ML20080U454
| ML20080U454 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 02/29/1984 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20080U445 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0422, RTR-NUREG-422 NUDOCS 8403020321 | |
| Download: ML20080U454 (50) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
<" 'N McGuire Nuclear Station
( J-An Analysis of Hydrogen Control Measures at McGuire Nuclear Station Revision 10 February 29, 1984 Changes and Corrections j- Remove and insert pages as follows: Remove these pages Insert these pages Volume 1 - Section 1 1.1-1 1.1-1 Volume 1 - Section 2 2.5-2 2.6-4 2.5-2 2.7-2 2.6-4
/ \ 2.8-3 2.7-2 \-- 2.9-2 2.8-3 2.9-2 Volume 3 - Section 3 3.3-2 3.3-3 3.3-2 3.4-1 3.3-3 3.4-2 3.4-1 ,
3.4-3. 3.4-2 I Figure 3.4-7 3.4-3 l Figure 3.4-8 Figure 3.4-7 Figure 3.4-9 Figure 3.4-8 Figure 3.4-9 Figure 3.4-10 Figure 3.4-11 3.6-1
~ 3.6-1 3.7-1 3.6-2 3.8-1 3.7-1 3.8-1 Volume 3 - Section 4 Table of Contents Table of Contents
_ 4.7-1
- 4.7-2 s - 4.7-3
- 4.7-4 4.7-5 9403020321 8 9 s PDR ADOCK O PDR E
- e. ...
Volume 3 - Section 6 6.2-2 6.2-2 Volume 3 - Section 7 7.0-104 7.0-104 7.0-129 7.0-130 7.0-131 7.0-132 7.0-133 7.0-134 7.0-135 - ! Volume 3 - Appendix A 3.1A-Introduction 3.1A-Introduction
-Figure 3.1A-l'(later) Figure 3.1A-1 (deleted)
Figure 3.1A-6 (later) Figure 3.1A-6 Figure 3.1A-7 (later) Figure 3.1A-7 Figure 3.lA-8 O 1 l
1.1 IMPROVEMENTS IN SYSTEM DESIGN (. A complete description of the permanent Hydrogen Mitigation System for McGuire ( is given in Section 3.0. This section presents the rationale for the selec-tion of this system, lists and justifies the design criteria for the system, and discusses system operation and testing. Improvements made in the system since 1981 include additional igniters in the upper and lower containments and in the ice condenser, electrical separation of igniters in the lower containment to improve reliability in the event of flooding, addition of con- ) trols to permit system actuation by the operator in the control room, and 10 i addition of annunciator and computer indication of system status in the Con-trol Room. O V i f l l l Ov 1.1-1 Revision 10
( This project demonstrated that the effect a water fog has on hydrogen com-bustion is very dependent on the density, droplet size, and temperature of the fog. More specifically it was concluded that:
- 1. Increased fog densities are required to achieve a given level of hydrogen inerting when the fog contains increased droplet sizes.
l
- 2. l Dense water fog at room temperature has a marginal effect on the hydrogen lower flammability limit.
- 3. Increasing water fog temperature causes large increases in the hydrogen lower flammability limit.
Based on the information obtained from this report, water fog conditions were selected for further testing in a larger vessel. The research described in this section was published in November 1982, by the Electric Power Research 10 Institute (EPRI) as report NP-2637, "The Effect of Water Fogs on the Deli-berate Ignition of Hydrogen." See Section 2.6 for information on the inter-mediate scale water fog tests. t n U 2.5-2 Revision 10
ignition. Flame speeds from the quiescent tests varied from 3-8 ft/sec as the hydrogen concentration was increased from 5 to 11 volume percent. Thus, we conclude that these data support the flame speed ranges used in the CLASIX analyses (see Section 4.0). Another important result of the transient test series was.that the nature of combustion was always deflagrative instead of detonative even when a hydrogen-rich mixture was entering the vessel. Perhaps the most significant observation was the extreme contrast in pressure rise between quiescent and transient combustion tests. The pressure rises during all of the transient tests in both Phase 1 and 2 was dramatically less than during the quiescent tests (with the exception of one very lean mixture quiescent test). From this contrast, we conclude that caution must be used in the direct application of data from quiescent tests to the investigation of transient conditions. A final conclusion is that since the expected con- ) tainment pestaccident environment would more closely resemble the transient test conditions, it follows that the pressure rises from sequential combustion should be relatively benign. The research described in this section was published in June 1983, by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) as report NP-2953, " Hydrogen Combus- 10 tion and Control Studies in Inter:nediate Scale." O V l 2.6-4 Revision 10
fs Data was obtained on glug plug perfo7mance in various hydrogen-steam-air U mixtures. The glow plug was operated at 12 and 14 volts in quiescent and turbulent conditions. Numerous tests were conducted to determine the lower ignition limits and corresponding igniter surface temperatures in various premixed hydrogen-air-steam mixtures. Hydrogen concentrations were varied between 4-15 volume percent and steam concentrations varied between 0-60 volume percent. The measurement of igniter surface temperature required for ignition showed that the igniter at its normal operating temperature has considerable margin even for high steam concentrations. An interira report is included in Appendix 21.
- The research described in this section will be published by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) as report NP-2956, " Ignition Effectiveness of Thermal 10 Ignitors in Lean Hydrogen - Steam Mixtures."
O f A 4 c g-~ U 2.7-2 Revision 10 w
-- w g--yem.- g - ,--esw,-,_--w e e +-ae - -,-- e-w--w-- w-- --a ,we- --- - -+ww
l Based on these tests, it was concluded that the observed effects of steam, induced turbulence, connected geometrics, and unequal hydrogen concentrations were consistent with our understanding of hydrogen combustion phenomena. The results of these tests are locat9d in three interim reports provided in Appendix 2J. These reports are dated December,1981, April,1982, and July, 1982. The research described in this section will be published by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) as report NP-2955, " Combustion Studies of Hydrogen- 10 Air-Steam Mixtures in Intermediate S ale." O i l l f l I. l 2.8-3 Revision 10 L _ - .
I l
^
fr~'T ,Results indicated that the lower compartment was well mixed; thus precluding
\
'~'
)
\
the formation of pockets containing significantly higher concentrations of 10 hydrogen. More specifically, the data indicated that:
- 1) The air return fans minimize the peak concentration and the maximum concentration difference within the test compartment.
- 2) lest compartment mixir.g is not strongly dependent on the orientation of the source jet.
~3) Mixing was very good even without forced circulation by the air return fans.
Based on these tests it was concluded that there is no potential for pocketing 5 of rich hydrogen mixtures and that the containment analysis mixing assumptions are valid. A preliminary project report is provided in Appendix 2K. The.res,earch described in this section was published in March 1983, by the Electric Power Research Insititute (EPRI) as report NP-2669, " Hydrogen Mixing 10 and Distribution in Containment Atmospheres." I ,
%i
[ 2.9-2 Revision 10
O. Hydrogen Mitigation System V Steam Generator Water Level Transmitters Pressurizer Water Level Transmitters Reactor Coolant System Loop Temperature Transmitters Core Exit Thermocouples 3.3.3 System Desian Requirements The Hydrogen Mitigation System will reliably cause the initittion of hydrogen-oxygen recombination reactions (deflagrations) at multiple sites in the con-tainment building when the hydrogen concentration is well below a level at which uncontrolled hydrogen-oxygen recombination reactions (detonations) occur. For design purposes, initiation of deflagration reactions shall occur at hydrogen concentrations of 8.5% or less. Hydrogen concentration will be
-aintained below 10% in all containment compartments by the ignition system.
The Hydrogen Mitigation System will meet the following specific design requirements:
- a. Seismic Category I.
- b. Two independent redundant trains.
- c. Each train supplied from class 1E vital busses. 10
- d. Remain operable under the full range of post LOCA containment conditions including the effects of hydrogen deflagration reactions involving hydro-N._)
3.3-2 Revision 10
gen produced by a 75% metal / water reaction in the reactor core, when the O hydrogen is released to the containment at rates consistent with the l progress of the accider.t.
- e. Manual actuation of igniters from the Control Room.
The Hydrogen Mitigation System will be actuated remotely from the Control Room in accordance with procedural requirements. The availability of power to each 10 string of igniters will be indicated in the Control Room. O r O 3.3-3 Revision 10 4
- vv v +v, e e,- ry ,- -----we---- e +-+-,ae--r-,m-a-e--*--e ,rr e --e------ ,.*-ea-c.. a. - , ,- - = =--v---e-w - - - .r - - --,w,-+- ,* - ,- - - .e,-. - - w.*e,-.-,---,---.e
-p 3.4 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND FUNCTION G The Hydrogen Mitigation System consists of 66 glow plug ignition devices (igniters), as shown in Figure 3.4-1, located in 33 areas of the containment. Each location has an igniter assembly powered from an A circuit and an igniter assembly powered from a B circuit. Power to the system is supplied from the l station vital 600 volt power system via redundant 600/120 volt transformers and 120 volt power panelboards. Power for the system orginates at busses 10 associated with the diesel generators. A and B train redundancy is retained back to the diesel generators. Each igniter assembly terminal box contains a transformer to convert the 120 volt lighting circuit supply to the 14 1 1 volt required by the glow plug O igniter to attain a temperature of 1600 F. The transformer is enclosed in a O' ' watertight metal case; the igniter is mounted through one of the sides of the case with the hot end protruding beyond the box profile. The box also fea-tures a removable front cover, a copper heat shield on the igniter side, and a drip shield above the hot end of the igniter. Igniter boxes are mounted on cable tray or other seismically mounted structures. The locations of the igniters in the containment are listed in Table 3.4-1 and 10 are shown in Figures 3-3 through 3-6. There are no compartments in the Reactor Building without direct coverage by igniters. Because of the importance of the igniters in the ice condenser upper plenum to the control of hydrogen burning, an analysis was performed to ensure that an adequate number of igniters was mounted in the ice condenser upper plenum. The analysis showed that six
. igniters spaced approximately equally will prevent hydrogen concentrations 3.4-1 Revision 10
greater than 10% by volume in the ice condenser at any location if ignition i (.^ takes place at 8.5% hydrogen by volume and propagation is at one foot /second, for the maximum hydrogen release rate predicted for the McGuire small break LOCA. Because 10% is considerably below any plausible detonation limit, this design criterion is conservative. Power to the igniter system is supplied through 12 circuit breakers, six each 8 on Hydrogen Mitigation System Power Panelboards HMPPA and HMPPB. These circuit breakers, panelboards, and associated connections to Class IE power sources and to the igniters are shown on Figures 3.4-7, 3.4-8 and 3.4-9. Periodic measure- l10 ments to establish the operability of the igniters are made at the Hydrogen Mitigation System power panalboards. Because each region of containment is supplied by at least one redundant pair of igniters, a failure which renders a single igniter inoperable, or which cauces 6 the failure of all igniters associated with a single circuit or panelboard, will not affect the ability of the hydrogen ignition system to perform its intended function. The function of the Hydrogen Mitigation System is to ignite mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen in the various areas of the containment when the local concentration of hydrogen is less than 8.5%. The early ignition of hydrogen 10 in the containment has several benefits.
- a. Hydrogen-oxygen recombination reactions occur at hydrogen concentrations substantially lower than those shown to produce uncontrolled reactions.
Thus detonation of hydrogen is precluded. 3.4-2 Revision 10
I"'
' b. ' Reaction at low hydrogen concentration produces lower temperatures and
\~ l smaller energy release rates. Because more time is available for the containment pressure mitigation systems (ice condenser and containment spray) to dissipate energy, the total containment pressure rise is lower. Lower temperatures also have less adverse effects on other equipment in containment.
- c. The product of deflagration (pure water) does not represent a threat to containment or system integrity or to personnel entering containment following termination of the accident.
b () -Revision 10 Carry Over 3.4.3
3.6 SYSTEM INSTRUME17ATION AND CONTROL 3.6.1 Instrumentation Instrumentation for the Hydrogen Mitigation System is provided so that the operator can assess the status of the supplies to power to the igniters in containment. Two annunciators in the Control Room indicate that power is being supplied to the system from station 600 volt busses; one annunciator per train. -Each one of the 12 circuit breakers has a computer point which provides indication in the Control Room that power is being supplied to the associeted igniter string. 3.6.2 Control The 12 circuit breakers which supply power to the igniter strings are manually operated and are maintained in the closed position. Actuation of the system occurs when the power panels containing these circuit breakers are energized through the use of two Control Room switches, one for each train. 3.6.3 Indication and Alarm When the Hydrogen Mitigation System is actuated, two status annunciators are energized in the Control Room indicating that the two trains of the system have power supplied. If power is subsequently lost to the system, these annunciators will deenergize. When the system is actuated, 12 computer alarms occur ( 6 per train) indicating the presence of power on the load side of n%s' 3.6-1 Revision 10 Entire Page Revised
the 12 system circuit breakers. If power is later lost on any of these circuits, a computer alarm indicating loss of power is actuated. The operator may obtain an indication of the presence or absence of power on each of the 12 igniter strings by consulting the corresponding computer point in the Control Room. Figures 3.4-10 and 3.4-11 show the control and indication for the Hydrogen Mitigation System (Train A). 10 A recandant system is provided for Train B. 1 O ( 4 l l l l l 1 I l l O 3.6-2 Revision 10 New Page i
_ 3.7- SYSTEM OPERATION 3.7.1 Procedural Requirements Upon automatic actuation of the Safety Injection System, indicating a possible LOCA is occurring, the operator is required to initiate an Emergency Procedure which contains a checklist for LOCA verification. When the presence of a LOCA has been verified, or when a containment high pressore (>3 psig) signal is received, the Shift Supervisor shall direct that the Hydrogen Mitigation System 10 be energized. The Shift Supervisor shall also direct that the Ice Condenser Air. Handling Units be deenergized at the appropriate control panel. The Hydro-gen Mitigation System remains energized until safe shutdown has been achieved or it is confirmed that a LOCA has not occurred. O o 3.7-1 Revision 10
--g--- ,-,y ,
O 3.8 SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE AND TESTING b The Hydrogen Mitigation System may be tested in two ways - the energized igniters may be individually-verified to reach the required normal operation temperature (1500*F) by measuring the temperature of the igniter element with an optical pyrometer, or the total power delivered te each igniter circuit may be measured and compared with baseline data. The first method requires containment entry and can be done only when the ur.it is shutdown. The second method uses measurements made at the Hydrogen Mitigation System Power Panel- 10 boards in the A wiliary Building and is therefore independent of plant condi-tions. Direct measurement of igniter temperature is considered a backup to the measurement of circuit power consumption and is used to locate defective igniters. On a quarterly basis, igniters will be energized and the power -h J consumption verified to be consistent with that measured using preoperational testing. Preoperational testing includes a 24 hour energization test during which the operating temperature of each igniter is measured directly and the power consumption of each igniter circuit is measured for comparison to later measurements. O 3.8-1 Revision 10
4 O Section 4.0 ANALYSIS OF CONTAINMENT RESPONSE TO HYDROGEN RELEASE AND COMBUSTION ! 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Selection of Base Case Analysis Conditions 4.3 Containment Model
-4.4 Discussion of CLASIX Result - Base Case
- 4.5 Conclusions for the Base Case Analysis 4.6 Sensitivity Studies 4.7 Analysis of Containment Conditions Following H2 Burn 10 Tables Figures O
f 1
, O Revision 10 , ,- - , - , . , . , . .-,..-,n,- ,. , . , , . . , . -..,,,..,._,_., ., ,.,,,n , ,n., .., .,,,,,_-n_,,,,,,,,.,~-,,.,n,,.,anvn,,,w,.4v----- ,, . , . . . _ . - ,
4.7 ANALYSIS OF CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS FOLLOWING HYDROGEN BURN V An analysis was performed to determine the minimum expected pressure inside 7 containment due'to the after effects of hydrogen burn events. This section describes the calculations made and conclusions reached from this analysis. 4.7.1 Calculation of Containment Pressure at Ambient Conditions Following Hydrogen Burning Initial (pre accident) containment conditions, based on measurements of normal operating containment conditions assumed were as follows:
- 1) Containment Volume - 1195900 ft3 (FSAR)
/
- 2) Pressure - 14.9 psia
- 3) Lower compartment and dead-ended compartments - 120*F at 25% rel, humidity
- 4) Ice bed - 15*F at 100% rel. humidity ~
- 5) Upper containment - 110*F at 30% rel. humidity Using the FSAR volumes and average normal containment conditions, the molar content of the containment is:
607.54 moles of 0 2 4.7-1 Revision 10 New Page
i 2299.17 moles of N 2 68.03 moles of H 2O Final (post accident) containment conditions are determined using the following assumptions:
- 1) Total H2 release to the containment is 1500 lbm. Of that release, 1200 lbm is burned due,to action of the hydrogen igniters. The remaining 300 lbm represents approximately 5% H 2 by volume; too low for reliable ignition by the Hydrogen Mitigation System.
- 2) During the accident, 300,000 gallons of 70*F water are delivered by the containment spray and safety injection systus. This assumption is based on several underlying facts:
./
a) The containment spray is initiated approximately 2 minutes after the start of the accident. Containment spray flow is 26800 gallons per min-ute, thus 300,000 gallons could be delivered by the containment spray alone in 45 minutes, i.e., before the start of hydrogen release. b) Containment cooling'can be accomplished only by recirculation from the containment sump through the containment spray system. Recirculation requires a sufficient sump level. Alarms and required operator actions in response to them during an extended accident sequence will lead to partial emptying of the Refueling Water Storage Tank into containment, providing at least 300,000 gallons. 4.7-2 Revision 10 New Page
g The effect of the injection of this water into containment is to reduce its volume by 39,900 ft2
- 3) Final containment conditions are 80 F and 100% relative humidity in all compartments.
- 4) Ice which occupies the ice bed (pre accident) at 15 F has a density of ;
54 lbm/ft3 Melted ice at 80*F sump temperature has a density of 62.5 lbm/ft3 I l Thus the effect of melting the ice bed adds 6196 ft3 to the free space in containment. Under these post accident assur::ptions, the final molar content and resulting pressure inside containment is calculated as follows: O V 02 = 607.54 - 300 (due to burning) = 307.54 moles N2 = 2299.17 moles HO= 2 101.75 moles H2 = 150 moles. Containment volume = 1195900 - 39900 + 6196 = 1162200 ft3 Final containment pressure = (?858.5 2b0 ) I 4 ) = 14.25 psia at 80 F 4.7.2 Protection of Containment from Vacuum Conditicns t q There are two systems which can be used to prevent a vacuum (reverse different-J fal pressure) in containment. The major system is safety grade and automatic. 4.7-3 Revision 10 New Page
5 A non-safety manually actuated system with a control room could also be used if required. 1 1 Protection against reverse differential pressure in containment is the function of redundant safety grade pressure sensors (8 total in containment). Upon reduction of pressure in containment to +0.25 psig, these pressure sensors cause the containment spray pumps and the air return fans to be secured. In the absence of active containment pressure suppression (energy removal), the < pressure decrease is stopped. This series of pressure sensors and controls, called the Containment Pressure Control System, is described in the McGuire FSAR, Sections 6.5.5 and 7.6.16. As a backup to the automatic pressure control system, a manually actuated system is provided so that an operator may add air from the Auxiliary Building to the Containment when pressure in containment is lower than pressure in the Auxiliary Building. The operator is alerted to the presence of a containment vacuum by an alarm at -0.25 psig, well -above. the containment design reverse pressure capability of -1.5 psig. This system is designed to maintain con-tainment pressure within normal operating limit; however in an emergency the system could be used to relieve a vacuum condition inside containment. The Containment Air Release and Addition System is described in the McGuire FSAR, Section 9.5.10. 4.7.3 Conclusion The containment pressure following a postulated hydrogen burn may be slightly subatmospheric assuming no mitigating actions are taken. However, this pres-sure. - .65 psid (14. 9 - 14.25) is within the design pressure of the containment. 4.7-4 Revision 10 New Page r .
i f r With operation of the Containment Pressur2 Control System, the pressure inside containment'will remain above atmospheric pressure. 1 i l 4 4.7-5 Revision 10 New Page
The McGuire Hydrogen Mitigation System consists of 36 pairs of GM AC-7G glow 10 4 plugs located throughout containment. All compartments within containment contain at least one pair of ignitors. This distribution of ignitors assures that hydrogen combustion will occur wherever flammable concentrations first appear. Power to the Hydrogen Mitigation System is supplied from station 10 Class 1E vital busses. Ignitor redundancy is preserved through its power sources. This system is relatively easy to install and maintain. Its simpli-city creates a situation of high reliability, while its predictable and repeatable, principle of operation provides a high degree of confidence that the system will perform its intended function. Additionally, there are no adverse consequences that result from an inadvertent or unnecessary actuation of the system. A detailed discussion of the system design is provided in Section 3.0. Calculations of the containment's response to hydrogen combustion have been performed using the CLASIX computer code developed by Westinghouse Offshore Power Systems and funded, in part, by the ice condenser owners. The CLASIX code has been shown to compare favorably with industry accepted containment codes and conservatively predict the response from several hydrogen combustion tests. Several sensitivity studies were performed to assure that the Hydrogen Mitigation System would perform its intended function under a variety of diverse conditions. These sensitivity studies included: 1) operation of only one instead of two trains of containment safeguards, 2) increased hydrogen release rate to a peak of 260 lbm/ min, 3) depletion of ice prior to release of hydrogen into containment, 4) inerting selected compartments within containment, and 5) varying the assumed flame speed. The calculated peak pressure for the 6.2-2 Revision 10
The data presented above shows that an ignitor assembly identical to that installed at McGuire has been exposed to and sucessfully performed in combus-tion tests with calculated spray densities greater than the spray density calculated for McGuire. The fact that no ignitors at McGuire are directly exposed to spray further ensures that operation of the containment spray system will be not adversely affect the operation of the hydrogen ignitor assemblies.
- 5. Provide the results of the AECL-Whiteshell combustion test with top ignition, 8.5% H 2, and 30% steam, as committed to by response to question 1C of the September 17, 1982, NRC Request for Information.
Response
Five additional low hydrogen concentration tests have been conducted by AECL-W5iteshell . All tests were quiescent with the ignition source located at the top of the test vessel. A description of the test facility is presented in the test reports provided in t.ppendix 2J. The test results are su.amarized in the following table: Hydrogen Concentration Steam Concentration AP T Burn (v/o) (v/o) (psi) (T$8) (%)
- 8. 5 15 0 0 0 9.0 15 0. 5 7.0 *1 9.0 30 0 0 0 10 9.5 30 19.5 8.4 100 8.5 15 23 0.8 100 The last test was conducted with fans operating. This test is more representative i
of the dynamic post-accident conditions than the four quiescent tests. The Acurex dynamic test with top ignition yielded AP's of 13-20 psi. Thus, it has been experi-mentally demonstrated that ignitor locations near the top of a compartment perform successfully in conditions typical of postuated degraded core accidents. 7.0-104 Revision 10
Response to Request for Information Transmitted by Elinor G. Adensam's Letter of August 18, 1983 ;
- 1. .With regard to the CLASIX code, the staff has previously requested clarification of the structural heat sink heat transfer models. The following pertinent points have been derived from the responses:
i) Heat transfer is based on a temperature difference determined by (Tbulk T ,,)j),
- 11) Heat transfer coefficients for degraded core accident analysis are determined from a natural convection (stagnant) correlation applicable to condensation heat transfer.
(V \ it?) CLASIX does not explicitly model mass removal due to condensation heat transfer. Based on the description of the CLASIX structural heat sink model, it appears that the CLASIX model differs dramatically from generally accepted approaches and is not, as is claimed, consistent with standard methods such as those used in CONTEMPT. The differences are related to the treatment of the three items cited above. By comparison, previously accepted approaches are characterized by the following:
- 1) Heat transfer is based on (Tsat T,,)j), when the surface temperature of the heat sink is less than Tsat; i.e., T ,,jj < Tsat' Ov 7.0-129 Revision 10 New Page L
- 11) Heat transfer coefficients are based on condensation only when v
T,,)) < Tsat' tii) Condensed mass removal is based on condensation heat transfer with provisions for revaporizing a small fraction of the condensate. A more detailed description of accepted practice is contained in NUREG-0588 and NUREG/CR-0255. The effect of the CLASIX models would appear to be the de-superheating of the atmosphere too rapidly thus retincing gas temperatures and possibly altering the combustion characteristics. ( Based on the above discussion, provide justification for the models in-corporated in CLASIX or provide the results of analyses with acceptable models as outlined above. The analyses should encompass selected sensi-tivity studies to assure that the effects of the changes are determined for be?.h containment integrity and equipment survivability considerations.
Response
The following additional information is provided concerning the method by which CLA.SIX models heat transfer to the passive heat sinks.
- 1. A close examination of the CLASIX code reveals that all heat transfer for the cases reported in our analysis used heat transfer coefficients based
, on the stagnant portion of the Tagami correlation:
7.0-130 Revision 10 New Page
H (BTUhr ft2 op)= Mass of steam _h b 2 + 50 (Mass of noncondensables} Table 1 compares this value of heat transfer coefficient with the Uchida correlation used in CONTEMPT 4, Reference (2). It can be seen that, for the small break LOCA case analyzed by Duke Power, CLASIX consistently selected conservative convective heat transfer coefficients. At no time did CLASIX use the correlations for natural convection of the form Nu = f (Pr, Re) due to the program logic associated with the particular heat transfer option selected for our analysis.
- 2. The use of Tbulk, rather than Tsat, to compute the temperature difference appropriate to passive heat sink heat transfer is supported by experi-mental and analytical work. This type of heat transfer is dominated by a boundary layer containing noncondensables, particularly in an ice contain-O V ment where operation of the air return fans assures that a continuous source of noncondensables is available in all compartments. An examina-tion of CLASIX output reveals that typical values of the mass ratio of noncondensables to steam is greater than 1.5, even immediately following a hydrogen burn. As discussed in reference (1), use of T rather than sat bulk to calculate heat transfer in the pressence of nonconden:: ables is T
" inappropriate."
- 3. CLASIX does not remove mass from the atmosrhere by condensation at the walls. There is, therefore, no credit taken for condensing heat transfer and no atmospheric temperature descrease due to energy removal by con-densate revaporization. This does not affect the period of most interest in analysis of hydrogen burning in containment - the period during and O 7.0-131 Revision 10 New Page
l immediately following a hydrogen burn during which the passive heat sinks i O function to desuperheat the atmosphere. Energy deposition in the heat sinks of compartments where hydrogen burning occurs causes T,,)) to rise to temperatures above T sat. These wall temperatures remain above satura-tion for the duration of.the period during which hydrogen burning occurs.
.Therefore no condensing heat transfer can take place on heat sinks in com-partments where hydrogen burning occurs, and the fact that CLASIX cannot model wall condensation is irrelevant. The principal cooling mechanism for the lower compartment atmosphere is the flow from the upper compart-ment due to operation of the air return fan.
In summary, it is apparent the CLASIX handles convective heat transfer in a conservative manner consistent with the physical processes occurring in the containment atmosphere. As noted in Table 1, the heat transfer coef-
.ficients are lower than those used in the Uchida correlation of CONTEMPT 4.
The use of the temperature difference between the w211 and the atmosphere is justified by the actual ratio of steam to noncondensables present during the period of hydrogen burning. Therefore, it is concluded that no further CLASIX analysis is required.
References:
(1) Laskin,. D. , A. Koestel, R. Gido, and P. Baranowsky, Containment Main Steam Line Break Analysis for Equipment Qualification, NUREG/CR-1511, June, 1980.
-(2) Cheng, T. C., L. Metcalfe,.J. Hartman, W. Mings, and A. Crail, CONTEMPT 4/M003, A Multicompartment Containment System Analysis Program,
'NUREG/CR-2558, December, 1982.
O 7.0-132 Revision 10 New Page
TABLE 1 Heat Transfer Coefficients l M. ass of steam H (CLASIX) H (CONTEMPT 4) Mass of noncondensables (BTU /ft2 hr *F) - BTU /ft2 hr *F) 0.02 3 2 0.05 4.5 8 0.10 7 14 0.20 12 21 0.33 18.7 29 0.43 23.7 37 0.56
- 29.8 46 0.77 40.5 63 1.25 64.5 98 2.0 102 140
*According to data from CLASIX results, the mass ratio before, during, and after hydrogen burning lie in this range. The CLASIX heat transfer coeffi-cients are about 35% less than those used in CONTEMPT 4 in this range.
l n
-v 7.0-133 Revision 10 New Page
.p 2. Provide a complete evaluation of fan (both air return and hydrogen i skimmer as applicable) operability and survivability for degraded core accidents. In this regard discuss the following items:
- a. The identification of conditions which will cause fan overspeed, in terms of differential pressure and duration, and hydrogen combusion events,
- b. The consequences of fan operation at overspeed conditions. The response should include a discussion of thermal and overcurrent breakers in the power supply to the fans, the setpoints and physical locations of these devices, and the fan loading conditions required to trip the breakers.
O c. Indications to the operator of fan inoperability, corrective actions which may be possible, and the times required for operators to complete these actions. '
- d. The capability of fan system components to withstand differential pressure transients (e.g., ducts, blades, thrust bearings, housing),
in terms of limiting conditions and components. l
Response
This question was addressed previously by Duke Power. Refer to pages 7.0-123 and 7.0-124. fi o 7.0-134 Revision 10 New Page
- 3. Provide an evaluation of the ultimate capability of ice condenser doors O to withstand reverse differential pressures.
Response
The top deck blankets rest on grating. In a reverse differential pressure situation, the grating would be the primary structural component if the closed blankets were pressed down on the grating. Calculations performed by TVA show a nominal static failure loading of 4 psi. The limiting component for the intermediate deck is the door which is conservatively estimated to fail at a
- j. static loading of 6 psi.
Any reverse differenti&l pressure across either the top or intermediate decks would be mitigated by the existing bypass area and any additional bypass area created by flow through the ice condenser which displaces the top deck blankets lO laterally. However, our previous analysis has demonstrated that for all rea-sonable assumptions on the course of events associated with a recoverable degraded core, hydrogen burning is precluded in the upper compartment. There-fore, reverse differential pressure on the ice condenser doors is not consi-dered to represent a realistic loading condition. a 7.0-135 Revision 10 New Page _ - _ _ - - - _ - _ - -_ _ _- --_-A
3.1A Introduction n The hydrogen mitigation system used at Catawba is identical to that used at McGuire, except for minor differences in terminal box designation and igniter location. The design basis and system description are unchanged from McGuire and the methods of operation and testing will also be identical to those used at McGuire. The following tables and figures are provided in this section which provide specific information to Catawba: Table 3.1A-1 provides the same information on igniter locations at Table 3.4-1 does for Mcguire. Figure 3.4-1 is applicable to both Catawba and McGuire and is not repeated in the appendix. l 10 Figures 3.IA-2 through 3.1A-5 provide a schematic representation of igniter locations in the Catawba containment building. These figures are analogous to Figures 3.4-3 through 3.4-6 for McGuire. Figures 3 1A-6 through 3 1A-8 show the power distribution, control and ind-ication for the Hydrogen Mitigation System for Catawba. They are analogous to 10 Figures 3.4-7 through 3.4-11 for McGuire. Revision 10 O LJ
. . . . . _. . ~ _ . . - - . - . . . .. - . - . . . .- . . -. .- . - - . - - - - . .
. O i
~
l l x . I
-\
I % Figure 3.1A-1 (Deleted) i
- s
.s, W
s y\ I I
. s.
A
~ >
S .,
% v r
( s-l s
, . .s js- .
x., s s . L. ~ m x x .., I l , A q ' I'
. ~.
Revision 10 l
l, I- a Teatt.
.g
,a
(,v) d'!% d;% - - 2,=.;,i ._ b !> h> h,
- e. .a[ ,... g g,,, ._ . j --- - e-e- d .. [s. _ h>>
t
! t 8 5 2 3 m.-,, i 1 1 1 1 1 1 T90x593
- c. u-- .
a .d':r., W44- . a a m'.,l
,t ad- -
i
' i"!
lC g_i;;>..@'r. *
.-<- TP:::; . ..
W, ,w a.
. -u:
~<.se Wt ,- m a
.[h,-_, bi4 r -~~
= e-o nca. -+,
axe n..a ,. A'44-. . Py+=r, u i.f mp=
-c,
_~;grL,
-.e .
e :1g =Nm [ p , , La* QhT. *.*.. Q. gg mup p 9 W
,,.i * . e -- . H ,. 2, C . e, ,
.- e
=+=
.>.=.
e R u_ 1
* *~ i, .. ,,,
(g*ag*~[-
. , _ -e , o -n . . 1 e-,
- x. t .,- -
1
.a,, -
r -
. a,,,-
,------_ic-m.,
. . #.sx
.m.
W 4 A aa r-- a S erwe r- -- *
- m 4, P~:%jg: / R]I c
y:_. 41 3 t,ir ~ ~. e th:
~~ Tav42. Ti, -
r, 1 t .se v#. e,
/y , F p- . . a
,4 Jf ad .n was-nT.u 4 et w
-ser , 7,Kt. l
. . . -~.
7 j M Me 8.SM *- n= -t~-_h 4045-545- 2 SI
; il ll'il j lillt,i' i ii > i
! !o iIti
% lle m _. , __
t ((t_.,_._,._.........s,..,.,,
.m....-.., ~
swa.,._.o wet ha se at-9 795 es. t ts 1 - se.
.ee -t et1+up'Las G-be (4-8 %F4 Sp e4=nme.;4 -- -ei L MiW I"J' L*- I I 4*0 %F4 .4
=a - - $E*thd@ 8=* O f f1-9ED'7@l f-44 (4-3 fSF*f t. 38 3 WIkUN.nr
.w, e w
- ?? '# '? - l.
41-- At .
. 1 8- 'lI T" r i L,,,,,
%
- im o es1 c.--
4 k
- s a m n a_ _1 ,,,
~ -
f --*L .
- t. _
, ; . _.: L-> r-> s
=At I
$ _] _.1 d l' 3l .,
. (v) sq F, -> , n__m i
~~2 .= .u
, t - s.e .
\
f .. _. *
. . .*' M '
ww-
- p. .
4 r f 41, Avdi-bb l
- o mm. -
Aperture Cart g s dT7.5
- a 3n
. 1M. . -
.ur i
** .- .,_sman;suiL ..
d f.. b I . b? b ? T e _.S l.'.e,, m aJ ? ?; j? l? i 93 4 I !. i f'.- s -y,n
?
l
.-,i i c ht t 9 h3 h a,.ar. us.ama-.-. - 1 I >1 iis f Taw R l'. i :tv.n,
>:r <<
- _en.
se e, en._e
- y . rs;y e
.s, .
a gr.p . - - - a , n ..
- 1. . .
.--r--+.
-r+-w,
. g VA .... <, a *;;(P ?- ? ::.gr<;, -$
u.--gu'.
~4
,s. _ .. .e5 ._.-.,.
l (- c y t. -}u. , ..~. , _ ---..n g6s
. .s ..,..,.,r
,, , s =s
.....-+-v.
n,, n,,-. * ,* @, w :3- =+ g a
-"1 " . 6,,,-_..= m*+
.u. .er
_._..,;l $,t- ~ 4, .,.
- ~ _'!.6 - 6,i*"..
- . a ga e. . e,.,i e.-
.i.p a y
..e J.i.,,r l,
-r r . -< ,
-- +---y-cu VA ,,,y,
..t,3.
; ,.-- '. -n, ..
.v. , . . .
*.,,;.- = , , , ,
b.--. .. . . - - - , , c---..-.,--t.}-~. i _ . , .~.u... .,... ,,_,f.,,;.,
-,.-*-a " ' . , , . ,
t ..* ** '$. . -j- .7-r-. .-~ 0.,rd.,.y-l".l*
" ' * * *_ gg, , , , , , , 'T ~48 ~u - s g
===axQ
. .t re.= ,= si
..,n- ua- 4 .
aen , .
- e. .* ..3.a 3 6
ae.
.-w, f. ,- .
*j l -...e.~
** e r ~
nr
?
***. .ma.
;7
;;:1 WR Hi vl vi- ,
'* [ '
.... .g N!4 I E ;ll 0 4 C " ". '?
L
.s *- . . De i t[ j :M ,,.. *
- v. c ,,
*- 5 m a*,L .u. t$c
{ l tE1 y o.~ .. 1,. . i- n.
!vi-
_-y_ , i... , p.t. .. , ,m .. -, e,s.s.h a r ,, e.
.mwse a m e2, > ;. . . cio
=
I i
..<p;
'. *' =
c f .' . ,9 i 1..
, ; ..- .. . -r.,
m .- : i
,l,;
.'j' . '4U ,% .. . we ; . i
!".' '~.-
- v.
- wr i j ; ; i r. g 7
!;ij
. . . v-_
. .. . sc . .
. _s
-t
, . .,,.1f,t . , n! !,ii
',: o:
*~' C..r.A , . .
.14 fis a i .jl'
.f
!.'i t
.~~-. .;.
f
;,., , ,i.i .: , .
.o.1 . :
it .di:3
,i *. ; ;i o rt
.: i> _ ., . . . , . . . . . . , , , , . ,
.ii;-u.
.t.1 i
. e_m. ..
. . ~ . . . . . , _ . . .
...m.,
- t - -
w- x -;; =., ,.
--.,u.-
t - = = -- . .v . m. . < < . v .s v f e
, a ..
- f p, b ,
I A .m . . m: :s
=,_m-,,..
A
).. . !
w.=py.w=.mc y,3g :,r-'~<~. .w- =ar.-m=:.m ,. a.n.A,..r a .v. e. ,v ~. , .
.s r A
J HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM (EHM) y POWER DISTRIBUTION s McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION l
Figure 3.4-7 g, . . ~ .
8403020321 1,.
4I
}^
PBQ) a )) (( // m H1 I g I"@ GLQw fluG
- cC)
W o H2 "' 4 5 3 g x 1 8 o 191La
" 1 g H1 GLQW fluG (C)
N 4 l PE W 2
)) (( // NTE 2 SEC TA9 FOR ASSOCIATION TO PAHENTHESIZED LETTEks t!9KE BEE._cwn 1.
IGNITCR TEAWINAL BOXES ARE CcretECTED IN PARALLEL
- 2. TIJittSFCAMER WC-1735-02.01 IGNITOR BOX C/D 120/10.12.14.16.18 *1-CCW.*2-1CV.
*)-12V. *4-14V. *S-16V. *6-18V. FIELO TO SELECT A TAP FRCh EACH TRANSFCRMER WHICH WIll. PROVICE A VOLTAGE ACROSS EACH GLOW PLUG CF 1421VAC.
l
. . x, J
l
\
O gyg ltdNO Aperture Card j
-TPO-(0) (C)
(A) PENETRATION to. IGnITCR 00X (1EHMTS) Teox/TERW!te PTS Cuc-1735-02.01) NOTE 1 DWG. tObdER O wG. toufri E-464 4 7.43.5t .5 3.55.57.S 3. 700XS89/ A2. A 3 61.63.65 WCEE-165-02. 03 MC-1767-12.05 E-120 11.25.27.29.3*.35.37 T80X589/85.A6 WC-1767-06.07 g 3,43 WCEE-165-02. 0 3 T00X589/88.r9 E-120 13.15.17.19.21.21.33 MC-1767-C6.07 41.43 WCEE-165-02.03 ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ' - E-120 1.67^ _ T80X589/A11.A12 WC-1767-06.07 McEE-165-02.03 E-120 3,5,7,9 T80X58S/A14.015 WC-1767-06.07 WCEE-165-02.03 E-46* 69.71 TOOX539/A17.Aig MCEE-165-02.03 MC-1767-12.05 700X590/A2.83 E-449 48.50.52.54.56.58.60. MCEE-165-02.05 WC-1767-C6.07 62.64.E6 E-2 31 12.26.20.30.3?.36.38. TBOX590/A5.86 40.46 WCEE-165-02.05 WC-1767-06. 04 T80X590/A8.A9 E-2 31 14.16.18.20.22.24.34 MCEE-165-02.05 WC-1767-06.04 42.44 E-231 2.6d : TBOX590/A11.A12 pC-1767 -C6. 04 MCEE-165-02.05 E-2 31 4.6.8.10 TBOX590/814.815 WCEE-165-02. 05 WC-1767-C6.04 E-449 70.72 ,.
- T80X590/A17.R18 MCEE-165-02.05 WC-1767-C6. C8 ,
l I a .- . ?'3 M?'/t M hhv e f_ i .__7 w - u-Revi sed Pe r tiSN : e Revislon Da.e: _ 2,,,m_,,,,, p- p > >
, , _ , _ ,, OEF >s g m IMPLEMEllTATIOft DATE: - - -
? uurt to muet me. .c 4 e,- n o This is a limitec ediceon print r1 w ,s .r.-e.e. e is u DEF *-S e a
shall not be use ! as a perrnanen, 3 m. _, , , , i ,, l record. , n m em cast m om ic-i s7 REVISION CHelo. DATE APPR. DATE lae s e t C t t o NO. se g[t.. 1
\
..,}
HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM (EHM) i TYPICAL IGNITOR BOX o m ro m McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION W' Figure 3 4-8 l 8403020321 ~* b
m.w n:s,, s s* - - sewe mis**na yyr.< en A* o j'm% .- ==*
-j-
.- . m n ,=.a. - s i-s w m e e r ..< . m w ien - .<=rme L e ' P68 - h $es I
' ,,u=. ,sg. m s**.a. s , ,-.t+-.e ie, , m.1* ,-me, , 't* A. .
. . , ..,s ,
to r2 m enem. e s.e s
- n. p .. n. .wats,m- u g*a%
l l
*'s
<..,wn,w..-.-..,a..s.v,....,..<.e . , , ,
e
> a er
.r ., vw .e n ..
ms.u'w . e,is."<nb s.e -ww,,, +.e. ir= nu . art'*we m - e I l J ;
. .e n'r J .s ne, ewwe J toewe - w ne.
2s*% rn .,rm. s . i , q ise. t 6 l i .w . *** b S.p.a es . at-9 tS-W. 93 9.casqg e- age.s,g + e,gt i -ias,s t , y.e..se sq.anse I IGhlTCR 804
,a...swr . it
. 's .n,: , . -Ih?ERCCiNECT-
='s 53*E D.,LAI e i E-- e j
4
<,..r..w....,=..<m.e..,e._=. --.-.,sa 8 er
= =
.)
3 9 *12 .11 9 "9, j
*t L et Fu- y an g j
tw-ef ve-49 es Sep.sge e- seense-.-agt see ta ap e+< - seenes y* ts.appig i v-s tate gra
*Y' Y
' rm e. r es p e *,e b J
.,. I 1
,.p.; . ,s7' t,,
test-.rw R af, ver.aw e-wM .sec age fee. **< - ss.a. rest ernesses sa-1F67-en 4*a
, d'*r."*
- F
*IY']E *
. , _ _., 7 e., ..vt , var., ,v;,,
.. ... f lat o rm-gr ses faus9 9 e se ses -*+ 4.s een b ess.ne td 'dessbee ie.stes c e.t.v+te,te. **T seem.*
EE1g sis 91*es'3E8 tI*'M9 m**SM 117.' 9 9 me re s.* me - y see me- - et m- nog geo- y see t 1 n... m . .e n . p. Y. ac-.7VI 03 et 191989 +
- quest.9 -- +- eis t.e.m,*E,m -itu.a ten.e.O .O.m.L- ep.edu
- Ws.ne te.eet
-*e 8e.4. ***
- 7. gj..f.....
ite'E3 was'De EL,tie amewe'fl9. som'D.0 e 2Mme mas r 1e - er e
- ccg
[ k
/ .
l l
' i.I di
m-Also Available On } Aperture Card { 0 H.<w.o.n5i. ..!.?d.,ic.o. t< v . n ,w
- s c=..n .
O C
=: _ _.y
. _._--.,....m. -
____y_
, -- - .m I ~~_
}
" pi t
, +1 .r J. / !l I
_4 . _..-. _ W . 4 '"-7' h' i Wv v4 m )
.y s
u i ' ! ~; . :) fg ,# nr .. . .a ,
. .--.sa,u..sm .sau. r e ,
1 L h. }4f mo! j l g
- r. .
M
- e. -
I .iw,:m.e.
-% m,,,,a 3:= -e .gpc s
m, mm>-- e .s.r;; ,;; .+< > a 4, ., N .nq T, t Y
~ 1:! .. v 0 s
7 ,h m e.---..... . -.mo.,..,,- .- :- u _r-e .i o ~4.p - \ ,g,p/,, i;
- ie
- 1. ,
/g\ .2--.:....,. . .s .
f ,. ri y h +,' n=*., (( I** h' , o 4 , =_T=.. w; 9 p _
.._.L__- - - .~.
P. 1
- r. i.
.. i
'..t
+ -- . . e. . . ~..m n. .a,e..m m at =
.a I O l O _) !
l 4 .______J
% ... 3
-:r,mei i!& v m
...~,,w-
, .f x. , 4 .s .L.,-; w,.a n . ,;e ,'a * -a * ;
- t. .g,, 'e.s.-*.r.
.,; M A .t .(g ed
- . pges #.
u, , . .. ., s : e -
. .so.
,a,engn .e. ?4 g.iyi,.
.re.g ,
,.,,,m.m.~.,.._-..,~.,,,.m.
,~ . .-n. .m.-.., p
.na m - .
.s. , MI ,.,....,m...;; ,U 'I re.g Sqyege g.p gg agg e.gcJs *g3
'I l $ .,,*.e44 .'e
- , -, m.;,.~ e % J . ;,,...m,,..
c u u.l
. , ~...n,,...y,..
. . . , _ .. u. .a g ,w.u. y;;:;;, g., ,..
......,..w.c,.,,,,.m......,..,,.s,.-
g = .p.f. %. . . . . m,. .
.-..,.,t,.,,m.. .... .
.m.. ..v,...n....~m
.x..4,...,.. m . , . . . .
w,,,.i,., 3 a m. n~.~n
%... ,,.~...,.s-..~.,.
. . .r.~.,.,.....,m.
.. ..i..
m,
- m. .o. ...c..,,..,..,..,
.;~4
. __ .. ., m. ~_ .. ... ,,.. . ,..., . u 4
- 1. ..
.J i ,.
..s...
au
- , . , . . - . _ _ .4..,...._. t. .
- ;. .. .; - ,*;Tf y.,
= v 4 .> ,. . n.. m..,..ym...,. . .w u .c,..
. .e,..
., ~ . . ., e..,.,~. m. . .s... . .. ,
.. s+w m..~ , s. t. . ,,ta* ase. .
< .. m w;q.,i.
. : e.
,, L e _s - . . , , . , , - . . . .
...,..,-...m....-,s J. LJ :..w:n.~";,. "
w~.. .v.. -__.__ m c ..n ? = =..~ s .;. . w.c
.c....
2. s..., n . . ..g wr ,
. .g a.. . +.n3.p l I [ .
. . - . ,, ,,,. a L . a ..
f< a. s,w y i. . w. _. ,7..%.. . wm w .n ut . . .+ y . . 1-w u , q_ _ g. -,
=t h'gl *-<. .wu . t .> : l ,u
. o...
,_w_
C %#4 ' . ,
-u
. ..J . JL. L. d J
('*\ j.'i , ,
h
'd. (d .'.. :
U n' a. ' t < {)-
.?"!.. ?*;!.. 5*P . ?;'."f.,
~ -.-
I ~~
-.~.
[ HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM (EHM) TYPICAL IGNITOR BOX Ot McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION Figure 3 4-9 l I I { 8409n20321 -C3 .. I l
I 600VAC W C 1EWXA
'T CCMPT. F3A (MC-1752-Ot.01)
'- M s a a a ]
0 T1 T2 T3 o 4 @ ( ( ( y "_Y_ &a '* 1 GPCIESGAX32 ".
~
E-OJ 1T m2 3T m3 2 3A g 0 O U m2 m3 g 6 5 E-DJ g.) 120VAC . P1-15 6 E
$ h F,'-f8-00a m3 111- 2 5 L L M 2 P- 0-08Z T T T- og qq s g _1-16 P
m6 G b
'2
> MCEE-165-02.03 CONTINUED ON
' 3 1
/
02T oA t.EGENOe i m1 - 1EMXA laI p,e m2 - TBOX589 R m3 - 10GLSA 54 - 1MC7 2.I.80R (CVERRIDE) Itt MS - 1MCG 2aI . sts - IIC1 Tci 3I. __ 51 3aT re I- NI-25 REF. DWG2 4a7 WCEE-114-00. 0 3-01 10GLSA WC-1713-01. 05 IIC1 CCNTP WC-1735-02.02 T80X589 uCC uCWT-1711-07 SH 3t.-1MC7 AUX. CCNTROL CCNTACTS uCwT-1711-08 SH P10 - 1MCS N3 b MCu-1314. 01 -122 - MCC MFG, C/D 4 I- ,$ ___ A5 F ST 7* x - DENOT LOCe 1WC7
,' 1 NI-25) 10,ge _
9T 11T
Also Ava'tlald3 @ Aperture Card 25 o W1? o E8_ m2 m6 m2 s hPd 8-08W 40.R ms g, L, es.1 - ' m2 83o 1T m2 [11-25 840s 84 Sh. Pd 8-08V E83 8) pyg 82 D mS 16 82 gT u1 g P_1-20 m6
"$BR)
<, D-9 IT m2 gE m2 a3 o El.
m2 1 Qi1ESCAX3) D P1-12 P1 -13 4 m3 la188.4 "E "E IT m2
'N 'N P-C,0-C8d Pd 3-C8c
[E D-8 3 E A1 m5 81 R III'25 G (11-25 g10 1I "2 A2 m4 CON) 92 m4C0FFJ m2 c.g , P-C8-C8b
~
Ag 1af g kST C2 i m2 3
,,m ma o m2 OA CnbnTTTON 1 I I a o ris_d Par N5M: on-#,;<s t ,
,, w w
<1slon D"te: A- a [
~
5tEHENTATICN DATE: [ is is a limitec ecition print i 4 4 ill not ba used as a perrr.cnent A c,e r,. va .utnev innar.,ia,, m , , . . 3
- ord. _ , , , , , , , , , , , , , , l l
E 30JY8 2-KLA3 msacciso TCP tuAINTAf tED) BOT TCM(MCL{NT Ai4Y J lq slg
- T 5i FUNCTION CONTACT FUNCTION I NO Y M 83 04 NO X 80R ,
i NC X 85 B6 NC X ES CONTACTS CLOSED ; HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM (EHM) i McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION j Figure 3.4-10 l 8403020321
1 N OkR 2A
)RXR1A m1 s1 R R
$ F,,,tA1 , FjU ,,3
,$ H1 X1
- q q L
ES s 2 1HuTA Lt N3 U/120 ' Pd H4 ^4 '. Fj)-4
$a 3-2 m2 n2
* '$ R A,L R P_,6_ ,
%3
'~
og c "* s "* d a 8o C1 ? C1 NOTE 1 tiOTE C2e C2 M 8 95 i 7 W 9 TYPICAL FOR BR1_-PP6 AR1
~~~
09 AR4 Q18 02 3MR40A _2w _ s2 1M1DEH000 21M1DEH006 2=T _ 2aT _ E13 0 19 1 1 -25@ *A *2 n1 1eT =2 m3 2 82 Gl.4 MS 9110 1 CCuPUTER _s? _u2 2aT THIS CwG. MICEkO2 21M1CEH008 2T _ 2T _ 3 - 1.5 ggt 1__ a.2 2 r.p_I 3aT 1. 2. 4 g3 Q16 g6 QR2 1__ _=2 _=2 gr 2IM1CEh04 EIM10EHC10 2aT _ 2=T ui;
'Q 1_7 _'QR3 m2 *2
AN Avcihb12 On f Aperture Card ( 3 3A }BKR4A )OKRSR ) BVR 6A
)B21 / at / ml / m1 O O O O b m2 ma m2 m2 C R R R y
S/-5 ; EM-7 EM-9 EU-11
- m2 m2 m2 m2 L L5 L L Lg L, L L 3 EM-6 Eh8 Eh10 Eh12
- m2 m2 m2 m2 RI 69 R A3 R 3 A R A3
.4 4 W 3 4
3 db di a il C1 C1 C1 C1 A NOTE 1 l NOTE 1 NOTE 1 NOTE 1 C2 C2 C2 C2 ML g I II
;A8 'I= All A14 ;A17 m2 x2 ma m2
~ ~
) Revised Per hSti: w;- t - 4 7 < . ,<c
*~
t Revision Date: , IMPLEMENTAT;0N CA!E: _~
! This is a lirnitco edition print f~
! shall not be used as a perrnanent
_ _reco rd . _
~
l 1 o o INMPPA w w T00X509 > 1MC7 > 4 <r A CM i G. To muuct le. w esu g g we-i-tesi, nor o. se. smTE l l C E M
" ' O" ' #' ^ ^#'
nesnc rea 50NTItAJED ON McEE-165-02.01 FU-1 THRU FU-12 TO BE 15 AMP. , DwGS. l735-02.02 C/D 1HMPPA. TBox389 T-1711-07 SH 3b IMC7 1 i AP_cRTUR1"" CAO HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM (EHM) CtreetIFigure I McGU:RE3 4-11 NUC{ 8403020321 v o$- I
I,t i r i
,, w
- v e n-3 _, ,_
1 s
'EfEEi1J l
p ee =n .
- me se , , , , ,
;= :: - - -
;r ::::=
. , i ,: , . . ~ , --
.,,.r '~' -
-'*1--.
- =; ::;;;; l -- -
!jj;;lr,,
j il l!t > l l - l
. l .
L<- _
'm m r r r r m L c.,~,
- . Cy. 'T I-. . 4t h.. ~.
2.... - v!v yvv , vT-
- . .a., _z. s. . t,
._____,.y..m.,
i
- 1. 1 .
;;- .2.. .
t : WJ ~.. ~.l ! : . 1 . !' i i . I ;t---- * :j.f.a .. n~,. nl
& 2 eieiii
-c u t-
- y ~. - '
p .; t-. Ist sia t. i. l als lit i
, ! ii! i !
4- !
@ l .A d I -Eqj 'pl di: :
j--~1m TV't d 4_ra ',ld ,i )t T*tT[p dun.t--+J_ 't'T t I b h7T? r -+2
, _w- as an._ _m I 2 y= ,
'j
.- J '% w.. ..
Ya ; 2L4 , V! l .quy_...~.42 .
. . . 424 ., . .. .+wp .)
, .r...yg.y p.~. r.~i ,7.
- *;.-'1,,9 :~.t>3
., nt3 l 1
, l
; __ _w. _ _rn-v_m.; _9 s.,v v. .
._ ._. i .i ,
; -1_....,_.' :. _
. . _ . . .,,_t c 4....* a..... .. -+. _frws. ...
. . .... - :27 .. , .~. - Jg .
'N.. .'a d_._3_ 2 "*' ...wi _i? _e_g;l 9
. ~ .-3.a{g
'.".P,; 50 / Wg '
m,.=
; pp i .
e_,_. m
. . ., . ee- l j
j i> !! n
!! s- l} I
lI_ l ll l1 i f!! !! I !
l L-m,;;;:i gt .!:,;) i : i,.
, u .
i1
. , il !
-9r.j e.q J--' r ;r ,,
!..i1. , , . . t . . l . . l _3l g ., .
l' le[ __ i;. p! . . ! I .
!- l
;,l m 9l esa 9 l em e9m4S .m*
e 'j i e.9' . 94em 9 , i e. *t a s4 *g 6 3 1
- f. __
Cf _ , , %c' 4 ' 8N'Ma 'On e 6 TN'f'4
g3o Aneb N .I Aperture Card ( 8 a,,
!,;a 3i 4. f-_J
- - = ~ - > [jj u..
11 nu l 11
- til t; .
.. _. 1 ttt
- ~' -== '~++= ljg p = ._.==.J u.....
= ; = ;; } i i
3 ItI
- e . l
- .._:,_ .._:> . , c v,m- v v, , _,_
1
- :r ~~h ~. ; < .. l : =, ;:;h_ ._
=~::: ;.. -;=
= ;;_ ,
, 7 ;;=
7 , -
~~; i : =::_:=
.: =:
. =: :fn :=
1
= :; a- ~~, , , , , , , , ,- ,
=:: ::=
l =: f:== : ;
- ~;
- > ~ *
;;;;;;*e e =
=-:g: ,. := ;: =.
=: s,,E =::== :a ,
= @. : =
l =. :tt ;;= ; $y. - ~t ~*~: ,- ,., -,
?-? -?- .
..t.::jH::;-=
_c-
-e-j s, i, i, ,,. i, n, i, s, i, a, i, n, n, i, .
, _g
. !, b !, kh _hk_ Nk 7 h_ k_h _7 NN !, b t, ,
, m. . ,
- g R_ E_l R_ii l
.._ g
- ql .._e, .
_w.., :
- ,_y. _~. ... . y _. _ y _.
, TdiE;1 Wi=JA W:JA veD _3r. . : ,
- a. n. ..- :
> r_ v._-
. v._-
Q_ .. . :,
- : .. _ g.1. . - . _
w . . . . . . m:
, =. _m _ _ ,
.p .
. .77 . . g 7 7..-..
. , etatt et_Jh mid _...
-- :.It ,
~ .- . . . : :.
&WM &DR% mm
- -c. w -
=:T::.:~:m:=_;I.
m , == :.-~
. ::ns..r_: :
m g
. ..I 5.a5.fp:n'Et~?@'
. emt -, GEN [.5.. 7@'AP" li r hb CARD 0i HYDR 0 GEN MITIGATION SYSTEM (EHM)
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION 1 Figure 3.1A-6 1 8403020321 - - -- _ _ --
O=T-t rse-ci-ce MCC
- 9E anz t CtaeT
- FOIR 600 WC* is 11L.
, ! Y I f il l
., L1 , L2 ,L3 i k F076J ,
op i p* M9 Ni r 3 7-e.. P5 6 W gg nJ. _d . m2 MF P-CS ,0 7sf YD' WM
- L 'O : :L
$0r-cs-Q*H F07hT1 FUNT2 F07&T B ,,t
- -14A tDest331. .1Et_ api 351 I iy e3 M4 o]j'e at gM' ?
It NM
' g[165 Gait 3) a 'i -' mai l)
Sa ':Ub(E-C' t e-CC. 03) ( E-Cit e-O teo ii j-[I i gt
. WA- B L
, w-,
~
':%9 l
i Tes -1 ( MPMA)rWTE 4 f 9Kel*A)
\ ** {MNJ **
gi
. i Ig (MCTE 32 pgg pJ l ' ~ ~ e4 et k
? $* , e4 u pR y;p EQt C1 Ct C1 Tel -), , , ,Igt-e 791.4 ,
84
, ,,741-4 84 791:24 M
, , ,IP-6 se e4 e4
%S 4FPE(3) 41 4 EPE(S) D D Pit 9) p tt 94
^
gy $3t 4 A
,HgM ' h h h v +
p, se , ,e swas 7n smne 6a h IGre1TOs aunt $ !GMITp BCMS Z.2 - 27- (C) (CJ
'1 E 't S* 5 54 1 fr-5 152-F NDTE 2 og rete 2 ,ee 4 icR troci ina imio a.c. ,ttes cTTrica **T .a e=T a
- n-.
se _rar-e og GAmp 94 "e, IsnITM 30xts 21 (C8 I EBR M4 esT a
=1e-4 TYP!CML FOR g3 ;}4mAun 1, 12e!TCA 1 G1 ha* O t. Tm
- 4-14w ,
$DS tncu 1
J_ 1 gji ). FUt T6eRJ aE3 - Iftss! F07A 1.T TalS CwG 4 SEE TM
*1 s;L -
6 h[ [
,1 si-ims-,
11-e ,ncrorre e4 - I cef c e toI %,,s coo
* ,.a In. it
,1f r
*1 e4._
(v4 i 6 _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ )
L r Also AvMl:1>l2 6 { Apertiire Car"' ; L
-treintim -
~ = <c'
,.e . , ,ws o, -, 'o m.v 90WCo pgeg,apTION
- IG lTO osoC .R noS',M.t
,C.in r Coe < =(10483 re > >
minan ContaC T miran , a+. CGMTNT 5{f ,, , , , , , , , C,,7.,... ai I~k = = > 1 =4 k 1 - e, i7 7-ei.os-as
,5*'a'*,,
as I as MT = es l fm_le u.L
/, iga se . n. Co , Cr Closco , C,,-i 7.,-o, .
'uu. 4.
C,,_l",?;'.'ho, e i.rs.17.rs.>i . n 44, m,,. ,
.. w, 4 sa _lgra'. *ao, ,s. i?. 4 4 >. 4, g,
"W w C, lgy;L 4 7.4,.si .si.ss.s7
-wer, % 7,
-, . es.. . ,y,, s,..i .. ..s
- 1. _,,,,-e,4,,
4e n an . "' ~C CPS-t ?)s-Of. 01 cy,e;>,'rge42 C/D TYelCM. 1GMITCA SON 2? ;p1;n' = C,,-lRsah .7... 8.:,'",,,',3,-o%, v e,- 7 . C. iW5%.
.i f ,1 n Cr.aef C, e, .171,7.01.
n 7 e, C.9. ,7. .. -- e,/ T li ec,f CS C,6-9 710-02. 0 C/D 10pfC4 f#-0847r 34 h4 e "3 y. j ,,-i , ,,c .
,'o r -$ co g e
,tg'm
,a. a,c.
i og o
, , for-*
e4
peggi) g,ne4gn; j ' gwpe_}rge; j ' greepj j ' gugm3
\ e4 % e4 \ og e4 e4_
h' 23 f' 15 w .w . w. W.. I e4 152-2
*1 t%I E 1P E 3f W C2 f [
" C1 C, Ci C1 1 -1.
, ' 9 -10 791-], ,I i-12 781- ,I]i -i 4 1 91 -1 ,
Tfig , 4
,' t -8 7 8, -,
], , , , , , ,
u ume> u ume, u ume, u ume, w , m ., T T i i i i i i i i
- - - ~
c.m,m .-i. c= > w r , 4. C., IGnITom goats 1Gn11aN st,uts IGn1 Tea cons IBM 3fo# MUES !G4110e sones (C) (C) (C3 (C) (C) 192-, IB'-H 152-13 102-i5 IF-i 7 e4 _ og 94
#4
~ 94 an uome 'tw Lw *Im 'wtm4 '!w iwms *t un 'wsw ee u
. e eeT _
m rei _e nel _ es rol _5 192-98
'I52-i t 'I52-14 19#-16
'Is2-10 e4 e4 e4 e4 e4 5
t N u.# 81 Pt
.4 . i,S. OMS4 fu,lf CO,.t(Cit.3 is O,-Coe IM itRAL,EL.
-iav. . .-irv.
r vg W .tew ,1(LD IO SELCCT n Ipus Faos tacM M the.CM !LL P40410E A WOL1MC MENDING AtaoS5
*Lu 143 1 98C.
bi S Apt OF 19 AbdP. Pfl0M FOR PESOCIAT10N TO PreEMTogstIED LETTERS. t I' HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM (EHM) IGNITOR BOX GROUP "A" g) g'CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION Figure 3.1A-7 f 8403020 m *d7 1 s
I a 1
- I Ce'9* *CI4 NA I(IhIUIII[C Y f9 NM 1
- a-c. r te; py j s s.. . in '_ i e-1.r.#S f 1 e.* -w S .=. #49e* p ,9 en w 9dtege 3 - - 4.-"
*C4 *i3 644 ad a w % ' .'t ;Sa IC9 '
( ; *A r i.", eg$ e V.g ,*e; _ f . . v f a*F * *ch.
****3
... . ~
g ener:4* .e 9,ugeg . - - -. --i gegeg r',a tfj=epipt qq W
, ears"4e r,.a.
.c., x. . s.# ,9-**- p e ee*e em weA.1 Wh'9 sew s' s De er l_*ee
-.-p
**W%-je=.e.ee,, a WFgj $e
!*
- p p4PN'1 a ,'8%'** -=#
j so se"%.t *' $ . s oe:r s
> i Jerm .14 e .c - LahW
.c3 s 1 e ~ sesco -.m' s.. s. e.gr.ee .. - rw teer w
2
'4 1 LD ut.de
' .- s .s.*e s F J- n 3mwq
>y e.,e.9 -- s ir es e 486 4 I
W1* # b l'%.I y * *h'9epr f.11 9e 4.M4x1Dt! g g_s; e i t
,a 4M tg. =J,-= *(.Wg d- r... megy,gg .
l ' i '
- A .C 9 D %7$
e r; } ea e #4 ' e' .J e sd'i_94'*dI
.!g e l wy s , ; , i 1
- e ! l s w ".,a em r.ma bcopA*ga se eo- .ase(? ..ea.r.e,rp gpaside a.s.O.e' . -.
. - ,-?1amptPJ ==* 6-*'W - h o
,,..w.
8 p. 4=a*C9 29=,1r t.!. ..". tin Ja3. . v , . . , _ . - _ .__J_ _, _,.,..e_ u
+=r, *=envp l . . m'93, . .,y e . ..m. r .ap .
****3 g , I e > s.
W-#ee e u
- estee gg .. , m
.y *Je**,- ' veer' e + - -*.-
%.f res 's e-= ese..,% -
- -vestle ett <w FM d M ins '3d e e .sse erfu 8 f
.-feeF"C+* teEW8) se'g=iegV9)
-n:f_C t#"K e ,gy 4 ,
I v g, a _ +1 u ,, . . J ., , _ ,
.tM*h8 *hMy) .' F el.'.M MNV-
+* *; t_j s e ; oc[< e * < L' < w t' A_j rf.t e sett 'd , t
,188 5
'pB5 4,A',4e i
..,.*,,,s.i,Jga..i3=g.-....
..,_.-._.. . , -U . ..J. . _w. %m WsI h $'# 79 "**#,# 1.Ena,yg mf.5)
W T_' C7 4* 8**g' 4 y '8 46*A' * * %'*M.f
- 1 I wt( te l g w,
6.,....- =qJ- --L_-.e- L ._l e. .% s , - . ,. . , - ,, .
.s v.
De GC'e - 'A ve h r e .; + . ra-O:
~
}
b l NM [NT OI ( 4eep r en 9 6es"YN I *
- in 9 tem ey ; as a i .
- t. .
lwN&- teme7 h ehmbas --* 1TY m , + r, e n e v ne e 8 spit 'd om%e em
.- e m . -.- . ,. - -
-m M.'
sin . *h.se ads s.m e %* 'ho s*1 (av
%g .
t v 1
\
}
Also Availabla On - Aperture Card l e<c W,m...a.:n,.icn
. ~. .e e n.
ach .. M- r ,
.r /
.m. ,.; 1.ro ws: a., ,-
neu= ....... - -... ._._'
~
ljr - _: c -__-
.- . . _ . . ~ . , , _ , , . , -
**.. .---n, m.
I
,w M ; ,- g 3,-m
.+rx++ a U,q N ---*.e-.->==
$*u a
. 9, ,
p . ,. . . . , . ,
- -- j .---:: i . ,_a' , - N. ;
.y - r'> -
---- rt- . v - <
.,.- ~ r ; ;; ; m,7 .< u -
g
'. ;rm
-<3
. ma % ,; ,.
. *P.36.. e p,igyq .. ,,
,/
l i t, -l , ya
.a u _".-
s
.-s.,,,,,.,
m
.m.:. , m ,_, 7e w -1.u. =
- w. v, r .. ..,y n*.
. . s..,.,., i
.....~
*s i. . 3
,. u. m.... , ,
b,;;-.:.,; :=n.;6y t.- - .t._rd.. .; ; ,..,m.,,,,,,,,,,
. ...c.~..w. ..
f
.e n. .c na rn , .. ...m.. g u.
pa} t i , i O u ,. W. ,,2m.j . r" '
~
-:: a. .
. J,n<m., .. g ..
w.2 , m.u u .
- >r . - i i
=.m.), ;~ d h4 :;
9n m .A r, n. . . , .
..a,.,.
.m .
l !
. . . L. .J -- . nJ -
~-
- w. w. -
ga,e n.m - r: me s ..>s:~ m~ ..- m r,~.a. . . e. m.: :,....u....-~~
.: e
. ... .,, am.,
+ ..
r
.w . wm,i
...~.s---,- .
~ :.-: --.
. ,w, u .v.a,.. n.. .ww i ,.u
,_,..-,,.....a-_.,
- i. :
. . .m...,.d,..u..v, ,v .lf,4 6
.~,.,~,m,.,,.v. . . . . . -.
...u...,.
... ..m._...
. . .c.,
.e . n.r. ..
. . . ,.a.n...m.1
.m.. :. m.v a, 3 ... ,_sc..; ,m. .. ., . : n-..m. . ,~. ., _.. . ,
=m.a
- w. up .
e 2.:; .. . , waa
. m .w.'.w.'.m.udu ** **c.8.*'.r.e
- s. .t.e== . - .>u.at m i 4 cent ' ~.c..o.s*
2<t *=x.'.9. i
- s.
t..e u., t
=.,,,:r.'.,.=~
t
' m.w; y ~~ .~ c~ ~ u. ~ " ** u-
..i wu mu.m..-.,...~..~c....
- ,, :;~ ~ .- ~. * ^ - > ><
m
.eun* - u:4.
- wm
**x..* .n.