ML20141E500

Insp Rept 50-382/85-31 on 851202-06.Violation Noted:Failure to Adequately Evaluate & Rept Defective GE AKR-50 Circuit Breakers in Accordance w/10CFR21

ML20141E500
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	02/05/1986
From:	Boardman J, Ireland R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20141E456	List: ML20141E452 ML20141E469 ML20141E500
References
50-382-85-31, NUDOCS 8602250270
Download: ML20141E500 (6)

See also: IR 05000382/1985031

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' APPENDIX B c

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..U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION i -

[ REGION IV ,

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NRC Inspection Report: 50-382/85-31 Operating License: NPF-26'

Docket

~ 50-382

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LLicensee: Louisiana Power and Light Company (LP&L) ~

142 Delaronde Street

New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 .

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Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station,, Unit 3 .,

Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana

Inspection Conducted: December 2-6,-1985

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Inspector: ,

4? 30ardman,

/ .CN Reactor

b d Inspector, Operations .2/S/r2 '

p J. R.Section, Reactor Safety Branch

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l Approved: N:. /Ireland,

. c I Acting

s /e Chief,

M Operations 4/5/vd,

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i Section, Reactor Safety Branch

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Inspection Summary

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. Inspection Conducted December 2-6, 1985 (Renort 50-382/85-31)

Areas Inspected: Reactive, announced inspection of the licensee preventive

maintenance program and nonlicensed staff training. The inspection involved 36

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inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: Within the one area inspected (corrective maintenance), one violation

was identified (failure to adequately evaluate and report defective General .

Electric AKR-50 circuit breakers in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21,' paragraph 3).-

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DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Employees

• R. P. Barkhurst, Plant Manager

• L. W. Myers, Operations Superintendent

• S. Alleman, Assistant Plant Manager Technical Service

• F. J. Englebracht, Manager Plant Administrative Services

,*A. S. Lockhart, Site Quality Manager

l *R. B. Willis, Manager, Engineering and Nuclear Safety

, *D. Packer, Manager, Training

l *H. A.-Trigg',s Records and Administration Manager

! *P. V. Prasankumar, Technical Support Supervisor

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• R. V. Seidle, Engineering and Nuclear Safety

I *K. L. Brewster, Onsite Licensing

! L. Laughlin, Technical Support

( J. Mahoney, Maintenance ,

• Denotes those attending the exit interview on December 6, 1985.

The NRC inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel.

2. Followup on Previously Identified Items

a. (0 pen) (382/8425-01) Licensee Document Controls for Vendor

Manuals and Technical Data

The NRC inspector began the inspection on licensee corrective action

for the subject violation by reviewing the following licensee pro-

cedures relating to the review and control of vendor manuals:

• PMI-016, " Vendor Manual Program," Revision 1,

dated July 31, 1985

• PPP-306, " Engineering Review," Revision 0, dated June 13, 1984,

and Revision 1, dated September 21, 1984

• PMP-004, " Control of Vendor Manuals," Revisions 0, 1, and 2,

dated April 16, 1984, November 15, 1984, and May 27, 1985

respectively

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• PMP-002, " Document Control," Revision 1, dated October 22, 1985

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The NRC inspector found no apparent programmatic problems or concerns l

in these procedures, except as follows:

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. * During review by the NRC inspector of potentially reportable

events (PRE's)'for possible maintenance and training causes, a'.

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case was discovered on Condition Identification Work

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Authorization (CIWA) 01740 where the incorrect hydraulic fluid , ,

was added to the valve operator of safety-related feed' water

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isolation valve FW-1848. Based on-technical evaluation of this

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error by the licensee, the use of incorrect fluid could have

adversely affected elastomeric parts of the valve, and

consequently valve operation.

m* Thelicensee'svendormanualforvalveFW-1848andits'operEtor

did not identify the hydraulic fluid to be used. Since a

l primary purpose of controlled vendor manuals is maintenance, the ,

NRC inspector, during a subsequent inspection, will evaluate

documentation of the licensee's technical review of vendor

l manuals to assure that vendor instructions exist for required

preventive and corrective maintenance.

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The NRC inspector also reviewed Vendor Technical Information

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l (VTI) for Agastat Relays used7 tn safety-related applications.

l The VTI identified by the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) ,

! supplier was for originally provided nonsafety related relays.

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used for safety-related applications. Licensee personnel stated

! that original relays were qualified by the EDG supplier.

Replacement relays will be safety-related (E-series). The '

licensee will verify that no unqualified relays have been .

Installed as replacements. Maintenance instructions will require

j the periodic replacement specified for E-series relays. This

will remain an open item (382/8531-01) pending further review

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during a subsequent inspection.

l Further review by the NRC inspector of the licensee's response I

! to 382/8425-01 will be accomplished during a subsequent l

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inspection.

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b. (Closed) (382/8527-01) Microflim identification of

safety-related preventive maintenance records showing required

l designations, such as Equipment Qualification (EQ). The.

l licensee now stamps preventive maintenance documents with the -

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special designation (EQ) prior to their issue,

c. (Closed) (382/8527-05) Possible Use of Preventive Maintenance

, (PM) Task Cards to Perform Corrective Maintenance. The NRC

inspector reviewed a sampling of PM task cards having a 3 and 5 ,

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, year accomplishment periodicity that had two or more recorded

i accomplishments in the first year of operation, with the following

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findings:

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l * Partial accomplishments of PM tasks were entered in the

!, licensee's maintenance information system as complete

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accomplishments, indicating erroneous multiple

accomplishments.

• In some cases, task cards were lo , and replacement task

cards issued. Subsequently, the licensee determined that

both task cards were accomp14shed, and both were entcred in

the licensee's maintenance management information system.

• In some cases, upon recalibration, measuring and test

equipment (M&TE) used for PMs subsequently was determined to

be out-of-calibration and the PM task was redone.

• In one case, there were two identical pieces of equipment

having a 5 year PM periodicity based on Technical

Specification requirements. FSAR requirements were

purported by licensee personnel to be the accomplishment of

10% of this equipment every 18 months. The licensee

interpreted this to require PM on one of the two pieces of

equipment every 18 months.

The NRC inspector suggested to licensee personnel that they

assure that similar practices resulting in much more frequent

PMs than required do not degrade safety-related equipmer.t. The

licensee's new maintenance information management system, having

the acronym "SIMS" (Station Information Management System), can

eliminate unnecessarily redundant accomplishment of PMs. SIMS

is scheduled to go "on line" in calendar year 1986.

3. Licensee Corrective Maintenance Program

The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's program for corrective

maintenance. This review included licensee procedures, and licensee

potentially reportable events (PRES), to determine if they were caused by,

or adversely affected by, licensee maintenance practices.

The licensee is evaluating and accomplishing site-specific, modifications

to the Middle South version of the SIMS which is presently used for

control of maintenance at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) for both units. The

ifcensee has targeted to have this system, with site-specific

modifications, on-line by October 1, 1986. Review of the Arkansas Power

and Light (AP&L) version of SIMS indicates that this program can provide

effective management visibility and control of maintenance,

a. Corrective Maintenance Administrative Procedures

Overall programmatic control of licensee maintenance activities is

covered by Administrative Procedure MD-1-014. " Conduct of

Maintenance," Revision 1, approved November 21, 1984.

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Corrective maintenance is performed using a work control document

i. entitled a " Condition Identification and Work Authorization (CIWA)."

The governing procedure is UNT-5-002, " Administrative Procedure . +

Condition Identification and Work Authorization," Revision 4, dated

l September 5, 1984.

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Plant engineering technical review and processing of CIWAs is *

Procedure PE-2-005, " Plant Engineering CIWA Processites." Revision 5,

approved June 21, 1985. .

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The NRC inspector noted no programmatic violations or deviations in

these procedures.

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b. Review of Licensee Potentially Reportable Events (PRES) for Events

That May Have 8een Caused, or Adversely Af fected, by Licensee Maintenance

Practices  !

The NRC inspector reviewed all licensee PRES for maintenance ,

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implications. Administrative Procedure UNT-6-010 " Event Evaluation

and Reporting," Revision 1 (approved November 26, 1984), provides .

guidance for licensee review, evaluation, and reporting of events.

The inspector identified two problems with the evaluation of events

as follows:

• One maintenance-related' PRE reviewed was.for the addition of

hydraulic fluid to safety-related feed water isolation valve

FW-1848. This is discussed previously in this report in ,

Section 2.(a). 1

• PRE 85-150, failure of B charging pump, GE AKR-50 circuit . .

breaker to make contact on one phase resulting in failure of the

pump motor to start was reviewed.  ;

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The failure of the AKR-50 breaker to make contact was caused by

rotationofaphasecontactadjustingscrewduringbreakeroperation.

The cause was a low thread torque (less than 40 inch pounds) for the

adjusting screw.

The event occurred May 18, 1985, General Electric (GE) provided to  ;

the licensee on June 6, 1985, an evaluation and engineering analyses

and specified corrective actions which required the application of

" LOCTITE-220" to the adjusting screw and verification of adequate

torquing. To implement GE's recommendation for breakers

having an above average number of close-open operations CIWA 021716 >

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was approved and issued August 26, 1985, but the action had not been

accomplished at the time of the NRC inspection. The licensee committed i

to accomplish this'CIWA prior to the next startup for those breakers

which had "an above average number of CLOSE-OPEN operations."

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Subsequent to the inspection, the licensee committed to review all

other similar safety-related GE breakers (AKR-30 and AKR-50) to ",

assure provision of timely corrective maintenance for this potential

failure. This matter will be an open item (382/8531-02) pending

review of the licensee actions during a subsequent inspection.

c. Failure to Adequately Evaluate and Report the Defects GE AKR-50

Circuit Breakers Under 10 CFR Part 21

The failure of the 8 charging pump breaker, as noted in b. above,

l was not reported under 10 CFR 50.73. The breaker failure had been-

evaluated under 10 CFR 21 by the licensee and determined not to be a

reportable defect. However, the defect identified by GE to the

l licensee was generic to all AKR-50 an AKR-30 breakers as noted in a

l June 6, 1985 letter to the licensee. Additionally, GE issued a

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revision to publication GEK-64459 (applicable to all AKR-30 and

AKR-50 breakers) to provide maintenance instructions for checking

and correcting the potential defect.

This breaker failure (rotation of a phase contact adjusting screw

during breaker operation) represented a defect in a basic component

that could create a substantial safety hazard. The failure of the

licensee to adequately evaluate and report this defect to the NRC is

a violation of 10 CFR 21,(382/8531-03).

4. Training of Nonlicensed Staff

The NRC inspector reviewed licensee Potentially Reportable Events (PRES)

for evidence of events that resulted from licensee training deficiencies.

! No events appeared to have been negatively influenced by training.

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5. Exit Interview

The NRC inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in

paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on December 6,1985.

The NRC inspector summarized the purpose, scope and findings of the

inspection.

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