ML18010A952

NRC Licensing Submittal Review of Licensing Conditions Imposed by NUREG-1216

ML18010A952
Person / Time
Site:	Perry, Catawba, Harris, Grand Gulf, River Bend, Vogtle, Comanche Peak, Bellefonte
Issue date:	11/30/1992
From:	TDI (TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INC.) OWNERS GROUP
To:
Shared Package
ML18010A951	List: ML18010A950 ML18010A952
References
RTR-NUREG-1216 NUDOCS 9212150259
Download: ML18010A952 (138)

Text

DUKEENGINEERING tel SERVICES, INC.

230 South Tigon St.

PO. Box 1004 Chartotta. NC 28201-1004 Bus f04) 373-2473 Fax P04) 373-2695 December 8, 1992 Document Control Desk Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

TDI Owners Group Generic Licensing Submittal for Emergency Diesel Generators Conditions of License for Utilities with Enterprise Engines Gentlemen:

Attached please find five (5) copies of the subject submittal.

This submittal is made on behalf of eight utilities having Enterprise Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) for emergency standby AC power.

These utilities are listed below with the respective plants they operate:

UTILITY

$TTATt )N Texas Utilities, Inc Entergy Operations, Inc.

Duke Power Co., Inc.

Carolina Power and Light Co., Inc.

Georgia Power/Southern Nuclear Operating, Inc.

Cleveland Electric Illuminating, Inc./Centerior, Inc.

Gulf States Utilities, Inc.

Tennessee Valley Authority Comanche Peak Grand Gulf Catawba Shearon Harris Vogtle Perry River Bend Bellefonte This Owners Group was formed in late 1983 following the crankshaft failure of an Enterprise EDG at the Shoreham Nuclear Plant. 'A complete Design Review and Quality Review of these EDGs was performed and completed in February 1985.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission reviewed the detailed Owners Group Program Plan and the components referred to as Phase I. (This Phase I program reviewed 16 major components that were selected as being the most critical to engine operation.)

Phase II was completed by the Owners Group but was ~nt reviewed in detail by the NRC staff as they had concluded that review of the Program Plan and Phase I of that plan provided sufficient justification for operation of the engines in a safe and reliable manner.

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Document Control Desk December 8, 1992 Page 2 The NRC review of Phase I is documented in NUREG 1216.

This document also imposed some of the findings of the review as conditions of license.

It was noted in these findings that many of these conditions were imposed due to the lack of operational experience with these machines in nuclear standby service.

Since 1985, over 9000 hours0.104 days <br />2.5 hours <br />0.0149 weeks <br />0.00342 months <br /> of operation have been logged collectively by TDI engines.

While a few problems have been found, the program has served its function and has increased the reliability of these machines.

In addition, many of the survelliance items that are in place have proven to be as effective as inspection for revealing a potential problem.

Using surveillances in lieu of inspections willalso contribute to decreased unavailability especially during outages.

This submittal presents background on the relevant issues for the Phase I components and the history collected over the past seven years of performing teardowns and inspections required by NUREG 1216.

The conclusions drawn from this data are also presented.

It is respectfully requested that the staff review this information by June 30, 1993, and permit the utilities listed above to remove these prescriptive teardowns and inspections as licensing conditions to give the utility the flexibilityto determine the best way to monitor engine condition while maintaining reliability and reducing unavailability.

Correspondence concerning this issue should be addressed to C. W. Hendrix or R. C. Day.

Sincerel J

eofge Chairperson TDI Owners Group CW Hendrix project Manager Duke Engineering and Services, Inc.

RCD/pja.017 Attachment

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSING SUBMITTAL ON BEHALF OF THE TRANSAMERICADELAVAL,INC., OWNERS GROUP FOR REVIEW OF LICENSING CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY NUREG 1216

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THE TRANSAMERICADELAVAL,INC. OWNERS GROUP LICENSING CONDITIONS TABLEOF CONTENTS

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~ 28 30 32 34 35 36 39 41 1.0 EXECUTIVE

2.0 INTRODUCTION

AND BACKGROUND 3.0 COMPONENT PERFORMANCE REVIEW 3.1 Engine Overhaul Frequency..

3.2 AirStart Valve Capscrews 3.3 Engine Mounted Electrical Cable 3.4 Engine Base and Bearing Caps..........

3.5 Connecting Rods 3.51 DSR-48 Inline En ine 3.6 Connecting Rod Bearing Shells..

3.7 High Pressure Fuel Injection Tubing 3.8 Crankshafts 3.81 DSR-48 Series En ine..

3.9 Jacket Water Pump 3.10 Cylinder Blocks/Liners 3.11 Piston Skirts 3.12 Cylinder Heads..

3.13 Push Rods 3.14 Cylinder Head Studs 3.15 Rocker Arm Capscrews 3.16 Turbochargers 4.0 SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY 5.0 SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY..

APPENDIX A Part A Part B APPENDIX B APPENDIX C APPENDIX D

1.0 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI) Owners Group recommends the removal of the licensing conditions imposed by NUREG 1216. Based on substantial operating experience and the Design Review/Quality Revalidation (DR/QR) effort for the critical components, the TDI emergency diesel generator (EDG) has demonstrated that special concerns of NUREG 1216 are no longer warranted.

Therefore, the TDI EDGs shall be regarded the same as other EDGs within the nuclear industry, and subjected to the standard regulations without the special requirements of NUREG 1216.

These conclusions are supported by the information that follows.

In addition, this action will improve unavailability of the engines for service, especially during outages, while maintaining current low unreliability levels.

The TDI Owners Group therefore requests the NRC to review the revised recommendations contained within this report and issue a generic Safety Evaluation Report (SER) endorsing removal of the component based License Conditions that are currently required by certain power plant Operating Licenses.

This generic SER would then be referenced by individual licensees to process Operating License amendments on each docket for plant with TDI diesels to remove these License Conditions.

All aspects of the maintenance and surveillance programs would then be controlled by the licensee and reviewed by the NRC under current regulations.

1

2.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The Design Review/Quality Revalidation (DR/QR) effort of 1984 has been performed on Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) supplying emergency AC power for the following utilities that are in support of this licensing submittal:

UTILITY STATION Texas Utilities, Inc Entergy Operations, Inc.

Duke Power, Inc.

Carolina Power and Light, Inc.

Comanche Peak Grand Gulf Catawba Shearon Harris Georgia Power/Southern Nuclear Operating, Inc.

Vogtle Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co./Centerior Energy Perry Gulf States Utilities, Inc.

Tennessee Valley Authority River Bend Bellefonte (Note that not all engines at all plants have completed DR/QR as indicated in the particular docket; but N

each utility has a representative sample of engines that have completed this inspection and have operational hours since the inspections).

This effort was in response to NRC concerns regarding the reliability of large-bore, medium speed diesel generators manufactured by TDI for application at nuclear power plants.

Southern California Edison remains a current member of the Owners Group, however due to a decision to decommission, Unit 1 of the San Onofre plant is not a participant in this action.

Long Island Lighting and Sacramento Municipal UtilityDistrict have ceased membership in the Group due to decommissioning actions and are not participating in this action.

Washington Public Power Supply and Consumers Power have deferred or canceled plants and are not a participant in this action. This accounts for the thirteen utilities that originally began development of the DR/QR effort.

This effort was originally outlined and documented with the NRC as the TDI Owner Group Program Plan.

This plan was accepted by the NRC in an Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated August 13, 1984.

Following issuance ofthe SER, the Owners Group member utilities developed and implemented the DR/QR in response to the Program Plan. The specific details of the DR/QR were submitted to the NRC for review and this information was reviewed and referenced as part of the NRC position which was documented in NUREG 1216. The recommendations of the NRC consultants hired to assist in this effort is also referenced in NUREG 1216 and is documented in PNL-5600. These details resulted in specific license conditions for each utilityas the individual DR/QR reports were submitted under the utilities respective dockets.

These utilities have operated for a substantial time period and logged many operation hours on these EDGs and this operational data is being submitted for review to remove the license conditions imposed by NUREG 1216.

It should be noted that the scope of the original NRC review was to look in detail at the Phase I

components as defined by the DR/QR program.

NUREG-1216 documents the NRC reviews of Phase I and II components.

Phase I components are addressed later in this submittal.

Phase II components constitute approximately 150-170 components on the engine.

The NRC review of Phase II components documented in NUREG-1216 concluded that a detailed review of these items was not necessary and would be redundant.

The Phase I components were chosen as those that had potential for generic concerns.

Through an extensive review of TDI and other engine performance data in both nuclear and non-nuclear applications, the Owners Group identified 16 components with such concerns.

These are:

air start valve capscrews connecting rods connecting rod bearing shells crankshafts engine base and bearing caps engine mounted electrical cable high pressure fuel injection tubing jacket water pump

cylinder block cylinder heads cylinder head studs cylinder liners piston skirts push rods rocker arm capscrews turbochargers These engines have operated under the requirements of the program reviewed and approved by NUREG 1216. This document presents the results of the operation of a large sample of engines under that program and demonstrates that the reliabilityof these engines is comparable to the reliabilityof other EDGs and that the time required to continue to perform teardowns and inspections as outlined in specific licensing conditions substantially adds to the unavailability of the engines.

Subject to the findings of this report, the Owners Group concludes that these engines can be operated in a safe manner without degrading reliability and still achieve improvements in unavailability by removing license conditions to perform inspections requiring engine teardown.

The Owners Group will develop a performance based maintenance program outside of the licensing environment to assure that the goals outlined above will continue to be met.

3.0 COMPONENT PERFORMANCE REVIEW This section discusses the original component concern, the proposed modifications/inspections that were subsequeritly required, the results ofthe modifications/inspections, and a proposed disposition of each item.

The modifications/inspections that will be discussed are listed in the DR/QR report, Appendix II, Part B.

A copy of the current version of Parts A and B of this Appendix is included as a part of this submittal as Appendix A. Appendix A and NUREG 1216 are the basis for the license conditions that are imposed on some utilitydockets.

The original review contained in the above documents along with the results of the inspections performed since that initial review was completed will be the review basis for the amended recommendations to be approved by the NRC.

3.1 ENGINE OVERHAULFREQUENCY The overhaul frequency forthe TDI engines was originally recommended to occur at an approximate 5 year interval.

This interval was later revised to 10 years because (1) of the comprehensive DR/QR effort conducted for each of the engine components, (2) of the limited number of operating hours forthe engines in nuclear standby service, and (3) a sample inspection of major engine components willbe performed on a one-time basis following 5 years of service.

Details of the results of inspections performed during this teardown are outlined in the discussion of the individual components.

Overall, the teardowns did not indicate any major problems or suggest that any component had experienced any significant wear.

The average number of operating hours togged on an engine in a year is approximately 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />.

This number is much less than the number of hours typically experienced by non nuclear engines. This mode of operation tends itself to using monitoring/surveillance programs in lieu of hours of operation to determine overhaul frequencies.

Collectively, these engines have accumulated over 9000 hours0.104 days <br />2.5 hours <br />0.0149 weeks <br />0.00342 months <br /> of operation.

This provides a signNcant data base on which to base removal of the license conditions imposed by NUREG 1216.

Recent studies performed-for the NRC (

Reference:

NUREG/CR-5078, PNL-6287) indicate that for approximately 2 years following a major engine overhaul, EDGs, regardless of their manufacturer, exhibit increased unreliability. This increase is attributed to several reasons.

One reason offered is that during disassembly there is a high potential to introduce dirt and other substances that may harm the engine.

Another is that disturbing a precision fitsystem that "wears in" to seat mating surfaces (eg rings and liners, crankshafts and bearings, connecting rods and bearings) can result in alteration of wear patterns that may increase wear or actually cause wear to start and decrease the life of the component.

As noted in the above reference, the period following overhaul is a "shakedown" period that is required to produce smooth running reliable engine.

The Owners Group agrees with the findings of the above study.

In addition, the results of the 5 year 'mini" overhauls have shown no component failures that resulted in a loss of component function and have also shown that operational component wear since installation has been very minimal. To perform a complete engine overhaul for a typical engine could take approximately six weeks during an outage and could make the diesel more unavailable during the outage.

Extending the period between overhauls reduces the overall cost that would be incurred for additional parts and labor to install and refurbish components that are no worse from wear than the new parts to be installed.

In order to prevent increased unreliability and to reduceunavailability,theOwnersGrou recommendsthatanoverallfr uenc notbes ecified. Individual utilities will use maintenance/monitoring and trending data similar to the information gathered in Table 1

of Appendix II of the DR/QR report, and coupled with the engine manufacturer's recommendations, to determine when a particular component would need refurbishment or replacement.

This would give the utilitythe flexibilityto plan for this work to be performed over an appropriate period in lieu of one outage period and would serve to reduce unavailability and unreliability.

3.2 AIR START VALVECAPSCREWS PM Recommendations There are no PM recommendations associated with this component in Part B, Appendix A. Revision 2 of Part B, Appendix A recommended that upon installation of a new capscrew, retorquing should be performed at specified intervals to compensate for gasket creep.

When no change in torque is detected, the gasket is fullycompressed and the torque willbe maintained.

This item was removed by revision 3 to Part B as

'the manufacturer has agreed that this is a proper recommendation and has put this item in their PM

'I recommendations.

Backcaround The air start valve capscrew have not had a history of failure. The original concern with the component dealt with the component being too long and "bottoming out" in the cylinder head.

In SIM 360, TDI recommended a change to use a shorter capscrew and recommended a suitable torque value. This was in response to reports at Shoreham and Grand Gulf where these capscrews had been found to loosen.

Results of Ins ections Loosening of this component or other related problems have not been detected since the utilityhas either made the change noted above or has verified that the existing capscrew does not bottom out.

All capscrews have been properly torqued.

This is the justification for removal of this item from Part B and placing this information with the vendor recommendations.

Conclusions This item was closed under NUREG 1216 and no further problems have been reported.

Utilities should continue to followvendor torquing procedures upon replacement.

3.3 ENGINE MOUNTED ELECTRICAL CABLE PM Recommendations There are no PM recommendations associated with this component in Part B, Appendix A.

~Back round TDI SIM 361, revision 1 notified the engine owners of potentially defective engine-mounted cables associated with the Woodward governor/actuator and the AIR-Pax magnetic pickup. This memo led the Owner's Group to review in detail the suitability of all class IE auxiliary module wiring and terminations currently installed on the diesel engines.

Of special interest was the suitability of this wiring with respect to flame-retardancy ofthe insulation, qualification to industry standards, routing of conduit, compatibilitywith circuit requirements, and the need for special requirements such as shielding. Modifications were, in some cases, recommended and all of these modifications were completed.

Results of Ins ections No further problems or issues have been found dealing with this component.

Conclusions The modifications specified address the concerns with this component and this issue was closed during the initial NRC review. This item was closed under NUREG 1216 with no additional concerns found since that time and this item remains closed.

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3.4 ENGINE BASE AND BEARING CAPS PM Recommendations The base and bearing caps preventative inspections are listed in Part B of Appendix A. SpeciTically, PM recommendation 1 can be made without a disassembly; PM recommendation 2 does require disassembly but is only required to be performed when the caps are removed for other reasons.

~Back round The original Owner's Group design review for this component found adequate factors of safety for all components.

Problems encountered with this component are not generic in the engines supplied for nuclear service.

Problems that were encountered were with non nuclear service engines resulting from inadequate bolt preload and in one case, marginal strength due to inferior quality of a casting.

The NRC review noted specifically that once the caps are installed according to the Owner's Group recommendations and torqued to TDI specifications, they should not require further attention until they are removed for some other reason.

It should be noted that inspections proposed in Part B of the maintenance matrix were to validate the findings of the analysis discussed above and were a conservative step to aid the licensing process.

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Results of Ins ections For all engines in current service, a metallurgical exam for Widmanstaetten graphite has been made or the recommended three cycle inspection for cracks have been completed and none of the bases have indications of inferior material.

Twenty-five separate base inspections have been made with no signs of cracks noted.

In addition, hundreds of inspections have been made ofthe bearing cap and saddle interface for PM item 2 and no problems have been detected.

Conclusions Based on the positive results of the monitoring and the conservative nature of the PMs, the base inspections should be no longer necessary.

The inspection of the cap mating surfaces should continue as good maintenance practice only when the caps are removed for other reasons.

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3.5 CONNECTING RODS 3.51 DSR-48 Inline En ine PM Recommendations The connecting rod preventative inspections are listed in Part B of Appendix A. Specifically, PMs 1,2,4, k

and 5 require teardowns to perform.

PM item 3 is excluded from this discussion as it is the scope of a previous license submittal and is already under review by the NRC.

These inspections have been performed on the River Bend engines as outlined in Appendix B.

~Back round During the DR/QR review, only one rod failure was reported and that was on a non nuclear application and the failure was due to the possibility of pre-existing defects on the surface of the rod eye and to the higher peak firing pressures'used in the engine that had the rod to fail.

The design review performed found no design problems with the rod. However, the NRC recommended that a rod eye and bushing be inspected using an acceptable NDE technique and that all bolts and washers

'e inspected at the same time.

Results of Ins actions The rods at River Bend have been inspected on a sampling basis at the 5 year interval with no problems found. This was performed on two connecting rods per engine and the associated bolts and washers and bearings.

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Conclusions Based on the initial design review and the positive inspection results it is concluded that these inspections should not be performed unless the rod is removed from the engine for other reasons.

These inspections should be viewed as good maintenance practices and not as requirements.

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3.52 DSRV-16 En ines PM Recommendations The connecting rod preventative inspections are listed in Part B of Appendix A. Specifically, all PMs with the exception of PM 9 require teardown to perform. PM item 3 is excluded from this discussion as it is the scope of a previous license submittal to the NRC and is already under review.

Backcaround During DR/QR review, a total of six rod failures were documented.

TDI had identified two failure mechanisms in SIM 349.

The first was due to fatigue of the link rod bolts resulting from loss of bolt preload.

The second mechanism was fatigue cracking of the connecting rod bolts and/or the link rod box in the mating threads.

The Owner's Group Design review performed a detailed stress analysis of the rod and looked at fatigue as suggested by TDI. The results of that analysis showed the peak stresses induced by the loading mechanisms are slightly below the fatigue initiation curve for rods with 1-1/2" bolts and slightly above the fatigue initiation curve for rods with 1-7/8" bolts. Grand Gulf (Entergy) is the only utility that has engines with the 1-7/8" bolts still in use. The summary of this work is that as long as the bolts are properly torqued the rods will perform with no problems.

Results of lns ections A total of 42 connecting rods have been completely disassembled and subjected to the PMs described above.

A total of 1776 bolts have been checked for proper tension during the time since DR/QR. These inspections have revealed no problems and these rods continue to provide good service.

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Conclusions Based on the above, the Owners's Group recommends that further connecting rod disassembly to perform the inspections above on a particular time frequency is not warranted.

However, it is the recommendation of the Group that as rods are removed from service for any reason, they should be subjected to the PMs in Appendix A as a good practice but this should not be a requirement.

Oil analysis should continue to be performed as this willprovide indication of premature bearing wear or bearing problems as babbitt willbe recognizable in the oil. Also, vibration measurements should continue as well as operation monitoring which will also provide an indication of potential problems with this component.

The engines at Grand Gulf are currently limited to 185 BMEP.

This derating reduces the stresses associated with fatigue cracking of connecting rod bolts and/or the link rod box.

Based on past positive inspection results and engine derating, the recommendations for 1-1/2" bolting willthen apply to Grand Gulf as well.

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3.6 CONNECTING ROD BEARING SHELLS This item has been covered in Section 3.5, Connecting Rods and in a previous license submittal currently under review with the NRC. The previous submittals are documented in letters to Mr. Om Chopra dated October 31,1991 and supplemented February 27, 1992 from Messrs JB George and RD Broome.

Therefore this item is addressed by reference to previous submittals.

(Copies of these submittats are included as Appendix C and D.)

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3.7 HIGH PRESSURE FUEL INJECTION TUBING PM Recommendations The high pressure fuel injection tubing preventative inspections are listed in Part B of Appendix A. The PMs do not require teardown to perform; however, the requirement to eddy current the non shrouded tubing prior to bending does result in considerable cost and delay of replacement tubing. Use of shrouded tubing has been approved by the Owners Group and the vendor to provide protection of leakage that would potentially result in a fire hazard.

Fire hazard and personnel safety are the primary concerns with failure of this component.

~Back round

,I The review of this component during the DR/QR process revealed that failures had occurred at Shoreham and Grand Gulf Nuclear Stations.

A 10CFR21 notification was issued on 7/20/83 by TDI alerting Owners and the NRC of the condition and identified that the cause of the failure stemmed from a draw seam that acts as a stress riser on the inner surface of the tube.

One of the points stated is that a draw seem is induced during the drawing phase of the manufacturing and generally willextend over most of the length of the tube and be readily detectable.

The design review noted that the tubing is acceptable as long as no preexisting flaws greater than a depth of.0054" existed.

This prompted the recommendation to eddy current the tubing prior to bending.

The reason for the concern was to prevent leakage that could potentially result in a fire and for personnel safety.

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Results of Ins ections The tubing is visually inspected for leaks during each engine run.

Since the DR/QR effort, four tubing failures have occurred.

This inspection has resulted in hundreds of inspections of this component.

Most engines are now equipped with the shrouded tubing which permits the leak check to be performed by removal of a plug. Shrouded tubing is a double wall tube that contains the high pressure fuel spray in the event of a leak and prevents fire and hazards to personnel.

Conclusions The Owners Group recommends that visual inspections for leaks continue during the engine runs.

Any problems should be readily identified by this process.

In addition, replacement tubing must be shrouded.

Further, because of its double wall design, use of shrouded tubing would eliminate the need to eddy current this tubing and this requirement should be deleted for shrouded tubing.

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3.8 CRANKSHAFTS 3.81 DSR<8 Series En ines PM Recommendations The site specific preventative inspections are listed in Part B of Appendix A. All of these inspections require disassembly to perform. These inspections have been performed on a per PM basis as detailed in Appendix B.

~Back round In August 1983, the crankshaft in the EDG 102 engine at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station fractured during plant preoperational tests.

The. fracture occurred at the crankpin journal of cylinder No.7 and involved the web connecting the crankpin to an adjacent main bearing journal.

Following this failure, several cracks were discovered in the crankshafts of the other two TDI diesels at Shoreham.

These crankshafts were found to be deficient and were replaced with a different design that increased the diameter of the crankpin from the original 11" to 12". The replacement crankshafts were analyzed by the Owner's Group and by NRC and found acceptable for use.

The EDG engines at the River Bend Nuclear Station have crankshafts of the same dimensions as the replacement shafts at Shoreham.

However, the generators and flywheels differ between the two installations, resulting in differences in crankshaft torsional stresses.

Also the fillet radii at Shoreham are shotpeened while those at River Bend are not.

The review and inspection made by the Owner's Group found that there were no relevant indications in the oil holes of the crankpins.

However, the analysis revealed that crankshaft torsional stresses in the Shoreham engines at an operational load of 3300kw was 20

equivalent to the torsional stresses in the River Bend engines at an operational load of 3130kw which accounts for the differences in the torsional systems.

Therefore, the River Bend engines have been derated for nuclear operation to 3130kw with the crankshafts that are currently installed.

Results of Ins ections The inspections that have been performed are in accordance with Appendix A and has been performed in number as indicated in Appendix B. No indications or problems have been found with this component.

Conclusion Based on the positive inspection results and on the previous design review, the Owner's Group recommends that future inspections of the crankshaft are not warranted as required by the DR/QR as long as the engine is operated at loads below 3130kw. Should this load be exceeded for an extended period, the engine should be removed from service and the crankshaft inspected in. accordance with current procedures.

Should no indications be found, the unit may return to service and no further inspections made unless the load limit is again exceeded.

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3.82 DSRV-16 En ines PM Recommendations The crankshaft preventative inspections are listed in Part B of Appendix A. Allof these recommendations require teardown to perform.

BBackBround The crankshafts forthe DSRV-16 engines have a crankpin diameter of 13" and the overall crankshaft length is approximately 20 feet 7 inches.

These engines have eight crank throws with 16 pistons driven by 8 articulated connecting rod sets.

Differences in the generators and flywheels at the various installations result in differences in the torsional stresses.

Therefore, each of the crankshafts at each installation were individually evaluated.

The results of these investigations produced similar results.

The results are that the component is adequate for its intended service at full rated load and the 110% rated overload.

Extended operation at speeds at or near the fourth order torsional vibration frequency modes should be avoided.

(These speeds have been documented in Owner's Group site specific reports.)

ln addition, the engine should not be operated for extended periods in an unbalanced condition.

Results of Ins ections Appendix B indicates how many times each of the inspections detailed in Appendix A have been performed.

None of these inspections have produced any indication of cracking and most ofthe engines have operated above the period (750 hours0.00868 days <br />0.208 hours <br />0.00124 weeks <br />2.85375e-4 months <br />) that would subject the crankshafts to a number of cyclic loadings to demonstrate unlimited fatigue life.

Conclusion Based on the positive inspection results and the original design review, the Owner's Group recommends that future inspections as required by the DR/QR are not warranted and should be eliminated.

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3.9 JACKET WATER PUMP PM Recommendations The jacket water pump preventative inspections are listed in Part B of Appendix A.

AII PM recommendations require teardown to perform.

~Back round The pumps forthe DSR-48 and DSRV-16 engines are somewhat different. The original design of the pump for the DSR-48 engines had two failures on the engines at Shoreham that resulted from a fatigue failure originating at the gear/shaft keyway. This pump was subsequently redesigned.

The new design removed the keyway on the impeller end and changed the impeller material to ductile iron.

The impeller is noW driven through its interference fit on the shaft. This later pump design is installed on the engines at River Bend.

Pumps for the DSRV-16 engines were reviewed as a result of the problems with the model DSR-48 engines.

At the time of the review, there were no reported failures and the design review concluded that the pumps were capable of serving their intended function with no problems.

Since the DR/QR, there are reports of drive gear failures on non-nuclear engines and these have been addressed through the 10CFR21 program. There have been no problems withthe original concern related to the shaft, keyway and impeller.

A very recent inspection at one utility has identified a potential concern that is currently under review.

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Results of Ins ectlons There have been no failures of jacket water pumps in nuclear service since the design changes made as a result of the DR/QR review.

Inspections performed as outlined in Appendix B reveal that some pitting of the gear teeth on DSRV-16 engines has occurred during the pump operation.

The resolution of this issue willbe dealt with through the 10CFR21 process.

Additional problems related to the shaft, impeller and keyway have not been identified.

Conclusion Based on the positive inspection history, future inspections of this component on a time dependent basis as a requirement is not warranted.

However, should the pump be removed or an engine overhaul be necessary, the pump should be inspected per the existing guidance.

25

3.10 CYLINDER BLOCK/LINERS PM Recommendations The block preventative inspections are listed in Part B of Appendix A. Specifically, PM recommendations 1, 2, and 3 require teardowns.

The PM for the cylinder liners does not require a teardown but removal of the injector for access to the liner is required for visual inspection.

Backcaround The cylinder block provides support for the upper-engine components and contains passageways for the engine cooling water. The block is subjected to both mechanical and thermal stresses and is a grey-iron casting. Although the cylinders in the DSRV-16 engines are arranged in two banks while those in the DSR-48 engines are in a single bank, the two configurations do not differ in block top thickness, cylinder head spacing, upper support of the cylinder liner, and the stud boss region that anchors the cylinder head studs.

Minordesign changes have been incorporated as a result of DR/QR to reduce the protrusion of the cylinder liner collar above the block top and to increase the cold radial clearance between the cylinder liner and the block, thereby reducing stresses in the block top. Cracks have been reported in cylinder blocks of both DSR-48 and DSRV-16 engines in nuclear and non-nuclear applications.

A thorough design review of this component was completed during the initial DR/QR review. The results of that review were that some of the castings made during the period may contain Widmanstaetten graphite which is an inclusion that weakens the grey iron casting.

It was shown that blocks containing this material have a greater potential for crack development.

However, it was also shown that should these cracks develop, regardless of the cause, that the block would continue to perform its intended design function and that the cracking would potentially produce a flow path for water to the block exterior.

A 26

cumulative fatigue usage index formula was created and an inspection frequency was established based on that usage.

Further, it was noted by the Owner's Group and by the NRC that this analysis was conservative and that "Ifcumulative results of these inspections over several power plant fuel cycles show that one or more of the inspections reveal nothing of significance, the scope and frequency of the inspections could be reconsidered."

(Source:

PNL-5600)

Results of Ins ections Block top inspections have been performed in accordance with the numbers outlined in Appendix B. Note that some of these inspections are being performed on a partial basis; however, none of the inspections (including those of blocks with widmanstaetten graphite) have revealed any cracks.

In addition, no significant liner wear or indications have been found. A 10CFR21 notice has been issued dealing with a different issue with liners and is currently under review by the Owner's Group.

Conclusion Based on the positive inspection results, the Owner's Group recommends that future block top inspections be performed when a

head is removed for other reasons for plants that have blocks with no widmanstaetten graphite. For those sites having blocks withwidmanstaetten graphite, the recommendation is to perform a visual inspection of the block top under strong lighting during a test run once a refueling cycle.

Should cracks be found, the engine should be evaluated for continued service and a more detailed inspection performed at the next available refueling outage.

27

3.11 PISTON SKIRTS The scope of this review willbe limited to Type AE piston skirts. These are the only type skirts currently used in nuclear applications.

PM Recommendations The piston skirt preventative inspections are listed in Part B of Appendix A. Specifically, the PM listed requires disassembly of the engine Backcaround The design review ofthis component revealed that design stresses are within the allowables and that based on experimentally measured data, neither crack initiation nor propagation is expected to occur.

The AE skirts were tested and validated during DR/QR.

The purpose of this validation was to determine the calculated fatigue lifeof this component.

Following the validation, a detailed inspection was made of these skirts with no problems found. These skirts have previously been approved by NRC for use at the rated engine loads and all engines in current service have been equipped with these skirts.

Results of Ins ections Thirty nine piston skirts have been removed and inspected in detail.

No problems have been found with this component and these skirts continue to provide good service.

See Appendix B for the numbers of inspections.

28

Conclusion Based on the positive inspection results of this component and documented design quality, further inspections under the DR/QR program forthis component are not required unless a piston is removed from the engine for some other reason.

29

3.12 CYLINDER HEADS PM Recommendations The cylinder head preventative inspections are listed in Part B of Appendix A. Specifically, PM 1 requires teardown

~Back round The basic cylinder head configuration is common to all TDI DSR<8 and DSRV-16 engines.

However, during periods of manufacturing, TDI made changes to manufacturing practices, quality control, and design.

The heads manufactured have been categorized into three groups:

those cast prior to October 1978 are referred to as Group I, those cast between October, 1978 and September, 1980 are Group II, and those cast after September 1980 are Group III.

Cylinder heads in Group I and II are subject to core shift, inadequate control of solidification, and inadequate control of the Stellite valve seat weld deposition process.

In addition, Group I heads are not stress relieved and are subject fatigue crack growth in thin areas.

Heads in Group III are much less prone to all of these problems.

Casting defects were found at Shoreham, Grand Gulf, Catawba, and Comanche Peak during the DR/QR process.

The net result from the design reviews and flaws, would have been to allow leakage of jacket water to the exterior of the head or to the cylinder.

Exterior leakage is of no real concern from a reliability standpoint, but leakage into a cylinder can result in major engine damage.

As a result, the Owner's Group recommended that the engine be barred or air rolled prior to starting with the air start cocks open to detect any potential leakage.

30

Results of Ins ections Inspections have been performed as detailed in Appendix B. Indications were found on the exhaust valve stem during RFO 4 at River Bend. The indications were caused by a sharp chamfered edge on the rocker arm swivel pad and are direct result of excessive valve lash.

The root cause of the excessive valve lash has been attributed to back pressure in the exhaust system during the start sequence of the engine.

The chamfered edge on the swivel pad was removed by machining.

An improved swivel pad has been developed by the vendor. A later inspection has found that removal of this sharp edge is preventing further damage to the valve stem.

In addition, a water leak has been found on a head at River Bend and this leak is under investigation to determine its cause.

Conclusions Based on the above positive inspection results, PM recommendation 1 is not warranted and should be discontinued.

It is the recommendation of the Owner's Group that pre run air rolls and inspections for leaks, prior to any planned start or as dictated by plant configuration, continue to preclude a leak from resulting in major engine damage.

Any other type of degradation that could occur will become evident during compression checks, with exhaust temperature monitoring, and monitoring jacket water standpipe level for losses.

31

'I t

3.13 PUSH RODS The scope of this review will be limited to push rods of the friction welded design.

PM Recommendations The push rod preventative maintenance inspections are listed in Part B of Appendix A.

The recommendation requires an engine teardown.

Backcaround Design analysis of this design showed that potential buckling under the loads to be imposed was not a concern.

Metallurgical evaluations showed no major discrepancies in the chemical composition, hardness, or microstructures of any components.

A fatigue crack growth analysis showed that, under cyclic loading, no potential fabrication cracks are expected to propagate in either the main or intermediate push rods using this design.

A fatigue test that included 10 to the seventh cycles compressive load from zero load to a value approximately 25% above the maximum theoretical service load, was also conducted.

No cracks or indications were found.

Results of Ins ections Over 900 push rods have been inspected following extended service and have shown no problems.

32

Conclusions Based on the positive inspection results and the conservatism of the design, future inspections as required in the DR/QR are not warranted and the Owner's Group proposes to delete this item.

Should these components be removed for other reasons, Owner's may elect to conduct these inspections depending on the service life and reasons resulting in engine teardown.

3.14 CYLINDER HEAD STUDS This issue was closed in the original NRC review resulting in no preventative inspections for this component.

There has been nothing found in subsequent operation of these engines to change this finding.

3.15 ROCKER ARM CAPSCREWS PM Recommendations The rocker arm preventative maintenance inspections are listed in Part B of Appendix A. The inspection is a "one time" inspection and has been completed for all engines.

The inspection does require teardown.

~Back round The review during the initial DR/QR revealed that capscrews failures had occurred on an isolated basis.

The cause of the failures was due to insufficient preload on the capscrews.

This failure history resulted in the requirements outlined under the PM Recommendations.

The Owners'roup performed a detail design review of the component which calculated appropriate resultant stresses, endurance limits, and looked at the material requirements to determine that the material is suitable.

Results of Ins ections Subsequent to incorporating the torque requirements there have been over 500 inspections of this component with no major problems found.

River Bend has reported two pop rivets missing; this was disposition as not being a problem as lubrication could still get to the needed areas.

Conclusion This inspection is currently performed only on reassembly of the rocker arms.

This should continue when the rocker arm is removed from service for any reason.

3.16 TURBOCHARGERS PM Recommendations The turbocharger preventative inspections are listed in Part 8 of Appendix A.

Specifically, PM Recommendations 2,4,5, and 6 require teardowns.

These inspections have been performed on a per PM basis as detailed in Appendix B. These turbochargers typically see operation hours of approximately 500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> per 5 year interval.

~Back round Turbocharger performance directly affects the design rating of the engine.

During the DR/QR review, several bearing and lubrication problems were identified. In addition, there was a concern dealing with the potential for damage of the rotating vane group due to ingesting fragments of material, specifically bolts and blades from the stationary vanes assembly that had failed due to fatigue loadings.

The response to these concerns were answered as follows:

1) Lubrication and Bearing Wear The Owners Group recommended modifications to install the drip and full flow prelubrication system to provide an oil filmto the turbo bearings that would drain away during standby and that this system should be activated to prelube any planned start.

This recommendation has been implemented by the Owners.

In addition, oil sampling was recommended as a means to detect significant bearing wear.

PM items 1,3 and 4 relate specifically to this concern.

36

2) Potential For Damage to Rotating Vanes During DR/QR review, it was learned that at least one engine in nuclear service had experienced loss of a stationary vane and bolting material originating from the rotating vane group. The net effect of this event was that no significant damage occurred, and the turbocharger performance was not effected.

This is documented in NUREG 1216 as referenced.

This issue resulted in PMs 1,2,5,6, and 7.

Results of Ins ections PM items 2,5, and 6 require teardown.

Appendix B shows the number of times that each PM has been performed.

The results of the inspections have shown that in most cases the'modifications have resulted in eliminating significant bearing wear. In a case where some moderate amount of wear was found, this was detected via the oil monitoring trends. There is no case where failure occurred due to excessive bearing wear.

Since the original discovery of stationary vane failure and passing of this material through the rotating vane group, three other occurrences have occurred with the same result that the vane fragment passed through the rotating vane group with no significant damage and no significant degradation of turbocharger performance.

Conclusions Based on the positive inspection results described and detailed in Appendix B, PM items 2,4,5,and 6 are not required.

PMs 1,3 and 7 will be continued as a part of the future maintenance prog'ram. PMs along with results from the oil sampling program and exhaust temperature trending will show degradation in turbocharger performance and/or indicate increased bearing wear or vane damage.

This will permit the 37

utility to evaluate and take actions necessary to correct the problems.

Should the turbochargers be removed from service forany reason, the PM recommendations 2,4,5, and 6 should be considered as good maintenance practice.

38

4.0 SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY System unreliability for the TDI EDGs has been consistent with the industry median for the period since DR/QR was completed.

A review of the INPO data for the period 7/89&92 gives a median unreliability for TDI EDGs as 0.0114.

This average is well within the expectations of NRC guidance for either a plant needing a 0.0250 unreliability or 0.050 unreliabilityas directed by Station Blackout and equal to the current industry median. Some unreliability has been attributed to the engine teardowns and inspections.

Industry experience indicates that elimination of frequent teardown and inspections has resulted in an additional decrease in unreliability. The following table lists the INPO data furnished for unreliability:

INPO UNRELIABILITYVALUE FOR TDI DIESELS 7/89%/92 ENGINE UNRELIABILITY 0.0556 0.0000 0.0238 0.0238 0.0357 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0112 10 0.0000 0.0371 39

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 0.0114 0.0373 0.0099 0.0000 0.0233 0.0360 0.0467 0.0059 0.0114 MEDIAN 0.0114 It is concluded from the data provided that the unreliability of the TDI EDGs is within the bounds and expectations of the regulatory guidance and other diesels within the nuclear industry.

40

5.0 SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY System unavailability has been reasonable for the TDI Enterprise engines since DR/QR as measured by the INPO indicators.

(The INPO Indicators are based on unavailability during power operations.) The industry median (for all engines) is 0.0182. The median forthe TDI engines is 0.0177. The followingtable gives the unavailability three year values for the TDI engines in service for the period 7/89-6/92:

INPO UNAVAILABILITYVALUES FOR TDI DIESELS 7/89-6/92 ENGINE UNAVAILABILITY 0.0175 0.0117 0.0179 0.0464 0.0385 0.0156 0.0113 0.0127 0.0416 10 12 0.0323 0.0673 0.0411 13 0.0439 41

14 0.0142 15 16 0.0040 0.0051 17 0.041 3 18 0.0152 19 0.0182 20 0.0167 MEDIAN 0.0177 Recent industry events have focused more attention on unavailability of safety related systems especially the diesels during modes of operation other than fullpower operation. The above numbers reflect standard industry practice of determining unavailability during periods of power and non power operation.

Review of data from utilities involved with this submittal, accounting for unavailability during outages would substantially increase the median.

As an example, assume an outage of 6 weeks for an overhaul on a diesel.

This would result in 1008 hours0.0117 days <br />0.28 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.83544e-4 months <br /> out of service and if this were translated, would result in an unavailability of 11.5% for the year without any other unavailability factored in.

In review of data from utilities supporting this licensing request, unavailability numbers in the range of 10-15% would not be uncommon with outage out of service time figured in. By not performing major teardowns, out of service durations during outages could be shortened to two weeks and significantly reduce this unavailability.

42

The basis of the TDI surveillance matrix deals with preventative maintenance, monitoring, and inspections.

The latter of this list is by far the largest contributor to the significant out of service times experienced in outages.

In addition the requirement to perform an overhaul every 10 years (a complete overhaul has not yet been performed after 10 years of operation) will add even more to the unavailability of the engines'uring outages.

The overhaul frequency is discussed in detail in Section 3.1. This submittal addresses a solution to reduce unavailability by reducing engine teardowns and inspections. This willbe accomplished by more closely monitoring and trending the data that is already being collected. Teardown and inspection willbe performed when indicated by the maintenance/monitoring and trending programs for the engines.

Acceptance of this submittal will reduce unavailability and will comply with Station Blackout levels of unreliability which will reduce the risk of core melt as noted in work that has been performed on Station Blackout Issues.

Acceptance will also help these utilities prepare for the issues to be addressed by the Maintenance Rule.

THE TRANSAMERICADELAVAL,INC. ONfNERS GROUP LICENSING CONDITIONS APPENDICES TABLEOF CONTENTS APPENDIX A PART A - Overview and Definitions. Operating and Standby Suweillance Parameters.

PART B - DR/QR Appendix II, Part B and Part D, Selected Pages From Site specific Matrix APPENDIX B Results of Inspection For TDI Diesel Generator Phase I Components.

APPENDIX C Position Paper on Radiograph Requirements For Connecting Rod Bearing Shells APPENDIX D Position Paper on Radiograph Requirements For Connecting Rod Bearing Shells

TDI OWNERS GROUP APPENDIX - II GENERIC HAINTENANCE HATRIX PART A OVERVIEW AND DEFINITIONS OPERATING AND STANDBY SURVEILLANCE PARAHETERS

TDI OWNERS GROUP GENERIC MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM APPENDIX - II I

INTRODUCTION The purpose of this appendix is to provide the TDI Owners with a set of maintenance and surve i 1 1 ance recommendati on s for. diesel generator components which have been developed by TDI and/or the Owners Group as a

result of the overall Owners Group Prog'ram and including subsequent testing and inspections performed following the review conducted by the original program.

This appendix is intended to enhance the existing TDI Instruction

Manual, Volume I and Volume III, which wi 11 maintain the qualification of the diesel generators for the life of the plant.

II METHODOLOGY During the implementation of the Owners Group Program

Plan, the Owners Group Technical Staff reviewed many sources of information regarding the maintenance and surveillance for the diesel generator components identified in this appendix.

These sources included TDI Instruction

Manuals, Service Information Memos (SIMs),

and TDI correspondence on specific components.

The basis of this matrix is formed by the following:

~

Owners Group Technical Staff review of TDI Instruction

Manuals, SIMs, and TDI correspondence on specific components.

Technical Staff input regarding the adequacy of recommendations found in sources mentioned above.

~

Additional maintenance recommendations identified during the DR/gR review and from 10CFR21 reports and operating.experience at nuclear plants.

Results of subsequent testing and surveillance

( i.e.,

Shoreham EDG103 750-hout endurance run and subsequent engine teardown) performed following the review conducted during the original program.

Additional review by the Owners Group representatives.

It should be noted that this revision in some cases modifies the original program results based on this additional information and review.

III RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS Proper maintenance is important in satisfactory service of the emergency

work, in order to be effective, must regularly.

It is for these reasons ensuring 1 ong, rel iabl e and diesel generators.

Maintenance be carried out thoroughly and that a

detailed schedule of Revi sion 3

maintenance service has been laid out by the Owners Group for the TDI Diesel Generators.

This s'chedule should be followed as closely as the operating conditions will permit.

This maintenance service as specified supersedes previous general maintenance requirements, but is separate and does not supersede guality Revalidation and/or modifications previously recommended.

The schedule detai 1 s speci fic components requiring maintenance on a regular basis.

This schedule separates the maintenance activities into frequencies as set forth in the. subsequently list of definitions.

Inspections, as outlined in this maintenance

schedule, are to be performed and parts refurbished or replaced as required by the program or deemed necessary by the inspection.

Any adverse findings shall be investigated and corrective

action, including amended inspection frequencies, shall be implemented unless sufficient justification is present to do otherwise.

This generic

matrix, Parts A,

B C

together with Part D entitled "Site-Specific Maintenance Matrix" and the sources defined in Section II form the TDI Maintenance Program.

Note that component numbers used in the generic matrix are for Texas Utilities'omanche Peak Steam Electric Station Unit 1.

Part E

provides a

cross reference to identify corresponding components for other engines.

Also note that a blank in the cross reference signifies that a

component is not on a particular engine and thus that Owner would not perform that maintenance item.

Tables I

and 2

of Part A

provide engine operating and standby surveillance parameters and frequencies.

It is recommended that the utility address these tables in its operating and monitoring programs.

Table I

addresses operating parameters and is not duplicated in the maintenance schedules; these parameters are to be recorded and/or checked during the monthly testing and any other period of operation.

Table 2

addresses the standby parameters that occur on a daily frequency and are not duplicated in the maintenance schedules.

IV.

DEFINITION OF TERMS I.

Overhaul Frequency a)

A complete engine teardown inspection will be performed every 10 years.

The utility has the flexibility to inspect one engine/reactor unit at the EOC prior to 10 years and the other engine at the EOC following 10 years.

Alternately for PWR units, the inspection may be performed coincident with the 10-year reactor vessel

.inservice inspection.

This will permit both engines for each unit to be disassembled in parallel since one engine will not have to remain in service with the reactor vessel off loaded.

(For reactor units having three

engines, the inspections are to be carried out as above with the third engine to be inspected at the second EOC following 10 years).

The 10-year interval will typically be taken from issuance of the Low Power Operating license or from subsequent teardown and inspection for plants already in operation.

Revision 3

b)

A one time inspection will be performed at the EOC closest to five years.

For a unit, one engine may be inspected at the EOC prior to fjve years and the other at the EOC after five years to minimize plant outage'ength.

(For reactor units having three

engines, the inspections are to be carried out as above with the third engine to be inspected at the second EOC following five years).

This inspection will generally involve the same components as the 10-year teardown;

however, only a

sample of items for some components will be inspected as set forth in the maintenance schedule.

During this five-year inspection, any significant adverse findings of a

particular component will result in an inspection of all such components of that engine to determine any adverse trends.

Favorable findings will result in reassembly of the engine for service.

2.

Daily Frequency To be performed once per day.

3.

Monthly Frequency To be performed once in a

month; normally during,

before, or after test run per plant Technical Specifications.

4.

EOC - (End of Cycle)

To be performed once during outage for refueling.

5.

Alternate EOC To be performed once every other outage for refueling.

6.

Five Years - To be performed once at the EOC occurring nearest to the end of a recurring five-year period or at the EOC midway between the one time EOC 2

inspections and the first overhaul inspection and subsequently midway between each overhaul.

7.

As Required To be performed as often as good maintenance, site procedures, manufacturer's recommendations, or experience dictate as determined by site personnel.

8.

Maintenance - Monitoring and/or surveillance on a periodic frequency to assure the component will perform its intended function in a

safe reliable manner.

9.

Accessible Any item on which the required function can be performed without disassembly of an engine compohent.

Removal of defined access cover is not considered disassembly.

10.

Appropriate NDE Nondestructive examination selected by site personnel that is most suitable to obtain the information sought by an individual inspection item; choice of NDE shall be made to assure that the technique will detect indications consistent with the acceptance criteria.

Revision 3

TABLE 1 Diesel Engine Op'crating Surveillance Parameters and Frequency Com onent 1)

Lube Oil Inlet Pressure to Engine 2)

Lube Oil Filter Differential Pressure 3)

Lube Oil Temperature (engine inlet and outlet) 4)

Lube Oil Sump Level 5)

Turbocharger Oil Pressure 6)

Fuel Oil Filter Differential Pressure 7)

Fuel Oil to Engine Pressure 8)

Fuel Oil Day Tank Level.

9)

Jacket Water Pressure (engine inlet) 10)

Jacket Water Temperature (in, out) 11)

Engine Cylinder Temperature Exhaust-All (If temperature in any one cylinder exceeds 1050', refer to HP-022/023 Item 7.)

12)

Manifold Air Temperature (RB, LB for DSRV Engines) 13)

Mani fold Air Pressure (RB, LB for DSRV Engines) 14)

Starting Air Pressure (RB, LB for DSRV Engines) 15)

Crankcase Vacuum 16)

Engine Speed 17)

Hour Heter 18)

Kilowatt Load 19)

Visual Inspection for Leaks, etc.

Fre uenc Log hourly Log hourly Log hourly Log hourly Log hourly Log hourly Log hourly Check hourly Log hourly Log hourly Log hourly Log hourly Log hourly Check hourly Log hourly Log hourly Log hourly Log hourly Check hourly II-A-4 Revision 3

TABLE 2 Diesel Engine Standby Surveillance Parameters and Frequency Com onent Fre uenc 2) 3)

Lube Oil Temperature (in, out)

Lube Oil Sump Level Check Operation of Lube Oil Keep-Warm Pump Motor Monitor Lube Oil Keep-Warm Strainer and/or Filter Differential Pressure Log daily Log daily Dai ly Daily 5) 6)

7) 8)

9) 10) 12)

Perform a visual inspection for leakage of the Lube Oil Heat Exchanger.

Verify that no leakage through the leak-off ports of the lantern ring is present.

Fuel Oil Day Tank Level Jacket Water Temperature (in, out)

Perform a visual inspection for leakage at packing for Jacket Water Heat Exchanger whenever the engine is in the emergency STANDBY mode.

Verify that no leakage through the leak-off ports of the lantern ring is present.

Verify proper governor oil level Verify proper oil level of generator pedestal bearing Starting Air Pressure Drain air receiver float traps and/or drain Starting Air Storage Tank and monitor the quantity of moisture produced.

If quantity of moisture is excessive, correct immediately.

Daily Log daily Log daily Oai,ly Daily Oa i ly Log daily Daily 13)

. Check Operation of Compressor Air Traps Daily II"A-5 Revision 3

TABLE 2 (Cont'd)

Diesel Engine Standby Surveillance Parameters and Frequency Com onent Fre uenc 14)

Test Annunciators 15)

Check Alarm Clear 16)

Inspect for Leaks Before Engine Operation Before Engine Operation Daily 17)

Visually inspect intercooler for external leaks including intake manifold drain connection.

Oai ly II-A-6 Revision 3

APPENDIX A PART B

TOI OWNERS GROUP APPENOIX' II GENERIC MAINTENANCE MATRIX PART 8 PHASE I COMPONENTS

0 GENERIC QIMIEHAICE MATRIX-PHASE I Coqenent Component Rober Identification HP'-022/23 Turbocharger PM Recommendation 1.

Measure vibration and check uith baseline data.

2.

Inspect inpeller/diffuser and clean if necessary.

3.

Measure rotor end play (axial clearance) to identify trends of increasing clearance (i.e.,

thrust bearing degradation).

4.

Perform visual and blue check inspections of the thrust hearing.

5.

Disassemble.

inspect, and refurbish.

6.

The noule ring components and inlet guide vanes should be visually inspected for missing

. I

arts or parts shovinq dis-ress.

If such conditions are Alt Monthly ROC BOC 5 Year brerhaul To be accomplished after obtaining stable exhaust temperature conditions.

Revieu thrust bearing axial clearances after inspection to determine if a trend exists.

Any trend touard increasing axial clearance could signify thrust hearing degradation.

Note:

Thrust bearing inspection should also be performed after experiencing each 40 nonprelubed (automatic) fast starts.

In additson, a one-time inspection should be completed after the first 100 engine starts.

Note: During reassembly.

ensure that capscrevs are properly installed uith the recomnended torgue.

If QR inspection was performed prior to accunulating significant hours (i.e.,

the number of hours accumulated during plant preoperational

testing, approximately 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />),

the turhocharqers should be reinspected at the next EOC.

Or perform a visual inspection on one turbo-charger per nuclear unit at each EOC.

Revision 3

Coapo neat Coaponent Identification PM Recoaaendation G%RRIC MAIHTERAKS MATRIX-PHASE I Alt Monthly EOC ROC 5 Year Overhanl 02-305A Base Asseahly

noted, the entire ring asseably should be replaced.

7.

Monitor inlet teaperature to ensure gas teaperature does not exceed aanufacturer s recon-aendation of 1200'f if exhaust tenperature for any cylinder exceeds 1050'F (ReEr: Table I).

1.

Perfora a visual inspection of the base.

The inspection should include the areas adjacent to the nut pockets of each bearing saddle and be conducted after a thorough wipe doun of.the surfaces, usxng-good lighting.

Any turbocharger in uhich nozzle ring anonalies are found is to be reinspected at the next EOC.

Note:

Discontinue inspec-tion with appropriate re-design.

Monitoring aay be per-foraed usznq pernanent in-line theraocouple.

strap-on theraocouple, heat gun, or other suitable aeans that has been appropriately tested and calibrated per plant pro-cedures.

lhte:

Also perfora aoni-toring any togae the engine operates zn an unbalanced condition.

Note:

Any cracks detected nust be investigated further before the engine is alloued to return fo service.

The aating sur-faces of the base and cap shall be thoroughly cleaned Rith solvent before any reasseably.

Perfora on EOC basis for 3 cycles.

then overhaul provided there are satisfactory results.

Note:

3 EOC inspections aay be eliainated by perforaing a aetal analysis to confira consistent to class 40 grey iron reguirenents; perforn-ing anaIysis does not eliai-nate need for overhaul in-spections.

II+2 Revision 3

GHNERIC HAIN?MRB HAIRIX-PHASE I Component Component Number Identification 02-305C Main Bearing Caps - Studs and Nuts PM Recoamemdatiou 1.

The mating surfaces at the bearing cap/saddle interface should be inspected when disassembled to ensure the absence of surface imperfec-tions that might prevent tight boltup.

Note:

Upon removal of bearing

caps, clean mating surfaces with a solvent pnor to reassen-bly of the caps to the base.

Alt Monthly ~

BOG ROC 5 Year Rerbaul Comments 02-310A 02-315A 02-315C Crankshaft Cylinder Block Cylinder Liners See site specific recommendations See site specific recor~endatlons Perform a visual inspection of liners for progressive wear.

To be performed for one EOC following piston removal; then discontinue until next piston removal.

Boroscopic 1nspection is acceptable if heads are not removed, Con-lete TDI Inspegtion and aintenance Record Fora No.

'15-1-1 as applicable, TDI Instruction Hanual.

Volume I, Section 6.

02-340A/B Connecting Rods.

Bushings and Bearing Shells (Generic) l.

Inspect and measure all con-necting rod bearing shells to verify lube oil maintenance, which affects wear rate.

X Complete TDI Inspection and Haintenance Record Eorm No.

3N-l-l as applicable, TDI Instruction Hanual.

Volune I, Section 6, appendix III for clearance values.

Per-form inspection at 5 years, on items accessible, consistent with iten 2 of this component.

II+3 Revision 3

Component Component tusber Identification PH Recommendation GMRIC HHHTIIBCH QTRIK - PHL% I hit Honthly ROC ROC 5 Tear Overhaul Comments02-340 h/B Connecting

Rods, Bushings DSRV's and Bearing Shells only 5.

Inspect and measure the connecting rods.

Note: Perforn inspection and measure four connecting rods for DSRVs and two for DSRs at randon at one time 5-year inspection.

Perforn an x-ray exanination on all replacement bearing shells to acceptance criteria developed by Owners Group Technical Staff.

All connecting rod bolts, nuts, and washers should be visually inspected, and danaged parts should be replaced.

The bolts should be MT inspected to verify the continued absence of cracking.

No detectable cracks should be allowed at the root of the threads.

During 'any disassembly that expokes the inside diameter of a rod-eye (piston pin) hushing, the surface of the hushing should be LP inspected to verify the continued absence of linear indications in the heavily loaded zone width +/-15 degrees of the botton dead-center position.

Heasure the clearance between the link pin and link rod.

This clearance should be zero; i.e.,

X Complete TDI Inspection Haintenance Record Eorm No.

340-2-1. -2 as applicable, TDI Instruction Hanual, Volume I. Section 6.

This is to be performed prior to installation of any replacement hearing shells as required.

X Perform inspection at 5

years, on items acces-sible, consistent with Item 2 of this component.

Perform inspection, as required anFon itens accessible, consistent with Iten 2 of this component.

To be performed at each reassembly of link pin to link rod.

Revision 3

Co ment Componeat IhaCr Identification PH Recommendation GEEERIC QIHIHILQASIRIZ - PiIASE I Alt Monthly EX EOC 5 Year Overhaul Comments 7.

no measurable clearance when the specified bolt torque of l,050 ft-lbs is applied.

At the overhaul. visually inspect the rack teeth surfaces for signs of fretting and at one time 5-year inspection for rods disassembled.

Inspect matinq surfaces to ver>fy that the ninimun manufacturers recommended percent contact surface is available.

To be performed once for new and/or replacement parts.

9. If connecting rod holt stretch was measured ultrasonically during reassenbly following the reservice inspection, the engths of the two pair of bolts above the crankpin should be reneasured ultrasoni-cally before the link rod box is dxsassemb]ed.

If ultrasonic measurement was not previously used.

begin use at next inspection that accesses the connecting rods.

Measure bolt stretch before disassenbly.

10. All connecting rod bolts should he visually inspected for thread danaqe (galling) and the two pairs of connecting rod bolts above the crankpxn should be MT inspected to verify the absence of cracking.

All washers used with the bolts should be examined visually for siqns of galling or crackinq and replaced if damaged.

If prestressor package zs

)nstalled, this iten does not apply.

X Also to be perforned at any time the connectinq rod is disassenbled.

Perforn inspection at 5 years.

on itens accessible, consis-tent with Iten 2 of this conponent.

X Also to be performed at any time the connectinq rod is disassembled.

PerKorm inspection at 5 years, on itens accessible, consistent with Iten 2 of this component.

II-B-5 I

Revi'sion 3

nent Component r

Identification PM Recommendation NHERIG MAINENKEMATRIX-PHASE I Alt Monthly EX EOC 5 fear Overhaul 02-341A 02-360A Pistons Cylinder Head ll. A visual inspection should be performed of all external surfaces of the link rod box to verify the ahsence of any signs of service-induced distress

12. All of the bolt holes in the link rod box should be inspected for thread danage (qallinq) or other siqns of abnornalities.

Bolt holes subject to the hiqhest stresses (the pair irxediately above the crankpin) should be exanined with an appropriate non-destructive method to verify the absence of cracking.

Any indications should be recorded for evaluation and corrective

action, If prestressor package is installed, this iten Goes not apply.

I.

Inspect and measure skirt and iston pin.

This iten assumes hat AE skirts are installed.

Eor other types, see site-specific recommendations.

l.

Visually inspect cylinder heads (all cylinders).

Also to be perforned at any tine the connecting rod is disassembled.

Perform inspection at 5 years, on itens accessible, consis-tent with Iten 2 of this conponent.

Also to be performed at any time the connecting rod is disassembled.

Perform in-spection at 5 years, on items accessible, consis-tent with Iten 2 of this conponent.

Conplete TDI Inspection and Maintenance Rezrt Earn No.

341-1-1 as applicable, TDI Instruction Manual, Volume 1, Section 6.

Use Volume 1, Section 8, Appendix III for clearances values.

To be performed at 5-year interval on sanpling basis consistent with Conponent 02-340A/B-Connecting Rods.

Complete TDI Inspection and Maintenance Record Eorm No.

360-1-1 as applicable, TDI Instruction Manual, Volume I, Section 6 - one sheet for each head.

To be per-formed at 5-year interval on sanplinq basis consis-tent nth Component 02-340 A/B - Connect)ng Rods.

II+6 Rerision 3

GHLIRIC HAILLYHLLALLCH}QTRIZ - PLLASH I Component Component LLuaber Identification PH Recommendation Record cold compression pres-sures and mazimun firing pressures.

Hontbly ROC X

Alt EQC 5 Year Overhaul If so indicated - remove cylinder heads.

grind

valves, and reseat.

Refr:

TOI Instruction Hanual, Volure I. Section 6.

02-365C Fuel injection Tubing 3.

4.

2.

Blow-over the engine at least 4

hours but not more than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after engine shutdown.

The cylinder cocks should be open for detection of water leakage into the cylinders.

A second air roll should be performed in the sane manner approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after engxne shutdown.

In addition, the engine should be air rolled shortly before any planned start.

Visually inspect the area around the fuel injection port on each. cylinder head during the normal ronthly run for signs of leakage, Check tubing for leaks at conpression fittings.

Visually inspect tubing lengths for fuel oil leaks or cracks if tubing is unshrouded.

If shrouded.

fuel oil leakage can be detected at the leak-off ports in the base nuts, which.are provided for this purpose, or by annun-ciator if so equipped.

ln the event water is

detected, the cylinder head should be replaced or re-turned to the vendor for repair.

Delete post-run air roll requirements for engines with Group Ill heads after one cycle with posit>ve znspectzon results.

Lf water leakage is

detected, the head(s) should be replaced.

All fuel oil leak in-spections to be performed while the engine is running or whenever the compression fittings have been disturbed.

Fitting inspection for leaks to be performed at engine operation following shutdown.

Subsequent inspections to be performed nodically as indicated.

nshrouded tubing, used as replacement, should be fully inspected consistent with FaAA NDE Procedure ll.l0 prior to bending.

II+7 Revision 3

GEHERIC MAINIEIHOCS MATRIX-PIE I nent Component r

Identification 02-390C Push Rods Pl{ Recomaudatiou l.

2.

Each push rod of the forged-head design should be inspected by liquid penetrant prior to instaIlation or. if installed.

at each overhaul.

This should be repeated, until it has been deternined by 750 hours0.00868 days <br />0.208 hours <br />0.00124 weeks <br />2.85375e-4 months <br /> of operation at the load level used for surveillance testing that the push rod will not develop service-induced cracks.

Push rods confirned in this vay need be exanined only visually at subsequent overhauls.

Push rods of the forged-head design exhibiting cracks larger than 0.25 inch should be replaced, referably vith push rods of he frictzon-welded design.

Each forged-head rod should also be visually inspected one tine to confirn that the head vas fully inserted in the tube prior to welding'ach push rod of the friction-velded design should be inspected initially by liquid penetrant.

If this initial xnspection was not perforned prior to placing the push rods zn service. it should be erforned at the first over-aul. If the friction-welded push rod has been previously suspected by liquid penetrant, then visual exaninatxon will.

suffice for future inspections.

All friction-welded push rods with cracks should be replaced, referably with push rods of he sane design.

Alt monthly BOG BOG 5 Tear Overhaul Coaneuts X

Refr: PNL-5600 X

Refr: PNL-5600.

If initial inspection vas not perforned, perforn on sanpling basis at 5-year inspectxon consistent with Conponent 340A/B-Connecting Rods.

II+&

Revision 3

neat Component r

Identification PH Reconnendation GEHERIC QIHTEI(AIRE 1(ATRIK - PKLSE I Alt Rmthly BOO EOC 5 Tear Overhaul Ccexmts 02-390G Rocker Arn Capscrews, Drive Studs (Pop Rivets) 02-425A Jacket Hater Punp - Gear l.

2.

l.

2 ~

3.

Yerify capscrew torque values during QR inspections.

If not erforned at PR, verify at next

, then as required at reassenbly.

Verify that rocker am drive studs are intact and tight during gR inspection or EOCI, then as required at reassenbly.

Visually inspect jacket water unp gear for chipped or broken

eeth, excessive wear. pitting or other abnornal conditions.

Check the key to keyway interface for a tit)bt Kit on both the punp shaft to inpeller and the spline to punp shaft during punp reassenbly.

At next disassenbly, verify inpeller is one piece (i.e.,

without a bore insert).

If it is not a one-piece inpeller, replace.

It is recomnended that the castle nut that drives the external spline on its taper have nininun and naxinun torque values of 120 ft-lbs and 660 ft-lbs, respectively for DSRYs and a naxinun torque value of 77 ft-lbs for DSRs.

Use TDI Instruction Hanual, Yolune I Section 8, Appendix IY for proper torque values.-

Any abnornal situations or indications of progressive itting should be reported or an engineering evaluation.

For ent)ines with less than 750 hours0.00868 days <br />0.208 hours <br />0.00124 weeks <br />2.85375e-4 months <br />, also inspect by EOC2.

X This along with the drive fit of the inpeller onto the shaft will preclude past problens where relative notion between shaft and inpeller caused fretting and upset of the keyway sides.

Torque valves will be checked each tine castle nut is reassenbled.

II+9 Revision 3

SITE-SPECIFIC HAINIENA))CE HATRIX Component Component Saber Identification 02-310A Crankshaft PH Recommendation 1.

Heasure and record crankshaft web deflections (hot and cold).

2.

Esanine the fillets and oil holes of three main bearing ournals (4, 6, 6 8) usinq LP.

f indications are evident, a

more thorough examination should be made usinq appropriate NDE methods.

3.

Examine the fillets and oil holes in three of the crankpin ournals (choose 3 from Nos. 3 hrough 8 inclusive) usinq LP.

If indications are evident, a

rare thorough exanination should be made usinq appropriate NDE methods.

4.

Heasure diameter of crankpin journals.

5.

Analyze the trends of cylinder pressure and temperature meas-urements to detect imbalances.

Alt Honthly EOC EOC 5 Year Overhaul Conplete TDI Inspection and Haintenance Record Form No.

310-1-1 as applicable, TDI Instruction manual, Volume I, Section 6, Refr:

TDI Instruction Hanual, Volume I, Haintenance Schedule.

Also to be performed once at 5 years.

Refr:

PNL-5600.

Also to be performed once at 5 years.

Refr:

PNL-5600.

Complete TDI Inspection and Maintenance Record Form No, 310-3-1 as applicable, TDI Instruction Banual, Volume 1, Section 6.

Aso perform inspection at 5

years, on items accessible, consistent with this component and Component 02-340A/B.

If an engine operates in a sever~el unbalanced conl~> )on. reinspect the oil holes for fatigue cracks wihin a time-franc deternined by the utility considering the particular circunstances of the abnormal operation.

Refr:

PNL-5600.

Revision 3

neat Conponent r

Identification N Recoraendation SITE-SPECIPIC HAIHTENAICE MATRIX Alt monthly IX EOC 5 Tear Rerhaul Coanents Note:

To avoid the effect of the 4th order resonance.

steady noraal-loaded operation at speeds nore than a feu rpn below the rated speed of 450 rpn should be avo>ded.

Appto-riate precautions should be aken to prevent sustained engine operation uith significant cylinder inbalance.

Lover speeds for testing and break-in are pernissible.

Avoid resonance frequencies.

Refr:

PNL-5600.

Revision 3

SITE-SPECIPIC MAIMIEEAKEMhTRIX Conponent Coupon eat Rusher Identification 02-315A Cylinder Block N Reaxxendation 1.

Perforn inspections per DR/gR Report 02-315h.

2.

Perforn visual inspection for cracks.

Hote:

Visual inspection not required if an appropriate HDE is perforaed.

Alt

}hnthly EOC EOC 5 Year 0/erhaul Connents Inspections based on cunulative engine hours in conjunction with EaAA X

reports Eahh-84-9-11 and SP-84-6-12(j).

Revision 3

APPENDIX B RESULTS OF INSPECTION FOR TDI DIESEL GENERATOR PHASE I COMPONENTS COMPONENT NAME COMPONENT NO.

NO. OF RECOMMENDATION INSPECTIONS NO.

RESULTS AND COMMENTS TURBOCHARGER MP 022/023 Note 1

No problems found.

50 No problems found.

87 47 47 No problems found.

Bearing wear has been reported. This wear has been dispositioned by the vendor as being within acceptable limits.

No problems found.

60 Note 2 Vogtle and Grand Gulf have reported broken or missing bolts passing through the rotating element without identifiable degradation. Vogtle, Grand Gulf and Catawba have reported missing stationary vanes without identifiable degradation.

Missing or damaged items were replaced.

Performed on each test run.

Note 1: Inspections performed monthly. The number of inspections are reater than 200.

Note 2: Performed on multiple occassions durin test runs. A large data base exists.

Reference Attachment 1 for Phase I Components 11/30/92 Page 1 of 14

APPENDIX 8 RESULTS OF INSPECTION FOR TDI DIESEL GENERATOR PHASE I COMPONENTS COMPONENT NAME COMPONENT NO.

NO. OF RECOMMENDATION INSPECTIONS RESULTS AND COMMENTS BASE ASSEMBLY 02-305 A No probIems found.

Reference Attachment 1 for Phase I Components 11/30/92 Page 2 of 14

APPENDIX B RESULTS OF INSPECTION FOR TDI DIESEL GENERATOR PHASE I COMPONENTS COMPONENT COMPONENT PM NO. OF RESULTS AND COMMENTS NAME NO.

RECOMMENDATION INSPECTIONS NO.

MAIN BEARING CAPS-STUDS AND NUTS02-305 C 28 Inspections are based upon the number of bearing caps examined. Perry has reported one shell with rolled edges due to contact with counter weight. Bearing performance was determined to be satisfactory and the reported item corrected.

Reference Attachment 1 for Phase I Components 11/30/92 Page 3 of 14

APPENDIX B RESULTS OF INSPECTION FOR TDI DIESEL GENERATOR PHASE I COMPONENTS COMPONENT NAME COMPONENT NO.

NO. OF RECOMMENDATION INSPECTIONS NO.

RESULTS AND COMMENTS CRANKSHAFT 02-310A 188 No problems found. Inspection is number of hot and cold deflection measurements taken.

67 Inspection is number of oil holes inspected.

Upon bearing rollout to perform inspections, River Bend has experienced minor cavitation, including pitting on bearing surfaces.

This was evaluated and dispositioned as not a problem. The bearings in question had performed their function and could continue to operate withouy adverse effects. Bearings were replaced as good engineering practice.

42 35 No problems found. Inspection is number of filletand oil holes inspected.

No problems found. Inspection is number of crackpin journals measured.

Note 1

No problems found.

Note 1: Inspections performed monthly. The number of inspections are greater than 200.

Reference Attachment 1 for Phase I Components 11/30/92 Page 4 of 14

APPENDIX B RESULTS OF INSPECTION FOR TDI DIESEL GENERATOR PHASE I COMPONENTS COMPONENT NAME COMPONENT NO. OF RECOMMENDATION INSPECTIONS NO.

RESULTS AND COMMENTS CYLINDER BLOCK 02-315A 105 No problems found. Inspection is related to number of areas inspected under individual heads when removed.

159 No problems found. Number of inspections include inspections made by several utilities during operation.

Reference Attachment 1 for Phase I Components 11/30/92 Page 5 of 14

APPENDIX B RESULTS OF INSPECTION FOR TDI DIESEL GENERATOR PHASE I COMPONENTS COMPONENT NAME COMPONENT NO.

NO. OF RECOMMENDATION INSPECTIONS NO.

RESULTS AND COMMENTS CYLINDER LINERS 02-315C 512 Number of inspections represent number of liners inspected. Vogtle has reported light and moderate scratches with bright spots and carbon build-up. This has been evaluated and dispositioned as acceptable.

Grand Gulf has found indications of porosity. The liners performed as designed and were dispositioned as acceptable, but were replaced as good engineering practice.

Reference Attachment 1 for Phase I Components 11/30/92 Page 6 of 14

APPENDIX B RESULTS OF INSPECTION FOR TDI DIESEL GENERATOR PHASE I COMPONENTS COMPONENT NAME COMPONENT NO.

PM RECOMMENDATION NO.

NO. OF INSPECTIONS RESULTS AND COMMENTS CONNECTING RODS, BUSHINGS AND BEARING SHELLS (GENERIC) 02-340A/B 42 Inspections indicate the number of connecting rod bearings.

River Bend has reported some cavatiation induced pitting.

The bearings remained capable of performing as designed, but were replaced as good engineering practice. The oil analysis did identify bearing material in the lube oil prior to replacement.

Vogtle has found three shells with evident wear and/or indications. These shells were evaluated and dispositioned as acceptable.

They were replaced as good engineering judgement.

36 No problems found. Inspection is the number of connecting rods examined.

See Referenced submittal to NRC, Attachment (?)

89 34 71 No problems found. Inspection is the number of connecting rods examined.

No problems found. Inspection is the number of rod-eye bushings examined.

No problems found. Inspection is the number of connecting rods examined.

Reference Attachment 1 for Phase I Components 11/30/92 Page 7 of 14

APPENDIX B RESULTS OF INSPECTION FOR TDI DIESEL GENERATOR PHASE I COMPONENTS COMPONENT NAME COMPONENT NO.

NO. OF RECOMMENDATION INSPECTIONS NO.

RESULTS AND COMMENTS CONNECTING RODS, BUSHINGS AND BEARING SHELLS (GENERIC) 02-340A/B 20 73 No problems found. Inspection is the number of rack teeth examined.

No problems found. Inspection is the number of sets of rod teeth examined (required for new or replacement rods).

10 296 20 20 No problems found. Inspection is the number of connecting rods examined.

Inspection is the number of connecting rods examined. Vogtle found 1 stud bolt missing. This was evaluated and dispositioned as acceptable.

No additional problems found.

12 20 Inspection is the number of connecting rods examined. Vogtle has found 1 indication in a hole. It was evaluated and dispositioned as acceptable.

The rod was replaced as good engineering practice.

Reference Attachment 1 for Phase I Components 11/30/92 Page 8 of 14

APPENDIX B RESULTS OF INSPECTION FOR TDI DIESEL GENERATOR PHASE I COMPONENTS COMPONENT NAME COMPONENT PM RECOMMENDATION NO.

NO. OF INSPECTIONS RESULTS AND COMMENTS PISTONS02-341 A 39 Inspection is the number of pistons examined. Grand Gulf has found 3 piston pins and plugs to be slightly loose. This was evaluated and dispositioned as acceptable.

The plugs were replaced as good engineering practice.

Reference Attachment 1 for Phase I Components 11/30/92 Page 9 of 14

APPENDIX B RESULTS OF INSPECTION FOR TDI DIESEL GENERATOR PHASE I COMPONENTS COMPONENT NAME COMPONENT NO.

PM RECOMMENDATION NO.

NO. OF INSPECTIONS RESULTS AND COMMENTS CYLINDER HEAD 02-360A 151 Note 1

Inspection is the number of heads examined. Vogtle has found minor pitting and nicks in 4 valves. This was evaluated and dispositioned as acceptable.

Perry has found 2 exhaust valve seat cuts. Performance was not effected. This was evaluated and dispositioned as acceptable.

The heads were replaced as good engineering practice. River Bend has found problems with swivel pads. This is discussed in Section 3.12 No problems found.

Note 2 Mist has been detected on several ocassions, leading to a in-depth investigation as to the cause. The results are incorporated in Section 3.12 and PM Recommendation No.

1 Note 3 Inspection performed each run. No problems found.

Note 1: Inspection performed each EOC and more frequently by several utilities. This inspection collectively amounts to greater than 200 inspections.

Note 2: Inspection performed prior to each start and collectively amounts to greater than 200 inspections.

Note 3: Ins ections erformed monthl

. The number of ins ections are reater than 200.

Reference Attachment 1 for Phase I Components 11/30/92 Page 10 of 14

APPENDIX B RESULTS OF INSPECTION FOR TDI DIESEL GENERATOR PHASE I COMPONENTS COMPONENT COMPONENT PM NO. OF RESULTS AND COMMENTS NAME NO.

RECOMMENDATION INSPECTIONS NO.

FUEL INJECTION TUBING 02-365 C Note 1

Note 1

Minor fitting leaks have been found and repairs are made as leaks are discovered. Catawba has examined 1 tubing failure of unshrouded tubing due to vibrations. River Bend has experienced 1 failure of the shrouded tubing due to the fuel in ection pump base cap screws failing. The tubing was replaced and the engine restored to service.

Same as for PM Recommendation No.

1 Note 1: Inspections performed monthly. The number of inspections are reater than 200.

Reference Attachment 1 for Phase I Components 11/30/92 Page 11 of 14

APPENDIX B RESULTS OF INSPECTION FOR TDI DIESEL GENERATOR PHASE I COMPONENTS COMPONENT NAME COMPONENT NO.

PM RECOMMENDATION NO.

NO. OF INSPECTIONS RESULTS AND COMMENTS PUSH RODS02-390 C NA Push rods of this design are not in service.

940 Inspection is the number of push rods examined. No probiems found.

Reference Attachment 1 for Phase I Components 11/30/92 Page 12 of 14

APPENDIX B RESULTS OF INSPECTION FOR TDI DIESEL GENERATOR PHASE I COMPONENTS COMPONENT NAME COMPONENT NO.

NO. OF RECOMMENDATION INSPECTIONS NO.

RESULTS AND COMMENTS ROCKER ARM CAPSCREWS, DRIVE STUDS (POP RIVETS)02-390 G 551 551 Inspection is of rocker arm assemblies.

No problems found.

Inspection is for rocker arm assemblies. Two pop rivets have been found missing. One each on the River Bend EDGs.

Result was no degradation in EDG operability since oil flow continued to the required locations. Grand Gulf has found bearing wear. An evaluation has dispositioned this as normal.

Reference Attachment 1 for Phase I Components 11/30/92 Page 13 of 14

APPENDIX B RESULTS OF INSPECTION FOR TDI DIESEL GENERATOR PHASE I COMPONENTS COMPONENT NAME COMPONENT NO.

RECOMMENDATION NO.

NO. OF INSPECTIONS RESULTS AND COMMENTS JACKET WATER PUMP - GEAR 02-425A 22 inspection is for jacket water pump drive gears. Vogtle has found gears with minor pitting. Grand Gulf has found gears with excessive wear. Vendor has a proposed modification to allow easy removal of pump for inspection.

They are also evaluating the gear design.

Inspections are for the number of verifications. No problems found.

Inspections are for the number of verifications. No problems found.

Reference Attachment 1 for Phase I Components 11/30/92 Page 14 of 14

APPENDIX C

DUKEGVGINEEBNG

&SERNCER INC 230 Sash Tiyon St PQ. Box 1004 ChatloCL NC 28201.1004 Bus t704) 373247:

Fax T704) 373.26%

October 31, 1991 Mr. P.

Om Chopra Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Electrical Systems Branch (MS 7 E4)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Re:

Cooper-Enterprise Clearinghouse Group Diesel Generators Position Paper on Radiograph Requirements for Connecting Rod Bearing Shells File: MTS-4086

Dear Mr. Chopra:

Enclosed is Cooper-Enterprise Clearinghouse Group's position concerning the current radiographic examination requirement for the diesel generator' connecting rod bearing shells as detailed in Appendix ZZ of the Design Review/Qualification Revalidation (DR/QR)

Report.

The position paper provides the necessary technical justification to permit elimination of requirements to inspect replacement bearings shells by radiographic techniques.

The Clearinghouse Group is requesting relief from the radiographic examination requirements because the bearings supplied by Cooper Industries are presently being manufactured by Federal-Mogul, rather than the form'er manufacturer/supplier, ALCOA.

Federal-Mogul manufactures their bearing using a

centrifuge process, a more advanced method than the static mold process used by ALCOA. The centrifuge process eliminates the potential for void formation and therefore radiographic examination is not required.

The Clearinghouse Group requests you review the enclosed document and based upon the technical justification provided, determine on a generic basis, that the current radiographic requirements are not necessary.

Response

to this issue by January 31, 1992 will be greatly appreciated by the Clearinghouse and the individual utilities members.

Should you have questions, please direct them to Rick Deese at (704) 875-4065.

Mr. P.

Om Chopra October 31, 1991 Page 2 oZ 2

Very truly yours, R.

D. Broome Project Manager Cooper-Enterprise Clearinghouse Duke Engineering

& Services, Enc..

Ge e

Chairperson Cooper-Enterprise Clearinghouse TU Electric RDB/VMA/100991 Enclosure cc:

E. B. Tomlison (NRC)

Clearinghouse Representatives R. J.

Deese

POSITION PAPER FOR RADIOGRAPHIC EXAMINATIONOF CONNECTING ROD BEARING SHELLS (02-340B)

FOR ENTERPRISE DSR-8, DSRV-16 AND DSRV-20 ENGINES rugose The purpose of this position paper is to provide sufficient technical justification to permit the elimination of the DR/QR Appendix II requirement to inspect replacement bearing shells by radiographic techniques.

ack ou During the period of 1983-1985, thirteen utilities formed the TDI Owners Group and contracted Duke Management and Technical Services, Inc.

(now Duke Engineering 6 Services,.Inc.) to perform a Design Review and Quality Revalidation (DR/QR) of the TDI engines following the crankshaft failure at Shoreham.

A portion of this review focused on the connecting rod bearing shells.

The experience based review of this component revealed a very small amount of bearing failures.

These failures were attributed to two causes:

(1) inadequate clamping force in the connecting rod assembly due to inadequate pre-load of the connecting rod bolts, and (2) potential voids and/or impurities induced into the bearing during the casting process.

These two items were corrected by:

(1) increasing connecting rod bolt pre-load, and (2) performing (NDE)

(radiography) of the bearing shells to detect voids or impurities.

Technical Discussion The original bearings reviewed and supplied by TDI were cast by ALCOA in static molds.

These castings were taken by TDI, machined, electroplated with

babbit, and then re-machined to final tolerances.

Cooper Enterprise (formerly TDZ) has informed the nuclear customers that, they willbegin supplying bearings purchased from a sub-supplier, Federal Mogul Corporation.

These bearings are cast via a centrifuge process that is superior to using a static mold in that the centrifuge assures a more uniform placement of equal density material.

Attachment 1 from Federal Mogul offers more details on this issue.

Material Testin Federal Mogul performed radiographic inspections of bearing shells cast by the centrifuge techniques.

These radiographs exhibited dark spots or "ghosts".

Several bearings containing these indications were sectioned and metallurgically examined.

These images were the result of either (1) material with columnar grains

as opposed to equi-axed or (2) slightly lower tin content in the columnar grain areas.

The results of the metallurgical examinations concludee that the metal in these areas is equal to the remaining material in mechanical properties; and therefore the shells will perform as required.

Cooper Enterprise has purchased and installed these bearings in several non-nuclear engines.

Theses engines have accumulated thousands of operating hours without failure.

co e

tion Due, to the manufacturing change that produces quality casting and favorable operating history, it is recommended that the requirement to radiograph connecting rod bearing shells be deleted.

Note that Cooper Enterprise concurs with this recommendation (see Attachment 2)

~

FEDERAL-ivfOGUL'1'ECHMCALCMTER Engine and Transmission Products April 16, 1991 091-Q4 Page 1

ATTACHMENT1 Cooper E..er v P/N 02-340-04-AQ: Bearin s Reiected bv Radio ra h

<t~s:. ract Hear ngs rejected by Cooper Ene:gy (25 pcs.)

were examined using ntetallography, microhardness, and SEM/EDS analysis.

Conclusion is that dark spots in radiograph (normally indicative oi lower density material, porosity, or oxide inclusion) are in th.'s case due to one or both of two possible causes:

either (1) small patches of material with columnar grains as opposed to equiaxed, ar (2) slightly lower tin content in these columnar grain areas.

Consultation with a radiographic expert confirm that the columnar grains can cause such an effect in the ra'iograph.

All metallurgical lests indicate that this metal is equal in mechanical properties to the equiaxed grains, and '.hcreforc predic'. that parts will perform acceptably in service.

Coov to:

B. Bridgham, D. Paaok, A. Sparks, R. Moore, D. Jackson, R. Poehler.

G. Pratt, J. Jones, H. Gibson, W Cook, Ann Arbor File File Under:

H-850, ivfooresvii]e, Cooper Energy Introduction Cooper Energy purchases heavy wall B-850 bearings irotn Mooresville for general use.

When required for special applications, the bearings are inspected by radiography, prior to use, by an outside lab, on behalf of Cooper.

As of April.11, 1991, Cooper reported to Moorcsvillc that they have approximately 25 bearings wnich they are rcjccting duc to indications found in radiography.

The defect in radiography appears as a fuzzy dark area on the radiographic film. The dark spots appear sporadically, but are more prevalent on one half of the bearing than the other (in other words, the prevalence differs between the top and bottom half of the part as cast.) Unfortunately, there is no way to determine once the part is machined, which half was the top and which was the bottom. Normally a dark patch in the radiograph would indicate a low-density area such as porosity, oxide inclusion, or lack of high density phase (in this case,. tin).

Discussion On April 11, a team consisting of B. Bridgham, Vf. Cook, H. Gibson and the write attempted to determine the cause of the dark s'pots. What wc found was that the dark spots corresponded to smail areas of columnar grains in the materiaL Figures 1, 2 and 3 show cross sections of the bearing wall, heavily etched with Ke11er's etch, to revea1 thc difference in grain structure-In all cases, the columnar grains appear near the ID of the bearing.

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FEDE~i-MOGUI. TECH'ICALCENTER Engine and Transr..ission Products Ap.il 16, 1991 491-Q4 Page 3

Furthermore, one microhardness in each area was taken with the 1 kg load.

This load would be less subject to extreme.'y localized aberrations such as grain boundaries and rnicroporosity.

Results are as follows:

Equiaxed:

Elongated:

Hv 60.3 Hv 5S.4 The difference between these two numbers is deemeti to be insignittcant.

In this study, no definite reason for the areas of different grain structures could be ascertained.

The most plausible explanation is that the sma11 manifestations of columnar grains represent small parcels oi material which froze either on the bottom of the mold or on the sidewalls prior to the beginning oi mold rotation.

When the mold began rotating, the small pieces of frozen material (with columnar structure, since it froze in contact with the cold surface) was wasned away and ended up in its Qnai resting point approximately 15 mm from the casing OD. In order to test this theory, a section was made through a rough casting (unmachined) at the bottom. It is shown in Figure 7. The grain structure revealed can be seen to be the same columnar strucntre which was seen in the questionable areas.

This lends credibility to the proposed theory.

The dark patches appea:ing in the radiograph consist of metal with columnar grains as opposed to equiaxed grains.

The columnar grains may be slightly lower in tin content.

Metallurgical tests indicate:hat this n>eral has mechanical oroperties favorably comparable to that of the surrounding metal.

Therefore the appearanceof these dark patches on the radiograohs is not cause to scrap the bearings.

W. J. Whitney

~ i.:L. TE<H'/ICALCEHTER Er.z:..-..:::; T::~.-;:.::: ss c; Products Q

i @~i:='-'

..C]>>Pa(7e I

C I

iS Figure 1.

Macro Etched Saw".:e A. 6X. H avv Keller's Etch.

ID is to:.'-e:angst.

Figure 2. Macro Etched S~~. pie B. 6X. Heavy Kel1er's Etch.

i~ tn ti'" riv!>t.

J. =J.';:"....'.";:i" TECHHICAI CEHTER L=~gl.i"-.::

...':".::sb.'Oil ProdQCts

-.: y.-<-'aae S

~'@el g ~

Figure 3. Macro Etched Sampie C. 6X. Heavy KeHer's Etch.

ID is to the top.

FEDERAL-hfOGULTECHi~lCAI ('hmi~

Engine and Transr."ission Products April 16, 1991 491-Q4 Page 6 l

'll4< ~ j)

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V

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~.,I Figure 4. EquiLied grain area.

200X. Heavy Kel KeBer's Etch.

7 Y

g

0'

( f

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.:S; Figure 5. Columnar grain structure.

200X. Heavy KeHer's er's Etch.

FEDER.M-MOGULTECH; fICALCENTER Engine and Transmission Products April 16, 1991 491-Q4 Page 7

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Figure 6.

Panoramic view through the columnar area Showing the hardness test indentations.

38X.

Heavy Keller's Etch.

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FEDERAL.-MOGULTECHMCALCENTER Ergin and Transmission Products Aorii !6, 1991 491-Q< Page 8

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Figure 'I. Cross section through surface of unmachined casing.

emote similarity to cen'. r area of Figure 6.

50X. h,cavy Keller's Etch.

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~

REALTXHZ X-RAY R=-VEALS BOmS IZZOamTXOCr Jaraes L.

Hh el's.

Magna flu". Corpora tion III Presented August 16.

1989 at the Air Transportation Association Nondestructive Testing Forum Soec>>>>

acLno~ledgement for tachni:al sup-ort from:

James Donaldson G=r.>J.<

I!ason

!!ic.".aal lioore Ha d

Rummy i Abstract:

A radiographic phenomenon, termed "Ghost indications",

which appear to be but ax'e not necessarily rejectable def acts is described

~

The ambiguous nature of these indications can result in a sound s true ture being x'ejected, or unsound structure boing placed in critical service.

The mechanism of the occurrence and a

means to differentiate between."ghost" and true indications is explained.

Hi"tory:

sage L

The "ghos t" or x-ray diffract'n pheno.".enon has plagued the radicgra ph ic inspect'n business sine crys talline s tructures were f's" radiographed.

Ge.".eral know'd~a of the a:.is:ance of this phenomenon coupled with e:ct~nsive de tractive varification, has allowed some very experienced rad'graphers to maJce judg;.,ent ca1Ls in none"itical areas.

An e ecol'ant paper sas presenced in gaeerial fvn'aien ns Dec.,

1966, Runnel 6 Greuory

'Ghosc Lack'i Fusion'n Aluminum Alloy But t Fusion Hel ds",

d ' faren Cia ting "ghos tee indications from t ue defects in a specific inspection application.

The increased use of e.otic (especia13,y copper bearing

~luminum and high n-ckleI a} loys increases the number and saverity of d=f reacted i ndica tions.

Diract'aally solidi fi ad and singl o c

Fst x

struc".u" es ar~ nearL t impc's=4bl

> to rpcdi >> -rabbi a'y inspect witnout varsy costly and Cine consuming Cechn'ques.

Toc!ay, due tc these limitat'nns and the extremely critica natur-of the air transportation industry.

ra6iographers are justif'ably reluctant to make judgment calls.

A method which Mould assist the radiographer in con'idently diff'rentiating "ghost" fc'am re$ ectab'e indications.

cou'd 1owe scrap rat>>s awhile a surincy that c"u'y r.

actabi:s parts do nct

". ach cr-'.:is~i s=.r Fi:e.

Obs e veri Phenomenon:

TN..

cp..*

". t - - ".'hl p,.:a

~ S s4'e

<<Ceo

'6i

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~ ~

Lt l'IC

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e G

~~

ae ~

~ o ~ ~

sw le i

e

~ sel

~

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r-e f

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Q,rc)>>(lh )ut the iQal,.p, rasnf fgn spLo tch".s sh s "p.y ie. in

'.ndi: x'ion."i.

9u

., !r Can a's..4~ t V>>

~ e o4 <<oe NC'2'; Hh-L-ini.'icat'cn ar. quit~ evident on 4.L tim~ moni".o:,.

fidelity negates reproduction Th9.s unusual phenomenon was nearly aLrcays accompanied by.'.

A mott3.ed background to the image, 3.

A, du),1 thud in the traditional tap or ".ing" )est.

audibLe Acustic Bmmission indicator.

poor ability to hold a sound we3.d repair..

i ~ C ~ s an

P~ge 2

window was cut from a part displaying this ghosting and was replaced with a piece of new material so tha" a direct comparison could be mnde.

Upon re-inspection of the windowed part, it was cbs

c-'he new material displayed neither the mottled backer'u.-.d nor th>>

"ghcst" indications.: further investigation revealed that the ghost images d'd not move in coordination with par= motion.

Mhen v'wed dynamically, the indications moved opposi".e to the part motion; i.e., if the part was moved from the left to right.

the indica tions would move from the rf.ght to 1ef "; i the par t was moved up, the indicat on mob)ed down.

This "ant'mot'on" made it obvious Chat the indications were diffracted x-ray patte ns rather than d fec t indications.

To f lly unde"stand tl:ese observations, a

s tudy of the.-.,atrial and the mechanism of x-ray diffract'on was undertaken.

Hateria3.

Study:

A section of the par t containing bo=h ox iginal and new ma"er'l was removed for analysis.

Tho chemical analysis showed little devi ation from the Has telloy Xo analysis supplied by t.".a alloy

vendor, Cahot.

X t.

was noted that th'u' ur cents.-.t of the surface analysis was a.factor of l0 times higher o.. the old mat~rial than either the vendor analys is or the ne'~

meta al anal ysxs

~

~

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.i s.".uss;.:n with )lee':hw'st

".er:cnne a c"n";n". !

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'at

.'.'..c

'~Je 'n sul " 'nt the stri 'ping pcocess used to r em~ve

".h i h..it:e'"' t'->>

rqwcr...

The qa 'n cnm~onen t g E t'.:a e br'.- p-n'-.'4 t ~

i s ul:ur=':.'c=', excss" ive r~ten Ci ~n c E s t "i',7'pi %c Qo u t '

)

c Qe'Atra'=ation may account f~r inc. <<ase.)

sul fur c ~no:n..

On closer observation the surface of the old material shows an extremely rough appearance.

(Photo 1)

The open an& saw-tooth appearance of the cracking also indicated a large grain presence.

Thesa observations were supported.with a

500x view of

the, same surface (Photo 2)

~

This view shows very large grains and severe etching at the grain boundaries.

Some grains appeax as if,they could be lilted Crom the surface.

Hhen compared to the. new material at 1000x (Photo

3).

the evidence supporting the high sulfur content theory is conclusive.

The extremely large grains

'lso indicate that'his part'was not properly annealed.

The open boundaries would account for the mottled

image, the dull 'thud'n tha tap or ring test, as

!)e11 as the inabliity to hold a good weld repair.

The ghosts in Chc image ar a r suit of the x-ray beam being diffracted from the indic s of the large grain s true tur Zn th' c

e the appear are of any "ghos t'ng" is an indication of poor or no annea'ing and is cause for rejection on i ts ourn.

This informa Cion in itself is an unexpected bonus for the real t';..e inspection.

Yat, the s tudy of the x-ray diffraction ph ncmencn also revealed mere universally usecbla informaiion.

X-Ray Dif raction The Runnel,'Gregory pape.

was used as basa point to s.udy the diffraction mechanism.

E':csrpt:

! vygoe mes Hhun a

baa."

o f X-ra<>

a cx ys ta1.

pa"= o'ne beam is transmitted.

part of the baam is scatte ed. 'ne of the mechanisms f'r X-ray "ca ttaring is by diffraction from the same manner as a gratinc Bif=" cts or8ina'.) light.

How. if a

ser 's of crys t <is (crystallit pLani 33 ala p\\Qper'y a

" cc'.sing" ef ~ct w' 'e c Q!

+f' qt opr1n

( q f'Qs

)r o

.J

~. '., Lnl('- ',) ~ '

~ V ~ 0

~

~ ~

st40 Oa I 0 S,O'1 Ta)-inq:hip class'c.q'

) ":

~..

e:p L.<na::i.)n and qr<p ~ <

~

> -'s!'"ay app3vin:;

to tha oisin "vsd phenom>non 1 a-" C on~

conclusions.

Either the original observations w~re not diffraction related or a

much mors comple:c mechanism is.

occurring

~

Close comparison oZ Fig 1

and the recent observed conditions revoalad several differences.

"Ghost lack of Fusion: in Aluminum" A3.loy Butt Fusion Velds Hard Rummel, and B.E. "Gregory Material Evaluations Dec 1965

P age i.

With film radiogr phy, the source "to-ob-:act distance

@as sufficiently long to assume near pareil.al incicent rays.

With hali crofocus Realtime X-ray, the sourca-to-object distance

~as under 5 inches and the di: "gance of the:c-ray beam must be considered 2.

Hith file radiography the ob diect-Co-=il=! di tance is always kept to a mini~urn.

preE.~rumbly zero.

With Raaltime.')icrofocus, the image plane-Co"ob."'act distxnc was 15 inches or a

3;Y projection ratio.

The travel length of the diffracted ray tttust now be cons:d=

3.

Meld inspect'on has a linear area of interest.

Tn this case the d'.'raction phenomenon could c "ns 'de" onl I thos indica tions appearinq parallel to th>> weld.

Burner

=wn.'nspecti )n is conc..r.".

w=:".ll any 'd. 'at Qn in any a::.'s and the diffracticn planes ar corpletely random With no prefer"ntial agnment.

~ Grappling with these differences, at length with scratch oad and pencil, lead to the undarstanding Chat the mechanisra had not chanred f~cm th= classic pr~s!!ntition (Fig 1)

~ but had multipli.d

."" variables su:h that was rery dif ic!lit to conceivu a graphic roc.rsentacicn to depict such v t labl 9s.

.+n

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1

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.1n UD 9 s "andlng o E t l s phenoltli:n 'll l".4ds tc:.lip abil'y to test concu)sively wh~t!Mr any indi.cat:.on in any-material is caused by x"ray diffraction.

Psga 5

Figure 2 is a graphic geome.-.r'F Her e, beam plane relat='onsh'."s are repz asen ta tion of observed real time divergence and source-to-ob je t-to'-image taken into consideration.

To c leer l y unders tend: the antimo tion p11&nomenon, ze mu's t consid!r a.- individual roy Prana.

From The rovof H-rs" Diff".sot'on in Cr resale

(

W.H.

Zsohariasen, Dover publishers, nuhlist1ea 1967),

pe accept the given chat tha diff"acted bear. N'll exit the indices a"

an equal and opposite angle to the entrance of the incident or primary ray.

Using this given.

we can now look a".

Qn'8 event (F'ure 3 )

~ in th>>

~ posit 'n, then moving only the d'.'ract 'g indic"s to the B position.

The r sul ti,.".g opposite shift of the di rac'.". d beam no+ supports the "ant,'.-motion'n th,. observed ealt=me x-ray imzga.

EI,>n

.ahura inte 'acing, is th'f"act of va=::i...g the cbject-h--

i;.age plane distance.

Zf the ratio o8 source to ohj act vs object to imago p'ne is l:0.

aqual zo tion occurs.

ZE the ra tic is 1:'l, no motion is apparent in the di C"ractad ind'cation when the object is moved. 't 1:" ratio.

equal but: opposite motion occurs.

Displaying this in thre>>

dimensions (Figure 4) thus accountiwg for t'.>e c ne

>f divergent radiation tend the v!rt cal and

!iagonal effact can be compr bhended.

f. n '.".::ion:

f e

ow 0

~ ssoI

~ >>

s(

msei s,

<<+

1 6

ee

~ ~ 6 is)eeg P

et oh

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s ~ q

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4 eeh

'814

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~ Pos Lese sa 4es aha'o e4 !o m

~ e

~ e i 38 c

2'3 i 'lItIi'j!

e((u'p'g I~nt c'ln 'nf lu"iv. Ly i

='!nt'i f

Is t '

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')bee~sos~~'1" Bv vR ~'F's n J P h

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Rneovn s,ore:

0 ob,:-'-'

cc 1.'as< " pl61 gs-6:."6-

~ !. it s d '

ice

.Pm inal s

~ tz ). 8 will varY in a pr sdictab:e man.".~r.

Mhen using an x-ray source of sufficiently small focal spot to allow soma variation in obj~ct-to-film distance.

a film'ef.'iograph could be reshot to conf irm the orig'n of suspicions indications.

~ ~

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(Photo')

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p

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(Photo 2)

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t.ysM)s Diffral:ted Beam

X-RAY SOURCE '

T 2AM ATERlAL

- RANOOM CRYSTAL RfNT f

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.TR ANSMITTE:0

,. BEATI fFFRAC SEAM GHOST IMAGF'E'CfEVtNG MEOfA FIGURC 2.

lAhGNAPLUX 7/89

X-RAY SOURCE I KHT RAM DIFFRACTE'D tRAH MtTTED BEAM FfQURK' MAGbfAfLUX7/89

APR-17-'91 1V:25 ID:FEDERAI ME@I I@I

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SOURCE'NClOKNT BEAM TRANSMITTED BEAM 1X

'SJECT 1

AiCACHMENT2 CPSES 9117826 SU 910310 July 15, 19e1 TO J.B.

George

SUBJECT:

Radiography Requirement for Enterprise Bearings

REFERENCE:

DR/QR RReport 02-340 B

Referenced report, prepared by a consultant to the owner's group, suggests that TDI bearings will be acceptable provided they pass a

radiographic examination performed by that consultant.

This study was initiated as part of the owner's group effort to qualify TDI diesels and included such events as discovery of cracked connecting rod bearings at Shoreham in 1983, and reports from TDI Vee Engine owners of cracked bearings.

Portions of this report have not been endorsed by Enterprise as discussed below.

Bearing shell cracking has never been a problem in the in-line engines such as used at Shoreham.

It has always been our contention that the cracking noted there was caused by use of connecting rods with an extremely large bore end chamfer, which allowed the bearing ends to be unsupported, combined with significant engine overloading.

The con-rod condition was corrected immediately.

No more cracking occurred.

Vee engines in those days utilized connecting rods assembled with what we now know was insufficient fastener

preload, causing excessive flexure, or micro-distortion of the big end of the rod.

This condition caused the highly publicized con-rod rack tooth fretting phenomena.

Of greater importance

however, was the effect of this flexure on the rod bearing, especially if that particular bearing was brittle, i.e. of extremely low ductility.

Most of the failure analysis studies done at Enterprise on bearings which cracked for no immediatley apparent reason reported bearing shell elongation numbers either nil or less than 14.

Some had regions of casting porosity on or near the crack surface, but most did not.

page 2

TDI supplied bearings made and plated in their factory from Aluminum/Tin castings made at Alcoa in Cleveland.

These castings were statically cast in a permanent mold and, from time-to-time exhibited less than adequate mechanical properties.

Porosity was also sometimes a

problem, and resulted in inability to satisfactorily electroplate the lining on the

piece, easily detectable in the plate shop.

Note also that pores as small as

.010"/.020" were easily visible.

In no case would pores of.050" allow plating to be acceptable.

I In the early 1980's the fastener preload on Vee Engine con-rods was significantly increased.

Rack tooth fretting, while still not zero has been reduced from very significant to almost nil.

In the mid 1980's, destructive testing of each heat of bearing castings was begun to verify adequate mechanical properties.

Operating experience after these changes was most satisfactory, bearing shells routinely lasting 20,000/25,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> (BY NO MEANS 38,000 HOURS).

Shells are replaced based on wear limits rather than base metal condition, in conjunction with general overhaul activities near this hour level.

None of these bearings were radiographed.

In

1988, Enterprise ceased manufacture of bearings, opting to purchase these parts in finished form from Federal

Mogul, a

worldwide supplier of all kinds of engine and compressor bearings, including bearings for engines which could have been installed in nuclear generating stations.

F-M is not aware of any radiograph requirement for these parts.

F-M uses the centrifugal casting method to obtain consistantly high quality castings.

This method affords the foundryman various options such as mold spinspeed, pour rate and cooling rate to further enhance casting quality.

F-M asserts this fine tuning is normal and on~oing, and may be the cause of radiograph ghost

imaging, as the report I gave you suggests.

F-M furthermore applies a flash of plating to the back of the bearing, the lead/tin content aggravating X-Ray problems, but improving. its grip in the housing.

F-M bearings have been in use in Enterprise Vee Engines for thousands of hours.

No reports of bearing quality problems have been received.

None of these bearings were radiographed.

page 3

In summary, I submit. that the onerous radiographic suggestion of referenced report was of questionable value in the beginning, anti certainly is of no value now.

Not only have the con-rod problems finally been solved with the use of adequate fastener preload applied by hydraulic tensioning tools, but also the bearings are manufactured by avendor specializing in this work, utilizing a completely different methodology than the TDZ/Alcoa method employed.

M. H. Lowrey Cooper Industries Distribution:

M. L. Bagale Ken Dixon Bo Weir

APPENDIX D

DUKEGVGINEERIA6 6 SERMGER INC 230 Soual Tiyon Q.

PO. Box 1004 Chaskaa hC 282M 1004 Bus P04) 373-2473 Fax P04) 373.2695 February 27, 1992 Mr. P.

Om Chopra Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Electrical Systems Branch (MS 7 E4)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Re:

Cooper-Enterprise Clearinghouse Group Diesel Generators Position Paper on Radiograph Requirements for Connecting Rod Bearing Shells File: MTS-4086

Dear Mr. Chopra:

Enclosed is additional information to clarify questions in regards to certain proposed process changes related to radiography of the connecting rod bearings.

This information supplements our previous letter dated October 31, 1991.

The Cooper-Enterprise Clearinghouse Group requests you review the enclosed document and based upon the complete technical justification provided, evaluate and concur with the Clearinghouse that current radiographic requirements are not necessary for Cooper Enterprise EDGs.

Response

to this issue by March 20, 1992 will be greatly appreciated by the Clearinghouse and the individual utilities members.

Should you have questions, please direct them to Rick Deese at (704) 875-4065.

Very truly yours, fm,0~

+~ R.

D, Broome Project Manager Cooper-Enterprise Clearinghouse Duke Engineering a Services, Inc.

B. George Chairperson Cooper-Enterprise Clearinghouse TU Electric RDB/VMA/021492

February 27, 1992 Mr. P.

Om Chopra Enclosure cc:

E. B. Tomlinson (NRC)

Clearinghouse Representatives R. J.

Deese

~.kl

• 451.County Line Road Mooresville, indians 46158 Tel. 31748$ 4NO

'aX 311431.7085 Q ranam~t.

MaKUL January 24, 1992 Jules Hudson Cooper Energy Services 14490 Catalina St.

San l aandro, CA.. 94677 Hr. Hudson:

Zn response to your fax dated January 10, 1997; there are many processing techniques to reduce or eliminate the existanca of gas entrapment within the hearing.

Hera at the Hooresviile facility, we usa the. centrifugal casting process.

This process inherently lends itself to the elimination of gas bubbles,

drossas, and oxides dua to tha outward radial force {approximately 30-60G) acting on these particles.'

Since the densitias of the aforementioned particles are considerably less than any element in the AA 857.0 alloy, they are forced to the inside diameter of the

~

casting were they are removed by subsequent machining.

To further insure the.removal of gasses, hexachloroethane'.

tablets. are dispersed into the eel t.

The tab 1 ets decompose to evolve chlorine gas which, in turn, ties up the hydrogen (the primary cause of entrained gas in aluminum} and removes i

from:the melt.

Past foundry testing using reduced pressure-.tests confirm the expulsion of hydrogen gas via.this method.

Zn. addition to production techniques, the process is closely monitored to verify the continued success of these techniques..

These include: Individual Process Set-Up Sheets for avery job, First Piece Xnspection of casting; Fluorescent Penetrant Tasting of each heat, and Verification of Mechanical Properties of each heat.

For every gob cast.,

a Process Set-Up Sheet (see attached) is generated and released to the foundry prior to production.

The Pr ocess Set-Up Sheet contains all of the vital process parameters needed to produce a particular casting..

Xn addition, it provides documentation of any changes to an exist.ing parameter.

P r Pf

$ n Standard practice dictates that first piece inspectian be performed on'he first casting poured on a job.

After cast, the casting is allowed to cool to approximately 300-400 F.

The casting is then fractured to reveal four (4) distinct, cross sections.

These cross sections are evaluated under

]Ox magnification and inspected 'far drass inclusions,

layering, gas voids, and excessive shrink cavities.

This evaluation is documented on the Process Set-Up Sheet.

Pen n

T The Requirement for fluorescent penetrant inspection (Zyglo) is indicated of the Pracess Set-Up Sheet.

The majority of 1arge castings

( >10 -

1 1 in. di a. ) are tested in this manner, A sample casting is poured prior ta production and bored to the blue print dimens i on.

The bore surf ace i s evaluated for.

surface discontinuities which may or may.not have been apparent during analysis of the fractured casting.

Me ni At.present, a representative casting (termed "lab sample" ) i'.

poured for each individual heat.

This casting provides for both chemical and mechanical testing.

Test bars are cut from the lab sample and tested far tensile and elongation properties.

This testing provides confirmation that no detrimental. defects exist within the test casting.

Under current evaluation is the potential for using separately cast test specimens

(.505" standard ASTM tensile bars) to predict the acceptability of production castings.

Since the separately cast bars are not under the influence of head pressures greater than 0 x gravity, they will be

-affected by discontinuities to a greater degree.

Therefore, acceptable results obtained via separately cast specimens would insure a degree of confidence in the centrifugally cast product.

~o JA+-24-'92 i3:89 ID:FEKPRA N3Rl NJ

(

TEL H3 3i7~~

(

I hope that this information assists you in your communication with the HRC.

Xf you need any additional information, please fee1 free to contact me.

Sincere 1 y, Brett L. Bridgham Plant Metallurgist Copy:

D. Jackson R.

Moore 0.

Pazuk Mooresvf 1 1 e Lab F f 1 e

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Cast Mt(1): 180%

Coat Nt(2) s llay: 8850 tification

', Chemistry s

Y Mechanical:

Y Specifications CKS D4998 Zyglu (y/n):

Y Other fkttrrlrtff44440 INITIALSETUP fCCCtr'4rrrf4ftrt Spray Tower "A" Nor+le Type (a) s 50/10 Locations (a) s 1,3 f 1350 300 400 2011

! 2 SEC fetal Temp

)Xe Temp

<pH

=lux

=act Start Spray Tower "B"s Nozzle Type (b)s 50/10 Locations (b) s 2,4,h ast, I D: 10" act Weights 1800 9

Stock

1.328 Mater Delay:

15 SEC 3.D ~ Stock:

~ 589 Cool Time

=

4 BIN 3AL Stack:

4. 201 Water Temp

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OUKEEItIGINEERING t4l StoRMGER IAC 230 South Tiyon SL PO. Box 1004 Chartotte. NC 28207 1004 etxt P04) 373.2473 Fax l704) 373.2695 February 27, 1992 Mr. P.

Om Chopra Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Electrical Systems Branch (MS 7 E4)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Re:

Cooper-Enterprise Clearinghouse Group Diesel Generators Position Paper on Radiograph Requirements for Connecting Rod Bearing Shells File: MTS-4086

Dear Mr. Chopra:

Enclosed is additional information to clarify questions in regards to certain proposed process changes related to radiography of the connecting rod bearings.

This information supplements our previous letter dated October 31, 1991.

The Cooper-Enterprise Clearinghouse Group requests you review the enclosed document and based upon the complete technical justification provided, evaluate and concur with the Clearinghouse that current radiographic requirements are not necessary for Cooper Enterprise EDGs.

Response

to this issue by March 20, 1992 will be greatly appreciated by the Clearinghouse and the individual utilities members.

Should you have questions, please direct them to Rick Deese at (704) 875-4065.

Very truly yours, fW,A~

~ R.

D. Broome Project Manager Cooper-Enterprise Clearinghouse Duke Engineering

& Services, Inc.

B. George Chairperson Cooper-Enterprise Clearinghouse TU Electric RDB/VMA/021492

e February 27, 1992 Mr. P.

Om Chopra Enclosure cc:

E.

B. Tomlinson (NRC)

Clearinghouse Representatives R. J.

Deese

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- -45'-County one Road Mooreselle, lndlana 4615B TOL 3$743t4B30 Fax 317 831.7085 January 24, 1992 Jules Hudson Cooper Energy Services 14490 Catalina St.

San Leandro, CA..

9467?

Mr. Hudson:

In response to your fax dated January 10, 1992; there are many processing techniques to, reduce or eliminate the existence of gas entrapment within the bearing.

Here at the Mooresvi 1 le f'acility, we use.the. centrifugal casting process.

This process inherently lends itself to the el imination of gas

bubbles, drosses, and oxi des due to the outward radial force (approximately 30-60G) acting on these particles.'

Since the densities of the aforementioned paitfcles are considerably less than any element in the AA 852.0 a1loy, they are forced to the inside diameter of the

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casting were they are removed by subsequent machining.

To further. insure the:removal of gasses,.

hexachloroethane'ablets.

are dispersed into the melt.

The tablets decompose to evolve chlorine gas which, in turn, ties up the hydrogen (the primary cause of entrained gas in aluminum) and removes it from:the melt.

Past foundry testing using reduced pressure-. tests confirm the. expul sion of. hydrogen gas via.this method.

Zn. addition to production techniques, the process is closely monitored to verify the continued success of these techniques..

These include: Individual Process Set-Up Sheets For every job, First Piece Inspection of casting; F'luorescent Penetrant Testing of each heat, and Verification of Mechanical Properties of each heat.

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) S'.') i." < V { 5."i j f)8 X C>> 'Ltr)09(f) Q,~I ' "- )". J i "*C'r)ia v'prv) .rc " )5t') f lit'a , s "('re.~crt" ""jl..) i" j9 << ar j vttqC r Ij j' tli wt 1 tl ~ CP v ')Vj PPP)l ~' y I >! <<JI Pq ( s-,< )(I <<qC" I<<I ~ t, )<<C) ~'i ') P ~ .r,K>>-" Sr'r f)C t'Z';)Jf >; X:: <<t'j) L4 4'..'SO '! (94 V3 j,~ C<< ~' t 4 j v Q { j I ) ~ For every job cast, a Process Set-Up Sheet (sea attached) is generated and released to the foundry prior to production. The Process Set-Up Sheet; contains al l of Che vital process parameters needed to produce a particular casting.. Xn addition, it provides documentation of any changes Co an existing parameter. F r pf ion f in Standard practice dictates Chat first piece inspection be performed on'the first cast,ing poured on a job. After cast, the casting is allowed to cool to approximately 300-400 F. The casting is then fraccured to reveal four (4) distinct. cross sections, These cross sections are evaluated under 10x magnification and inspected for dross inclusions,

layering, gas voids, and excessive shr ink cavities.

This evaluation is documented on the Process Set-Up Sheet. The Requirement for fluorescent penetrant inspection (Zyglo) is indicated of the Process Set-Up Sheet. The majority of large castings (>10 - 11 in. dia. ) are tested in this manner, A sample casting is poured prior to production and bored to the blue print dimension. The bore surface is evaluated for surface discontinuities which may or may.not have been apparent during analysis of the fractured casting. Me ni At present, a representative casting (termed "lab sample" ) i's. poured for each individual heat. This casting provides for'oth chemi cal and meehan ica l t,estf ng, Test bars are cut from the lab sample and tested for tensile and elongation properties. This testing provides confirmation that no detrimental. defects exist. within the test casting. Under current evaluation is the potential for using separately cast test specimens (.505" standard ASTM tensile bars) to predict the acceptability of production castings.- Since the separately cast bars are not under the inf)uence of'ead pressures greater than 1 x gravity, they will be affected by discontinuities to a greater degree. Therefore, acceptable results obtained via separately cast specimens'ould insure a degree of confidence in the centrifugally cast product; P\\ 4p,q ~ . U 's ~ l~P Vol w l ~TL 'I ,s r ip '>>g< -p~ t<gg Q~ Ydl I 6f>".'l-'e ~ JP al )I' .'t G' JAN-24-'92 13:89 lD:FEDERAL NQRl NJ ( TEL'"H)o3i7~~ ( I hope that this information assists you in your communication with the NRC. Xf you need any additiona) information, please feel free Co contact me. Sincerely, 8rett L. Bridgham Plant Metallurgist Copy: D. Jackson R. Moore

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