IR 05000261/2011011
| ML111330081 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/2011 |
| From: | Randy Musser NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Duncan R Carolina Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR-11-011 | |
| Download: ML111330081 (25) | |
Text
UNITED STATES May 13, 2011
SUBJECT:
ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - NRC TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/183 INSPECTION REPORT (05000261/2011011)
Dear Mr. Duncan:
On April 29, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Robinson Unit 2, using Temporary Instruction 2515/183, Follow-up to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on May 12, 2011, with you and other members of your staff.
The objective of this inspection was to promptly assess the capabilities of Robinson Unit 2 to respond to extraordinary consequences similar to those that have recently occurred at the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station. The results from this inspection, along with the results from this inspection performed at other operating commercial nuclear plants in the United States will be used to evaluate the U.S. nuclear industrys readiness to safely respond to similar events. These results will also help the NRC to determine if additional regulatory actions are warranted.
All of the potential issues and observations identified by this inspection are contained in this report. The NRCs Reactor Oversight Process will further evaluate any issues to determine if they are regulatory findings or violations. Any resulting findings or violations will be documented by the NRC in a separate report. You are not required to respond to this letter.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Randall A. Musser Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-261 License Nos. DPR-23
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000261/2011011
__ML111330081 ____ X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP SIGNATURE RAM /RA for/ JSD /RA/ Via email Via email RAM /RA/
NAME JWorosilo JDodson JHickey CScott RMusser DATE 05/13/2011 05/13/2011 05/12/2011 05/12/2011 05/13/2011 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
CP&L 2
REGION II==
Docket Nos: 50-261 License Nos: DPR-23 Report No: 05000261/2011011 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company Facility: H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2 Location: 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, SC 29550 Dates: March 23, 2011 - April 29, 2011 Inspectors: J. Hickey, Senior Resident Inspector C. Scott, Resident Inspector Approved by: R. Musser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000261/2011011, 03/23/2011 - 04/29/2011; H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2;
Temporary Instruction 2515/183 - Follow-up to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event This report covers an announced Temporary Instruction inspection. The inspection was conducted by Resident inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 4, dated December 2006.
INSPECTION SCOPE
The intent of the TI is to provide a broad overview of the industrys preparedness for events that may exceed the current design basis for a plant. The focus of the TI was on
- (1) assessing the licensees capability to mitigate consequences from large fires or explosions on site, (2)assessing the licensees capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions,
- (3) assessing the licensees capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events accounted for by the stations design, and
- (4) assessing the thoroughness of the licensees walk downs and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the potential that the equipments function could be lost during seismic events possible for the site.
If necessary, a more specific follow-up inspection will be performed at a later date.
INSPECTION RESULTS
All of the potential issues and observations identified by this inspection are contained in this report. The NRCs Reactor Oversight Process will further evaluate any issues to determine if they are regulatory findings or violations. Any resulting findings or violations will be documented by the NRC in a separate report.
03.01 Assess the licensees capability to mitigate conditions that result from beyond design basis events, typically bounded by security threats, committed to as part of NRC Security Order Section B.5.b issued February 25, 2002, and severe accident management guidelines and as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.54(hh). Use Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial), Section 02.03 and 03.03 as a guideline. If IP 71111.05T was recently performed at the facility the inspector should review the inspection results and findings to identify any other potential areas of inspection. Particular emphasis should be placed on strategies related to the spent fuel pool. The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to:
Licensee Action Describe what the licensee did to test or inspect equipment.
a. Verify through test or inspection The licensee inventoried and inspected the special tools and equipment needed to that equipment is available and implement the Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs).
functional. Active equipment Equipment which included the Engine Driven Makeup Pump (EDMP), the portable water shall be tested and passive pump, and the Temporary Skid Diesel Generator were tested satisfactorily using the normal equipment shall be walked down surveillance procedures during the performance of the walk downs.
and inspected. It is not expected that permanently installed equipment that is Describe inspector actions taken to confirm equipment readiness (e.g., observed a test, tested under an existing reviewed test results, discussed actions, reviewed records, etc.).
regulatory testing program be retested.
The inspectors reviewed completed inspection and surveillance records for the following This review should be done for a components; reasonable sample of mitigating
- EDG A and B Portable Field Flash Batteries strategies/equipment.
- Annual Inspection of the Engine Drive Pump
- Bi-Monthly Engine Drive Pump Surveillance
- Temporary Skid Diesel Generator The inspectors accompanied operations and maintenance personnel to inspect the physical condition of selected portable equipment used to mitigate B.5.b events associated with spent fuel pool cooling.
The inspectors accompanied the licensee on a verification of Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) quantities being maintained at the Darlington County Fire Stations #7 and #12.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
Discrepancies were entered into the licensees corrective action program. No discrepancy was evaluated as significant enough to impact any overall strategy. Discrepancies deemed noteworthy are listed below;
- EDMG-006, Electrical Power, implementation may require up to 8000 feet of electrical cabling. Sufficient cabling could not be located in the warehouse. Some of the required cabling had been reserved for other activities. The licensee located cabling on-site which could have been used to support the mitigating strategy.
Actions were taken to procure additional cabling and maintain the required amount in inventory. AR 453999453999was written to develop the permanent corrective actions.
Note the use of the portable generator is a strategy beyond the B.5.b requirements.
- Consumables/hardware to support EDMG implementation does not have safety stock designations to ensure that minimum supplies are maintained on site at all times. AR 454251454251was written and immediate action was taken to protect stock for EDMG-006, Electrical Power.
- Preventive maintenance checks on equipment do not have acceptance criteria associated with the performance testing, for example pump performance. AR 453557453557was written and will add performance criteria to the testing procedures.
- D Deepwell Pump testing is performed using the Non-safety related power source.
Indirect testing via continuity checks are performed on the safety related power supplies. Evaluate periodic testing using the safety-related sources, Action Request (AR) 457924.
Describe the licensees actions to verify that procedures are in place and can be executed Licensee Action (e.g. walkdowns, demonstrations, tests, etc.)
b. Verify through walkdowns or The EDMGs were walked down to validate that procedural guidance existed and was demonstration that procedures executable to implement the strategies associated with 10 CFR 50.54(hh) and B.5.b. The to implement the strategies Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines (SAMG) were walked down to the extent possible.
associated with B.5.b and 10 Actions taken per these guidelines use permanently installed equipment, systems and hard CFR 50.54(hh) are in place and piping to carry out the majority of the actions outlined. Where specific strategies were are executable. Licensees may developed that include non-permanent plant equipment, walk downs were performed to choose not to connect or ensure that the procedures could be executed as written.
operate permanently installed equipment during this Describe inspector actions and the sample strategies reviewed. Assess whether verification.
procedures were in place and could be used as intended.
This review should be done for a The inspectors accompanied operations personnel during a walkdown of several B.5.b and reasonable sample of mitigating strategies/equipment.
SAMG response procedures to evaluate the implementation strategy and procedure quality.
The procedures evaluated were;
- EDMG-000, Extreme Damage Initial Actions, Rev. 9
- EDMG-006, Electrical Power, Attachment 2, TSDG Setup and Operation, Rev. 5
- EDMG-006, Electrical Power, Attachment 7, TSDG Supply to D Deepwell Pump, Rev. 5
- EDMG-011, Spent Fuel Pool Casualty, Rev. 11
- EDMG-012, Core Cooling Using Alternate Water Source, Rev. 9
- SAM-2, Depressurize the RCS, Rev. 2
- SAM-3, Inject into the RCS, Rev. 1
- SAM-7, Reduce Containment Hydrogen, Rev. 2
- SACM-3, Control Hydrogen Flammability, Rev. 2 No discrepancies were noted in the procedures or methodology used for implementation.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
No discrepancies were noted in the procedures.
Describe the licensees actions and conclusions regarding training and qualifications of Licensee Action operators and support staff.
c. Verify the training and The licensee reviewed the qualification and training requirements of the operators and qualifications of operators and support staff. The training for B.5.b response is performed annually and SAMG training is the support staff needed to performed bi-annually. The licensee reviewed the current qualification status of the implement the procedures and operators and support staff. No qualification discrepancies were noted.
work instructions are current for activities related to Security Describe inspector actions and the sample strategies reviewed to assess training and Order Section B.5.b and severe qualifications of operators and support staff accident management guidelines as required by 10 CFR 50.54 (hh).
The inspectors reviewed the qualification records for twelve emergency response organization positions. The random sample included an Emergency Response Manager, Technical Analysis Manager, Site Emergency Coordinator, Plant Operations Director, Technical Analysis Director, Accident Assessment Team Electrical, Accident Assessment Team Mechanical, and Accident Assessment Team Reactor, Shift Manager, Reactor Operator, Inside Auxiliary Operator and Outside Auxiliary Operator. All qualification records were current for the assigned positions.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The licensee will perform a formal review of the tasks and training associated with the execution of the EDMGs using the Systematic Approach to Training (SAT). AR 453557453557
Describe the licensees actions and conclusions regarding applicable agreements and Licensee Action contracts are in place.
d. Verify that any applicable The licensee confirmed that memorandums of understanding, letters of agreement, and agreements and contracts are in contracts are in place to provide aide in combating beyond design basis events, including place and are capable of those covered under NRC Security Order B.5.b.
meeting the conditions needed to mitigate the consequences of For a sample of mitigating strategies involving contracts or agreements with offsite entities, these events.
describe inspector actions to confirm agreements and contracts are in place and current (e.g., confirm that offsite fire assistance agreement is in place and current).
This review should be done for a reasonable sample of mitigating The inspectors reviewed the letters of agreements/understanding and verified the licensee strategies/equipment.
had confirmed their contents with the various stakeholders. The inspectors did not identify any content concerns which would negatively impact a mitigation strategy.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The agreement for assistance from the Shaw Air Force Base was not approved. Based on the Air Forces Assistant Staff Judge Advocates opinion, no basis for an MOU agreement between a private entity and the Air Force is in place. However, the Air Forces Assistant Staff Judge Advocate noted that response to an event at the request of the NRC or other government agencies could be supported.
Document the corrective action report number and briefly summarize problems noted by the Licensee Action licensee that have significant potential to prevent the success of any existing mitigating strategy.
e. Review any open corrective The inspectors reviewed the following open corrective actions generated as a result of the action documents to assess licensees reviews and walkdowns; problems with mitigating
- Only having a single key to start the Temporary Skid Diesel Generator and EDMP.
strategy implementation Additional keys with multiple storage locations are being established, AR 453999453999
identified by the licensee.
- Identify the locations for the key boxes in the EDMG and EDMP procedures, AR Assess the impact of the 453557.
problem on the mitigating
- Determine the specific length of cable required for each temporary power strategy in capability and the remaining the EDMG procedures, AR 453557453557
capability that is not impacted.
- Establish pre-staged kits for making electrical connections. The material was available in the warehouse, AR 453557453557
- Evaluate the need for a float charge on the emergency diesel field flash batteries.
Currently a load test and re-charge is performed quarterly, AR 453557453557
- Loose sound insulation on the EDMG, AR 459535459535
- During the disconnecting of the main generator from the iso-phase bus in preparation for backfeed, no sample is performed to ensure hydrogen is not present, AR 459931459931
- EDMG-000, Extreme Damage Initial Actions, minimum injection flowrate graph has typographical errors on the time since shutdown axis, AR 458842458842
- EDMG equipment is stored in a non-seismic warehouse, AR 458857458857
None of the preceding identified issues would significantly impact the success of the licensees mitigation strategies.
NRC identified concerns;
- EDMG-012, Core Cooling using Alternate Water Sources, Rev. 9 specifies two 12 adjustable wrenches for use in replacing the boron Injection Tank manway with an injection flange. The number and size of the nuts may require larger and higher torque producing tools to efficiently remove them, AR 459725459725
- EDMG-011, Spent Fuel Pool Casualty, Rev. 11, provides for several alternate methods for makeup to the spent fuel pool. Some of these methods require access to the spent fuel pool operating floor or areas immediately adjacent to the spent fuel pool. There is a potential that radiation levels may not allow access to support some of the mitigation strategies, AR 459728459728
- EDMG-011, Spent Fuel Pool Casualty, Rev. 11, provided for use of a fire hose from the ground elevation to the spent fuel pool. The hose transitions from vertical to horizontal across concrete edges which could cause the hose to fail over time, AR 459732459732
- The post accident containment vent, path downstream of the Post Accident Containment Vent Filters is not hardened and may be vulnerable to failure as a result of hydrogen ignition. Procedures are currently in place to manage the combustibility of hydrogen via the addition of nitrogen to the containment, AR 459733459733
The inspectors have concluded the existing strategies are presently sufficient. The licensee intends to correct deficiencies and non-conformances by June 30, 2011 unless the items require an outage, in which case, the items will be corrected during the next refueling outage, currently scheduled for January 2012.
03.02 Assess the licensees capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions, as required by 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Current Power, and station design, is functional and valid. Refer to TI 2515/120, Inspection of Implementation of Station Blackout Rule Multi-Plant Action Item A-22 as a guideline. It is not intended that TI 2515/120 be completely reinspected. The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to:
Describe the licensees actions to verify the adequacy of equipment needed to mitigate an Licensee Action SBO event.
a. Verify through walkdowns and The licensee reviewed the design basis for a SBO at Robinson Unit-2. Robinson Unit-2 is inspection that all required an Alternate AC (AAC) plant which utilizes a Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator (non-materials are adequate and safety equipment) and supported systems upon a loss of all AC power. The licensee properly staged, tested, and walked down the pre-staged equipment to support a SBO event on March 17, 2011. All maintained.
equipment was in place and ready for use. The equipment testing frequency varies from monthly for the Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator (DSDG) to annual hydrostatic testing of hoses. Inventories of the required equipment are performed monthly or quarterly and the condition of the equipment is verified to be ready for use.
Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees actions and independently walked down the DSDG and support equipment to verify no material conditions were present that would impact the availability of the DSDG.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The review did not identify any issues which would impact the success of the licensees mitigation strategies.
Licensee Action Describe the licensees actions to verify the capability to mitigate an SBO event.
b. Demonstrate through The licensee walkdowns included the SBO coping procedures; walkdowns that procedures for
- EPP-22, Energizing Plant Equipment Using Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator, executable.
Rev. 25 Describe inspector actions to assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.
The inspectors independently verified by walkdowns portions of EPP-1, Loss of all AC Power, Rev. 43 and EPP-22, Energizing Plant Equipment Using Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator, Rev. 25 to confirm the procedure could be used to implement the planned strategy.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The inspectors reviewed 3 open action requests generated as a result of the licensees reviews and walkdowns, the issues included items such as the following;
- Pre-staging of required materials such as screwdrivers or jumpers should be considered, AR 453557453557
- Labeling discrepancies, AR 453557453557
- Add door blocking devices to the pre-staged equipment for use when installing control room ventilation equipment, AR 453557453557None of the identified issues would significantly impact the success of the licensees mitigation strategies.
03.03 Assess the licensees capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events required by station design. Refer to IP 71111.01, Adverse Weather Protection, Section 02.04, Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding as a guideline. The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to verify through walkdowns and inspections that all required materials and equipment are adequate and properly staged. These walkdowns and inspections shall include verification that accessible doors, barriers, and penetration seals are functional.
Describe the licensees actions to verify the capability to mitigate existing design basis Licensee Action flooding events.
a. Verify through walkdowns and The licensee reviewed the following basis documents; inspection that all required
- GID/R87038/0006, Pipe Failures, Rev.5 materials are adequate and
- GID/R87038/0007, Hazards Analysis, Rev.5 properly staged, tested, and
Containment, Dated December 21, 1973
- NO-80-896, CP&L Response to NRC, Fire Protection Program, Dated June 12, 1980
- SOER 85-05, Internal Flooding of Power Plant Buildings, including CP&L response, dated December 30, 1985
- RNP-M/MECH-1622, LOCA Containment Flood Depth, Rev.0
- UFSAR, Sections 2.4, 3.6 and 9.5
- ISAR, Section 2.4
- RNP-F-PSA-0009: Assessment of Internally Initiated Flood Events, Rev. 1
- Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) Submittal, Final Report, CP&L, June 1995 The licensee reviewed mitigating procedures and performed walkdowns of the floor drains in the Auxiliary Building, and storm drains in the Protected Areas. The licensee also inspected doors which would be used to mitigate flooding to ensure they were capable to perform their function.
Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable. Assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.
The inspectors accompanied operations staff on a walkdown and inspection of multiple floor drains in the Reactor Auxiliary Building. The walkdown was performed using drawing G-190495, Reactor Auxiliary Building Ground and Mezzanine Floor Plans and Drainage, Rev 12 and G-190238, Fuel Handling Floor and Equipment Drainage and Embedded Piping, Rev 14. The inspector noted that there were several drains that appear to have been partially obstructed. The licensee has flagged several drains that need additional attention and cleaning. During the walkdown, the operations staff found numerous instances where the drawing showed a floor drain existing in a specified location; however no drain could be seen in the indicated area. The discrepancies were captured in AR 457673457673and 457959.
The licensee placed the floor drain discrepancies on the emergent work list and corrected them.
The inspectors accompanied engineering staff on a walkdown and inspection of multiple storm drains in the Protected Area. The walkdown was performed using drawing HBR2-11739, Storm Drain Locations, Rev. 3. The inspectors noted several storm drains with sediment accumulation obstructing between 10% and 50% of the drain lines available surface area. During the walkdown engineering staff found several instances of drain location and identification differences between the drawing and the actual field locations. In addition, two sea-land containers were placed over storm drains and could not be inspected. The inspectors noted there is no preventive maintenance performed on the storm drain system such as periodic inspection or cleaning. The discrepancies were captured in AR 457685457685 The licensee placed the storm drain discrepancies on the emergent work list and corrected them.
The inspectors performed a walkdown of the Auxiliary Building to verify that the accessible doors and barriers were functional. The inspector verified that all the proper equipment used to mitigate an internal flood was adequate and properly staged in the Auxiliary Building. The inspector reviewed AOP-022, Loss of Service Water, Attachment 4: Flood Control in Auxiliary Building and observed licensed operators test the adequacy of staged equipment.
The inspectors observations were that the internal flood mitigation strategy in the Auxiliary Building was sufficient.
Due to the site topography, external flooding scenarios do not apply.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The inspectors reviewed 5 open corrective actions generated as a result of the licensees reviews and walkdowns, the issues included items such as the following;
- Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Sump Pump Preventive Maintenance is on a 10-year frequency. Evaluate the frequency, AR 453557453557
- Storm drains partially obstructed with sediment, AR 457685457685
- Auxiliary Building floor drains partially obstructed , AR 457959457959* Review preventive maintenance for floor and storm drains, AR 457685457685 457959.
Because of the specific site topography and minimal below grade components, none of the issues identified in this section would significantly impact the success of the licensees flood mitigation strategies.
03.04 Assess the thoroughness of the licensees walkdowns and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the potential that the equipments function could be lost during seismic events possible for the site. Assess the licensees development of any new mitigating strategies for identified vulnerabilities (e.g., entered it in to the corrective action program and any immediate actions taken). As a minimum, the licensee should have performed walkdowns and inspections of important equipment (permanent and temporary) such as storage tanks, plant water intake structures, and fire and flood response equipment; and developed mitigating strategies to cope with the loss of that important function. Use IP 71111.21, Component Design Basis Inspection, Appendix 3, Component Walkdown Considerations, as a guideline to assess the thoroughness of the licensees walkdowns and inspections.
Describe the licensees actions to assess the potential impact of seismic events on the Licensee Action availability of equipment used in fire and flooding mitigation strategies.
a. Verify through walkdowns that The licensee identified the components used to mitigate fire and flood events using plant all required materials are drawings, design basis documents and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The adequate and properly staged, licensee performed walkdowns of the fire and flood mitigating systems in the Auxiliary tested, and maintained.
Building, Turbine Building, Intake Structure, Major Fire System Sectionalizing Valves, the Motor Driven Fire Pump (MDFP), the Engine Driven Fire Pump (EDFP), the diesel fuel tank for the EDFP, fire hydrants, fire hose stations, Cardox and Halon suppression systems, and fire brigade bunker gear and equipment. The licensee noted the fire protection system is non-seismic and this vulnerability is beyond the design basis for the plant. Potential mitigation strategies will be included in the scope of the Utility Industry Executive Advisory Group (EAG).
Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable. Assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.
The inspectors accompanied engineering staff on a walkdown and inspection of fire protection piping and components in the Auxiliary Building, Intake Structure and Owner Controlled Areas. The walkdown was performed using drawing HBR2-8255, Fire System Piping, Rev. 20. The inspectors noted several examples minor material condition issues related to coating degradation of components exposed to the elements. The licensee captured these issues and entered them into the corrective action program as work requests or condition reports. No new vulnerabilities were identified by the licensee as a result of the walkdown.
The inspectors reviewed AOP-041, Response to a Fire Event, Rev. 4. No discrepancies were identified which would impact the success of the licensees mitigation strategies.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee. Briefly summarize any new mitigating strategies identified by the licensee as a result of their reviews.
The inspectors reviewed 5 open corrective actions generated as a result of the licensees reviews and walkdowns, the issues included items such as the following;
- Fire piping deficiencies, one support missing U-bolt, one support not in full contact with wall, AR 458834458834* Rust stains visible on concrete below fire piping, inspect pipe condition, WR 480296
- Post Indicating Valves require painting, WR 480300
- The warehouse where the B.5.b equipment is stored is non-seismic, AR 458857458857None of the issues identified in this section would significantly impact the success of the licensees mitigation strategies. The licensee is awaiting the recommendations of the EAG working group for a response to identified generic vulnerabilities.
Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Duncan and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 12, 2011. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- A. Acharya, Civil, Senior Engineer
- J. Cole, Manager, Shift Operations
- T. Cosgrove, Plant General Manager
- R. Duncan, Vice President
- D. Foster, Superintendent, Work Control Center
- A. Jones, Supervisor, Mechanical/Civil Design
- J. Pennington, Operations, SRO
- W. Stewart, Civil, Lead Engineer
NRC personnel
- R. Musser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II