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MONTHYEARML20090M5231992-03-17017 March 1992 Forwards PRA Individual Plan Exam Summary Rept,In Response to Generic Ltr 88-20, Individual Plant Exam for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities. Rept Organized,Per NUREG-1335, Individual Plant Exam Submittal Guidance Project stage: Other ML20114B0281992-08-17017 August 1992 Responds to NRC 920715 Request for Addl Info Re Util Response to Generic Ltr 88-20, Individual Plant Exam for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities. Responses Delayed from 920831 to 0930 Project stage: Request ML20115B0881992-10-0101 October 1992 Forwards Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 PRA IPE, Summary Rept.Rept Addresses Issues in GL 88-20 & Organized Per IPE Submittal Guidance in NUREG-1335 Project stage: Other ML20129H1771996-09-30030 September 1996 Forwards Staff & Technical Evaluation Repts Re Facility IPE, Internal Events,Gl 88-20 Project stage: Other 1992-03-17
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARIR 05000412/19990071999-10-21021 October 1999 Refers to Special Team Insp 50-412/99-07 Conducted from 990720-29 & Forwards Nov.Two Violations Identified.First Violation Involved Failure to Implement C/A to Prevent Biofouling of Service Water System ML20217M1591999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards NRC Rept Number 17, Requal Tracking Rept from Operator Licensing Tracking Sys.Rept Was Used by NRC to Schedule Requalification Exam for Operators & Record Requal Pass Dates L-99-143, Informs That Subsequent Review of Approval Ltrs & SE for Relief Requests 1TYP-2-B5.40-1 (Rev 0),BV1-RV-AUG (Rev 1), BV2-RV-AUG (Rev 1),BV3-IWA-1 (Rev 1) & BV3-IWA-2 (Rev 1) Identified Erroneous Statements Which Dl Wishes to Correct1999-10-11011 October 1999 Informs That Subsequent Review of Approval Ltrs & SE for Relief Requests 1TYP-2-B5.40-1 (Rev 0),BV1-RV-AUG (Rev 1), BV2-RV-AUG (Rev 1),BV3-IWA-1 (Rev 1) & BV3-IWA-2 (Rev 1) Identified Erroneous Statements Which Dl Wishes to Correct L-99-152, Submits Relief Request BV3-N-533-1,rev 0,requesting Use of ASME Approved Code Case N-553-1, Alternative Requirements for VT-2 Visual Examination of Class 1,2 & 3 Insulated Pressure Retaining Bolted Connections1999-10-11011 October 1999 Submits Relief Request BV3-N-533-1,rev 0,requesting Use of ASME Approved Code Case N-553-1, Alternative Requirements for VT-2 Visual Examination of Class 1,2 & 3 Insulated Pressure Retaining Bolted Connections ML20217C6741999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards RAI Re Licensee 970128 Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions, . Response Requested within 60 Days of Receipt of Ltr L-99-151, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-412/99-07.Corrective Actions:Condition Repts Were Written for Listed Issues So That Repts Could Be Addressed Using BVPS Corrective Action Program1999-10-0707 October 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-412/99-07.Corrective Actions:Condition Repts Were Written for Listed Issues So That Repts Could Be Addressed Using BVPS Corrective Action Program ML20217E0301999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/99-06 & 50-412/99-06 on 990809-13 & 990823-27.Violation Noted Involving Failure to Correctly Translate Design Change Re Pertinent Operating Logs & Plant Equipment Labeling ML20212M2661999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards Order Approving Transfer of Licenses for Beaver Valley from Dlc to Pennsylvania Power Co & Approving Conforming Amends in Response to 990505 Application ML20212K8071999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs That on 990916,NRC Staff Completed mid-cycle Plant Performance Review (PPR) of Facility.Staff Conducted Reviews of All Operating NPPs to Integrate Performance Info & to Plan for Insp Activities at Facility ML20216J9621999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/99-05 & 50-412/99-05 on 990725-0904.Two Violations Noted & Being Treated as Ncvs.One Violation Re Failure to Follow Operation Manual Procedure Associated with Configuration Control Identified L-99-149, Informs NRC That Items Identified in 990629 Response to GL 98-01 Have Been Completed.Attached Table Submitted with Has Been Updated to Reflect Completion1999-09-28028 September 1999 Informs NRC That Items Identified in 990629 Response to GL 98-01 Have Been Completed.Attached Table Submitted with Has Been Updated to Reflect Completion L-99-148, Notifies NRC of License Withdrawal of M Linch,License SOP-11478 IAW 10CFR50.74.M Linch Resigned from Employment at Bvps,Effective 9908171999-09-24024 September 1999 Notifies NRC of License Withdrawal of M Linch,License SOP-11478 IAW 10CFR50.74.M Linch Resigned from Employment at Bvps,Effective 990817 ML20212G0601999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Answer of Duquesne Light Co to Petition to Waive Time Limits & Suppl Comments of Local 29, Intl Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.Copies of Answer Have Been Served to Parties & Petitioner by e-mail or Facsimile ML20212C5521999-09-21021 September 1999 Forwards for Filing,Answer to Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Co & Pennsylvania Power Co in Opposition to Petition to Waive Time Limits & Suppl Comments of Local 29 Intl Brotherhood of Electrical Workers L-99-144, Forwards NRC Form 536 Which Addresses Util Proposed Operator Licensing Exam Schedule,In Response to Administrative Ltr 99-031999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536 Which Addresses Util Proposed Operator Licensing Exam Schedule,In Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03 ML20212B3291999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards for Filing,Petition to Waive Time Limits in 10CFR2.1305 & Supplemental Comments of Local 29,Intl Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Re Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2 L-99-134, Provides Addl Info to Support 990617 LAR 127,proposing Mods to Heatup,Cooldown & Overpressure Protection Curves.Info Is Provided to Formally Docket Info Discussed During 990820 Telcon with NRC1999-09-15015 September 1999 Provides Addl Info to Support 990617 LAR 127,proposing Mods to Heatup,Cooldown & Overpressure Protection Curves.Info Is Provided to Formally Docket Info Discussed During 990820 Telcon with NRC ML20211Q3431999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That During 990903 Telcon Between L Briggs & T Kuhar,Arrangements Were Made for NRC to Inspect Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Plant,Unit 1.Insp Planned for Wk of 991115 ML20211Q5601999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-412/99-07 on 990720-29.Three Apparent Violations Noted & Being Considered for Escalated Ea. Violations Involve Failure to Implement C/As to Prevent bio- Fouling of Svc Water Sys L-99-138, Forwards Rev 37 to Issue 4 for BVPS Physical Security Plan (PSP) (Base Plan,Safeguards Contingency Plan & Training & Qualification Plan).Changes to Plan Are Listed.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(d)1999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Rev 37 to Issue 4 for BVPS Physical Security Plan (PSP) (Base Plan,Safeguards Contingency Plan & Training & Qualification Plan).Changes to Plan Are Listed.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(d) L-99-136, Forwards Data Point Library (Dpl) Changes,Iaw Provisions of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,Rev 1,Section 3.6, Administrative Implementation Requirements. Ten Listed Dpls Have Specific Setpoint Values Removed,Per Unit 2 Dpls1999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Data Point Library (Dpl) Changes,Iaw Provisions of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,Rev 1,Section 3.6, Administrative Implementation Requirements. Ten Listed Dpls Have Specific Setpoint Values Removed,Per Unit 2 Dpls L-99-098, Forwards Proposed Changes to Bvps,Units 1 & 2 Operations QA Program Description,Iaw 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii).Change Would Reduce Operations QA Program Description Commitments by Limiting Required Onsite Safety Committee Reviews of Mods1999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Proposed Changes to Bvps,Units 1 & 2 Operations QA Program Description,Iaw 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii).Change Would Reduce Operations QA Program Description Commitments by Limiting Required Onsite Safety Committee Reviews of Mods L-99-137, Forwards Issue 3,rev 3 to Bvps,Unit 1 Inservice Testing Program for Pumps & Valves. Encl 1 Provides Summary of IST Program Changes Which Have Been Incorporated Into Issue 3, Rev 31999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Issue 3,rev 3 to Bvps,Unit 1 Inservice Testing Program for Pumps & Valves. Encl 1 Provides Summary of IST Program Changes Which Have Been Incorporated Into Issue 3, Rev 3 L-99-022, Forwards Issue 2,Rev 1 to Bvps,Unit 2 Inservice Testing (IST) Program for Pumps & Valves. Summary of Changes,Encl1999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Issue 2,Rev 1 to Bvps,Unit 2 Inservice Testing (IST) Program for Pumps & Valves. Summary of Changes,Encl L-99-012, Forwards Proposed Change to Bvps,Units 1 & 2,operations QA Program Description,Per 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii),including Description of Proposed Change,Reason for Change & Basis for Concluding Revised Program Satisfy 10CFR50,App B1999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Proposed Change to Bvps,Units 1 & 2,operations QA Program Description,Per 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii),including Description of Proposed Change,Reason for Change & Basis for Concluding Revised Program Satisfy 10CFR50,App B L-99-037, Forwards Proposed Change to Bvps,Units 1 & 2 Operations QA Program Description,Iaw 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii).Attachment 1 Further Describes Proposed Change & Identifies Reason for Change1999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Proposed Change to Bvps,Units 1 & 2 Operations QA Program Description,Iaw 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii).Attachment 1 Further Describes Proposed Change & Identifies Reason for Change L-99-132, Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Six Month Rept for 990101-990630 for Bvps,Units 1 & 21999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Six Month Rept for 990101-990630 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2 05000412/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00, Forced Shutdown Due to Inoperable EDG, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Rept Is Delayed Due to Util Needing Addl Three Days to Address Event Issues on Reportability & Provide Addl Safety Implications Info1999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00, Forced Shutdown Due to Inoperable EDG, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Rept Is Delayed Due to Util Needing Addl Three Days to Address Event Issues on Reportability & Provide Addl Safety Implications Info ML20211A5111999-08-18018 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/99-04 & 50-412/99-04 on 990613- 990724.One Violation Noted & Treated as Non-Cited Violation Involved Failure to Maintain Containment Equipment Hatch Closed During Fuel Movement L-99-127, Provides Response to NRC Ltr Requesting Review & Comment of NRC Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity Database by 990901.Inconsistencies Noted in Way Data Characterizes Condition of Reactor Vessel1999-08-17017 August 1999 Provides Response to NRC Ltr Requesting Review & Comment of NRC Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity Database by 990901.Inconsistencies Noted in Way Data Characterizes Condition of Reactor Vessel L-99-124, Requests Withdrawal of Editorial Changes That Do Not Pertain to Transfer of Operating Authority or Plant Ownership That Are Proposed in LARs 269 & 144.Revised mark-up License Pages Reflecting Changes,Attached1999-07-30030 July 1999 Requests Withdrawal of Editorial Changes That Do Not Pertain to Transfer of Operating Authority or Plant Ownership That Are Proposed in LARs 269 & 144.Revised mark-up License Pages Reflecting Changes,Attached L-99-121, Submits Data Point Library (Dpl) Changes,Iaw Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,rev 1,Section 3.6, Administrative Implementation Reqiurements1999-07-28028 July 1999 Submits Data Point Library (Dpl) Changes,Iaw Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,rev 1,Section 3.6, Administrative Implementation Reqiurements L-99-118, Forwards Response to NRC AL 99-02,request for Info Re Estimate of Number of New Licensing Actions Expected to Be Submitted in Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-25025 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC AL 99-02,request for Info Re Estimate of Number of New Licensing Actions Expected to Be Submitted in Fy 2000 & 2001 L-99-120, Forwards Annual Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments for BVPS Unit 1,IAW 10CFR50.59.Rept Provides Brief Description of Each Facility & Procedure Change & Summary of Safety Evaluations1999-07-22022 July 1999 Forwards Annual Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments for BVPS Unit 1,IAW 10CFR50.59.Rept Provides Brief Description of Each Facility & Procedure Change & Summary of Safety Evaluations L-99-119, Forwards Rev 17 to UFSAR for Beaver Power Station,Unit 1. Submittal Reflects Changes to Facility & Procedures as Described in UFSAR That Were Completed During Annual Reporting Period Endinig 9901221999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Rev 17 to UFSAR for Beaver Power Station,Unit 1. Submittal Reflects Changes to Facility & Procedures as Described in UFSAR That Were Completed During Annual Reporting Period Endinig 990122 L-99-113, Forwards Final,Typed TS Pages for LARs 262 & 135,previously Submitted with Editorial Changes Identified by1999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Final,Typed TS Pages for LARs 262 & 135,previously Submitted with Editorial Changes Identified by L-99-111, Forwards Revised Final Typed Pages for LARs 109 & 115, Previously Submitted by 990615 & 28 Ltrs.Revised Pages Replace Those Previously Provided for LARs 109 & 115.With Summary of Editorial Changes1999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Revised Final Typed Pages for LARs 109 & 115, Previously Submitted by 990615 & 28 Ltrs.Revised Pages Replace Those Previously Provided for LARs 109 & 115.With Summary of Editorial Changes L-99-112, Responds to NRC Questions Made During 990518 Meeting with Util Re LARs 220 & 88,for Bvps,Units 1 & 2.Copy of Ltr DLC-99-743,which Is non-proprietary Version of DLC-96-310 & Westinghouse Technical Bulletin ESBU-TB-96-07-R0 Also Encl1999-07-14014 July 1999 Responds to NRC Questions Made During 990518 Meeting with Util Re LARs 220 & 88,for Bvps,Units 1 & 2.Copy of Ltr DLC-99-743,which Is non-proprietary Version of DLC-96-310 & Westinghouse Technical Bulletin ESBU-TB-96-07-R0 Also Encl L-99-110, Forwards Changes to ERDS for Unit 1,IAW Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,Rev 1,Section 3.61999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Changes to ERDS for Unit 1,IAW Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,Rev 1,Section 3.6 ML20209G5701999-07-12012 July 1999 Discusses Closure of TACs MA0525 & MA0526 Re Response to RAI Concerning GL 92-0,Rev 1,Suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity. Info in Rvid Revised & Released as Ver 2 as Result of Review of Response ML20207H6621999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards RAI Re Util 981112 Response to IPEEE Evaluations for Plant,Units 1 & 2.RAI Was Discussed During 990628 Telcon in Order to Ensure Clear Consistent Understanding by All Parties of Info Needed L-99-105, Forwards Response to NRC 990420 RAI Re Previous Responses to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Power-Operated Gate Valves1999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990420 RAI Re Previous Responses to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20209D8191999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/99-03 & 50-412/99-03 on 990502- 0612.No Violations Noted.Program for Maintaining Occupational Exposures as Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) & for Training Personnel,Generally Effective L-99-109, Forwards Inservice Insp Ninety-Day Rept Bvps,Unit 2 Outage 7,Year 1999, IAW ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Article IWA-62301999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Inservice Insp Ninety-Day Rept Bvps,Unit 2 Outage 7,Year 1999, IAW ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Article IWA-6230 L-99-108, Requests Withdrawal of Change Proposed for TS Bases Page B 3/4 2-2 from LARs 1A-262 & 2A-135,originally Submitted by Licensee to NRC1999-07-0707 July 1999 Requests Withdrawal of Change Proposed for TS Bases Page B 3/4 2-2 from LARs 1A-262 & 2A-135,originally Submitted by Licensee to NRC L-99-104, Responds to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants. Disclosure Rept Encl1999-06-29029 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants. Disclosure Rept Encl L-99-093, Provides Response to RAI on Proposed Change to Operations QA Program Description.Attachment 2 Provides Revised Markup for Proposed Changes to Affected UFSAR Section 17.2.51999-06-25025 June 1999 Provides Response to RAI on Proposed Change to Operations QA Program Description.Attachment 2 Provides Revised Markup for Proposed Changes to Affected UFSAR Section 17.2.5 L-99-102, Forwards Typed,Final TS Pages for LARs 259 & 131.Summary of Description of Plant Editorial Changes Incorporated in Addition to Those Addressed in Previously Provided marked-up Pages,Encl1999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Typed,Final TS Pages for LARs 259 & 131.Summary of Description of Plant Editorial Changes Incorporated in Addition to Those Addressed in Previously Provided marked-up Pages,Encl L-99-101, Submits Response to NRC Oral RAI Concerning Qualifications for Senior Nuclear Executive Ref in 10CFR50.80 Submittal1999-06-22022 June 1999 Submits Response to NRC Oral RAI Concerning Qualifications for Senior Nuclear Executive Ref in 10CFR50.80 Submittal L-99-062, Forwards Final TS Pages for LARs 262 & 135,including Summary Description of Plants Editorial Changes Incorporated in Addition to Those Addressed in Previously Provided marked-up Pages1999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards Final TS Pages for LARs 262 & 135,including Summary Description of Plants Editorial Changes Incorporated in Addition to Those Addressed in Previously Provided marked-up Pages 1999-09-08
[Table view] Category:OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARIR 05000412/19990071999-10-21021 October 1999 Refers to Special Team Insp 50-412/99-07 Conducted from 990720-29 & Forwards Nov.Two Violations Identified.First Violation Involved Failure to Implement C/A to Prevent Biofouling of Service Water System ML20217M1591999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards NRC Rept Number 17, Requal Tracking Rept from Operator Licensing Tracking Sys.Rept Was Used by NRC to Schedule Requalification Exam for Operators & Record Requal Pass Dates ML20217C6741999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards RAI Re Licensee 970128 Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions, . Response Requested within 60 Days of Receipt of Ltr ML20217E0301999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/99-06 & 50-412/99-06 on 990809-13 & 990823-27.Violation Noted Involving Failure to Correctly Translate Design Change Re Pertinent Operating Logs & Plant Equipment Labeling ML20212K8071999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs That on 990916,NRC Staff Completed mid-cycle Plant Performance Review (PPR) of Facility.Staff Conducted Reviews of All Operating NPPs to Integrate Performance Info & to Plan for Insp Activities at Facility ML20216J9621999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/99-05 & 50-412/99-05 on 990725-0904.Two Violations Noted & Being Treated as Ncvs.One Violation Re Failure to Follow Operation Manual Procedure Associated with Configuration Control Identified ML20212M2661999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards Order Approving Transfer of Licenses for Beaver Valley from Dlc to Pennsylvania Power Co & Approving Conforming Amends in Response to 990505 Application ML20211Q3431999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That During 990903 Telcon Between L Briggs & T Kuhar,Arrangements Were Made for NRC to Inspect Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Plant,Unit 1.Insp Planned for Wk of 991115 ML20211Q5601999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-412/99-07 on 990720-29.Three Apparent Violations Noted & Being Considered for Escalated Ea. Violations Involve Failure to Implement C/As to Prevent bio- Fouling of Svc Water Sys ML20211A5111999-08-18018 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/99-04 & 50-412/99-04 on 990613- 990724.One Violation Noted & Treated as Non-Cited Violation Involved Failure to Maintain Containment Equipment Hatch Closed During Fuel Movement ML20209G5701999-07-12012 July 1999 Discusses Closure of TACs MA0525 & MA0526 Re Response to RAI Concerning GL 92-0,Rev 1,Suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity. Info in Rvid Revised & Released as Ver 2 as Result of Review of Response ML20207H6621999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards RAI Re Util 981112 Response to IPEEE Evaluations for Plant,Units 1 & 2.RAI Was Discussed During 990628 Telcon in Order to Ensure Clear Consistent Understanding by All Parties of Info Needed ML20209D8191999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/99-03 & 50-412/99-03 on 990502- 0612.No Violations Noted.Program for Maintaining Occupational Exposures as Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) & for Training Personnel,Generally Effective ML20207G2611999-06-0707 June 1999 Informs That NRR Has Reorganized,Effective 990328.Forwards Organizational Chart IR 05000412/19980091999-05-26026 May 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-412/98-09 ML20195C4461999-05-21021 May 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/99-02 & 50-412/99-02 on 990321-0501.No Violations Were Identified.Licensee Conduct of Activities at Beaver Valley Power Station Characterized by Safe Conduct of Activities During Refueling Outage ML20206P1241999-05-14014 May 1999 Refers to Proposed Changes Submitted by Dl on 990316 to BVPS QA Program Described in BVPS-2 Ufsar,Chapter 17.2.Forwards RAI Re Proposed QA Program Changes ML20206N3161999-05-0606 May 1999 Responds to Ltr to NRC on Continued Events Re Transfer of Generation Assets Between Dl & Firstenergy.Info Will Be Considered as NRC Monitor Pending License Transfer Application of Bvps,Units 1 & 2 & Pnpp ML20206H7931999-04-30030 April 1999 Ack Receipt of 990426 Request for Enforcement Discretion & 990427 Withdrawal of Request for Enforcement Discretion. Resolution Documented.Enforcement Discretion Not Necessary ML20206B2751999-04-22022 April 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/99-01 & 50-412/99-01 on 990207- 0320.One Violation of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violation Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20206A8381999-04-20020 April 1999 Forwards Reactor Operator Initial Exam Rept 50-412/99-301 on 990322-25.All Three Reactor Operator Applicants Passed. Initial Written Exam Submittal Was Determined Not to Meet NRC Guidelines in Certain Instances ML20205R9071999-04-20020 April 1999 Forwards Second Request for Addl Info Re Response to GL 95-07, Pressure-Locking & Thermal-Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205Q8311999-04-14014 April 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-334/98-11 & 50-412/98-11 Issued on 990225.Actions Will Be Examined During Future Insp of Licensed Program ML20205L0341999-04-0909 April 1999 Forwards SER Accepting Util 971209 & 980729 Submittal of Second 10-year Interval ISI Program Plan & Associated Relief Requests for Beaver Valley Power Station,Unit 2.TER Also Encl ML20205P2431999-04-0909 April 1999 Discusses 990225 PPR & Forwards Plant Issues Matrix & Insp Plan.Ltr Provided to Minimize Resource Impact on Staff & to Allow for Scheduling Conflicts & Personnel Availability to Be Resolved in Advance of Inspector Arrival ML20205K0901999-04-0505 April 1999 Informs of Individual Exam Result on Initial Retake Exam Conducted on 990322-25 at Licensee Facility.Three Individuals Were Administered Exam & All Three Passed. Forwards Encl Re Exam.Without Encl ML20205R1791999-03-30030 March 1999 Responds to Issue Re Generic Implication of part-length Control Rod Drive Mechanism Housing Leak at Praire Island, Unit 2 & Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205C0301999-03-26026 March 1999 Informs That Util Responses to GL 97-04, Assurance of Sufficient Net Positive Suction Head for Emergency Core Cooling & Containment Heat Removal Pumps Acceptable ML20204D7371999-03-16016 March 1999 Advises That RW Lindsey Authorized to Administer Initial Written Exams to Sh Cencic,Tf Lardin & Ta Pittas on 990322. Region I Operator Licensing Staff Will Administer Operating Tests ML20207E0201999-02-25025 February 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/98-11 & 50-412/98-11 on 981227- 990206 & Forwards Notice of Violations Re Uncontrolled Reduction of Main Condenser Vacuum ML20203D0691999-02-10010 February 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Approval of Proposed Revs to Plant QA Program Description in Chapter 17.2 of Updated Fsar,Per Util 981224 Submittal ML20206U3011999-02-0505 February 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/98-09 & 50-412/98-09 on 981116-1217 & Nov.Violation Identified Re Inadequate Design Control in Unit 2 Dc Voltage Drop Calculation ML20203A0811999-02-0404 February 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Review of Beaver Valley Power Station,Unit 1 License Amend to Allow one-time Extension of Steam Generator Insp Interval ML20199E6681999-01-14014 January 1999 Forwards RAI Re Licensee Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs, for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199F1961999-01-13013 January 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/98-10 & 50-412/98-10 on 981115-1226.No Violations Noted.Informs That Overall Fire Protection Program Functioning Well ML20199F5101998-12-29029 December 1998 Discusses Third 10-year Interval ISI Program Plan & Associated Relief Requests for BVPS-1 Submitted by Dlc on 970917 & 980618.Informs That NRC Has Adopted Ineel Recommendations in TER INEEL-98-00893.Forwards SE & TER ML20198K5911998-12-24024 December 1998 Forwards Emergency Response Data Sys Implementation Documents Which Include Data Point Library Updates for Fermi (Number 268),Peach Bottom (Number 269) & Beaver Valley (Number 270).Without Encls ML20198K8251998-12-21021 December 1998 Forwards SER Granting Licensee 980611,as Suppl 981015 Pump Relief Request PRR-5 for Third 10-year IST Interval for Beaver Valley Power Station,Unit 1 Pursuant 10CFR50.55(a)(f)(6)(i) ML20198B1301998-12-0909 December 1998 Advises of Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Beaver Valley Power Station mid-year Insp Resource Planning Meeting Held on 981110.Historical Listing of Plant Issues & Details of Insp Plan for Next 6 Months Encl ML20198A1301998-12-0909 December 1998 Forwards SE Re USI A-46 Program Implentation for Plant Unit 1.Staff Concludes Program Implementation Met Purpose & Intent of Criteria in Generic Implementation Procedure 2 & Suppl SER 2 for Resolution of USI A-46 ML20196J2761998-12-0404 December 1998 Forwards Corrected Pages 17 & 18 of NRC Integrated Insp Repts 50-334/98-06 & 50-412/98-06 for Exercise of Enforcement Discretion ML20196H3051998-12-0202 December 1998 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/98-06 & 50-412/98-06 on 981004-1114.No Violations Noted.Conduct of Activities at Beaver Valley Power Station Facilities Characterized by Safe Plant Operations ML20196H2781998-12-0202 December 1998 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/98-08 & 50-412/98-08 on 981026- 30.No Violations Noted.Plant Operations Witnessed by Team Were Conducted in Safe & Controlled Manner ML20196G9921998-12-0101 December 1998 Forwards Ltrs from Fk Koob, to JW Pack & CF Wynne Re Plant Deficiencies Assessed During 981006 Exercise Against Hancock County,Wv & Beaver County,Pa,Respectively ML20196D4371998-11-25025 November 1998 Discusses Concerns Re Announced Asset Transfer Between Firstenergy Corp & Duquesne Light Co ML20196A7101998-11-24024 November 1998 Forwards Notice of Withdrawal of Amend to License NPF-73. Proposed Change Would Have Extended on one-time Only Basis, Surveillance Interval for TSs 4.8.1.1.1.b & 4.8.1.2 Until First Entry Into Mode 4 Following Seventh Refueling Outage ML20195K3331998-11-18018 November 1998 Informs That Effective 981214,DS Collins Will Become Project Manager for Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2 IR 05000334/19980041998-11-13013 November 1998 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-334/98-04 & 50-412/98-04 Issued on 980915.C/As Will Be Examined During Future Insp of Licensed Program ML20195J2941998-11-12012 November 1998 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re First & Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Request for Relief ML20155K4041998-11-0505 November 1998 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/98-07 & 50-412/98-07 on 981006- 07.No Violations Noted.Overall Performance of Emergency Response Organization Was Good 1999-09-08
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! NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION L e WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001
'% September 30, 1996 Mr. J. E. Cross President-Generation Group Duquesne Light Company Post Office Box 4 1 Shippingport, PA 15077 '
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SUBJECT:
STAFF EVALUATION REPORT OF BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1, ,
INDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMINATION (IPE), INTERNAL EVENTS, GENERIC )
LETTER (GL) 88-20 (TAC N0. M74378) ,
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Dear Mr. Cross:
The purpose of this letter is to transmit our Staff Evaluation Report (SER) of Duquesne Light Company's (DLC's) IPE submittal for internal events and internal flood for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No.1 (BVPS-1). The BVPS-1 IPE was submitted on October 1, 1992, in response to GL 88-20, and supplemented on March 10, 1995, in response to our January 5, 1995, request for additional information. Also included with our SER are our contractors' Technical Evaluation Reports (TERS). ;
The NRC staff performed a " Step 1" review which examined the IPE results for their " reasonableness" considering the design and operation of BVPS-1. The NRC staff employed Science a Engineering Associates, Inc., Concord Associates, and Scientech Inc. to review the front-end analysis, human reliability analysis, and back-end analysis, respectively, of the IPE submittal. Their ;
TERs are attached as Appendices A, B, and C, respectively, to the SER. These contractor TERs were reviewed by the IPE " Senior Review Board" (SRB) as part of the NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) quality assurance process. The SRB is comprised of RES staff and consultants at Sandia and 1 Brookhaven National Laboratories with probabilistic risk analysis expertise.
The IPE has estimated a core damage frequency of 2.1E-4/ reactor-year, ,
including a contribution from internal flooding of 3E-6/ reactor-year. Reactor l coolant pump (RCP) seal loss of coolant accident contributes 46%, station '
blackout (SBO) 30%, containment bypass / isolation failures 21%, anticipated transients without scram 20%, and loss of emergency switchgear heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) 16%.
The DLC defined vulnerabilities as "the fundamental contributors to risk" in the important scenarios. Based on this definition, the IPE identified eight vulnerabilities: (1) ac power generation capability, (2) reactor trip breaker failure, (3) pressurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV) block valve alignment, (4) loss of emergency switchgear room HVAC, (5) RCP seal cooling for SB0, (6) battery capacity for steam generator level during SBO, (7) pressurizer PORV sticking after loss of offsite power, and (8) fast 4160 V bus transfer failures. Plant improvements, however, were identified and I considered for implementation.
pl l n00H NRC FILE CENTER COPY 9610080035 960930 PDR P ADOCK 05000334 PDR
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J.-Cross i J
Based on the " Step 1" review, we conclude that DLC has met the intent of i GL 88-20. We do not recommend that.a " Step 2" review be conducted. It is i important to note'that the NRC staff's review is not intended to validate the 'j accuracy of.DLC's IPE findings. Although certain aspects of the'IPE were :
explored in'more detail than others, the review primarily focused on DLC's ability to examine'BVPS-1 for severe accident vulnerabilities, and not ;
specifically in the detailed findings ^(or quantification estimates), which i
stemmed from the examination.
l With this letter, the NRC staff is closing TAC No. M74738. l Sincerely, .
/S/ t Donald S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager ,
Project Directorate I-2 .
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II i Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. '
Docket No. 50-334
Enclosure:
Staff Evaluation Report cc w/ encl: See next page DISTRIBUTION !
Docket File >
PUBLIC PDI-2 Reading ;
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'WHodges i PEselgroth, RGN-I 0FFICE PDTtOfl.k), PDI-2/PM A /// MM/D NAME MOSBNe'nOI DBrinkmaErb JStb DATE S/d/96 9 /2 7/96 h/91/96 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: BV74378. GEN l i
J. Cross Based on the " Step 1" review, we conclude that DLC has met the intent of GL 88-20. We do not recommend that a " Step 2" review be conducted. It is important to note that the NRC staff's revie, is not intended to validate the accuracy of DLC's IPE findings. Although certain aspects of the IPE were explored in more detail than others, the review primarily focused on DLC's ability to examine BVPS-1 for severe accident vulnerabilities, and not specifically in the detailed findings (or quantification estimates), which stemmed from the examination.
With this letter, the NRC staff is closing TAC No. M74738.
Sincerely,
- , a K ,,/ h/ Y, 4,m-Donald S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate I-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-334
Enclosure:
Staff Evaluation Report cc w/ encl: See next page
i J. E. Cross Beaver Valley Power Station Duquesne Light Company Units 1 & 2 !
cc:
l Jay E. Silberg, Esquire Bureau of Radiation Protection !
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Pennsylvania Department of ,
2300 N Street, NW. Environmental Resources !
Washington, DC 20037 ATTN: R. Barkanic Post Office Box 2063 !
R. K. Brosi, Manager Harrisburg, PA 17120 :
Nuclear Safety Department (BV-A) '
Duquesne Light Company Beaver Valley Power Station Mayor of the Borrough of PO Box 4 Shippingport Shippingport, PA 15077 Post Office Box 3 Shippingport, PA 15077 Commissioner Roy M. Smith ,
West Virginia Department of Labor Regional Administrator, Region I I Building 3, Room 319 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission :
Capitol Complex 475 Allendale Road )
Charleston, WVA 25305 King of Prussia, PA 19406 i 1
John D. Borrows Resident Inspector !
Director, Utilities Department U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Public Utilities Commission Post Office Box 298 ,
180 East Broad Street Shippingport, PA 15077 i Columbus, OH 43266-0573 '
L Director, Pennsylvania Emergency Duquesne Light Company j
. Management Agency Beaver Valley Power Station )
Post Office Box 3321 PO Box 4 '
Harrisburg, PA 17105-3321 Shippingport, PA 15077 ATTN: S. C. Jain, Vice President Ohio EPA-DERR Nuclear Services (BV-A)
ATTN: Zack A. Clayton Post Office Box 1049 Columbus, OH 43266-0149 Dr. Judith Johnsrud National Energy Committee Sierra Club 433 Orlando Avenue State College, PA 16803 1
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STAFF EVALUATION REPORT OF i
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO.1 i
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INDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMINATION (IPE) i (INTERNAL EVENTS ONLY) 3 i
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- 1. INTRODUCTION l
On October 1. 1992, Duquesne Light Company (DLC) submitte. 'he Beaver Valley
- Unit 1 (BV1) Individual Plant Examination (IPE) submittal in response to Generic Letter (GL) 88-20 and associated supplements. On January 5, 1995, the staff sent questions to the licensee for more information. The licensee
- responded in a letter dated March 10, 1995.
A " Step 1" review of the BV1 IPE submittal was performed and involved the efforts of Science & Engineering Associates, Inc., Scientech, Inc., and
- Concord Associates in the front-end, back-end, and human reliability analysis !
(HRA), respectively. The Step 1 review focused on whether the licensee's l
- method was capable of identifying vulnerabilities. Therefore, the review l
! considered (1) the completeness of the information and (2) the reasonableness 1
- of the results given the BV1 design, operation, and history. A more detailed review, a " Step 2" review, was not performed for this IPE submittal . A summary of contractors' findings is provided below. Details of the 3
i contractors' findings are in the attached technical evaluation reports j (Appendices A, B, and C) of this staff evaluation report (SER).
k In accordance with GL 88-20, BV1 proposed to resolve Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-45, " Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Requirements." No other specific USIs or generic safety issues were proposed for resolution as part of the BV1 l IPE.
3 The BV1 IPE submittal does not state that a "living" Pila will be maintained, I however, the BV1 IPE submittal states: "DLC now recognizes the benefits of a PRA and the capability that has been developed will be maintained. This i i capability will support a comprehensive risk management program."
1 4 II. EVALUATION j BV1 is a Westinghouse 3-loop PWR with a large dry subatmospheric containment. ;
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The BV1 IPE has estimated a core damage frequency (CDF) of 2.lE-4/ reactor-year l
- from internally initiated events, including the contribution from internal i
! floods . The BV1 CDF ' compares reasonably with that of other Westinghouse 3- 1 l loop PWR plants. Reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal loss of coolant accident
! (LOCA) contributes 46%, station blackout (SBO) 30%, containment l bypass / isolation failures 21%, anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) l
- 20%, and loss of emergency switchgear heating ventilation and air conditioning l (HVAC) 16%. The licensee's Level 1 analysis appeared to have examined
- significant initiating events and dominant accident sequences.
The licensee made two changes since completion of the IPE, namely, installation of the station cross-tie and a reanalysis of ATWS sequences.
l These changes results in a new CDF of 1.2E-4/ year.
Based on the licensee's IPE process used to search for decay heat removal
- (DHR) vulnerabilities, and review of BV1 plant-specific features, the staff
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finds the licensee's DHR evaluation consistent with the intent of the USI 1
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l A-45, Decay Heat Removal Reliability, resolution.
The licensee performed an HRA to document and quantify potential failures in human-system interactions and to quantify human-initiated recovery of failure events. The licensee identified the following operator actions as important in the estimate of the CDF: failure to set up portable fans to cool emergency switchgear, failure to restore electric power given SB0 with auxiliary feedwater (AFW), failure to open normal switchgear ventilation supply louvers, failure to manually insert control rods, premature securing of safety injection, failure to align outside recirculation spray (RS) pump to low head safety injection (LHSI) for high pressure recirculation, failure to depressurize and cool down secondary in small LOCA (SLOCA). The staff concluded that there were limitations in the licensee's HRA approach. For example, human errors related to calibration of equipment were not appropriately treated in the HRA. Although it is unlikely that the omission of calibration errors critically impacts the licensee's overall conclusions from the IPE, the licensee may have missed the opportunity to identify potential enhancements to plant safety.
The licensee evaluated and quantified the results of the severe accident progression through the use of a containment event tree and considered uncertainties in containment response through the use of sensitivity analyses.
The licensee's back-end analysis appeared to have considered important eevere accident phenomena. Among the BV1 conditional containment failure probabilities, early containment failure is 6.5% with high pressure melt ejection being the primary contributor, late containment failure is 43.4% with occurrence of containment overpressurization when containment heat removal is unavailable, bypass is 4.5% with steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) being the l primary contributor, and containment isolation failure is 16.3% with a 1 majority of contribution from emergency switchgear ventilation failures. The containment remains intact 29.3% of the time. Early radiological releases are i dominated by loss of offsite power sequences and late releases'are dominated '
by SB0 sequences. The licensee's response to containment performance improvement program recommendations is consistent with the intent of GL 88-20 and associated Supplement 3.
Some insights and unique plant safety features identified at BV1 by the licensee are:
- 1. Dedicated feedwater pump is powered from the emergency response facility diesel generator (DG) as an Appendix R backup for auxiliary feedwater. !
- 2. There is an automatic switchover of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) from injection to recirculation.
- 3. The plant operates with two of the three PORV block valves closed. This feature tends to increase the CDF by reducing the pressure relief capability in response to an ATWS.
- 4. Ventilation to the emergency switchgear rooms is required. This feature tends to increase CDF by requiring the emergency switchgear ventilation to support IE power operation.
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The licensee defined a vulnerability as "the fundamental contributers to risk" in the important scenarios. Based on this definition, the IPE identified eight front-end vulnerabilities:
- 1. AC power generation capability,
- 2. Reactor trip breaker failure,
- 3. Pressurizer PORV block valve alignment,
- 4. I Loss of emergency switchgear room HVAC,
- 5. RCP seal cooling for SB0, l
- 6. Battery capacity for SG level during SBO, j
- 7. Pressurizer PORV sticking after loss of offsite ' Power,
- 8. Fast 4160 V bus transfer failures.
In addition, the licensee identified containment overpressurization and containment bypass as two back-end vulnerabilities, based on large, early release frequencies.
Plant improvements were identified.to address these vulnerabilities. These I
improvements, which were characterized by the licensee as shown below and.have
' not been reviewed by the staff, are either implemented or under evaluation by
.the licensee:
- 1. Cross-tie DGs between Units 1 and 2,
- 2. Enhance procedures to de-power bus for enhanced recovery for ATWS,
- 3. Enhanced procedures to prevent overheating of emergency switchgear,
- 4. Use of high-temperature 0-ring for RCP seal,
- 5. Enhanced procedures for load shedding and using portable battery ;
chargers to extend time of SG level indication under loss of AC power,
- 6. Enhanced procedures and training to reduce 4160 V. breaker failure ,
frequency, i 7'. Implement plant procedures and training to enhance the operator response to containment bypass sequences,
- 8. Use the diesel-driven fire system pump for some accident sequences'.
For LOCA outside the containment, the licensee identified the importance of ir? roving guidance to the operators on the key valve to close.
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1-111. . CONCLUSION Based on the above findings, the staff notes that: (1) the licensee's IPE is
. complete with regards to the information requested by GL 88-20 (and associated l guidance NVREG-1335), and (2) the IPE results are reasonable given the BV1 i- design, operation, and history. As a result, the staff concludes that the licensee's IPE process is cap;Sle of identifying the most likely severe accidents and severe accident vulnerabilities, and therefore, that the BV1 IPE i has met the intent of GL 88-20.
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It should be noted, that the staff's review primarily focused on the i licensee's ability to examine BV1 for severe accident vulnerabilities.
j Although certain aspects of the IPE were explored in more detail than others, i the review is not intended to validate the accuracy of the licensee's detailed
! findings (or quantification estimates) that stemmed from the examination.
l Therefore, this SER does not constitute NRC approval or endorsement of any IPE i material for purposes other than those associated with meeting the intent of i GL 88-20. However, because the licensee intends to continue to use and maintain its IPE, the staff encourages the licensee to improve the BV1 IPE in order to make it a valuable tool for other regulatory applications.
Date: September 30, 1996 i:
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I APPENDIX A BEAVER VALLEY I NUCLEAR PLANT INDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMINATION TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT (FRONT-END) 4 W
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APPENDIX A BEAVER VALLEY I NUCLEAR PLANT INDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMINATION TECHNICAL EVALVATION REPORT i
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