ML20091L872
| ML20091L872 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1984 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20091L871 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8406080238 | |
| Download: ML20091L872 (30) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:i DUKE POWER COMPANY l DESIGN ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT ! SQRT AUDIT RESOLUTIONS FOR SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NUMBER 50-413 O O RESOLUTION SUBMITTAL DATE May 31,'1984 ll JO ,= 8406000238 840531 PDR ADOCK 05000413
.E.; .
PDR __. I s mm
a 0-SQRT AUDIT RESOLUTION (m,,) - SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NUMBER 50-413 J CONTENTS Introduction Generic Issues - 3.10.1.1 (1) and (2) Equipment Specific Issues - 3.10.1.2 (1) Solid State Protection System (Westinghouse Report No. WCAP-7817, Rev. 0) (2) Centrifugal Charging Safety Injection Pump / Motor (Pacific Report No. K-318-1, Rev. 5) (3) RHR Pump / Motor (Mcdonald Report No. ME-174) n'
\se (4) Engineered Safeguards Test Cabinet (Westinghouse Report No. WCAP-7817, Supp. 7)
(5) 4160 - Volt Essential Switchgear (Gould Report No. 33-50465, AddII, Sept.,1981) (6) Main Control Boards (Duke Spec. No. CNS-1393.00-00 "002, Rev. 3) (7) Pressurizer PORV (Control Component Report No. 18789-1 & 2) (8) 18-Inch Feedwater Isolation Valve / Actuator
-(Borg-Warner Report No. NSR-74040, Dated 8-25-78)
(9) Containment Return Air Isolation Damper Operators (Wyle Report No. 43979-1,Rev.A)
- (10) Motor Operators (ITT Report No. 721.77.085, Dated 3-14-77)
, u/
SQRT AUDIT RESOLUTIONS
/~' - SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
^ k ,] CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NUMBER 50-413 ,- . INTRODUCTION On March 13-16, 1984, the NRC conducted a Seismic Qualification Review c Team (SQRT) audit at Catawba. A list of NRC concerns were given to Duke L Power at an exit interview on March 16, 1984. Duke Power has responded to 4 these concerns in a resolution submittal dated April 18, 1984. On May 21-22,1984
. appropriate personnel from Duke Power, Westinghouse, and BBC, Brown Boveri, Inc. met with the NRC to resolve NRC concerns with the Duke April 17, 1984 submittal. The' purpose of this submittal is to document the resolutions mutually agreed upon during the May 21-22 meeting.
t O 1 f v .
3.10.1.1 Generic issues (1) Verify and confirm in writing that the g-values obtained from the as-built piping analysis do not exceed the g-values used for qualification of pipe-mounted equipment. In the referenced response (April 18, 1984), the applicant stated that thei r QA procedures require the as-built piping analysis accelerations to be within the specified qualification limits. This response is inadequate to resolve the issue. The applicant should confirm that the analysis has been performed and the resulting accelerations are acceptable. Resolution: Duke Power has confi rmed that Catawba Uni t I as-built piping accelerations are less than the allowable valve / equipment acceleration values. This response was discussed and found acceptable by the NRC Staff at the May 22, 1984 meeting. Status: Closed. (2) Verify and confirm in writing that for flexible pipe-mounted equip-ment, the as-built piping systen was modeled with the flexible equip-ment mass and dynamically analyzed, and the resulting stress and acceleration values do not exceed the respective allowable and quali-() fication levels. ' For example, the UHI Valve qualification .eports indicate multiple natural frequencies below 33 Hz and the Feedwater Isolation Valve exhibits one flexible mode. Resolution: Duke Power has confirmed that Catawba Unit 1 as-built piping systems were modeled to include any flexible equipment and dynamically analyzed. The analyses verify that the resulting stresses and acceleration values are below the respective allowable and quali-fication levels. This response was discussed and found acceptable by the NRC Staff at the May 22, 1984 meeting. Status: Closed. q h-- g MMM
3.10.1.2(1) Solid State Protection System (Westinghouse Report No. WCAP-7817, Rev. 0)
.~; ,
(a) Provide an auditable link between the specimen tested and the equipment installed in the field. Resolution: Westinghouse has designed two standard types of Solid State Protection Systems (SSPS). They are the Two-Train (three and four bay) and Three-Train SSPS as identiried in EQDP-ESE-16 and EQDP-ESE-17 respectively. Catawba Unit 1 is provided with the standard three-bay two-train SSPS. The three-bay two-train SSPS was seismically qualified by type testing. The test cabinet is representative of that provided for the Catawba Unit 1 application. The test cabinet and electrical components found within are the same type as those provided for Catawba Unit 1. The patential differences between the two units are the number of electrical components and their locations within a specific cabinet bay. The electrical components tested were critically positioned within the three-bay two-train SSPS cabinet to conservatively represent a plant specific application. Status: Clo, sed. (b) Provide test resonance frequencies and justify acceptability of the qualification for the frequency range 25-33 Hz, since 9s per documents presented during the audit, the specimen was not tested in this frequency range. Resolution: The Solid State Protection System (SSPS) for Catawba Unit 1 (DCP) Nuclear Station, consists of two three-bay two-train SSPS cabinets. The three-bay two-train SSPS was seismically qualifiad using single axis single frequency sine beat testing. This testing is documented in the following reference: e WCAP-7817, " Seismic Testing of Electrical and Control Equipment," Revision 0, December 1971. e WCAP-7817, Supplement 2, " Seismic Testing of Electrical and Control Equipment (Low Seismic Plants)," Revision 0, December 1971. e WCAP-7817 Supplement 3, " Seismic Testing of Electrical and Control Equipment (W Solid State Protection Systems)," Revision 0, December 1971. These reports were presented during the Catawba Unit 1 SQRT Audit the week of March 13, 1984 to demonstrate seismic qualifica-tion of the three-bay two-train SSPS. The subject reports do not identify that SSPS was tested in 25-35 Hz frequency range. a-
,. 7. . - As part of the-SQRT audit, W presented for the three-bay
? two-train SSPS comparisons of single frequency test response
../N spectra curves against the Catawba Unit 1 required response V ~
spectra (RRS). The Catawba RRS have a cut-off frequency of 20 Hz. The comparisons provided demonstroted the TRS curves in the horizontal and vertical directions to envelop the
. Catawba RRS' with considerable amount of margin. In addition,
- the test input peak accelerations at resonance frequencies of
. the cabinet were greater than the ZPA for the Catawba RRS.
Westinghouse has reviewed the seismic test data file for the 4 three-boy two-train SSPS and has verified testing was performed E in the 25-35 Hz frequency range. This testing was performed at } the same time period as the 1-25 Hz seismic testing. - Resonance search testing was performed on the three-bay two-4 train SSPS separately in the front-back, side-side, and vertical l~ directions prior to seismic testing. Sinusoidal sweeps were ' conducted from 1-35 Hz at an amplitude of 0.2g. Resonant t frequencies identified during testing are defined below: Front - Back: 8.5 - 10.5 Hz Side - Side: 8.0 - 9.5 Hz ~ i Vertical: None
- Following resonance search testing, the three-bay two-train SSPS was seismically tested over the 1-35 Hz-frequency range.
. :O - WCAP-7817 and Supplenents 2 and 3 idencify the acceleration levels the three-bay two-train SSPS' experienced during seismic
- testing within the 1-25 Hz frequency range. Seismic testing-
! within the 25-35 Hz frequency range was verified by reviewing i test data in the three-bay- two-train'SSPS seismic test ~ data file. Brushrecordings(SSPS-LS-FB,SSPS-LS-SS,SSPS-LS-V L found in W Storage Box No. 30160(86-7)) from testing identified the equipinent was tested in the front-back, side-side, and vertical directions at 33.5 Hz at an amplitude of 0.29 1 I i Therefore based on the above W believes there is sufficient documentation and test data to demonstrate the three-bay two-train SSPS was seismically qualified within the 1-35 Hz frequency j- range. s l 1 Status: Closed. h ' (c) ' Include complete test mounting details in the qualification-l report. b Westinghouse's response that this information is available
~~
- in SQRT forms 'is not: acceptable since SQRT forms are not QA
' documents, jTest mounting details should-be completely defined 9
' snd made part'of the ~ qualification package. ,
, vQ 1 ,
'o l' _
4a ,
--s r- er -9 , .v--m.- # y g- -- + -. r--- m ' - - - -
oor c,?n- --mep-r= rg - .me'-T+ ee gg g e- e e Sv
Resolution: Westinghouse has demonstrated seismic qualification of tha 77 three-bay two-train Solid State Protection System (SSPS) by V testing. The seismic testing and results are documented in WCAP-7817 " Seismic Testi.:9 of Electrical and Control Equipment" and Supplements 2 and 3 dated 1971. These documents do not identify the mounting details used during testing of the three-bay two-train SSPS. Westinghouse drawing 5656086, Sheet 5 identifies the outline and installation for the three-bay two-train SSPS cabinet. This drawing shows the mounting base to have 4-7/8 inch diameter holes per bay to secure the cabinet base to a base mounting surface. For this size diameter hole, the largest acceptable American standard size bolt is 3/4 inch diameter. Seismic qualification testing of the three-bay two-train SSPS was performed at the Westinghouse seismic testing facility, in Large, Pennsylvania. At the Westinghouse seismic testing facility it is the standard practice to use the largest American standard size low carbon steel bolts which the equipment mounting base holes will accomodate unless otherwise specified by the customer. For the three-bay two-train SSPS, the test mounting would have been 12-3/4 inch diameter SAE grade 2 (A307) bolts. In addition, Westinghouse has calculated for the three-bay two-train SSPS the maximum base bolt stresses, a 3/4 inch diameter SAE grade 2 (A307) bolt would have experienced during seismic n testing defined in WCAP-7817. The maximum stresses experienced t%'y - during seismic testing and the bolt allowables are tabulated below: Actual Stress Allowable Stress Tensile 12.5 KSI 20.0 KSI Shear 4.3 KSI 10.0 KSI Check allowable tensile stress for fasteners in bearing-type connections: For A307 bolt: 26 - 1.8 fv < 20 19.3 520 From the results provided above, a 3/4 inch diameter SAE grade 2 (A307) bolt is expected to experience during seismic testing, loadings within the allowable limits for tnis bolt. In summary, Westinghouse believes that 3/4 inch diameter SAE grade , 2 (A307) bolts were used during seismic qualification testing of the three bay two-train SSPS. The bolting calculation performed demonstrates the adequacy of the subject bolts for the three-bay two-train SSPS application. Therefore based on the above, there is sufficient documentation and justification to demonstrate 3/4 inch diameter SAE grade 2 (A307) bolts were used during seismic testing-documented in WCAP-7817.
' (fO' Status: Closed.
W -
-._r,
3.10.1.2(1) Solid State Protection System (Westinghouse Report flo. WCAP-7817,Rev.0) (d) Modify field mounting to represent test mounting in that the monmetallic insulating washer was not used for testing. Otherwise, justify field mounting by testing with identical moun ting. Resolution: Calculation CflC-1381.05-00-0060, Rev. 0 was submitted to the T1RC Staff at the f4ay 22,1984 mee ti ng . Based on this calculation and subsequent discussion between Duke and the Staff, the following steps were developed for resolution of this item.
- 1. Duke will verify applied torque value to cabinet mounting bolts to insure a friction type connection. This will be reflected on the cabinet mounting drawing, CN-1214- 1.
- 2. The primary concern of the fiRC Staff was the possible creep of the nonmetallic bushing (Ohio-Brass Hi-Lite fiberglass).
The manufacturer's available creep property data for the bushing is 8%/20 yrs. at 100,000 psi. Calculation CNC-1381.05-00-0060, Rev. O, shows the maxinum stress on the bushing to be approximately 30,000 psi. Based on this information, Duke shall recheck (retorque) the mounting bolts prior to initial criticality and at appropriate time intervals thereafter. This interval will be contingent upon outage and accessi- ^ bility factors on a fuel laod basis. Please note that this cabinet cannot be opened during plant operation.
- 3. Duke will revise field mounting to insure a " snug-fit",
i.e. uniform bearing condition for the glastic electrical isolation sheet material located between the cabinet and mounting channel. This will be reflected on the cabinet mounting drawing, Cfi-1214-1.
- 4. Duke shall provide the flRC Staff with information regarding amount of overtest on cabinet by Westinghouse and also the affect of frequency shif t on cabinet qualification. The Westinghouse cabinet qualification was by sine beat test for a " low-level" seismic plant. This information is attached.
Status: Revisions to appropriate documents will be completed by fuel load. Work to be completed by initial criticality. As agreed during the May 22, 1984 meeting, this item does not impact fuel load.
Du $ NEE 3gdoit I 0
)Rg1m r %hz Qy u! Ew ,o(g,2 . w Qdg02 mgn&omgmm
%Wka"nHc3%,zQ=t z :t U<..uM2 n =q Whtg 5 ot n @ g= ,
S%sq 3<'
/ (' DEkmm a$a gw O R h 3 Q % z o g m o " Q ;F e "o i:;l
.'I!.- .liI[i j. :: '
1 ;
' .!l ~ [iTT 7l
-i{jtI_
>sM am 2mg p lT. T.
~ - n
_~ s e>wzA " E $ n[:.$p: .i.l!r .a lbl{ H"
,l .
, j st i l ll ii o, i ij l d ll !il l
lfl-. Iy 4@, T . nnb n9 p1l Ty h oz , T. ,, ,
"Og .
i ! iO! l l i ti i 8 d[ mo ja g:, !nh I l l bi lil ii i ijh n i,, , U i ,9 l-n! ! psii i ZyeQ3 y p '^ y xmzs2 doz lf
;lTfeiF.!4;Ot%p;k !
T t' _i! jl i i . 2e Oz
@Co
.i
~ m T, 0 lf mo
.lhI_
i4 0 1
,I l 1 4 .
7 i i T, i.i 6 _
} .I i ll 2
D .* 2" ".. . 4 . l l . l zeEmpm%m2angn7CW g Do _ ljI I4 1 \}I . i 1' 4 :ii
.~, E P YI h- [_ . j, i
>Ersq mnaaEMU*
{4} _ 1i
~ -
.l a{. i 1. i
&. 6,.L0tl !hn f i r ;n hlll
, Lim g
. t : .:
gm i.n n, m l
.m[i Hn "U!i i~
Fpdmt{ i
- 1
.!.!ll i i n L i. :
!i - .! !: ;
I. I.
!o$iii
- i. ;.
li a m.# Wu j i . h Jt ! t
';jn N.
I r, !f lf _ i i T hh p i
.ai H @I.. .
f i n m%ged t l. i. {. Ii, h h i. n g+ r l f uy r !d: gi&Bgu$,Qh h L l'i pMI!
- l. ,
ih F ei i lHl i
- g. !
,, g,e
-[
Dd l j ! j f
! nn E$ gg:
f j. ch n l lh h h : l -
- m. !iiyt.ill h p:. U n; i-- c ir
%u ie
;j H:1: 4!
i. i: b pt. i
! i O R:h. q {l I. !. .
li H II h
., i: ;
j j. l !. g o l im. a.!:gp'-!. .ium:j.
! l r i: !. i. i .
llNM j N s j
,l jbiI .i fi i
i n i 4
. hll J.
I
!-n! un
- t j
j. f i i i t
. J y!.
.tj
.l[
. ;i oti d.
j i. i4 it 4 ipi n a 4 E i E liNii .y. l,} c f ;i.i l j i l i i 4 ;t: i i g j. i
! i i uo . - ':
p i ti f. !. t i i
- Wpm}I
. t .;'
c f t i. j t i 4 li 1j nn ti f f A iU i + p, il i i i i. I ,
;! i tt
;t f
f J I. 4 fl i i i 6 su p-K n
} jtj.
.j i tt ;
c 4 . . it j { I + 4i
+
i tt T t qt F q= k t
+4 + j tt .
.rtL*T *h.M:
l j c .m L i { H t MN n 1wa.-. n p4 Hu
~
E i tf 4
-- pi:. !
y \!
- t f .
'T d4t 1
b if h-y + : . it l i i
- l. 4 + .
c.3s
- . { ,' ! i l +
xco . j9 1 -I ! f i i i , . ; i tt I. i. f t .i
\j- if .li i t i . t. ! l. f ! i ii . j i.
sa . tt ti l. j ffii I\ T~ i.l cs is ~
-k1. "!
..liI + , + t i l. f ! i i . . tJ _tt .j i tI f { iii .
ue 1- - I:[ II ti . e3 t f . wo . l ii i .
,4t. gy>4a, t n d.1 0 5 !. mN.,b#$"#
n
- r. t
! - . j : ! .
i .mm!I-_ wg ie n n
! l nm. ! .
i . i na
! . ! l m n. f . .
arr .
- l ! * ! i it i tt f . !:
t l+! t1bi+ i. . !ih:. l.- l' .
.Nl i,tl,h ly!,
i cu l.!
.li H i o i7 m . .
aa i(ttt [::
- j. f . 1'
- : i.
- i. i.pi t i. l. .
Ln . i. I t .. ;. i i i. l 4 . 4 .
,i . -
.l i
/ , i .
- i. I t o
dpy _ f i . . ;t n
- 1. !. i. j +
,* i ! } pt. i .
E.
-f-l if f-f O
ti t i 4 t
/ig..
+
. t.
mlI tI
- I j j
[ f f f i
- n Hi o
i 1
+f
;t "U !
i
.i l
j j [ i j t. i 4 t
+
+
v o i
+
M . - . . m"}! !-!N
.::l. k .h .
j . :
- . h:
s:: i H- i [ dpe.. . um n . t! !- t',:m pgi!
. i. i-d .
.m t. 4 i 4 i ;
I i . :i
' i 1 .
4 . t : !- i. j .
. i- I i. !-
,: :t {.
!,N ! .
#sg:7}t i!r! N
! i b ds it : ! , . i ! ; 1:*! i. i. i i;:
n.nti {I'r
! i i ii, a o .
i P@. hh1" 4 nt I l.! l! h nn . j.
- h t.:
i i . + t i r
- .j1g.,
a! t
!:f.I
.!-.I I
. l f
l ll i i i i i i i. i. 4 f] 4i
- n. mii l" i:
t: o
+
!i y,. :t f
- y:pgn m $.Fw y*9 Dg -
c i,A+
"n p. !n "
i ! I i 4 . t . '! l t i , . m( !t; u!! i ' t ! i , . . .
, tI t! l
;t n
'jh i ! 5 ,
o
. . ! .' i , . .
j1i"m n:!
.,j' tI i! ! +
i i l. i !: ; itj i' .i $ ! i ! . +
. !i I h1, 1t
- ' s j. ! i
+
t ! : I:
!: i t
., +
+
J. - o p- ~ . ' ", ,
. * ~: . , . , "*{
g r"
"i, ' nxsymR4 _
s
@ " o L . g n . nm .
m +"
SEISFtIC ~ QMLtFICATIGM WLe Test RePer esl6-1 QCcm ErrrAT1oN FitoM FoR TH L: CRTAWB A RegM QotAm PUMP POWER McMITER MEL L^ TEST tMG cAIEtrTATION : UcRI2cNTAL FB VERTlcnL 2:o 99 _ . _ . _.. .. . . . . . _.. . ._ ... . . . .._. ._... _ . ... _..-._ _ ._ ...
..____,_.,...,m+_...__4.._..p_.._,. .,......,.4.o,
[ 5
-.___._}..,.. . . -. 4. . t -. .-.- h-q . 4 . t ----+--- ---- t --- 6 --- { - - ---- f - -- f - f - l -- f - t t - - --- - -t -f - -- +
I-.-
\ 7 6
t_. _ j _. y. . _ .-~ }- _.4._ ._}_t }.
, } _ ..} . . 4-.} ....} . j _4 . t . t _ . . _ t -- . ._. _ . i ._ . t . . 1. . ..-
cr.iH. _+2.:h :::=r. =__: } _i::. f, =. - -- [ _i p' _ l :.
- 9 _"_=__'- p:_E :-J.:.p. .'i li= n. . u.!} : [ .: l :..} 11 . 2L. i:
.. }4. { i a 3
4 II 5!!5fb5fM!b555f5f[ ~N5b5f5 . 5lU{$lb hl~~ 2 5 5 - IYhI It . !
..)_.
_p. __r. ._.-. _ . l . .. .
._ .. .___ .. . . _ _ _ , _ _ _ .# _ _ ._ . . . . . _ . . . _ _. . a.. . .+. . . _ _ ..
3 . - . , . _ * . . . . . . .
; I-
. _. I _.t __l_...._ .. .. _: .; = ._n : ' --_:l:.-
.=. . .-1.:n: 1_:...I . .-"...t.. J-J .:
.. __ . . _ . _ . _ _ .. . . .. _ . . . L-
_- .j __: 1=:=
..._. m ._. ,-__.;. _
; . . g..,. ;__ ; . _ _ _ . ._ g ;
_; .y . _ 3 . .. :,
. t -- - -
2 ___. _._. __ xa: : - --
- r== x- rrt n - - -
- .--_._ -- .t r :::r :1: -
o o _ . -1 . _.p
~ + _
.. ._t.
- _-_ 1 = :t r ~._- - _-.._._.
y .! - .., _. . _ L-
. . . ,__ . + - . _._ -...__
_ _4. _,__.
. . . L. .
_ t N ..+_.. i____ ..._.,.1 e 3 , .
.__._ .+ _ __ } . . - .-. - . . .... ..
d%Mh
.M
- ^
^
y .
. ~_ ~. . ~
~ - ~ ~ . ~ .~. ~. ~ _ . _ ' ' ~ . .' ~ ~ ..~~ .. ' ' .' . '
} _. . g.g. p ___. } . _.
pg_ p .l q
.____.4__-,_.m_ . . , _ . ~...._ , _ . _%.g..-___ . . _ . . _ . . . _ _,__
.._.,_._,___.t._p-_,__%..
_ . . . . . . __. . . . . . . . a. _a. _.. _i.....p...+.._5%_._. ,. 8 1
+ - ..,.6 ._.._. . . _ _._.9
.._.,_..._..tg_.;_.
p._ . ... g .___g.,..._ ._...{-.. __. {. _.
. . __ ,-. _. } .. . p. . i ___q .__. }. ..
.. _ .. . . .- ~ .
6 ~ D, :. ..j -5.: ri. i.d. ' n.ci. . 5 ' '
. A::
'i .; n
- _n_1_ .- { :.:_::. .- i.nd. {i ::A". :f :r- n. h::
' i_.: i s- . - " - ' F;- 5 fi:n f C. :
. g ,_- . .
.__3__..... -. _ . . . . _ . . -. . ._~ . . . .
( t n+:t- ===:: m:p
..i.
._). . - _ . %,
M .::. -t;= - 2.
. :=
-'n- r.: :
- ~. = .::: : n .
2 , . _
- 4. -_.. _ _ .L,
. . +
.__9_.. .+._.a*-{.+.
...,,.-_ . - . . * ._._7
. - + ..
+
.i_._.
_ y _-__ 3
._. . . . . .~ ... .. . .
q. t
. . _ g.
....l.=.=. .=. _: =_ =.y.
...g l'[: a.i:
%GCAL T657 2EsiM56 g' .
=_ _
..:.-li. } =. .- =.}. . . . _
.=. . %_... ::
ggg n H 1 : rr g _ r._.:. 1-
- fg untz = _ . - : n :.
- - It;n- ng
-:c_ t=J..=...t=. :._:=...
g .
.g.. _. .
- ,_.= ::. -.u. .,=g. =.. , ; .,
- - - __-,.+
..E.
. ._ . ."""_"C b_ ._
4._ ... . .. A . _ .
.)'
. . . . _ _ _ .~
. ..~.
q
, _. ..y
.. _~,!, . ... _.
. y. .
q.. _ .~ .~- . .... .
.u. .. . ... ._ 4 . . . .
_ . . .m. . h ._- . . _. _. ...
.u 44
.~' .#_ ' . . -+ -. -. . _ . ... ..... .. .
%5 . . _ t .- ...+,. msgmt F B tat RE5pg 4d-.4
. . 4 . . ++ **- ~*I+-*- '
M u aM9 o g_._j.v' .
' fJill #- ..w.4.
.._ a . ..
L
._.41 L'+..t *.
. _4 +411 '
..' .. _+._ .;
h 1 .54.1 2.1.4 FRot4 FB/V ERAT 4Th@
,, .._.. .. . _ _ . . . . _ .... .. ._. p. . . . . . . . " _ . _ . _ . ... ... . , . . ._... . . _ . . . . .
4 _.ww . . . , . _ .. ._ . 4 ._ . . . . . ..... .... ,_ . - _..p... .. .q . . _ . . . . _ . .. . . .. . p8 y_ ... . _ _ . .. . g.. . ._. s - .. . , .. .
-4.. . p... . _ . . _ . . . _ ..
p7 ,r . , ._,. ._ . g . ... .. .. ._. ., ..., .. _ +~* N. c
, ._ =EME hii 'liti Hi! !5 =4
- i .: : EE:Ni lth\ diW!! iEi Hii '!5 : -
i:iiflMii!SSE cAWEn cdhE (0.47 suNATiera EPA 5 g ,, J .. .. 7;..;. 2. ;u._= . :.. 7 p ...n___.,. . _ g._n g
.n 4
._.g. m ._. . . . .
. .~ ..
._. _ 3 _ .. . .
.- N..g...
g 4.._-
. .~ _.. . .- . ,__.. . _ . . . . _ . .. . . . .... . . .. .. _. ._.. .
b dE Ei*Mi !!= iiii !Ii! H: - - M NH; -
-Mi n: 1 -
^i:Fi 7 iM '; f;i- '-
i En r .: .:n = un r : 7 : :. : t . an n: . ::: . : :_: an: - ~~ ~~ -- - - + M 2 n:= an- == r :n -r - - A==.c.n -
. :~- ...+
- rnu :n CNN54 Wmes RE9o4C
._J. SSE. CurdG (0.,mf EPA u
. .. ..~ . _. . . . . .. . . . .- .. .. .. . .
_ - .. .j.
. _ . . - _.. . ._ _.. _.. p... . . .
r _ - . .. .. . .. . . .. ._. _ . . .. _ .. _.. . . . . 4 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 to 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 L 10 100 fl REQMENCY W b. 1000 l ( < 3.lo.l.1 LO U) (4)
SE/SMIC. @AL /FICMi:N NcwENTATtoM FRoM w(LE TEST R6cgT +%9t&-l Fce THE c.ATM BA ggyqct c.coatJT PUMP PME2 McNITol W^M-7m g ICAL g g g)T)GloN3Ik&l2* NL $$ k*19 _ . , . , .. , . . ... ..i.... ___..._.._v_..._.._r_,_.,_,,__.___.-_-_.r... . .,. 4. a ...}.... ... 4 ..-
.i-t-i-t.
a -
/' q __ - q . _. p
. -- . . . - t - . t . - , F } - i _._
4._ p.+_g . __ -. . ..p_...._ 4 .,. - -t-r -- 4
.\ 7
._.j.__.,___. __ } _ _ p__.j __ }._______._.p__.. . - q - .}_.-}.}.{.{. . + . .-. . b -- ..j --- . j -- { --- -.-
N-NN N5 Ir_ 5}N:Idi}". ~~ ~ ~ ~ 'i ~ ~- 't r.f N ^ !"bI : I - l i II - - . - 'i- -' h EI? 'I ::!N ~~H
~
4 _
+
bb _a _b ' b k -
-J._-..--
.~._y__._.r,._._.--.._ . .. _ _ . .. . . ... _..y __. .
_-_,.... .---. -. -. -4.-..._....-..._.+,_.-{_.__...-
- - - + _ . - _ . _
..._..- ----...~--
~.
.- ~
3 - . . . . - _ _ . . . . . . . . . .. - - . -. . . . . . . - . _ _.....g-.._
- p. : ;
a :n_ . -- n. : us. . - . : n_.: : .: p-L_,_. ._..t.__. . _ _ _ .. ,_ _._ _. .....- _-.-- .. .: c=.- = := ; c . : ::: 4:=tr i:t :n.: r 1=: . :!: . r2: : n :- ' mir..- m: := .I : ; i 2 _ _ _ .L.m =t-- __ .= [._ P_.. ._ _ t d ---n:n._.. - - l :mtr 1 T:rtn=m--+ = 1---- { := { cc:= :: : o _....-.___..._ . _ _ _ .
._..._.......-,.-4._ ._.-e..
-- .,__..---...-..._-w...
_--~- I-. .._.- ..- _-_.._._.._._.a+ . - 4_ _- _p . _ _ . , _ .
.. .. + +.
y o p L_ . _ . -_ N _ . , . . ~ . _
- p. . l4_.,C..gQ M._,J_a, m.. . _.-
17.5h_ . . e y j ._. _
..__i__ ---.
_ _q . _ . _ .. . .--_. . . 4. .__ --
. . _ - - - . _ _ . . - _ . - _ . ...-f....-- .- .. - _ - - .
y
-.4' . _ -. - . ._ . _ - - - __-. - . . .
7._ . h 3 4__ r.__, _ . . _ _ . . . _ _m__._
% - 5.__ 4_ , _ v . p_ _.- _ . _ . . _
_... M4 Cd,Ind M.Jc. 24.8 M _. .
._..-_t-......_.-.-_,.p e
__..i._.i.._. -. . . , . i i . i -- - ~. _ .
-..q--_,_..-..4_-pe
. , _ , _ _ , ,,__,_ ,4_____,.,._ q ,., , ., _,_
, ,, g ,,_ ,4 u_,_,,___v__ _.q. _4,__4 ,_4__ ,,4_,
7
, _j p, - . --. ... . . ._ a.. . . . _ _.m . .
_ + _ . . _ H . . ._ t __ . . _ .
-F. .
6 D N j-!~;~~biHE N 55fs:: i M'l5 t[- L. . _~ 2L 2 - l li i = 2 Y IN- : "2' u I 5 . _ . . . , . . _.
. . - =-=-= 1 t, ....]._..'.'
. . - . _ . _. . ._. _ _ :=. . .2n.j- . . . . .. _ . . .=-= h_ . @. . -.[=. . 2C. >_. . r. .: :. . .c_ -
- r jn- =: =
- + -
3=._ a n t,::::
. ._ . _ . ._ . _. 4 _ . - _ . _ . . ..
. ~J ..
.._._I'_-- _ ..
_r
._._._._}_
.o...._ -... ~__.. ._
.3 j , __w -
-._..4._. - . . - . - . -I
~l '
,/.
p .. .. ..
..g. .._.. ... . . .
.. . . _ . . _ ~ .. _
,.i.. .....__7
. .y 2_ ._ ;
.n g ---;=n = ;= r. = au: c---- :.n : = ; _r : + . :n t= . :=
=t an .: :: 1.
rnM:r-rr : n q -_ _t == rut r- 2n: _ . ,=_ = _c n..'._ ;.
- = := n = 24 mt : n-
.. =._n-d:u:x
... . , _ . . i
- 3. _... . _ . . _ . _ _ ._ . _ . .~ . ..
y - __._j4 _. _.-. . . - . .
.j A_ ..
....(..
~..
._......._.,_g y.
w y._.. .. ....
. . . ~
- 4. .... . . ~
m. m
.HoMONTA 5-5MT h g p : .
;I
- n. .y . . ,7 g . _ . _ 2 - . . . _ ... . _
g. q .
._ - - _ q.._
FfM 55 e h :rnnen f f 4 . - . . . .. - .-. .. . . ... .
...y .mq gp.g. gg T- . . . . . _ . .. v .. .. . . w.- -..'
.,jf . _4. . . _. ... .-. . .. . . .. _ . g .. _. . . _ . ._. .
pp% VfATICAL TEST EME n a. . 4 ,(
-_.r. 4 . .% RoH % 4 ,CR.tE,N,
, , , Tf5,M, 7
/- j-- }.
; _ ._ -. .. .. ~ .._.- __ . .. . :
..r.
CATAWlM ELNATion 5% d h 5
= 141-ihi a. Mii sk = t ; i == W \, # = m= =. + i .
titti-iilsse caeve (o.W IEPA) n g =r ,.4+:. ~. .n. y ...
. . .y . . _ _ .. . . _ . . _ . . .... .
..m .g
.=
.. . . ., . . _ _ . _ . . .~ . ..... . .
.n 4
.~
A _ . .. .. ..
. . _ . _ . -_.. n. . . . .. +. .. .. . .+ ., . . . . . . _ . . .
.. _ . .. __ . ~ .. a.. ..
W . . . _ ..._. ....
~. .
g.. - _u
- _ . .- - .. . . . . . _ - .. .. ... . . . . .._ . . .. . 4.. . . . . .. .- . . . .
@ dMi! Eilif .. ...
_ . . . . ' . . . .Mi5 i NiiEE
. . . .. . p in H:- Gi
- '{
i -: tM4 .'. .il 4 =
.-........_'....n Effi .9 =
- 4 N
.... cgp Wgig gtges
_. 4 .._ ,.. . . . .. _ . . . ... . . . 55 . cugg (o.14 Z PA
~ .
. . , _ _ ._ . . N. ..
. - . . I . .. . ..
(s . . .
._..t..-. . .. .... - . . .._ -. . . _. -. .. .... .. ._ . . . . - . . - . . . . . . ..
. . } . ..
. . -_ g ... .... .. .- - - . . - . .. . . . . . . . . .
d'i 2 2
- 5 *" 2 '
- 5 * ' a'" 2 ' ' '
- 7 "
10 FMQMENCY W Ih .100 koo v v 3 .10. l. 1 (1) U) (.4.)
t SE15MIC QMLWicaTiobl DOCuMENTM1oN FoR THE CATAWBA SERVICE g.')
@ER. HEAD IggenoM HSDRAutic.
TANEL-LOCAftod : MAIM CcWTML Room 8a
~
ELEVATscM ! M M9 _ .
,7 a
. _ . . . _..__%_,.... g_ _ , +. s . . m . . y. ._ _ _ . . . ... m. .
_4 ,_n 4 _._ g.y. _..a a . t y --........rr.,_._r k 7 i l {_ }_.y. , v _.} 4 . _ ..p.y } . .p_ e.~ }-.._} _ .9.-.[_ -._ .. .
#siMinD-iMt "_ thi:i s t a; l- n r ._ __- =u.insEl41Ml= =!il-i l i 14 ; d -eel 4M4iEEMSi=@+b =
Es = s _
+ = . . __ __,
_ _ - .. _ =.__m._.._7 _
. = ..
_ , . = _ .
.=_m. +.$_* . . .
.. __ ; , . . . . .--.- p. _n = :_. .+.. .. e_ .. =... = =--
2
.... + - ** * +
4
. . . ~ - - - ... . . . - . ~ . ' _ - - * - - ".
-1.
.+ ..
a... . , _ . _ _ 3
.t _.
. . _._.-.L--..-. ._.._.
..___...r_-_. ." . ':n.
- -- l. x.- . .:n.- . . ~-
,.- u:::: .r t . ::l.. . '.. ' . ~ ': ^
n_n..-:. : 1
= .-_ . - .- .. . n r. -_.n_..- _..i. ...-
.=...I._.. t.n.. - - . . - .
---~.*'4:...- - .t.::.:. -- .
...Z
_ _._ _.t=:r:=t= _. _ _ . = = = ;t z IC1=2 : 1
^ *
=r !4!=~ :2 :! - : :!!C =_ I :: :::
=
= r'==;.cf =:
2
- =t- -.-=.= = === = .- = -
- == t = = =n=-..==.= ==
o 4_.
. . . . . -. - =.
O _ t. ._- _ a., 1 _~ i ~ _.4 m
..i.
_._.+._.. . . . . , _ _ _ . . _ .
.4-.-
. -. . _ r+ .
y _. p
.. .. .}
h.
+
._.t.-
. .._., . . _ . . . . _ ,. e.. _ . . _ -....._. - + . 4 .. .__.
_t p.y _.. 7 9.p. _ _. . j __. . j _ . j . j .._ 9 -._ j . ..v.,-._..- i. 4 z. --. . . , ~ -..- __ S
._g. l . . t. . L___ 1 - . i . - . 4.6 6,..--_.j.-.._ _~_ . _ ......
7
- m. r bt c a .t H a rr.7 % > p.~ _ ._ __.. ..
@ ==isPi iiM!!! . i#i M14= = Ri\ =_:+. t:- Ml!!.: =M . iii! == + + ~
s!Ei!=iiFsiihim. =~ == = 44 s : i 2 - 1._::_=_ .t. l.=.t=_ _m__ = . =. .=_. . :: _j i: -=m . . . _ lM C=L..%t Hoh 18.9 b._m.t
. .. == . . . . . . .
. . . ==+t n r. . . . -==-.:= c
- = :..:
y ,-
,. /. __..
1 .- . _. . _ . .. _ . . . z 1 -
,A_, 2. .
w _ . . . n
/m
+% , . _. t . ... .
_. ...L....
.. ._.. _a r= ;; f- n; _.-.
/.-. - };
~
n:._:. .; j. 9._3 3
.__..n . . . . . .. M_ M M_ N.. o.. &..L_H. . e. . . .a. - a - . - l. ui. .:. . .- _ . - .- 2_ :i
. 3. ;./_ _ . . _ . . . \; _ .
. . . t L. .-
$g '
- . n. ; E'
---M := ::=r : 4n ;---
t- rirtfinn T1: n = 1: :
.i:
=j :: :=: {: = .... : .. . n_ 4 n n 2:=2. :n .= .:.. =: : ::
q t: .
- : . t *r 7 :r : ::n n n:: : ::1.
= _ = _ ' = . . . = . . .
- g. .r _-
_ .y .__. . _. . A_ g. ....,. . _. ..i.
.y _ .
y y _ _m. .
. q4. n .
,, p-.a y,uf. .. ,_.
- d. ..
s .... 7 .. _.
.,e. .. ..
+
, . ,.o;;
r
+. m.+ ,. .,
r . . _ u 4
, p,.3 _
q,4 y ...
.g g LL
. . . . . . . .y a
4- a
., ; 4 _p44.t 4. A l ..I 4.M '
..p. i 2l& o,
. :. ... a. rig tg g@, .. T +
x8 ' _.p.
,,=: -..w ... .
y . .. y +. ...
.mau. -ra een . . . . . . . . . .
. . - . . . ._. ._ _. .. .q. -4 N +-
eme M.h -- ++++ +++- + +- y ,r
,e , +.;-
x w . .n , ; ; ; e,.n . _-+ . .
+-
+ -
p - 4 ,.y .w .gm.mg gg) d, n
=i#-tiitii si iir i#i =in .
m ir =_;iisi \ Mil r h iumur m.n 9sse es (om EPA
. . : .:. . n....
o2 .=.=._ . =. = . . .= . . ...n_=. . . = .=._ _._. : .
. . . t. .. . ... .-. .
.n. ....
_. _,m . . . -.. .. _
- .J;..... . . . __ . ._
A g. __ m, M:IM5! 5i! .2-- rih II; EEi ' I M 5i 2 :! *il MI- Hi i + i i MiM!iii R :iiii I if : i: i i -
.f:=.=: it nc ::.
- :-.....r
;..: .:n : ...:
= = ~r : :
2 : : 2.. :rn
+r =j ... =n n
at : : . .nnu : n:: "~ ~*- -- ** - + 1
- r- : rt. in. t - -
- 1t : t. :::' OEW WiUh MMoN6C
.x.s
. . . . . . .. .. . .... ti
-*.l 55E tuVG (o.1/4 EPA
. _. _.. .. m 7, _ _ . . _ . ._ .
._. ,\
s . _ . . .. . .+. . . . . _ .2. _. .
....i ._ . .. . . . . _.a .. . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . .
4 - gi 2 3 4 s e ; e o io a n 4 s e i a S to a 3 4 s s i e o io 1 .to FMonency m th .too Wo s -
%a
.3.10 .l. 1 (.O (J) ( 4)
.~
A 3.10.1.2(2) Centrifugal Charging Safety Ingection Pump / Motor (Pacific d Report No. K-318-1, Rev. 5) (a) Include the effect of operating bearing pressure in the analysis. Resolution: At the May 21, 1984 meeting of the USNRC EQB, Duke Power and Westinghouse personnel, this additional analysis was presented by Westinghouse and reviewed and accepted by the USNRC EQB personnel. Status: Closed. (b) Calculate natural torsional frequency and verify whether a resonance condition exists between the critical speed and the operating speed. Resolution: During the SQRT audit follow-up meeting held on May 21, 1984, these calculations were submitted. The percent separation between the secor.d torsional natural frequency and the running speed of the pump assembly was questioned. Westinghouse deems the 6.7 percent separation acceptable based on the following: e Second mode frequencies are less excitable than first mode.
- If a problem existed in torsional critical speeds, it would appear in the first mode frequency of 2666 cpm. This '
frequency is not reached by the motor at full speed,1770 h'- RPM, and is quickly passed through by the pump during start-up, e There is a large amount of system damping due to pump fluid and material. These types of damping effects were not considered in the analysis, o If the pump assembly responded to this torsional critical I speed, excessive wear would be expected in the gear teeth, l coupling teeth, and shaft. Westinghouse has not found wear problems to exist in the gear or coupling teeth; wear problems discovered in the shafts have resulted from deficiencies other than torsional critical speed vibration. In addition, Westinghcuse has had over 400,000 hours of operating experience with this pump design and no failares or problems have occurred due to torsional critical speed vibration. The pump assembly is acceptable for its intended use. Status: Closed. 1 1
l 3.10.1.2(3) RHR Pump / Motor (Mcdonald Report No. ME-174) J (a) Provide stress calculations for elements at the nozzle-to-casing interface (e.g., elements 90 and 82), subdivide per components and demonstrate structural integrity. Resolution: Element 92 exists in the pump cover near the stuffing box hub. Since the finite element model contained a coarse mesh at the geometric discontinuity, stress results cannot readily be shown to meet allowable stress criteria. The pump vendor is being requested to revise the analyris making the necessary changes to more realistically represent the actual configuration and provide plausible stress results. Results will be available by mid June, 1984. Interim justification is provided based on several considerations. The pump cover is subject to only internal pressure and gasket seating loads. These loads. These laods are static in nature thus, not of a high cyclic nature that would cause fatigue problem. Each pump is also subjected to a production hydrostatic test at 150 percent of design pressure. Tois proves the pump pressure integrity via test. Also, this same model pump has experienced many years of successful operation in numerous Westinghouse Nuclear Steam Supply Systems. Status: As agreed during the May 22, 1984 meeting, this item does not impact fuel load. This item is open until the USNRC reviews ]\q the analysis. (b) Same issue and comment as item (2)b. Resolution: To date, a critical torsional frequency analysis has not been performed. Becuase certain information is not currently available to Westinghouse, the pump vendor is being requested to perform this analysis. Results will be available by mid June, 1984. Interim justification is provided in resolution of (3)a above. Status: As agree during the May 22, 1984 meeting, this item does not impact fuel load. This item is open until the USNRC reviews the analysis. (c) Include operating hydrodynamic bearing pressure in the analysis, and submit the resulting analysis for SQRT review and acceptance. Resolution: It should be clarified that the RHR pump / motor assemblies at Catawba do not use any journal type bearings which are subject to hydrodynamic loads. The ball bearings used in the RHR assemblies at Catawba are not subject to hydrodynamic loads.
- Status: Closed
(
L
^
F ..... i s l' l i
- -
- '3.1.0.1.2(4) Engineered Safeguards Test Cabinet (Westinghouse Report No.
j g WCAP-7817, Supp. 7)
- . (a) Same issue and comment as item (1)d. i Resolution
- Same as item (1)d with the following clarification. The
- Calculation No. is CNC-1381.05-00-0061, Rev. O, rather than
! CNC-1301.05-00-0060, Rev. O. l \ I l- Status: Sameasitem(1)d. i -~ ; d E I i I O t R 1 l i 2 0
:...._ 2 u __- .. __ .; _ N i __ ._ _ ________ _ _ _ ____._ _ ______ _ ___________ _ ____ _ _ _________ _ _ _ _ _____ _ ___ _ _______ _ ___________ _ _ I
3.10.1.2(5) 4160 - Volt Essential Switchgear (Gould Report No.. 33-50465, AddII, Sept.,1981) (a) Submit for SQRT review and acceptance, the Wyle Labora-tories test report used to qualify the equipment and not ! presented during the audit. l I Resolution: Wyle test reports 42686-1, 42686-2, and 42686-3 were submitted to, and accepted by, the NRC Staff at the May 22, 1984 meeting. The NRC Staff agreed that satisfactory resolution of Item 5d would resolve this item (See 5d). Status: Closed. t
, (b) Provide justification for acceptance of the anomalies observed during the test.
Resolution: Attached is a copy of a memo to file dated May 21, 1984 which was submitted to, and accepted by, the NRC Staff at the May 22, 1984 meeting. Questions concerning the ancmaly relating to a 600 volt breaker were resolved by the acknowledgement that the component for which the anomaly occurred is not included in the equipment whose qualification report is being audited. (c) Provide justification for extending the qualification of a 4-cubicle test specimen to that of the 18-cubicle switchgear by addressing the torsional mode due to O multiple units and assuring that any additional unit does not use a common enclosure wall. Resolution: Carl Kunkel letter dated March 23, 1984, (attached) and Wyle test report 46387-1 were submitted to, and accepted by, the NRC Staff at the May 22, 1984 meeting. Status: Closed. (d) Qualification documentation for power resistors and certain relays is not complete (ITE Report No. R-09161-CI, dated May 27,1975). Submit a complete description of the test procedures and test results in an auditable manner for SQRT review and acceptance. Resolution: Test procedures and test results for power resistors and relays were reviewed with, and accepted by, the NRC Staff at the May 22,
. 1984 meeting, contingent upon confirmation of frequencies at which the power resistor was tested.
As agreed, Duke Power Company is providing the attached letter from BBC, Brown Boveri Inc. dated May 23, 1984 and test procedure TD-7629A, " Seismic Test Procedurc for Class IE Electrical Equipment." Th::M t'so documents adequately address the above concern. Status: Closed.
ggC
,- 3.10.1. 3. ( 5) (a_u (d)
Brown Boveri * ^ " " = Switchgear Products Division BBC Brown Boved Inc. Rte.109 & Norristown Road Spring House, PA 19477 Phone:(215)628 7400 May 23, 1984 Duke Power Company Mr. C. J. Wylic Attention: Mr. Robert Thompson P.O. Box 33189 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242
Subject:
TD 7629A Test Procedure Centlemen: As agreed at the meeting with Duke and NRC representatives on May 22, 1984, a copy of our component test procedure TD 7629A is furnished, attached. Note that paragraph 2.4.1 delineates the discrete frequencies at which testing was conducted. This procedure calls for testing in two axes on the basis that simple aymmetrical components are not sensitive to variations in coherence. The report R-09161-CI indicates that testing was conducted at the maximum accelerations shown in the report for 30 seconds at each of the frequencies (25 f requencies) in each of two orientations. The vibration testing therefore had a total duration of 30 sec. x 2 axes x 25 frequencies = 1500 seconds minimum. This does not include calibration or the time of increasing and decreasing amplitude at each frequency. Since the destructive effects of a 30 second dwell at each of these frequencies in two axes is so much greater than the strongest motion multifrequency program and the test duration was many timea longer than a maximum multifrequency program including 5 OBE and 2 SSE 1cvel tests in each of two orthogonal axes, it is judged to be more than adequate to assure the seismic capability of a simple resistor assembly with no dynamic operating requirements. This is intended to finalize the BBC input to the resolution of the open SQRT items on Catawba Station, please advise if we can be of any further assistance. BBC Brown Boveri, Inc. Switchgear Products Division
. nkui Mar ocr, Product Analysis & Qualification CEK/jm Attachment cc: J. Detsiler, R. Iannozzi, W.1,aubach, R. Mc! Lister L
,:<,s. ,
e 1 l p-.. p - TD-7629A SEISMIC TEST PROCEDURE FOR CLASS 1E $LECTRICAL EQUIPMENT (SWITCHGEAR MOUNTED DEVICES) Prepared by 1-T-E IMPERIAL CORPORATION Switchgear Division Technical Services-Group April 1923:I W 1.0 Introduction This i;est procedure was prepared in accorda2cevith certain applicable sections of IEEE 344-1975 for seismic qualification of components or devices. The tests described in this procedure provide a means by which a Class 1E switchgear mounted device or component may be tested to determine its degree of capability to function properly both during and following, the postulated Seismic Design Basis Event (DBE). Normally, the typ.es of components or devices to be tested under this procedure are those of a Resale nature, i.e., those components or devices purchased by I-T-E from outside manufacturers for installation on the customer's piece of I-T-E Switchgear. (Examples of these Resale items would be, various types of relays, various types of meters, test switches,. transducers and resistors) Components, such as Power Circuit Breakers, Disconnect Switches and Current Transformers which are associated with a particular Voltage ( '3 Classification of Switchgear, are certified by the results of the Seismic Type Test for that voltage classification,of switchgear. 2
-. -2
- I-T-E IMPERIAL CORPORATION S ismic Tist Pr:c: dura TD-7629A Page 2 of 4
,k__ ' > 2.0 Test Procedure 2.1 Device Mounting The device shall be mounted on the vibration table in a manner which typifies it's normal installation. (If necessary, a fixture vill be fabricated to facilitate device mounting; such as a section of panel, for flush or semi-flush mounted instruments.)
2.2 Electrical Connections I-T-E will furnish to the test laboratory, a schematic diagram of the device's external connections for electrical operation and circuits to be monitored. 2.3 Device Monitoring Thch d evice shalli be . continuously. monitored _by os cillograph.or. . equivalent rueousdor. maintenance-ofstircuit3 funetion und/or - continuity throughout the- test: sequence. Depending on the' . type of device, electronic monitoring of certain circuits may be required. Should a failure occur during the test sequence, the test fre-quency, g level, and type of failure shall be noted. 2.4 Test Table Excitation The test will be conducted simultaneously in the vertical and one horizontal axis and then repeated in the vertical and second horizontal axis; i.e., a test in the XY axis and then in the YZ axis. The force reintionship of the vertical to the horizontal axis will .be 1.0 of the horizontal, which requires the input force to the table to be at an angle of 450 from the horizontal axis. The test will consis of one or both of the following phases; 2.4.1 Amplitude Sweep - This test is conducted by maintaining a constant f requency, and progressively increasing the g level at that frequency until a malfunction occurs or the level reaches a maximum of 5.5
- 0.5g or a higher g level as dic-cated by the I-T-E representative. When this maximum g level is reached, or a malfunction occurs, the g level will be re-duced to a minimal value and the next ascending test frequency will be selected.
The frequency range of interest is 1.0 to 60 Hz.l b
r- .
.
- Y' ; *
~ ~ IN2 r i" - I ~
I-T-E IMPERIAL CORPORATIOR Sai:mic Test Procedura
;- TD-7629A Page 3 of 4
/:-
O=- 2.0 Test Procedure (Cont'd.) . 2.4.1 Amplitude Sweep (Cont'd.) The discrete test frequencies are; 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 8.0, 9.0, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 36, 40, 45, 50, 55'and 60 Hz. 2.4.2 Frequency Sweep - This test is used for those devices which evidence a "withstandability",or ", fragility" level in the 5.0 g range. These Frequency Sweeps will be started at a level of 5.0g and progressively increased until a malfunction occurs. The frequency range will be from'l.0 to 60 Hz and the sweep rate will be a maximum of 1 octave per minute. (NOTE: Due to machine limitations, it may not be possible to attain these high g levels at the low end of this frequency range.) 2.5 Device operation i Certaini devic es t cayah ave o ne.,o r . mo re: o pera ting , modes su chas .. energized ,s d e- energized-o r . N.O.JN. C. ' contacts _o r ;various-settings of time levers; and some devices may not require electrical energizing at all. I-T-E will provide the test (55 facility with sufficient information for device operation. c 3.0 . Device Inspection and Functional' Check Within the test laboratory's capabilities, the test laboratory shall make a pre-test and post-test inspection and functional check of the device. (Tests requiring special equipment, etc. will be per-formed at an I-T-E facility.) 4.0 Test Documentation 4.1 Tabulation of Test Data It shall be the responsibility of the test facility to furnish I-T-E with an organized presentation of the raw test data. Ordinarily, this data shall include each devices' pre-assigned identification-number (s)1-acceleration icvels and test fre-quencies of the response spectrum, type of device monitoring and type of device malfunction, should a malfunction occur. (A malfunciton shall be noted by the frequency and g level at which it occurred.) Unusual conditions, such as excessive vibration, unusual harmonics and damage shall also be noted. Reasonable care shall be taken, at the descretion of the test facility, should an I-T-E representative not be present, not to subject the device to damagina influences which would impair lll[) its future usefulness.
.e
.-c~.
.: - er, .- -
..., - e : f er-m : w-
~
^ - -: 4 7~~ "' I-T-E IMPERIAL CORPORATION !
Smitmic Test Precedure l TD-7629A Page 4 of 4 ( n::
'~'
s_. 4.0 Test Documentation 4.2 Extension of Test Data
.It shall be the responsibility of I-T-E's Technical Services group tc analyze the data generated by the test facility in order to evaluate the device's " seismic withstandability" or "fragiliqr level".
The seismic "withstandability level" or' fragility level" will be documented in the form of a graphical presentation showing peak "g" units bf acceleration and applied frequency of vibra-5 j t, tion. The plotted points of the resultant curve will be the 8 maximum "g" level to which the device may be subjected to at
- a given frequency without device calfunction or damage. This response spectra now becomes the device's degree of seismic
. certification.
f Additional-evaluation-by-the-Technical Services group will bct_ to" review =the device's' construetion in order- to determine .what; other deiric~e s-in' the same_ family ~ ofrinstruments,-may be certifi6d-based on the type tested specimen.- L
- I 6
h
+
e I f 9
7 JJ 3.10. l. 2 (d (.Q V 'May 21, 1984 Memo To File: MC-1312.02 CN-1312.02
Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station Catawba Nuclear Station 4160V Class IE Swltchgear Equipment qualification R. S. Thompson raised the question to me as to the adequacy of the Westinghouse COV-8 relay qualification at McGuire. He is basing his questions on the statements made in switchgear test report (Page 20 of MCM 1312.02-79, copy attached). Apparently the relay failed in what is considered test " Mode C". The relay In this test would have been in the " picked up" condition (contacts closed). During the seismic test for full SSE, apparently the contacts bounced open. Apparently there were no failures which would cause the relay to false trip. It is my opinion that contact bounce, occurring in this " Mode C" presents no problem in our McGuire application of COV-8's In the cla'ss IE switch-gear. First of all, the present McGuire design does not have these relays i a trip circult. They only alarm. Contact bounce while the relays are
.n picked up in an alarm function presents no adverse safety implications.
There are NSM's at McGuire, however, awaiting Implementation which will result in the COV-8 relays being rewired from alarm circuitry to trip circuitry. The trip circultry will be such that the diesel breaker will be tripped, regardless of diesel mode of operation, upon a pickup of any 2 out of the 3 COV-8 relays. Even after Implementation of these NSM's, I see no qualification problems with the " Mode C" test failures referenced. I base this conclusion on the fact that the failure would be of the COV-8 to trip when required. Reg. Guide 1.9, Revision 2, requires all trips other than differential or overspeed, to be In'a logic circuit (such as 2 out of 3) or be blocked during accident conditions. If one of our relays falls to trip, as Indicated by the test " Mode C" failure, the consequences are the same as if the circuitry were blocked as suggested In Reg. Guide 1.9. (vD
Memo to File: Mc-1312.02 CN-1312.02
'May 21,'1984 Page 2 As the circuitry'at Catawba is similar to McGuire (that is the COV-8's are wired to trip in a 2 out of.3 logic), I would reach the same con-clusion regarding a similar failure mode at Catawba,
- f. W Au=a E.~ M. Brinson Design Engineer 11 Electrical Division EMB/kss
'ATTACHl1ENT
.CC: R.5. Thompson w/ attachment .
K. R. Caraway w/ attachment O ______.i_.____..n_. .- - . -
N .
,/ l
_COM.E TS & CONCLUSIONS 1 ngu l n D.O. 960-4107-102 ;
.' [J .
SIIK Switchgcar , Multiple Frequency Test, Curve A MC 13 & 14 Westinghouse Type COV-8 Voltage controlled Overcurrent Relayd-(Catalog # 1876244) Struthors-Dunn Aux!liary Relay (Catalog # 219BDXP) Monitor circuit MCl3 was connected to monitor the normally closed contact of the Struthors-Dunn auxiliary relay (#219BDXP) and monitor circuit MCl4 was connected to monitor the normally open contact. The monitoring circuitry consisted of both the cecillogram and the chatter detector. The auxiliary relay was controlled by three (3) Westinghouse Type cov-8 relays (#1876244), device 51V. In other words, wher the output contacts of the cov relay closed, the auxiliary relt would pick up. The oscillogram and chatter det$ctor showed ' indications of aux-iliary relay contact bounce during full SSE, side to side and vertical, and front to back and vertical, multiple frequency, curve A, tests. The bounce always occurred in electrical con-o). y* C dition "C", the condition during which the COV relays and, hence the auxiliary relay, were operated. The auxiliary relay contact bounce indicatiions are belic:ved to be the result of the coV contacts bouncinij open. This bouncing of the coV contacts occurred supposedly because the auxiliary relay operating coil did not drau sufficient current to operatt the target and scal-in element of.the COV relay. The followint points lend support to this supposition. .
. a. When one of the COV relays was disconnected from the auxiliary relay and reconnected to an appropriately sized loading resistor, the output contacts of the COV relay no longer bounced and the targot operated properly. Zio ta'rget occurred with the cov relays connected to*the' auxiliary relay.
- b. The auxiliary relay contacts did not bounce in the
- de-onergi=cd state, i.e. during electrical conditions
. - . "A" and "B" such a relay is more susceptibic to DOCUMENT bounce in the de-onergized state than in the energized CONTROL DATE state. !!cnce, it is reasoned that the auxiliary re-lay contacts themselvcs did not bounce during cloc-DEC 9 1980 trical condition "C" when the relay was energi=ca.
0'2-007 9 y (bKE POWiR "OMPANY1,y 3 , cn esamiemac- ,
.3. 2 1s
>9
.. R-09400
. . - Sheet 20 of 21 l
310.1.2 (s) w Brown Boveri BBC
'"o* ~ "oa a' /
Switchgear Products Division esc arown soveri.ine. Rte,309 & Norristown noad ('") Spring House, PA 19477 Pnone:(215)620 7400 March 23, 1984 Ted Holoff Duke Power Company P. O. Box 33189 Charlotto. N.C. 28242
Dear Ted,
As wo discussed, the questions raised about ilk switchgcar are not difficult to Yosolvo. The first issue, regarding construction, can be ronolved by inspection. The side shcots of the equipment are formed to provido the structural support
/%
thus there is a double sido shoot at each bolted interface. i ( } U The recond area of coneorn is the equivalency of a 4 unit tent sanplo to a longer lincup installed at the station. In power switchgear, with a height-to-depth ratio well below 2 providing good front-to-back utability and the offect of interframe bolting in providing substantini damping in interf ramo force transmission, there has been littia controversy about long lineup
" snaking" or beam-type amplification of fects until recently. In response to recent concerns we have conducted comparison tonts betwoon a four frame and twenty two frano lineup and have extensive resulta documented by an indepen-dont laboratory, which verify that no amplification due to long lineups will occur.
t our documentation reference for this issuo is propriotary tust report no. 46387-1 and can be audited with propor arrangemont through our Sales Offico. z-- [
. . i 'ol, Manager Produc Analysis & Qualification l
CEK/jm cc J. 11. Dotwilor W. D. llagner ( m
q 3.10.1.2(6) Main Control Boards (Duke Spec. No. CNS-1393.00-00-0002, Rev.3) N' (a) Revise the existing analysis to address the effect of flext-bility of the enclosure panel when components are mounted away from the structural frame (i.e., modal points). The , effect on both the enclosure plate stress and component RRS l should be addressed. Also, the modo shape comparison and additional parametric studies should ba documented. ! Resolution: Calculations CNC-1381.05-00-0029 Rev. 5, and CNC-1301.05-00-0044 l Rev. 1, have been revise.1 to address the above concerns. The appropriate documentation was submitted to and approved by the NRC Staff at the May 22, 1984 meeting. Status: Closed. (b) Perform an as-built weld survey for the mounting channel, l and demonstrate that the welding is in compliance with the support conditions assua.ed in the analysis. Resolution: The as-butit weld survey has been completed. Analysis has been performed demonstrating that the as-built wolds are in comnliance with the support conditions asstmed in the analysis. This analysis is contained in calculation CNC-1381.05-00-0044 Rev. 2. l ! Status: Closed. O . l p..
, - E
3.10.1.?(7) Pressurizer PORV (Control Component Report No. 18789-1 & 2) (a) Demonstrate operability of the actuator and its electrical accessories under cynamic seismic load conditions. Resolution: Duke Power has confirmed that all of the PORV actuator's electrical accessories are qualified to IEEE 344-1975. The actuators are air operated and were qualified by analysis. The NRC Staff made a request at the May 22, 1984 meeting that model numbers for the electrical accessories be verified and listed in this resolution. The requested information is listed below: Limit Switches - Namco Model EA-180 Duke Drawing CNM-1205.19-0041 Solenoid Valves- Valcor Model V70900-39-3 TestReport#(Valcor)MR70900-39-3-1-1 Status: Closed. G- . -.
. m
t
- 3.10.1.2(8) 18-Inch Feedwater Isolation Valve / Actuator (Borg-Warner Report No. NSR-74040, dated 8-25-78)
(a) Verify the effect of water hammer load on the valve i - . design. Resolution: Water hammer load calculations listed in Impell Corporation's 3/28/84 letter (Duke CNM-1205.12-0008-001) were reviewed and accepted by the NRC Staff during the May 22, 1984 meeting. As requested by the Staff, Duke Power has confirmed that stress levels in the valve are still less than allowable when the additional pressure due to water hammer is considered. Status: Closed. i a O i b a f .! " K /_ a3 y ,_ e-
F.:
.L .e (n'l# ' 3.10.1.2(9) Containment Return Air Isolation Damper Operators (Wyle Report
<x -No. 43979-1, Rev. A).
(a) Since the operator was qualified with 1/3-rated torque, demonstrate that this torque is adequate to operate the damper.
- Resolution: American Warming and Ventilation Inc. (AMV), the damper vendor has performed a torque requirement calculation, Document No.
80343-317, which determined the following torque requirements: Cycling Torque Requirement = 5.9 f t. lbs. Opening Torque at 1/2 psi differential pressure across damper (which is the Catawba Parameter) = 18 f t. lbs. Wylie Test Report #43979-1, Rev. A demonstrated that the operator will operate through a complete open/close cycle at 1/3 rated torque load during each test. This was not meant to specify that the operator would only develop 1/3 rated load in seating. To be more precise, the report should have stated that the actuator develops full rated load in the open/close -position and cycles at mid-stroke at 1/3 rated load. The full rated load of the operator as stated in Wylie Test Report No. 43979-1 is 32 ft. lbs.. Therefore, the test demonstrated,with margin,the adequacy of the operator to f"' cycle the damper and to open the damper against a 1/2 psi
; differential pressure.
Additional documentation has been submitted to and accepted by the NRC Staff at the May 22, 1984 meeting concerning this item. Status: Closed. (b) Demonstrated structural adequacy of the mounting bracket. Also, document the test mounting bolts and compare them with the field installation. bolts for acceptability. Resolution: Additional documentation, AWV Document No. 80343-301A,
" Seismic Qualification of Rotork Actuator Mounting Bracket",
was'. submitted to and accepted by the NRC staff at the May 22, 1984 meeting which. verified the structural adequacy of the
. mounting bracket and bolts.
- Status: Closed.
l
/-n a ,
N -
~ . 1
_g,[ 4
E ' l y _ l l 3.10.1.2(10) Motor Operators (ITT Report No. 721.77.095, dated 3-14-77)
..[ S, (a) The motor operator qualification requires the operator b'- to be in the upright position, although the operator inspected during the audit was mounted horizontal.
Resolve this discrepancy. Resolution: Additional documentation, ITT Report No. 730.1.140, "Requalification of ITT GC NH90 series Hydramotor Actuators", was submitted to and accepted by the.NRC staff at the May 22, 1984-meeting. This. documentation demonstrated the functional operability of the actuator mounted horizontal during the seismic test. Status: Closed. 4 i~ I-n f~.
-(,/ -
1 J r , ~ - I t i 1 b 4 -.a a
~
>-,,h,,[L ';' ,,
- x - ~ ..
, a,, , 4 t
4 7 , f 7 ) ,NC
~
$ #'k
^ -
_g g , , .. , ,}}