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{{#Wiki_filter:.t VINGINIA ELucrurc Axn Powen Coniwxy EIcnMoNo,VIHOINIA c3c61 December 17, 1979 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Serial No.
{{#Wiki_filter:. t VINGINIA ELucrurc Axn Powen Coniwxy EIcnMoNo,VIHOINIA c3c61 December 17, 1979 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director                                 Serial No.       973 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation                           FR/RWC:           mye Attn: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.1                           Docket No.:       50-338 Division of Operating Reactors                                             50-339 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555                                           License No.       N PF-4
973 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FR/RWC: mye Attn: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.1 Docket No.:
50-338 Division of Operating Reactors 50-339 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 License No.
N PF-4  


==Dear Mr. Denton:==
==Dear Mr. Denton:==


PROCEDURAL CHANGES REQUIRED TO ADDRESS CONTROL ROD DROP ANALYSIS CONCERNS Westinghouse Electric Corporation notified Vepco of an unreviewed safety question on November 15, 1979 concerning the potential for predicting more limiting results for single dropped rod events. Discussions with Westinghouse confirmed that the only Vepco plants affected were North Anna Units 1 and 2.
PROCEDURAL CHANGES REQUIRED TO ADDRESS CONTROL ROD DROP ANALYSIS CONCERNS Westinghouse Electric Corporation notified Vepco of an unreviewed safety question on November 15, 1979 concerning the potential for predicting more limiting results for single dropped rod events. Discussions with Westinghouse confirmed that the only Vepco plants affected were North Anna Units 1 and 2.             Consequently, the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) notifications were made.
Consequently, the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) notifications were made.
The event was investigated further by Vepco through detailed discussions with Westinghouse and the NRC Staff at a meeting in Bethesda, Meryland on November 19, 1979. The interim solution agreed upon at the meeting is provided in Attachment 1 and will be incorporated in the appropriate Operating Procedures applicable to both North Anna Units 1 and 2 prior to operation. Since the current Technical Specifications limit on control rod insertion is nonconservative, we are immediately implementing an administrative reduction in the control rod insertion limits consistent with Attachment
The event was investigated further by Vepco through detailed discussions with Westinghouse and the NRC Staff at a meeting in Bethesda, Meryland on November 19, 1979. The interim solution agreed upon at the meeting is provided in Attachment 1 and will be incorporated in the appropriate Operating Procedures applicable to both North Anna Units 1 and 2 prior to operation. Since the current Technical Specifications limit on control rod insertion is nonconservative, we are immediately implementing an administrative reduction in the control rod insertion limits consistent with Attachment 1.Operation in compliance with this solution will eliminate any safety concerns associated with potential dropped rod events. Westinghouse is continuing to address the issue, and we will evaluate their proposed permanent solutions for applicability to North Anna Units 1 and 2 when the solutions are finalized.
: 1. Operation in compliance with this solution will eliminate any safety concerns associated with potential dropped rod events. Westinghouse is continuing to address the issue, and we will evaluate their proposed permanent solutions for applicability to North Anna Units 1 and 2 when the solutions are finalized.
In conjunction with this interim solution, we are withdrawing our proposed Technical Specificat ans Change No. 21 transmitted by my letter to you dated July 6, 1979, Serial No. 504. As discussed at the meeting on November 19, 1979, these changes are no longer appropriate.
In conjunction with this interim solution, we are withdrawing our proposed Technical Specificat ans Change No. 21 transmitted by my letter to you dated July 6, 1979, Serial No. 504. As discussed at the meeting on November 19, 1979, these changes are no longer appropriate.
The proposed solution has been reviewed and approved by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee. If you require additional information, please contact us.
The proposed solution has been reviewed and approved by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee. If you require additional information, please contact us.
Very truly yours,[ '/ [. fLQc i f C. M. Stallings Vice-President-Power Supply and Production Operations Attachment j 6}Q'iQ[cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement 79122 00 5M Region II s ATTACHMENT 1 INTERIM PROCEDURAL CHANGES REQUIRED FOR NORTH ANNA UNITS 1 AND 2 AS A RESULT OF CONTROL ROD DROP CONCERNS- MANUAL ROD CONTROL- O TO 100% POWER: NO CHANGE FROM CURRENT ROD INSERTION LIMITS (RIL)- AUTOMATIC ROD CONTROL- O to 90% POWER: HO CHANGE FROM CURRENT RIL- 90 TO 100% POWER: D BANK GREATER THAN 215 STEPS 1630 308}}
Very truly yours,
[ '/ [. fLQc i f C. M. Stallings Vice-President-Power Supply and Production Operations Attachment                                                                 j 6}Q 'iQ[
cc:   Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II                                                79122 00 5M
 
s ATTACHMENT 1 INTERIM PROCEDURAL CHANGES REQUIRED FOR NORTH ANNA UNITS 1 AND 2 AS A RESULT OF CONTROL ROD DROP CONCERNS
  - MANUAL ROD CONTROL
          - O TO 100% POWER: NO CHANGE FROM CURRENT ROD INSERTION LIMITS (RIL)
  - AUTOMATIC ROD CONTROL
          - O to 90% POWER: HO CHANGE FROM CURRENT RIL
          - 90 TO 100% POWER: D BANK GREATER THAN 215 STEPS 1630 308}}

Latest revision as of 13:10, 19 October 2019

Forwards Procedural Changes Required to Address Control Rod Drop Analysis Concerns & Withdraws 790706 Proposed Tech Spec Change 21 Re Control Rod Insertion Limits
ML19211A736
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 12/17/1979
From: Stallings C
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 7912200562
Download: ML19211A736 (2)
v • d • e


Text

. t VINGINIA ELucrurc Axn Powen Coniwxy EIcnMoNo,VIHOINIA c3c61 December 17, 1979 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Serial No. 973 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FR/RWC: mye Attn: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.1 Docket No.: 50-338 Division of Operating Reactors 50-339 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 License No. N PF-4

Dear Mr. Denton:

PROCEDURAL CHANGES REQUIRED TO ADDRESS CONTROL ROD DROP ANALYSIS CONCERNS Westinghouse Electric Corporation notified Vepco of an unreviewed safety question on November 15, 1979 concerning the potential for predicting more limiting results for single dropped rod events. Discussions with Westinghouse confirmed that the only Vepco plants affected were North Anna Units 1 and 2. Consequently, the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) notifications were made.

The event was investigated further by Vepco through detailed discussions with Westinghouse and the NRC Staff at a meeting in Bethesda, Meryland on November 19, 1979. The interim solution agreed upon at the meeting is provided in Attachment 1 and will be incorporated in the appropriate Operating Procedures applicable to both North Anna Units 1 and 2 prior to operation. Since the current Technical Specifications limit on control rod insertion is nonconservative, we are immediately implementing an administrative reduction in the control rod insertion limits consistent with Attachment

1. Operation in compliance with this solution will eliminate any safety concerns associated with potential dropped rod events. Westinghouse is continuing to address the issue, and we will evaluate their proposed permanent solutions for applicability to North Anna Units 1 and 2 when the solutions are finalized.

In conjunction with this interim solution, we are withdrawing our proposed Technical Specificat ans Change No. 21 transmitted by my letter to you dated July 6, 1979, Serial No. 504. As discussed at the meeting on November 19, 1979, these changes are no longer appropriate.

The proposed solution has been reviewed and approved by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee. If you require additional information, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

[ '/ [. fLQc i f C. M. Stallings Vice-President-Power Supply and Production Operations Attachment j 6}Q 'iQ[

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II 79122 00 5M

s ATTACHMENT 1 INTERIM PROCEDURAL CHANGES REQUIRED FOR NORTH ANNA UNITS 1 AND 2 AS A RESULT OF CONTROL ROD DROP CONCERNS

- MANUAL ROD CONTROL

- O TO 100% POWER: NO CHANGE FROM CURRENT ROD INSERTION LIMITS (RIL)

- AUTOMATIC ROD CONTROL

- O to 90% POWER: HO CHANGE FROM CURRENT RIL

- 90 TO 100% POWER: D BANK GREATER THAN 215 STEPS 1630 308

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