ML20212K120
| ML20212K120 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 01/23/1987 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212K111 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-59111, TAC-59112, NUDOCS 8701280516 | |
| Download: ML20212K120 (26) | |
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7-t DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION FINAL DESIGN DESCRIPTION ATWS MITIGATION SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUITRY "AMSAC" JANUARY 23, 1987 l
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i l 8701280516 870123
6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title PaSe
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1 E
i
1.1 BACKGROUND
INFORMATION 1
. 2.0 FINAL DESIGN DESCRIPTION )2
2.1 DESCRIPTION
OF THE SYSTEM ,
2 i 2.1.1 DESIGN DESCRIPTION 2 2.1.2 LOSS OF MFWPT ACTUATION 3 2.1.3 LOSS OF FEEDWATER-VALVE CLOSURE 4 3.0 RESPONSES TO NRC APP 03_jAL SER OF TOPICAL REPORT 10 QQAP-10858) - Pf Q ; PECIFIC INFORMATION 4.0 RESPONSES TO APPENDIX A. AMSAC ISOLATION DEVICES 21 l
5.0 IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULES 22
F 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
In response to the July 16, 1986 NRC Staff Safety Evaluation Report for WCAP-10858 "AMSAC Generic Design Package", Duke Power Company submits the following Final Design Description for the Catawba and McGuire Nuclear Stations. Plant specific information is contained in the final design description for each of the plants.
1.1 BACKGROUND
INFORMATION On July 26, 1984 the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) was amended to include Section 10 CFR 50.62, " Requirements for Reduction of Risk from Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Events for Light-Water-Cooled fluclear Power Plants" (known as the "ATWS Rule"). An ATWS is an expected operational transient (such as loss of feedwater, loss of condenser vacuum, or loss of offsite power) which is accompanied by a failure of the reactor trip system (RTS)' to shut down the reactor. The ATWS rule requires specific improvements in the design and operation of commercial nuclear power facilities to reduce the likelihood of failure to shut down the reactor following anticipated transients, and to mitigate the consequences of an ATWS event.
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- 2.0 FINAL DESIGN DESCRIPTION The basic requirements for Westinghouse plants is specified in Paragraph (c)(1) of 10 CFR 50.62, "Each pressurized water reactor.must have equipment from sensor output to final actuation device, that is diverse from the reactor trip
, system, to automatically initiate the auxiliary (or emergency) feedwater system and initiate a turbine trip under conditions indicative of an ATWS. This equipment must be designed to perform its function in a reliable manner and be independent (from sensor output to the final actuation device) from the existing reactor trip system."
2.1 DESCRIPTION
OF THE SYSTEM
- The AMSAC system that will be. installed at the Catawba and McGuire Nuclear
! Stations is based upon the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) WCAP-10858 "AMSAC .
i Generic Design Package" generic design 3. The following sections describe the plant specific design for the Catawba and McGuire stations. Design differences for Catawba Unit 2, which has model D5 steam generators, are specifically identified.
i 2.1.1 DESIGN DESCRIPTION l
The AMSAC design for the Catawba and McGuire stations is based on conditions that are indicative of an ATWS event. The system will monitor the main feed-water control valves and the main feedwater isolation valves for position and i
'; will monitor both main feedwater pumps for operating status.
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Actuation of AMSAC will occur whenever:
0 Both main feedwater pumps are tripped
- or -
0 When main feedwater flow to the steam generators is blocked due to inadvertent valve closure Failures of other Condensate - Feedwater system components or equipment upstream of the main feedwater pumps which could result in the loss of feedwater to the steam generators will not be monitored. This is because those events will result in loss of the main feedwater pumps due to low suction flow or pressure.
2.1.2 LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINES ACTUATION The actuation of the AMSAC system on loss of both main feedwater pumps will be by three pressure switches monitoring the hydraulic control oil pressure to the stop valves for each turbine. Each of the feedwater pump turbine stop valves will close whenever there is a trip of the turbine. These pressure switches will monitor the hydraulic oil pressure holding the stop valves opers. Whenever the pressure switches sense a loss of pressure, indicative of a turbine trip, a two-out-of-three logic circuit will actuate. If both pumps are tripped then the AMSAC circuitry will perform the following:
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- 1) Trip the main turbine
- 2) Start both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps
- 3) Close the steam generator blowdown and sampling valves The actuation of the main turbine trip is performed via the Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation system which is independent and separate from the Reactor Protection system.
Actuation of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and closure of the blowdown and sampling valves occurs as part of the normal control features for each system.
See Logic Diagram 1 for the above circuits.
2.1.3 LOSS OF FEEDWATER - VALVE CLOSURE 2.1.3.1 Loss of Feedwater for 01, D2, D3 Steam Generators The .~ollowing describes conditions and equipment to be monitored for the McGuire 1 and 2 and Catawba 1 units. The differences between the D1, 02, D3 steam generators and the D4 and D5 models deals mainly with feedwater flow conditions during normal power operaticM. D1, 02 and D3 models do not use the split flow to the upper nozzle at power as do the D4 and 05 models. For plants with D1, 02 and D3 models it will be necessary to monitor the feedwater control i
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valves and feedwater isolation valves for closure conditions which could lead to a loss of feedwater condition.
The actuation of the AMSAC system on closure of the main feedwater isolation valves or closure of the main feedwater control valves will be by limit switches monitoring the valves position. Closure of 3 out of the 4 valves will cause the following to occur:
- 1) Trip the main turbine
- 2) Start both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps
- 3) Close the steam generator blowdown and sampling valves Feedwater control valve limit switches used for AMSAC applications will be set at a 25% open setting to account for valv, regulating movement. Feedwater Isolation valve limit switches will be set at the full closed valve position since these valves are operated as open-closed valves only.
The feedwater control valves' logic will be delayed 10 seconds prior to actuating the valve closure portion of the AMSAC logic to prevent potential trip conditions when steam generator level perturbations cause rapid feedwater control valve movements. These valve fluctuations could cause unwanted unit trips when trying to bring the unit up in power and the valve status circuits have been reset by the operator.
The actuation of the turbine trip on feedwater valve closure is performed via the Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation system which is independent and separate EL40131W/5
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from the' Reactor Protection system. A "First-out" annunciator will be installed in the control room to alert the operator that the turbine has tripped due to the feedwater valves AMSAC logic. An annunciator alarm already exists for the-loss of both main feedwater pumps condition.
' Computer points will be provided for the feedwater control valves to indicate when these valves are in the 25% or less open condition.
Actuation of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and closure of the steam generator blowdown and sampling valves occurs as part of the normal control features for each system.
The actuation of AMSAC due to feedwater control and isolation valve closure can be bypassed whenever the unit is below a 56% power level. This is neces-sary to allow proper start up of the unit due to steam generator pre-heating requirements and feedwater control valve operational characteristics. Normal startup calls for the feedwater control valves to remain closed until approxi-mately 15% power and the feedwater isolation valves to remain closed until steam generator preheating requirements are met.
The use of a 56% load value is based upon the present condensate-feedwater system design. A 56% load value corresponds to a station status at which one j feedwater pump and the condensate system respond to a generator load rejection condition and are expected to maintain the unit operational. This is a familiar unit status with the plant operators and one at which unit feedwater control valve stability above the 25% open setting on the limit switches can be obtained.
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See Section 3.6 for a detailed discussion of the operating bypass and reset mechanism.
See Logic Diagram 1 for McGuire 1 and 2 and Catawba 1.
2.1.3.2 Loss of Feedwater for 04 and D5 Steam Generators The following describes conditions and equipment to be monitored for the Catawba Unit 2 which uses model 05 steam generators. D5 steam generators utilize a split flow feedwater arrangement where approximately 10% of the normal full power feedwater flow is diverted through the feedwater pre-heater bypass valve (Westinghouse notation FPBV). The remainder of the flow follows the normal pathway through the'feedwater isolation valve. Closure of the isolation valves would not result in a loss of all feedwater flow to the steam generator. Feedwater flow to the upper nozzle would provide protection and mitigation against reactor coolant system overpressurization.
The actuation of the AMSAC system on closure of the main feedwater control valves will be by limit switches monitoring the valves position. Closure of 3 out of the 4 valves will cause the following to occur:
- 1) Trip the main turbine
- 2) Start both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps EL40151W/7
- 3) Close the steam generator blowdown and sampling valves Feedwater control valve limit switches will be set at a 25% open setting to ac-count for valve regulating movement.
The actuation of the turbine trip on feedwater valve closure is performed via the Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation system which is independent and separate from the Reactor Protection system. A "First-out" annunciator will be installed in the control room to alert the operator that the turbine has tripped due to the feedwater valves AMSAC logic. An annunciator alarm already exists for the loss of both main feedwater pumps condition.
Computer points will be provided for the feedwater control valves to indicate when these valves are in the 25% or less open condition.
4 I Actuation of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and closure of the steam generator blowdown and sampling valves occurs as part of the normal control features for each system.
The actuation of AMSAC due to feedwater control valve closure can be bypassed whenever the unit is below a 56% power level. This is necessary to allow proper start up of the unit due to steam generator pre-heating requirements as described in Section 2.1.3.1.
See Section 3.6 for a detailed discussion of the operating bypass and reset mechanism.
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See Logic Diagram ? for the Catawba 2 logic arrangement.
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CONTROL ROOM START UP .
BYPASS SWITCH MAIN FEEDWATER FLOW MAIN FEEDWATFR ISOLATION VALVES BYPASS RESET CONTROL VALVES MAIN TURBINE MFWPTA TRIP MFWPT B TRIP 25% CLOSED CLOSED IMPULSE CHAMBER PRESSURE PRESSURE STEAM GENERATORS STEAM GENERATORS PRESSURE > 56%
SWITCHES A B C D A B C D __
- SWITCH 2/3 3/4 3/4 2/2 2/3 y ( 10 SEC. )
Eii" i m!n
- S
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I AND l
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START BOTH TRIP MAIN CLOSE S/G CLOSE S/G M.D. AUX. FWPS TURBINE SAMPLING VLV.S BLOWDOWN VLV.S (NOTE 2) (NOTE 1) (NOTE 1)
NOTES (NOTE 1)
- 1. Start of M.D. Auxiliary FWPS, Closure of Sampling Valves and Blowdown Valves Accomplished as Part of Normal Systems Control Features.
) 2. Turbine Trip Accomplished through Turbine Control and Instrumentation System (TSI).
- e .
CONTROL ROOM MAIN TURBINE ,
START UP IMPULSE CHAMBER
- BYPASS SWITCH PRESSURE > 56% LOAD ,
MAIN FEEDWATER FLOW BYPASS RESET 2/2 MFWPT A TRIP MFWPT B TRIP CONTROL V.6LVES PRESSURE PRESSURE 25% CLOSED I SWITCHES SWITCHES STEAgGENEpTORg 2/3 2/3 3/4 TIME (10 SEC.)
DELAY
-4 is . l
(( l I m
i I L i START BOTH TRIP MAIN CLOSE S/G CLOSE S/G M.D. AUX. FWP.S TURBINE SAMPLING VLV.S BLOWDOWN VLV.S (NOTE 1) (NOTE 2) (NOTE 1) (NOTE 1)
NOTES
- 1. Start of 11.D. Auxiliary FWPS, closure of sampling VLV.S and blowdown VLV.S accomplished as part of normal system controls features.
- 2. Turbine trip accomplished through Turbine Control and Instrumentation system (TSI).
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3.0 RESPONSES TO NRC SER- TOPICAL REPORT (WCAP-10858)
PLANT SPECIFIC INFORMATION 3.1 DIVERSITY The AMSAC design for the Catawba and McGuire Nuclear Stations is designed to maximize the diversity between equipment used for AMSAC and the Reactor Protec-tion System (RPS).
The equipment used to detect conditions indicative of an ATWS as described in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 is independent of all equipment used in the Reactor Protection System (RPS).
The pressure switches which detect trip conditions of the main feedwater pumps will provide only AMSAC related functions. These sehsors will not have any interface with the RPS.
The limit switches used to detect valve position for the main feedwater isola-tion valves and the main fcedwater control valves will provide only AMSAC
, signals. The valve limit switches used will not provide any signals to the RPS.
I l
l l 3.2 LOGIC POWER SUPPLIES l
l Power supplies for AMSAC logic power will be selected from existing plant l
l sources which will provide the maximum available independence from power supplies used by the Reactor Protection System (RPS).
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Highly reliable non-interruptible non-safety power sources will be utilized for the AMSAC design since the parameters being monitored are also non-safety.
The AMSAC design will utilize the 125 VDC station auxiliary batteries for the power supply. Power will be distributed to the circuits through existing distribution centers.
i Catawba will use Distribution Centers CDA and CDB which are shown in Catawba Nuclear Station FSAR Figure 8.3.2-1.
McGuire will use Distribution Centers DCA and DCB or DCA-1 and DCB-1 depending upon present loading. These distribution centers are shown in McGuire Nuclear Station FSAR Figure 8.3.2-2.
3.3 SAFETY RELATED INTERFACES The proposed AMSAC design does not have any interfaces with the existing RPS.
Therefore the RPS will continue to meet the existing safety criteria.
i Auxiliary Feedwater, Steam Generator Blowdown and Steam Generator Sampling are systems which are safety related or have safety related components which will receive AMSAC inputs as described generally in the WCAP. Interfaces with safety related systems will be designed such that the safety related system will perform its function coincident with a postulated failure of the non-safety AMSAC input.
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3.4 QUALITY ASSURANCE In response to Generic Letter 85-06, " Quality Assurance Guidance for ATWS Equipment that is not Safety Related", the existing Duke quality programs were reviewed to determine the need for any necessary changes or additions. This review indicated that no new or separate quality program was needed to adequ-ately cover non-safety related ATWS equipment. However, based on the eighteen criteria of the NRC quality assurance guidance, some adjustments were required to the implementing practices and procedures in order to clearly apply these to ATWS items. The results of the review are described below on a criterion-by-criterion basis.,
I. Organization - the existing Duke organization meets the guidance of Generic Letter 85-06.
II. Program - a new and separate quality program for non-safety related ATWS equipment was not developed. The existing Duke practices and procedures were determined to be adequate in overall content to cover ATWS items.
However, minor changes to the existing Duke practices and procedures have been made as described for each appropriate criterion.
i III. Design Control - the existing Duke Design Engineering Department proce-dures and the Nuclear Station Modification Program were determined to meet Generic Letter 85-06.
IV. Procurement Document Control - the existing Duke Design Engineering Department procedures and the Nuclear Production Department Administrative EL40151W/12
Policy Manual for Nuclear Stations were determined to meet Generic Letter 85-06.
V. Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings - a requirement for the development and use of plant procedures on ATWS items was added to the Nuclear Produc-tion Department Administrative Policy Manual for Nuclear Stations. This was the only change to Duke practices and procedures determined to be necessary to meet Generic Letter 85-06.
VI. Document Control - the existing Duke practices and procedures were deter-mined to meet Generic Letter 85-06.
VII. Control of Purchased Items and Services - the requirement to control purchased items and services for ATWS equipment including receipt inspec-tions was added to the Nuclear Production Department Administrative Policy Manual for Nuclear Stations.
VIII. Identification and Control of Purchased Items - station specific listings of ATWS related systems and components will be added to each station's Quality Standards Manual to facilitate identification. Otherwise, the existing Duke practices and procedures were determined to meet Generic Letter 85-06.
IX. Control of Special Processes - the requirement to control special pro-cesses for ATWS equipment was added to the Nuclear Production Department Administrative Policy Manual for Nuclear Stations.
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X. Inspection - the inspection of ATWS items was added to the Nuclear Produc-tion Department Administrative Policy Manual for Nuclear Stations.
XI. Testing - the testing of ATWS items was added to the Nuclear Production Department Administrative Policy Manual for Nuclear Stations.
XII. Control of Measuring and Testing Equipment - the control of measuring and test equipment for ATWS items was added to the Nuclear Production Depart-ment Administrative Policy Manual for Nuclear Stations.
XIII. Handling, Storage and Shipping - the existing Duke practices and proce-dures were determined to meet Generic Letter 85-06.
XIV. Inspection, Test, and Operating Status - the existing Duke practices and procedures were determined to meet Generic Letter 85-06.
XV. Non Conformances - the existing Duke practices and procedures were deter-mined to meet Generic Letter 85-06.
XVI. Corrective Action System - the existing Duke practices and procedures were determined to meet Generic Letter 85-06.
XVII. Records - the existing Duke practices and procedures were determined to meet Generic Letter 85-06.
XVIII. Audits - the existing Duke practices and procedures were determined to meet Generic Letter 85-06.
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3.5 MAINTENANCE BYPASSES The components selected for the AMSAC design will be of reliable design and installed in such a manner to enhance preventive and scheduled maintenance.
Where maintenance may be required at power, features will be provided to assist the maintenance technicians in that performance.
l A human factors review will be performed on all controls and indications to ensure that they can be utilized in an efficient and readily understood manner.
Indication of any bypass will be provided in the main control room and will be part of the human factors review.
3.6 OPERATING BYPASSES The AMSAC design for both the Catawba and McGuire plants does use an operating bypass. The purpose of this bypass is to allow the operators to bring the plant up in power using alternate flow paths to the steam generators and to meet steam generator preheating requirements. The normal flow paths through the feedwater control valves and the feedwater isolation valves cannot be used because of pre-heating requirements associated with the steam generators. The j
flow control valves are closed below 15% load and the isolation valves are typically closed below 30% load. Therefore, the operator must bypass the valve status inputs into the AMSAC system below these values. In addition, for low load values typically between 30-50%, the feedwater control valves can modulate f
l into the 25% open range. Therefore, the operator can bypass the valves' status input up to 56% unit load. A status light is provided in the control room for the operator to indicate when any of the four valves is less than 25% open.
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Computer inputs are also provided to determine which valve is below 25% setpoint.
When these valves are open and the unit is in a stable operating condition, the operator will remove the bypass and the valve status actuation will be armed.
3.7 MEANS FOR BYPASSING The means for bypassing the valves' status input into the AMSAC system is by a control switch mounted in the main control room.
This control switch is provided with an indicating light to indicate whether the valves' status portion of the system is bypassed. An illuminated indicating light will continuously indicate the system is reset.
The reset feature of the AMSAC design for the operating bypass will also be activated automatically by two pressure switches (in a two-out-of-two logic) monitoring first stage turbine impulse chamber pressure. These pressure switches will be set to initiate the automatic resetting of the bypass when turbine loading reaches a point coincident with a plant loading of 56%. This will provide auto-matic resetting of the bypass independent of the operator controlled bypass switch.
The pressure switches which monitor turbine load will not have any interfaces with the RTS. A failure in the RTS cannot prohibit this reset.
A human factors review will be conducted on the bypass controls provided'in the main control room.
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c 3.8 MANUAL INITIATION Manual controls are available in the control room to perform a turbine trip and start auxiliary feedwater flow. These controls were reviewed as part of the control room review described in Duke Power Company's response to Supplement 1, NUREG-0737 for both Catawba and McGuire.
These controls are conveniently located near each other enabling the operator to quickly initiate manual actions if they are required.
The controls provided for the main turbine consist of pushbuttons, which energize the trip solenoids which in turn close the main turbine stop valves.
Indication is provided which accurately provides feedback of the turbine trip condition.
The operator can start the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps from the control room by pressing their control pushbutton which in turn will close the breaker in the switchgear and start the motor. Indicating lights and flow indicators are available to indicate a successful start of the motor driven pump.
3.9 ELECTRICAL INDEPENDENCE FROM EXISTING REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)
Electrical independence for the Catawba and McGuire AMSAC design with regards to the RPS is achieved by complete system separation. The AMSAC design has no common control devices, power supplies or sensors with the RPS.
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The Catawba and McGuire AMSAC design and their respective RPS's are completely separate systems and have no interfaces in common. The AMSAC system will perform its designed function regardless of failures within the RPS.
3.10 PHYSICAL SEPARATION FROM EXISTING REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM The Catawba and McGuire AMSAC system designs will utilize standard Duke separa-tion philosophy and criteria.
Since no interface is planned between the AMSAC design and the existing RPS, complete separation is achieved. Existing separation between the RPS and non-safety related circuits will not be violated by the AMSAC design.
3.11 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION The AMSAC system equipment will be located in areas of the plant that are considered a mild environment.
3.12 TESTABILITY AT POWER AMSAC equipment will be tested prior to installation to ensure functionality.
l The proposed AMSAC design is similar to the NRC accepted design option 3 as listed in WCAP-10858. The portion of the design which uses main feedwater pump status as an input is fully testable at power. The portion of the design that utilizes main feedwater control and isolation valve position as an input is not fully testable at power.
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f The main feedwater control and isolation valve status is determined by valve stem limit switch inputs. These valve stem limit switches cannot be tested for status change at power without adversely affecting the operating status of the unit. It is proposed that the limit switches for these valves be tested at each refueling outage during the valve stroke tests. These limit switches can be tested during the stroke test to verify functionability. Stroke testing the limit switches at power would likely trip the unit due to system instability when one steam generator flow path is blocked.
The main feedwater pump turbine trip sensing devices can be tested at power.
These devices are pressure switches which sense oil pressure on the stop valve control oil line. The proposed AMSAC design will utilize three pressure switches per turbine to sense oil pressure and will provide a trip signal upon two-out-of-three actuation. A selector switch and indicating light will be used to test each switch individually. It is proposed that each pressure switch will also be tested at each refueling cycle.
Controls and indications used for testing purposes will include a human factors examination to ensure proper operation.
3.13 COMPLETION OF MITIGATIVE ACTION The actuation of plant turbine trip, auxiliary feedwater start, closure of the blowdown valves and closure of the sampling valves, once actuated, will continue to completion as part of the AMSAC system design.
This is commensurate with Duke's design philosophy for important plant functions.
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f Operators can reset the AMSAC initiated signal to the auxiliary feedwater system with the signal present in order to modulate auxiliary feedwater flow.
This reset also allows the operator to control steam generator level with the blowdown valves to prevent any possible overfilling. This reset is provided as part of the normal auxiliary feedwater system controls.
The AMSAC signal itself can only be reset by either 1) resetting the main feed-water pump turbines or 2) opening the feedwater control or isolation valves or placing the bypass switch in the bypass mode below 56% load.
3.14 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION By letter dated September 15, 1986, Duke Power proposed a means by which items that do not meet the proposed technical specification selection criteria may be maintained. Duke considers that the AMSAC system does not meet any one of three criteria proposed by the AIF (and endorsed by the Staff in SECY-86-10) in that ATWS is an event that is beyond the Design Basis of the plants.
Due to the high degree of reliability of the components of the system, Duke considers that testing on an 18 month frequency is sufficient.
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f 4.0 RESPONSE TO APPENDIX A. AMSAC ISOLATION DEVICES The present design concept for ATWS/AMSAC does not call for the use of isolators between it and the existing RPS. The use of an isolator to access available sensors also utilized by the RPS would require a detailed response to Appendix A. Because our design concept does not use those sensors, no Appendix A response is provided.
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5.0 IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE Potential outages have already been identified which would allow installation
]
prior to the July 1989 deadline on each unit as outlined in the DER. The most current forecasted dates for these proposed outages is as follows:
McGuire Unit 2. E004 - June, 1988 McGuire Unit 1 EOC5 - November, 1988 Catawba Unit 1 E0C3 - February,1989 Catawba Unit 2 E0C2 - February,1989 NRC approval is needed by May 1,1987 to accomodate the proposed installation schedule.
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