ML17264A109

Part 21 Rept Re 14 Inch air-operated Butterfly Valve,Used as SW Outlet Valve AOV-4561 Supplied by Fisher Controls Co.On 950418,found That Valve Actuated Opposite from Required Configuration.Actuator Lever Reinstalled

ML17264A109
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/14/1995
From:	Mecredy R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	Andrea Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-PT21-95 NUDOCS 9507200264
Download: ML17264A109 (7)

Text

PRTOR1TY 1 (ACCELERATED RZDS PROCESSING)

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9507200264 DOC.DATE: 95/07/14 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit, 1, Rochester G 05000244 P AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas 6 Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION JOHNSON,A.R. Project Directorate I-1 (PDl-1) (Post 941001)

SUBJECT:

Part 21 rept re 14 inch air-operated butterfly valve, used as SW outlet valve AOV-4561 supplied by Fisher Controls Co.On 950418,found that valve actuated opposite from required 0 configuration. Actuator lever reinstalled.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE19T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: Part 21 Rept (50 DKT)

NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). 05000244 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL , ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD1-1 PD 1 1 JOHNSON,A 1 1 INTERNAL ~C+5gg 01 1 1 NRR/DOPS/OECB 2 2 NRR/DOTS/TSIB/B 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN1 1 1 RGN2 1 1 RGN3 1 1 RGN4 1 1 SECY/PDR 1 1 EXTERNAL: INPO RECORD CTR 1 1 NOAC S ILVERiE 1 '

NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 yea PPCuMENT HA$ 8EEN SCAN'~~

NOTE TO ALL "RZDS" RECZPZENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D8 (415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 16 ENCL 16

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4ND ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORR)RAT1ON ~ 89 FASTAVENUE, ROCHESTER, N. Y 1dbf9.0001 ARFA CODE716 Sf6-2700 ROBERT C. MECREDY Vice President Nvcteor Operations July 14, 1995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Allen R. Johnson PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

10 CFR Part 21 30 Day Report R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance, Section 21 (c)

(3) (ii), which requires "Written notification to the NRC ... on the identification of a defect or a failure to comply", the attached 10 CFR 21 report is hereby submitted.

Ver truly yours, Robert C. Mecre xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Allen R. Johnson (Mail Stop 14B2)

PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C. 20555 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector

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950720026 5000244 g()5I PDR AD ~ PDR 8

PAGE 2 10CFR21 30 DAY WRITTEN REPORT I. NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE INDIVIDUALINFORMING THE COMMISSION:

Robert C. Mecredy Vice President Nuclear Operations ADDRESS: Rochester Gas 4 Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE FACILITY, THE ACTIVITY, OR THE BASIC COMPONENT SUPPLIED FOR SUCH FACILITYWHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTAINS A DEFECT:

The facility is the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. The basic component is a 14 inch air-operated butterfly valve, used as the Service Water outlet valve AOV-4561 (Fisher Series 7600 valve) for the Containment Recirculation Fan Coolers (CRFC). The valve assembly (less actuator) was replaced during the 1995 refueling outage as preventive maintenance for AOV-4561.

III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE FIRM CONSTRUCTING THE FACILITY OR SUPPLYING THE BASIC COMPONENT WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTAINS A DEFECT:

The butterfly valve installed during the 1995 outage was procured as a replacement for a specific serial numbered original plant valve (AOV-4561). Since the valve is standard and commercially available, it was procured as commercial grade and'dedicated as safety-related by Rochester Gas and Electric (RGB') under Commercial Grade Item Engineering Evaluation (CGIEE)94-051. The valve was supplied by:

Fisher Controls Co.

c/o Northeast Controls, Inc.

60 John Glenn DR Amherst, NY 14228

PAGE 3 IV. NATURE OF THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY AND THE SAFETY HAZARD WHICH IS CREATED OR COULD BE CREATED BY SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY:

The replacement valve was installed as AOV-4561 in mid-April, 1995, with the plant in cold shutdown and this portion of the Service Water system isolated for maintenance and not required to be operable. As part of the installation process and prior to turnover for post-maintenance testing (PMT) and return to operable status, Instrument and Control (IAC) technicians were performing initial alignment of the valve to the valve actuator and valve positioner, using a valve-specific calibration data sheet. On April 18, 1995, during this initial alignment, the ISAAC technicians found that AOV-4561 actuated opposite from the required configuration. The difference in actuation was caused by improper keyway placement, resulting in "air-to-open" operation. The original engineering requirements stipulated "air-to-close" operation.

The safety hazard which could be created by such a defect is the loss of Service Water flow through the Containment Recirculation Fan Coolers (CRFC), when combined with single failure considerations. This condition could result in the Containment pressure slightly exceeding design limitations in the event of the limiting "Steam line break in Containment" accident.

V. THE DATE ON WHICH THE INFORMATIONOF SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURETO COMPLY WAS OBTAINED:

The information was obtained on April 18, 1995.

VI. IN THE CASE OF A BASIC COMPONENT WHICH CONTAINS A DEFECT OR FAILS TO COMPLY, THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ALL SUCH COMPONENTS IN USE AT, SUPPLIED FOR, OR BEING SUPPLIED FOR GINNA STATION:

One valve was procured for AOV-4561, and installed in mid-April, 1995, in the Service Water system at Ginna Station.

PAGE 4 VII. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILLBE TAKEN; THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUALOR ORGANIZATIONRESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTION; AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT HAS BEEN OR WILLBE TAKEN TO COMPLETE THE ACTION:

Corrective action was taken by the Ginna Station Maintenance group. A nonconformance report (NCR) was initiated, and the valve was repaired in accordance with the Engineering disposition for this NCR, by cutting a new keyway in the valve actuator lever. The actuator lever was reinstalled, and the valve actuator was calibrated per the requirements of the calibration data sheet to verify proper valve operation. These corrective actions were completed within seven days of identification of the problem, with the plant in cold shutdown and this portion of the Service Water system isolated and not required to be operable.

The CGIEE for this valve was revised by Procurement Engineering, to include verification of appropriate component operation, with successful completion of PMT as the acceptance criteria. This provides assurance that the valve interfaces correctly with the valve actuator and functions correctly as part of the Service Water system.

The purchasing description in the Materials Management computer system was revised by Procurement Engineering to ensu're that future purchase orders will stipulate the original design requirement that the valve be supplied as "air-to-close".

The importance of verifying equipment interfaces and component interactions during consideration of critical characteristics for dedication was reemphasized to procurement engineers by Procurement Engineering supervision in June, 1995.

VIII. ANY ADVICE RELATED TO THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY ABOUT THE FACILITY, ACTIVITY, OR BASIC COMPONENT THAT HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILLBE GIVEN TO PURCHASERS OR LICENSEES:

The critical characteristics selected for commercial grade dedication should have required verification that the valve would fail as designed on loss of air. Associated activities that are normally performed to assure that the valve interfaces correctly with the valve actuator (such as I&C calibration and PMT) should be included as part of the commercial grade dedication process. Verification that dedicated components interface correctly assures the configuration necessary for proper component operation and system function.

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