to completion.

12

PERFCBMANCE EVALUATION DETA 25 Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Design Interfaces Objective No. DC-2

1. Perfc: man.ce Area:

(title) ,

2. Provide factual information that succorts the Performance Evaluation Su=marv_

5 A weakness was noted in the communication between the Analysis and Support /

Restraint Section and the Station Services group in the area of diesel generator isometrics and piping, layout drawing review and coordination. Specifically, the isometrics used for hanger design are not reviewed by the group responsible for the piping layout.

6. The Duke data base program provides all organizations an efficient and effective means to identi fy and locate design information.

O e

13

- ---- - _ _ ~ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SU!OiARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Performance Area DESIGN PRCCESS Objective No. DC-3 Ivaluator(s) C Glidewell l

I. Performance Chiective The management of the design process should result in designs that are safe, reliable, verifiable, and in corepliance with the design recuirements.

II. Score of Evaluation The evaluation of this area involved essentially three members of the team.

Approximately 57 hours6.597222e-4 days 0.0158 hours 9.424603e-5 weeks 2.16885e-5 months were expended in personnel interviews, document reviews and~research at varingsjo__aI_ians wi th the Desi gn of fi ce. - --

t III. Conclusion The majority of activi yt evaluated under this performance objective was generally satisfactory. Howeve r , there were a number of weaknesses identified that indicated a need to strengthen certain aspects of the organization.

14 l

4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Parformance Area Design Proce.ss Objective No. DC-3 Evaluator (s) C G1idewel1 IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices Finding Design records are not always being filed in a timely manner. Waiver (DC.3-1) form originals on file in a manual had not been transmitted to General Services for Corporate filing.

Finding Changes'to Design drawings do not receive the same degree of documented (DC.3-2) review as the original issue. Originals are documented by designer, drawer, checker and approver. Revisions are documented by checker and approver.

Finding Design documents relating to the design of the RHR System are in disagree-(DC.3-3) ment creating a potential for error in the design. This is also true for the AFW System.

Finding Calculations are not being maintained in a controlle( manner that support (DC.3-4) Issued Design documents.

l t

I s

h 15

i, *.

s

t. ., ,

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAITS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station i

1. Perfor=ance Area: Design Process Objective No. DC-3

. (title)

2. Provide factual information that suceerts t.e i Performance Evaluation Summarv- - . . . . .

4 1. From interview's and document reviews within the Civil / Environmental Division, the Project Management Division, and the Safety Review Aralysis and Licensing Division, no requirement could be determined to exist for identifying and tracking PSAR commitments. The. Safety Review Analysis and Licensing Division does compile a list of commitments of which they are aware and track these to completion.

2. From review of issued drawings in the Civil / Environmental Division, drawing revisions do not receive the same degree of documented review as the original issue of the drawings; i.e. , original sign-out shows designer, drawn, checked, and approved; whereas, revisions show only checked ar.d approved.

3 A review of the Specification CNS-1108.00-00-0002, Volumes I and 11, and interviews within the Civil / Environmental Division identified no documented program for assuring correct use of the spectra contained in the specification exit.

4. Review of Specification CNS-1108.00-00-0002 Volures I and 11, a controlled document, showed the manuals contained no name, number, or uniq*ue identifier to assure control of the, manuals is being maintained.

5 Interviews and document reviews in the Civil / Environmental Division show a good understanding of how the design process works.

6. Review of the manual containing coordination waiver forms completed and on file in the Civil / Environmental Division showed several of the completed waivers had not been transmitted to the General Services Division for fLllng.

7 Thirty to forty percent of pipe hangers b'eing installed in the Reactor Building are temporary hangers requiring replacement when 9esign information on permanent hangers become available. .

8. Intervie.s and document revisions in the area of support restraint design showed criteria is being met.

9 Review of the RHR System description and flow diagram revealed discrepancy between the requirements of the two documents concerning emergency power train assignment l

for the isolation valves between the RCS and the RHR System.

10. Review of the Mechanical and Electrical System descriptions for the RHR System showed the two documents do not agree as to the current system requirements.

4 16 N wg

. - , , yy,.-~- ,.,_-----,_y..-- -,~y- _ , , . - ~ , _ - . - . - - - - - - - , .

7y . .- .,

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Objective No. DC-3

1. Performance Area:

(trtle)

2. Provide factual information that succorts the Performance Evaluation Summarf _ _

11. A review of the Systems Group Document Storage File did not reveal any documented calculation (per QA Procedure MPR 101) to support data sheets information used to purchase safety related equipment for the AR1 System.

12. A review of the document file ,(Systems Group) did not contain any documented calcula-tion to support flow diagram Information for the AFU System.

13 Information provided by Duke to Westinghouse Corporation to be used in the safety analysis to evaluate the effects of the secondary system (AFW) on the NSSS following various postulated accidents was not based on calculations verified, approved, and documented in accordance with Procedure MPR 101 or PR 101.

14. There is no procedure in the Electrical Division which identifies the Mechanical or Electrical System description for the RHR or AFV Systems as being the controlling occument for Design.

15. Responsible engineers and first-line supervisors d. not feel keeping system descriptions current with Design drawings is important.

16. The AFW Electrical System description, the elementary diagrams and the Mechanical System description do not agree.

17. From interviews with Electrical Division personnel, no program could be i denti fied which defined responsibility for providing and controlling Design input information.

f 17

s l- . . -:__ .

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SUP.'4ARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station +

]

< Parformance Area DESIGN OUTPUT Objective No. DC-4 Evaluator (s) Belew. Clift. Glidewell , Hendricks .

I. Performance Obie:tive .._

Project design documents should specify constructable designs in terms of complete, accurate, and understandable design requirements.

II. Secce of Evaluation The evaluation of this performance objective was performed by interviewing respon- i sible Design engineers and their supervisors; comparing Design input documents with Design output documents; reviewing procedures which control Design documents; and reviewing Design output documents. Approximately 40 hours4.62963e-4 days 0.0111 hours 6.613757e-5 weeks 1.522e-5 months were spent on these actI-vitles.

i I

I s

-I:2. Conclusien The majority of the activities evaluated under this performance objective was satisfactory. However, there were some weaknesses identified that indicated a need for improvement in areas by the findings.

l l

0 1

18 I

---._,-m--.m,- -

s

=

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SUMyARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Design Output DC.4 Performance Area Objectivo No.

Evaluator (s) Balaw. Clif* . Clidewall. Handricks IV. Areas of weakness and corrective actient Good Practices Finding The ' BOP transmitter accuracy Information required for the NUREG 0588 (DC.4-1) Electrical Equipment Environmental Qualification Report is not being properly determined. The overall instrument loop accuracy is not considered.

Finding No documented program was identified for determining and assuring (DC.4-2) review for constructability, maintainability and operability is conducted. Reviews are performed where a need is identified.

Finding System descriptions are used to provide system control information.

(DC.4-3) They do not reflect current system design.

O l

19 e

PERFOPMdiCE EVALi;ATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station

1. Perforr.ance Area: Design Output Objective No. DC.h (title)

2. Provide factual infomation that succorts the Perfomance Evaluation su::raarv __ _,

1. The BOP transmitters required accuracy information supplied by the Mechanical

- Ir,C Group for the NUREG 0588 Electrical Equipment Environmental qualification Report does not consider overall instrument loop accuracy. The required accuracy for these transmitters is not coordinated with the Electrical Control System Engineering Group for consideration of overall loop accuracy. The entire system requirements are' being used for the transmitter.

2. During interviews with responsible engineers and their supervisors, it was deter-mined that constructability, operability, maintainability and personnel movement were considered during the design phase, but no documented prcgram was identified which requires these evaluations with the exception of the piping design criteria.

1 Some examples of weakness in the review of constructability are as follows:

A. Transition pieces are being added to the "A" frames of the steam generator upper lateral supports. These transition pieces were necessary due to the "

fact that the required post weld heat treatment of the welds joining the upper lateral supports and the embedment could not be performed.

B. The sealing surfaces of the KF heat exchangers are being weld built-up and machined to eliminate leakage at the sealing surfaces. A welded reinforcing collar was identified and added near the sealing surface that caused distortion of the sealing surface.

C. The area in Unit 1 Auxiliary Building Penetration Room at Elevation 577 where hangers are being installed is extremely congested, making quality installation difficult.

D. In the above defined area, Design changes on items already installed provide potential for extensive rework and/or modifications. Such rework and/or modifications may alter the quality of installed items previously accepted.

i l

= .

20

^

PERFORMANOZ EVALCAT*0N DETAILS Construction P cject Catawba Nuclear Station Design output Objective No. DC.h

1. Performance Area:

(t:.tle) f

2. Provide factual information that suceons the Performance Evaluation Su=marv_ __

3 The Residual H' eat Removal (RHR) System flow diagram and system description have a discrepancy between the requirements of the two documents concerning emergency

. power train assignments for the isolation valves between the Reactor Coolant System and the RHR Systems.

4. The Auxiliary Feedwater and Residual Heat Removal Mechanical System descriptions are not in agreement with the Electrical system descriptions. There are no set requirements for revising these documents and no procedure which identifies which of thes,e is the controlling document.

5 The Auxiliary Feedwater Electrical system description was last revised on October 10, 1980. There has been several revisions of the Electrical elementary diagrams and a complete revision of the Auxiliary Feedwater Mechanical System cescription since the last revision of the Electrical system description.

6. Personnel interviewed within the Civil / Environmental Division showed a very goo L understanding of existing Design procedures and in carrying out their requirements.

21

_ ___ =--. . _ :a- e. .. ._.-..-.:-.. . . . . . .r PEPEOP.MANCE EVALUATICN SUMMAP.Y 'Const .:ctica Project Catawba Nuclear Station Par:'ormance Area DESIGN CuANGES Objective No. Dc-5 Draluator (s) a, i w ciic. nit % .ii u ., s t r t. e I. Performance obiee-ive _

Changes to released project design documents should be controlled to ensure that constructed designs comply with the most recent design recuirements.

II. Scoce of Dialuation The evaluation of this performance objective was performed by Interviewing responsible Design engineers and their supervisors; reviewing documents which control Design changes; and reviewing revised documents. Approximately 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months were spent on these activities.

l t

I III. Conclusien .

The majority of the activities evaluated under this performance objective was satisfactory. However, there were some weaknesses identified that indicated a need for improvement in areas identified by the findings.

-l l h j i i

i . !

22 ;

l I I

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Performance Area Desten Chances Objective No. DC-5 Evaluater (s) Belew, Clift, Glidewell, Hendricks IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices Finding Conflicts between system design documents exist for extended periods (DC 5-1) of time, because system descriptions are not revised in a timely manner.

b l

l 23 n: .

r. .- - - . . . ..

e

PERFORMANCE EVALL*ATION DETAILS Construction Project-Catawba Nuclear Station Design Changes Objective No. DC-5

1. Perfor: nance Area:

(trtle)

2. Previde factual infor ::ation that sueecrts the Perfor=ance Evaluatio3 Su=marv ,,,_

1. From review of issued drawings, drawing revisions do not receive the same degree of documented review as the original issue of the drawings. Original sign-out shows designer, drawn, checked and approved; whereas, revisions show checked and approved.

2. The Auxiliary Feedwater Electrical System description was last revised October 10, 1980. There has been several revisions of the elementary diagrams and a complete revision of the Auxiliary Feedwater Mechanical System description since the last revision of the Electrical system description.

3 The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System flow diagram and system description have a discrepancy between the requirements of the two documents concerning emergency power train assignments for the isolation valves between the Reactor Coolant System and the RHR System.

m.

24

^

. _ . . _ _ -.-~~ . = ~.-.._._ ... :- -

..- :.:=;~ ~ . . . . .

PEPSCPS.AI;CE EVAI,UATION SW1ARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station P;rformance Area CCNSTRUCTION E'iGINEERING Objective No. CC-1 l

Evaluator (s) T F Wyke, R D Anderson I. Performance Ob-iective Engineering and design performed under the authority of the construc-tion organiza' tion should be controlled as to consistency with the basic design criteria to ensure compliance with applicable codes, standards, and regulatory co.._.it=ents.

II. Scoce of Ivaluation The evaluation of this area involved several members of the team. Approximately 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months were expended in reviewing work practices in the various discipline areas. This evaluation included review of procedure, review of examples of work, and discussion with various levels of personnel.

I -

[

i 0

r f

s 1

0 4

l t

I I

l.

O i

III. Conclusien j The large majority of activity evaluated under this performance objective was j satisfactory. However, several weaknesses were identified which indicated a need to strengthen certain aspects of the organization.

4 0

e 25

1 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SU.W.ARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Performance Area Construction Ene i nee ri no Objective No. CC.1

- Evaluator (s) t -

IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices Mana'gers and supervisors do not always enforce adherence to plant Finding) policies and procedures. Several areas were noted where personnel i

(CC.1-1 did not adhere to established work procedures.

i l

l i

l l

26 1

i i

l' 4.. * *

, e 8 . * * .

gwP-*. w+- ,#wrw e8- ,- e , . - ,,w-.,--- - - ,- - - -

t PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Construction Engineering CC.1

1. Performance Area: Objective No.

(title)

2. Provide factual information that succorts the Performance Evaluation Summarv _

1. A controlled copy of CP-461 was revised by hand, contrary to QA Procedure G-1,

2. The actual practice interface between the pipe erection craft and the Pipe Fab Shop for preassembled sections is at variance with CP-42, omitting preparation of sketches by the Construction Engineer-Mechanical.

3 Work on instrumentation guide funnels on Unit 2 reactor vessel head was observed at variance to approved drawings, based on verbal authorization.

4. Instructions to pipe erection craft on installation of Unit 2 instrument root valves are provided by a memo to file, rather than by a controlled document.

l l

l 27

j' PERFOP ENCE EVALCATION

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Construction Facilities Performance Area and Ecuirment Objective No. CC-2 Evaluator (s) R Anderson I. Performance Chiective ~

Construction facilities and equipment should be planned for, acquired, installed, and maintained consistent with project needs to support quality construction.

~

II. Scoce of Evaluation The evaluation of this area was a result of input from several of the team l

1 members, and approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months was expended in this effort. A meeting was held with the Facility Engineer to discuss methods and responsibilities for recognizing need, planning, implementing and maintaining Construction facilities and equipment. The evaluation was limite'd to the plant site.

i l

III. Conclusien Construction facilities and equipment are planned for, acquired, installed and maintained in a manner consistent with project needs to support quality construction.

l l1 1

3 j 28 i i

2

~ -

%=

- - . __ _ - . _ _,y_9 __._,.-_.yr. , , , , .,__.p.m,.--c._. ,y-_>,_ 7 - y ,.- w- r-'N T

._ :- .__.:------ - == ..- .:. _c : . . . . _ _ .

PERFORMANCE IVALUATICN

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nucicar Station Perfor=ance Area Material Control Objective No. CC-3 Evaluator (s)

I, ?erformance Obiective _ , ,

Material and equipment should be inspected, controlled, and maintained to ensure the final as-built condition meets design and operational requirements.

II. Scoce of Evaluation The evaluation of this performance area involved nine of the twelve team members at the project site. Approximately 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months were expended in observing work practices at several locations such as warehouse, fabrication shops, powerhouse -- -

and storage yard areas. A review was made of the written procedures, instructions, manuals and standards on material control. Walk-throughs, observations and reviews revealed most of the evaluation details.

, III. Conclusion Some of the activities evaluated under this performance objective were satisfactory.

However, weakness was identified in a couple of areas where there is a need to

] strengthen certain aspects of the project's policies.

l i

29 i

, I

s PERFOP3.ANCE EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Performance Area Material Control g33,g gy, go, CC-3 S Sheppard Evaluator (s)

, i IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices '

Finding Site' receipt inspection does not ensure that material and equipment (CC.3-1) received on site are evaluated against the requirements of the pro-curement specifications. Examples of the problems identified may potentially result in delays, waste of materials, additional time spent on disposition of deviations from procured materials and work stoppage.

Finding A consistent method for material identification was not in effect in (CC.3-2) the warehouse. Several instances were noted where I.D. tages had fallen off, equipment was marked with ink; and when material was being sectional-ized to start fabrication, a means for maintaining the identification was not being done.

Finding Proper protective measures were not taking place for, environmentally (CC.3-3) sensitive equipment that was " robbed" for spare parts. Some parts were being stored in an open door instrument cabinet.

Finding Procedure QFP-8.002 CNS, Rev 1A, does not indicate the disposition of ~

(CC.3-4) unused filler material. Confusion appears to exist regarding handling ,

of unused filler material and adherence to AWS code requirements could not be determiend.

Finding Materials are not being maintained or stored effectively at work site (CC.3-5) locations. Several examples were noted which reflected improper control.

Finding Scheduled preventive maintenance activities on installed equipment are

, -(CC.3-6) not always assured throughout the entire period of Construction Depart-ment centrol. Equipment was identified for which preventive maintenance had been canceled up to 21 months ago, and there was no evidence that compensatory requirements had been established.

1 a

30 l-

s. _ . . . . .- . . - .

~ .

y .

~ ~

PEPSORMASC2 DIA* UATION DETAI' S Construction Projo t Catawba Nuclear Station

1. Performance Area:

Material control Objective No. CC-3 (tr.t.!.e )

l P, . Provide factual information that succorts the Perfo: nance Evaluation Su=marv _

1. During a walk-through in the HVAC, Pipe Fab and Welding Equipment Shops, several weaknesses were observed:

A. In the Pipe Fab Shop:

1. Carbon steel pipe was heavily pitted on the inside diameter, which was only slightly above minimum wall thickness, thus not allowing much for clean-up, fitting and grinding.

2. Orifice flanges are being purchased oversized (next higher schedule) so that sufficient material is available for clean-up of the flow section.

B. In the Welding Equipment Shop:

1. A large supply (several boxes) of glue which is used for we.lding purge dams was being stored in one of the welding shops. The craft indicated they needed to keep a large supply because the warehousg would let them run out if they did not s. ore up.

C. In the HVAC Fab Shop:

1. A safety related galvanized steel angle used by the HVAC contractor is color coded on the ends when received at the site, but when f abrication begins (sectionalizing), no attempt is made to maintain this identification.

2. Procedure QFP-8.002 CNS, Rev 1A, (Control of Welding- Filler Material) requires the return of unused filler material at the end of each shift.

The procedure does not indicate what is the disposition of the unused filler material. The supervisor indicated that the coated electrodes are placed back into the holding oven and are subject to reissue to the -'

next shift. The QA engineer indicated that the returned coated electrodes are placed in a separate holding oven and are returned to Duke Power Company,

, who is responsible for the reconditioning of the electrodes. There is con-fi rmation f rom Duke Power Company welding material issue station employee

, that the contractor does occasionally return coated electrodes. The effective Code, AWS D1.1, requires reconditioning of coated electrodes after exposure to the atmospFere.

l

2. In a walk-through of warehouse and storage yard area, the following weaknesses were. observed:

A. Stick-on paper I.D. tags were used for electrical equipment identification.

Most of these tags were falling off the equipment in two warehouses. No 31 usesr. m -eme =,-n ~ -enem -t m c--w e m m w r,w r=r-':n -w

(

PEPSORMANCE EVALUATION DETA :.S Construction Projce:

Catawba Nuclear Station

1. Perfor: nance Area: Material Control Objective No. CC-3 (title) ,

2. Provide factual information that 'succorts the Performance Evaluation S u=:ur_v _

consistent' method of correcting the problem was being employed. One ware-house was usi ng ink to mark i,tems. The other one was stapling paper tags on equiprent when possible.

B. Spare generator cifcuit breaker had been robbed of parts for use with other circuit breckers without protection of disconnected parts. Some parts were stored in an instrument cabinet with the door open.

C. Access to warehouse area where safety-related equipment was stored was not secured in two warehouses. Entrance area was open for access by both maintenance personnel and electrical termination and panel fabrication crew.

D. A 4-inch stainless steel pipe was on a rusty set of carbon steel rollers used to move pipe into the pipe cutting building. The stainless pipe had rust streaks on the surface.

E. Cable reels were stored with cable ends not taped as requirtd in the storage yard. .

3 At a review of a repressure test in the Auxiliary Building on 10-4-82 for Shutdown 201B 7626 water was leaking from a temporary hose connection and was being allowed to soak a carton of filters. The carton was identified "AHU-3 1131-CNS." The situation was pointed out to the test director, but was not corrected.

4 During a walk-through of Unit 1 Turbine Building, it was noticed that while pipe fabrications on spool piece CT-SM-73 had end caps missing, there was no fit up being done in this area. Other fabrications in the main steam chest area were also uncapped. .

5 During a review of No. 10 cadweld operation in the Auxiliary Building, it was learned that the cadweld sleeves and powder had not been received by QC Receiving.

These items were received from another site as non quality items, and the QC inspector was not aware of the 16 51144 sleeves until notified by his supervisor.

The work was stopped.

6. A review of the welding filler control center did not identify any weakness. It is well equipped and designed to handle the flow of work in a smooth, efficient manner.

7 The program for prevantive maintenance of project equipment was observed. The details are presented in Observation of Preventive Maintenance Program. It was noted that preventive maintenance activi ties do not continue through the entire period of construction control.

32

- _ ..._ ,-- - m,- u- _____ -m-ace.

n__. .____-:._...:._.n____ .; .. _r . . . . . . _

PERFC M. alice EVAICACIC!i SC W.ARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station is Perfor=ance Area Control of Construction Processes Objective lio. CC-4 l

T F Wyke, H S Sheppard l Evnlunter(s) -

l l 2. ?eric=ance ob iective The construct. ion organization should ronitor and control all construc-tion processes to ensure the project is completed to design requirements and that a high level of quality is achieved.

II. Sccce of Evaluation The evaluation of this area involved many members of the team. An estimated 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months were expended in observing work practices at various locations on the project.

As a -folt&-up 'to these observations, an estimated 120 hours0.00139 days 0.0333 hours 1.984127e-4 weeks 4.566e-5 months were devoted to-dis-cussions with various levels of supervision and management and review of selected records.

i a

f f

I. Conclusien The majority of activity evaluated under this performance objective was satisfactory.

However, there were several weaknesses identified that indicated a need to strengthen certain aspects of the organization.

l t l

I e i

. 33 i

1 PERFORMANCE EVALUAT:CN

SUMMARY

Construction Projce:

Catawba Nuclear Station Parfernance Area Control of.Constructton Processes Objective No. CC.4 Evaluntor(s) .' T F Vyke c H S Sheppard IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good _ Practices Finding Managers and supervisors do not always enforce adherence to plant (CC.4-1) policies and procedures. A number of areas scere noted where personnel did not adhere to established work procedures.

Finding Veaknesses were observed in control of HVAC contractor's welding (CC.4-2) program. Several instances were noted where contractor personnel were not famillary with program requirements.

Finding Weaknesses were observed in the training of craft personnel in selected (CC.4-3) areas. Several examples were noted which reflected insufficient familiarity with work procedures.

Finding The following good practice was noted: A Quality Awareness Team selects (CC.4-4) a " Quality Crew of the Month," promoting a competitive attitude toward improving quality.

Finding One example of restrictive procedure (CP-601) was observed. Use of this (CC.4-5) procedure precludes Judgement by experienced personnel and results in concrete mix which will not meet acceptance criteria.

I i

34

PEPICRMANCC DIALOAT CN OETAILS Construction P 0jcet Catawba Nuclear Station i

Control of Construction Processes Pctfc:tuuice A;nea: Objective No. CC.4 L.

(tarle)

1. Provide factual information that sucocrts the Performance Evaluation s t==na rv ,

1. Review of documentation and physical installation of RHR Pumps 2A and 2B (Unit 2) identified the following weaknesses:

A. Several required forms were not in the process control package; e.g.,

Forms M-5A (Pumps 2A and 23), Form M-18 A (2A) and Forms M-9C (2A and 23).

S. Several forms not completely signed; e.g. , Form M-9D (layout for LA and 2B and QA approval for 23) and Form M-9A (shim and grout for 25).

C. Verification of anchor bolt material not clear on Form M-10A(29).

D. Form "VDF Inspection Before Velding to Piping" shows Section A measure-ments out of tolerance (Pumps 2A and 23) and readings which indicate that internals will not mate with casing (Pump 23)7 No action taken on latter problem even though it was identified 5-22-81, and no R-2A initiated.

E. No requirement for inspection of torquing of casing studs specified on Forms M-90 (2A and 2B).

F. Special cover for Pump 2B casing was left off.

G. Installation of casing hold down studs was signed off on Form M-10A. The nut on the st,ud opposite the discharge of Pump 2B was not fully threaded.

2. During plant walk through, several pipe caps were observed to be missing; e.g. ,

in main steam line at turbine stop valves in Unit 1 Turbine Building contrary to CP- 116. -

3 At Pipe Cutting and Beveling Shop, a section of stainless steel pipe was observed on a set of rusty carbon steel rollers, with visible rust pickup on stainless steel piping, contrary to CP-170.

4. The following weaknesses were observed during preparation for and conduct of concrete pours:

A. Wall section for Unit 2 pressurizer cavity

-rebar was not installed in accordance with Design drawings

-area engineer did not document Design information provided to craft

-placing crew had not planned their activities 35

s PERF0FF.ANCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Control of Construction Processes Objective No. CC.4

1. Perfor tance Area:

(title)

2. Provide factual info:: nation that succorts the Perfor ance Evaluation Su::cnarv _ ,

B. Wall secti~on for Unit 2 steam generator compartment, Pour 4958

-placing crew had difficulty placing concrete in congested form 5 The following weaknesses were observed in control of HVAC contractor's welding program.

A. No welder knew the weld procedure under which he was working.

B. All welders knew required weld size and location, but did not know how they acquired that information.

C. No process control was available to specify the welding procedure for plenum erectica (from Drawing CH-1684-VA-000H, Rev 0).

D. Welder was making welds without removing galvanizing mater,lal.

E. HVAC support 2-H-yC-4999 had undercut in excess of that allowed by AWS Dl.1 code.,

F. Welder / supervisor picks welding procedure from all available welding procedures.

Supervisor indicates welding procedure (s) used on a support af ter the support is complete.

6. Work on instrumentation guide funnels on Unit 2 reactor vessel head at variance to approved drawings, based on verbal authorization.

7 During discussion with electrical craft personnel, the following weaknesses were cbserved:

A. Different understandings among personnel with respect to requirements for f electrical lugging tool 'recalibration.

B. Different understandings among personnel with respect to procedure for i checking sliding link terminal block connections.

C. Electrical lugging tool not adequately marked for easy identification in

> - some instances.

36 g . ..w e e

rIF PEPEORMANCE EVAI,UATION DETA :,5 Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station ye f ce ; urea: Control of Construction Processes Objective No. CC.4 (title)

2. Previde factual information that su=corts the Performance Evaluation Summarv __ ,

8. A Quality Awar'eness Team selects a " quality Crew of the Month" each month, promoting a competitive attitu&etoward improving quality.

9 Personnel in the Pipe Fab Shop are not familla'r with all the markings on pipe.

No person could . explain certain markings etched into the material on pipe bend 2N5-139-AA. Personnel did know which numbers were required to be transferred.

10. CP-601 requires the addition of a specific amount (88 ounces / cubic yard) of Melment L10-A to first truck of concrete at the discharge point. This require-ment precludes judgment by experienced personnel to determine variations in the amount of this additive appropriate for different weather conditions. Implemen-tation of this requirement in Pour No 4958 resulted in wasting 24 cubic yards of concrete before concrete mix passed test criteria.

11. Review of terminations in electrical cabinets revealed the following weaknesses:

A. Form H-93 was not present in cabinets in the Unit I cable spreading area.

B. Talked with an electrician foreman and an electrician crar'tsman who did not know what Forms H-9A, H-98 and H-9C are.

12. Design Engineering Specification CNS-1390.01-00-0011 provides information required for setting switches on Limitorque and Rotork electric valve operators. However, neither this specification nor Construction procedures provide details and pre-cautions for properly adjusting and operating these electric valve operators.

Craft personnel stated that vendor manuals containing this information are not available to them.

13 CP-458, Section 4.1, requires the hanger material sent to the Coatings Shop to be tagged. A box of unmarked materials was observed during the review of the 1 Coatings Shop, contrary to CP-458. Coatings Shop personnel Indicated that this occurred on several occasions. Warehouse personnel indicated that not tagging the material is acceptable.

37

s- -

i

... _ . . _ 7-~.'I. 21. . ! . _. . : ~;. - _ ' T . ". . - .

PERFORMANCE EVAL 0ATION

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Perfor=ance Area Construction Qualitv Inspections _ objective No. CC-5 Evaluator (s) D L Freeze I. Performance obiective '

Construction. inspections should verify and document that the final product meets the design and quality requirements.

II. Sco=e of Evaluation The evaluation of this area involved essentially all team members working at the construction site. Approximately 35 hours4.050926e-4 days 0.00972 hours 5.787037e-5 weeks 1.33175e-5 months were expended in observing work practices at various locations on the project. As a followup to these observations, approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months were devoted to discussions with various levels of supervision and management. Some records were reviewed as reflected in the section entitied Performance Evaluation Details. .

III. Conclusion The majority of activity evaluated under this performance objective was generally satisfactory. However, there were a number of weaknesses identified that indicated a need to strengthen certain aspects of the organization.

i

1 ij 3S

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Construction Quality Assurance objective No. CC.5 Parforr.ance Area Evaluator (s)

IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices i

Finding Inspection procedures are not always clear in their definition of (CC.5-1) inspection requirements, resulting in installed items being accepted when requirements have not been met and vice versa.

Finding Inspection documents are sometimes completed in an illegible manner, (CC.5-2) making any required future follow-up difficult, if not impossible.

Finding Inspection requirements established by HVAC contractor do not verify (CC.5-3) that Code requirements are met.

Finding QC inspectors sometime perform production functions.

(CC.5-4) .

[

i a

39

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAII.S Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station

1. Performance aerea: Construction Quality inspections Objective No. CC.5 (title)

I.

i 2 Provide factual information that suerorts the Performance Evaluation Surenarv -

1. The performance of concrete placement and inspection was observed to evaluate the quality of concrete installation. The details are presented in Observation of Concrete Operation. Veaknesses were noted in the use of procedures. Ove ra l l work and end results were satisfactory.

2. A review of piping system flushing and hydrostatic testing procedures and documents was performed. The details are presented in Observation of Test Procedures and Documents. Although the overall work and end results were satisf actory , several weaknesses were Identi fied. These included:

A. QA management has provided procedural requirements in memos and letters which should have been detailed in inspection procedures.

B. Preparation of documents which define piping system flush boundaries and also hydrostatic testing limits is not defined in inspectlon procedures. _

3 The performance of hanger inspections was observed to evaluate the quality of hanger installation. ' The details are presented in Observation of Hanger inspection. Overall work and end results were satisfactory. A weakness was observed in an inspection requirement (full thread engagement) not being adequately defined. An additional weakness was observed in that QC inspectors sometimes torque concrete expansion anchors to correct values af ter their inspections reveal insufficient torque rather than notifying the craf t organization of the deficiency.

4. The performance of the HVAC contractor was observed to evaluate the quality of the HVAC installation and inspection. A weakness was identified in the prepara-tion of visual weld inspection procedures. Details are presented in the Observa-tion of HVAC Contractor.

5. An inspection of the setting of Residual Heat Removal pump casings was made.

Areas of weakness were identi'fied as listed below:

A. Inspection initials and signatures on inspection forms are illegible.

B. Prerequisite inspection items were not initialled prior to equipment's being set and groundad.

C. Ccmpleted records had blank inspection steps. All inspection steps should be addressed.

D. Layout (surveying) verification was not obtained prior to setting Pump 2A.

40

PERFORMANCE EVALUATICN SC.CiARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Perfor=ance Area Const n etien ccrrective Actiens Objective No. CC-6 !

D L Freeze '

Eve.luator (s)

L Performance Obiective The construction organi stion should evaluate audits, inspections, and surveillances; process replies and follow-up; and take corrective c.ction to prevent recurrence of similar problems.

82. Scoce of Evaluation The evaluation of this area involved six members of the team working at the construction site. Approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months were expended in discussions with various levels of supervision and management. Some records were reviewed cs reflected in the section entitled Performance Evaluation Details.

III. Cenelusien The majority of activity evaluated under this performance objective was generally sSt i s f acto ry .

No program is in place to satisfy the requirements of this performance objective in regard to generic implications of problems and actions to preclude recurrence. l t

l 41 I

PERFORMANCE EVALCAT:CN Si;M_v.ARY Construction. Project Catawba Nuclear Station Parfor: nance Area Construction Corrective Actions Objective No. CC.6 Evalunter (s)

IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Goed Practices Finding Certain trend analyses have not been performed as required in the three (CC.6-1) months that followed change of responsibility for such trends f ro:n QA to Construction.

Finding No program requirements exist for trend analyses of surveillance and (CC.6-2) inspection documents other than R-2A Inspection Discrepancy Reports.

Finding Replies to deficiencies do not always address all areas of concern (CC.6-3) regarding such deficiencies. Technical resolutions art addressed; however, procedural violations and safety implications sometimes are not addressed.

1 r

42

1 +

1 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station

1. Perforr,ance Area: Constructicn Corrective Actions Objective No. CC.6 (title)

2. Provide factual infomation that succorts the Perfornance Evaluation sur:narv _

1. The performance of Construction corrective actions was reviewed. Responsibility for trend analysis of R-2A's (inspection discreponcy reports) recently was changed from QA to Construction. This review Indicated the following areas of weakness:

A. No trend analysis has been performed during the period 6-1-82 through 8-23-82 for R-2A's.

B. -Construction has not performed any trend analysis of QA surveillance reports.

C. Construction has not performed any trend analysis of nonconforming item reports.

D. Statement of action on R-2A #M5677 does not address all areas of concern.

Piping system was pressurized prior to release by hydro group. R-2A did not address procedure violation nor safety implications.

E. Action required on R-2A #M5350, although cleared by QA, ha's not been completet.

2. , An Inspectirbn of the setting of Residual Heat Removal pump casings was made. Areas

, of weakness identified are listed below:

^

A. An inspection before welding to piping Indicated one area to be out of tolerance and that the internals will not mate with casing. This information was obtained 5-22-81, and no action has been taken since then.

B. No R-2A, inspection Discrepancy, has been generated to address situation in A., above.

) -

/

43

&..._ - - - .:.: . .a . . .-. . - . - := -.. . .. . ..

i . PERFORMANCE ..". /AI UATION SC20*AM . Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Parfor:nr.nce Area Test Ecuirment Control Objective No. CC-7 Ivalustcr (s) C F York I. Perfor..ance Chiective Measuring and test equipment should be controlled to support '

construction testing effectively.

II. Sec=e of Evaluation The evaluation of this area involved several members on the team. Approximately 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months were spent in evaluating the testing equipment in the civil and mechanical laboratories at the site. Discussions were held with several inspectors and super-visors on the testing program and their understanding of it. A review was made on the appropriate QA and Construction procedures.

/

III. Cenclusion The majority of activities evaluated under 'his performance objective was generally sa ti s f acto ry. However, there were a number of weaknesses identified that indicated a need to strengthen certain aspects of the civil :est control area.

i,

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station l

l

%erformance Area Test Eculement Control Objective No. CC.7 E: valuator (s) C F York IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices Finding Supervisors in the quality Control organization do not always enforce (CC.7-1) adherence to required Quality Assurance or Construction Procedures.

l l

Finding Illegible unique numbers on some electrical lug crimping tools were (CC.7-2) noted in the electrical area.

45

PEPSOPy.ANCE E'.TALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Test Equipment Control objective No. CC.7

1. Performance Area:

(title)

2. Provice factual infc =ation that succo ns the Perfc =ance Evaluation su=arv _ .

1. A review of the applicable procedures and the testing and measuring equipment located in the soils laboratory identified the following weaknesses:

A. Scale CKSC TB.-2 stored in a cabinet in the Soils / Concrete Lab with a valid sticker having a calibration due date of 10/23/82. Supervision stated this scala was not bcir.g used. This item could r.ct be located on the computer calibration printout sheets; therefore, no recalibration could be made on this scale by QC area. Calibration sticker on this item implied this was under the program and subject to controls of Procedure 0-1, Rev 15 This procedure required an item to be entered on Form 0-1 A and listed on Form 0-1B; each M and TE item to be controlled. This was not done.

B. Triple Scale 2157 and several soil sieves located in the Soils / Concrete Labora-tory with stickers showing calibration dates had expired. QC supervisor stated these items were not in use. Procedure 0-1, Revision 15, Section 3.8, Discrepancies -- if the calibration check interval is excepded for a M & TE item, but the item is not used af ter the due date, an explanatory note shal t'~

be entered on Form 0-1 A or card 0-1D. Supervisor had failed to meet either of these requirements.

C. A 200 mesh sieve (CKQUA-19707) was observed in the Soils / Concrete Laboratory with a tear in the mesh screen. CP-620 requires any damage sieve to be imme-diately (1) removed from the test area; (2) removed f rom the calibration recall program (not in program); (3) calibration sticker removed (valid sticker-sieve due date not exceeded yet); (4) disposed of immediately (sieve still in Soils /

Concrete Laboratory). Item was removed from the program.

2. Two scheduled concrete placements were observed. The de: ails are presented in Observations of Concrete Placement. The overall work and end results were satis-factory; however, it was obsersed that the device used in measuring the slump 3 had a 1" movement in the vertical direction which could result in cn inaccurate reading.

3 During plant walk-through, severai electrical lug crimping tools (each requires h a unique identification number and requires bi-weekly calibration verification) unique numbers were very difficult to decipher.

_ 4. Construction Procedure 9, Section 5, requires the calibration of the dry film thickness gage at the beginning of each day. The dry film thickness gage used during the review of the coatings facility was calibrated September 13, 1982, with a two-month interval before the next calibration.

46

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SIT.CiARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Perfo mance Area Industrial Safe:Y Objective No. PS-1 Evaluator (s) B Rice I. Perfc =ance obiective The construction site industrial safety program should achieve a high degree of personnel safety.

II. Sccce of Evaluation The evaluation of this area involved essentially the entire team while performing evaluations of activities associated with other performance objectives. Approxi-mately 16.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months were expended in observing safety. As a follow-up to these observations, 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months were devoted to discussions with varicus levels of supervision and management. Some records were reviewed as a follow-up tc interviews and obser-vations.

III. Conclusien The majority of activity evaluated under this performance objective was generally sa t i s f acto ry. However, there were a number of weaknesses identified that indi-cated a need to strengthen certain aspects of the organization.

47 .t

_1

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SUM. MARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Industrial Safety Objective No. PS-1 Performance Area Evaluator (s) B Rice

IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices Finding Managers and supervisors do not always enforce adherence to plant (PS-1) safety procedures. A number of areas were noted where personnel did not adhere to established safety procedures.

e l}

l L

l 48

5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Industrial safety Objective No. PS-1

1. Perfor: nance Area:

(title)

2. Provide factual information that succorts the Performance Evaluation S u=narv --

1. The performance of the various disciplines' work was observed and reviewed, and the following items were noted which appeared to be in violation of safe practices for the site work areas.

A. A ladder providing access to a concrete pour (Elevation 642 in Reactor Building

2) did not'have a cage or protective enclosure around the top part of ladder.

The ladder was approximately 50 feet f rom the ground elevation.

B. During observation of concrete pour No. 4a57, builders were observed working around a floor opening (10' x 12' x 10' depth) that contained no guard rails, and the builders were not using attached safety belts, in addition, other workers were at the bottom of the opening.

C. Scaffolding in Reactor Building 1 which was inside the crane wall underneath the reactor and steam generator level had no handrails or toe boards,and personnel were not using safety belts. .

D. Handrails on the , walkway on top of Reactor Building 1 are old and are coming loose at their anchor points.

E. Personnel working in Reactor Building 1 dome area were not using safety belts at all times.

F. Welcers for HVAC Contractor Bahnson were making welds without removing the galvanizing from the metal. This could result in the welder inhaling fumes that would be hazardous to his health.

G. In Unit 1 Auxiliary Building Penetration Area, a worker was standing on a platform which had no handrails and was not secured by a safety lanyard.

The platform was greater than 20 feet above the floor.

H. In three separate interviews, the control of welding was reported as inadequate for protection of personnel from eye flash burns and from splatter.

I. A powerhouse mechanic was observed climbing on pipe in the pipe rack with no provisions to prevent pipe from shifting.

J. Scaffolding in Unit 1 Reactor Building in the area of the "ND" System piping was found in need of repair.

49

PERFOPEANCE EVALUAT CN DETAILS Ccnstruction Project Catawb'a Nuclear Station Industrial Safety Objective No. PS-1

1. Performance Area:

(title)

2. Provide factual information that su== orts the Perfo mance Evaluation Su=arv _

K. During concrete pour No 4958 for Unit 2 Reactor Building steam generator enclosure walls, contractor's personnel (Rock Hill Ccncrete Company truck driver) was observed not wearing side shields on eye glasses.

L. In the Paint-Sandblask Shop, steel grit was present on floor around reclaim equipment, causing slick surface to exist. There were no warning signs.

M. In cooling tower area, no handrails or handrungs were available to assist in climbing through floor opening to second elevation from ladder.

N. In Unit 2 Reactor Building, material pulley was inaccurately and inadequately attached to cables supporting personnel work platforms.

O. Three separate instances were observed where electricians were standing on the top step of the stepladders. In one instance, the supervising electrician was holding the ladder; and when questioned, he revealed he was aware of v-safety procedure requirements prohibiting this practice.

P. During concrete pour No 4957 on waste solidification Building, a builder stepped to a screid board from a stable footing, lost his balance and fell into freshly poured concrete in which rebar was sticking up.

Q. Corrective Action Notice (R-2A) indicated craf t performed pressure testing on fire protection line before work was properly inspected and released. The systems engineer when questioned did not consider this a problem. The Safety Department was not copied on corrective action notice.

R. On the roof of Unit 2 Auxiliary Building, the cadweld power is stored in a map box. The box was not lccked and had no warning signs or markings.

S. Protective personnel barriers were not placed in front of energized boards to keep people from coming in contact with the boards behind the control room panels.

I.

T. Protective shields around a welding activity on piping in the containment penetration region of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building were not being used which could result in eye flash burns of personnel in the area.

U. During a repressure test for Shutdown 201B, water was allowed to run through sleeves to the elevation below creating an unsafe slippery floor surface. The testing oecole received comolaints about the conditions from two different workers in the working area below.

50

,e

PERFOPSliCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Industrial Safety

1. Performance Area: Objective No. PS-1 (title)

2. Provide factual information that succorts the Performance Evaluation su==arv V. During interview with warehouse personnel, a need was expressed for more training in handling and storage of hazardous materials.

W. Electrical supervisor stated that safety information was sometimes watered down by the time it reached his crew.

X. Records indicate that eye injuries account for approximately 40 percent of all injuries, averaging approximately 160 per month, it was estimated that flash-burns accounted for 30 percent of this number with foreign particles accounting for the remaining percentage.

Y. The general housekeeping practices resulted in an exceptionally clean work area for the employees.

Z. During a response to a crane accident, the site safety personnel were quite effective in responding to the event by prompt removal of the injured cer-sonnel, control of access and control of spill of hazardous material . "~

6 en 51

.- . _ ..: :~ .= ' --

_=_:..=~... . ..~

PERIORMANCI ETALCATION SCMMARY Construction Project Parformance Area preiect Planninc Objective No. PS-2 Evaluator (s) B M Rice

^

I. Performance Objective Project plans.should ensure ccmpletion of the project to the highest industry standards by indentifying, interrelating, and secuencing the tasks of the project organizations.

II. Sec=e of Evaluation The evaluation of this area involved observation, plan review and discussions with various levels of supervision and management. Approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months were spent in this evaluation.

1

~

III. Conclusien The activity evaluated under this performance objective was generally satisfactory.

The findings were minor in nature and are not considered significant.

l s

j 52 m

"v +-m-- 'w *---w w -

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SUMMAItY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station j Perfor: nance Area Project Planning Objective No. PS-2 Evaluator (s) B Rice

IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices

Finding input into schedule and planning from Quality Assurance and Control (PS-1) did not appear to be covered in sufficient detail compared with other activities.

l I

t O

I a

i 1

P f

f l'

i 53 I.

= -

t ..

- - - - .__.-. - - , . . . _ , _ , - ~ _ . . _ _ - - , _ _ . - . . - . . . _ . . . _ . . _ _ . . _ . , . _ - _ . - - _ . _ . . . - . . . _ . . _ . . _ _ , - _ _

s NERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station

1. Perfor: nance Area: Project Planning Objective No'. PS-2 (title)

2. Provide factual infomation that suceerts the Perfomance Evaluation Su=na f _

l. An assessment of the project planning activities, scheduling and interfacing of project tasks was made with the following items of interest noted:

A. A new concept'of area work package is being evaluated for implementation on Unit 2; however, personnel are not yet available to implement due to concentration of work on Unit I and hi ring f reeze.

B. Project construction schedules and planning appear to lack proper consideration of input from the Quality Assurance and Control groups to enable a complete definition and sequencing of tasks of the project organization.

9

~

9a e

54

PERFOTOiANCE EVAI,UATION SU.91ARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station ferformance Area Project Control Objective No. PS-3 D E Hatley Rvaluator (s)

g. Perfor: nance Objective Project scheduling and work planning and coordination should ensure that the objectives of the project plan are met through effective and efficient use of project resources.-

II. Scoce of Evaluation The evaluation of this area involves primarily one evaluator plus input from the remainder of the team. The evaluations use interviews as the main source of data and a review of Project Control Documents and Reports. Approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months were expended on this evaluation.

s III. Conclusion The activities and criteria evaluated under this area were all satisfactory.

I I

I 55 i.

._ : ::._ _ ;u _ - -~ = : = - . : -- ~

PERFORMANCE EVAI.UATICN SW1ARY Conct uction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Performance Area Proiec- Procurement Process Objective No. pc-a Evaluator (s) D T Clift I. Perfe.r.ance objective The project procurement process should ensure that equipment, materials, and services furnished by suppliers or contracters meet project requirements.

II. Sccee of Evaluation The evaluation of this area involved several members of the team. Approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months were spent in the evaluation of the procurement process. The evaluation included di scussions-wi th r,echanical , Elect rical and Civil procurement personnel; review of procure ent procedures; procurement records; and review of work in prccess to determine compliance with procurement procedures.

r 1

1 III. Ccnclusion The activities evaluated under this performance objective were found to be satisfactory.

I

)

) 56 l

&& =

~

. -. ~..:.--- .:. ; .~ ' :

PFRFCRMANCE EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Construction Project Perfc.~ance Area . Contract Administration t Objective No. PS-5 Evaluator (s) Hol1 ins /Hendrieks I. Performance Obiective Methods for administering and controlling contractors and suppliers and for nanaging changes to their contracts should ensure effective control of performance. .

II. Scoce of Evaluation The evaluation of this area involved two members of the team. Approximately five hours were expended in reviewing this item with individuals responsible for administration of on-site contracts. This included review of control of corrective action and review of schedule control. Quality of the performance is covered under other performance objectives, it should be noted that this is a small segment of the overall construction effort.

The two major contractors are Bahnson which has the HVAC scope and Covil which has the insulation scope.

t L

III. Conclusion The activity evaluated under this performance objective was found to be satisfactory.

i I t.

I

'l

57 n

_ - - . - . _ _ - - , - , , - - - - , . --n,,. , ~ _ , , , , , - - . _ , - . . - , _ . ,,n- . , - , , - - . , - ,

t PERFORMANCE EVA*UATION SU.v_ VARY - Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station

_m Perfor: nance Area Contract Administration Objective No. PS-5 Evaluator (s) HolIins/Hendricks IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices No areas of weakness were found. Quality of performance is covered under other performance objectives, j l,

e i

i i 1 1

58 i ,_ ._

~

PEPSORMJdCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station

1. Performance Area: Contract Administration Objective No. PS-5 (title)

2. Provide factual information that succorts the Performance Evaluation Summarv _

1. Changes are reviewed and approved appropriately.

2. Changes in schedule are reviewed by management.

3 Changes are approved by Construction Engineering.

4. Performance is monitored through schedule reviews and appropriate audits.

l b

L 59 t .

L.2 - _ . . - _ _ _ _ . _ . . .__ _ . . _ _ _ _

_.. . _ c - - -_=_-.:= . . . _ .: :- .: .:::._ _ .. . . . . i PEPSOFF.ANCI E'EUATICN

SUMMARY

Constructi'on Project Catawba Nuclear Project Performance Area Documentation Management Objective No. PS-6 Evaluator (s) r vnd _

I. Performance Obiective

t The manacement of eroject documentation should support the effective control and coordination of project activities and provide a strong foundation for the documentation / info: cation requirements of the plant's operational phase.

II. Sccee of Evaluation The evaluation of this area involved several members of the team. A program for the receipt, review of acceptability, resolution of deficiencies and control of documents during construction were reviewed. The Quality Assurance program was examined to determine what, when, how, to whom, by when and in what format records will be turned over to the plant's operational staff. Several controlled documents were traced through the entire cycle on the construction site. Discussions were held with various levels of supervision and management in the Construction and QA areas. Approximately 30 work-hours were expended in this objective.

III. -Corclusion The activities evaluated under this performance objectiva were satisfactory.

I e

8 .

g b) 8

, I e e-

PERF0FSdiCE EVALUATION SCMMARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Perfo =ance Area Trainine Manacenent Succort Objective No. TN-1 [ ,

Evalua:Or(s) A R HolIins I. Peric=ance Chiective Management should ensure that an effective progran exists for indoctri-nation, training, and qualification of personnel involved in the project.

II. Secue of Evaluation The evaluation of this area involved interviews with various levels i n the training organization and user organization at the construction site. Approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months were expended in the training area.

/

l .

c.

l -

III. Conclusien Generally, management gives adequate support to insure effective programs exist.

T m e. . me

, - - - -+----.g .--p ---- - - - . , y # , .- -- --,-,v

PERFORMANCE EVALUA'I' ION

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Perfor: nance Area Training Management Support Objective No. TN.1 g i

l A R Hollins Dialuator (s) i 1

IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices Finding Management has shown its support by performing a "needs analysis" (TN.1-1) to determine the direction that training should follow and has hired an outside consultant to determine training organizational needs.

t 4

o e e

O 62 l_-

~ .

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station i

j Training Management Support DI

1. Performance Area: .

Objective No.

(title) ,

i 2. Provide factual information that succorts the Performance Evaluation Sunmarv _

1. Management has recently hired an outside consultant to evaluate the training organization.

2. A task force has recently performed a "needs analysis," and the findings have been reported to management.

3 Management has used existing feedback (. reaction questionnaires, verbal feedback and post testing) to modify programs and instructors.

63 mO .

---a m-n- - . - . - - . -_.-,mv, , ,-.- 6 , - - . - . -r -+t-- +--,,y

_ _ _ _ .~ __._ _ . _ . . _

PER.?ORMANCE EVA*,UAT;CN SUMMAM Construction project Catawba Nuclear Station Training Organization Per:.crmance Area and ; d-"iistr? tion Cbjective No. -;_7 Evaluator (s) A R Hollins

!. Perfor=ance Obiective The training'. organization and administration should ensure effective control and 1=plementation of training activities.

. Scoce of Ivaluation The evaluation of this area involved interviews with various levels of supervison in the training organization and user organizations at the construction site.

Approximately 1&-hourr were expended in the training area.

i III. Conclusion .

Generally, the training organization and administration ensures effective control aad implementation of training activi ties. However, the role of the training o.ganization appears to be not clearly defined and no feedback system for measuring the ef fectiveness was determined to be in place.

l 64 -

I w.

a PERFOPy.ANCE EVAIUATION

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Performance Area Training Organization and Administration Objective No. TN-2 Evaluator (s) A R Hol1 ins IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices Finding Some managers in the Construction area appeared to not understand the (TN.2-1) responsibilities of the training organization. Confusion as to who is responsible for the development of the employees and who determines the employees' need for training was evident.

Finding No active program could be identified to acquire feedback to determine (TN.2-2) the effect on productivity or quality brought about by training.

G 9

65 s.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station

1. Performance Area: Training Organization and Administration TN-2 (title) ,

2. Provide factual information that succorts the Performance Evaluation su=marv _

1. There were no procedures identified that outline the responsibilities of the training organization. -

2. A program is in place called " Training the Trainer" to enhance the performance of instructors.

3 Managers and supervisors indicated that they were not clear who determines training needs and how individuals are selected to receive training.

4 The following programs exist to acquire feedback at the completion of training for the purpose of developing, modifying and improving the training program:

A. Training reaction questionnaires B. Verbal feedback C. Post-testing 5 QA procedure training for individuals is~the only area where training require-ments are defined clearly and documented.

66

i-

-- -- . . . . .~.~ ~.; : : -

PIS50RMANCE Ev;JUATION SU20!ARY Construction Project l

Catawba Nuclear Station Parformance Area Quality Programs Objective No. OP-1 Evaluator (s) P Schrandt

.I. Performance obiective The quality assurance program scope, content, and acclicability ~~ ' should be appropriate, defined clearly, and understood.

II. Scoce of Evaluation The evaluation of this performance objective involved one member of the team. The evaluation consisted of approximately 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months of discussion with Quality Assurance management, supervision and various employees. Procedure reviews and numerous record checks requi red a:: proximately 18- hours, s

s III. Conclusien ..

The comitments of the quality program in general are satisfactory as evaluated under this performance objective. Identifled weaknesses indicate a need for increased emphasis in certain elements.

I I

t 67 -

I !

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SU.'OiARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Perforr.ance Area Quality Programs Objective No. QP-1 Evaluator (s) P Schrandt IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices Finding Contracted vendor QA and QC program audits are not being performed , ?

(qP.1-1) in sufficient depth to ensure program effectiveness. Several weaknesses exist in the welding program of the HVAC contractor.

I l

i 68 -

I

3 PIRFOR.vJdiCE EVALUATION DITA ~ S Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station

1. Performance Area: Quality Programs Objective No. QP-1 (t:. le)

2. Provide factual info:mation that succor *s the Performance Evaluation Su=marv ._ _

1. A review of the vendor audits of the HVAC contractor did not disclose any weaknesses in the program. Observations of HVAC support installation indicates the following weaknesses:

A. There is no' traceability of weld procedures to the finished weld.

B. Procedures did not meet Code requirements.

'2 . i roc ura evidp e n 95 blished method y i h the'c rrectf *

\, perhsnp aqp st d n ~o. j

, 5 Re orii a e veri (ip$ as og.dleteg S' ,.ic y (t a s * * * .3%

f j!fe4hEI*

? .

b3 /

PERFCP.MIOICE EVEUA"ICN

SUMMARY

Const: uction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Perfor=ance Area Procram Imple=entation Objective No. OP-2 Dialuator (s) P Schrandt I. Perfor=ance Objective Quality assurance and quality control functions should be 'cerformed in a manner t'o support and control tihe quality of the project activities.

II. Score of Evaluation The evaluation of this area consisted of discussion with vari.~ous levels of personnel outside of the Quali ty Assurance Department as well as management, supervisicn and auditors within the QA Department. Procedures were checked and numerous records were reviewed. Approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months were expended in/Jircussion and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ,.

in review of records, procedures and certification of auditors.

III. Conclusion The areas evaluated under this performance objective are well programmed and implemented. There are no findings under this performance objective; however, an area of concern in vendor QA program implementation has been identified under QP-1, Quality Programs.

I I

I l

l i 70 l

7 g

- - - - - - - _ - - - . . . . , . . . . = _ . _ . _ . =..

PERFORMANCE IVALUATION SC/S.ARY COnst nction Prcject Catawba Nuclear Station P=for=ance Area Indecendnet Assessments Objective No. OP-3 D Franks, P Schrandt, G Robinson M a= b )

Perfor:!ance Objective ,.,,

Management should provide'an effective, independent assessment of project activities affecting the cuality of the project.

. Scene of Evaluation The evaluation in this area involved approximately 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months and included direct observation of activities, discussions with various levels of supervision and with technicians and review of records, organization charts and procedures.

t III. Conclusien .

The criteria under this performance objective was generally satisfactory. However, there were some weaknesses noted in the site surveillance area which need attention.

0 D . e 71 l i, _.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SU.M RY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station performance Arca Indecendent Assessments Objective No. QS-3 Evcluator (s) D Franks G Robinson, P Schrandt '

IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices Finding Independent assessments of some quality-related activities have not (QP . 3-1 ) been performed by the QA Ocpartment at Catawba for the last two years.

Lack of independent assessments were noted for two special processes.

Finding The surveillance program does not always assure a comprehensive assess-(qP . 3-2 ) ment of addressed areas. An area was noted where an audit found several deficiencies but surveillances performed in the same area had not been effective in identifying problems.

Finding Surveillance personnel do not adequately pursue full completion of (QP.3-3) assigned checklists in some cases. An area was noted where a checklist item had not been performed for 13 months when activity in the area has been regular.

72

(

. . . . _ _ . . . .~ . - . - . . - --. .. .

PEPEORMANCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project

1. Performance Area: Independent Assessments Objective No. QP-3 (title)

2. Provide f actual infomation that succorts the Perfo mance Evaluation Su=narv _

i

1. Independent as'sessments have not been performed for at least the last two years by the QA Department (either the Audit Division or the site surveillance group) in the following areas:

A. Post weld heat treatment (Note: site surveillance was performed in this ,

area through February, 1981, but the assessments were superficial). I B. Pipe Bending

2. The QA technical group does not do a logic check / review of pressure test ,

procedures. The Project QA Manager, in a memo dated 7-B-82, stated that QA review shall not normally include a " testing logic" check--that this check would be accomplished on a surveillance basis. To date, the surveillance.

program has not done a complete pressure test procedu e review. As a result, at a time when 75 percent of the Unit 1 test procedures are written, an effective independent assessment of the test procedures has not been done by site QA.

3 The site surveillance program has noted one finding in the last six months on the test program in six surveillances. Departmental Audit CD-82-10(CN),

conducted July 21 through 27, found four deficient items. A review of the surveillance checklist covering testing (MWN-1) revealed that it did not provide guidance in sufficient detail for a comprehensive assessment of the area.

4. Surveillance CEl-4 completed checklists habitually fall to cover item 13 (Monitor the electrical checkout of one electrical elementary diagram.)

The programmatic requirement for CEl-4 completion is quarterly, although

! the checklist itself requires monthly completion. The last time item 13 was performed was during October 1981. The reasons noted in the completed surveillance checklists for not performing item 13 were either failure of the craft to notify the technicial that the activity was going on or that no work was going on. The Electrical Support Group stated that checkout of electrical elementaries has been performed regularly. There are completed reporting forms, CP-466A, on file for this activity covering the period May through September 1982. Other items of the same checklist have not been performed for several months.

73 y e =- a e- --~-i----- ---r, et --*---m--- g- - - - - - ---t

9 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SW.".ARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Parfor=ance Area Corrective Actions Cbjective No. QP-4 D Franks, G Robinson, P Schrandt Ivaluator (s)

I. Performance Obiective Conditions requiring corrections or improvements should be resolved in an effective and timely manner.

II. Scoce of Evaluation The evaluation in this area involved approximately 23 hours2.662037e-4 days 0.00639 hours 3.80291e-5 weeks 8.7515e-6 months and included record review, discussions with various levels of supervision and procedure review.

III. Conclusion .

The criteria under this performance objective were generally satisfied. However, there were weaknesses noted which need attention.

1 4

! 74

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SU.vv.ARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station POrfor:sance Area Corrective Action Objective No. QP.4 D Franks, P Schrandt, G. Robinson Evaluator (s)

IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices Finding in some cases, QA approval of Inspection' Discrepancies (Forms R-2A) was not sufficiently critical. Cases were noted where QA had approved (QP.4-1)

R-2A Forms where the statement of required action did not address the root causes and where corrective action had not yet been taken.

Finding Some conditions adverse to quality found during inspection are (qP.4-2) reported in a manner that is not subjected to trend analysis. As a result, related generic problems are not addressed; and basic causes of degraded quality are not evaluated.

75

PEPSORMISCE EVALi;ATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station

1. Perfomance Area: Corrective Action Objective No. 0P.h (title)

2. Provide factual infomation that succorts the Perfomance Evaluation Su=marv _ ,,

1. Deficiencies were noted in Forms R-2A (Inspection Discrepancies) where the Quality Assurance group A. accepted the, statement of action required when the action did not address the root cause of the problem or B. approved clearance of the R-2A when corrective action had not yet been taken.

Specifics of the examples are discussed in Performance Evaluation Details for Objectives No. CC-6, items 1.D and E.

2. For seven of nine 10CFR50.55e folders reviewed, senior management was not informed of the reportability status within the procedure guidelines. Procedure PR-290, Paragraph 2.2.2, states that the Vice President Design Engineering, Responsible Division Head, and the Corporate QA Manager should be notified of the reportability "

status of a potentially reportable item within five days.

3 Procedure i-51 requires the inspector to fill out an M-51C Form to identify dis-crepancies noted during hanger inspections. The forms are then returned to the craft for correction. Management is not made aware of problems noted, and no trending of these discrepancies is developed and analyied to evaluate basic causes and address generic problems.

I 76 0--

PERFOD!ANCE E'EUATION

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Performance Area Test Program Objective No. TC-1 .s o

M N Sawyer Evaluator (s)

I. Performance Obiective The test program should verify the plant's full capability to operate as intended by testing the plant's systems functionally.

II. Sc=ce of Evaluation The scope of the evaluation of this area was restricted to hydrostatic and pneumatic testing of piping systems. Functional testing of systems is the

__. responsibility of Nuclear Power Prbduction, rather than Design and Construc-tion. Specifications and procedures were reviewed along with a typical test procedure containing test data. Discussions were conducted with the appro-priate supervision during the evaluation and as a followup after performance details were obtained. Approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months were expended on, review of specifications, procedures and interviews.

P .

III. Cenclusion The majority of activity evaluated under this performance objective was satisfactory.

However, there were indications of weaknesses identifled that point to a need to further examine and strengthen certain aspects of the program.

77 .

i

- J

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Parfor:cance Area Test Program Objective No. TC-1 Evaluator (s) M N Sawyer 9

IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices Finding There is no clear policy document f rom management that defines the (TC.1-1) Systems group or the organization's mission and responsibilities for testing systems.

Finding The controlling Quality Assurance and Design documents do not contain (TC.1-2) all of the information required and used to perform system tests.

Finding There is no program for identifying and tracking discrepancies in test (TC.1-3) documents to cause appropriate resolutions or corrections in a timely manner.

78

wi- - - - - w . . , , .

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Test Program TC.1

1. Performance Area: Objective No.

(t.1.tle )

2. Provide factual information that suceorts the Perfor:.ance Evaluation Summarv _

An inspection was made of the Systems Group. The Systems Group is responsible for conducting hydro and pneumatic tests of piping systems. The supervisor of the Systems Group reports to the Construction Engineer-Mechanical. Veaknesses were observed in specifications and procedures.

1. The supervisor had no overall policy direction on paper, such as a letter from management describing the group's mission and responsibilities.

2. The controlling design document is Specification CNS 1206.00-02-1002. This specification covers testing with water. There is nothing in this document that specifies how to handle pneumatic testing. Pneumatic testing is done on such systems as instrument, air and oil.

3 The controlling Quality Assurance procedure is Procedure N-1, Pressure Testing.

This procedure does not address Form L-71 A. There is nothing in N-1 on how to prepare or how to use L-71A. This form is the flow diagram that describes the systems and furnishes Design information. It also gives boundaries for partial system tests and is a principle planning document. The evaluator was told that a new revision of N-1 *is being distributed that mentions Form L-71A.

4. The Form L-7.A for hydro testing the Unit I CA System in the Feedwater Pump Rocm shows mislocated instrument lines. Corrective Action Notice form R-2A No 5350 was issued. The R-2A cleared with a statement that the flow diagram would be revised. The R-2A did not address the testing document (L-71A). The flow diagram has not been corrected. The L-71A was addended to reference the R-2A after the evaluator expressed concern.

5 A part of Design and QA Information being used to perform tests is not in the controlling Specification CNS-1206.00-02-1002, nor in the QA Procedure N-1. This.

Information is contained in various letters that are not controlled documents.

Examples of these letters are:

$ A. Letter dated 9-22-82, Davison to Dressler, regarding Catawba 1-2, Hydro of Flanged and Screwed Connections.

B. Letter dated 12 14-78, Coggins to Dick, regarding Catawba I-2, Hydrostatic Test Pressure, Refereace Point, File CN-1206.03-1.1.

C. Letter dated 9-1-82, Davison to Dressler, regarding Catawba 1-2, QA Review of Hydro Prior to Turnover.

D. Letter cated 7-8-82, Davison to Morgan and Willis, regarding Hydrostatic Testing.

79

l PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAII.S Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station

1. Performance Area: Test Program Objective No. TC.1 (title) 2, Provide factual information that suceerts the Performance Evaluation Summarf -

E. Letter dated 10-12-81, Blackley to Rogers, regarding Catawba 1-2, Safety, Relief and Safety-Relief Valves.

F. Letter dated 9-21-82, Davison to Willis and' Dressler, Catawba 1-2, Verification of Valve Posi, tion on L-710.

6. The QA Procedure N-1, Pressure Testing, and accompanying forms do not provide Instructions nor a place for verification signature that gauges have been properly calibrated per Procedure 0-1, Control of Measuring and Test Equipment.

80

..,,,,.,g,.__ .. ,__, ,. .

PERFCPN dCE EVAI.UATICN

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Test Group Organization Performance Area and Staffin? Objective No. TC-2 ..

M N Sawyer Evaluator (s)

~

I. Performar.ce Obiective The test group organization and staffing should ensure effective implementation of the test program.

II. Scoce of Evaluation The scope of the evaluation of this area was restricted to hydrostatic and pneumatic testing of piping systems. Functional testing of systems is the responsibility of Nuclear Power Production, rather than Design and Construction.

The test organization, test staffing and records were reviewed. A hydrostatic test was evaluated while the test was in progress. Discussions were held with test group supervision during the evaluation and as-a follow-up after perform-ance details were obtained. Approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months were expended on review and l discussions.

e III. Conclusion . . . .

The majority of activity evaluated under this performance objective was satis-f actory . However, there were indications of weaknesses identified that point to a need to further examine and strengthen certain parts of the program.

a e

I 81 i j ..

(;. . _ . . _ . _. .. . _ _.

Construction Project PEFJOPP.ANCE IVAI.UAT CN

SUMMARY

Catawba Nuclear Station Test Group Organization and Staffing Objective No. TC.2 Perfor:::ance Area Evaluator (s) M N Sawver IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action Good Practices Finding The Systems Group functional organizational relationships to (TC.2-1) interfacing organizations are not clearly defined.

Finding The key management, supervisory and professional positions and (TC.2-2) responsibilities are not described in writing.

Finding ~ The personnel who are assigned to perform testing do not meet the (TC.2-3) experience and qualification requirements in all aspects.

0 1

O I

82

( . - _ _ _

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station

1. Perfc:= mace Area: Test Group Organizational Staffin9 Objective No. TC.2 (title)

2. Provide factual information that succorts the Performance Evaluation Summarv_ _ , , ,

The Systems group reporting to the Construction Engineer-Mechanical is responsible for hydrostatic and pneumatic testing. This organization was reviewed, and interviews were held wi th appropriate' supervi sors. A hydrostatic test was observed for RN retest for Form CP-201B, No. 7626.

1. There is no procedure that clearly describes the organizational structure and organizational relationship to interfacing organizations.

2. There is no document that describes the reporting priorities and relationships between the Systems group supervisor and three separate superiors. The three superiors-are the Construction Engineer-Mechanical, the Completion Engineer and the General Superintendent for Unit 2.

3 The size of the Systems group appeared to be adequate for the assigned tasks.

4. There are no written descriptions of the positions of key management, supervisory and professional personnel. The evaluatcr was Informed that job descriptions have been written, but not yet approved and issued.

5 Personnel who are assigned to perform are trained on procedures. The quali fications of personnel are maintained by training on revisions to procedures. A record is made of training received by each individual.

6. The Hydrostatic Test Procedure CP-283 for the RHR (ND) System was reviewed. The hydrostatic test record for Section 7A shows that the test pressure was held for five minutes, rather than the ten minutes specified. The same individual that recorded this data conducted the RN retest for Form CP-201B, No. 7626. The hydro-static test record Form N1A for this test was examined. The test record and observation revealed that this test director had the following problems:

A. The N-1A listed the piping section low point as Elevation 578. The actual low point was approximately Elevation 602. The N-1A was not corrected before the test was attempted.

B. The N-1A requires the test relief valve set point to be in the range 234-236 psig.

The relief valve furnished by the test director was set to 238 psig. The maximum test pressure was 233 psig. This could have over pressured the system. The test director removed and reset the valve.

C. The test director had marked the minimum test pressure space on the calculation sheet as not applicable. After this was pointed out by the QC inspector, the test director calculated the minimum test pressure as 219.8 psig. The calculation sheet was then corrected.

83

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Test Group Organizational Staffing TC.2

1. Parfor: nance Area: Objective No. __

(trtle)

2. Provide factual info mation that sureorts the Perfo mance Evaluation S u=narv _

0 D. The temporary hose connected to the test equipme.nt was leaking. The water was saturating a carton of air filters and leaking to the floor below. A complaint was made by two craftsmen from the floor below.

m 84

PERFOPS.ANCE I*.'A*,UAT!CN SUPE.ARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Parfo:=ance Area Test Plan Objective No. TC-3 M N Sawyer W)

Ovaluator (s)

. Performance Obiective The test organi::ation should prepare a plan and a schedule that describe the sequence of system or co=ponent testing to support major schedule milestones.

II. Scoce cf Evalua. tion The scope of the evaluation of this area was restricted to hydrostatic and pneumatic testing of piping systems. Functional testing of systems is the responsibility of Nuclear Power Prcduction, rather than Design and Construction. Discussions were

- ---- held with appropriate supervision during the evaluation and as a follow-up af ter performance details were obtained. Test schedules and logic diagrams were reviewed and a hydrostatic retest was observed. Approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months were expended on review cnd discussions.

i l

l l

. Conclusion The activity evaluated under this performance objective was generally satisfactory.

l t I !

. e i !

85, j

l ..- - _

l l

I PEFSO.V.ANCE EVAI,UATION SUMv.ARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Perfor:::ance Area Test Plan Objective No. TC-3 Evaluator (s) M N Sawyer IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices Finding There are indications that a growing amount of rework after systems (TC.3-1) are turne,d over to the test group could adversely affect the scheduled system completion dates.

i i

I I

i I

t

. j I

i i

3 l

8 l

86

s. . . , . . .

1 PERFORMANCI EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Test Plan Objective No. TC.3

1. Perfor: nance Area:

(trt4e) 2, Pro' vide factual infomation that succorts the Perfo mance Evaluation Sumarl -

An interview was held with the supervisor of the Systems group. The test logic diagram and test schedule were reviewed. A visual observation of a test was made.

I 1. The c ystems group has adequate input to the overall site schedule.

2. The systems requi red to be completed in the near term are coordinated wi th Nuclear Power Production.

3 Experienced personnel developed and are following the test schedule.

L. The system boundaries of piping sections scheduled to be tested are clearly defined on Form L- 71A. The valve lineups are carefully planned for each test.

Controls are in effect to insure prerequisites are met prior to beginning a test.

5 The needed interface people were present at the scheduled test. The numbers of craf t and QC inspectors were adequate to complete the test in a timely manner.

However, changes to the pressure test Form fl-1 A were necessary af ter the group was assembled at tne test locction. This caused a delay in starting the test.

6. There have been approximately 7,740 Request for Shutdown Forms CP-201B and approximately 1,100 Shutdown Forms F-13A written to date. These forms list rework af ter the time systems are turned over to the Systems group for testing.

l 87

. . . - . ,e- - - - - - - - - . - , - _ .. .

._ _-.__ ~ _ _.

>--...__ -_... - u.-~- --=.....:.=--=..._z--:-x.- - -

l l PERFCP.MANCE EVALUATICN

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Parformance Area System Turnover for Test Objective No. TC-4r \g*

Evaluator (s) G no binson

r. Performance obiective The construction testing and turnover process should be controlled effectively to ensure that program objectives are met.

II. Scoce of Evaluation The evaluation of this area involved two team members. Approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months were expended observing a QC walk-down. Approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months were expended reviewing and discussing turnover documentation with involved personnel.

l III. Conclusion ,,__ ,_

The majority of activity evaluated under this performance objective was generally satisfactory. Two items of weakness were noted.

1 0

f I

!i iI lt i

i

!0 l!

88

. .-. , _ . . . _ . . - . . - ,..e-- - . . _ _ _ , . _ _ _

PEPSORMANCE EVALUATION SUMV.ARY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Parfor::tance Area System Turnover for Test Objective No. TC-4 Evnluator (s) G B Robinson IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices Finding Not all items that identify Construction deficiencies or i tems that (TC.4-1) could have an ef fect on maintenance are identi fied. Examples are reliance on craf t for the requi red list of outstanding variation notices and craft's leaving valves uncapped and QC mechanical inspector stating he has na responsibilities for keeping valves capped.

Finding Although turnover procedures identify responsibilities of various (TC 4-2) organizations, not all groups adhere to their responsibilities. An example is craft applying test pressure to an unreleased portion of a system without direction from Construction Engineering.

cs

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station System Turnover for Test Objective No. TC-4

1. Performance Area:

(title)

2. Provide factual information that succorts the Performance Evaluation Surnmarv _

1. Without direction from the Systems group, craft applied 200 psig to a portion of RF/RY. This occurred prior to the system being properly released for testing.

Reference R-2A (corrective action notice), Serial No. M5677

2. During a walk-down performed on c section of System N1, three valves were welded out on one side and left uncapped on the other. (Valves 1N1328, 1Hl329 and 1N1330) When questioned, the inspector stated they were not in his area of responsibility. The items had passed the craft pre-inspection.

3 Electrical Construction Engineering is relying on the craf t for the list of outstanding variation notices (S-2J) at the time of turnover.

k 90 h

.~ . . - . . . . . . . . . . _ . . _. - . - . - ..

PERF0FF.ANCE IVA' UATION SU:O'.AEY Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Test Procedures and Parformance Area Test Documents Objective No.

TC-5 }

f, Evaluntor(s) G Robintnn I, Perfo-=ance Obiective ._

Test procedures and test documents should provide appropriate direction and should be used effectively to verify operational and design features of respective systems.

II. Scoce of Evaluation The evaluation involved two team mcmbers. Approximately seven hours were expended observing work practices. A a follow up to the observation, twelve hours were devoted to discussions with various personnel involved in testing. Review of records involved another twelve hours.

III. Conclusion . _ _ _

The majority of activity evaluated was generally satisfactory. However, there were weaknesses identifled.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATICN

SUMMARY

Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station P;rformance Area Test Procedure and Test Documents Objective No. TC-Evaluator (s)

IV. Areas of weakness and corrective action: Good Practices th Finding Appropriate preparation of Construction testing teams prl'r o to conducting (TC.5-1)g.c tests is not always being accomplished. Several problems were observed to occur resulting from poor planning practices.

Finding Technical data, inspection criteria, documentation handling, and (TC.5-2) procedure review criteria are being obtained from uncontrolled documents and verbal instructions. This could potentially result in rework.

92

b PERF0F ENCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station

1. Performance Area: Test Procedures and Test Documents Objective No. Tc-5 (title)

2. Provide factual information that succorts the Performance Evaluation Summarv __

1. During observations of testing in progress, the following weaknesses were noted.

(A through C -- approximately 300 feet of 1" pipe on CP-566)

A. More than one-half hour each for four craftsmen and the technician were spent trying to locate radios for communications during testing.

B. For approximately one and one-half hours the test crew tried to pump one section to test pressure. There was a boundary valve leak-through problem that prevented bringing the system to pressure. I t was not determined where the leak was.

C. Approximately s!x hours were spent from the time the test technician and craft started out to do a relatively simple test until it was completed and the pipe Inspected.

(D through J -- test for 201B 7626, RN System approximately 100 feet of 3" pipe)

D. The N-1A (hydro test form) listed th'e section low point as Elevation 578.

The actual low point was approximately 602. The N-1A was not corrected.

E. The N-IA indicated a relief valve set to 234-236 psig was required. The relief valve supplied by the test director was set at 238 psig. The maximum test pressure was 233 psig.

F. The QC inspector pointed out to the test director that he had marked minimum test pressure as not applicable. The minimum test pressure was then calculated by the director to be 219.8 psig, and the form corrected.

G. The temporary hoses being used to supply water to the system were leaking.

The water was soaking a carton of filters identified as "AHU-31131-CNS."

This was pointed out to the test director, but the situation was not corrected.

H. Water from a hose leak was running through an air duct sleeve to the elevation below, creating a slick floor. During the observation, two different people came to the test director to complain. A utility person was stationed on the floor below to clean up the water. The hose connection was tightened to slow down the leak.

l. The test director lef t the test area to have the relief valve reset to 232 psig, and the range corrected on the N-1A. Two craft personnel and two inspectors waited in the area for him to return. The wait was approximately 20 to 25 minutes.

93

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Nuclear Station J

i l. Performance Area: Te.it Procedures and Test Documents Objective No. TC-5 (title)

, 2. Provide factual information that suceerts the Perfor=ance Evaluation Summarv _

J. Further checking concerning proper system low point revealed direction had been given the systems people in a letter dated 12-14-78. The letter stated

- the provisions would be added to the specification. A review of the specification revealed that it has not been incorporated to date. This was verified with the systems engineer.

2. A review of testing documents, procedures, audits and records revealed the following i

A. CP-283, a recently completed ND System pressure test, was obtained from Systems (prior to their final approval) and reviewed in general. The following items were noted:

1. Section 7A was on a Class E line which is ANSI B31.1, but ASME Ill was the referenced Code on the N-1A. This discrepancy had not been caught by Construction and/or QA on initial review.

2. The test of Section 7A was held only 5 minutes; 10 minutes is required.

by B31.1.

3 Section 7A had atteched an F-10A (ASME repair form) for Valve 1FV56.

The valve was actually in SectIon 7B and was not shown on the L-71A.

]

4. Step 7.65 had a valve number added with no initials and dates contrary to procedure.

a 5 The test engineer did not approve some of the CP-249A Forms (fill source analysis). CP-249 does not explain the approval process.

6. R-2A 5478 was referenced on Section 6 as a problem. The test was signed acceptable by the test engineer on 9-17-82. The R-2A was not cleared until 9-28-82. There appears to be procedural guidance given concerning clearing problems discovered on testing as they relate to

, accepting the tests.

B. CP-566 (NI Pressure Test) was recently finished. A review noted the following problems:

1. Several Class E N-1 A's (hydro forms) did not have the test data on the form. The technician stated he had the data in his notes and just had not completed the form. Some of the tests were accomplished as much as one month earlier.

94

--w--,w,. - - -in- ,-7 -,, , , _ .v--, -.7g-my. .,, ,, p,..m,,, , - , , - . , , , , , , , , ,,7, - - - - - - - - - - - , , 9 .v- s,-- , , ,

- _ _ __ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . ._ _m . __ . ._ __ _.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION DETAILS Construction Project Catawba Huclear Station

1. Perfor: nance Area: Test Procedure and Test Documents Objective No. TC-5 (title) t l 2. Provide factual information that su= ports the Perfor: nance Evaluation l Summarv

2. Section 8 contained Class B and Class C piping. This section was

! completed on either 8-31-82 or 9-1-82, but no data was placed on the

! N-1A by the inspector. The test director stated that a particular QC inspector had witnessed the test. Checking revealed a different inspector had witnessed the test, and the test data was on a small, loose, piece of paper in the inspector's table drawer. The inspector had to study for a moment before he could relate to the data. QA Procedure N-1, Paragraph 4.3, requires recording the data properly i during the test.

I j 3 QC stated that within the last two weeks they have started completing the test data portion of N-1A and withholding their signatures until

( the test gauge is calibrated. There is not a procedure that addresses this practice.

C. Several letters which are not controlled documents are being used by systems and QA/QC for determining requirements and performing inspections. Examples are:

1. Letter dated 12-14-78 concerning system low points

2. Letter dated 10-12-81 concerning flanged relief valves 3 Letter dated e-1-82 concerning testing records

4. Lc.tter dated 7-8-82 concerning procedure review 1

\

l 95 _

m,e - a w w*r*--c-+ e -=+--4 -- wer-mru-m <-rp-- -iserma- e n

-w-a-m--w=*-*v+=N- ----w-+i -r--+-- - ~- pl4---wan' sp y F y-----

......._.:_--u

. .. _ . _ _ . . . . = . _ _ .

PERFORMANCE IVAI.UA"' ON

SUMMARY

COnsrruction Project Catawba Nuclear Station Parfor=ance Area Svstem Status Centrols Objective No. TC-6 Evaluator (s) G Robinson I. Performance Objective ,

A method, should. exist to identify the status of each system or component and the organization holding control cr jurisdiction over that system or compenent to prevent interference and ensure equipment and personnel safety.

II. Sccee of Evaluation The evaluation of this objective involved in the preoperational testing accomplished by Nuclear Production. No observations were made in this area, since it does not apply to work acccmplished by Duke Design or Construction.

l l

d III. Conclusien . _ _ _

4 1 l

)

e S6

__.m

l Response Summary The information that follows addresses each of the Evaluation Team findings. Several of the corrective act ens resulting from the findings have already been initiated. We will track the remaining corrective actions until completely implemented.

57

- ^^

DESIGN ENGINEERING Performance Area Reviewed Finding #

Design inputs (DC-1) DC.1-1 DC.1-2 .

DC.1-3

. DC.1-4 DC.1-5 Design interface (DC-2) DC.2-1 DC.2-2 DC.2-3 Design Process (DC-3) DC.3-1 0C.3-2 DC.3-3 DC 3-4 Design Output (DC-4) DC.4-1 DC.4-2 DC.4-3 Design Changes (DC-5) DC.5-1 4

8

y .-.-- -

4

/

INP0 EVALUATION GENERIC WEAKNESS: Lack of Documented Requirement for Implementing PSAR & FSAR Design Commitments APPLICABLE INP0 FINDING (s):

DC 1-1 APPLICABLE SUPPORTING FACT NUMBER l-1 2-4 3-1 L

99

1 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT IUP0 RESPONSE SilEET CATAWBA HUCLEAR ST. i T

Performance Area Desian input Evaluator (s) C. Glidewell l

IV. ' Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # DC.1-1 No requirement exists for identifying, tracking, and assuring commitments I

identified in the PSAR are met. Design information should be clearly defined and controlled.

I i c orrective Action Plan Duke Power Company's past method for control of SAR commitments has been as follows:

1. Listings of commitments maintained by SRAL Division have been used to identify, track, and control:

I a. PSAR commitments, outside those embodied in normal engineering j practice.

b. Commitments sent to the NRC after PSAR approval and prior to submittal of FSAR.

l c. Commitments identified prior to preparation of the FSAR to be I included in the FSAR.

t d. Deviation from PSAR commitments.

l

e. Deviations from FSAR commitments. These deviations included in licensing documents via norm,al SAR and license amendments.

j

2. Commitment and deviation listings have been distributed to Design

Engineering Sections Heads and updated on no less than a quarterly basis.

3. All SAR and Regulatory Commitments are reviewed by appropriate levels of Duke management prior to submittal to'NRC. Quality Assurance procedures require the consideration of SAR and other regulatory commitments in the preparation of calculations, design specifications, and related documents.

l Duke Power Company feels that this finding has merit in that a number of SAR and Regulatory Commitments were considered a part of normal engineering practice and were not controlled by any o.f the above methods. An effort will be initiated to develop a program for more direct commitment tracking.

Program development will be complete by March 1,1983.

100

-W w- 7 _ .r-,

-, m----.------,-m -

w-,4 w-w y,-- --ym, w q

)

l l l l

INP0 EVALUATION GENERIC WEAKNESS: Lack of Formal Program Defining Responsibility for Provision of Design Input APPLICABLE INP0 FINDING (s):

DC 1-2.

APPLICABLE SUPPORTING FACT NUMBER l-2 3-5 1-3 3-8 1-13 3-14 2-3 3-17 2-6 4-6 1

l 101

f i

I l PERFORMANCE EVALUATION INP0 CONSTRUCTION PROJECT RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA' NUCLEAR ST.

(

Performance Area DESIGN INPUT Evaluator (s) C. Glidewell IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # DC 1-2 No control program for defining responsibility for providing Design input could be found. Input is usually provided on a request basis.

Corrective Action Plan The organizational responsibilities in the Design Engineering Department are formally documented in responsibility statements. In addition, significant commitments to provide design input are included in the integrated schedule or' punch list by responsibile group. At the supervisory level within Design Engineering, the design process is well understood; however, due to speciali-zation in some functional groups, individual engineers may not be familiar with the overall process.

The INP0 finding identifies some Design Engineering activities where formal procedures could be of value to Duke's overall design program. The INP0 observations will be used as a basis for continued review of this area through May 31, 1983,to determine if specific problems indicate a need for a more stringent control program. Corrective action regarding specific problems identified concerning system descriptions is addressed under the discussion of findings DC 1-4, 2-1, 3-3, 4-3 and 5-1. Corrective action regarding specific problems identified concerning instrumentation design is addressed under the discussion of findings DC 2-2 and DC 4-1.

102

't i

INP0 EVALUATION GENERIC WEAKNESS: Lack of Formal Program for Assuring Control of Design Input Documentation APPLICABLE INP0 FINDING (s)

DC 1-3 s

APPLICABLE SUPPORTING FACT NUMBER 1-4 2-1B 1

l 103

l- ,

i l

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area Desian Inout Evaluator (s) C Glidewell

! IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # DC.1-3 i

i Design input information is not always provided in a controlled manner.

Memorandums serve as the primary vehicle for documenting design input.

( Corrective Action Plan Duke agrees additional review is in order to determine if procedure changes or additions would be beneficial. This review and any needed procedure development will be completed by March 1,1983.

I l

I 1 .

104

INP0 EVALUATION GENERIC WEAKNESS: System Descriptions not Current and/or Disagree with Other Design Documents (Flow Diagrams / Design Drawings / Elect. System Descriptions, etc.)

APPLICABLE INP0 FINDING (s):

DC 1-4' DC 2-1 DC 3-3 DC 4-3 DC 5-1 APPLICABLE SUPPORTING FACT NUMBER 1-8 1-12 3-10 4-4 1-9 2-1A 3-15 4-5 1-10 2-lc 3-16 5-2 1-11 3-9 4-3 5-3 l

l l

105

k. .. .

Page 1 of 2 IUP0 PERFORf1ANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Design inputs, Design Interfaces, Design Process, Design Output, Performance Area and Design Changes Evaluator (s) C. clidewell. D. T. Clift, Belew, and Hendricks IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # DC.1-4, DC.2-1, DC.3-3, DC.4-3, and DC.5-1

DC.1-4 System descriptions and flow diagrams do not always agree as to the current requirements. Several system descriptions were observed to lag revisions of system flow diagrams.

DC.2-1 The process for controlling Design input documents does not require tirt,ely updating of system descriptions. The RHR and AFW System descriptions are not maintained current with system designs.

DC.3-3 Design documents relating to the design of the RHR System are in disagreement creating a potential for error in the design.

This is also true for the VFW System.

DC.4-3 System descriptions are used to provide system control informa-tion. They do not reflect current system design.

DC.5-1 Conflicts between system design documents exist for extended periods of time, because system descriptions are not revised in a timely manner.

Corrective Action Plan All of the above INPO findings evolve from Design Engineering Depart-ment's philosophy pertaining to system descriptions. System descriptions q as utilized in Duke's design process are considered general supporting documents to flow diagrams and electrical elementary drawings. Also, system descriptions are important for initiating system design and for documenting the final design.

The present method of handling system descriptions requires a close working and approval process between Mechanical and Electrical. Although the process has worked well in the past, there is potential for improve-ment and the following corrective measures will be considered and pursued by Design Engineering:

1) Provide more timely update for both mechanical and electrical systems descriptions on a continuous basis with completion by Reactor Fuel Load date for Catawba Unit 1.

106

Page 2 of 2 Finding #'s DC.1-4, DC.2-1, DC.3-3, DC.4-3, and DC.5-1 Corrective Action Plan (Continued)

2) Document future changes in instrumentation and controls on instru-mentation data sheets. Instrumentation data sheets currently have a three level signoff (prepared, checked, approved); addi-tionally, in the future these documents will be issued via a controlled distribution. This approach will provide downstream work groups a document to work from until the Mechanical System Description is revised.

3) On future plant designs, consider using logic drawings to transmit design -information now found in the Mechanical System Description in a more graphic and controlled manner. With this change, the Mechanical System Description would then become a general i n fo rma-tion document only. '

4) Establish a time interval governing revisions to the Electrical System Description. Afterwards, monitor Electrical system descrip-tion release schedules to insure they reflect current system-designs.

Areas 1), 2), and 3) stated above for improvement of Duke Power Company's Design program will be evaluated, appropriate procedures revised or developed for implementation within Design Engineering by March 1, 1983 Item 4) will be implemented by December 15, 1982.

s 107 L . ..

INP0 EVALUATION GENERIC WEAKNESS: Lack of Formal Program to Assure Correct Application and/or Control of Seismic Response Spectra APPLICABLE INP0 FINDING (s):

DC 1-5 APPLICABLE SUPPORTING FACT NUMBER l-5 3-3 1-6 3-4 l 100

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area Design Input Evaluator (s) C. Glidewell IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # DC.1-5 No documented program was found for assuring correct application of seismic response. spectra.

Corrective Action Plan As a result of an earlier internal review by Desgin Engineering, revised procedures are being implemented to improve contral of seismic design requirements. Responsibilities have been reviewed and the Civil / Environmental Division will review all specifications and procedures containing seismic design or qualification requirements to assure seismic requirements are adequately and correctly specified. In addition, the Civil / Environmental Division is preparing structural design specifications for each plant that include the seismic analysis and design requirements for major structures.

It is Duke's position that adequate procedures are in place or being implemented to control the use of response spectra and assure seismic design requirements _are being satisfied.

10s

8 f

INP0 EVALUATION GENERIC WEAKNESS: Lack of Formal Program for Determining and Assuring Constructability, Maintainability and Operability APPLICABLE INPO FINDING (s):

DC 4-2 APPLICABLE SUPPORTING FACT NUMBER l-7 3-7 4-2 l

110

l ..

PERFORMAMCE EVALUATION . CCMSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 .

RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area Design Output Belew, Clift, Glidewell, Hendricks Evaluator (s)

IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # DC 4-2 No documented program was identified for determining and assuring review for constructability, maintainability and operability is conducted. Reviews are performed where a need is identified.

Corrective Action Plan Reviews for constructability, maintainability, and operability.have been conducted during the design and construction phases of Catawba Nuclear Station.

There are three primary programs for review as follows:

1) Scale Model Reviews - Each area of the plant has been reviewed several times utilizing our scale model (3/8 inch = 1 foot). Also, special enlarged models of small congested areas are constructed where potential-problems are known to exi'st.

2) . Composite Drawing Reviews - This series of orthographic drawings illustrates the design of all engineering disciplines within each area of the plant.

As design drawings are released, the composite drawings are updated and the design is reviewed for constructability and maintainability.

3) Piping Design Criteria - There are 24 Piping Design Criteria. Construct-ability, maintainability and operability were considered in the development of the criteria. Since the Piping Design Criteria is a recent development, it has only been utilized on new designs and recent design revisions.

Each of the above programs is documented and solicits appropriate inputs by affected groups within the company.

'To further improve or supplement the above programs, Duke Power organized a task force to i.nvestigate methods for improving Construction and Nuclear Production input into the design process during the fall of 1981. This study especially addressed reviews for constructability, maintainability and operability. The study and resulting reconnendations have been completed and approved for imple-mentation beginning with the design of the Cherokee Nuclear Station. Recommend-ations included the formation of review groups from the Construction and Nuclear Prod 0ction Departnents which review considerations for constructability, main-tainability and operability.

In summary, our Design Engineering Department's design process includes formal reviews for constructability, maintainability and operability which are considered adegu, ate; therefore, no change to existing or approved future Duke practices are p'lanned as a result of this finding.

111

5 t

INP0 EVALUATI0fl GEllERIC WEAKNESS: Inadequate Interfacing of Design Changes /Information Relative to Instrumentation Design APPLICABLE INP0 FIllDIflG(S)

DC 2-2 DC 4-1 CORRESP0flDIfiG IllP0 FACTS:

2-2A, 2-28, 4-1 & 1-14 112

\. . -

INPO PERFORNAMCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT RESP 0MSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area Design Input / Design Interfaces / Design Output Evaluator (s) Below, Clif t, Glidewell, Hendricks IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # DC.2-2. DC.4-1 Finding Several instances were identified where Design and Design change (DC.2-2) information were not effectively coordinated between the affected organizations. Several problems were observed involving the exchange of information and control of interfaces between the electrical and mechanical I & C groups and between suppo.rt/

restraint and piping layout sections.

Finding The B0P transmitter accuracy information required for the NUREG 0588 (DC.4-1) Electrical Equipment Environmental Qualification Report is not being properly determined. The overall instrument loop accuracy is not considered.

Corrective Action Plan The above findings all relate to the specific weakness identified in Finding DC.4-1 with respect to the interface between Mechanical Instrumentation and Control (liPIC) and the Electrical Division. The weakness is a lack of an established and documented program and responsibility assignments for determining -

required accuracy for Catawba safety related instroments located in potentially harsh plant environments as required by NUREG 0588.

To correct this specific problem, an appropriate dccumented resolution will be developed and implemented with affected groups by December 15, 1982.

I In addition, existing methods of accounting for instrumentation accuracies in overall system design, both safety and non-safety, consist of unwritten understandings and agreements. To improve Design Engineering interfaces, responsibilities and methods, a more formal progran will be developed and implemented by March 1, 1983.

113

INP0 EVALUATION GENERIC WEAKNESS: Inadequate Interfacing of Design Changes /Information Relative to Piping and Support / Restraint Design APPLICABLE INP0 FINDING (s):

DC 2-2 APPLICABLE SUPPORTING FACT NUMBER 2-5 114

.. ~ -. - - . . - . . .

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

l Performance Area Design Interfaces Evaluator (s) D. T. Clift IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action: Good Practices ,

Findino_ # DC 2-2 Several instances were identified where Design and Design change information were not effectively coordinated between the affected organizations. Several problems were observed involving the exchange of information and control of interfaces between the Electrical and Mechanical I & C Groups and between l

Support / Restraint and Piping layout sections.

f f Corrective Action Plan l

Current practices have an inherent weakness to the extent that Support / Restraint generated isometrics have potential for being in disagreement with the drawings produced by the Station Services Group. Discrepancies between the two can exist l for the following reasons:

l 1. Discrepancy between erected pipe and Station Services Drawings; i

2. Incorrect field measurement;

3. Translation error in the isometric process;

4. Time lag in revision process, i.e., the two documents temporarily may not be in agreement with latest revisions.

In order to ensure that disagreements between the Support / Restraint isometrics and the Station Services drawings are discovered and resolved in a timely fashion, the following future action plan will be implemented by the Mechanical. and, Nuclear Division:

1. Support / Restraint Group will review their isometric drawings against Station Services Group drawings and identify and resolve cases where there is a disa-greement.

2. Future isometric drawings will require an inspection sign-off by the Station l Services Group. Station Services Group will review the isometrics for con-

. figuration and inclusion of the latest revisions.

l ,, (pplementation ,of steps 1 and 2 will begin December 1,1982.

In conclusion, Duke agrees with the INP0 Finding- and appropriate procedures will be revised and/or developed formally documenting the above interface improvements.

within Design Engineering by January 4, 1983.

l 115

- .,.;.,--- . - - n-- r r-~ ,,ne-- , ,- n -,r,.,--- -- ,.,-,a- e - - - - , .. - - , . _ , , ,,,..,.--w , -,.e.--,.n-- - - . - m ,m e

i INPO EVALUATION GENERIC WEAKNESS: Lack of Formal Program to Assure Timely and Proper Filing of Design Records APPLICABLE INP0 FINDING (s):

DC 3-1 APPLICABLE SUPPORTING FACT NUMBER 3-6 116

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INPO RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area DESIGN PROCESS Evaluator (s) C. Glidewell IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Goo'd Practices Finding # DC 3-1 Design records are not always being filed in a timely manner. Waiver form originals on file in a manual have not been transmitted to General Services for corporate filing.

Corrective Action Plan INP0's finding is valid for the specific instance identified. A thorough and encompassing review of Civil / Environmental, Mechanical & Nuclear, and Electrical Divisions for the generic implications of the finding indicated that there is not a significant deficiency or weakness in this area. The isolated deficiency identified in the audit finding has been further investigated and corrective action initiated. A revision'to the procedure (PR-130) will be proposed by November 30, 1982 to clarify the filing requirements of the original form (Form 130.1).

117

s INPO EVALUATION GENERIC WEAKNESS: Original Issue and Revisions to Design Documents Differ in Sign-Off Documentation APPLICABLE INP0 FINDING (s):

DC 3-2 APPLICABLE SUPPORTING FACT NUMBER 3-2 5-1 118

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area DESIGN PROCESS Evaluator (s) C. Glidewell IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action: Good Practices Finding # DC 3-2 Changes to design drawings do not receive the same degree of documented review as the original issue. Originals are documented by designer, drawer, checker and approver. Revisions are documented by checker and approver.

Corrective Action Plan Dresings are processed in accordance with the Design Engineering Quality Assurance program. This program distinguishes between original drawing issue and revision issue insofar as the degree of sign-off required. Even though there is a difference in the amount of documented information concerning those individuals working on a drawing, the overall program maintains the same integrity for r'. visions as for original issue. Both original issue drawings and revisions to those drawings are prepared by a qualified individual. The information which is prepared by the qualified individual is then checked by another individual, other than the supervisor, who is equally qualified. This check is documented in the case of original issue and revision issue. If there are interfacing considerations with other divisions, appropriate inspection signatures are obtained for both original issue and revision issue drawings. Finally, the original issue or revision issue of the drawing is approved by an individual authorized in writing by the division head of the sponsoring division. In all instances, work on design drawings is done by a qualified preparer, checked by another qualified individual, and approved by a designated supervisor who is in responsible charge of the work. Documentation of who actually prepared a revision to an original drawing has no bearing on the quality or integrity of the design.

Although INP0's finding is correct,it does not represent a design deficiency or weakness. The finding and supporting facts describe what is documented in the Design Engineering Quality Assurance program as Duke procedure. This program has met the test of time for adequacy and has been reviewed and accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. No change to existing Duke practices are planned as a result of this finding.

11P

INP0 EVALUATION GENERIC WEAKNESS: Design Calculations not Current, Complete and/or do not Support Other Design Documents APPLICABLE INPO FINDING (s):

OC 3-4 APPLICABLE SUPPORTING FACT NUMBER 3-11 3-12 3-13 120

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area Desian Process Evaluator (s) C. Glidewell IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # oc.3 4 Calculations are not being maintained in a controlled manner that support issued Design documents.

Corrective Action Plan The INP0 finding relative to this matter is unique to the Mechanical Systems Group of Duke Design Engineering and requi res two corrective actions as follows.

1) Documentation Deficiencies - As a result of this INP0 finding, Design Engineering conducted a review of the Mechanical Systems Group calculational file which revealed that a small percentage

(<5%) of the Catawba calculations were not in the required docu-mentation format. All calculations not in the required documenta-tion format will be upgraded to proper format by March 1, 1983

2) Mechanical System Verification - As a system reaches an advanced stage of erection (system as-built to QA procedure HPR-140), design data, parameters, and functional design requirements that are important to nuclear safety ere verified in a final system verifica-tion calculation prior to reactor fuel load as required by ANSI N45.2-II. Although the Design Engineering Department's system verification process is acceptable, it has two weaknesses; the requirement for system verification is not documented in writing nor is the work scheduled. In order to formalize and assure the requirement for system verification is met, a Mechanical Systems Group work place procedure will be written and implemented by 1-15-83 to define design parameters to be verified and how the verification can be accomplished. A schedule for system verifica-tion will be developed based on as-built and reactor fuel load dates. Appropriate entries will be added to the Design Engineering acti vities punchlist by 12-15-82 to assure system verification calculations are completed prior to reactor fuel load.

121

, CONSTRUCTION Performance Area Reviewed _ Finding #

Construction Engineering (CC-1) CC.1-1 Material Control (CC-3) CC.3-1

.CC.3-2 CC.3-3 CC.3-5 CC.3-6 Control of Construction (CC-4) CC.4-1 Processes CC 4-3 CC.4-5 Construction Corrective (CC-6) CC.6-1 Actions CC.6-2 CC.6-3

< Test Equipment (CC-7) CC.7-2 Control Industrial Safety (PS-1) PS.1 Project Planning (PS-2) PS.2-1 Test Program (TC-1) TC.1-1 TC.1-2 TC.1-3 Test Group Organization and (TC-2) TC.2-1 l Staffing TC.2-2 TC.2-3 Test Plan (TC-3) TC.3-1 System Turnover for Test (TC-4) TC.4-1 TC.4-2 Test Procedures and Test (TC-5) TC.5-1 Documents TC.5-2 Training Management Support (TN-1) TN.1 -1 Training Organization and (TN-2) TN.2-1 Administration TN.2-2 i 122

,J_: . . 7- _ . . ._ , , ..._._ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _- _ _, , _ . _ . . . _ _

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

' Performance Area Cons t ruct ion Cnginee ring T F Wyke, R D Anderson EvalEator(s)

IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding 4 CC.1-1 Managers and supervisors do not always enforce adherence to plant policies and procedurss. Several areas were noted where personnel did not adhere to established work procedures.

Corrective Action Plan Currently, Construction procedures are reviewed annually. By July 31, 1983, this review will be expanded, actual work practices will also be reviewed.

123

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area Material control ,

Evalu"ator(s) s shennard IV. Areas of Weaknecs and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # cc.3-1 Site receipt inspection does not ensure that material and equipment received on site are evaluated against the' requi rements of the procurenent speci fications. Examples of the problems identi fied may potentially result in delays, waste of materials, additional time spent on disposition of deviations f rom procured materials and work stoppage.

Corrective Action Plan

Response

The method for transferring non-safety-related materials between sites will be examined. Any changes needed will be completed by May, 1983 124i

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET -CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

?

Performance Area Material control Evalu"ator(s) s. shenoerd IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # cc.3-2 A consistent method for material identification was not in effect in the wa rehouse. Seve ral instances were noted where 1. D. tags had f allen of f, equipment was marked with ink; and when material was being sectionalized to start fabrication, a mean; for maintaining the identification was not being done.

Corrective Action Plan

Response

A uniform marking system will be developed by January and implemented by April, 1983 Also, beginning in April ,1983, in-house audits will be made to ensure compliance with the marking s~ystem.

125

L PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INPO RESPONSE SHEET CATAWEA NUCLEAR ST.

?

Performance Area Material control EvalEator(s) S Sheppard IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # cc.1-1 Proper protective measures we re not taking place for envi ronmentally sensitive equipment that was " robbed" for spare par cs. Some parts were being stored in an open instrument cabinet.

Corrective Action Plan _

Response

The Equipment Maintenance Section had reported this situation to the site manager of equipment and materials in a memo dated September 28, 1982. By January 1, 1983, a procedure will be implemented to control reraoval of parts.

It should be noted that the Transmission Department is responsible for the items cited in 2B.

?

(

126

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

t Performance Area Material control s sheppard Evaluator (s)

TV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding S cc.3-5 Materials are not being maintained or stored effectively at werk site locations. Seve ral examples we re noted which reflected improper control.

Corrective Action Plan

Response

A program to hold supervisors accountable for Material Control and housekeeping will be implemented by April 1, 1983 r

I 127

l l

l i

PERFOR!iANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INPO RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Material Control Performance Area Evaluator (s)

TV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # CC.3-6 Scheduled preventative maintenance activities on installed equipment i are not always assured throughout the enti re period on Construction Department cont rol . Equipment was identified for which preventative maintenance had been cancelled up to 21 months ago, and there was no evidence that compensatory requirements had been established.

Corrective Action Plan

Response

l By March 1,1983, the preventive-maintenance program will be revised.

This will ensure that plant equipment is maintained until it is turned over to the Nuclear Production Department. j e

12G s . -.

-- --- - -., ,-+- , +-.3-.- , +w..-- ,,-w+ r.- ,- m%w ,-.f.-+y ----er, -

,y. _.- ,, w- ,m------*,- .-,&- = , - p.. -,-

PERFOR!iANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area control of construction Processes Evaluator (s) T F Wvke. H S Sheonard IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # cc.4-1 Managers and supervisors do not always enforce adherence to plant pol i ci es and procedures. A number of areas were noted where personnel did not adhe re to established work procedures.

Corrective Action Plan An evaluation and action plan will be completed by February 28, 1983 129

PERFORfiANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

l t Performance Area Control of Construction Processes

Eva16ator(s) T F Wyke & H S Sheopard IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # cc.4-3 Weaknesses were observed in the training of craft personnel in selected areas. Several examples were noted which reflected insufficient familiarity with work procedures.

Corrective Action Plan in-house and consultant training studies have been completed. Recommended changes will begin January 1,1983 I

130 1

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INPO RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Control of Construction Processes Performance Area Evaluator (s) T F Wyke, H S Sheppard IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # cc.4-5 One example of restrictive procedure (CP-601) was observed. Use of this procedure precludes judgment by experienced personnel and results in concrete mix which will r.ot meet acceptance criteria.

Corrective Action Plan Construction procedures are reviewed annually. These reviews will include checks for overly restrictive requi rements.

d e

e 4

131

. .-= , __ - - _ . _ _ _. __. . ._ _ .. -

i l

l PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INPO RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

l . Performance Area Construction Corrective Action Evaluator (s)

IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # Cc.6-1 Certain trend analyses have not been performed as requi red in the three months that followed change of responsibility for such trends from QA to Construction.

I Corrective Action Plan The Construction Department will review QA Procedure A-1. The, procedure will be revised to ensure changes in departmental responsibilities are communicated and implemented promptly. The revision will be completed l

by January 31, 1983 i

I 3

l . ;

I l

132

INPO PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Perforrance Area construction Corrective Action D L Freeze Evaluator (s) ,

IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Actioni Good Practices Findina # cc.6-2 No program requi rements exist for trend analyses of surveillance and inspection documents other than R-2A Inspection Discrepancy Reports.

Corrective Action Plan Manageme n t recognizes the importance of identifying adverse trends and implementing timely corrective action. Construction has designated a supervisor resconsible for trend analyses. Managenent will determine items to be trended by February 1, 1983 Procedures for trending these items will be developed and implemented by April 1, 1983 133

b . + , ..

INP0 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area Construction Corrective Action D L Freeze Evaluator (s)

IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # CC.6-3 Replies to deficiencies do not always address all areas of concern regarding such deficiencies. Technical resolutions are addressed; however, procedural violations and safety implications sometimes are not addressed.

Corrective Action Plan Deficiencies involving procedural and safety implication must be reported as Non-Conforming items (NCI's) . Presently, all Catawba NCI's are reviewed by an offsite evaluation team. Items that warrant further investigation are returned to the site. This is an engoing effort.

134

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJE^T INPO RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

e Performance Area Test Eautoment Control C F York Evaluator (s)

IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # CC.7-2 lilegible unique numbers on some electrical lug crimping tools were noted in the electrical area.

Corrective Action Plan Quality Control inspects lug-crimping tools on a random basis. Tools needing repair or calibration are documented for corrective action.

These tools are identified by the company number of the empicyee that has been assigned the particular tool. When the number has been in question, it has been easy to trace the tool to the employee to which it has been assigned.

By November 1,1982, all responsible employees will be instructed to monitor tool identification numbers to make sure they are legible.

135

INPO PERFOR!!ANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT RESPONSE SHEEl CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Perforrance Area industrial Safety Evaluator (s) B Rice IV. Areas of V?akness and Corrcctive Action; Good Practices Findino # ps-1 Managers and supervisors do not always enforce adherence to plant safety procedures. A number of areas were noted where personnel did not adhere to established safety procedures.

Corrective Action Plan The individual items identified have been reviewed and appropriate corrective action initiated on each observation. In order to assure that Managers and Supervisors promote and enforce adherence to safety criteria and procedures, we initiated in September 1982, a Management training series. This ongoing series concentrates on criteria, supervisor responsibility, constant involvement, and the consequences of violations.

.t 136

. . ~ . .

__m 9 _-

g- ._7 , r _,.__e,m- _ _ . . _m e p- ,% , -g w,- ,. . ,-.,

INPO PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Perforrance Arca Project Planning Evaluator (s) B Rice IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # PS.2-1 Input into schedule and planning f rom Quality Assurance and Control did not appear to Le covered in sufficient detail compared with other activities.

Corrective Action Plan On August 20, 1982, G W Grier, Corporate QA Manager, formally requested by letter to R L Dick, Vice President, Construction, that planning of QA activities be conducted by the Catawba Construction Planning Organization.

In response, planners have been assigned to QA/QC planning for Units 1 and

2. These planners are beginning to provide long-range QA/QC plans, covering work schedules and staffing needs. Quality Assurance has assigned an ex-pediter to work with these planners. The expediter is responsible for communicating short-range schedules and changes in priority to QA management.

137

INPO PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area System Testing (includes All Test Areas TC-1 thru TC-5)

Evaluator (s) M N Sawve r , G Robinson IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # TC;-1 thru TC-5 TC-1-1 There is no clear policy document from management that defines the System Group or the organization's mission and responsibilities for testing systems.

TC-1-2 The controlling Quality Assurance and design documents do not contain all of the information required and used to perform system tests.

TC-1-3 There is no progran for identifying and tracking discrepancies in test documents to cause appropriate resolutions or corrections in a timely manner.

TC-2-1 The Systems Group functional organizational relationships to interfacing organizations are not clearly defined.

TC-2-2 The key management, supe rvisory , and professional posit ions and responsibilities are not described in writing.

TC-2-3 The personnel who are assigned to perform testing do not meet the experience and qualification requi rements in all aspects.

TC-3-1 There are no indications that a growing amount of rework af ter systems are turned over to the test group could adversely af fect the scheduled system completion dates.

TC-4-1 Not all items that identi fy construction deficiencies or items that could have an ef fect on maintenance are identi fied.

TC-4-2 Although turnover procedures identify responsibilities of various organization, not all groups adhere to thei r responsibili ties.

TC-5-1 Appropriate preparation of construction testing teams prior to conducting tests is not always being accomplished.

TC-5-2 Technical data, inspection cri teria, documentation handling, and pro-cedure review cri teria are being obtained f rom uncontrolled documents and verbal instructions.

Corrective Action Plan An in-depth review of practices and policies in the system testing area will be pe r fo rme d. An action plan to identi fy and address weaknesses will be developed by March 1, 1983 Meanwhile, test personnel have been di rected to comply with established procedures and to pay close attention to details.

130

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SEEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

T Performance Area Training Management support Evaluator (s) A R Hollins IV, Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # TN.1-1 Management has shown its support by performing a "needs analysis" to determine the direction that training should follow and has hired an outside consultant to determine training organization needs.

Corrective Action Plan An outside consultant was hi red to determine training needs and develop an organizational structure for the training area. In addition, an "in-house" needs analysis was conducted to further define and determine the direction that training should follow, implementation of recommendations made in the studies is scheduled to begin January 1, 1983 139

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INPO RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area Trainina orcanization and Aa,i,istratin, A R Hollins Evaluator (s)

IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # TN-2-1 Some managers in the Construction area appeared not to understand the responsibilities of the training organization. Confusion as to who is responsible for the development of the employees and who determines the employees' need for training was evident.

Corrective Action P1,an_

Responsibility for traiaing will be clearly identified to management.

Implementation is scheduled to begin January 1,1983 1

140

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

?

Training Organization and Administration

- Performance Area A R Hollins Evaluator (s)

IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices ,

Finding # TN.2-2 No active program could be identified to acquire feedback to determine the ef fect on productivity or quality brought about by training.

Corrective Action Plan The ef fects of training on quality and productivity is very difficult to me as u re . One responsibility of the new training organization will be to evaluate the ef fects of t raining. This will begin in January, 1933 2

141

\

QUALITY ASSURANCE Performance Area Reviewed Finding #

Material Control (CC-3) CC.3-4 i Control of Construction (CC-4) CC.4-2 Processes Construction Quality inspections (CC-5) CC.5-1 CC.5-2 CC.5-3 CC;5-4 Test Equipment Control (CC-7) CC.7-1 Quality Program (QP-1) QP.1-1 Independent Assessment (QP-3) QP.3-1 QP.3-2 QP.3-3 Corrective Actions (QP-4) QP.4-1 QP.4-2

)

W 142

s PERFORftANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATA'43A NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area Material Control Evaluator (s) S Shecoard IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action: Good Practices Finding 4 CC.3-4 Procedure QFP-8.002 CNS, Rev. IA, does not indicate the disposition of unused filler material. Confusion appears to exist regarding handling of unused filler material and adherence to AUS code requirements could not be determined.

Corrective Action Plan Procedure apolies to Bahnson filler metal issue station and does not apply to Bahnson field welders. Procedure does not cover the handling of filler material after being returned to Bahnson issue station after exoosure. The steps not covered are segregation of filler material and the return to Duke for rebake. However , thi s i s bei ng done properly.

The.orocedure is to be revised to include the segregation and return of unused filler metal to Duke Power for rebake. This procedure is to be comoleted and implemented prior to November 21, 1082. With this orocedure

? change and adequate instruction of personnel, i t should eliminate any confusion concerning adherence to AWS Code requirements in this area.

?

143

l i

l PERFOR!MCE E'/ALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INPO RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

l Performance Area Control of Construction Processes Evaluator (s) T F Uyke, H S Sheppard l

TV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action: Good Practices _ l Findina 4 CC.4-2 Weaknesses were observed in control of HVAC contractor's welding program. Several instances were noted where contractor personnel l were not familiar with program requirements.

Corrective Action Plan A meeting was held on 10/28/32 between Bahnson management and Duke QA to determine the best method of transmitting the weld procedure assign- i ment (in writing) to the welder. Alternate methods of making the weld l procedure assignments were discussed at great lengths. Bahnson is making i I

a study to ascertain the most efficient method that would be acceptable to Duke Power Company. The new method will be determined, reviewed by Duke QA and implemented prior to December 15, 1932.

> 1 l

l l

1 l

144

PERFOR!%!1CE EVALUATIOil CONSTRUCTIO?l PROJECT IllP0 RESP 0tlSE SHEET CATAWBA flVCLEAR ST.

Performance Area Construction Quality inspections Evaluator (s) D L Freeze IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action: Good Practices Finding d CC.5-1 Inspection procedures are not always clear in their definition of inspection requirements, resulting in installed items being accepted when requirements have not been met and vice versa.

Corrective Action Plan A procedures group has been established and will be reviewing and correcting any unclear situations identified. All the items observed will be corrected. The QA procedure for installation and inspection of concrete anchors will be revised to define " Full Thread Engagement".

Site QC personnel will be instructed on Construction Procedure 601.

These corrective actions will be completed by January, 1983 I

145

PERFORPANCE E'/ALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT If4P0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area Construction Quality Inspections CC-5 Evaluator (s) D L Freeze IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # CC.5-2 Inspection documents are sometimes completed in an illegible manner making any required future follow-up difficult if not impossible.

Corrective Action Plan For comparison purposes, we will have on file an example of each inspector's signature and initials with the name printed beside them. In addition, all inspectors will be reminded of the importance of a legible signature or initial on documents. These actions to be completed by 1 Dec. 82.

145

4 PERFOR"ANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area Construction Quality Inspections Evaluator (s) D L Freeze IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action: Good Practices Finding # CC.5-3 Inspection requirements established by HVAC contractor do not verify that Code requirements are met.

Corrective Action Plan A review with Bahnson personnel confirmed that the sign offs on the weld procedures constituted verification that the procedure meets the require-ments of AWS D-1.1. A letter is forthcoming to verify this.

Based upon this aedit, questions have been raised as to the compliance of Bahnson Weld Inspection Procedure, QCI-9.001 CfiS, to the AWS Code D1.1 as it relates to undercut.

When Bahnson procedure QCI-9.001 CNS was formulated, a conversation was held between Bahnson and Duke's Catawba Analysis and Support Restraints section concerning the 1/32" undercut being in compliance with the Code.

Duke's support restraint section felt that the 1/32" undercut was acceptable due to the loading on these welds but this was not documented or followed up by a letter.

Duke Design Analysis Section has stated that concern for undercut is primarily related to fatigue considerations. The requirement for less allowable undercut when its direction is transverse to primary tensile stress is specifically aimed at high stress fatigue considerations.

Fatigue is not a concern in HVAC duct support systems and stresses for all loading conditions other than seismic are relatively low. For this reason the criteria used by Bahnson is considered acceptable.

Duke Specification CHS 1211.00-05 will be revised stating that fatigue is not a concern for HVAC duct support systems and stresses for all loading conditions other than seismic are relatively low; therefore undercut up to 1/32 inch is acceptable regardless of direction of primary tensile stress.

This revision will be completed by Feburary .1,1983.

147

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

I Performance Area construction Quality Assurancq__ _ _ _ _

Evaluator (s) D L Freeze ,

XV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practicts Finding # CC.5-4 _

QC inspectors sometimes perform production functions.

Corrective Action plan This finding is based on observation of an inspector tightening a loose nut on a concrete expansion anchor. While this did occur we do not feel, based on interviews with individual inspectors, that this is a common practice; however, all inspectors who inspect torque on concrete expansion anchors will be cautioned to report obviously loose nuts on appropriate process control documents (R-2A, M-51C, etc.). This action will be completed by November 15, 1982.

I 14C ,

. PERFOR",ANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION FROJE'CT INPO RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Test Equipment Control Perforr.ance Area C F York Evaluator (s) .

IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding # CC.7-1 Supervisors in the Quality Control organization do not always enforce adherence to required Quality Assurance or Construction Procedures.

Corrective Action Plan The factual information provided represents a minor violation of Procedure requi rements although no work was done using the M&TE items in question and the intent of the procedure was met. A nonconforming item. NCl 15749, has been originated, calibration stickers removed where applicable and the damaged sieve destroyed. Supervisor will be cautioned to adhere to procedures in future. This action will be completed by Nov 15, 1982.

149

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area Quality Procrams Evaluator (s) P Schrandt IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action: Good Pract. ices Finding # QP.1-1 Contracted vendor QA and QC program audits are not being performed in sufficient depth to ensure program effectiveness. Several weaknesses exist in the welding program of the HVAC contractor.

Corrective Action Plan Plans are to review Bahnson audits and Duke Vendor surveillance reports for sufficient depth.

Depending on our findings, surveillance will be expanded in order to further assure that Bahnson's QA Program is functioning properly. The review and first surveillance is to be completed by December 15, 1932.

t i

e 150

f.

~

l PERFOR!'.ANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INPO RESPONSE SHEET CATAWSA NUCLEAR ST.

I Independent Assessments 8 Performance Area D Franks, G Robinson, P Schrandt Evaluator (s)

IV. AreasofWeaknessandCorrectiveAction;_GoodPfactices Findino i QP 3-1 Independent assessments of some quality related activities have not been performed by the QA Department at Catawba for the last two years. Lack of independent assessments were noted for two special processes.

Corrective Action Plan l

The Surveillance Checklists at Catawba will be reviewed and revised as necessary to assure that significant activities are adequately covered. This review and I the necessary revisions will be completed by 2-15-83 Surveillance will be l performed in the two areas noted by 3-1-83 Note that an independent assessment I of one of the processess was performed by the NRC Resident inspector in August 1982. No deficiencies were noted.

An evaluation by the Audit Division to assure all quality-related activities were either assessed or planned to be asse,ssed before the end of 1982 was ongoing during the INPO evaluation. As a result of our efforts, the two special processes noted in Finding QP3-1, along with others, were identified as needing action; and plans have been made to complete this action. The two specific areas of QP3-1 are to be addressed during an audit beginning 10/25/82. The other areas will be addressed in subsequent audits.

The evaluation for assuring coverage of quality-related activities will be incorporated into our Audit Planning System.

151 .

, . - - , , . - , . - - , - ~ , - - , , , ,, . - . - . _ , - - , -

F08tANCE EVALUATION - CONSTRUCTION PROJECT

";PO

" CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

RESPONSE SHEET independent Assessments Performance Area D Franks, G Robinson, P Schrandt Evaluator (s) t IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action- Good Practices Finding i Q P 3-2 The surveillance program does not always assure a comprehensive assessment of addressed areas. An area was noted where an audit found several deficiencies but serveillance performed in the same area had not been effective in identifying problems.

Corrective Action Plan The position of Surveillance Supervisor was established at Catawba on September 1, 1982. The Surveillance Supervisor is reviewing surveillance activity to assure that it is effective. The area noted by this finding had been recognized as needing attention and surveillance had been planned. The planned, comprehensive surveillance was performed October 11-15, 1982.

152

PERFORf'.ANCE EVALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

RESPONSE SHEET Independent Assessments Performance Area D Franks, G Robinson, P Schrandt Evaluator (s)

IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action; Good Practices Finding

QP 3-3 Surveillance personnel do not adequately pursue full completion of assigned checklists in some cases. An area was noted where a checklist item had not been performed for 13 months when activity in the area nas been regular.

Corrective Action Plan The Surveillance Supervisor reviews all surveillances conducted. Effective immediately his review will include an evaluation of any checklist item not performed to detcrmine.the validity of the reason for not performing the item. If his evaluation indicates an invalid reason he will have the item scheduled and completed. Surveillance on the item noted as deficient will be completed by 3-15-83 153

Y .

PEAf0R".ANCEEVALUATION CONSTRUCTION P;0 JECT INP0 RESP 0tSE SHEE,T CATAWBA NUCLEAP,ST.

rrective Actio, Perforr.ance Area D Franks , P Schrf.r.d t , G Robinson Evaluator (s) ,

IV. Areas of L'eakr.ess and Ccerective Action; Good Practices Findino , QP 4-1 ,

in some cases, QA approvals of inspection discrepancies (Form R-2A) was not sufficiently critical. Cases were noted where QA had approved R-2A Forms where the statement of required action did not address the root causes and where corrective action had not yet been taken.

Corrective Action Plan s .,

Procedure R-2 which governs the initiation and resolution of R-2As i s presently under revision to clarify the~ initiation and resolution of inspectior. discre-pancies (Form R-2A). This revision will address the review of the R-2A by QA prior to QA approval. This rev!sion will be completed by 1 8 3 '.

+4 %

,N.

M 154

PERFORMANCE E'/ALUATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INP0 RESPONSE SHEET CATAWBA NUCLEAR ST.

Performance Area Corrective Action Eva fuator(s) D Franks, P Schrandt, G Robinson IV. Areas of Weakness and Corrective Action: Good Practices Finding # QP.4-2~

Some conditions adversesto quality found during inspection are reported in a manner that is not subjected to trend analysis. As a result, related generic problems are not addressed; and basic causes of degraded quality are not evaluated.

s Corrective Action Plan Ve agree with the finding. Quality Assurance Procedure M-51 will be revised to require the trending of the M-Sic forms by the Construction Department. This revision will be -completed by January, 1983 O

b t

k s

'h g s

155

-a <w-. Aw-- -- -_ .---- -- .- ..a_. -_

n --- - -

I APPENDlX A i

b' i OBSERVATION SHEETS a

7 o

t t

N ,

\

% . \

g 6

156 b--.__--__.._ _ , , , _ _ ---_-_- __,_ ~^-* -ey-g,, __

l I

l l

OBSERVATION OF SYSTEM VALK-DOWN

1. Scoce Observed a partial walk-down of System Nl.

II. Observations well-A. The information supplied the inspector appeared to be organized.

B. The inspector signed the walk-downs acceptable on the drawings prior to doing the work. ,

C. Valves IN1328, IN1329 and IN1330 were welded up on one side and left uncapped on the other. The inspector stated that was out of his area of rasponsibility. No corrective action was taken.

Ill. Conclusions A. Inspections may be signed off before they are performed.

B. Protective covers on valvet are not always being maintained.

157

OBSERVATION OF COSMETIC CONCRETE REPAIR I. Scope Observed two Concrete Finishers and one QC Inspector performing cosmetic concrete repair of spalled concrete around a 12" pipe penetrating the concrete containment wall--Unit 1 Reactor Building. The repair was on the outside f ace of the wall at Elevation 560 in the Auxiliary Building penetration room area.

11. Observations A. The repai r area had been previously cleaned of all loose particles.

The workers did clean area of any loose dust, etc, with compressed air before beginning work.

B. The inspector measured depth of spalling and assured the repair area met requirements for cosmetic repair.

C. The repair material, Sikatop 123, was already mixed. The QC Inspector said they had mixed one comolete bag since several large areas were going to be repaired.

D. The workers aoplied the components properly and blended the repai r with the originally-placed concrete such that a smooth interface resulted.

E. The QC Inspector observed the work in progress. He had a current copy of CP-430 in his possession which addressed cosmetic repair.

He also had a release log of Sikatop materials approved by QA 9-24-82, Revision 33, Occument Number 337 F. In the area was a fire extinguisher which had been inspected 9-8-82.

150

G. Two workers near the area were on an unguarded platform greater than 20 feet above the floor drilling and installing expansion anchors. One worker was tied off by safety lanyard; the other was not.

Ill. Conclusions A. Some craf t personnel tend to ignore safety practices.

B. Cosmetic concrete repai rs are being performed and inspected in accordance with proper procedures.

159

OBSERVATION OF CONCRETE OPERATION

1. Scoce Observed the batching, sampling, testing and placing operations for concrete assigned to Pour No. 4960 in the No. 2 Reactor Building from 8:45 am till 12:15 pm on 10-1-82.

11. Observations A. One Level I civil-structural inspector and one operator were present at the batch plant.

B. The first truck load (4 c.y.) was batched out--had the required mix-actual weights on a printed-out ticket, signed by the inspector releasing the truck for delivery. This load of concrete was rejected because of unacceptable amount of Melment was added to the concrete.

C. Reviewed records on storage of material--Form P-3C, Revision 1, dated 6-12-80, inspection of Stored Material and Equipment. Aggregate and admixtures met the level and storage conditions required. It was signed by Level I structural inspector and dated 10-1-82.

1 D. The second truck load (4 c.y.) was batched out--meeting all require-ments of Procedure M-2. This load of concrete was rejected--exceeded slumo before addition of Melment, even though the batched out water was 858 pounds, and the maximum Design called for was c60 pounds.

Note: There was a long telephone conversation between the plant inspector and his supervisor about the amount of water and Melment to be batched out on the second load.

E. The third truck load (4 c.y.) was batched out--met all requirements of the procedure. This load was accepted before and after the addition of Melment.

160

F. It was noted during the slump test measurement that the handle attached to baseplate had a 1/4" movement in the vertical direction.

This device is not under the calibration program. Remaining slump tests were performed by the inverted cone method. Both methods are acceptable.

G. A QA technician was performing a surveillance of this concrete pour.

These are required quarterly. No problems were noted.

H. First concrete reached the form at approximately 10:45 am. At the form were four utility personnel and thei r supervisor to place the concrete, two builders and thei r supervisor to monitor the form, one crane flagman and one QC inspector to monitor the placing of the concrete.

I. The concrete was being transported in a two cubic yard bucket. A tremie chute was used to drop concrete to bottom of form.

J. The Melment admixture caused the concrete to flow readily. Good vibration of the concrete in the form was performed.

K. Placing of the concrete progressed well. No clogging of tremie chute occurred.

L. The two craf ts were assisting each other when the need arose indicating good cooperation.

M. Good safety practices were observed. Safety belts and lanyards were being used where needed.

N. The approach path of the concrete to the form traveled over the refueling canal. The canal had been covered with polyethylene to protect against dripping concrete laitance.

161

I Ill. Conclusion Site personnel are not properly trained in the use of the additive, Melment to the concrete mix.

t 152

' ~~ _ _.

OBSERVATION 0F MATERIAL CONTROL .

I. Scope Review warehouse and storeyard storage activities relating to electrical equipment.

II. Observation A. Identification of material and equipment, both safety and non-safety, within warehouses was by paper stick-on tag with non-permanent adhesive. Tags on numerous items were either loose or had fallen off. Warehouseman stated there was no standard procedure for tagging or identifying equipment in the warehouse.

B. A non-safety transformer that was damaged was stored in middle of the aisle without any identification tag. The warehouseman was able to find the receiving paper by leafing through the record book. There was no camage notation on record.

C. Safety and non-safety equipment was stored together. There is potential for issuing wrong equipment.

D. Access to warehouse is rat secure from adjacent termination fabrication shop. Material on second and tnird shelves on bin separating the shop and warehouse is directly accessible L

to shoc personnel.

E. Access to warehouse is not secure from adjacent maintenance office area. Double doors were unlocked and open allowing direct access to storage areas.

F. Warehouseman responsible for receiving equipment in one warehouse stated he did not know of any procedures relating to his work.

Quality Assurar.ce Procedures P-1 and P-2 are directly applicable to receiving ano storage activities.

163

G. Same warehouseman Indicated he had been in his job three years and had not received any formal training in that job. Absence of knowledge of procedures indicates need for training. i H. Cable reels were stored in storage yard with cable ends open and unprotected. Open cable ends allow moisture to enter causing cable deterioration and possible failure in service.

1. Spare generator circuit breaker stored in yard had its control cabinet open where parts had been robbed. Disconnected tubing connections and loose parts were, therefore, exposed to the open envi ronmen t. This indicated lack of storage control, maintenance and surveillance and could lead to deterioration of equipment.

J. Varehouse supervisor indicated he needed training and informa-tion on handling hazardous materials.

Ill. Conclusions A. The procedures for storage of material are not always followed.

B. Procedures for identification of equipment in storage are not available.

C. Knowledge of storage procedures appear to be lacking.

0. Training of personnel does not appear adequate.

E. Procedures for identi fication of damaged equipment wi thin the warehouse do not appear to exist.

F. Control of access to warehouse appears to be weak.

164

OBSERVATION OF HVAC SUPPORT INSTALLATION

1. Scoce An observation was made of Bahnson Service Company's installation of duct supports and plenum work in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building.

Approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months were spent on this observation.

II. Observations A. Viewed Support 2-H-VC-4999 There appeared to be excessive undercut on some of the welds.

B. Looked at a plenum that was shown on Drawing CN-1684-VA-000H, Rev 0. This drawing had two sheets. There were differences between the drawing and what was erected.

Reviewed Design Change Request A-0073N523, Rev 15, wnich had 20 pages of revised details attached. Due to the volume of changes, the required configuration was difficult to understand.

DCR Procedure QFP3 004CNS, Rev 2, does not specify a time f rame to incorporate changes. No apparent discrepancies between the assembly and the drawing as modifled by the DCR were found.

C. The " process control" package for this plenum contained only the 7

drawing and the OCR. The Senior QA Engineer indicated that it should contain a sheet specifying the welding procedure, al though there is no written requirement.

D. When asked how the welder knew what welding procedure to use on the plenum, the supervisor said that the welder walks up and either knows what procedure to use, or he doesn't. If he knows what to use, he uses it. If he doesn't know, he asks his supervisor.

165

1 Each support package has a Sheet BSC-62-81, Rev 1, in it. This E.

sheet lists all procedures qualified for Catawba. Each welding procedure on the list has such things as base material type, base material thickness, welding process, joint type, etc shown. The welder (s) selects the welding procedure (s) to be used. After the support is completed, the supervisor checks off on the sheet the welding procedure (s) that was used.

t F. The welders did not stencil their work. The HVAC contractor's procedure requires that work be stenciled in those areas designated by the Project Welding Supervisor. No areas have been designated.

There is no Code requirenent (AWS 01.1) to stencil welds. Either the supervisor or the welder (s) list the welder (s) on "Ductwork Hanger Log Sheet." This log sheet is kept by the supervisor. The supervisor indicated that the log sheet, even though i t is a part of a formal procedure, is not a permanent QC/QA record, and he has never turned any in to the office. This log sheet is required by Procedure AFF-CNS 5 003, Rev 1. The procedure does not indicate the disposi tion of the log, and the Senior QA Engineer confi rmed that it was not a part of the permanent record. He also confirmed that there is no permanent record showing which welders or procedures were used on a suoport.

G. The supervisor indicated that QC checked each welder's " rods"

about once each week. The Senior QA Engineer said that filler material was checked on a surveillance basis, and there is no written requirement. There is a form (QC/QA 116, Rev 1) used to

documen t the inspection.

H. Procedure QCl 9 001 CNS, Rev 0, (Visual inspection of Welds) was reviewed and determined that this procedure allows 1/32" undercut on material greater than 5/32" thick. This does not meet the AWS 01.1 Code requirement.

1. The QC inspector's copy of QCl-10.002 CNS, Rev 0, (Seismic Hanger installation) was reviewed, and no apparent problems were found.

166

J. The QC inspector was asked that since the welders don' t mark their work and the welding procedure is not specified or recorded by individual welds, how did he know that the proper procedure was used on the weld and that the welder making that weld was qualified. He indicated that it was not a problem, that he just knew. The Senior QA Engineer indicated that this inspection was done on a surveillance basis.

K. Procedure CNS-007, Rev 0, (Welder Quali fication Log) was reviewed.

This procedure is designed to meet the 00-day requalification require-ment of ASME IX and appeared adequate.

L. A log is published monthly to show which welders are qualified on which procedures. This log is not a controlled document. As this log is not controlled, it is used to assign qualified welders to production welds and is subject to change; the distinct possibility exists to assign an unqualified welder to a job.

Ill. Conclusions A. Welding procedures and welders are qualified, but the program to control thei r use in the field needs modification.

I B. There are necessary functions that need to be performed; and V

these functions are being performed, but are not formalized in a procedure.

C. Procedures need to be reviewed for technical adequacy (i.e., do they meet the Code?).

D. Training should be performed so that welders know to which procedures they are working and where to find the requirements.

l 167 i

OBSERVATION OF BASEPLATE GROUTING

l. Scooe Conducted a brief review of quality and non quality baseplate grouting.

II. Observations A. The first two plates were quality related, and quality control was present.

B. The mixing water was measured by a painted line on the inside of a bucket.

C. The grout was Gifford-Hill Supreme, a non-shrink grout, of which a full sack was used in each batch.

D. An electric hand mixer was timed for 5 minutes. (The mixing time required was 4 to 5 minutes).

E. The inspector took the mixed grout temperature and recorded 78 F.

F. The area to be grouted had been wet and covered in burlao.

G. The area was inspected and released for grouting by the inspector, i

H. The grout was placed from one corner, and the entraoped air was removed.

l. The placea grout was dressed, and the crew moved on to the second baseplate.

J. The last two baseplates were non quali ty.

168

K. The difference between quality and non quality grouting was the inspection; craf t action was the same.

111. Conclusion The baseplate grouting operation for both quality and non-quality activi ties is meeting the program established and the effected performance objectives.

[

l u

e 7

169

OBSERVATION OF HANGER INSPECTION

1. Scoce Observed the final QC inspection of Hangers 1-R-FW-87 and 2-A-YC-3163 II. Observations A. The hanger document packages had all the required information needed to perform the final inspection, including applicable variation notices, nonconforming i tem reports, supplementing typical drawings ,

and baseplate epoxy report.

B. The inspector cited correctly the applicable procedure as M-51.

C. The inspector verifed that he had the correct drawing revisions by comparing them wi th those identified on Form M-51B.

D. The inspector verified all the dimensions shown on the hanger sketches and the correct material and size. The inspector was generally familiar with allowed tolerances but sometimes checked with a QA process control :echnician (our escort) for seccifics.

For example, on Hanger 2-A-YC-3163, the inspector did not recall "the latest thing they told us" on the tolerances for the "W" and "C-C" dimens ions. The QA technician provided the information, and the inspector stated that anything in doubt would be verified correct by checking the procedure, specification, or information f rom hi s supervisor.

E. Sufficient thread engagement was questionable on one of the nuts on Hanger 1-R-FW-87 The inspector stated that he could barely get a fingernail in part of a thread, so it was ok. He stated that no one said you had to be able to feel a thread the entire circum-ference of the anchor bolt. CP-115, Section 1F, states, "the anchor 170

to be torqued has at least a full nut engagement after torquing."

f Subsequent evaluation by the QA hanger group determined that the engagement was marginal but acceptable.

F. While attempting to verify that the welds were in the correct posi tion on Hanger 1-R-FW-87, the inspector became confused wi th the weld symbols on the hanger sketch and stated, "I don't know.

I'm not much of a weld inspector." He stated that the only reason they verified weld locations was to be sure that bench fabricated hangers were installed in the correct orientation. The inspector and the QA technician (escort) subsequently agreed that the welds were in the correct locations. Further checking with the QA hanger group verified the welds were positioned correctly.

G. Bearing surfaces of expansion anchor washer surfaces were visually inspected.

H. The inspector veri fied minimum torque on Hanger 2-A-YC-3163 anchor nuts. He stated that torquing was not checked at installation but at final inspection. This agrees with Procedure M-52.

1. Torque was checked at 20 ft-lb with a torque wrench set correctly with an attached sticker indicating calibration was current. The QA hanger group verified that this was the correct to rq ue.

2. The torque inspection resulted in three of four plate nuts tightening further during inspection, toraue being applied at minimum torque (20 ft-lb). One of there three moved significantly (more than 1/2 turn) .

3 The inspector tightened all the loose nuts to minimum torque while explaining that when they found loose nuts, they were instructed to stop, allowing the craft to correct the discrepancy.

He further stated that he believed i t was the common practice for the inspector to go ahead and tighten the nuts.

171

4. When asked how he knew how much torque to apply, the inspector stated that he did this so much that he just knew (the "12" in the expansion anchor identification HN1240 identified the amount of torque). Subsequent checking with the QA hanger group verified that 20 ft-lb was the correct torque.

~ The welds on item 3 (plate) of 2-A-YC-3163 were incorrectly positioned.

'l.,

x' The-inspector noted this and noted the discrepancy on Form M-51c for correction.

J. Several of the tolerances which the inspector cited without consulting the procedure were recorded and later verified with the QA hanger group.

Ill. Conclusions inspectors sometimes perform torquing on expansion anchor nuts which are found insufficiently torqued at the time of inspection rather than having the craft correct the discrepancy for subsequent reinspection.

172

OBSERVATION OF CONCRETE EXPANSION AllCHOR INSTALLATION

1. Scoce Observed two powerhouse mecpanics (hangers) installing two sleeve-type concrete expansion anchors in Unit 1 Auxiliary Building Penetration Room at Elevation 577 The general foreman and foreman for this area were present during the observation. Approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months was used for observation.

II. Observations The initial anchor Installation to be observed did not occur. The A.

hanger could not be installed to meet Design requirements. The problem was communicated to the Hanger Construction Engineering group. The hanger had previously been pre-checked and ok'd for installation.

B. The next anchor installation was for a two-anchor plate to be mounted to the ceiling. The plate had a strut attached to it.

C. The workers had located the anchors per the hanger sketch using l

the piping as the reference. .

D. Due to small size and spacing of these anchors, no ultrasonic check for embedded rebar was deemed necessary.

E. The holes were drilled to an approximate depth of 3 1/h" inches.

The workers used the length of the drill bit to gage the death and did not measure. Minimum depth required was 2".

F. Wi th the holes in an overhead position, no specific action was taken to clean the holes.

173

G. Anchors were installed by threading nut onto bolt and tapping on nut with a hammer to set the anchor into the drilled hole.

H. Nuts were tightened snug against plate. QC inspector was not present. Calibrated torquing will be done when the QC inspector is present for documentation.

I. While in the area, an anchor hanger was observed. This particular hanger was installed as a QA-2 hanger which did not require visual welding inspection. The hanger has been re-classified as a QA-4 hanger which requires visual weld inspection; however, some of the welds are now inaccessible. The workers did not know whether or not the hanger could be accepted as installed or if the hanger would have to be removed and re-installed.

J. Checked records and verified the two workers were trained to install anchors.

K. Returned to area later and installation had been completed.

Epoxy had been applied, and anchors torqued. Wrench used to torque was identified as CA-160. Follow-up with QA/QC showed the wrench to be currently in its calibration.

L. Area where expansion anchors were being installed was extremely congested with piping, valves and other hangers and restraints.

The congestion appears to make quali ty installation difficult to do.

Ill. Conclusions A. Vorkers and supervisors installing concrete expansion anchors are trained and knowledgeable of installation requirements.

B. Areas where hangers are being installed are extremely congested, making quality installations difficult.

C. Changing Design criteria provides potential for extensive craft rework.

174

OBSERVATION OF PRESSURE TEST

l. Scoce Observed a pressure test performed for shutdown 2018 7626. (RN System 100 + feet of 3" pipe.)

11. Observations A. The N-1A (hydro test form) listed the section low point as Elevation 578. The actual low point was approximately 602.

The N-1A was not corrected.

B. The N-1A indicated a relief valve set to 234-236 psig was required. The relief valve supplied by the test director was set at 238 psig. The maximum test pressure was 233 psig.

C. The QC inspector pointed out to the test director that he had marked minimum test pressure as not applicable. The minimum test oressure was then calculated by the director to be 210.8 psig, and the form corrected.

D. The temporary hoses being used to supply water to the system were leaking. The water was soaking a carton of filters identifiec as "AHU-3 1131-CNS." This was pointed out to the test director, I but the situation was not corrected.

E. Water from the hose leak was also running through an air duct sleeve to the elevation below creating a slick floor. During the observation two different people came to the test director to comolain. A utility person was stationed on the floor below to clean up the water. The hose connection was tightened to slow down the leak.

175

F. The test director left the test area to have the relief valve reset to 232 psig, and the range corrected on the N-1A. Two craft personnel and two inspectors waited in the area for him to return. The wait was approximately 20 to 25 minutes.

G. Further checking concerning proper system low point revealed di rection had been given the systems people in a letter dated 12-14-78. The letter stated the provisions would be added to the specification. Nothing could be located in the spec by this observer, nor by the systems engineer.

Ill. Conclusions A. Appropriate preparation for testing operations is not being performed prior to going to the field.

B. Direction is being taken from Design in letters which are not controlled.

C. Appropriate attention is not being given to stored materials and surrounding areas affected by leaking water.

176

i l

REVIEW OF PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

l. Scooe Reviewed the program for identification and performance of preventive maintenance during the construction process. The preventive maintenance program (PM) is implemented by Procedure P-3, and PM tasks and frequencies are identified by the Construction Engineering group on Form P-3A. Forms P-3A are initiated when a component arrives for storage and :re reviewed as necessary when the component is installed.

11. Observations A. A review of selected P-3A records maintained by QA revealed that all identified PM tasks on QA condition equipment are performed at the identified frequencies.

B. A reviewton to P-3A # M-94 (Reactor Cavity Manipulator Bridge Crane) changed the classification from " Nuclear Safety Related" to "Non QA Condition." The QA records reflected cancellation of the PM item.

1. QA reflected the status as cancelled because inspection of the PM activity is not required for non-QA condition equipment; thus, QA had no responsibility to assure PM compliance once the classification was downgraded.

2. A check of the Safety Related Structures. Systems and Comoonents Manual confirmed a non-safety related (QA Condition 1) status.

3 Additional examination of non-QA condition records reflected that PM M-c4 has been acccmplished at the prescribed frequency. Checks of additional non-QA condition PM tasks revealed accomplishment at the specified frequencies.

C. QA records reflected that P-3A #E-125 (KC Pump Motor 1B1) was can-celled by Construction Engineering on 5-19-82.

177

1. The stated reason by Construction Engineering for the cancella-tion was that once the power to the motor is terminated and the pump is coupled, it is turned over to the Construction " Systems" group for flush and hydro, and then it is turned over in short order to the Nuclear Production Department (NPD), who assumes PM responsibility. The cancellation Form P-38 stated the reason was that the pump and motor are coupled.

2. The KC System has not been turned over to NPD, and NPD performs no PM tasks on the equipment.

3 The Systems group runs the pumps periodically, as requested by NPD, for chemical mixing, but performs no PM tasks on the equip-ment.

4. No scheduled maintenance activities have been performed on 1B1 KC Pump Motor since cancellation of the P-3A Form.

5 QA reviewed the cancellation of the PM tasks. Asked why the PM was cancelled, the reviewer stated that " Construction Engi-neering determines the requirements--they can do anything they want to."

D. QA records reflected that P-3A #E-133 (Centrifugal Charging Pump IB Motor) was cancelled by Construction Engineering on 1-9-81. Previously identified PM tasks included rotati'g the shaft, checking the space heaters energized, periodic resistance checks and checking the oil level.

1. The same reason as stated in C.1 above was given for cancellation.

2. The NV System has not been turned over to NPD, and NPD performs no PM tssks on the equipment.

3 The Systems group performs no PM tasks on the equipmen:.

170

4. No scheduled maintenance activities have been performed on the equipment since cancellation of the P-3A Form.

5 QA reviewed the cancellation as in D.5, above.

E. The testing engineer stated that he is supposed to get copies of P-3A Forms when the systems are turned over to his group so that h'e can designate any PM items which are to continue. He stated that he has seen very few of the forms.

F. The wording of CP-411, Section 4.2.4 ("When a P-3A appears no longer appropriate because of T/0 to Systems...") implies preventive main-tenance ends at that point.

111. Conclusions Scheduled preventive maintenance activities on installed equipment does not always continue through the enti re period of Construction Department control.

b 179

OBSERVATION OF CONCRETE OPERATION

1. Scope Observed the batching, sampling, testing and placing operations for concrete assigned to the steam generator enclosure wall, Pour No.

4958 in the No. 2 Reactor Building from 8 am till 11: 30 am on 9/28/82. A visit was made to the civil section of site construction engineering, also,

11. Observations A. One Level I civil-structural inspector and one operator were present at the batch plant.

B. One truck had been loaded out before observation started.

C. Three consecutive loads were batched out--each had the required mix--actual weights on a printed-out ticket, signed by the QC insoector releasing the trucks for delivery.

D. Three of the four truck loads (8 c.y. per load) were rejected at the test point af ter the addition of Melment changed the batch-out Design mix from an allowable slump of under 4" to an unacceptable

! slump of more than 8".

E. The QC inspector was questioned about inspection and Testing, Part 4.3 of Procedure M-2, inspection of Design Concrete. He said that a mixer performance was performed on both the batch plant mixer and on truck No. 37 Upon checking on records at the concrete lab, they showed the main batch plant mixer passed the test, but truck No. 37 failed.

180

F. One QC supervisor, one Level I and one Level 11 inspector (civil-structural) were present at the discharge point (sampling and testing).

G. When the first truck load of concrete (8 c.y.) arrived, Melment L10-A was placed in the truck at the discharge point in accordance with the procedure (88 OZ/cy). Concrete met the Construction procedure before Melment was added to mix (less than 4" slump, 4-8 percent air content allowable), but failed criteria after Melment.was added (greater than 8" slump)..

H. QC supervisor produced Construction Procedure 461 as the control -

procedure for this concrete pour. CP-461 relates to repair of honeycomb areas. Pour No. 4958 was a first-time pour. Procedure 601 was the correct Construction procedure for this concrete pour,

l. The ladder allowing access to the area where concrete pours were being made had no cage or railing around the top portion of the ladder. The top of the ladder was 50 plus or minus feet from the ground floor of Reactor Building Uni t 2.

J. Procedure 461 (a controlled document) in the civil section of Construction Engineering had been altered by marking through parts of the typed materials. Also, additional comments had been written in ink at several places in this procedure. Altered controlled documents could cause confusion when referenced by individuals in the civil section.

K. At the pour location, there were six utility personnel plus utility supervisor, two builders plus builcer supervisor, two concrete finishers and one QC inspector during concrete placement at the form.

L. The rebar placement inside the form was somewhat irregular.

The builder supervisor stated that rebar previously embedded 181

s, Ny .-

s ,

. s

?,

- a- ,

was not precisely where it should have been. As a result, rebar was pulled into alignment to meet configurationfof the form. The \ s QC inspector stated this section of wal1 was actually better f rom --

>s this standpoint than some below it. -A few isolated reba'rs Were ,5 -

N '

wi th i n 1/2" -of Ithe fo rm. .

M. Drawings used'by the buidder supervisor to install the rebar and embedments were verified with Document Control that all ware of ,

the current revision.

N. In talking with the concrete finishet, he..expeds ed.Aconcerns about productivity'in grouting work being hampered by lack; of paperwork ,

to release hangers for grouting. He stated he often went into areas that looked like they.had many (40 to 50) hangers ready to -

grout, but would only ? lave' paperwork fyr a few (2 to 3). He was !.

concerned about inaccessibiJ i tyl -di ffi cul ty in transporting grout materials to areas of work. A general comment was made that there1 were too many people on site in the craft organization.

~

-^

O. The concrete pour was scheduled to begin at 8 am. Concrete arrived at approximately 10:25 A tremie chute (elephant trunk) ;

was used to tremie concrete to bottom of form; however, concrete backed up and chute became lodged. Af ter pulling, prying, etc for approximately 20 minutes, the builder supervisor told the $

3 utility supervisor he woulh remove the forms.,which he did. The s chute was then freed. The vibration of the concrete was adequate, s I

and the QC inspector was.activ'ely invcived in visual observation +I thatplacementandvibration5abreadequate. The tremie chute was 7

n. cw lodged again with tha next bucket of concrete. ,,

t.

P. A Rock Hill Concrett Ccmpany truck driver lef t his truck to watc s <

a slumo test, and h'e dij not have side shields on his glasses. ~

s.

y w .

Q. The uppermost personnel scaffold around the inside perimeter of ,

s the crane wall in Unit 2 Reactor Building is supported by cables ts.

1

, e 182 .

. .g _-

\

from brackets attached to the wall. Scaffolds are required to be,tnspected at regular intervals by craft foremen. An inspection the indicated last inspection was in March 1982.

R. Ywo powerhouse' mechanics were installing instrumentation guide funnels to the underside of the Unit 2 reactor vessel head. They N were having difficulty installing two of these funnels due to

. interference with the funnel and weld reinforcement on the instru-

'. nettation tube penetrating the head. They were waiting for the iletinghouse s site representative to observe the situation and recom-i mend action. No process control documentation had been generated to control the work.

\

ill. Conclusion A. Site personnel are not properly trained in the use of the additive Melment to the concrete mix.

A s' B. Some site workers tend to disregard basic safety rules.

4

=

p h g g k

\4 ,

L

_ , t. ' . ,,i

N F i .

y g

s k

A i eb

.i j133 -

.s. s.

s OBSERVATION

' 0F UNIT 2 PRESSURIZER CAVITY ENCLOSURE WALL b

!. Scoce Observed three utility personnel plus foreman, two buliders, one area engineer and one QC inspector making final adjustments to release bottom lift of pressurizer cavity enclosure wall for concrete placement. Work was identified by Placement No. Ao60.

11. Observations A. The previous day, the evaluation team was advised this pour would begin the morning of 9-30-82. When we arrived at the form at 9 am, the pre-pour inspection sheet had not been signed by QC.

B., Several areas had rebar too close to the form.

C. Final cleaning of the form was in progress.

D. QC was questioning the correctness of splice lengths on horizontal rebar. The builders had installed the rebar per verbal information t

l from the area engineer who had checked with Design. No cri teria was specified on the rebar drawings,and no variation notice was written to authorize the splice lengths used. The area engineer was measur ing the splice lengths on the horizontal bars to give information to Design such that a decision could be made by Design as to adequacy of installation. The area engineer did initiate a VN to verify splice lengths, and QC signed pre-pour.

E. No pour grade was marked on the form, and the utili ty foreman did not know where the top of concrete would be. He stated he would get the information from the builder foreman.

184

F. The utility foreman had not identified access points for placing concrete in the more heavily congested areas.

Ill. Conclusions A. The concrete pour was not ready for placement.

B. The builders had Installed rebar without knowing splice length criteria.

C. The builders had installed rebar not in accordance with clearance criteria.

D. The utility personnel had not planned their placement activi ties.

E. The area engineer was providing Design criteria information without documenting the information.

L

[

185

1 OBSERVATION OF MATERIAL CONTROL

i. Scope Review warehouse and storeyard storage activities relating to electrical equipment. i

11. Observation A. Identification of material and equipment, both safety and non-safety, within warehouses was by pap.. stick-on tag with non permanent adhe-sive. Tags on numerous items were either loose or had fallen off.

Warehouseman stated there was no standard procedure for tagging or Identifying equipment in the warehouse.

B. A non-safety transformer that was damaged was stored in middle of the aisle without any identification tag. The warehouseman was able to find the recel*/ing paper by leafing through the record book. There was no damage notation on record.

C. Safety and non-safety equipment war, stored together. There is poten-tial for issuing wrong equipment.

D. Access to warehouse is not secure from adjacent termination fabrication shop. Material on second and third shelves on bin separating the shop and warehouse is directly accessible to shop personnel.

E. Access to warehouse is not secure from adjacent maintenance office area.

Double doors were unlocked and open allowing direct access to storage areas.

F. Warehouseman responsible for receiving equipment in one warehouse stated he did not know of any procedures relating to his work.

Quality Assurance Procedures P-1 and P-2 are directly applicable to receiving and storage activities.

186

G. Same warehouseman indicated he had been in his job three years and had not received any formal training in that job. Absence of knowledge of procedures Indicates need for training.

H. Cable reels were stored in storage yard with cable ends open and unprotected. Open cable ends allow moisture to enter, causing cable deterioration and possible failure in service.

l. Spare generator circuit breaker stored in yard had its control cabinet open where parts had been robbed. Disconnected tubing connections and loose parts were, therefore, exposed to the open envi ronment. This indicated lack of storage control, maintenance and surveillance and could lead to deterioration of equipment.

J. Warehouse supervisor indicated he needed training and information on handling hazardous materials.

Ill. Conclusions A. The procedures for storage of material are not always followed.

B. Procedures for identification of equipment in storage are not available.

C. Knowledge of storage procedures appear to be lacking.

D. Training of personnel does not appear adequate.

E. Procedures for identification of damaged equipment within the ware-house do not appear to exist.

F. Control of access to warehouse appears to be weak.

I 187

. . _

ML20023B396

Contents

Text

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

Response

Response

Response

Response

Response

Navigation menu

ML20023B396

Text

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

Response

Response

Response

Response

Response

Navigation menu

Search