IR 05000266/2013010
| ML13340A790 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 12/06/2013 |
| From: | Robert Daley Engineering Branch 3 |
| To: | Meyer L Point Beach |
| Dariusz Szwarc | |
| References | |
| IR-13-010 | |
| Download: ML13340A790 (20) | |
Text
mber 6, 2013
SUBJECT:
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2, TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2013010; 05000301/2013010
Dear Mr. Meyer:
On November 25, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Triennial Fire Protection Inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on November 8, 2013, with Mr. E. McCartney, and on November 25, 2013, with Mr. B. Woyak and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
However, inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in Section 4OA7 of this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the subject or severity of any Non-Cited Violation you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector office at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. In accordance with Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Section 2.390 of the NRC's
"Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Robert C. Daley, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000266/2013010; 05000301/2013010 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION III==
Docket Nos: 50-266; 50-301 License Nos: DPR-24; DPR-27 Report No: 05000266/2013010; 05000301/2013010 Licensee: NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Two Rivers, WI Dates: October 21 through November 25, 2013 Inspectors: D. Szwarc, Senior Reactor Inspector, Lead M. Munir, Reactor Inspector D. Oliver, Reactor Inspector R. Winter, Reactor Inspector Approved by: Robert C. Daley, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000266/2013010, 05000301/2013010; 10/21/2013 - 11/25/2013; Point Beach Nuclear
Plant, Units 1 and 2; Routine Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection.
This report covers an announced Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III inspectors. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated June 7, 2012. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified
and Self-Revealed Findings No findings were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program. This violation and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems
1R05 Fire Protection
The licensee was in transition to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition, as incorporated by 10 CFR 50.48(c). The NFPA 805 standard establishes a comprehensive set of requirements for Fire Protection Programs at nuclear power plants. The standard incorporates both deterministic and risk-informed, performance-based concepts. The deterministic aspects of the standard are comparable to traditional requirements. However, the transition to a risk-informed, performance-based Fire Protection Program requires an in-depth nuclear safety circuit analysis for equipment identified for nuclear safety functions such as safe shutdown.
Because the conversion and licensing process to NFPA 805 was expected to identify and address a variety of issues that were normally the subject of the Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) modified the Enforcement Policy for licensees in transition to NFPA 805. As part of the transition to NFPA 805, certain findings not associated with findings of high-safety significance that meet the four criteria established by Section A of the NRC's Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48)receive enforcement discretion in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.
The purpose of the fire protection triennial baseline inspection was to conduct a design-based, plant specific, risk-informed, onsite inspection of the licensees Fire Protection Programs defense-in-depth elements used to mitigate the consequences of a fire. The Fire Protection Program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in plant areas important to safety by:
- preventing fires from starting;
- rapidly detecting, controlling and extinguishing fires that do occur;
- providing protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor plant; and
- taking reasonable actions to mitigate postulated events that could potentially cause loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires.
The inspectors evaluation focused on the design, operational status, and material condition of the reactor plants Fire Protection Program, post-fire safe shutdown systems, and B.5.b mitigating strategies. The objectives of the inspection were to assess whether the licensee had implemented a Fire Protection Program that:
- (1) provided adequate controls for combustibles and ignition sources inside the plant;
- (2) provided adequate fire detection and suppression capability;
- (3) maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition;
- (4) established adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems or features;
- (5) ensured that procedures, equipment, fire barriers and systems exist so that the post-fire capability to safely shut down the plant was ensured;
- (6) included feasible and reliable operator manual actions when appropriate to achieve safe shutdown; and
- (7) identified fire protection issues at an appropriate threshold and ensured these issues were entered into the licensees problem identification and resolution program.
In addition, the inspectors review and assessment focused on the licensees post-fire safe shutdown systems for selected risk significant fire areas. Inspector emphasis was placed on determining that the post-fire safe shutdown capability and the fire protection features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available. The inspectors review and assessment also focused on the licensees B.5.b related license conditions and the requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.54 (hh)(2). Inspector emphasis was to ensure that the licensee could maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities utilizing the B.5.b mitigating strategies following a loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
The fire areas and fire zones and B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below and in Section 1R05.13. The fire areas and fire zones selected constituted four inspection samples and the B.5.b mitigating strategies selected constituted two inspection samples, respectively, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05T.
Fire Area Fire Zone Description A23N 304N Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room North A30 318 Cable Spreading Room Control Building Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning A33 337 (HVAC) Room A71 308 Diesel Generator Room
.2 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a. Inspection Scope
For each of the selected fire areas, the inspectors reviewed the fire hazards analysis, safe shutdown analysis, and supporting drawings and documentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the Fire Protection Program and/or post-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Passive Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire rated electrical cables. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The inspectors reviewed approved construction details and supporting fire tests. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards to verify that fire protection features met license commitments.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area.
The inspectors reviewed the installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the fill material was of the appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Active Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The inspectors reviewed design documents and supporting calculations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license basis documentation, such as, NRC safety evaluation reports, deviations from NRC regulations, and NFPA standards to verify that fire suppression and detection systems met license commitments.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of each of the selected fire areas to assess conditions such as the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.6 Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees systems required to achieve alternative safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The inspectors also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.
The inspectors conducted selected area walkdowns to determine if operators could reasonably be expected to perform the alternate safe shutdown procedure actions and that equipment labeling was consistent with the alternate safe shutdown procedure. The review also looked at operator training as well as consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and any associated administrative controls.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified
.7 Circuit Analyses
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors did not review the licensees post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) analysis because the licensee was in transition to NFPA 805.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.8 Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed, on a sample basis, the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties. The inspectors verified that plant telephones, page systems, sound powered phones, and radios were available for use and maintained in working order.
The inspectors reviewed the electrical power supplies and cable routing for these systems to verify that either the telephones or the radios would remain functional following a fire.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.9 Emergency Lighting
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a plant walkdown of selected areas in which a sample of operator actions would be performed in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions. As part of the walkdowns, the inspectors focused on the existence of sufficient emergency lighting for access and egress to areas and for performing necessary equipment operations. The locations and positioning of the emergency lights were observed during the walkdown and during review of manual actions implemented for the selected fire areas.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.10 Cold Shutdown Repairs
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and material to accomplish those repairs were available onsite. The inspectors also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the licensee's procedures and repair methods. The inspectors also verified that equipment necessary to perform cold shutdown repairs was available onsite and properly staged.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.11 Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review to verify that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems, and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The inspectors also conducted a review of the adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions were taken.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.12 Review and Documentation of Fire Protection Program Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed changes to the approved Fire Protection Program to verify that the changes did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the Fire Protection Program and/or post-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.13 Control of Transient Combustibles and Ignition Sources
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the fire hazards analysis. A sample of hot work and transient combustible control permits were also reviewed. The inspectors performed plant walkdowns to verify that transient combustibles and ignition sources were being implemented in accordance with the administrative controls.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.14 B.5.b Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparedness to handle large fires or explosions by reviewing selected mitigating strategies. This review ensured that the licensee continued to meet the requirements of their B.5.b related license conditions and 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) by determining that:
- Procedures were being maintained and adequate;
- Equipment was properly staged, maintained, and tested;
- Station personnel were knowledgeable and could implement the procedures; and
- Additionally, inspectors reviewed the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b related equipment.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees B.5.b related license conditions and evaluated selected mitigating strategies to ensure they remain feasible in light of operator training, maintenance/testing of necessary equipment and any plant modifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed previous inspection reports for commitments made by the licensee to correct deficiencies identified during performance of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/171 or subsequent performances of these inspections.
The B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below. The offsite and onsite communications, notifications/emergency response organization activation, initial operational response actions and damage assessment activities identified in Table A.3 1 of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 06-12, B.5.b Phase II and III Submittal Guidance, Revision 2 are evaluated each time due to the mitigation strategies scenario selected.
NEI 06-12, Selected Revision 2, Licensee Strategy (Table) for Review Section 3.2.2 Off-site and On-site Communications (Table A.3-1) Evaluated 3.2.3 Notification/Emergency Response Organization Activation Evaluated (Table A.3-1)3.2.4 Initial Operation Response Actions (Table A.3-1) Evaluated 3.2.5 Initial Damage Assessment (Table A.3-1) Evaluated 3.3.3 Manual Operation of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Selected Pump (Table A.4-3)3.3.6 Containment Flooding with Portable Pump (Table A.4-6) Selected
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program procedures and samples of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the Fire Protection Program at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the Corrective Action Program. The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, design packages, and fire protection system non-conformance documents.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting Summary
On November 25, 2013, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Seizer, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
On November 8, 2013, the inspectors presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. E. McCartney, and other members of the licensee staff.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as an NCV.
- The licensee identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1.h for the failure to control transient combustible material in accordance with the Fire Protection Program requirements. Technical Specification Section 5.4.1.h for Units 1 and 2 required that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained, covering activities related to Fire Protection Program implementation. Nuclear Procedure (NP) 1.9.9, Transient Combustible Control, Revision 23, Section 2.10 stated, in part, that no transient combustible material be allowed in combustible exclusion zones without specific evaluation and the approval of the fire protection engineer.
Contrary to the above, on September 17, 2013, the licensee failed to implement the guidelines specified in Procedure NP 1.9.9 and identified two instances where transient combustibles were located in combustion exclusion zones. The licensee entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program as Action Request (AR) AR01904510 and removed the transient combustible materials.
The finding was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during plant operations. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the Significance Determination Process (SDP) in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings," dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix F, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Worksheet," dated September 20, 2013.
This finding screened to a Phase II analysis in accordance with SDP Phase I based on review of the "Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls" Section of IMC 0609. Using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Attachment 2, "Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements," dated February 28, 2005, the inspectors determined that the finding resulted in a low degradation from the combustible controls program and screened the finding as having very low safety significance (Green).
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- E. McCartney, Site Director
- R. Wright, Plant General Manager
- J. Fischer, Fire Protection Engineer
- K. Locke, Licensing Engineering Analyst
- R. Mrozinsky, Appendix R Engineer
- E. Schmidt, Engineering Supervisor
- T. Schneider, License Engineering
- R. Seizert, Licensing Supervisor
- B. Woyak, Engineering Manager
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- D. Betancourt, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
- B. Bartlett, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
- K. Barclay, Resident Inspector
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened, Closed, and Discussed
None.
Attachment