ML17265A676

Part 21 Rept Re Defects & noncompliances,10CFR21(d)(3)(ii), Which Requires Written Notification to NRC on Identification of Defect or Failure to Comply. Relays Were Returned to Eaton for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis

ML17265A676
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	06/16/1999
From:	MECREDY R C EATON CORP., ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	VISSING G S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
References
REF-PT21-99 NUDOCS 9906220033
Download: ML17265A676 (8)

Text

REGULARLY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTICOSYSTEM (RIDE)ACCESSION NBR:990622'0033 DOC.DATE: 99/06/16 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET I FACIL:>0-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C.

Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFXLIATION VISSING,G.S.

Records Management Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Part 21 rept re defects S noncomplicanse,10CFR21(d)(3)(ii), which recpxires"Written notification to NRC on identification of defect or failure to comply." Relays were returned to Eaton for evaluation 6 root cause analysis.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE19T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: Part 21 Rept (50 DKT)NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

E 05000244 G RECIPXENT ID CODE/NAME LPD1-INT NAL: FILE CENTER 01 DR NARD, RGN1'GN3 COPIES LTTR ENCL.'1 1-1 1 1 1 1 1 1.1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME VISSING,G.

NRR/DRIP/REXB RES/DET/EIB RGN2 RGN4 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 EXTERNAL: INPO RECORD CTR NRC PDR 1 1 1 1 NOAC SILVER,E NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 1 1 D M'E UINIgIIIhim NOTE TO ALL MRIDSM RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 14 ENCL 14 4ND ROCHESTER GAS Ah/D EIECTRIC CORPORATION

~89 FASTAVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y 1dbf90001 ARFA CODE716 Sf6-27D0 ROBERT C.MECREDY Vice President Nuciear operations June 16, 1999 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Guy S.Vissing Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555

Subject:

10 CFR Part 21 30 Day Report R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244

Dear Mr.Vissing:

The attached 10 CFR 21 report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance, Section 21 (d)(3)(ii), which requires"Written notification to the NRC on the identification of a defect or a failure to comply".Very ruly yours, Attachment Robert C.Mecredy xc: Mr.Guy S.Vissing (Mail Stop SC2)Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects-I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20S5S Regional Administrator, Region I U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S.NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector 990622003$

9906ib PDR ADQCK 05000244 s PDR

10CFR21 30 DAY WRITTEN REPORT NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL INFORMING THE COMMISSION:

NAME: ADDRESS: Robert C.Mecredy Vice President Nuclear Operations Group Rochester Gas 6.Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 IDENTXFICATXON OF THE FACILXTY, THE ACTIVITY, OR THE BASIC COMPONENT SUPPLXED FOR SUCH FACILITY WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTA1'NS A DEFECT: The basic component is the NBFD65NR Control Relay, supplied by Eaton Corporation, Inc.This component was purchased safety-related for use in various locations at Ginna Station, and is installed in reactor protection and safeguards systems for use as control logic relays.III.IDENTIFICATION OF THE FXRM CONSTRUCTING THE FACILITY OR SUPPLYING THE BASIC COMPONENT WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTAINS A DEFECT!The relays were supplied to Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E)by: Eaton Corporation Znc.21 South Street Danbury, CT 06810 XV.NATURE OF THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY AND THE SAFETY HAZARD WHICH IS CREATED OR COULD BE CREATED BY SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY: Per RGGE Technical Evaluation 90-145, NBFD65NR relays were evaluated as suitable replacements for NBFDXXS relays.Ginna Station Technical Specifications allows a minimum voltage of 108.6 VDC at the battery terminals.

According to a letter from Westinghouse to RG&E,"Maximum and Minimum DC Voltage and Operating Currents for Relays", dated September 13, 1993, the NBFD65NR relay would operate at voltages as low as 100 volts.Fifteen (15)NBFD6SNR relays failed to perform per the requirements of the purchase specifications during pre-installation bench testing at Ginna Station.As the relays were gradually energized, the contacts would start to chatter at approximately 70 VDC, and eventually fully pick up at 125 VDC~The energized relays would chatter below 125 VDC, and completely drop out below 70 VDC.Purchase Page 2 specifications were: 125 VDC Nominal operating voltage and a Certificate of Compliance that the relays met all performance specifications.

These specifications included testing at degraded voltage, which is defined as 90 volts.The deviation was detected by RG&E during testing prior to installation into a reactor protection or safeguards system.No actual safety hazard existed.The nature of the defect consisted of a manufacturing deficiency.

Upon investigation, by Eaton, it was determined that the relay coil had been incorrectly wired.The internal coil design includes two coils, a pick up and a hold coil, which are designed to operate in series.The hold coil is shorted by a normally closed contact when the relay is de-energized, and inserted in the circuit in series with the pick up coil when the relay energizes and opens the contact.Due to the incorrect wiring, the coils opposed each other when the contact opened.At low voltages, this caused the relay to drop out as soon as the hold coil was energized, resulting in relay chatter and preventing a solid pick up.At Ginna Station, an NBFD65NR can be used for a safety-related function, such as Containment Spray.For this application, relays are normally de-energized, and energize to generate the protection logic.The relays could have caused containment spray not to function at allowed voltage levels below 125 VDC.Therefore, the use of the deficient NBFD65NR relays, in the this application, could have created a substantial safety hazard.THE DATE ON WHICH THE INFORMATION OP SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY WAS OBTAINED: The information was obtained on April 2, 1999, during the pre-installation testing of the relays.IN THE CASE OP A BASIC COMPONENT WHICH CONTAINS A DEFECT OR FAILS TO COMPLY, THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OP ALL SUCH COMPONENTS IN USE AT, SUPPLIED POR, OR BEING SUPPLIED FOR GINNA STATION: There are numerous NBFD65NR relays in safety-related applications in various locations at Ginna Station.Eaton supplied 50 of the model NBFD65NR relays to RGSE for installation in the Ginna Station reactor protection and safeguards systems during the 1999 outage.None of the deficient relays had ever been installed or used at Ginna Station.Page 3 V T~r I l THE CORRECT IVE ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN I I S BEING g OR WILL BE TAKEN)THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTION;AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT HAS BEEN OR WILL BE TAKEN TO COMPLETE THE ACTION: After the deviation was discovered by RG&E, the relays were returned to Eaton for evaluation and root cause analysis.An RG&E QA Engineer was present during the root cause investigation.

At the factory the relays were tested and passed the bench test, but the sound of the relays chattering'as not detected because factory noise masked the chattering sound.Upon further investigation, it was discovered that one of the two relay coils was wired backwards on all the relays in question.According to the vendor, the coil winding problem was isolated to the RG&E order only.The deficient relay coils were replaced and the relays were retested using enhanced test procedures which included checking for relay chatter.The incorrect wiring was attributed to insufficient training and subsequent poor workmanship of a new employee.Inadequate factory testing failed to detect the chattering relays.According to Eaton, their training program has been revised and the work location has been enhanced with visual aids to ensure the relays are correctly constructed and tested.RG&E has currently imposed a Source Surveillance requirement on Eaton, and will consider the need to include Source Surveillance and/or to perform receipt testing of relays purchased from Eaton as a condition of acceptance for future orders.ANY ADVICE RELATED TO THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY ABOUT THE FACILITY, ACTIVITY, OR BASIC COMPONENT THAT HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILL BE GIVEN TO PURCHASERS OR LICENSEES:

Performance of receipt inspection testing of relays and/or performance of a source surveillance of the vendor's testing practices may be appropriate.

Page 4

-0 e c**'lm