IR 05000334/1988021

Insp Rept 50-334/88-21 on 880509-13.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Corrective Actions on Concerns Identified in Equipment Qualification Insp 50-334/86-12 Conducted in June 1986

ML20207C916
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	07/14/1988
From:	Anderson C, Thomas Koshy NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207C899	List: IR 05000334/1988012 IR 05000334/1988021 ML20207C911
References
50-334-88-21, NUDOCS 8808100305
Download: ML20207C916 (9)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'

REGION I

Report No. 50-134/88-21 Gocket No. 50-334-License No. DPR-66 l

Licensee: Duquesne Light Company l Post Office Box 4 I Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 l

Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No: 1 Inspection At: Beaver Valley Power Station, Shippingport, Pennsylvania l

Inspection Conducted: May 9-13, 1988 l Inspector: _ 7'N'

Thomas Koshy, Senior Re# actor Engineer date l Approved by: /,p 7 - I V -- F8 C#d. Anderson l Chief Plant System Section date Inspection Summary: Inspection Report No. 50-334/88-21 on May 9-13, 1988 Areas Inspected: This was an unannounced inspection to review the licensee's corrective actions on the concerns identified in the Equipment Qualification inspection, 50-334/86-12, conducted in June 1986. This inspection reviewed six Unresolved / Potential Enforcement items and one open ite Results: The licensee had completed the corrective actions on the previously identified EQ issues. However, the licensee inspection of the motor operated valves was not tSorough. The presence of unqualified wire nuts and unqualified wire in the MOVs d2monstrates the inadequacy of the licensee's corrective action I i

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 Duquesne Light Company (DLC)

• R. C. Eiben, Equipment Qualification Engineer S. Hovanec, Sr. Engineer, Electrical Maintenance W. S. Lacey, General Manager Nuclear Operations F. J. Lipchiek, Sr. Licensing Supervisor T. P. Noonan, Plant Manager F. Oberlitner, Equipment Qualification Supervising Engineer 1.2 DLC Consultants Schneider Engineers J. Archer, Manager J. A. Murphy, Vice President D. M. Suhan, Equipment Qualification Engineer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

S. M. Pindale, Resident Inspector

• Not present at the exit meeting 2.0 Purpose The purpose of this inspection was to review the licensee corrective actions that resulted from the concerns identified in the equipment quali-fication inspection, 50-334/86-12, conducted in June 1986. This inspec-tion reviewed six unresolved / potential enforcement items and one open ite .0 Background An equipment qualification program inspection, 50-334/86-12, was conducted by the NRC during June 9-13, 1986. This inspection identified six Potential Enforcement / Unresolved items and one open item. The licensee responded to this inspection report in a letter from J. D. Sieber, Duquesne Light dated July 21, 1986. This letter provided some additional informa-tion on the concerns addressed in the inspection report and the corrective actions performe . _ -- _ . _ .

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4.0 Followup of Previous Inspection Findings 4.1 (0 pen) Potential Enforcement / Unresolved Item (50-334/86-12-1)

Continental Cable File No. IV.B. 1/5 for Continental Silicone Rubber insulated cable, did not establish qualification to the DOR Guidelines as the file contained no performance data at elevated temperatures. In addition,

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the insulation resistance values were not measured at elevated temperature The licensee conducted'another qualification test at Wyle laboratories to address the above problem. The report No: 49020-01 documents the higher temperature exposure to the subject cable and the insulation resistance values recorded during the test. The licensee calculation indicates that the minimum leakage current cal-culated from the minimum insulation res'istance of 6.6X106 ohms will give a signal error of 0.62 percent which is well within the assumed error of 4.34% in the Westinghouse calculation. This supplemental data establishes the qualification of Continental cables. This item is technically closed, however, this item will remain open pending resolution of NRC potential enforcement action for not having established the qualification during the previous inspectio .2 (Closed) Potential Enforcement / Unresolved Items 50-334/86-12-2 Rosemount Transmitter Installation This deals with installation of a Rosemount transmitter in a confi-guration different than the tested configuration. The transmitter was mounted on the mounting bracket and this was attached to a pipe with 2 U-Bolts to a two inch carbon steel pipe. This is different than the welded mounting bracket used in the qualification test. The licensee's calculation that supported the installation did not address fix, tolerance and relaxatio ,

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The licensee has performed a re-evaluunc., co establish the adequacy ;

of the above referenced installation. The evaluation concludes that l the maximum accelerations imparted by the U-bolt installation are '

well below the Rosemount tested acceleration of 24 g's vertical and !

27 g's horizontal. However, in order to improve the installation, l the licensee has replaced the U-bolt installation. The replacement was performed per specification 8700-DGS-0003 (NDS-0112) Rev. 2 The licensee review observed one more installation using th9 U-bolts for PT-SI-940. As the installations were not accessible, the inspector reviewed the equipment release document SR No: 514.5 dated July 22, 1986 for confirming that all of the Rosemount support installations are complete.

3 This item is closed.

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4.3 (0 pen) Potential Enforcement / Unresolved item (50-334/86-12-3)

Victoreen High Range Radiation Monitor This concern deals with the excess leakage current due.to the lack of coaxial feed through penetrations for.the detector high voltage and signal leads. The accident environment with high temperature, radiation and lack of sufficient signal shielding can lead to unacceptable radiation level reading The licensee replaced this cable configuration.during the previous refueling outage. Design change package 800, completed on February 20, 1968 installed a new mineral insulated cable that starts from the Victorecn connector through the ptnetration and out the connector without any other connections in between. This cable is manufactured by Reuter Strokes and qualified by Combustion Engineer-ing. The inspector reviewed cable qualification file IV-3.1/2408 MI Triax Cable dated May 10, 1988. No discrepancies were observe This item is technically closed, however, this item remains open pending NRC resolution of potential enforcement action .4 (Closed) Potential Enforcement / Unresolved Items 50-334/86-12-4 Limitorque Motor Operator Valve Wiring

.This deals with the jum.oer wires that are used in the Limitorque compartment of the motor operated valve. The inspector observed four jumpers used in MOV-RC-536 to be not identifiabl Subsequent to the inspection, the licensee removed the wire from the valve and was able to identify the wiret to be Rockbestos Firewall II The inspector verified the jumper wire repiacement records for the following valve MWR 875981 For MOV-SI-864B MWR 875979 For MOV-SI-8906 MWR 875978 For MOV-SI-8908

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MWR 875951 For MOV-SI-860A-The field verification of wiring lead to two findings. These are discussed in detail in Section 5. No other discrepancies were observe This item is close l

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4.5~ (Closed) Dotential Enforcement / Unresolved Item 50-334/86-12-5 Barton Transmitter The licensee qualification file IV.B.1/2103 did.not establish the qualification of cable entrance gland seal. The tested gland seal part number was 0764.10628 and the installed gland seal number was 764.1221.8 for steam generator level transmitter LT-FW-148 On June 17, 1986, immediately after the inspection the licensee received a letter from ITT Barton Instruments Company stating that- ,

the subject connector is an improved version of the qualified  ;

connector and that che only difference is the higher temperature solder that is used. This data establishes the qualification of the existing installatio The licensee relocated this transmitter to elevation 717 which 25 feet above the flood level during the outag The justification for interim operation below the flood level was presented to the inspectors in the June 1986 audi The inspector had no further question This item is close .6 (Closed) Potential Enforcement / Unresolved Item (50-334/86-12-6) .

Rockbestos Cable Ouring the inspection in 1986, the licensee was in the process of determining the types of Rockbestos cables used in the plant. The qualification was established for all types of cables except KXL 78 ,

During the inspection, on June 10, 1986, the licensee received confirmation from the cable manufacturer that the Beaver Valley Unit 1 doesn't have the KXL 780 type of. insulation. This information was conveyed to the NRU in a letter dated July 21, 198 This item is close .7 (Closed) Open item (50-334/86-12-7) Equipment File Discrepancies ,

This item deals with several minor discrepancies in Equipment Qualification files. One of the discrepancies was the serial  !

number and model number errors within the qualification file The i licensee has approached the manuf acturer and clarified the numbe )

The correct number is 9269319M00 The first digit represents the  !

veer of manufacture - 1969, the second to the eighth digit represents l model number, ninth digit is the place of manufacture - Milwaukee, I and the last three digits are the serial number. The files currently I reflect this informatio The second discrepancy was the qualified life of the Westinghouse  !

motors. The SCEW sheet indicated 18 years of service life and the l

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Westinghouse document indicated 11.7 years. The licensee has ap-proached the manufacturer and obtained a new aging analysis WCAP 8687- .

Supplement 2, Revision 2 based on operating time. This analysis indicates qualified life based on 54,790 running hours. The EQ group l collects this data (running hours) to keep control on the qualified lif The third-discrepancy was in ASCO Solenoid Valve. file number IV.B.1/2208 which contained a model number different than the field -

installations and the qualification did not envelop 350 F specified in the plant accident temperature profil The licensee. corrected the data for solenoid valve 50V-RC-456-2.as NP-831654E from 816AS4 The certificate of conformance and the walkdown data agrees with this number. The exact temperature profile for the plant accident envirorment-is 343.7 F for 160 seconds. The ASCO qualification record indicates a qualification profile of 346 F. The licensee considers this profile to be sufficient due to the margin built into the accident temperature profil The fourth discrepancy deals with the Rosemount Model 1154 Transmitters requiring a .25 percent accuracy and not having addressed the effect of one part being open to the containment atmosphere. As per the Westinghouse analysis on the setpoint WCAP i 9885 Revision 1, the required accuracy for this instrument is 10 percen The worst case error experienced on this instrument during the test was 7.5 percent. The gauge pressure error adds another ;

percent error which brings the total error to 9 parcent. This inac-

curacy is within the acceptable limit established in the Westinghouse setpoint analysis documen In the light of the discrepancies, the licensee has reviewed all the EQ files for similar potential discrepancies and made the necessary revisions. The inspector reviewed the following file IV.8.1/9 Revision 5, Rockbestos SIS Wire i IV.B.1/2212 Revision 2, Rosemount 1154 Transmitter

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No discrepancies were observe This item is close .0 Findings on Motor Operated Valves During the verification of qualified wiring in the Limitorque Motor Operated Valves, the inspector performed a walkdown to review the licensee corrective action. The unresolved item related to this findings ,

was closed in Section 4.4. The inspector had the following finding '

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l 5.1 Ideal Wire nuts in Limitorque Compartment The inspector examined Limitorque compartment for MOV-SI-885A and MOV-SI-885 The jumper wires used inside these valves were Raychem Flamtrol and Rockbestos Flamtrol III wires. Both valves indicated seepage of grease and some accumulation in the bottom of the compart-ment. The inspector observed that an Ideal Model wire nut was used in splicing the stator power leads for MOV-51-8858. .During the-inspection, the licensee traced the work history and found that the unauthorized wire nuts were installed during a jumper wire replace-men This activity was performed through Work Request 875974 dated April 28, 1987. However, the work request or the QC inspection reports 70558 and 70531 did not reflect the installation of-wire nuts. The oil seepage accumulated in the wire nut could have created

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a ground faul The licensee inspected all the motor operated valves that were reworked for meeting environmental qualification requiremants. The licensee located one more valve MOV-SI-864A that utilized a wirenu The QC inspection reports 80053, 80150 and 80218 which documented the work done on this valve did not address the use of wire nuts. On May 12, 1988 the equipment qualification file 0044 Revision 3 dated May 14, 1987 for MOV-SI-885B did not establish the qualification of Ideal Model wire nuts used in motor operated valve MOV-SI-885 This is a violation of Site Administrative Procedure Chapter 31 Revision 2 Section 2a which requires that each item have sufficient documents-tion to establish that the equipment is environmentally qualifie This constitutes a violation of 10 CFR 50.49(f) (50-334/88-21-01).

Subsequent to the inspection, the licensee promptly replaced the wire nuts with qualified splices. These wire nuts were in service for 12 months. The valves containing the wire nut splice are located outside the containment and exposed to a radiation environmen They are not required to operate during the injection phase of the acciden In the exit meeting, the inspector expressed the need for increased attention on equipment qualification training, quality control inspection practices and maintenance documentatio The licensee committed to inspect all potentially affected valves inside contain-ment during the earliest plant outage. Based on a review of equip-ment history, the licensee concluded that MOVs inside containment are ut su'oiect to this proble .2 Unqualified Jumper Wires During this inspection, the NRC examination of valve MOV-RW-1050 revealed that the jumper wires utilized are TEF 600V and an unidenti-fied grey cable. The licensee indicated that this valve was one of

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the 27 valves added into the EQ program in November 1987 due to its post accident monitoring function. This valve is not required to change status during an accident. It is required to be closed only_

for isolating the Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger in case of a leak. The licensee Engineering Memo 73602 dated November 4, 1987-recognized the need for inspecting the subject valves. However, it was not recognized as critical to be performed before restarting the plant and no justification was made for the existing wiring. Based on the concern shared by the inspector, the licensee inspected all the 27 valves added to the EQ program for unqualified wirin The licensee identified 21 valves to have. unqualified wiring. All unidentified wiring in these valves except six were promptly replaced with the quailfied wirin The licensee developed justifications for continued operation for these six valve On June 9, 1988, the licensee had an unscheduled outag This opportunity was utilized by the licensee to inspect the remaining EQ valves that were not available for inspection during the plant opera-tio This inspection revealed several unidentifiable wires in the following valves that were located outside the containment. The licensee has currently completed the MOV inspection to address this ,

issu WORK REQUEST FOR MOV NO: REPLACING UNICENTIFIABLE WIRE c

MOV-CH-1158 882976 MOV-CH-1150 882974 MOV-CH-275A 883030 MOV-CH-275B 862980 MOV-CH-275C 883032 MOV-CH-373 883038 MOV-CH-381 883039 MOV-SI-836 882840

MOV-SI-863A 882982  :

MOV-SI-863B 882983 ,

MOV-SI-869B 883018 l

l These valves were in the licensee EQ master list and were required to be within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49. The NRC Information Notice  ;

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86-03 addressed the need for establishing the qualification of the  !

manufacturer supplied internal wiring in the Limitorque compartment of the motor operated valves. However, the licensee inspection and l corrective action during 1986 addressed the wires between torque i switch and limit switches only. The unidentifiable jumper wires were found t' etween limit switches and terminal block.

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On May 12, 1988, the licensee qualification file no: 103 Revision 0 did not establish the qualification of the above listed jumper wire This is a violation of Site Administrative Procedure Chapter 31, Revision 2 Section 2a which requires that each item have sufficient documentation '.o establish that the equipment is environmentally qualifie T'.11s constitutes a potential violation of 10CFR 50.49(f)

(50-334/88-2'-02).

6.0 Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection on May 13, 1988, the inspector met with the licensee representatives, denoted in Section 1.0. The inspector summarized the secpe and findings of the inspection at that time, e

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