IR 05000302/2012004

IR 05000302-12-004, 07/01/2012 - 09/30/2012, Crystal River Unit 3; Routine Integrated Report

ML12298A503
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	10/24/2012
From:	Rich D NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB3
To:	Franke J Progress Energy Florida
References
IR-12-004
Download: ML12298A503 (22)

Text

UNITED STATES ber 24, 2012

SUBJECT:

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000302/2012004

Dear Mr. Franke:

On September 30, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Crystal River Unit 3. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on October 3, 2012, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they related to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). Adams is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Daniel W. Rich, Chief Reactor Project Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-302 License No. DPR-72

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000302/2012004 and w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72 Report No.: 05000302/2012004 Licensee: Progress Energy (Florida Power Corporation)

Facility: Crystal River Unit 3 Location: Crystal River, FL Dates: July 1, 2012 - September 30, 2012 Inspectors: T. Morrissey, Senior Resident Inspector N. Childs, Resident Inspector P. Capehart, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 1R11.2)

C. Fletcher, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 4OA5.4)

Approved by: D. Rich, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000302/2012004; 07/01/2012-09/30/2012, Crystal River Unit 3; Routine Integrated Report.

The report covered a three month period of inspection by the resident inspectors, a senior operations engineer and a senior reactor inspector. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4.

NRC Identified

& Self-Revealing Findings No findings were identified

Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status:

Crystal River 3 began the inspection period in No Mode with the full core off-loaded to the spent fuel pool. The unit remained in this condition for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

On August 27, 2012, the inspectors reviewed the licensees storm preparations for tropical storm Isaac. The inspectors verified that the licensee implemented actions in accordance with emergency management procedure EM-220, Violent Weather, for a potential tropical storm impacting the site. The inspectors verified that the licensees violent weather committee had been established and that preparations were made for tropical storm conditions. The corrective action program (CAP) database was reviewed to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting adverse weather protection issues.

Violent weather conditions were not experienced at the site.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial Equipment Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed walkdowns of the critical portions of selected trains to verify correct system alignment. The inspectors reviewed plant documents to determine the correct system and power alignments, and the required positions of select valves and breakers. The inspectors verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact mitigating system availability. Documents used to facilitate the system walkdowns are listed in the attachment. The inspectors verified the following four partial system alignments through system walkdowns.

• A and B trains of service water (SW) while SW pump SWP-1C was out of service for planned maintenance

• emergency diesel generators EGDG-1B and EGDG -1C, and B engineered safeguards (ES) 4160V bus while EGDG-1A was out of service for planned maintenance

• A train of decay heat (DH), emergency nuclear services raw water (RW), and decay heat closed cycle cooling (DC) systems while the B train of emergency core cooling system (DH, RW, and DC) was out of service for planned maintenance

• B train of emergency nuclear services RW, SW, and spent fuel (SF) pool cooling while the A train of emergency core cooling system and the normal nuclear services raw water pump were out of service for planned maintenance

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Complete System Walkdown: Emergency Feedwater (EFW) and Makeup (MU) Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the condition of the EFW system (motor-driven EFW pump EFP-1, turbine-driven pump EFP-2, and diesel-driven pump EFP-3)and the MU system (makeup pumps 1A, 1B, and 1C). Both systems have been in an extended layup condition since the unit was shut down in 2009. The inspectors reviewed outstanding maintenance work orders (WOs) to verify that deficiencies identified were properly scheduled to be addressed during the extended shutdown period. In addition, the inspectors reviewed open condition reports (CRs) in the CAP to verify that system problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. The second quarter 2012 EFW and MU system health reports and system engineer walkdown summary reports (MU system report dated July 3, 2012, and EFW system report dated May 9, 2012) were reviewed to ensure equipment issues identified were properly addressed in the CAP. The inspectors completed walkdowns of both systems to verify deficiencies had been documented in the licensees CAP. This constituted two samples representing performance of complete system walkdown activities.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Complete System Walkdown: A and B Train Decay Heat Removal (DH) System

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a detailed walkdown and review of the alignment and condition of both trains of the DH system. The inspectors utilized licensee procedures, as well as licensing and design basis documents to verify that the system (i.e., pump, valve, and electrical) alignment was correct. During the walkdown, the inspectors also verified that the pumps, valves, and piping associated with the DH system did not exhibit leakage that would impact its function; components were correctly labeled; hangers and supports were installed and functional; and essential support systems were operational.

In addition, pending design and equipment issues were reviewed to determine if the identified deficiencies impacted the system functions. The second quarter 2012 DH system health report and system engineer walkdown report (dated July 3, 2012) were reviewed to ensure equipment issues identified were properly addressed in the CAP. A review of open WOs and CRs was performed to verify that the licensee had appropriately characterized and prioritized equipment problems for resolution in the corrective action program. This completed one sample for a complete system walkdown inspection. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the plant to assess the licensees implementation of the fire protection program. The inspectors verified that the areas were free of transient combustible material and other ignition sources. Also, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and compensatory measures for fire protection problems were verified. The inspectors checked fire suppression and detection equipment to determine whether conditions or deficiencies existed which could impair the function of the equipment. The inspectors selected the areas based on a review of the licensees probabilistic risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees fire protection program to verify the requirements of final safety analysis report (FSAR) Section 9.8, Plant Fire Protection Program, were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. The inspectors toured the following five areas important to safety:

• A train DH and building spray (BS) vault

• alternate AC emergency diesel generator EGDG-1C building

• auxiliary building SF pool area

• emergency feedwater pump EFP-3 building

• auxiliary building 143 elevation

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

Internal Flood Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Crystal River Unit 3, FSAR, Chapter 2.4.2.4, Facilities Required for Flood Protection, and the Crystal River Unit 3 design basis documents that depicted protection for areas containing safety-related equipment to identify areas that may be affected by internal flooding. A walkdown of the auxiliary building 95 foot elevation seawater room was conducted to ensure that flood protection measures were in accordance with design specifications. Specific plant attributes that were reviewed included structural integrity, sealing of penetrations, and operability of sump systems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

a. Inspection Scope

On August 7 and August 14, 2012, the inspectors observed and assessed two separate licensed operator crews response and actions for licensed operator simulator evaluated session SES-61. Session SES-61 involved a reactor coolant leak outside containment, a reactor coolant pump seal failure, a steam generator tube leak and subsequent tube rupture, a reactor trip, and a stuck open steam generator atmospheric dump valve. The plant degraded to a point where the licensee entered a site area emergency declaration.

The inspectors observed the operators use of emergency operating procedures EOP-02, Vital System Status Verification, and EOP-06, Steam Generator Tube Rupture and abnormal procedures AP-520, Loss of RCS Coolant or Pressure, and AP-510, Rapid Power Reduction.

The operators actions were verified to be in accordance with the above procedures.

Event classification and notifications were verified to be in accordance with emergency management procedure EM-202, Duties of the Emergency Coordinator. The simulator instrumentation and controls were verified to closely parallel those in the actual control room. The inspectors attended the crew critique and evaluation to verify that the licensee had entered any adverse conditions into the corrective action program. The inspectors also verified that areas for improvement identified for each crew member during the 2012 licensed operator annual simulator examination were adequately challenged and critiqued during this SES. The inspectors evaluated the following attributes related to crew performance:

• clarity and formality of communication

• ability to take timely action to safely control the unit

• prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms

• correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency operation procedures, and emergency plan implementing procedures

• control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions

• oversight and direction provided by supervision, including ability to identify and implement appropriate technical specification actions, regulatory reporting requirements, and emergency plan classification and notification

• crew overall performance and interactions

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Review of Licensee Requalification Examination Results

a. Inspection Scope

On April 30, 2012, the licensee completed administration of the annual requalification operating tests which are required to be given to all licensed operators in accordance with 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2). The inspectors performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating tests, as well as the crew simulator operating tests. These results were compared to the thresholds established in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process (SDP).

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees effectiveness in performing routine maintenance activities. The review included the identification, scope, and handling of degraded equipment conditions, as well as common cause failure evaluations, and the resolution of historical equipment problems. The inspectors verified that the components reviewed were appropriately classified per 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2). The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. The inspectors conducted this inspection for the following three items:

• Alternate AC diesel generator system (EGDG-1C)

• CR 520615, RW pressure switch RW-63-PS failed to function due to flow blockage

• Control complex chiller system (CHHE-1A, 1B)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

.1 Temporary Modification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed one temporary modification which was in effect during the installation of engineering change (EC) 76363, Radiation Monitors RM-A1 and RM-A2 Replacement. The temporary modification consisted of a temporary change to abnormal procedure AP-250, Radiation Monitor Actuation, installation of two temporary dose rate instruments on the auxiliary building ventilation duct, and two operator standing instructions. The inspectors reviewed the FSAR and design basis documentation to verify the temporary modification did not adversely affect the safety functions of important safety systems. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed licensee engineering procedure EGR-NGGC-0005, Engineering Change, to determine if the temporary modification was properly developed and implemented. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Temporary Modification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification implemented by EC 85752, Reduce Crystal River Unit 3 (CR3) 230kV Switchyard Required Voltage for R16 Extended Outage. This temporary modification consisted of temporary revisions to CR3 and energy control center (ECC) procedures, one standing instruction for the operators, and calibrations of the A and B train 4160V ES bus second level undervoltage relays (SLURs) to the revised alarm setpoints. The inspectors reviewed the associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening as well as FSAR and design basis documentation to ensure the modification did not adversely affect the safety functions of important safety systems.

The inspectors reviewed the completed installation documents to verify consistency with the modification documents. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed licensee engineering procedure EGR-NGGC-0005, Engineering Change, to determine if the temporary modification was properly developed and implemented. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed post-maintenance test procedures and test activities, as appropriate, for selected risk significant systems to verify whether:

(1) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed;

(2) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents;

(3) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application;

(4) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; and

(5) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The five post-maintenance tests reviewed are listed below:

• SP-354A, Monthly Functional Test of the Emergency Diesel Generator EGDG-1A, after performing planned maintenance per WOs 2068691, 1876685, and 1820221

• SP-340E, DHP-1B, BSP-1B and Valve Surveillance, (DH portion only), after performing planned maintenance per WOs 2037240, 1905289, and 1970177

• SP-335B, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Functional Test of RMLS and RM-A3, A4, A7 and A8, after performing maintenance on auxiliary duct radiation monitor RM-A8 per WO 2110251

• SP-340B, DHP-1A, BSP-1A and Valve Surveillance, after performing planned maintenance per WOs 1901080, 1911009, and 1901082

• SP-340A, RWP-3B, DCP-1B and Valve Surveillance, after performing planned maintenance per WOs 1403185, 1981696, and 1901006

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

Steam Generator Replacement Refueling Outage (RFO16)

a. Inspection Scope

On September 26, 2009, the unit was shut down for a steam generator replacement refueling outage. The previous quarters NRC inspection activities in this area were documented in NRC integrated inspection report 05000302/2012003. During this quarter, the inspectors observed and monitored licensee controls over the refueling activities listed below. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

• outage related risk assessment monitoring

• controls associated with reactivity management of the spent fuel pool (SFP)

• controls associated with electrical and mechanical alignments for those systems used to support SFP cooling

• implementation of equipment clearances

• foreign material exclusion controls associated with the SFP during containment repair activities

• work controls associated with the protection of SFP cooling and support systems from maintenance activities

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors either observed or reviewed the four surveillance tests listed below to verify that improved technical specification (ITS) surveillance requirements were followed and that test acceptance criteria were properly specified. The inspectors verified that proper test conditions were established as specified in the procedures, that no equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria had been met. Additionally, the inspectors also verified that equipment was properly returned to service and that proper testing was specified and conducted to ensure that the equipment could perform its intended safety function following maintenance or as part of surveillance testing.

In-Service Test:

• SP-311, Diesel Fuel Transfer Pump Surveillance (DFP-1A portion only)

• SP-375B, CHP-1B and Valve Surveillance Surveillance Test:

• SP-907B, Monthly Functional Test of 4160V ES Bus B Undervoltage and Degraded Grid Relaying

• SP-354B, Monthly Functional Test of the Emergency Diesel Generator EGDG-1B (fast start)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation Emergency Preparedness Drill

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed one emergency response activity to verify the licensee was properly classifying emergency events and making the required notifications and appropriate protective action recommendations. The inspectors assessed the licensees ability to classify emergent situations and make timely notification to State and Federal officials in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72. Emergency activities were verified to be in accordance with the Crystal River Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Section 8.0, Emergency Classification System, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. Additionally, the inspectors verified that adequate licensee critiques were conducted in order to identify performance weaknesses and necessary improvements.

• July 10, radiological emergency response training drill involving a tornado striking the protected area, a steam generator tube leak, and a radiological release to the environment

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems Cornerstones

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee submittals for the PIs listed below for the period of July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012, to verify accuracy. Performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Rev. 6, were used to review the reporting for each data element. The inspectors reviewed licensee events reports, operator logs, and daily plant status reports to verify the licensee accurately reported the data. The inspectors verified that any deficiencies affecting the licensees performance indicator program were entered into the corrective action program (CAP) and appropriately resolved.

• Safety System Functional Failures

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Daily Review

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by attending daily plant status meetings, interviewing plant operators and applicable system engineers, and accessing the licensees computerized database.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Sample Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee administrative instruction AI-6000T, Unit Preservation Review Plan, Revision 0, to assess the status of the plan and to determine whether the plan had been properly implemented. The licensee initiated the unit preservation plan as a result of the extended outage. The inspectors review focused on the building spray (BS), emergency feed water (EFW), makeup (MU), reactor coolant (RC) and once through steam generator (OTSG) systems, which are not routinely operated or surveillance tested in the current no mode condition. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action database to verify that issues identified throughout implementation of the preservation plan had been evaluated and corrected in a timely manner. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees work management database to ensure that preventative maintenance items associated with the above systems were being completed as prescribed in the plan. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, the inspectors performed a review of the licensees CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector CAP item screening discussed in section 4OA2.1 above, plant status reviews, plant tours, and licensee trending efforts. The inspectors review nominally considered the six month period of April 2012 through September 2012, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when the scope of the issue warranted. The review also included issues documented in various departmental quarterly trend reports for the 2nd quarter of 2012, the licensees September 2012 Plant Health Committee Site Focus List, daily operator log entries, and maintenance rule (MR)reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees corrective action program were reviewed for adequacy.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified. The inspectors evaluated the licensees trend methodology and observed that the licensee had performed adequate trending reviews and appropriately addressed identified trends within the CAP. The inspectors did not identify any new trends.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.

These observations took place during normal and off-normal plant working hours.

These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors normal plant status reviews and inspection activities.

b. Finding No findings were identified.

.2 Steam Generator Replacement Project and Containment Wall Repair (IP 50001)

a. Inspection Scope

During this quarter, the licensee performed limited field work associated with containment wall repair. As of the end of this inspection period, major field work activities had not been approved or scheduled. Containment stability was being monitored utilizing installed acoustic and displacement sensors. The licensee, as necessary, also performed impulse response scans of the containment walls to determine if there was any degradation of the walls. The data from the sensors and scans was periodically monitored by the inspectors to verify containment stability.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 (Discussed) NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/187, Inspection of Near-Term Task

Force Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns, and NRC TI 2515/188, Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

Inspectors accompanied the licensee on a sampling basis, during their flooding and seismic walkdowns, to verify that the licensees walkdown activities were conducted using the methodology endorsed by the NRC. These walkdowns are being performed at all sites in response to a letter from the NRC to licensees, entitled Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No.

ML12053A340).

3 of the March 12, 2012, letter requested licensees to perform seismic walkdowns using an NRC-endorsed walkdown methodology. Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) document 1025286 titled, Seismic Walkdown Guidance, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12188A031) provided the NRC-endorsed methodology for performing seismic walkdowns to verify that plant features, credited in the current licensing basis (CLB) for seismic events, are available, functional, and properly maintained.

4 of the letter requested licensees to perform external flooding walkdowns using an NRC-endorsed walkdown methodology (ADAMS Accession No.

ML12056A050). Nuclear Energy Industry (NEI) document 12-07 titled, Guidelines for Performing Verification Walkdowns of Plant Protection Features, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12173A215) provided the NRC-endorsed methodology for assessing external flood protection and mitigation capabilities to verify that plant features, credited in the CLB for protection and mitigation from external flood events, are available, functional, and properly maintained.

b. Findings

Findings or violations associated with the flooding and seismic walkdowns, if any, will be documented in future reports.

.4 (Discussed) Temporary Instruction (TI) -2515/182 - Review of the Implementation of the

Industry Initiative to Control Degradation of Underground Piping and Tanks, Phase 1

a. Inspection Scope

Leakage from buried and underground pipes has resulted in ground water contamination incidents with associated heightened NRC and public interest. The industry issued a guidance document, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 09-14, Guideline for the Management of Buried Piping Integrity, (ADAMS Accession No. ML1030901420), to describe the goals and required actions (commitments made by the licensee) resulting from this underground piping and tank initiative. On December 31, 2010, NEI issued Revision 1 to NEI 09-14, Guidance for the Management of Underground Piping and Tank Integrity, (ADAMS Accession No. ML110700122), with an expanded scope of components which included underground piping that was not in direct contact with the soil and underground tanks. On November 17, 2011, the NRC issued TI-2515/182 Review of the Industry Initiative to Control Degradation of Underground Piping and Tanks, to gather information related to the industrys implementation of this initiative.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees programs for buried pipe and underground piping and tanks in accordance with TI-2515/182 to determine if the program attributes and completion dates identified in Sections 3.3 A and 3.3 B of NEI 09-14, Revision 1 were contained in the licensees program and implementing procedures. For the buried pipe and underground piping program attributes, with completion dates that had passed, the inspectors reviewed records to determine if the attribute was in fact complete and to determine if the attribute was accomplished in a manner which reflected good or poor practices in program management.

b. Observations The licensees buried piping and underground piping and tanks program was inspected in accordance with paragraphs 03.01.a through 03.01.c of TI-2515/182 and was found to meet all applicable aspects of NEI 09-14 Revision 1, as set forth in Table 1 of the TI.

Based upon the scope of the review described above, Phase 1 of TI-2515/182 was completed.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On October 3, 2012, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J.

Franke, Site Vice President, and other members of licensee management. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

B. Akins, Superintendent, Radiation Protection

C. Bergstrom, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness

P. Dixon, Manager Training

B. Foster, Manager, Operations

J. Franke, Vice President, Crystal River Nuclear Plant

T. Hobbs, Plant General Manager

J. Huegel, Manager, Maintenance

M. Kelly, Manager Outage and Scheduling

R. Llewellyn, Superintendent Operations Training

S. Valeri, Senior Engineer

D. Westcott, Supervisor, Licensing

R, Wiemann, Manager, Nuclear Oversight

B. Wunderly, Director, Engineering

NRC personnel

D. Rich, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3, Division of Reactor Projects

T. Morrissey, Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

None

Discussed

05000302/2515/187 TI Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Flooding Walkdowns (Section 4OA5.3)

05000302/2515/188 TI Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns (Section 4OA5.3)

05000302/2515/182 TI Review of the Implementation of the Industry Initiative to Control Degradation of Underground Piping and Tanks, Phase 1 (Section 4OA5.4)