IR 05000266/2013010
| ML13340A790 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 12/06/2013 |
| From: | Daley R C Engineering Branch 3 |
| To: | Meyer L Point Beach |
| Dariusz Szwarc | |
| References | |
| IR-13-010 | |
| Download: ML13340A790 (20) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210 LISLE, IL 60532-4352 December 6, 2013
Mr. Larry Meyer Site Vice President NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC 6610 Nuclear Road Two Rivers, WI 54241
SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
, TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000 266/20 1 3010; 05000 301/20 1 3010
Dear Mr. Meyer:
On November 25, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulato ry Commission (NRC) completed a Triennial Fire Protection Inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on November 8, 2013, with Mr. E. McCartney, and on November 25, 2013, with Mr. B. Woyak and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
However, inspectors documented a licensee
-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in Section 4OA7 of this report.
The NRC is treating this violation as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the subject or severity of any N on-Cited Violation you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555
-0001; with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532
-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washing ton, DC 20555
-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector office at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
. In accordance with Title 10 , Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Section 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/ Robert C. Daley, Chie f Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.
50-266; 50-301 License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000 266/20 1 3010; 05000 301/20 1 3010 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl:
Distribution via ListServ
Ž Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket No s: 50-266; 50-301 License No s: DPR-24; DPR-27 Report No:
05000 266/20 1 3010; 05000 301/20 1 3010 Licensee: NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Two Rivers, WI Dates: October 21 through November 25, 2013 Inspectors:
D. Szwarc, Senior Reactor Inspector, Lead M. Munir, Reactor Inspector D. Oliver, Reactor Inspector R. Winter, Reactor Inspector Approved by:
Robert C. Daley, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety 1 Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000 266/20 1 3010, 05000 301/20 1 3010; 10/21/2013 - 11/25/2013
- Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
- Routine Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection.
This report covers an announced Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III inspectors.
The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy dated June 7, 2012.
The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG
-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
A. N RC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings No findings were identified.
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program. This violation and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstone s: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems
1R05 Fire Protection
The licensee was in transition to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 , "Performance
-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition," as incorporated by 10 CFR 50.48(c). The NFPA 805 standard establishes a comprehensive set of requirements for Fire Protection Program s at nuclear power plants. The standard incorporates both deterministic and risk
-informed, performance
-based concepts. The deterministic aspects of the standard are comparable to traditional requirements. However, the transition to a risk
-informed, performance
-based Fire Protection Program requires an in
-depth nuclear safety circuit analysis for equipment identified for nuclear safety functions such as safe shutdown. Because the conversion and licensing process to NFPA 805 was expected to identify and address a variety of issues that were normally the subject of the Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) modified the Enforcement Policy for licensees in transition to NFPA 805. As part of the transition to NFPA 805, certain findings not associated with finding s of high-safety significance that meet the four criteria established by Section A of the NRC's Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48)receive enforcement discretion in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.
The purpose of the fire protection triennial baseline inspection was to conduct a design-based, plant specific, risk
-informed, onsite inspection of the licensee's Fire Protection Program's defense-in-depth elements used to mitigate the consequences of a fire. The Fire Protection Program shall extend the concept of defense
-in-depth to fire protection in plant areas important to safety by
- preventing fires from starting; rapidly detecting, controlling and extinguishing fires that do occur; providing protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor plant; and taking reasonable actions to mitigate postulated events that could potentially cause loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires.
Th e inspectors' evaluation focuse d on the design, operational status, and material condition of the reactor plant
's Fire Protection Program , post-fire safe shutdown systems, and B.5.b mitigating strategies. The objectives of the inspecti on were to assess whether the licensee ha d implemented a Fire Protection Program that:
- (1) provided adequate controls for combustibles and ignition sources inside the plant;
- (2) provide d adequate fire detection and suppression capability; (3)maintain ed passive fire protection features in good material condition; (4)established adequate compensatory measures for out
-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems or features; (5)ensure d that procedures, equipment, fire barriers 2 Enclosure and systems exist so that the post
-fire capability to safely shut down the plant wa s ensured;
- (6) included feasible and reliable operator manual actions when appropriate to achieve safe shutdown; and
- (7) identifie d fire protection issues at an appropriate threshold and ensure d these issues were entered into the licensee's problem identification and resolution program.
In addition, the inspectors' review and assessment focused on the licensee's post
-fire safe shutdown systems for selected risk significant fire areas. Inspector emphasis was placed on determining that the post
-fire safe shutdown capability and the fire protection features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post
-fire safe shutdown success path was available. The inspectors' review and assessment also focused on the licensee's B.5.b related license conditions and the requirements of Title 10 , Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.54 (hh)(2). Inspector emphasis was to ensure that the licensee could maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities utilizing the B.5.b mitigating strategies following a loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
The fire areas and fire zones and B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below and in Section 1R05.13. The fire areas and fire zones selected constitute d four inspection samples and the B.5.b mitigating strategies selected constitute d t wo inspection samples, respectively, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05T. Fire Area Fire Zone Description A23N 304N Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room North A30 318 Cable Spreading Room A33 337 Control Building Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Room A71 308 Diesel Generator Room
.2 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a. Inspection Scope
For each of the selected fire areas, the inspectors reviewed the fire hazards analysis, safe shutdown analysis, and supporting drawings and documentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the Fire Protection Program and/or post
-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
3 Enclosure
.3 Passive Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire rated electrical cables. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The inspectors reviewed approved construction details and supporting fire tests. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards to verify that fire protection features met license commitments.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area. The inspectors reviewed the installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the fill material was of the appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Active Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The inspectors reviewed design documents and supporting calculations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license basis documentation, such as, NRC safety evaluation reports, deviations from NRC regulations, and NFPA standards to verify that fire suppression and detection systems met license commitments.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of each of the selected fire areas to assess conditions such as the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.
4 Enclosure
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.6 Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's systems required to achieve alternative safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The inspectors also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.
The inspectors conducted selected area walkdowns to determine if operators could reasonably be expected to perform the alternate safe shutdown procedure actions and that equipment labeling was consistent with the alternate safe shutdown procedure. The review also looked at operator training as well as consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and any associated administrative controls
.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified
.7 Circuit Analyses
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors did not review the licensee's post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) analysis because the licensee was in transition to NFPA 805.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.8 Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed, on a sample basis, the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties.
The inspectors verified that plant telephones, page systems, sound powered phones, and radios were available for use and maintained in working order.
The inspectors reviewed the electrical power supplies and cable routing for these systems to verify that either the telephones or the radios would remain functional following a fire.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
5 Enclosure
.9 Emergency Lighting
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a plant walkdown of selected areas in which a sample of operator actions would be performed in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions. As part of the walkdowns, the inspectors focused on the existence of sufficient emergency lighting for access and egress to areas and for performing necessary equipment operations. The locations and positioning of the emergency lights were observed during the walkdown and during review of manual actions implemented for the selected fire areas.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.10 Cold Shutdown Repair
s
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and material to accomplish those repairs were available onsite. The inspectors also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the licensee's procedures and repair methods. The inspectors also verified that equipment necessary to perform cold shutdown repairs was available onsite and properly staged.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.11 Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review to verify that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection and post
-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems, and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The inspectors also conducted a review of the adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions were taken.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
6 Enclosure
.12 Review and Documentation of Fire Protection Program
Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed changes to the approved Fire Protection Program to verify that the changes did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the Fire Protection Program and/or post
-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.13 Control of Transient Combustibles and Ignition Sources
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the fire hazards analysis. A sample of hot work and transient combustible control permits were also reviewed.
The inspectors performed plant walkdowns to verify that transient combustibles and ignition sources were being implemented in accordance with the administrative controls.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.14 B.5.b Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparedness to handle large fires or explosions by reviewing selected mitigating strategies. This review ensured that the licensee continued to meet the requirements of their B.5.b related license conditions and 1 0 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) by determining that:
Procedures were being maintained and adequate
- Equipment was properly staged
, maintained, and tested
- Station personnel were knowledgeable and could implement the procedures; and Additionally, inspectors review ed the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b related equipment.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's B.5.b related license conditions and evaluated selected mitigating strategies to ensure they remain feasible in light of operator training, maintenance/testing of necessary equipment and any plant modifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed previous inspection reports for commitments made by the 7 Enclosure licensee to correct deficiencies identified during performance of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/171 or subsequent performances of these inspections.
The B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below. The offsite and onsite communications, notifications/emergency response organization activation, initial operational response actions and damage assessment activities identified in Table A.3 1 of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 06
-12, "B.5.b Phase II and III Submittal Guidance," Revision 2 are evaluated each time due to the mitigation strategies' scenario selected.
NEI 06-12, Revision 2 , Section Licensee Strategy (Table)
Selected for Review 3.2.2 Off-site and On
-site Communications (Table A.3
-1) Evaluated 3.2.3 Notification/Emergency Response Organization Activation (Table A.3
-1) Evaluated 3.2.4 Initial Operation Response Actions (Table A.3-1) Evaluated 3.2.5 Initial Damage Assessment (Table A.3
-1) Evaluated 3.3.3 Manual Operation of Turbine
-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Table A.4
-3) Selected 3.3.6 Containment Flooding with Portable Pump (Table A.4
-6) Selected
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution
of Problems (71152)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program procedures and samples of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the Fire Protection Program at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the Corrective Action Program.
The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, design packages, and fire protection system non
-conformance documents.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting Summary
On November 25, 2013, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Seizer , and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues 8 Enclosure presented. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
On November 8, 2013, the inspectors presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. E. McCartney, and other members of the licensee staff.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as an NCV.
The licensee identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1.h for the failure to control transient combustible material in accordance with the Fire Protection Program requirements. Technical Specification Section 5.4.1.h for Units 1 and 2 required that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained, covering activities related to Fire Protection Program implementation. Nuclear Procedure (NP) 1.9.9, "Transient Combustible Control," Revision 23, Section 2.10 stated, in part, that no transient combustible material be allowed in combustible exclusion zones without specific evaluation and the approval of the fire protection engineer. Contrary to the above, on September 17, 2013, the licensee failed to implement the guidelines specified in Procedure NP 1.9.9 and identified two instances where transient combustibles were located in combustion exclusion zones. The licensee entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program as Action Request (AR)
AR01904510 and removed the transient combustible materials
. The finding was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire)and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during plant operations
. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the Significance Determination Process (SDP) in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings," dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix F, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Worksheet," dated September 20, 2013. This finding screened to a Phase II analysis in accordance with SDP Phase I based on review of the "Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls" Section of IMC 0609. Using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Attachment 2, "Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements," dated February 28, 2005, the inspectors determined that the finding resulted in a low degradation from the combustible controls program and screened the finding as having very low safety significance (Green).
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Attachment
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTAC
T Licensee
- E. McCartney, Site Director
- R. Wright, Plant General Manager
- J. Fischer, Fire Protection Engineer
- K. Locke, Licensing Engineering Analyst
- R. Mrozinsky, Appendix R Engineer
- E. Schmidt, Engineering Supervisor
- T. Schneider, License Engineering
- R. Seize r t, Licensing Supervisor
- B. Woyak, Engineering Manager
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- D. Betancourt, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
- B. Bartlett, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
- K. Barclay, Resident Inspector
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSS
ED Opened, Closed, and Discussed None.
Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
CALCULATIONS
Number Description or Title
Date or Revision
2004-004 MAAP4 Analysis for Appendix R Timing of Restoration of AFW
and Charging Flow
January 20, 2005
2005-0054 Control Building Gothic Temperature Calculation
95-0094 Acceptance Criteria for TS
-74, Annual Underground Fire Main Flow Test
June 26, 1995
FPTE 015 Technical Evaluation of Acceptance Testing For The Cable Spreading Room, Vital Switchgear Room And Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Halon System
COMPLETED SURVEILLANCES
Number Description or Title
Date or Revision
RMP 9384-1 Appendix R Emergency Lighting Testing and Maintenance
August 15, 2013
2007 Discharge Test Concentration Log
- Cable Spreading, Vital Electric Switchgear, and Auxiliary Feedwater Rooms
September 20, 1984
0-PT-FP-004 Annual Fire Pump Capacity Test
July 26, 2013
TS-78 Semiannual Halon 1301 Fire Suppression Surveillance Test
March 15, 2013
TS-78 Semiannual Halon 1301 Fire Suppression Surveillance Test
September 24, 2013
RMP 9057 Fire Barrier Penetration Fire Seal Surveillance
August 11, 2011
RMP 9057 Fire Barrier Penetration Fire Seal Surveillance
February 27, 2013
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING INSPECTION
Number Description or Title
Date or Revision
1914362 FEP 4.16 - Control Room/Cable Spreading Room/Computer Room
October 22, 2013
1914696 Drawing PBC
-219 Sheet 27 Shows Inaccurate W12 Switch Location
October 23, 2013
Attachment
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING INSPECTION
Number Description or Title
Date or Revision
1914764 NRC Triennial
- B.5.b Flowchart Concerns
October 23, 2013
1914872 EDMG-2 - Loss of Large Areas of the Plant Due to Fire or Explosions
October 24, 2013
1915145 NRC Triennial-Unsecured Items in Non Vital Switchgear Room
October 24, 2013
1915268 NRC Triennial
- Timeliness of Corrective Actions October 25, 2013
1917802 EDMG-2 Att. F TD AFW Pump Local Operation Procedure Flowpath
November 5, 2013
1917813 NRC Triennial
- AOP 10A Operation of TDAFP November 5, 2013
1918130 NRC Triennial
- Transient Combustibles Identified Near ADVs
November 5, 2013
1918133 Triennial Fire Protection
- Missing Appendix R Label
November 5, 2013
1918141 NRC Triennial
- Cable Identification for Appendix R Equipment
November 5, 2013
1918487 NRC Triennial
- Discussion of NFPA 805 Comp Measures
November 6, 2013
1918804 NRC Triennial
- AOP 10A Guidance Improvement
November 7, 2013
1919120 RMP 9057 - Fire Barrier Penetration Seal
Surveillance
November 8, 2013
1919180 Triennial Fire Protection
- Unresolved Item
November 8, 2013
21659 NRC Triennial
- Error Identified in NFPA 805 Report
November 19, 2013
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Number Description or Title
Date or Revision
23 2 138 Comments on 125 V DC Vendor Calc.'s After Owner's Review
August 12, 200
1263584 Radios May Not Function Properly for Appendix R Fire
November 5, 2004
290079 Treatment of Safe Shutdown Manual Actions During NFPA 805 Transition
March 14, 2006
23111 NFPA 13 Issues with G
-01 and G-02 Room Sprinklers
July 12, 2007
1339552 Calculation 2001
-0049 Identified Issues with Fire Pump Power Supply
March 21, 2008
1345411 Appendix R Common Enclosure Concern
June 16, 2013
1356884 B.5.b Fire Drills
December 17, 2008
1400837 Changes to OM 3.27 Rev
for EC 13407
November 30, 2010
21315 OM 3.27 - EC 259831 & 259835 EPU Procedure Revisions per EC 259831 and February 18, 2011
Attachment
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Number Description or Title
Date or Revision
23991 Degraded Fire Seal Between PAB and AFP Room February 25, 2011
1636540 IER1 11-1 Vulnerability: Inadequate B.5.b Pump April 1, 2011
1638260 OI-40 - Fire Detection System Reset Instruction for Alarms
April 6, 2011
1669330 Japan Earthquake EDMG
-2 B.5.b Pump Prolonged Use with No AC
July 14, 2011 1669678 NRC URI - Loss of Diesel
-Driven Fire Pump Suction During Test
July 15, 2011
1672387 Less Than Timely Training Review Committee Actions
July 26, 2011
1678233 Appendix R Concern Identified During Review of CDBI Question
August 16, 2011
1713472 Computer RM Smoke Detectors Not Installed Per NFPA Standards
December 7, 2011
1713509 Fire Detection Procedures Do Not Meet NFPA Standards
December 7, 2011
1713517 Control Room Smoke Detector Coverage May Not Meet NFPA
December 7, 2011
25575 Fire Detection Modification is Still Not Fully Implemented
January 18, 2012
1787922 AFW Modification Has Not Finished Fire Protection Program
Document Revisions
July 26, 2012
1805552 There Seems To Be a Lack of Respect for Fire Detection at PB
September 21, 2012 1844088 WO to Repair Fire Detection Panel Pushed Out Another Year
January 31, 2013
1848619 WO to Repair D
-405 Pushed Out 6 Months
February 15, 2013
1854599 D-416 Delay In Alarm Function
March 7, 2013
1858707 NRC IN 2013
-02 Issues Potentially Affecting Fire Safety
March 21, 2013
1875052 NFPA-805 Electrical Review "Short Time Pick-up" Concerns
May 16, 2013
1879465 Cable Running Through Combustible Exclusion Zone
June 5, 2013
1904510 Inadequate Control of Transient Combustibles
September 17, 2013 DRAWINGS Number Description or Title
Date or Revision
6118 E-1 Single Line Diagram Station Connections
6118 E-6 Sh. 1 Single Line Diagram 125V DC Distribution
Attachment
DRAWINGS Number Description or Title
Date or Revision
System 6118 E-6 Sh. 2 Single Line Diagram 125V DC Distribution System 19 6118 E-6 Sh. 3 Single Line Diagram 125V DC Distribution System 4 6118 E-98 Sh. 50D
Panel Schedule 125V DC Panel D
-28 (D-40) 12 PBC-218, Sh. 2
Fire Protection for Turbine Building Aux Building and Containment Elev. 8'
-0" 23 MFPL 00001010 Fire emergency Procedure 4.12 Turbine & Aux Building Elev 8'0"
MFPL 000015111
Fire Barrier Locations Turbine Building, Aux Building
and Containment Elev 8'0"
MFPL 000015225
Fire Protection Turbine Building, Aux Building and Containment Elev 8'0 23 MFPL 000015312
Fire Protection Turbine Building, Aux Building and Containment Elev 26'0"
MFPL 000015410
Fire Protection Turbine Building, Aux Building and Containment Elev 44'0"
MFPL 000015606
Fire Protection Turbine Building
and Containment Elev 66'0"
MFPK 00000123
P&ID Fire Protection Water Unit 2
MFPK 00000502
P&ID Halon Fire Protection System
MFPK 00000736
P&ID Fire Protec./Sprinkler Sys Unit 1
EFPL 00001103
Electrical Layout Fire Detection Control Bldg EL 60'0"
EFPL 00001405
Electrical Layout Fire Detection Control Bldg EL 26'0"
E147 01800103
Electrical Layout Fire Detection Control Bldg EL 8'0"
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
Number Description or Title
Date or Revision
MR 00-063 Install New 900 MHZ Radio System May 22, 2002
IWP 00-63 Work Order Plan Point to Point Testing for Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis
June 26, 2001
PC 6 Part 1
Monthly Operations Inventory Report
October 24, 2013
PROCEDURES
Number Description or Title
Date or Revision
0-PT-FP-013 Quarterly Operations B.5.b Fire Equipment Inventory Report
- Local Control
Attachment
PROCEDURES
Number Description or Title
Date or Revision
AOP-30 Temporary Ventilation for Vital Areas
CS-13 ERO Notification
EDMG-2 Loss of Large Areas of the Plant Due to Fire or Explosion
EPIP 2.1 Notifications
- ERO, State and Counties, and NRC 47 FEP-4.0 Fire Emergency Plan
FEP-4.12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump And Vital Switchgear Area
FEP-4.13 Emergency Diesel Generator (G01/G02) And Compressor Rooms
FEP-4.16 Control Room/Cable
Spreading Room/Computer Room
FOP 1.2 Potential Fire Affected Safe Shutdown Components
FPTE 007 Technical Evaluation of PBNP Point
-to- Point Portable Radio Communications for an Appendix R Fire
MA-AA-100-1008 Station Housekeeping And Material Control 5 NP 1.9.13 Ignition Control Procedure
NP 1.9.9 Transient Combustible Control
OI-40 Fire Detection System Reset Instructions for Alarms and Detectors
OI-62B Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System (P-29) 27 OM 3.27 Control of Fire Protection & Appendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment
RMP 262 Emergency Replacement of Power Supply Cables to RHR and CCW Pump Motors
RMP 9006-4 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor Emergency Replacement
RMP 9376-12 Emergency Power for Containment MOVs
WORK ORDERS
Number Description or Title
Date or Revision
40100443 01
EL-LTG11, 2 Year Test of Emergency Light Batteries Group
II February 10, 2012
40141461 01
EL-LTGIV, 2 Year Test of Emergency Light Batteries
May 12, 2013
40160612 01
EL-LTG III, 2
Year Test of Emergency Light Batteries
February 6, 2013
40067174 01
P-011A/B-M SPR, Inspect Spare CCW Motor (Warehouse No. 3) February 8, 2011
Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS USE
D AC Alternating Current
ADAMS Agencywide Document Access Management System
ADV Atmospheric Dump Valve
AFP Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
AOP Abnormal Operating Procedure
AR Action Request
CCW Component Cooling Water
CDBI Component Design Basis Inspection
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
DC Direct Current
EC Engineering Change ED M G Extensive Damage Mitigation Guideline
EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures
EPU Extended Power Uprate
ERO Emergency Response Organization
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
IN Information Notice
IR Inspection Report
MHz Megahertz MOV Motor-Operated Valve
NCV Non-Cited Violation
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OM Operations Manual
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Drawing
PAB Primary Auxiliary Building
PARS Publicly Available Records
PBNP Point Beach Nuclear Plant
SSD Safe Shutdown
TCCF Transient Combustible Control Form
TDAFW Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
WO Work Orde
- L. Meyer -2- In accordance with Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR), Section 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
-rm/adams.html
(the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely, /RA/
Robert
- C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50
-266; 50-301 License Nos. DPR
-24; DPR-27 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000266/2013010; and 05000301/2013010
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