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Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20203J8581998-01-31031 January 1998 Rev 2 to Catawba Nuclear Station PRA Summary Rept, for Jan 1998.W/one Diskette ML20094N0751995-10-31031 October 1995 Validation of Crest, Interim Rept ML20117M8021995-07-31031 July 1995 CNS Standby Nuclear SW Pond Analysis ML20094N0641995-07-31031 July 1995 Computer Program for Coupled Response Spectrum Analysis of Secondary Sys ML20086F4711995-06-30030 June 1995 Interim Plugging Criteria 90 Day Rept ML20098A4511995-04-30030 April 1995 Stations Replacement SG Topical Rept ML20083N7541995-04-24024 April 1995 Rn Sys Corrosion in Stainless Steel Welds Metallurgical Analysis Rept ML20117M7911995-02-28028 February 1995 Standby Nuclear SW Pond Physical Testing Conducted During Feb 1995 ML20077R7101994-12-20020 December 1994 CNS Units 1 & 2 10CFR50.59 Evaluation of FSAR Change Related Edsfi Deviation 50413,414/92-01-02 (IEEE 308-1974) ML20077C5771994-11-0303 November 1994 1 Cycle 7 Interim Plugging Criteria Assessment & Projected EOC-8 Slb Leakage ML20072T4441994-08-31031 August 1994 Selected Licensee Commitments ML20063E2801994-01-31031 January 1994 Duke Power Co Catawba Nuclear Station Special Rept RHR Pump Vibration ML18010B0841993-05-0505 May 1993 NRC Licensing Submittal Review of Licensing Conditions Imposed by NUREG-1216. ML18010A9521992-11-30030 November 1992 NRC Licensing Submittal Review of Licensing Conditions Imposed by NUREG-1216. ML20062G7271990-11-19019 November 1990 Eddy Current Exam Rept Catawba Unit 2 June 1990 Refueling Outage 3 ML20043E7701990-02-28028 February 1990 Rev 0 to Catawba Unit 2 Cycle 3 Core Operating Limits Rept. ML20043E8101990-02-28028 February 1990 Rev 0 to Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 5 Core Operating Limits Rept. ML20154K2091988-09-0909 September 1988 Rev 0 to Response to NRC Bulletin 88-005,Nonconforming Matls Supplied by Piping Supplies,Inc at Folsom,Nj & West Jersey Mfg Co.... Proprietary Procedure 1404.1, Leeb Hardness Testing (Equotip).... Encl.Procedure Withheld ML20196L6281988-05-20020 May 1988 Rev 2 to ATWS Mitigation Sys Actuation Circuitry (Amsac) ML20212K1201987-01-23023 January 1987 Final Design Description,Atws Mitigation Sys Actuation Circuitry ML20207H9651986-05-13013 May 1986 SPDS Software Verification & Validation Summary Package, Catawba Nuclear Station ML20155F7451986-04-30030 April 1986 Draft Main Bearing Shell Analysis 2B Emergency Diesel Generator-Catawba Unit 2 ML20155F7381986-04-30030 April 1986 Diesel Generator 2B 7 Main Bearing Failure Rept,Low Power License Condition 13,Attachment 1,Item 9 ML20198J4071986-04-30030 April 1986 Rev 1 to Catawba Nuclear Station Diesel Engine 2A Component Revalidation Insp ML20203N4171986-04-30030 April 1986 Rev 2 to Tdi Owners Group App Ii:Generic Maint Matrix & Justifications ML20207H9701986-04-28028 April 1986 SPDS Maint Summary Package,Catawba Nuclear Station ML20207H9601986-04-23023 April 1986 SPDS Human Factors Program Summary Package,Catawba Nuclear Station ML20207H8901986-03-27027 March 1986 SPDS Design Basis Summary Package,Catawba Nuclear Station ML20210E5111986-03-25025 March 1986 Rev 13 to Pages from Analysis of Hydrogen Control Measures at McGuire Nuclear Station, Responding to Questions Transmitted by Youngblood ML20207H9211986-03-14014 March 1986 SPDS Critical Safety Function Selection Summary Package, Catawba Nuclear Station ML20207H9541986-03-14014 March 1986 SPDS Logic Verification Summary Package,Catawba Nuclear Station ML20207H9501986-03-14014 March 1986 SPDS Logic Generation Summary Package,Catawba Nuclear Station ML20207H9331986-03-14014 March 1986 SPDS Status Trees Development Summary Package,Catawba Nuclear Station ML20138P4801985-12-17017 December 1985 Diesel Engine 2B Component Revalidation Insp ML20137V9141985-09-25025 September 1985 Diesel Engine 2A Component Revalidation Insp ML20215C4221985-08-31031 August 1985 Rod Swap Methodology Rept for Startup Physics Testing ML20128E9831985-06-21021 June 1985 Diesels - Tdi Owners Group Design Review/Quality Revalidation Final Rept,Summary of Recommendations ML20115E0231985-04-30030 April 1985 Main Steamline Break Inside Containment, Bimonthly Status Rept for Apr 1985 ML20198B5701985-02-28028 February 1985 Rev 1 to Tdi Diesel Generator Design Review & Quality Revalidation Rept, Vols 1-4 ML20090J0071984-07-31031 July 1984 Description of Deviations from Generic Emergency Response Guidelines (Westinghouse Owners Group ERG-Basic Edition) ML20092N7021984-06-29029 June 1984 Diesel Engine 1A Component Revalidation Insp Final Rept ML20092J2441984-06-20020 June 1984 Duke Power Co 12 H Shift Experience ML20092J2671984-06-0808 June 1984 Util Advisor Evaluation Team Rept on Catawba Nuclear Station Shift Advisor Program,840606-08 ML20091J0561984-06-0101 June 1984 Diesel Engine 1A Component Revalidation Insp Rept ML20091L8721984-05-31031 May 1984 Sqrt Audit Resolution for Ser,Catawba Unit 1 ML20090G6731984-04-30030 April 1984 Nuclear Physics Methodology for Reload Design ML20083P9381984-04-17017 April 1984 Sqrt Audit Resolutions for Sqrt Audit Conducted 840313-16. W/Seven Oversize Drawings.Aperture Cards Are Available in PDR ML20087M6281984-03-28028 March 1984 Nonproprietary, Methodology for Addressing Superheated Steam Releases to Ice Condenser Containments ML20080U4541984-02-29029 February 1984 Rev 10 to Analysis of Hydrogen Control Measures at McGuire Nuclear Station 1999-05-31
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217H0201999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 ML20212B4711999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217H0321999-08-31031 August 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999 Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate ML20211A9791999-08-20020 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section Xi,For Plant,Unit 2 ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999 Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009 ML20211C1291999-08-17017 August 1999 ISI Rept Unit 1 Catawba 1999 RFO 11 ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20210S2891999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20212B4871999-07-31031 July 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20210S2951999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4501999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4561999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology ML20196A0001999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206P5201999-05-14014 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20206N8391999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr ML20206R1811999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196A0041999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N8261999-04-22022 April 1999 Rev 15 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr. Page 145 of 270 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20205S5551999-04-21021 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20205N3651999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting IPE of External Events Submittal ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML20206R1931999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9521999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9561999-02-28028 February 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20204C9111999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20203A2581999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation of TR DPC-NE-3002-A,Rev 2, UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology. Rept Acceptable. Staff Requests Duke Energy Corp to Publish Accepted Version of TR within 3 Months of Receipt of SE ML20204C9161999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199K8711999-01-13013 January 1999 Inservice Insp Rept for Unit 2 Catawba 1998 Refueling Outage 9 ML20199E3071998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216F9931998-12-31031 December 1998 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 1998 Annual Rept ML20205E9441998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 10CFR50.59 Rept for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2, Containing Brief Description of Changes,Tests & Experiments,Including Summary of Ses.With ML20206P2081998-12-31031 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981218,inoperability of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Channels,Was Observed.Caused by Data Logger Overloading Circuit.Replaced & Repaired Temp Signal Processor ML20203A4101998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-25, Catawba Unit 2 Cycle 10 Colr ML20203A4041998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 14 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 11 Colr ML20198B1341998-12-14014 December 1998 Revised Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Removal of Firestop Damming Boards.Hourly Fire Watches Established in Affected Areas ML20196J8351998-12-0808 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request Re Relief Valves in Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Sys ML20199E3221998-11-30030 November 1998 Revised MOR for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 Re Personnel Exposure ML20198E3151998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196C0251998-11-27027 November 1998 SER Accepting Clarification on Calibration Tolerances on Trip Setpoints for Catawba Nuclear Station ML20196A6881998-11-25025 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request 98-02 Re Limited Exam for Three Welds ML20196D4041998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 1 to Special Rept:On 980618,determined That Method Used to Calibrate Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Does Not Meet TS Definition for Channel Calibration.Procedure Revised ML20195E5521998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20198E3261998-10-31031 October 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154M7661998-10-12012 October 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 980913,terminated Vendor Employee Entered Protected Area.Caused by Computer Interface Malfunction. Security Retained Vendor Employee Badge to Prevent Further Access & Computer Malfunction Was Repaired.With 1999-09-07
[Table view] |
Text
Attachment 3 SPDS STATUS TREES DEVEIDPIENT SUIEEARY PACKAGE CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION Section I: Description of Development Process Section II: Summary of Results Section III: Listing of Applicable Documentation H. J. Lee, Jr.
Nuclear Engineering Design Engineering Department March 14, 1986 Page 1 of 5 e607230137 e60715 14 PDR ADOCK 0500 P
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Attachment 3 I. Description of Develotmoent Process Parts 1 and 2 of the following have been condensed from the Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines Background information.
Status Tree Format The plant parameters that define the state of each Critical Safety Function are identified on the associated Status Tree.
Typically, only a few parameters are required to identify the status of a Critical Safety Function. This limited set of parameters must be evaluated in a systematic manner to determine the Critical Safety Function status. A branching structure inherent in a decision or event tree is the logical vehicle to structure the systematic evaluation of plant parameters that determine the status of a Critical Safety Function. Each Status Tree has a single entry point and several exit points (termini) depending on the parameters that define the Critical Safety Function status. Each pass through a Status Tree can produce only one exit point based on the values of the parameters in the Status Tree.
The basic format for the Catawba SPDS Status Trees is referred to as the block version. In the block version, each question is simply stated once in a positive sense, and the decision options "YES" or "NO" provide the branching.
The block version has been found easy to evaluate since a question only needs to be answered once and the branching follows from the decision. This form closely approximates the logic which would be programmed for a computer evaluation of a " branch point".
Definition of Priorities In addition to identifying the safety state of the plant, the Status Trees also provide an ideal vehicle to prioritize operator response to Critical Safety Function challenges.
When Critical Safety Functions are challenged, multiple challenges may exist requiring additional guidance to structure operator function-related restoration. This additional guidance is provided by prioritizing all potential challenges to Critical Safety Functions. This predefined prioritization is accomplished by prioritizing the Critical Safety Function" (i.e., specifying the order in which the Status Trees are monitored) and prioritizing the termini of
! the Status Trees.
i Page 2 of 5
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. _ - . _ . - - - - --- = - . ._ . . . - .
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J Attachment 3 6
Challenges must be prioritized within each critical Safety i Function and between Critical Safety Functions. Since each
! pass through a Status Tree produces a single terminus (exit)
}
based on the status of the Critical Safety Function, the j termini can be prioritized based on the severity of the
- challenge. Four status conditions (i.e., extreme challenge, j severe challenge, off- normal and satisfied) are defined to permit each condition to be prioritized with respect to other j Critical Safety Function conditions. Furthermore, for each j Status Tree the parameter decision points are arranged so i that parameter decisions that indicate extreme challenges are i generally situated early in the Status Tree followed success-ively by decision points that indicate severe challenges, J off-normal and satisfied conditions. This permits relatively j comparable conditions (e.g.; two severe challenge conditions)
! within a Status Tree to be prioritized by the arrangement of I decision points in the tree structure.
) As indicated previously, the prioritization discussed above is expressed by colored line codings and terminus symbols.
l The color coding is used as a mechanism to immediately inform 4
the operator that a Critical Safety Function is in jeopardy and to indicate the relative severity of the challenge. The priorities of each Status Tree terminus (representing some i
l plant condition) have been evaluated against each other so that all internal priorities are consistent.
The action which an operator takes in response to a Critical Safety Function challenge is related to the severity of that i challenge. Each terminus symbol which is not green (satis- ,
! fied) is annotated with the instruction "GO TO l EP/2/A/5000/2XY," the appropriate Function Restoration l Procedure. "X" is the alphabetical code for the respective l Critical Safety Function and "Y" is the subprocedure number.
Each of the RED priorities is assigned the first subprocedure i number; for example, the Function Restoration Procedure or an
! inadequate core cooling condition (RED priority on Core Cooling (B) Status Tree) is depicted as EP/2/A/5000/2Bl.
f In summary, the priority of operator action is fixed by the physical arrangement of the trees. Each tree contains d multiple termini, each of which represents possible current status of that critical Safety Function. Each terminus (and
- preceding branch) is color coded, reflecting the urgency of that condition regarding operator action, and each also l
j refers to the appropriate guidelines to be used.
f I Page 3 of 5 l
l i
Attachment 3 For the entire set of trees, priority of operator action is given by the following:
- 1. REDS (Extreme challenges), in tree order
- 2. ORANGES (Severe challenges), in tree order
- 3. YELLOWS (Off-normal) in tree order As an example, a RED condition for Core Cooling is of higher priority than a RED condition for Containment (order of trees). However, the RED condition for Containment is of higher priority than any ORANGE condition (order of colors).
Incorporation of NRC Comments In the NRC SER on the BASIC version of the WOG ERGS, page 4-9, Item (12), it is recommended that ice condenser plants should incorporate an additional branch on the containment status tree to check for a high containment hydrogen concentration. This change, although not done on a generic basis, has been made to the Catawba Status Trees.
Technical Chances by Duke Power Company The WOG ERG Integrity statue tree treats pressurized thermal shock and cold overpressurization as the only challenges to RCS integrity. Overpressuriation due to a partial or complete failure of the RCS pressure control mechanisms is also a valid challenge. To address this, additional branches were added to the Catawba Status Trees.
' Setpoint Development All of the setpoints used in the Catawba Status Trees have
- been calculated, reviewed, and documented by Duke Power Company. Appropriate consideration was given to the differences between Catawba and the generic plant. e.g. the UHI RVLIS, and to differences between units at Catawba, the steam generator level setpoints. The Catawba Status Trees use dual setpoints for normal and adverse containment conditions where appropriate.
Format Chances to Facilitate SPDS Usage The WOG ERG Subcriticality Status Tree was modified by adding a branch at the beginning to decide whether a reactor trip is required. If not, the safety function is satisfied. This allows usage of this Status Tree when the unit is at power.
i Page 4 of 5
Attachment 3 II. Sununary of Results The enclosed Catawba Unit 2 Critical Safety Function Status Trees are reprinted from EP/2/A/5000/02 III. Listing of Applicable Doctamentation Date From M Subject 06/01/83 DG Eisenhut (NRC) JJ Sheppard (WOG) BASIC ERG SER 06/18/84 HB Tucker HR Denton (NRC) Deviations (Duke Power) Between Catawba EPGs and Revision 1 ERGS.
06/01/84. Duke Power Company Catawba Nuclear Station Emergency Procedure Guidelines Reference Document, Chapter 5, "Setpoints".
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PAGE NO.
CNS SUBCRITICALITY 1 EP/2/A/5000/2A RETYPE #0 GO TO EP/2/A/5000/2A1 GO TO EP/2/A/5000/2A1 gMMMMMMMMMMMMM NO g POWER E RANGE g
< 5%
g ,.
GO TO
- ' ;EP/2/A/$000/2A2 YES E E
N0 INTERMEDIATE
^"
INTERMEDIATE YES M0RE RANGE SUR NEGATIVE REACTOR ZEROOR
~ THAN -0 2DPM
+ TRIP NEGATIVE YES REQUIRED YES NO l CSF i
SAT NO SOURCE RANGE ENERGlZED YES GO TO EP/2/A/5000/2A2 l
l l NO SOURCE l RANGE l SUR ZERO OR r NEGATIVE YES i CSF SAT l
CSF i SAT PAGE 10F 1
4 CNS PAGE NO.
CORE COOLING 1 EP/2/A/5000/2B RETYPE #0 P/2 A/5000/2B1 GO TO EP/2/A/5000/2B1 NO CORE EXIT
'$ RX VESSEL f'H AN l200*F LOWER RANGE LEVEL GREATER YES THAN 43%
- NO CORE EXIT T/Cs LeSS g THAN 700*F GO TO NO EP/2/A/5000/282 YES ONE NC GO TO PUMP RUNNING EP/2/A/5000/282 NO RX VESSEL LOWER RANGE LEVEL GRE ATER THAN 43%
NO NC SYSTEM YES SUBC00 LING GREATER THAN0*F YES GO TO EP/2/A/5000/283 GO T0 l
1 EP/2/A/5000/282 RX VESSEL D/P LEVEL NO GRE ATER THAN REQUIRED j LEVEL FOR PUMP COMBIN (REFER TO YES EP/28 PG 2)
GO TO EP/2/Ai5000/283 CSF i
SAT PAGE 10F 2
A2(H21 PAca NO.
r , CNS 2 CORE COOLING Retype #0 EP/2/A/!M)00/2B ,
p' DYNAMIC HEAD RANGE RVLIS I SETPOINTS FOR DEGRAOED CORE COOLING !
Channel B f Number of Channel A with NC Pump C l NC Pumps with NC Pump A ~
' Not Running Running Not Running Running
-- 80%
4 80%
60% 32%
60% 32%
3 45% 20%
45% 20%
2 35% 14%
35% 14%
1
. 0 Page 2 of 2
CNS PAGE NO.
HEAT SINK 1 EP/2/A/5000/2C RETYPE #0 P/2 A/5000/2C1 TOTAL NO FEEDWATER FLOW TO INTACT S/Gs GREATER THAN 450 GPM YES ~~
" ' ' ' * ~ __ -. ,,
" " c "
2 GO TO
'EP/2/A/5000/2C2 NO NO NR LEVEL IN PRESSURE IN AT LEAST ONE ALL S/Gs S LESS THAN
> 5% 1230 PSIG ACC)
! yg YES GO TO
, 0 0; EP/2/A/5000/2C3 NARROW NO RANGE LEVEL IN ALL S/Gs LESS THAN 781%
( < 631% FOR YES ACC)
' ~ ' ' ' GO TO
'.\
I
. _ 'EP/2/A/5000/2C4 I
NO PRESSURE IN ALL S/Gs LESS THAN l 1175 PSIG YES GO TO EP/2/A/5000/2C5 NR LEVEL IN NO ALL S/Gs
> 5%
( > 18% FOR ACC)
YES l
CSF PAGEt0F1 SAT
. - . - , _ . , _ , __ .- _ .-, ,, _ . _ . , . , ,.m
CNS PAGE NO.
REACTOR COOLANT INTEGRITY 1 EP/2/A/5000/2D RETYPE #0 P/ A/5000/201 ALL NC NO PRESSURE /
COLD LEG
_ TEMPERATURE POINTS TO RIGHT OF LIMIT A YES EBE R R E m m m m m m m ag n g333 0T fp/2A!5000/201 ALL NC SYSTEM NO EPJPERATURES . EEEEEEEEE P/2 A!5000/203 GREATER E THAN 350*F YES PZR N0 "'
GO T0 SuR G<
g hR gA ( a EP/2/A/5000/202 2400 PSIG TEMPERATURE { < 2250 FOR NC ACC) YES DECREASE IN ALL COLD M
t gg
' ^
HA 1 "F IN GR ATER THE LAST 60 THAN MINUTES YES 457'F YES CSF l SAT EEI B LEI M E3 M E3 E E E E M M E G EI N E E M E EE EE C2 . , GO TO EP/2/A/5000/203 g f .,
" ~
GO TO Ell EP/2/A/5000/201 PZR NO PRESSURE LESS THAN NO
- ALL NC 2400 PSIG COLD LEG
( < 2250 FOR l ACC) TEMPERATURES YEe' GREATER NO THAN 250*F NC PRESSN'S LESS THAN N0 400 PSIG GO TO ALL NC SYSTEM ype' COLD LEG EP/2/A/5000/202 TEMPERATURES
- GREATER THAN 300 F YES f
- CSF SAT I . CSF PAGE 1 OF 2 \
I .
CNS PAGE NO.
REACTOR COOLANT INTEGRITY 2 EP/2/A/5000/2D RETYPE #0 PTS LIMIT CURVE 2600
)
2400
[
2200 2050 FSIG /
/
muF 'A /
wy 2000 1800 1600 en i
b w 1400 -
( g
?n
@ 1200 j 49 &
m C RFn 4 M ORAblGE
$ 6
~
ALARM ALARM d E 1000 h
800 600 400 200 l
0 100 200 300 400 TEMPERATURE ( F)
PAGE 2 OF 2
CNS PAGE NO.
CONTAINMENT 1 EP/2/A/5000/2E RETYPE #0 P/2 A/5000/2E1 NO CONTAINMENT PRESSURE LESS THAN 15 n rSIG YES GO T0 g4 E E IB E E E E IB Idi M E E E K3 E E E E E E EP/2/A/5000/2E1 m
CONTAINMENT PRESSURE LESS THAN 3 0 PSIG YES (EEEEEEEEEEEEEE P/2 A/5000/2E1 B
CONTAINMENT N0 HYDROGEN CONCEN-TRATION LESS THAN YES
( GO TO gEEDEEEEEE EP/2/A/5000/2E2 I e l
NO CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL LESS THAN 13 FT YES l GO TO EP/2/A!5000/2E3 EMF 53A(B) l CONTAINMENT R ADI ATION LESS THAN 3R HR YES PAGE 10F 1 l 'O.
i CSF g / SAT
CNS PAGE NO.
REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY 1 EP/2/A/5000/2F RETYPE #0 Gd TO 9
EP/2/A/5000/2F3 NO RX VESSEL UPPER RANGE LEVEL > 97%
& STABLE 1
YES GO TO EP/2/A/5000/2F1 NO PRESSURIZER LEVEL GO TO
=
LESS THAN EP/2/A/5000/2F2 92% ( < 80% -
FOR ACC)
YES PRESSURIZER LEVEL N0 GREATER THAN 17%
( > 45% FOR GO TO ACC)
EP/2/A/5000/2F3 NO RX VESSEL UPPER RANGE LEVEL > 97%
& STABLE YES l3 , CSF SAT l PAGE10F1 l
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