ML18017A284

Forwards Summary Rept of Safety Evaluations Approved During Period 940101-950508

ML18017A284
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	11/15/1995
From:	BYRAM R G PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
PLA-4385, NUDOCS 9511270008
Download: ML18017A284 (276)

Text

95%01 OCP-7Z.II i The proposed action is to install a two (2)position (NORM-BYPASS)switch in the control of the following valves to prevent containment isolation and to improve operator response so that Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)can be performed as intended: 2)3)4)MSIVs-Div.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)-Control Logic A and Control Logic C for: 1.1 Inboard MSIVs: HV-2F022A through D 1.2 Outboard MSIVs;HV-2F028A through D CIG HV-22603, Div.1 CIG SV-22651, Div.1 CIG SV-22605, Div.2 QlJRdhBX: No.Chapters 6,7,'l5 of the FSAR and NUREG%776 were reviewed to determine if the.proposed action has an effect on the spectrum of postulated initiating events for which transients or anticipated operational occurrences and accident conditions were analyzed, The proposed action does not affect any of the postulated initiating events identified in chapters 6,7,15 of FSAR and NUREG-0776.

The consequences of an accident are riot changed by this proposed action.The addition of the bypass switches does not affect the safety functions of the-existing components.

This modification reduces the chance of core damage.and containment failure during ATWS events which dominate the core damage probability.

Therefore, this.modification does not increase the pr'obability of occurrence of a malfunction.

of equipment analyzed in the FSAR.II No.With this modification, there is no pos'sibility of creating an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.This modification installs G.E.CR2940 bypass switches, MDR isolation relays, indicating lights, fuses, fuseblocks, cables and terminal blocks.The components being added by this modification are dynamically qualified and analyzed for installation in their prop'osed locations.

III No.Technical Specification 3/4.4.7 MSIVs requires that two MSIVs per main steam line be operable with closing times greater than or equal to 3 and less than or equal to 5 seconds.This requirement is in place to contain fission products and to ensure the core is not uncovered following line breaks.The proposed action does not affect any Technical Specification requirements.95-002 DCP.3Ui id This modification removes the existing plugs in the Units 1 and 2 upper and lower cable spreading room floor drains and installs rupture discs at the ends of the drain discharge piping that are located in the Units 1 and 2 Turbine Buildings.

Installing the rupture discs will prevent water back up into the cable spreading rooms, and removing the floor drain plugs will.satisfy the FSAR 9.5.1.2.14 requirement to have floor drains to drain any fire protection water.SJhfhthRY:

No.The removal of the floor drain plugs and addition of rupture discs in the drain discharge piping does not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an inadvertent, fire or actuation of the sprinkler systems in the cable spreading rooms.It decreases the probability of occurrence or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety since it permits removal of fire protection water before it creates a flooding hazard to equipment located in the cable spreading room as is presently described in FSAR Section 9.5.1.2.14.

II No This modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR since it restores the floor drains to the open configuration that is described in the FSAR (FSAR 3.4, 9.5.1.1.9, and 9.5.1.2.14) for Fire Protection purposes while providing the required control structure leak tightness (see FSAR 6.4.2.3 and 6.4.2.4)through a new rupture disc.No.The planned modification will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications.

Technical Specification 3/4.7.2 (Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System)is applicable to this modification since it, requires that'the Control Structure be maintained at a positive pressure of 1/8 inch W.C.relative to the outside atmosphere.

'The existing plugs in the floor drains and steel barrier enclosing the lower cable spreading rooms drain discharge piping, in the control structure perform this function.With this change, the Control Structure Pressure Integrity boundary shifts from the removed floor drain plug to the new rupture disc and existing drain piping located in the Turbine Building.

9503 OCP, Ii i The proposed action is to remove pipe supports EBB102-H24 and.-H25 connected to HPCI minimum flow bypass valve HV-1 55F012 in order to correct an error in piping calculation.

f SlRlhL4dE:

No.This modification has no impact on the dynamic qualification of HV-155F012 as discussed in Section 3.9.3.2b.2 of the FSAR since the actual dynamic accelerations at the valve during a dynamic event are.below allowable.

The design stroke time will remain within the FSAR limit of 10 seconds after implementation of the modification.

The valve leakage criteria is not changed by this modification, nor does it change the LLRT requirements of FSAR Section 6.2.6.3.Also this modification will not affect valve operability or circuit signal logic.Also, the HPCI system and its basis is not affected which is addressed in FSAR Section 6.3.2.2.1.

Therefore, this modification will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously analyzed in the FSAR.No.The proposed modification retains the ability of HV-155F012 to perform its intended design function, as described in FSAR Sections 6.2A.3.3.3 and.6.3.2.2.1 and FSAR Table 6.2-12.The modification does not change the stroke time of the valve beyond that previously contained in the design basis for SSES as described in FSAR Table 6.2-12.Also this modification does not decrease the valves allowable seismic acceleration below the actual value determined in the piping analysis, as described in FSAR Section 3.9.3.2b.2.

It also assures the ability to open or close the valve when required, as described in FSAR Section 6.2.4.3.3.3.

and 6.3.2.2.1 and FSAR Table 6.2-12.This modification does not adversely affect the valve leakage, as described in FSAR Section 6.2.6.3 and FSAR Table 6.2-22, nor does it affect any other equipment in the HPCI system, as described in FSAR Section 6.3.2.2.1.

Based on the above conclusions, the proposed modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The modification does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the bases of any Technical Specifications'(Tech Specs), particularly Tech Specs bases 3/4.5.1, 3/4.6.1.1, 3/4.6.1.2.

and 3/4.6.3.Valve pressure boundary integrity and seat leakage are not affected.The valve stroke time is within the design basis analysis bounds of 10 seconds, and there are no adverse effects to any other systems/components by this modification.

Therefore, this modification has no effect on the HPCI system intended design function or the bases of above Tech Specs.

95%04 pc The proposed action is to modify HV-255F012 by increasing the actuator size, and by replacing the motor, yoke clamp, and existing circuit breaker.This will increase the pullout torque, and provide an improved range of torque switch settings.I No, The modification has no impact on the dynamic qualification of the Motor Operated Valve (MOV)as discussed in Section 3.'9.3.2b.2 of the FSAR.The new MOV design stroke time will be within the FSAR (Table 6.2-12)limit of 10 seconds after implementation of the modification.

The increased actuator torque will improve the valve's capability to isolate, while not adversely affecting the pressure retaining capability of the valve.The valve leakage criterion are not changed by this modification nor will this modification change the LLRT requirements of FSAR Section 6.2.6.3 and Table 6.2-22.The modification has no impact on the seismic qualification of control center 2D264 since a new starter is not being added.The proposed modification will not increase the probability of occurrence of the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously analyzed in the FSAR., II No.Considering the summary in section I,.it is concluded that the proposed modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.III No.This modification does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the bases of any Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), particularly Tech Specs 3/4.5.1,.3/4.6.1.1, 3/4.6.1.2, 3/4.6.3 and 3/4.8.2.Valve pressure boundary integrity and seat leakage are not affected and the valve stroke time is within the design basis analysis bounds of 10 seconds.There are no effects to the system or any of the components by this modification.

The changes to the DC power sources, cables and raceways meet the General Design Criteria and commitments outlined in Tech Spec 3/4.8.2.

95%05~CP-,Ui 1 The purpose of this modification is to change the control logic of coolin'g water valve F059 to prevent potential flooding of the Barometric Condenser, HPCI turbine, and steam exhaust piping.I No.Changing the control logic of the cooling water valve F059 does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The modification only changes the post accident operation of valve F059.This modification does not increase the consequences of an accident because the modification does not change the accident mitigating design or performance of the HPCI system.The modification does not increase the consequences of a malfunction.

These systems are designed to function in the event of a HPCI failure and are not affected in any way by this modification.

It was also concluded that the modification will not increase the overall probability of occurrences of a malfunction of HPCI II No.The HPCI turbine, pump, piping, support structures and initiation logic are*not being changed by this modification.

Changing valve F059 logic to parallel the HPCI turbine operation does not create the possibility of an~accident of a different type because the affected HPCI system components only operate in response to an accident and the modified components only effect post accident operations.

This modification does not create a'possibility for a malfunction of a different type because the replacement trip.relay has the same failure modes as the relay it replaces and failure of F059 is already addressed as.a failure of the HPCI system.III No.Changing the control logic of cooling water valve F059 does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications.

System initiation and flow delivery in response to an accident are not changed by this modification.

95%06 C 9.9 The purpose of this modification is to replace the valve actuator motor pinion gear and worm gear on HV-15766 to reduce the stroke time and provide adequate margin below the Technical Specification (Tech Spec)limit of thirty seconds.No.The modification has no impact on the dynamic qualification of the Motor Operated Valve (MOV)discussed in Section 3.9.3.2b.2 of the FSAR.After implementation of the modification, the MOV design stroke time will be decreased to'approximately 2?.3 seconds which is below the Tech Spec (Table 3.6,3-1)limit of thirty seconds.ln addition, the decreased MOV.design stroke time will improve system response.This modification does not require changes to the electrical power supply or control portion of the valve.Since the valve's pressure retaining capability is maintained, the leakage characteristics are unaffected, and the stroke time is within the'esign basis, this modification will not increase the probabilityof occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously analyzed in the FSAR.No.Considering the summary in section l, it is concluded that the proposed modification does not create the possibility for an accident of malfunction of.~a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.ill No.The modification does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the Bases of any Tech Specs, particularly Tech Spec bases 3/4.6.1.1, 3/4,6.1.2, 3/4.6.2, and 3/4.6.3,.With the result of the proposed modification being decreased valve stroke time and adequate thrust, the above Tech Spec bases will be better supported by the implementation of this modification.

Therefore, this modification has no effect on the containment isolation design function or the basis of the, above Tech Specs.

9M07 C , B, C, U i I The purpose of this modification is to install eight additional vibration transducers on each reactor recirculation pump to properly monitor the vibratory behavior of each pump.I No.II No.This modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of any accident evaluated in the FSAR.The installation of this equipment or its failure would not be an initiating cause for the events analyzed in the FSAR.The modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety, This modification enhances pump monitoring capabilities and a decrease in the probability of a malfunction of equipment is expected.This modification does not increase the consequence of an accident since the modification does not affect any safety functions of the system.The modification does not increase the consequences of malfunction of equipment since this equipment's failure to produce valid data is no different from the present configuration.

This modification does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR since non-safety equipment is being added to monitor pump vibration and failure of this equipment will not result in an accident.The modification

'does not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type, Failure of the proposed equipment does not involve a change in system operation or add a different failure mode.III No.The proposed action to enhance capability to monitor reactor recirculation pump vibration has no impact on the Technical Specification (Tech Spec}and does not affect the margin of safety defined in the basis for any Tech Specs.

95408 OC-9*The purpose of this modification is to install a new actuator stem and a new anti-rotation device to HV-251F017A/B.

This will preclude any rotation of the Motor Operated Valves (MOVs)during closure, and will ensure the limit switch settings are not altered during valve stroking.SUhdhSfE: I No.II'o.The installation of the new anti-rotation devices and actuator stems to MOVs HV-251F017A and B will ensure the valves function properly to support LPCI and SDC modes, of RHR.This modification will eliminate the possibility of misalignment of the limit switches and subsequent motor failure that existed with the original stem coupling design.Considering the above, the actions taken in this modification will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.This modification will also enhance the overall reliability of the MOVs, while allowing them to fulfill their design functions.

Therefore, there will be no increase in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.There is no increase in the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety because this modification does not change the operation or function of MOVs HV-251F017A and B or the RHR System.Considering the points stated in summary I, the proposed actions taken by this modification do'not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The use of the anti-rotation device for MOVs HV-251F017A and B will, have no adverse effects on the RHR System performance.

The opening and closing time of valves HY-251F017A and B will remain unchanged by this modification.

Considering this and the fact that the modification will meet all applicable design criteria, the proposed actions will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

95%09 DC->>...D, The purpose of this modification is to improve the overall reliability of the RPS power distribution system.This will be achieved by replacing the existing EPA logic cards with the new G.E.logic cards, disconnecting the instrument ground on the RPS Distribution Panels, and coordinating the underfrequency trip time delay setpoint with the main generator underfrequency protection scheme and Pf M interconnection-requirements.

No.The proposed modification will have no impact on the postulated initiating events identified in the engineered safety features and accident analysis of FSAR Chapters 6 and 15.This modification will reduce spurious trips of.the RPS from its power source circuits.Therefore, there is no increase in the probability of occurrence of an accident.These changes will result in an EPA with more reliable operation for the'PS buses under normal or accident conditions.

Thus, the proposed modification does not increase the consequences of a design basis accident.The uses of the new G.E.logic cards, which have the same function and similar setpoints as the existing EPA cards, will not affect the performance of equipment supplied by the RPS buses or increase the consequences of a malfunction of any equipment.

In addition, disconnecting the instrument ground and changing the underfrequency time delay setpoint do not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment.

No.The new logic card is a plug-in replacement for the existing card with additional trip status or indication and circuit test features and does not modify the EPA protection

'ircuit configuration.

The new underfrequency time delay setpoint does not change or affect the operation of any RPS load.The removal of the ground loops will eliminate system noise and produce more reliable EPA operation.

Considering all of these'points, the modification does not create the possibility fo'r an accident of a different type nor does it create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.No.The setpoints listed in Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)Section 4.8.4.3.b are applicable to the new logic cards that will replace the existing EPA cards.The'new underfrequency time delay setpoint will prevent a premature SCRAM and a probable LOOP by facilitating coordination with the PJM underfrequency load shedding program, The new time delay will ensure that SSES will not trip prematurely before the PPAL system automatic load shedding relays have attempted to stabilize the frequency by systematically removing bulk power loads.The new G.E.logic cards have also lowered the trip threshold voltage band from 2 volts to 1 volt thus reducing the uncertainty band prior to reaching the trip setpoints.

Therefore, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%10 OCP-,Ui d The purpose of this modification is to reconfigure the POWERPLEX CMS software.This will create a separate file structure and separate executable modules for the uprated and non-uprated Units.This modification will also enable POWERPLEX CMS perform an accurate calculation of percentage core thermal power level and allow output of total core flow in Mlbm/hr.No.The proposed modification involves an upgrade of non-safety related software, POWERPLEX CMS, resident on a non-safety related system, RDAS.The POWERPLEX CMS software is not designated as a system important to safety and does not affect any safety related systems.Therefore,'he installation of DCP 93-5006 does not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety.No.The installation of DCP 93-5006 only requires changes to the POWERPLEX CMS software resident on the RDAS computer system.This DCP does not change any of the'routines in the POWERPLEX CMS that calculate core reactivity, core power distribution, core exposure, or thermal limits.Therefore, the installation of DCP 93-5006 does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different.

type than any evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The proposed modifications to the POWERPLEX CMS software will not change the calculation of core reactivity, core power distributions, core exposures, or thermal limits.Therefore, the installation of DCP 93-5006 does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

95%11 The purpose of this modification is to modify HY-255F003 by replacing the actuator, motor, yoke clamp, stem nut, adapter plate, and disc.The replacement actuator will be larger (SMB-1-40 to SMB-2-60)to increase the stall torque and provide a range of acceptable torque switch settings for the valve under the current design requirements.

No.The modification has no impact on the dynamic qualification of the Motor Operated Valve (MOV)as discussed in Section 3.9.3.2b.2 of the FSAR since the actual accelerations of the valve during a dynamic event are less than the allowable accelerations.

Changing HV-255F003 motor actuator will provide sufficient thrust to insure the valve functions during all design conditions.

The ability to open or close the valve when required is not affected by the modification.

The valve's pressure retaining capability is maintained, the leakage characteristics are unaffected, and the stroke time remains within the design basis.Therefore, this modification will not increase the probability of occurrences or the consequences of an accident or.malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously analyzed in the FSAR.II No.Considering the points in summary I and the fact that the modification does not affect any other equipment in the HPCI system, it is concluded that the proposed modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The modification does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the bases of any Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), specifically Tech Spec bases 3/4.5.1, 3/4.6.1.1, 3/4.6.1.2, 3/4.6.3, and 3/4.8.2.Valve pressure boundary integrity and seat leakage are not affected.The valve stroke time is within the accident analysis bounds of 50 seconds.There are no effects to any of the system or components in this modification.

Therefore, this modification has no effect on the above Tech Specs.

95%12 C.>>.U The pr'oposed modification will replace the existing high pressure fu'el lines on Diesel Generators (D/Gs)A through E with the engine manufacturer's (Cooper-Bessemer) improved design.This will eliminate repeated fuel leaks and delivery valve fitting failures.Kh5lhRY: No.This modification does not increase the probability or occurrenc'e of an accident previously evaluated in the'FSAR since'/G failure is not an accident initiator.

This modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.Replacement of the high pressure fuel line and associated fittings with a new improved design, reduces the probability of failure in the fuel system and reduces the probability of equipment'alfunctions.

The proposed modification does not increase the consequences of an accident as previously evaluated in the FSAR.This modification improves the reliability of the high'pressure fuel oil system and improves the operability of the diesel engine.Therefore, availability of the D/G is enhanced, providing assurance that power to ESF loads are met.This modification does not increase the consequences of malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No..This modification does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR.The function and operation of the fuel system and the D/Gs are unchange'd.

Therefore, if the affected components, are going to fail, the failure mode would be essentially the same as the existing configuration.,The operation of the D/Gs have not been identified as an initiator for any accident and this modification does not have the possibility to create a different ty'pe of accident.This modification does not create a possibility for a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR.I No.The proposed modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)particularly Tech Specs 3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2, 3/4.8.2.1, 3/4.8.2.2 3/4.8.3.1, 3/4.8.3.2.

Only one D/G will be out of service at a time.The conditions for plant shutdown and refueling during operational conditions 4 and 5 will not be affected by this modification.

This modification also meets the requirements for DC and AC electrical power sources required during plant shutdown and plant operation respectively.

Also valve overload protection will be automatically bypassed when D/G"E's not aligned to the Class 1E distribution system.

95%13 0.>>,Il i>>The purpose of this modification is to modify HV-155F001 by'replacing the SMB-1-60 actuator with an SMB-2-60 actuator and the 4.3 HP motor with a higher torque rated 4.3 HP motor.The replacement actuator will be larger (SMB-1-60 to SMB-2-60)to increase the stall torque and to provide greater thrust to overcome a valve seat'leakage problem.No.This modification has no impact on the dynamic qualifications'of the'Motor Operated Valves (MOVs)as discussed in Section 3.9.3.2b.2 of the FSAR since the act'ual accelerations at the valve during a dynamic event are less than the allowable accelerations.

The MOV design stroke time will be within the FSAR (Table 6.3-8 and 7.3.1.1a.1.3.7) design limit of 20 seconds, The changing of the HV-155F001 motor actuator will provide sufficient thrust to ensure the valve functions during all design conditions.

The valve's pressure retaining capability is maintained, and the leakage characteristics are unaffected.

FSAR Section,6.3,2.2.1 that addresses the HPCI system and its basis is not affected since system performance and function is not impacted by this modification.

Considering the discussion above, this.~modification will'not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously analyzed in the FSAR.No.Considering the points stated in summary I, the proposed actions taken by this modification do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.No.This modification does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the bases of any Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)particularly Tech Specs 3/4.5.1 and 3/4.8.2.This modification has no effect on Tech Spec 3/4.5.1 because there are no effects to any of the system or components by this modification, valve integrity and seat leakage are not affected, and the stroke time is within the limit of 20 seconds.The change to the DC power sources, cables and raceways meets the General Design Criteria and commitments that ensures compliance with the functions specified in Tech Spec 3/4.8.2.

9M14 The purpose of this modification is to modify HV-255F001 by replacing the SMB-1-60 actuator with an SMB-2-60 actuator and the 4.3 HP motor with a higher torque rated 4.3 HP motor.The replacement actuator will be larger (SMB-1-60 to SMB-2-60)to increase the stall torque.The larger actuator will also provide greater thrust to overcome a valve seat leakage problem.I No.This modification has no impact on the dynamic qualifications of the Motor Operated Valve (MOV),.discussed in Section 3.9.3.2b.2 of the FSAR since the actual accelerations at the valve during a dynamic event are less than the allowable accelerations.

The MOV design stroke time will be within the FSAR (Table 6,3-8, and 7.3.1.1a.l.3.7) design limit of 20 seconds.Changing HV-255F001 motor actuator will provide sufficient thrust to ensure the valve functions during all design conditions, The ability to open or close the valve when required is not affected by the modification.

The HPCI system and its basis are not affected since system performance and function are not impacted by this modification.

Considering the discussion above, the modification will n'ot increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously analyzed in the FSAR.No III No Considering the points stated in summary I, the proposed actipns taken by these modifications do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.This modification does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the bases of any Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)particularly Tech Specs 3/4.5.1 and 3/4.8.2.This modification has no effect on Tech Spec 3/4.5.1 because there are no effects to any of the system or components by this modification, valve integrity and seat leakage are not affected, and the stroke time is within the limit of 20 seconds.The change to the DC power sources, cables and raceways meets the General Design Criteria and commitments that ensures compliance with the functions specified in Tech Spec 3/4.8.2.

95%15 NL-94401, Unit 1 The proposed modification initiates a bypass that will isolate a thru wall leak from the piping adjacent to LSH-10112B by closing two manual valves in the Main Steam Supply System.Sllh1hfddiL No.II'o.The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety will not increase with the implementation of this bypass.A review of FSAR Chapter 15 was performed to determine if the proposed action has any affect on the accident analysis already evaluated for SSES, and it was determined that the accident events/causes described in Chapter 15 are not affected by changes to the systems or components included in this bypass.The proposed bypass has no safety related function.Implementation of the bypass'ill not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.III No.Considering the above discussion, the proposed bypass has no affect on the basis of any Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), particularly Tech Specs 3/4.4.4.7 and 3/4.6.1.4.

9&016 DC The purpose of this modification is to upgrade the RBCWS chillers by rerating the chillers for a capacity of 718 tons, and by replacing shrouds and impellers with components of higher performance ratings.This will increase the chiller heat removal capacity.I No.The Chilled Water System performs no'safety related function other than containment isolation.

Therefore, the proposed modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident.This modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.The equipment involved in this modification is the RBCWS Chillers which do not perform any plant functions which are important to safety.Also, the additional heat rejected through the Service Water System to the cooling towers is insignificant and the Service Water System does not perform any plant functions which are important to safety.The proposed modification does not increase the consequences of an accident as previously evaluated in the FSAR.None of these accidents or events take credit for RBCWS or SWS operation because they are non-safety systems.This modification does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.The modification does not affect any other equipment that could potentially increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.II No.This modification does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.This modification does not involve changes in system function or contribute to a different type of failure mode.Failure of the chillers does not initiate an accident of any type and does not challenge the safety function of other systems.The modification does not change the function of the chillers or the overcurrent relays and does not change the operating modes of the chillers.Therefore this modification does not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.This modification does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the bases'of any Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)particularly Tech Spec Sections 3.6.1.7 and 3.8.3.2.This modification has no effect on Tech Spec Section 3.6.1.7 because this modification improves the ability of the system to achieve the design chilled water loop supply temperature of 50 degrees F under all power uprate conditions.

As a result, system performance using one chiller should provide more margin for maintaining the Tech Spec limit.This modification has no effect on Tech Spec Section 3.8.3.2.This modification will not affect the safety function of the 4.16 kV ES Switchgear and therefore will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for this Tech Spec.

The proposed action is to add an automatic transfer logic to the breaker trip circuitry of each divisionalized load supplied from the Unit 1 Channel C 4.16 kV Bus.The automatic transfer logic prevents a random single failure of the Unit 1 Channel A battery from affecting the operability of more than one channel of safety related equipment.

I No.The addition of an automatic transfer logic into the breaker trip circuitry of each divisionalized load supplied from the Unit 1 Channel C 4.16 kV Bus does not affect any of the postulated initiating events identified in Chapters 6 and 15 of the FSAR.Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR, This modification is within the error bounds associated with the original design calculations and does not constitute a significant increase in probability of the overall system malfunction.

This modification will assure that the trip circuitry operates for a random single failure of the Unit 1 Channel A battery should the single failure occur coincident with the accident and a LOOP condition.

Therefore, this modification does not increase the consequences of an accident.The MDR relays, the indicating lights, the disconnect

'switches, the fuses and the breakers are all qualified devices.Therefore, the proposed modification does not increase.the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.Chapters 6 and 15 of the FSAR were reviewed to determine if the proposed action had the potential of creating a postulated initiating event that would create the possibility for an accident of a different type.The review determined that this will not happen.This modification does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the bases of any Techriical Specifications (Tech Specs)particularly Tech Specs 3/4.7.1 and 3/4.8.3.Tech Spec 3/4.7.1 makes reference to the operability of.the Emergency Service Water System and Residual Heat Removal Service Water System.The proposed action does not affect the operability requirements of the Service Water Systems.Also the operability requirements of the Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System are not affected by the proposed action.Therefore, this modification has no effect.on Tech Spec 3/4.7.1.The proposed action ensures operability of the Unit 1 Channel C 4.16 Bus for a Unit 1 Channel A battery failure coincident with a LOCA/LOOP condition thereby maintaining the existing margin of safety for the Unit 1 Channel C 4.16 kV Bus.Therefore, this modification has no effect on Tech Spec 3/4.8.3~

9M18 The proposed action is to add an automatic transfer logic to the breaker trip circuitry of each of the divisionalized affiliated loads'supplied from the Unit 1 Channel D 4.16 kV Bus.The automatic transfer logic prevents a random single failure of the Unit 1 Channel B battery from affecting the operability of more than one channel of safety related equipment.

No.No.The addition of an automatic transfer logic into the breaker trip circuitry of each divisionalized or affiliated load supplied from the Unit 1 Channel D 4.16 kV bus does not affect any of the postulated initiating events identified in Chapters 6 and 15 of the FSAR.Therefore the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The addition of an automatic transfer logic irito the breaker trip circuitry of each divisionalized or affiliated load supplied from the Unit 1 Channel D 4.16 kV Bus does not affect actuation of the breaker trip circuitry.

This modification will assure that the trip circuitry operates for a random single failure of the Unit 1 Channel B battery should the single failure occur coincident with the accident and a LOOP condition.

Therefore, the proposed modification does not increase the consequences of an accident.The MDR relays, the indicating lights, the disconnect switches, the fuses and the breakers are all qualified devices.Therefore, the.proposed modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.~\Chapters 6 and 15 of the FSAR were reviewed to determine if the proposed action had the potential of creating a postulated initiating event that would create the possibility foF an accident of a different type.The review determined that this will not happen.No.This modification does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the bases of any Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)particularly Tech Specs 3/4.7.1 and 3/4.8.3.Tech Spec 3/4.7.1 makes reference to the operability of the Emergency Service Water System and Residual.Heat Removal Service Water System.The proposed action does not affect the operability requirements of the Service Water Systems.Also, the operability requirements of the Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System are not affected by the proposed, action.Therefore, this modification has no effect on Tech Spec 3/4.7.1.The proposed action ensures operability of the Unit 1 Channel D 4.16 Bus for a Unit 1 Channel B battery failure coincident with a LOCA/LOOP condition thereby maintaining the existing margin of, safety for the Unit 1 Channel D 4.16 kV Bus.Therefore, this modification has no effect on Tech Spec 3/4.8.3.

95%19 OC The proposed modification will clear the Circulating Water Pump'ouse (CWPH)rear truck doorway and supply two hose connections, related piping,'nd valves to tie-in the vendor demineralizer truck.These modifications will provide automatic isolation of the vendor truck'on high silica or high conductivity, the ability to rinse in the truck to the neutralizer basin and the ability to isolate the plant piping and drain the vendor hoses during freezing conditions.

No.FSAR Chapters 6 and 15 were reviewed to see if there are possible adverse consequences with respect to the installation of this modification.

Loss of seal water to the Circulating Water Pumps could cause them to trip resulting in a turbine trip and loss of condenser vacuum.This modification will not result'in an increase in the probability of occurrence of these events due to the storage capabilities of the Well Water and Clarified Water Storage Tanks and due to the capability to make clearwater from a vendor truck within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of notification..Therefore, the.probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.

The Makeup Demineralized Water;Domestic Water, and Raw Water Treatment Systems and the systems to which they connect are not safety related.The probability that a component failure that would prevent the Domestic Water, Makeup Demineralized Water, or Raw Water Treatment Systems from performing their design function is not increased by this modification.

Also the probability of contaminating the Demin Water Storage Tank is reduced by this modification.

Therefore, the probability of occurrence-of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.The proposed action does not involve.a precursor of or a significant contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.Therefore, there will.be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The proposed modification will be designed to meet all the requirements of the ASME/ANSI 831.1 Code to ensure its structural integrity, and guarantee that the Domestic Water, Makeup Demineralized Water, and Raw Water Treatment Systems will be able to operate and function as specified in the FSAR.The proposed action will not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.This modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of any plant system governed by Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).None of the parameters that are the bases for the Tech Specs will be adversely impacted by this modification.

'

95%20 CP, L The proposed modification will install a pressure retaining threaded pipe cap on the 2" ANSI B31.1 (HBD portion of DCA-202)drain line downstream of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB)ASME Section III Class I isolation valves 243F051A and 234F052A.This will resolve the probable valve seat leakage problems, prevent the leakage from contributing to the unidentified Reactor Coolant leakage to the drywell sump, and prevent further degradation of the valves'eating capabilities.

No.II No.III No.The postulated failure of the,HBD piping does not present a new mode of failure for the los~f-coolant accident.The change does not affect the operation or function of., the Reactor Recirculation System (RRS)or the RCPB.The proposed action does not involve a precursor of or contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.Therefore, there will be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR..As discussed in Summary I, the modification does not introduce any new failure modes for the affected systems, nor does it impact the systems in such a manner, that the probability of any type of accident would be increased.

Therefore, the proposed modification does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR.The Unit 2 Technical Specifications (Tech Spec)limits that are applicable to this'ystem with respect to this modification are described in Tech Specs 3/4.4.3 (3 4.3.2)and 3/4.4.8.This modification provides a secondary pressure retaining boundary downstream of the ASME Section III boundary that is intended to contain leakage (otherwise contributing to"unidentified leakage")due to normal wear of the boundary isolation valves until the valves are replaced in the near future.This modification will not adversely impact the structural integrity of the ASME Code Class 1 Components nor will it impede any periodic inspection or hydrotesting procedures.

The configuration created by this modification does not affect the existing boundaries of the bases for the Tech Spec limits or programmatic requirements identified.

Therefore, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

9M21~C-.,C, DCP 93-3093A 5 8,'nit 2 The proposed modification will modify the Unit 2 RHR and Core Spray pump discharge check valves.This modification will: 1)Limit disk opening angle to approximately 60 degrees to enhance the closing capability following pump shutdown 2)Ensure stability of disk during minimum and maximum flow conditions 3)Eliminate the valve handle while installing valve disc position indication off of the valve hinge pin 4)Achieve proper clearances to avoid interference between moving parts and the valve body.No.The check valve is not considered a high stress location, where pipe breaks could occur.Further, the modified check valves meet all design basis pressure and seismic requirements.

Therefore, there is no increase in the probability of occurrence of a high energy pipe break resulting from this modification.

Modification of the valves maintains the design basis structural integrity, meets system flow requirements'and significantly improves the disk.closing and,seating capabilities.

Therefore, the probability of malfunction of the pump discharge check valves has not increased.

Consequently, reliability of system operation and operation of equipment important.to safety in the Core Spray and RHR systems has not decreased.

This modification.

does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.Malfunction of the pump discharge check valves is not previously evaluated in the FSAR and is not considered the bovnding case for component failure.II No.This modification does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.System (Core Spray&RHR)function is unchanged.

Component (Punip discharge check valves)function is unchanged.

Flow through the pump discharge check valves meets design basis requirements for all modes of operation.

Modifications of the valves improves the capability to open , and close while maintaining dynamic qualification and position indication features.This modification does not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.Modification of the valves enhances the valves operational capabilities and is in accordance with ASME BRPV code requirements.

III No.The Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)reviewed for this particular modification were 2.1.4, 3/4.3.3, 3/4.4.9, 3/4.5.1, 3/4.5.2, 3/4.5.3, 3/4.6.2:2, 3/4.6.2.3, and 3/4.9.11.The margin of safety is not reduced for these particular Tech Specs.

95%22 E C~,U The modification modifies the process design of the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU)System to match the current operating valve lineup and normal mode flowrates.

SURRlhRY: h I No.This modification does not increase the probability of any accident evaluated in the FSAR including FSAR Sections 3.6, 5.4.8, 6, and 15.The proposed modification is designed in~accordance with the original Class 1 Piping requirement, Implementation of this modification does not impact the original design requirements of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB)or the RWCU System piping and valves.The dynamic qualification of the valve motor operator'assembly is not affected.The proposed modification does not impact the overcurrent protection of the containment penetration boxes because the circuits are disconnected.

'Also, the proposed modification does not affect the safety function of the RWCU System.Therefore, the proposed modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.This modification does not increase the consequence of a m'alfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.The modification maintains the RCPB, does not cause a malfunction of the F101 and F103 valves, or cause malfunction to any other equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.C II No.The proposed modification does not make any change to the reactor coolant'ressure boundary or to any safety systems.This modification does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR since all potential failure modes (mechanical and electrical) have been considered, and appropriate design features (dynamic, mounting, electrical, separation, isolation) have been incorporated into the design.These design features eliminate all credible failures that could potentially result in an unanalyzed event.No.This modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defi'ned in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech Spec)particularly Tech Spec Section 4.4.1.1.2.3.

The acceptance limit of maintaining temperature differential between the Rx Bottom Head Drain and the steam dome prior to starting of an idle recirculation loop during a hot standby condition, is not changed and will not be exceeded by placing the Unit with valve lined-up as implemented by this modification.

9~23 The modification installs sheet metal cable tray covers on cable tray E2P)16.The completed modification will support criteria of Deviation Request¹16 in the Fire Protection Review Report (FPRR).SUhlhdhlE:

No.AII cable tray cover installation will be done in accoidance with CDS-16, Thermal and Structural Loading Analysis for Cable Trays design criteria.All cable tray covering will be installed seismically, therefore, no safety impact concerns can result.No adverse ampacity or structural loading concerns will result from this modification.

Therefore, there will be no increase in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The proposed modification does not affect any safety functions of, the Class 1E Power System.Also this modification provides the necessary means to inhibit fire propagation in conjunction with the fire protection design basis and will in no way affect the offsite dose the public.Therefore, this modification does not i~crease the consequences of an accident.No adverse affects will happen to any of the equipment using this cabling.Therefore, there will be no increase in.the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as a result'f this modification.

ll No.Installing cable tray covers on cable tray E2PJ16 will not result in any risk to public health and safety.Therefore, this modification does not create the possibility for'ew accident scenarios or malfunctions of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR.ill No.The p'roposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)particularly Tech Spec Basis 3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2, and 3/4.8.3.The performance characteristics of all E2PJ16 tray cabling will essentially remain the same as delineated by the mentioned Tech Specs.The margin of safety inherent in the Deviation Request is not reduced since the enclosed cables have been analyzed using the established Appendix R methodologies, and the exclusion of the enclosed cable from area combustible loading totals is.consistent with the approach taken with other enclosed tray sections in the same Deviation Request.

95%24 SCl.,', The purpose of this modification is to increase the setpoint for the generator hydrogen low pressure switch, PSL-20184, to alarm at 65 psig, while leaving the maximum hydrogen gas operating pressure unchanged.

Raising the minimum hydrogen gas pressure to 65 psig from 60 psig will ensure operation within the generator reactive capability curve whenever power factors are greater than 0.95.RlMHAIE'No.The proposed modification is consistent with the original design.Therefore, increasing the setpoint of PSL-20184 does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The proposed modification also does not increase the consequences of an accident as'previously evaluated in the FSAR nor does it increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction'of equipment as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The proposed modification does not change the function or performance of the hydrogen cooling and temperature control system.Also, this system is not used in an accident.Considering these statements; the-proposed modification does not create a possibility,foi an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.A review of the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)confirmed that the hydrogen cooling and temperature control system for the main generator is not referenced.

Therefore, this modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

'94425 The proposed modification is to open four state's links in Panel TB-0150.Opening the links removes the intermittent grounding problem from the annunciator circuit so that the alarm will be clear and functional for the other three inboard vacuum breakers.I No.From FSAR Section 6,2, the safety function of the vacuum breakers concerns providing vacuum relief for the drywell during'an inadvertent drywell spray or small break LOCA event, minimizing the pressure differential across the drywell floor during LOCA events, and maintaining containment integrity by remaining closed during a LOCA to prevent steam bypass to the wetwell air space.With the alarms defeated, the vacuum breakers could open due to a pressure buildup in the wetwell (or vacuum in the drywell).However, this bypass only affects two inboard valves, and if the inboard and outboard valves on the C and E lines would open the outboard annunciator would alarm.Considering the discussion above, the modification will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously analyzed in the FSAR.II.No.The defeating of the input to the alarm from the vacuum breaker does not affect'the safety function or operability of the valve.It was determined that the annunciator does not prov'ide a safety related function, and its absence does not create any possibilities for accidents or malfunctions.

III No.The-existing annunciator problem'alarm in)does not affect vacuum breaker operability.

Vacuum breakers are closed and operable as required by Technical~Specification 3.6.4.Defeating the input from the Cl and E1 vacuum breakers to the annunciator does not affect vacuum breaker operability.

Thus, the Technical Specification basis (3/4.6.4)is not affected, and margins of safety are unchanged.95-026 The purpose of this modification is to modify the Unit 2 Class IE 250 VDC OV/UV annunciator isolation relay circuits.This will limit the voltage across the Class IE 250 VDC OV/UV annunciator during circuit energization.

No.The proposed does not increase the probability of an accident.The relay circuits monitor only overvoltage and undervoltage conditions and provide no system protective function.Also, the existing relays, Zener Diodes, and associated components are dynamically qualified for this application, are dynamically mounted, and are located in a mild environment, The sole function of the existing C Bc D undervoltage and overvoltage relays is to monitor for undervoltage and overvoltage on the Class 1E 250 VDC System and provide indication to the Control Room during a system disturbance.

The undervoltage and overvoltage relays are not necessary'o determine operability.

A failure of the relays to alarm does not.cause a battery charger problem or failure.Therefore, the proposed modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of a malfunction of equipment,A failure of the undervoltage and overvoitage relays does not impact the safe operation of the Class 1 E 250 VDC System.Also, there are no other failures in the Class 1E 250 VDC System that can be postulated as a result of the proposed changes.Therefore, it is concluded that the'proposed modification does not increase the consequences of an accident.II-8o III No The function of the existing relays has not changed from that of the previous installation.

No safety impacts exist for the proposed changes to the 250 VDC equipment.

Therefore, there is no possibility of creating an accident of a different type.The new Zener Diode and resistor are qualified components.

Therefore, there are no situations that could create the'possibility of a malfunction of a different type.The proposed modification has a minimal increase in the load of the 250 VDC System, but has no appreciable reduction in the margin of safety that is the basis for the battery operability requirements presented in Technical Specification (Tech Spec)4.8.2.l.d.

The Tech Spec operability requirements that are used as the bases to demonstrate operability of the 250 VDC System, are not affected by the proposed modification.

Therefore, the margin of safety is not adversely affected by this design change package.

95C27 c-.u The purpose of this modification is to replace phase"B" (2X101B)and phase"C" (2X101C)transformers for.the Unit 2 McGraw Edison GSU transformer with new ABB transformers.

This will decrease the possibility of an increase in the combustible gas level in the oil.I No.The replacement ABB generator step up transformers for phase B" (2X101B)and phase C (2X101C)are functionally compatible with'he existing McGraw Edison transformers in their ability to provide required voltage and current to the 500 kV transmission network.The associated modification work will be performed to supplement the transformer replacement so as to.satisfy existing codes and design bases, and to'provide the satisfactory operation of auxiliary equipment.

Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment related to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased as supported by the statements above.II'o The proposed action does not affect the plant electrical system that provides, normal and emergency AC power to reactor protection and engineered safety feature equipment.

Failure of the 2X101B and 2X101C generator step up transformer units will not prevent the plant electrical system from performing its design safety functions..

This modification constitutes replacement of existing equipment, and the reconfiguration of the 480 V AC power service to the 2X101A fan cooling scheme and will not cause a different type of accident scenario from those previously'evaluated.

Considering the above, the proposed modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The proposed modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)particularly, Tech Specs 3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2, and 3/4.8.3.The modification does not interfere with.the logic, control, or operation of any safety related plant power source, system, or'component.

95%28 OC,II i The proposed modification will replace the existing Containment Instrument Gas (CIG)Accumulator Relief Valve (PSV22645).

The existing valve will be replaced with a more reliable valve that will conform to the original design requirements.

5UlHhlhRY:

No.This modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of the accidents described in the FSAR Chapters 6 and 15, because the modification does not alter the original design basis for the CIG System and allows it to be operated as described in the FSAR.The affected portion of the CIG System serves no safety function and the modification meets all the design requirements specified in the FSAR Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.This modification ensures the integrity of the CIG System.The proposed action does not involve a precursor of, or contributor to, any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.Therefore, there will be no increase, in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.-This modification replaces existing pressure relief valve PSV22645 with a valve that is more reliable and maintainable..The new valve will not alter the function of the CIG piping nor will it degrade the operation of CIG Accumlator 2T215.This modification simply allows the CIG piping in question.to fulfill Its original design basis.Since this modification does not alter the original design basis of the CIG System, the modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III-No.This modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of any plant system governed by the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).None of the parameters that are bases for the Tech Specs are adversely impacted by this modification.

Therefore, the proposed modification will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%29 SCP j93-2102, Unit 2 The purpose of this modification is to restore the design basis of the Unit 2'Reactor Building HVAC (DX Refrigeration Units)by performing a setpoint change.This setpoint change involves expanding the refrigeration cycle and operating at increased cycle temperatures and pressures.

I No.Increasing the setting of the refrigerant compressor'high discharge pressure cutoff switches from 270 psig to 279 psig does not affect the ability to maintain the post DBA or Appendix R temperature limit(s).Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The setpoint change will actually increase the post accident reliability of the DX units.The overpressure protection function of PSH-27202A/B is still maintained with suitable margin above the calculated post DBA maximum operating pressure and below the system relief valve (PSV27203A/B) settings.Thereforethere is no increase in the.probability of a~malfunction of equipment important to safety.II No.Increasing the setpoint of PSH-27202A/8 from 270 psig to 279 psig does not conflict with the other compressor trip/alarm functions and no different types of accidents or malfunctions.

are created.Therefore, the proposed modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated-previously in the FSAR.III'No.Unit 2 Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)3/4.7 and B 3/4 were reviewed for.this setpoint change.Neither PSH-27202A/B nor the Unit 2 ESWGRALC refrigeration units are directly or indirectly addressed in the Unit 2 Tech Specs.Therefore, the proposed modification setpoint change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the design basis for any Tech Spec.

95%30 L This safety evaluation addresses the operability of the Unit 1 Bypass Valve (BPV)¹1 Fast-Acting Solenoid Yalve (FASV).The FASY sticks in the actuated position causing the¹1 BPV to remain open longer than expected.The safety evaluation shows that the safe operation of Unit 1 is not.affected by this situation.

Sllhih&E'o.

The function of the Bypass Valve is to limit reactor vessel pressure transients to minimize challenges to the Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs).This pressure-limiting function is based on the opening characteristics of the BPVs.These opening characteristics are not affected by the present condition of the FASV for the¹1 BPV.Therefore, There is nq increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as a result of this situation.

II No.The sticking of the FASV for the¹1 BPV is not expected to prevent the closing of the¹1 BPY, but if this occurs, the situation is bounded by the Main Steam Line (MSL)break outside of containment transient analysis in FSAR Section 15.6.4, or stuck open MSRV transient.

A stuck open bypass valve situation can eventually be terminated by closing the Main Steam Isolation Yalves (MSIVs).Plant safety is ,bounded by either of these transient analyses.III No.Based on the current observation of the¹1 BPY, SSES, and industry experience, it is reasonable to conclude that the¹1 BPV will continue to operate appropriately.

The margin of safety of Unit 1 is not compromised as a result of this situation.

95%31 DCP-,II I The purpose of this modification is to lower the water level in the Moisture Separator (MS)drain tanks by 10 inches.This will accommodate the higher level transient associated with the Power Uprate and help prevent a turbine trip.No.The proposed modification does not increase'the probability of occurrence of any accident evaluated in the FSAR, including FSAR Sections 6 and 15.The hardware relocations provide the same functions and meet the same design basis for the MS drain tank level instrumentation.

Potential failure modes of the relocated level transmitters have not changed.The action will reduce the probability of turbine trip after Power Uprate by providing additional margin between operating MS drain tank levels and the turbine trip setpoint.This modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment since it is relocating and recalibrating existing equipment while retaining the design bases of the original system.The modification does not increase the consequences of an accident since the modification does not affect any safety functions.

The modification will not affect the offsite dose to the public.This modification does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment since the only equipment malfunction that the MS drain tank level control system could initiate would be loss of control..Also, the lowering of the MS drain tank level by approximately 10 inches has no adverse impact on the operation of the feedwater heaters.No.This modification does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR.Potential failure modes of the relocated and recalibrated equipment are the same as those at the existing location.Ill" No The Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)do not govern the'operations of the MS drain tank level instruments.

Therefore, this proposed action does not affect the margin of safety defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

9M32 I DCP 93-3059, Unit 1 The purpose of this modification is to modify the two lower, condensing chambers (XY-B21-1D004A and XY-B21-1D004B) and the two upper condensing chambers (XY-B21-1D002 and XY-14202)in the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV).The vent modification for the two lower condensing chambers will install a modified condensing chamber and vent piping from each chamber to the associated one inch variable leg piping (DCA-138)from vessel nozzle N11A/B.The vent modification for the two upper condensing chambers will install a modified condensing chamber, vent piping from each chamber to the two inch vessel head vent piping (DBA-112)from vessel nozzle N7, and insulation on the vent piping.Both of these modifications will allow a flow of steam through each respective chamber which will prevent the accumulation of non-condensable and a concentration build-up in each respective chamber.No.A detailed review of the FSAR was made to determine if the proposed modification has an effect on the postulated initiating events for which transients or anticipated

'operational occurrences and accident conditions were analyzed.The proposed modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident at SSES.The probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment is not changed by this proposed modification.

Design considerations ensure that the integrity of the vent line is maintained during all modes of operation and that no adverse effects on plant equipment are introduced.

No new failure modes or mechanisms have been created.The reliability of the level indication system is actually enhanced, and will ensure that reference leg volume remains unaffected by non-condensable gases.The consequences of an accident are not changed by the proposed modification.

The addition of a new condensing chamber design and associated vent piping does not affect the safety functions of the existing components.

There will be no change in the radiological consequences of the pipe break accidents inside or outside the drywell.Also, there are no increases to the 10CFR100 offsite doses.Separation, redundancy, and ability to withstand single failure design requirements will be maintained.

Considering this review, the proposed modification will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment.

II No.The proposed modification does not create the possibility for an accident of a different type, nor does it create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type.The proposed modification installs passive components whose malfunction is enveloped by pipe break analysis previously evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The proposed modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech Spec), especially Tech Spec 3/4.3.Tech Spec 3/4.3 requires that RPV instrumentation be operable in all plant operating modes.This requirement is in place to ensure that there is adequate core cooling, sufficient cooling inventory, and that the plant operating requirements are maintained.

i 95-033 The purpose of this modification is to modify the two lower condensing chambers (XY-B21-2D004A and XY-B21-2D004B) and the two upper condensing chambers (XY-821-2D002 and XY-24202)in the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV).The vent modification for the two lower condensing chambers will install a modified condensing chamber and vent piping from each chamber to.the associated one inch variable leg piping (DCA-238)from vessel nozzle N11A/B.The vent modification for the two upper condensing chambers will install a modified condensing chamber, vent piping from each chamber to the two inch vessel head vent piping (DBA-212)from vessel nozzle N7, and insulation on the vent piping.Both of these modifications will allow a flow of steam through each respective chamber which will.prevent the accumulation of nonwondensable and a concentration build-up in each respective chamber.No.A detailed review of the FSAR was made to determine if the proposed modification has an effect'on the postulated initiating events for which transients or anticipated

.operational occurrences and accident conditions were analyzed.The proposed modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident at SSES.The probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment is not changed by this proposed modification, Design considerations ensure that the integrity of the vent line is maintained during all modes of operation and that no adverse effects on plant equipment are introduced.

No new failure modes.or mechanisms have been created.The reliability of the level indication system is actually enhanced,.and will ensure that reference leg volume remains unaffected by nonwondensable gases.The'onsequences of an accident are'not changed by the proposed modification.

The addition of a new condensing chamber de'sign and associated vent piping does not affect the safety functions of the existing components.

There will be no change in the radiological consequences of the pipe break accidents inside or outside the drywell.Also, there are no increases to the 10CFR100 offsite doses.Separation, redundancy, and ability to withstand'single failure.design requirements will be maintained.

Considering this review, the proposed modification will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment.

II No.The proposed modification does not create the possibility for an accident of a different type, nor does it create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type.The proposed modification installs passive components whose malfunction is enveloped by pipe break analysis previously evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The proposed modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech Spec), especially Tech Spec 3/4.3.Tech Spec 3/4.3 requires that RPV instrumentation be operable in all plant operating modes.This requirement is in place to ensuie that there is adequate core cooling, sufficient cooling inventory, and that the plant operating requirements are maintained.

The proposed modification ensures that this requirement is fulfilled.

95434 The purpose of this change is to add multi-pin quick disconnect connectors (QDC)at the interface , of the field cables and raceway system with the valve operator limit switch compartment.

These connectors are to facilitate the removal of the entire motor actuator from the valve during maintenance and VOTES testing.In addition, single-pin quick disconnect connectors are added to each phase of the power leads of the motor inside the limit switch compartment.

These connectors will permit separate removal of the motor from the actuator.No.No.The addition of the quick disconnect connectors does represent an increase in probability of an intentional trip of the reactor recirculation pump motor.,However, based on the high reliability of the connector and its ability to meet the required minimum safety function, the increase in probability is considered to be so small'or insignificant that the change in probability is negligible.

Also, the disconnecting of the space heaters in no way affects accident initiators.

Thus, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident.The disconnection of the space heaters increases the probability of condensation.

Also, the space heaters were d~nergized during the environmental and seismic qualifications.

SSES and industry experience have shown that space heaters have caused internal damage.Therefore, the modification reduces the probability of the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment.

The probability of an increase in the consequences of an accident is not affected by the proposed action.The safety function of all of the valves is not changed by the addition of the multi-pin and single-pin quick disconnect connectors, nor by disconnection of the space heaters.Also, the.proposed modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident of malfunction equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.Chapter 6 and 15 of the FSAR, were reviewed for this particular safety evaluation.

The review did not identify a postulated initiating event which would create the possibility for an accident of a different type.The multi-pin and'singl~in quick disconnect connectors are seismically and environmentally qualified to the valve motor actuator seismic and environmental conditions so that the connectors do not create any potential for a common mode failure.Thus, the possibility of a malfunction of the valve of a different type is not created.III No.The operability of the primary containment isolation valves HV-21343, HV;21346, HV-22603, HV-241F016, HY-244F001, and HV-249F007 are governed by Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3I4.6.3.The proposed action does not affect the operability requirements or maximum isolation times of Section 3(4.6.3.Thus, the margin of safety defined in the Tech Spec for the containment isolation valves is not affected.Tech Spec 3.8.4.2.1 requires thermal overload protection be continuously bypassed for the primary containment isolation valves listed above.The proposed action does not affect the operability requirements of the thermal overload protection in Section 3.8.4.2.1.

Therefore, the proposed modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%35 DC-*ili DCP 93-9071B, Unit 2 The purpose of this modification is to install additional cask pit drainage prevention barriers to those which already exist.This will provide additional assurance that inadvertent cask pit draindown events cannot occur when the cask storage pit gates are removed.No.This modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of the accidents described in FSAR Chapters 6 and 15 nor the Loss of Fuel Pool Cooling Event described in FSAR Appendix 9 because the modification meets the original design basis of the Spent Fuel Storage and Cooling Systems and actually decreases the probability of a pool inventory loss.The modification does not affect any equipment important to safety and it meets all of the design requirements specified in the FSAR.Also, as stated above, the modification meets the design basis specified in the FSAR.Th'erefore, the modification does not increase the probability

'of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The components affected by this modification comply with the original construction codes.Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR..II No.This modification will not alter the design basis of the Spent Fuel Cask Storage Pit that is part of the Spent Fuel Storage or Cooling Systems and will comply with the original construction codes.Therefore, this modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR.ill..No.The proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Teclinical Specification (Tech Spec), especially Tech Spec Section 3/4.9.9.None of the parameters that are the basis for the Tech Spec will be adversely impacted by this modification.

95%36 DC The purpose of this modification is to replace the four existing ITT Barton Suppression Pool Level transmitters with Rosemount transmitters.

This will'enhance the transmitter reliability.

No.This modification does not increase the probabilig of occurrence of the accidents described in the FSAR Chapters 6 and 15.'he four level transmitters will be~operated within their design basis and meet or exceed the seismic and environmental qualifications.

The probability of a malfunction of the new transmitters is not any greater than with the original.Also, this modification will not adversely affect any structure, system, or component from performing its safety function, and no common mode failures or adverse effects to any equipment or circuits are possible.Therefore, the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.

II No.The replacement of the ITT Barton level transmitters with the fully equivalent and qualified Rosemount transmitters, will not increase dose to the public above the Licensing Limit.There is no effect on the accidents that have radiological consequences as a result of this modification.

Also, no additional or new radiological consequences can occur.Therefore, there will be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.Accident scenarios or malfunctions of a different type cannot result because no unanalyzed or new adverse equipment or circuit effects are possible.Installation of the seismic and environmentally qualified replacement transmitters will not degrade the circuit from performing its design basis operation, Therefore, this proposed action does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The level transmitter replacements proposed in this modification are Technical Specification (Tech Spec)related items and are addressed in Tech Specs.3.3.7.5, 3.5.3, and 3.6.2.1.The proposed modification does not adversely affect the logic, control, or operation of any Tech Spec related system.The model Rosemount transmitter is a qualified instrument for this application.

None of the parameters that are the bases for the Tech Specs will be impacted.Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margins of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Specs.

95%3T The proposed modification involves a flush of radioactive residue existing within the Recirc to the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU), the vessel bottom head drain line, and the Ricirc discharge valve drain lines.By throttling the valves associated with these drain lines and having Health Physics personnel monitor dose rates, this will ensure that excessively high dose rates in this area will be lowered.No.The FSAR concerns itself with any situation that violates the integrity of the vessel.This procedure'hrottles two inch dead leg drain lines in the case of the RWCU suction drain and vessel bottom head drain lines and one inch lines in the case of the recirc discharge valve drain lines to flush the hotspot residue into the drywell sumps/drywell equipment drain tank (DWEDT)or suppression pool downcomer.

The potential for large water inventory losses from the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)is minimal because;1)Vessel level and drywell sump/DWEDT levels will be monitored while the valves are open, 2)The isolation capability is not impaired since the operator can close the isolation drain if necessary, and 3)The flushes are of a short duration (approximately thirty seconds)and use vessel'water head as the driving, force.In addition, the procedure has a prerequisite step to ensure that all administrative controls are completed for Operations with Potential for Draining the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV)in accordance with OP-AD-326 (Operations With Potential for Draining Reactor Vessel/Cavity).

Therefore, based on the above discussion, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.This procedure involves operating equipment in its designated mode of operation.

.While three of the five flushes are technically classified as OPDRV's, the necessary precautions are taken to prevent draining the vessel.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR.III No,'he proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech Spec), particularly sections 3.6.5.3 (Standby Gas Treatment System-SGTB), 3.6.5.1 (Secondary Containment isolation Dampers), and 3.5.3 (Suppression Chamber).

95%38 This modification will install permanent ventilation seals and Local Leakage Rate Test (LLRT)vent line at the reactor head piping penetrations in the Unit 2 refueling seal plate.This modification will provide an interim barrier until the dome covers are installed between Zones ll and lll.Also, this modification will permit the removal of the drywell airlock interlocks and allow person'al access prior to the removal of the reactor head piping.No.The presence of a leakage liquid accumulation reservoir in the upper drywell is not a safety concern for leaks that are possible in any significant quantity from the reactor coolant pressure boundary.The addition of the permanent ventilation seals and LLRT vent line at the reactor head piping penetra'tions in them refueling seal plate will not increase the probability of the leakage.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident.The proposed permanent ventilation seal's design requirements are enveloped by design parameters of penetration seals presently used at SSES.These penetration seals have proven to be highly reliable.Therefore, the addition of the permanent ventilation seals will not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment.

The addition of the permanent ventilation seals and LLRT vent line at the reactor head piping penetrations in the refueling seal plate will not increase the presence of steam in the upper drywell.The materials that comprise the permanent ventilation seals assure that the seal does not deteriorate and become dislodged if the radiation exposure limits of the'seal are exceeded during an accident.Therefore, the consequences of an accident are not increased due to the proposed action.The probability of an increase in the consequences of a malfunction of equipment is not affected by the proposed action.This modification does not affect the failure modes of an'y equipment.

II.No.Section 5.2.5 (5.2.5:1.2.4.1) of the FSAR, Chapters 6 and 15 of the FSAR, the Design Assessment Report, and NUREGC776 were reviewed to determine if the proposed action had the potential for creating a postulated initiating event which was not within the spectrum of events anticipated.

The review did not identify any postulated initiating event that would create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type.ill No.The requirements for the integrity of the Secondary Containment are addressed by Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3/4.6.5.By adding the permanent ventilation seals to the refueling seal plate no significant additional leakage'at the reactor head piping penetrations will occur during the reactor head piping removal and dome cover installation.

Therefore, the modification ensures that the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec is not reduced.

95%39 This modification will remove the 3/4'ent line on each of the (8):6" overflow lines for the (6)Collection, (4)Surge, and (6)Sample Tanks, and install a 2" open vent line on top of each overflow line.This will provide the necessary siphon breaking action to prevent a siphoning effect through the overflow and consequently prevent any excessive loss of tank inventory if a tank is overflowed.

No.This modification doep not alter the design basis or operation as described within FSAR Section 11.2.1, Liquid Waste Management Systems (LWMS).The modifications create no change to system operation or function.They will, however, enhance the piping system's performance and the instrumentation re-spanning will enhance Liquid Radioactive Waste (LWR)processing by'enabling utilization of additional tank inventories made available by the previous tank overflow piping enhancement.

The LWMS itself has no direct nuclear safety related function as a design basis.Safety systems do empty radioactive waste water into the'LWMS as designed.However, since the changes made to the LWMS do not alter the system operation as discussed above, no safety related function of any system associated with the LWMS will be affected.All modifications to the piping, will be performed in full compliance with the original construction codes and'he probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction is already bounded within the onginal calculations and design bases.Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment related to safety, as previously evaluated in'he FSAR.II No..Implementation of this modification will not change the normal operation of the LWMS, specifically the Liquid Radwaste Processing Subsystem.

The system will continue to operate in accordance with its original design bases, and the piping modifications comply with the original construction codes and regulations.

Therefore, the proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.This modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis'for any Technical Specification (Tech Spec), particularly Tech Specs 3/4.11.1.1, 3/4.11.1.2, and'3/4.11.1.3.

The modification does not affect the concentration of radioactive materials released in the liquid radwaste effluents (Tech Spec 3/4.11.1.1), nor the doses of the radioactive material in those effluents (Tech Spec 3/3.11.1.2), nor the operability/availability of the LRW Processing Subsystem (Tech Spec 3/411.1.3) 9M40 D*The proposed modification installs a Hydran 201R Gas Monitoring System on the Unit 2 Main Transformers.

This modification will allow for the continuous monitoring of the transformers to help detect incipient failure conditions and monitor fault gases dissolved in the transformer dielectric oil.No.This modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of the accidents described in FSAR Chapters 6 and 15 since there is no adverse impact on any plant equipment as a result of the proposed action.The Gas Monitoring System has no direct or indirect connection to or influence upon any plant safety equipment and it does not adversely affect the function or operation of the transformer.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of the malfunction of equipment related to safety, as previously'valuated in the FSAR.No.The proposed modification will not alter or affect the design basis.Even complete failure of the 2X101A, B, and C generator step-up transformer units will not prevent the plant Class 1E electrical system from performing its design safety functions.

Considering the above, this modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR.III No.This modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech Sp'ec)<particularly, Tech Specs 3/4.8.3.1 apd 3/4.8.3.2.

The Gas Monitoring instrumentation's not required for, and has no affect upon, operation or shutdown of the unit or for mitigation of the consequences of an accident.I 95%41 OCP..U i iC The modification will replace the existing Barksdale model ODPD2T-M18SS-L6-B5 flowswitch, with a Barksdale DPD2T-M3SS-L6-B5 flowswitch.

The new switch provides a flow switch with a lower adjustable range.This will prevent drifts in the flowswitch and thereby prevent spurious trips of the Radwaste Water Chillers.No.The Radwaste Building Chilled Water System has no safety related function.This modification does not create any new failure modes or any adverse effects to the Radwaste Building Chilled Water System.Therefore, based on a review of FSAR Chapters 6 and 15, this modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of e'quipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.Each flow switch being replaced is in either loop A or B of the Chilled Water System.Each loop is redundant.

The flow switch failure would either not trip the pump if the flow would decrease below the setpoint and possibly cause pump failure, or spuriously actuate and trip the pump when flow is present.The single failure would only affect one loop of the system.This failure is not a different type than is evaluated in the FSAR nor does it create the possibility of any different type of accident or malfunction than evaluated in Chapters 6 and 15.III No.There are no Technical Specification (Tech Spec)limiting conditions for operation or surveillance requirements relating to, or affected by the Radwaste Building Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC)system ambient temperature.

Therefore, the modification does not affect or reduce any margin of safety for any Tech Spec.'

95%42 ,U d.C This modification involves a setpoint change package that changes the Motor Operated Valve (MOV)allowable torque switch setting range as listed on the MOV Data Detail Drawing.Changing the torque switch setting will assure that the MOV is within the allowable thrust range, functions properly, and is not damaged.No.The only equipment affected by this modification is the motor operated valve assembly itself.The valve's function within the system does not change.Valve stroke time remains unaffected and still conforms to stroke time requirements.

Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety.The modification does not adversely affect valve dynamic qualification.

Therefore, the modification does not impact the dynamic qualification of the MOV as discussed in the FSAR.No.Considering the discussion above, it is concluded that the proposed action does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a'different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.III No..The modification does not affect MOV stroke time requirements.

Also the valve design basis function is maintained and the modification has no effect on system operation.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications.95-043 sc j-,uii The modification will revise the two setpoints for the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM)Steam Flow Interlock and Alarm flow switch, FSL-C32-2K608, according to General Electric Report, GE-NE-901%264592.

Recalculating the two setpoints for FSL-C32-2K608 will coincide with the Power Uprate.8/hlhSRY: I No.Increasing the Lower Power Setpoint (LPSP)and Low Power Alarm Point (LPAP)of FSL&32-2K608, and the RWM Steam Flow Interlock and Alarm does not add or change any components whose failure would initiate an accident or be used prior to an accident.Therefore, it does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident as previously evaluated in the FSAR.This modification does not add or change any components whose failure would initiate an accident or which would be used prior to an accident'.

The RWM and Steam Flow Totaling systems are not required to mitigate an accident.Therefore, the proposed'action does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.III No.This modification does not change the function or performance of the instrument and this system is not used in an accident.Further, the increases of the setpoints remain within the acceptable operating range of the switch.Therefore, it does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type.or the possibility for malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR., Plant Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Sections 3.1.4.1 and 4.1.4.1 state'hat the RWM must be operable in operational conditions 1 and 2 when thermal power is less than or equal to 20%of rated thermal power.The minimum allowable low power setpoint is 20%of rated'hermal power.Since the new setpoint is in compliance with the Tech Specs, the proposed action will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Tech Spec.

95%44 The modification will revise the two setpoints for the Reactor Manual Control Rod Power Alarm Unit (P~12-2N654A) and the Alarm First Stage Turbine Pressure Alarm Unit (PS-C12-2N654B) according to General Electric Report, GE-NE-901%2&6592., Recalculating the setpoints for PS-C12-2N654A and PK12-2N654B will coincide with the Power Uprate.I No.The revised setpoints provide adequate margin to the allowable values for Power Uprate conditions.

This setpoint change does not change the function or performance of the rod sequence control system or any equipment or components associated with these devices:.In addition, these devices are not required to mitigate any accidents.

Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.Changing the process setpoint of P&C12-2N654A and PS-C12-2N654B, Reactor Manual Control System (RMCS)Power and Alarm First Stage Turbine Pressure interlocks does not change the function or performance of the instruments.

This system is not used in an accident.Therefore, it does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create a possibility for malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.Plant Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Sections 3.1.4.2 and 4.1.4.2 state that.the Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS)must be operable in operational conditions 1.and 2 when thermal power is less than or:equal to 20%of rated power.The minimum allowable low power setpoint is greater than 20%of rated thermal power.'ince the new setpoint is in compliance with the Tech Spec, the proposed action will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of the Tech Spec.

95445 The modification will install a ventilating fan in the ceiling of the E Diesel Generator Engine Control Panel OC521E and a filter/grill in the door of the control panel.This modification will eliminate the premature failures of Agastat relays and fiber optic boards due to overheating in the summer months.Khit6h,lE:

No.The proposed modification does not adversely affect the E Diesel Engine control panel.Since the ventilation system will greatly improve the cooling inside this panel, this modification will provide for increased dependability regarding electrical components and, therefore, increased component reliability.

Therefore, this modification does not increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.The modification meets the seismic requirements of this panel.The failure of the fan to perform properly would not prevent the Engine Control Panel.components from perforrriing their design safety functions.

Therefore, there will be no increase in the probability of occurrence

'of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.The addition of the ventilation fan and associated equipment to cool the inside of panel OC512E, will not increase dose to the public above the licensing limit.There.,could be no effect possible on the accidents that have radiological consequences as a result'of this modification.

Also, no new radiological consequences can occur.Therefore, there will be no increase in the consequences of.an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No new accident scenarios or malfunctions of a different type can result because no new or unanalyzed adverse equipment or circuit effects are possible.Installation of the seismically supported fan and associated equipment and even complete failure of the new cooling apparatus will not degrade the control panel from performing its design basis operation.

Therefore, this modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The E Diesel Generator is addressed in Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3/4.8, Electrical Power Systems.The proposed modification does not adversely affect the logic, control, or operation of any Tech Spec related item.The ventilation system proposed is qualified for this application and is currently used in panel OC519E.None of the parameters that are the bases for the Tech Specs will be impacted.Therefore, this modification does not reduce the margins of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Specs.

95446 DCP-0.U'he modification will remove the restrictions presently in the process computer for mode switch monitoring.

This will allow the bulk temperature of the Suppression Pool to remain valid regardless of the mode switch position as long as all other checks for valid Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD)temperatures are met.I No.The modification doeq not affect any automatic initiations or functions.

It allows Operations to use the Suppression Pool Monitoring (SPM)calculated temperature irrespective of Mode Switch Position and for any plant condition.

Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring System (SPOTMOS)temperature data and alarm functions are not affected.Performing a realistic calculation of bulk Suppression Pool temperature while still retaining a substantial degree of conservatism does not affect or invalidate the results of any analysis performed in the FSAR.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.This change only affects the calculation of bulk Suppression Pool temperature by SPM.It does not affect any automatic initiations or functions, Therefore, it does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The Suppression Pool temperature limits are contained in Technical Specification d (Tech Spec)Section 3.6.2.The calculation method employed by SPM has bee as een emonstrated to give a conservative estimate of bulk Suppression Pool temperature.

Removal of Mode Switch position from the determination of valid bulk Suppression Pool temperature allows continued use of this calculated bulk Suppression Pool temperature.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%47 The modification will reconfigure the 1/2 CO>discharge piping to the'Unit 1 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)Room supply damper FPD-3P-12-4-4 of the Control Structure.

This will permit the damper to close upon a manual or automatic actuation of the CO>flooding system in the UPS Room and to reestablish the CO>system in accordance with its piping and instrument design drawing.No.The Fire Protection Review Report (FPRR)has been reviewed in relation to this modification.

The safe shutdown of the plant will not be jeopardized by a fire in either the UPS Room or the Lower Relay Room.FSAR Chapter 15 was also reviewed and there was no reference to any accident scenarios that could be impacted by the actions taken by this modification.

Considering the above and that the reworked CO>fire protection piping will meet the guidelines.

of its original design basis,'he modification will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.The modification will allow fo'r the proper functioning of fire damper FPD-3P-12M and improve the overall reliability of the CO>Fire Protection System to suppress and extinguish.

fires in the Unit 1 UPS Room of the Control Structure.

Therefore, the modification will not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR..The proposed changes will properly configure the COq discharge piping to damper FPD-3P-12M and will not involve a precursor of or contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.Therefore, there will'be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.This modification will meet all the design basis criteria as specified in the FSAR for CO<Fire Protection Systems.Also, the design basis function for the UPS Room supply damper FPD-3P-12~

will be ensured as a result of this modification.

Considering the above, the.actions taken by this modification will not create a'ossibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.Ill No.The Unit 1 Technical Specification (Tech Spec)which is applicable to this system with respect to this modification is described in Tech Spec Section 3/4.7.6.3.

The rework of the CO<Fire Protection piping for fire damper FPD-3P-12-4-4 will be in accordance with the applicable design criteria specified in the FSAR.Therefore, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%48 DC1 The modification will install three new 6 manual gate valves to the 6" GBD-215 condensate piping.These new gate valves will provide an alternate means of isolating the 6" fill lines leading to the drain coolers and feedwater heater strings A, B, 8 C.The new gate valves will also allow maintenance personnel to isolate the piping for maintenance.

They could also be utilized as an alternate to the existing HV-20659A, B, L C valves for equalization of pressure around the large 20" gate valves HV-20639A, B, 6 C to assist in reopening them following isolation of the condensate piping to the drain coolers and feedwater heater strings.I No.This modification will add new manual gate valves as backups to the existing motor operated globe valves HV-20659A, B, 8 C.The new gate'alves will normally be open and have a negligible impact on the flow characteristics in the 6" GBD-215 condensate fill lines for feedwater heater strings A, B, 5 C.This modification will have no adverse affects on'the operation or function of the Condensate System as defined in the FSAR.Considering the above, the modification will not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.The modification will not adversely affect the function or performance of the 6" GBD-215 condensate piping.Therefore, the.modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The proposed action does not involve a precursor of or contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated.

in the FSAR.No.The function and performance of the 6" GBD-215 condensate piping system will be enhanced by the addition of these manual gate'alves, because an additional method will be available for isolating the fill line to the feedwater heater strings if the HV-20659A, B, 8 C valves fail or leak-by.Considering the above, the proposed actions do not create a possibility for'an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.No.The piping and components affected by the actions taken by'his modification are not specifically addressed in the basis for any Unit 2 Technical Specification (Tech Spec).Therefore, the modification does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-049 This modification will remove the four abandoned 2" pipes from the penetration X-30-6-9 and re-seal the penetration using approved SSES procedures.

Removal of these pipes is recommended to prevent potential deterioration of the penetration seal.l No.The modification complies with the original design basis of the Control Structure and Reactor Building and the original design requirements for penetration X-30-6-9.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of any accidents described in the FSAR.The modification will prevent the degradation of the penetration.

Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The penetration affected by this modification will comply with the original design requirements, and degradation of the seal penetration will be prevented.

Therefore,'his modification does not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.This modification will not alter the design basis of the Control Structure or the Reactor Building and will comply with the original design requirements.

Therefore, the modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.a This modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of the Control Structure, Reactor Building, or any plant system governed by the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), especially Tech Specs Sections 3/4.6.5 and 3/4.7.7.Therefore, the actions taken by this modification will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%50 DC 9 The modification will redesign the interface between the top of the load cell on the refueling bridge main hoist 2H201 beam.This will prevent premature wear of the parts and assure proper loading alignment.

No.The modification will not chan'ge the original design function of the load'cell.

It will redesign the interface between the load cell and the refueling bridge main hoist frame to provide a more reliable loading alignment resulting in a consistent load monitoring by.the load cell.All automatic hoist trips remain unchanged.

Considering the above and a review of FSAR Chapter 15, the actions taken by this modification will not increase the probability of occurrence of an'accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.The refueling bridge main hoist and its sub components, such as the interface mechanism, do not serve any safety-related functions.

The modification will also conform to all of the design requirements specified in the FSAR.Since this modification does not adversely affect the performance of the bridge nor any other associated equipment, there will be no increase in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.The modification does not involve a precursor of or contributor to any evaluated accidents involving off-site dose.Therefore, there will" be no increase in the consequences of an accident or'malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.fl No.This modification will meet all the design basis criteria as specified in the FSAR.The function and performance of the refuel bridge main hoist will be enhanced by the redesign, of the load cell interface.

Considering the above, the proposed modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.Unit 2 Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3/4.9.6 provides surveillance requirements for the refueling bridge/platform to demonstrate that it is operable prior to its use.The proposed modification enhances the monitoring capability of the load cell which will be proven by testing prior to hoist use.Considering the above, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%51 C>>,U'he modification will redesign the interface between the top of the load cell on the refueling bridge main hoist 1H201 beam.This will prevent-premature wear of the parts and assure proper loading alignment.

No.The modification will not change the original'design function of the load cell.It will redesign the interface between the load cell and the refueling bridge main hoist frame to provide a more reliable loading alignment resulting in a consistent load monitoring by'he load cell.All automatic hoist trips remain unchanged.

Considering the above and a review of FSAR Chapter 15, the actions taken by this modification will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.The refueling bridge main hoist and its sub'omponents, such as the interface mechanism, do not serve any safety-related functions.

The modification will also conform to all of the design requirements specified in the FSAR.Since this modification does not adversely affect the performance of the bridge nor any other associated equipment, there will be no increase in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.The modification does not involve a precursor of or contributor to any evaluated accidents involving off-site dose..Therefore, there will be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No, This modification will meet all the design basis criteria as specified in the.FSAR.'he function and performance of the refuel bridge main hoist will be enhanced by the redesign of the load cell interface.

Considering the above, the proposed modification does not create a possibility for an accident or'alfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.Unit 1 Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3/4.9.6 provides surveillance requirements for the refueling bridge/platform to demonstrate that it is operable prior to its use.The pro'posed modification enhances the monitoring capability of the load cell which will be proven by testing prior to hoist use.Considering the above, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-052 These modifications requires that the flow transmitters and pressure transmitters within the Reactor Recirculation System (DCP 93-3062A)and Feedwater System (DCP 93-3062B)have their loops re-spanned and indicators re-scaled.

The purpose of this is to ensure that the flow transmitters and pressure transmitters coincide with the Power Uprate.No..Tlirt Chfi ii d i<<h b I il'ip of any accident evaluated in the FSAR.This DCP does not involve the addition of equipment or changes in the type of existing equipment.

This modification does not increase'the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment.

The new process conditions are within the range of the instruments and interface with other equipment is unchanged.

The Recirculation Flow Control System flow instrumentation and its operation and functions are not changed by this modification.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of an accident, nor does it increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment.

dll i d i 1 p btwy of any accident evaluated in the FSAR.The transmitter is calibrated to 10%of its published specification upper range limit.This extension beyond its normal range is within its capabilities by design.This modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment.

The Power Uprate conditions are within the capabilities of the instrument and interface with other equipment is unchanged.

This modification does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment since there are no system operations or functions changed by this modification.

II No.-These modifications do not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR because the re-spanning and scaling of the Recirculation Flow Control System flow instruments merely changes calibration and scale range, all physical and electrical characteristics are identical.

Since there is no equipment change involved other than indicator scales, these modifications do not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR.Ill No-Review of the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)shows that the functions performed by the equipment within the scope of these modifications are not mentioned in the Tech Specs.Therefore, the modifications do not reduce the margin of safety as defined by the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%53 NL,Il,;d This modification will provide a method to drain the Condenser Area Transfer Sump 1SP100 (2SP100)after a drain line isolation signal from (a)Fire Protection Sprinklers in the Condenser Area, (b)High water level in the Condenser Area Transfer Sump, or (c)Oil Intrusion isolation signal into Turbine Building Central Area Sumps 1SP102 (2SP102).This will allow a controlled flow to drain the Condenser Area Transfer Sump 1SP100 (2SP100)and reset the high sump water level isolation.

This is necessary to prevent fioor drain backup and eventual flooding of the Condensate Pump Room.5i&lhSfE: I.No.The proposed Condenser Area Transfer Sump'draining is within the bounds of the design features.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction not previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No'.No.Failure of any portion of this equipment will have no effect on any safety related system.A spill is bounded by the Concentrates Tank scenario, and does not add a failure mechanism different than previously evaluated in the FSAR.The proposed change describes a new mode to bypass the isolation signals and.drain the Condenser Area Transfer Sump to the Turbine Building Central Area Sump.This is not an evaluated accident or malfunction.

Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3.11:1.3 provides basis and limiting conditions of operation for the Liquid Radioactive Waste System.The proposed Condenser Area Transfer Sump draining does not alter the operation of collectiori tank recirc flow paths.The only change to the.system is another alternate method to drain the Condenser Area Transfer Sumps when a isolation signal is present.This test does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%54 The purpose of procedure MFP-QA-5250 is to provide the actions necessary to track and conti ol work activities that breach the Negative Leak Rate Test (NLRT)and/or Positive Leak Rate Test (PLRT)boundaries.

This will ensure that the design basis leak rates for both the NLRT and PLRT boundaries are not exceeded at any time.l No, The design intent of the Secondary Containment and the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)are not impacted by'this procedure.

Also, the design intent of the Control Structure pressure boundary and the Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System (CREOASS)are not impacted by this procedure.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability or consequences of any accident or malfunction of equipment related to safety.ll No.III No.This procedure only allows breaches of the NLRT and/or the PLRT boundary that result in a total cumulative leak rate less than the design basis leak rate.Therefore, the modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type that any previously evaluated by the FSAR.The modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech.Spec), especially Tech Spec Basis 3/4.6.5 and 3/4.7.2.The actions proposed by MFP-QA-5250 ensure that the design basis inleakage rates specified in 3.6.5.1 are not exceeded.Also,'he design basis~leak rate specified in 3.7.2 is not exceeded.

94455 C->>B,U i The purpose of this modification is to increase the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU)system design flow from 135 GPM to 148.5 GPM through each of two filter demineralizers.

This is needed to offset the effects of power uprate on reactor water chemistry and quality.No.The modification does not alter system configuration, the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB), or operational logic.Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an accident of equipment important to safety has not been increased by changes proposed for this modification.

There are no new hardware or system configuration changes that occur as a result of this modification.

The RWCU System isolation response time, from time of break detection to isolation, is unchanged.

No new component failure modes or protection interface features of equipment important to'afety are impacted by this proposed activity.Therefore, this modification does not increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment.

The'consequences of any previously evaluated accident will not increase as a result of this modification since no radiological consequences are altered by these proposed changes to the RWCU system and monitoring instrumentation.

There are no new system or equipment malfunctions postulated which would result in any increased~radiological consequences not previously analyzed.This modification will not cause a malfunction of equipment, important to safety, previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.This modification creates no new pathways to the environment.

The possibility for an accident of a different type, than any previously evaluated in the FSAR has not been created since the functionality of the RWCU System and the RWCU leak detectio'n system.is unchanged.

The operational logic and functionality of the RWCU.leak detection system are unchanged.

The modification does not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type.III No.The modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech Spec), especially Tech Spec Section 3/4.3.2.The new proposed Tech Spec limits will result in a negligible reduction'in the margin between RWCU System'isolation and the 4351 GPM flow expected-.during a postulated RWCU high energy line break outside containment.

Also the instrumentation serves no other safety function.95-056 DCP 94-9018, Unit 2 The purpose of this modification is to install a 6 diameter penetration through the Unit 2 Turbine Building West exterior concrete wall panel.This will provide a more direct and safer passage to the Unit 2 condenser area for Hydrolazer activities.

I No.The new penetration will be designed and constructed in accordance with the ACI and AISC codes as specified by the FSAR.Considering this and the fact that the integrity of the Turbine Building exterior concrete wall panel will be maintained, this modification will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.This modification will conform to all the design criteria as specified in the FSAR.There is no equipment important to the safe shutdown of the plant that could be impacted by this modification.

Therefore, the actions taken by this modification will not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.The new penetration will be properly sealed during normal full power operations of the plant.The proposed'actions taken by this modification will not involve a precursor of nor contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.Therefore, there will be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.I II No.The structural integrity and quality of shielding protection for the Turbine Building wall will be maintained in accordance with the requirements, and guidelines provided in the FSAR.Therefore, the proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III" No.None of, the parameters that are the basis for the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)will be affected by this modification.

Therefore, the modification will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%57 The modification will redesign the interface between the top of the load cells and the hoist frames on the refueling bridge frame mounted auxiliary hoist (2H203)and the monorail auxiliary hoist (2M214).This modification is needed to prevent premature wear of the parts and assure proper loading alignment.

r No.The modification will not change the original design function of the load cell.All automatic hoist trips remain unchanged.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.The refueling bridge auxiliary hoists and their sub components, such as the interface mechanism, do not serve any safety-related functions.

The modification will also conform to all of the design requirements specified in the FSAR.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR., The proposed modification does not involve a precursor of or contributor to any evaluated accidents involving off-site dose.Therefore, there will be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.The function and performance of the refuel bridge auxiliary hoists will be enhanced by the redesign of the load cell interface.

Considering this and the above, the proposed modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No..Unit 2 Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3/4.9.6 provides surveillance requirements for the refueling bridgeJplatform to demonstrate that it'is operable prior to its use.The modification e'nhances the monitoring capability of the load cell which will be proven by testing prior to hoist use.Therefore, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

9M58 OC>>,~i The modification will redesign the interface between the top of the load cells and the hoist frames on the refueling bridge frame mounted auxiliary hoist (1H203)and the monorail auxiliary hoist (1H214).This modification is needed to prevent premature wear of the parts and assure proper loading alignment.

No.The modification will not change the original design function of the load cell.All automatic hoist trips remain unchanged.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.The refueling bridge auxiliary hoists and their sub components, such as the interface mechanism, do not serve any safety-related functions.

The modification will also conform to all of the design requirements specified in the FSAR.Therefore,'he modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.The proposed modification does not involve a precursor of or contributor to any evaluated accidents involving off-site dose.Therefore, there will be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The function and performance of the refuel bridge auxiliary hoists will be enhanced by the redesign of the load cell interface.

Considering this and the above, the proposed modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.ill No.Unit 1 Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3/4.9.6 provides surveillance requirements for the refueling bridge/platform to demonstrate fhat it, is operable prior to its use.The modification enhances the monitoring capability of the load cell which will be proven by testing'prior to hoist,use.

Therefore, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for a'y Tech-Spec.

95%59 OCP-,U i The purpose of this modification is to remove the unused and abandoned externally mounted limit switches and supporting hardware for the Anchor Darling Motor Operated Valves (MOVs).This will permit maintenance to remove these components and not reinstall them during valve work.No.The actions taken by this modification will'not impact the design, functions, or operation of the Anchor Darling MOVs.The seismic qualification, required for many of these valves, is not affected by the removal of these limit switch assemblies since the assemblies are not part of the seismic valve qualification, o'r the seismic qualification binders.The effects on adjacent supports due to the removal of the limit switches is negligible.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The removal of the external limit switches and/or associated components will enhance further valve maintenance by eliminating unnecessary components attached to the valves.Therefore, the modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR.III No.,Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)are affected by the unused/non-functional external'imit switch assemblies, The proposed modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

9&060 The purpose of TP-26231(TP) is to control the replacement of the existing Reactor Vessel Instrumentation Condensing Chambers XY-B21-2D004A and B.The replacement of these chambers will prevent nonwondensable gas migration to the instrument reference leg and cause possible erroneous level indication.

'E No.During this modificatign, the fuel racks and the contained fuel will remain covered with water.Plugs will be installed into Reactor Vessel Instrumentation penetration H12A/B (upper/reference leg penetration) and H11A/B (lower/variable leg penetration) with this modification.

Since these plugs will not be subjected to any pressure except head pressure from cavity level, which will maintain the plug in the nozzle, the probability of the nozzle falling into the vessel or the core is minimal.The plugs will be tied off with a lanyard to prevent the plug from falling.If the plugs were to fall into the vessel, no core or fuel damage would occur.Therefore, this TP'does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously described in the FSAR.II No.The only accident or malfunction that could occur would be the failure of the nozzle plugs causing draining of the Reactor Vessel/Cavity and Spent Fuel Pool.Since the calculated leakage of 55 GPM is well within the available makeup capability, water level can be maintained at 22 feet above the racks and fuel.Therefore, a reactor vessel/draindown event with refuel gates removed would not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3.9.8 requires at least 22 feet over the top of Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)flange during the handling of irradiated fuel assemblies or when irradiated fuel assemblies are seated in the RPV, both while in Condition 5.Tech Spec 3.9.9 requires at least 22 feet over the irradiated spent fuel in the fuel pool.The calculated leakage through the RPV penetration, with no plug installed, is well within the makeup capabilities of the systems available.

Therefore, the minimum water level is met.Considering the above, this TP does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

9~61 cp.u The purpose of this modification is to repair a crack in a Unit 2 steam dryer'channel to support ring weld.The modification is necessary because it will eliminate the crack.Also the additional weld material will reduce the probability of new cracking in this area.No.The steam dryer is a no~ode, nonwafety related rea'ctor internal component.

This modification will not affect the dryer function, it simply replaces a cracked drain channel to support ring weld.The overall structural performance of the dryer is not affected by this modification.

Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of.an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.Considering the statements above, the modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The steam dryer is not addressed in the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).It is a nonwode, nonwafety related item.Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

e 9S-062 C.,U The purpose of this modification is to install TSI Thermo-Lag fire barrier wrapping to Conduit B1K019.This modification is necessary to provide protection to Conduit 81K019 located in Fire Zone 1-5A-S.I No.The modification will provide additional protection for the safe shutdown circuit.The structural and seismic requirements for the conduits are not affected by the addition of the fire barrier wrapping.Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability ofoccurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The addition of the fire barrier wrapping to conduit 81K019 will not increase dose to the public above the licensing limit.There could be no effect possible on the accidents that have radiological consequences as a result of this modification.

Also, no new radiological consequences can occur.Therefore, there will be no ihcrease in the consequences of an accident of malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The addition of the fire barrier wrapping, will not result in any risk to public health and safety.No new accident.scenarios or malfunctions of a different type can result because no new or un-'analyzed adverse equipment or circuit effects are possible.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than evaluated in the FSAR.III No.Fire rated assemblies are addressed in Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3/4.7.7.The reliability of, the electrical cables to perform their required functions is not reduced, but rather restored to the original design basis.No plant parameters are affected by this modification.

Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec is not reduced by this modification.

95%63 S l9 The purpose of this modification is to increase the high pressure alarm setpoint for switch PSH&32-2K636 to 1050 psig.This modification is required to accommodate the increased generating capacity implemented by the SSES Power Uprate Project.No.Switch PSH<32-2K636 is a non-safety related instrument and only provides a warning alarm for high.reactor dome pressure.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident or the consequences of an accident as previously evaluated in the FSAR, The equipment operates within its design capability at the increased pressure.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.This setpoint change does not involve any hardware or system function changes.The modification affects a non-safety related instrument and the function of the device is not changed.The'ossibility of a different type of accident, not previously analyzed, is not applicable.

Therefore, this modification does not create a possibility for an accident of a different.

type than any evaluated previously in the'SAR.III No.A revie'w of the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs}confirms that the reactor pressure vessel alarm setpoint for PSH C32-2K636 is not required.to enforce any Tech Specs.Therefore, this setpoint change does not r'educe the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Specs.1 95%64 ME-F,Ii i The purpose of this new procedure is to control the proposed activity of installing 20 new jet pump holddown beams.No.The proposed activity does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of accidents'or malfunctions of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR.This activity is being performed with the core defueled and one loop of core spray functional.

All equipment is being used within its design basis.II No.The proposed activity does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than evaluated previously in the FSAR.No new failu're modes are created and the plant will be in an improved condition after the modification is performed.

III No.The modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech Spec).The jet pump operability Tech Spec 3/4.4.1.2 is only required during Conditions 1 and 2.Since all this work is being completed with the core defueled, no decrease in safety will occur.

95465 OCP-...0 DCP 93-3092A 6 B Unit 1 The purpose of this modification is to modify the Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)and Core Spray pump discharge check valves.This will limit the valve disk opening angle to enhance the closing capability, ensure stability of disk during minimum and maximum flow conditions, eliminate the valve handle while installing valve disc position indication off of the valve hinge pin, and achieve proper clearances to avoid interference between moving parts and the valve body.5@dhdhKY I No.The modification to the discharge check valve cannot affect the function of the suction valve, because the modification does not alter the method of operation of the discharge check valve.The check valve is not considered a high stress location.Further, the modified check valves meet all design pressure and seismic requirements.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.Modification of the check valves maintains the design basis structural integrity.

Reliability of system operatioh and operation of equipment important to safety in the Core Spray and RHR systems has not decreased.

The design basis accident is not changed by this modification.

The Core Spray and RHR systems functions are improved and there is oo increase in radiation dose to the public.The modification to the pump discharge check valves improves their safety function operability.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipnient important to'afety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The function of the check valves is unchanged.

Flow through the pump discharge check'alves meets the design basis requirements for all modes of operation.

Modifications of the valves improve capability to open and close while maintaining dynamic qualification and position indication features.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.The modification provides an opening limitation and improves disc alignment and clearances, for proper seating.Therefore,'he modification does not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)reviewed for margins of safety applicable to the components and systems affected by this modification are: 2.1 4, 3/4.3.3, 3/4 4.9, 3/4.5.1, 3/4.5.2, 3/4.5.3, 3/4.6.2.2, 3/4.6.2.3, and 3/4.9.11.Considering the above, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

c The modification will provide the Unit 2 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)software changes identified in the Power Uprate Project, which are not part of, or included in other Power Uprate Project Design Change Packages.It will also define the testing required to assure the overall SPDS functionality post Power Uprate Project modifications.

No.The SPDS computers and software are not safety-related and do not impact any FSAR analysis.This modification updates the alarm limits changed by the Power Uprate so that the validity of the displayed information is not affected.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment related to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The failure modes after this modification remain the same as before the modification.

The modification will in no way affect the availability of the SPDS.Therefore, the proposed modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated-previously in the FSAR.III No.The proposed software changes to the SPDS do not affect any systems or functions addressed in the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as define)in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%67 OC>>,U i The purpose of the modification is to relocate Main Steam isolation Valve (MSIV)conduits and replace the cabling in these conduits that was degraded.The relocation of the affected MSIV conduits will eliminate the'damage and degradation caused by excessive heat.QlhihdhRL I No.There is no adverse impact on plant equipment as a result of the proposed action.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of the accidents described in the FSAR.The proposed action provides for continued design basis operation of the MSIVs and does not adversely affect the function of the MSIVs.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of the malfunction of equipment related to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.'o, III No.There are no new failure modes of equipment important to safety associated with the activities of this modification.

The function and design criteria of all components remain the same.The relocation of conduit and cabling does not create the potential for a new type of unanalyzed accident or a new.type of malfunction.

Therefore, the modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type.The Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)reviewed for margins of safety applicable to the components and systems affected by this modification are: 3/4.4.7, 3/4 4.7;and 3/4.3.1.The pr'oposed action does not affect the operation or closing time capability of the MSIVs and does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the basis for Tech Spec 3/4.4.7.Relocating the cabling to the MSIV-Leakage Control System (LCS)does.not reduce the margin of safety defined in the basis of Tech Spec 3/4.6.1.4.

The relocation of the conduit and associated cabling will not impact the operation of the limit switches, nor degrade any Reactor Protection System response times since the circuit functions remain the same.Tlierefore, the margin of safety as defined in Tech Spec 3/4.3.1 is not reduced.

9568~SCP j94-2032, Unit 2 The purpose of this modification is to change the setpoints for the Unit 2 Rod Block Monitor (RBM), channels A and B, for both single and two loop reactor recirculation operation.

These setpoint changes are to be implemented to support Power Uprate operations.

No.The Rod Block Monitor and associated" setpoints are described in FSAR Section 7.7.1.11.The RBM does not perform any safety function and is not required for the safe shutdown of the plant.This setpoint change does not change the function of the RBM.Also, the setpoint change does not represent a change from the current limits.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.-The proposed action does not change the function of the RBM or.any other plant..equipment.

Therefore, the setpoint change does"not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.No.The Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)applicable to the RBM include Tech Specs 3.3.6, 3.4.1.1.2.5.a, Table 3,3.6-2, and Bases.3/4.4.1.The RBM setpoints.affected by this SCP are non-technical specification related but were revised to maintain the operating margin from the revised Tech Spec setpoints.

Therefore, the modification will not reduce the margin of.safety as defined in the basis of any.Tech Spec.

95%69 CH-SY%16, Unit Common The purpose of this new procedure is to monitor zebra mussels by installing two sampling racks in the spray pond.I No.Placement of the two small sampling racks in the spray pond does not initiate a LOCA, LOOP, or any other FSAR accident.The placement of the sample racks in the spray pond does not affect the operation of the spray pond ot the operation of the Emergency Service Water (ESW)and Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW)pumps.In addition, because of the size and permeability to flow of the test racks and baskets, their presence does not pose a threat to providing flow through the pumphouse intake screens to the ESW and'RHRSW pumps.Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as already analyzed in the FSAR.II No.The installation of the sample racks in the spray pond has no adverse affects'on the ability of the ESW and RHRSW systems to perform their intended functions.

Therefore, the proposed action does not create the possibility for an accident of a different type than any'previously analyzed in the FSAR.III No.The affected systems and components are addressed in Sections 3.7.1.1, 3.7.1.2, and 3.7.1.3 of the Technical Specifications

{Tech Specs).The proposed actions enhance, rather than degrade the ability to comply with plant Tech Specs.'herefore, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%70 c-,~The purpose of this modification is to: 1)Provide hose connections to allow the use of vendor supplied Cooling Tower Treatment and Detoxification chemicals.

2)3)Replace the SOz shed with a preengineered building and upgrade the electrical supply in the old shed to supply the new shed.Isolate and deactivate the domestic water showers and eyewash stations and replace them with a new portable model.4)Isolate the abandoned SO>and Chlorine Subsystems from all operable plant systems.This will eliminate the potential of falling cooling tower ice in the winter by supplying a building capable of protecting the two vendor supplied storage tanks, related pumps, and piping from freezing temperatures.

This modification will also provide isolation valves and'langes for easy.connection of the vendor detoxification chemical skid.I No~I T FSAR Chapters 6 and 15 were reviewed for this modification.

The biocide chemicals added in this modification, have been in use for over a year at SSES.During that time the biocide has proven itself to be an effective biological control agent with no adverse effects on the Condenser Vacuum.Therefore, the proposed" action does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident previously analyzed in the FSAR.The Domestic Water and Cooling Tower Chlorine and Acid Systems and the systems to which they connect are not safety related.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurr'ence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.The Domestic Water and Cooling Tower Chlorine and Acid Systems are non-radioactive and are not tied in any way to a radioactive system.The proposed action does not involve a precursor of or a significant contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as" previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.The modification will be designed to meet all applicable requirements of ASME/ANSI 831.1 and IEEE codes to ensure its structural and functional integrity.

The systems affected contain no radioactive material and do not affect'any safety systems.The chemicals proposed for use in this modification would not cause habitability problems in the power block.Therefore, the modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of any plant system governed by the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).Therefore, the actions taken by this modification will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%71 CP The purpose of this modification is to modify the Motor Operated Valve (MOV)HV-155F012, in the High Pressure Coolant Injection System by replacing the actuator and motor.The larger actuator will provide increased pullout torque and will ensure that the valve design requirements of PP&L's Generic Letter 89-10 program are met.The modification will also provide an improved range of torque switch settings for the valve to facilitate VOTES testing.SJhihlhRY:

I'o.FSAR Sections 3.9.3.2b.2, 6.2.6.3;6.2.3.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.3.2.2.1 and Tables 6.2-12, 6.2-22 and 6.2.4.3.3.3 were reviewed for this modification.

The modification has no impact on the dynamic qualification of the MOV.The increased actuator torque will improve the valve's capability to isolate, while not adversely affecting the pressure retaining capability or operability of the valve.The valve leakage criteria is not changed by this modification.

The modification has no impact on the seismic qualification of control center 1D264.Also the ability of HV-155F012 to open or close when required is not affected by this'odification.

Therefore, the.modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously analyzed in the FSAR.II No Considering the above, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.III'No.The affected system's and components'are addressed in Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Bases 3/4.5.1, 3/4.6.1.1, 3/4.6.1.2, 3/4.6.3, and 3/4.8.2.Valve pressure boundary integrity and seat leakage are not affected.The valve stroke time is within the design basis analysis bounds of 10 secorids.There are no effects'to any of the systems or components mentioned"in this modification.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%72 OC 9->>,U The purpose of the modification is to correct the problem with excessive resin heel in the Condensate Demineralizer Service Vessel, resin segregation during resin transfer, and the lack of knowledge of the status of the drained Condensate Demineralizer Service Vessel., SilhQdhRY:

No.FSAR Sections 9.2.10, 10.4.6, 11.2, 11.3, and 15.2.7 were reviewed for this modification.

The proposed action does not affect the primary condensate or feedwater flow path.The function and operation of the condensate or feedwater system is unchanged.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR.The Condensate Demineralizer or the Condensate Transfer and Storage systems are not safety related or required for safe shutdown of the reactor, or mitigation of a design basis accident.Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.The proposed action could result in a new flow path from the Condensate Demineralizer Vessel to the Condenser in the event of a valve leakage or misali'gnment.

This flow path could create a possibility for a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.However, a flow path through the Condensate Transfer System to the Condenser presently exists through the current resin inlet line.In addition;a reliable check valve will be installed in this"potential flow path to preclude/minimize flow to the condenser due to..valve misalignment or valve leakage.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility.

for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The affected systems and component's are addressed in Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Bases 3/44.4 and 3/4.8.The conductivity monitoring equipment will-'ot be affected by this modification.

Electrical separation and protection device coordination of the non-Class 1E power circuit ensure that the availability ahd the operability of the upstream Class 1E power sources to Panel 2Y128 are not affected by the modification.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%73 DCP 89-9151, Unit Common The purpose of this modification is to relocate two A and B loop temperature elements into the north and south side of the Common Return Air Duct in the Control Structure Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC)System.This will optimize the return air temperature measurement and provide better control of the heating and cooling function of the Control Structure HVAC System.I No.FSAR Sections 6.4, 7.3, and 9.4 provide descriptions of the HVAC System.The modification maintains the function and operation of the existing Control Structure HVAC System.The proposed action does not affect the present basis, design, or requirements of the Control Structure HVAC System.'Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment related to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.C II No.Lowering the setpoint of'the high temperature switches is also conservative and does not change the system design or the operation of the Control Structure HVAC System.The relocation of the temperature elements and high temperature selector does not introduce a different failure mode, but improves the system by providing an alarm on temperature element failure.Therefore, the modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech Spec), especially Tech Spec Section 3/4.7.2.The proposed action does not affect the ability of the instrument loops,to meet the requirements of the Control Structure HVAC System, but enhances operability by providing a more representative return air temperature for control.

0 0 9M74 The purpose of the modification is to install pulsation dampers (snubber filters)in the tubing connected to the E" D/G DC Motor Driven Auxiliary Diesel Oil Booster Pump.The installation of these dampers will eliminate pressure surges to the switches, thereby preventing unnecessary start of the booster pump.No.The modification-.is designed to be consistent with the original design requirements for the booster pump.Also, the proposed action meets the original design basis and operation of the booster pump.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident or a malfunction of equipment important to safety described in FSAR Chapters 6 and 15..II No.Considering the above, the modification does not increase the probability for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The proposed modification will not jeopardize the starting ability nor the running capability of the"E Diesel Generator as described in Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Section 3/4.8.Therefore, the actions taken by this modification will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95475~SCP)93-2086, Unit 2 The purpose of this modification is to increase the process setpoint for'eactor steam dome Anticipated Transient Without Scram-Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) high pressure switches, PS B212N045A, B, C,&D from 1108 psig to 1123 psig.This modification is required to" accommodate the inc'reased generating capacity implemented by the SSES Power Uprate Project.'I No.The ATWS-RPT trip instrumentation is described in FSAR Section 7.1.2a.l.30, and associated accident scenarios are discussed in FSAR Section 15.8 and Appendix 15A (Event 51).The associated trip setpoint and allowable value remain unchanged and the safety function of the switches remain unchanged.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No..Considering the above, the proposed action does hot create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III'o.The Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value for the reactor steam dome pressure for ATWS-RPT are given.in Table 3.3.4.1-2 of the Tech Specs.The proposed modification has an adequate operating margin to avoid spurious ATWS trips and to ensure actuation prior to reaching the Tech Spec allowable value, Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%76 CPI->>, II i The purpose of this modification is to increase the process setpoint of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)turbine electronic overspeed system to 5093 rpm.This modification is required to accommodate the increased generating capacity implemented by the SSES Power Uprate Project.No.FSAR Sections 15.2.7.2.3, 15.2.9.3.2,'15.2.9.3.2.1, 15.2.9.3.2.2, 15.2.9.3.2.3 7.1.2a.1.18, and Tables 7.$-2, 7.1-3, and 7.1-9 were reviewed for this modification.

The electronic overspeed trip device does not provide a safety function, and the reliability of the-device is not affected by the newly proposed setpoints.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident as previously evaluated in the FSAR.This setpoint change does not exceed the trip setpoint which was previously recommended in General Electric Service Information Letter (GE SIL)0382.Design analysis by GE confirms that the RCIC pump will operate at the higher loads required by Power Uprate.Therefore, raising the electronic overspeed trip device setpoint will not contribute to an increased probabilityof overspeed trip or other equipment malfunction as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The RCIC pump will continue to perform its cooling function as previously designed.Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.Changing the electronic overspeed trip setpoint does not make failure more likely or affect the consequences in any manner.Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously'valuated in the FSAR.II.No.The modification.

does not involve any hardware changes or change the system function.The function and operability of the equipment is not altered by the setpoint change.The trip setpoint is within the recommended setting of GE SIL 382.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously'in the FSAR.III No.The RCIC electronic overspeed trip for the RCIC turbine is not referenced in the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)for Unit 2.Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

957?The purpose of this modification is to replace 248 irradiated SPC 9x9-2 fuel assemblies with 248 fresh SPC 9x9-2 assemblies and reshuNe the remaining fuel assemblies.

This will form a configuration which will provide the required energy for Unit 2 Cycle 7 (U2C7)operation and maintain the same margin of safety as in previous cycles under normal operating conditions.

I No.The applicable sections of the FSAR which are affected by the core loading are chapters 4, 5, 6, and 15.The core loading will not affect the failure mode of any plant system or component, nor will it affect the.probability of occurrence of any.transient or accident initiating event.Safety analyses performed for the original U2C7 core design have been evaluated.

It has been determined that the revised core loading remains applicable to the original core design.The analyses and evaluations, including their supporting calculations, have been documented, reviewed, and approved in accordance with applicable design control procedures.

Therefore, the modification does not increase th0 consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The Unit 2 Cycle 7 core design is mechanically, thermal-hydraulically, and neutronically very similar to previous core loadings.It does not create any new or different initiating events, failures, or failure modes that have not been previously considered or evaluated, nor does it make any accidents or malfunctions previously considered incredible, any more credible.As a result of this change there are no new accidents or malfunctions that mu'st be considered within the design basis of the plant.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously'in the FSAR.III No.The applicable Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)referenced by this modification are 2.0, 3,1, 3.2, 3.4, and 6.9.3.The U2C7 core loading does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of any plant system or component and will maintain an equivalent margin of safety as currently defined in the basis of the applicable Tech Specs sections referenced above.L 9&4T8 The purpose of this modification is to replace the existing KCR-21 battery entirely or partially with new KCR-19 cells depending on their availability.

The addition of the 60 KCR-19 cells will reduce battery capacity of 2D620 but there will be sufficient capacity to meet the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> load profile.Partial replacement will result in an improved condition since the KCR-21 are higher capacity cells.I No.The one-for-one changeout of the 125 VDC battery cells on battery 2D620 does not change the ability of the battery to perform its safety function.The decrease in capacity has no adverse effects on the ability of the currently installed connected cabling, circuit protection, and circuit disconnect devices to withstand the possible fault currents.This change does reduce the engineering margin for future designs adding load to the 125 VDC system.The reduction in engineering margin will not affect the ability of the KCR-19 battery to meet all design basis requirements.

Hydrogen generated from the KCR-19 battery is adequately'removed by the ventilation system and therefore poses no compromise to plant safety.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment related to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No..FSAR Section 8.3.2 was reviewed for this modification.

The short-circuit current associated with the smaller capacity battery does not affect the ability of the installed'ircuit breakers to provide shortwircuit piotection to related equipment.

The new battery has an acceptable seismic response and an ability to satisfy load profile requirements that do not compromise design integrity.

Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than=any previously evaluated in the FSAR.I No.The modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech Spec), especially Tech Spec 3/4.8.2.The KCR-19 batteries will result in a net decrease in battery capacity.The KCR-19 battery will however, have sufficient capacity to meet all design basis requirements, including the Tech Spec and Station Blackout load profiles.Adequate voltage will exist at the end device loads at the end of the four hour profile to assure equipment operability.95-079 The purpose of this modification is to raise the setpoint of temperature elements TSH-21206A/B to the new Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW)design temperature of 97 degrees.The modification is required to accommodate the increased generating capacity implemented by the SSES Power Uprate Project.No.FSAR Sections reviewed for this modification were 1,2, 2.4, 7.3, 9.2, and 15.2.The instrument loops are non-safety related and provide an alarm in the control room if the RHRSW inlet temperatures reach their design limit.The switches and temperature elements will operate within their normal operating ranges.The operator actions associated with the alarm response procedure AR-209<01 will not change as a result of this modification.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.'o.The modification does not involve any hardware or system function changes.The modification will allow the subject alarm to retain its function at the new RHRSW design temperature.

There are no operator actions required that could initiate any operational transients.

Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for.an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)related to the RHRSW system include Tech Specs 3/4.7.1.1 and 3/4.7.1.3.

Since the margin of safety is maintained, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%80 DCP 93-9048, Units 1 and 2 The purpose of this modification is to install a new cover on the hatchway at Elev.726'Z for the E Diesel Generator Ventilation Exhaust Fan OV512E3..The addition of the hatch cover will prevent recirculation of exhaust from OV512E3 back into the E Diesel Generator Room and eliminate the potential for raising the ambient temperature in the room above the design temperature of 120 degrees F while maintaining safe access through the hatchway.No.FSAR Chapters 6 and 15 were reviewed for this modification.

There are no engineered safety features or accident scenarios that would be impacted by the actions taken by this modification.

The modification will be within the original design criteria specified in the FSAR and does not introduce any new failure modes for the affected systems.The proposed actions taken by this modification will not involve a precursor of nor contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.Considering the abov'e, the modification does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech Spec), especially Tech Spec 3/4.8.1.None of the parameters that are the basis for the Unit 1 and/or Unit 2 Tech Specs will be affected by this modification.

95481 tl.S,li i V,i The purpose of this modification is to manually isolate the Automatic Thermal Purge Recovery System (ATPRS)on the Control Structure Chillers (OK112A/B), Unit 2 Turbine'uilding Chillers (2K102A/B), Radwaste Building Chillers (OK325A/B), and Unit 2 Reactor Building Chillers (2K206A/B).

This will eliminate the inadvertent operation of the ATPRS that has resulted in several releases of Chloroflourocarbons (CFCs)into the atmosphere.

I No.The manual isolation of the ATPRS will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction because its function is not necessary to operate or maintain the chillers mentioned above.It will also eliminate the possibility of refrigerant leakage introduced with the automatic system.The modification does not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of the Control Structure Chillers because it is not required for the equipment to operate.No.Manual isolation of the ATPRS on any chiller will not result in any risk to public health and safety.No new accident scenarios or malfunctions of a.different type can result because no adverse equipment effects are possible.'herefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.There is no specific mention or bases for any of the chillers mentioned in this modification in the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).Therefore,'he modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%82 DC-,Ui The modification will add a clamp to the Average Power Range Monitoi (APRM)flow biased upscale alarm and rod block.By adding the clamp to the APRM rod block, the alarm and rod block will coincide with the proposed setpoint of 108%thermal power.No.Upon review of FSAR Section 7.1,?.?, and 15.4't was concluded that the modification will not increase the probability of a postulated accident previously identified and evaluated in the FSAR because safety-related trip functions of the APRM are not changed.No other APRM system functions are affected.The existing APRM setpoints remain unchanged from that presently identified in Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Table 2.2.1-1 and Section 3.2.2.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment.

The modification doi;s not alter the safety-related or non-safety function of the APRM System as described in FSAR..7.1.2a.1.4.4.1 or 7.1.2a.1.4.4.3.

The modification does not affect the trip function.Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of an accident.II No.All other existing functions of the APRM system and circuits remain the same.Upon review of FSAR Sections 7.1, 7.6, 7.7, and 15.4, it is concluded that the modification does not create a passibility.

for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III""No.Applicable Operational Conditions aie identified in Tech Spec Sections 3/4.2.2, 3.4.1.1.2, and Tables 2.2.1-1,3.3.1-1, 3.3.6.1, and 3.3.6.2.The modification does not affect any APRM function described in the FSAR or any Tech Spec.Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety for any Tech Spec.'

95483 DCP 93-3062A&B, Unit 2 DCP 93-3062A re-spans the existing Unit 2 Reactor Recirculation System Flow Transmitters and corresponding electronics.

The modiTication will also re-scale the associated indicators, recorders, and computer inputs.DCP 93-3062B re-spans the Narrow Range Reactor Pressure Transmitter.

These modifications are required to accommodate the increased generating capacity implemented by the SSES Power Uprate Project.SUMMIT: I No.The modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of any accident evaluated in FSAR Sections 5 and 15.The transmitters, square root extractors and summer re-spanning along with the indicator and recorder re-scaling merely change the'cale range.All physical and electrical characteristics of the electronic loops are.identical.

The modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment.

The new process conditions are within the range of the instruments and the interface with other equipment is unchanged.

The modification does not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment since the Recirculation Flow Control Systein flow instrumentation and its operation and functions are not changed by this modification.

The modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of any accident evaluated in FSAR Sections 15.1.2 and 152.7.The transmitter is calibrated to 10%of its published speciflication upper range limit.The extension beyond its normal range is within its capabilities by design.The modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment because the re-spanning of the transmitter does not alter the Feedwater Control System.The modification does not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment since the system instrumentation has no function related to preventing the uncontrolled release of radioactivity nor does it affect any equipment that does.Il No.The modification does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR because the re-spanning and re-scaling of the Recirculation Flow Control System flow and Feedwater Control System instruments merely change the calibration and scale range.All physical and electrical characteristics are identical.

The indication and recording functions performed by the fiow instrumentation within the scope of these modifications.

are not mentioned in the Technical Specifications.

Therefore, the existing system margins are not affected by this modification package.

The proposed action is to perform a single discliarge test that will incorporate the requirements of both the Performance and Service Tests.No.Replacement of the 2D620 125VDC Battery Bank decreases the available capacity with only the KCR-21 cells, FSAR Section 8:3.2.1.1.4 requires the battery to have sufficient capacity to supply the required load for four hours.In addition, Technical Specification (Tech Spec)4.8.3.2.1(d) specifies the load profile for a four hour discharge.

Performing a single discharge test will demonstrate that the battery will meet its design basis requirements.

Changing the procedure does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment related to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II.No.FSAR Section 14.2.12.4 describes the preeperational testing for the.125VDC system and describes doing a separate Performance and Service Test.The proposed change combines both tests into a single discharge test under vendor requirements.

The Modified Performance Test adequately demonstrates the battery's ability to deliver its rated capacity and supply the design'basis load profile.Therefore, this test doe's not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than , previously demonstrated in the FSAR~No.Tech Spec 4.8.2.1 describes surveillance requirements for the 125VDC system, in addition Section 3.8.2.1 describes the minimum requirements for operability.

The new KCR-19 cells will result in a net decrease in battery capacity from the original KCR-21, The new'cells will however have sufficient capacity to meet all design requirements including the Tech Spec and Station Blackout load profiles.Performance of this test will show the battery's ability to meet and exceed the requirements for both the Service Test and the Performance Test described in Tech Spec 3.8.2.1.Therefore, the proposed test does not reduce the margin of safety asset forth in the Tech Spec Bases.

95485 The purpose of this modification is to add a new Containment Radiation Monitor (CRM)and Wetwell Sample System with separate containment sample lines that will replace the existing CRMs.The new CRM and Wetwell Sample System will significantly reduce the maintenance effort required to keep the CRMs operable, eliminate the operational problems caused by the degraded condition of the existing CRM System and the effects on the Containment Atmospheric Control System, and provide a representative containment air s'ample to the new CRMs within acceptable plateout limits.No.FSAR Chapters 6 and 15 were reviewed for this modification.

The addition of the new CRM and Wetwell Sample System does not affect any of the postulated initiating events identified.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident.The addition of the new CRM and Wetwell Sample System does represent a change in the probability of the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment.

The addition of the auxiliary relay to the Division I and Division II CAC System containment isolation logic represents the source of another malfunction in the logic due to the additional relay in the circuit.However the increase in the probability of a malfunction due to the additional relay is considered to be so small that the change is within the error bounds associated with the original design calculations and does not constitute a significant increase in the probability of the overall system malfunction.

The probability of an increase in the consequences of an accident is not affected by the proposed action, The new CRM and Wetwell Sample System are isolated from the primary containment under accident conditions.

The probability of an increase in the consequences of a malfunction of equipment is not affected by the proposed action.The new CRM and Wetwell Sample Rack containment isolation valves and all of the components which comprise the valve control circuitry including the accident signal and the position indication circuitry are all qualified devices.II No.Ilf No.The CRM Sample Panels, CRM Local Control Panels, CRM Remote Control and Indication Inserts, the new nitrogen bottle racks, the new Relay Panels and the new Local Component Boxes are mounted/anchored'in accordance with the dynamically tested and/or analyzed configuration for subject equipment.

The operability of the CRMs is governed by Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Sections 3/4.4,3.As part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak Detection System, the CRMs provide the monitoring and detection of the airborne particulate radioactivity and the airborne gaseous radioactivity associated with system leakage.The proposed action does not affect the operability requirements, surveillance requirements, or any existing margin of safety defined in Tech Spec Section 3/4.4.3.The operability of the primary containment isolation valves for the sample lines to the new CRMs and Wetwell Sample Rack is governed by Tech Spec Section 3.4.6.3.The new CRM and Wetwell Sample Rack Sample Line Isolation Valves are solenoid valves which close immediately on an accident signal.The proposed action does not affect the operability requirements of Tech Spec Section 3/4.6.3.Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-086 OCP.>>,U l The purpose of this modification is to increase the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU}System design process flow rate.This modification is required to accommodate the increased generating capacity implemented by the SSES Power Uprate Project.No.FSAR Sections 3.6, 5.2.5, 5.4.8.1.1, 7.3.1.1a.2, 7.6.1.8, and 15.6 were reviewed for this modification.

The modification does not alter the RWCU System configuration, the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB), or the operational logic of the RWCU System.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident.No additional hardware or system configuration changes occur as a result of this modification.

The RWCU System'isolation response time is unchanged.

No new component.

failure modes or protection interface features of equipment important to safety are impacted by this proposed activity.Therefore, the modification does not increase the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment.

Consequences of a pipe rupture accident due to a break in the bottom head drain line remain unchanged, since the flow rate out of the break is limited to the reactor bottom.bead drain nozzle size.The increased fiow rate has a negligible effect on the ASME Class 2 6 3 RWCU System pipe whip, jet impingement, and mass release accident calculation.

Therefore, the consequences of an accident are not increased.

There are no malfunctions postulated that would result in any increased radiological consequences.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment.

II No.The increased'flow rate has a negligible effect on the ASME Class 1, 2;&3 RWCU piping design.The modification creates no new pathways to the environs.The possibility for an accident of a different type, than any previously evaluated in the FSAR has not been created since the functionality of the RWCU System and the RWCU Leak Detection System is unchanged.

The modification does not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type since the operational logic and functionality of the RWCU Leak Detection System is unchanged.

No.Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Section 3/4.3.2 prescribes the limiting conditions for operation of isolation actuation instrumentation.

The isolation instrumentation channels shall be operable with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values specified in Table 3.3.2-2 of the Tech Specs.The new Tech Spec limits have a negligible effect on the large margin between the RWCU System isolation setpoint and the flow expected during a postulated RWCU high energy line break outside containment.

Tech Spec 4.4.1.1.2.3 provides the acceptance limit of maintaining a temperature differential between the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)bottom head and the steam dome prior to starting of an idle recirculation loop during a hot standby condition.

This modification maintains this Tech Spec temperature differential.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.k 9S-087 DCP ,U i The purpose of this modification is to modify valve HV-149F008 on the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System by installing a new standard gear set.Installing the new standard gear set prov'd s a 1 ovi es a 4/o higher efficiency rating which results in more available torque for valve stroking, and provides a greater range of acceptable torque switch settings for the valve.No.No.The modification has no impact on the dynamic qualification of the'Motor Operated Valve (MOV)as discussed in Section 3.9.3.2b.2 of the FSAR since the actual accelerations at the valve during a dynamic event are less than th'e allowable accelerations.

The MOY will close upon receipt of an isolation signal, The modification will not affect the circuit signal logic.Installing a new standard gear set will provide sufficient torque to ensure the valve functions during all design conditions.

The ability to open or close the valve when required is not affected by the modification.

Valve integrity and seat leakage are not affected.The valve's pressure'etaining capability is maintained and'he leakage characteristics are unaffected.

The modification does not adversely impact the ability of HV-149F008 to perform its intended design function., Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability'f the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or.malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR, P Conside'ring the above, the modification does not increase the probability for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III Nq.Technical Specification (Tech Spec)bases 3/4.6.1.1, 3/4.6.1.2, 3/4.6.3, 3/4.7.3 and 3/4.3.5 were reviewed for this modification.

There is no change to the pressure b oundary or to seat leakage criteria.There are no changes,to the valve sealin c apability.

Valve actuation is less than the Tech Spec requirements and seat leakage I g criteria are not changed.Performance and operation of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)system and valve HV-149F008 are not affected by this modification.

No changes have'been made to the valve actuation instrumentation or trip setpoints.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%88 DCP,U i The purpose of the modification is to mount replacement controllers in a waterproof Hoffman enclosure attached to the 2C275 panel and route associated instrument tubing from the existing panel to the new sub-panel to maintain existing loop configuration in the Reactor Building Heating, Ventilation; and Air Conditioning (HVAC)system.This will maintain the functional design of the Reactor Building Zone.No.-The affected instrument controllers described in FSAR Section 9.4.2 have no safety related function.No system logic changes occur with this modification.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.New controllers are the manufacturers suggested replacement.

Also Reactor Building HVAC system design parameters will remain the same.The modification has no direct connection to any safety related equipment and will have no effect on any structure, system, or component that performs a safety function.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The proposed action does not involve a.precursor of or a contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.The proposed change does not adversely affect the operation of the Reactor Building HVAC System as mentioned in FSAR Section 9.4.2.The modification can have no effect on the accidents that have radiological consequences.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.Considering the above, the modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.No.Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3/4.6.5 addresses limiting conditions for operations and surveillance requirements involving secondary containment integrity.

Although the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)is the primary system that maintains this Tech Spec commitment during accident conditions, the Zone II Exhaust System in conjunction with the PDC-27581 instrument loop provides'the means of satisfying this commitment during normal operation.

The relocation of PDC-27581 and'the rerouting of associated tubing will not impact the operability of the Zone II Exhaust System since no functional change occurs.The modification does not affect the operation or the discharge capabilities of the 2V205A/B Exhaust Fans.Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in Tech Spec 3/4.6.5 is not reduced.

95489 ,U The proposed revision to EO-100/200-102 (Reactor Pressure Vessel Control)gives the operator the ability to initiate the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)if needed.QlhihSKY'No.FSAR Sections 6.2.1.1.3.1, 6.2.1.1.3.3.1.1, and 7.3.1.1A.1.4 were reviewed.The procedural guidance provided in EO-100/200-102

'is adequate to preserve core cooling.The'SAR anticipates manual control of the ADS when plant conditions indicate that such actions would be prudent.Therefore, the implementation of EO-100/200-102 does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.Implementation of EO-100/200-102 conforms with the design of SSES.EO-100/200-102 imposes tighter restrictions on the use of the ADS than would be the case if the ADS was allowed to initiate automatically.

As a result, the type of transients

~associated with the ADS actuations are less likely'to occur inadvertently as a result of the implementation of EO-100/200-102.

Section 7.3.1.1A.1A of the FSAR acknowledges that manual control of the ADS is an acceptable operating approach.Therefore, the implementation of EO-100/200-102 does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the~FSAR.III No.EO-100/200-102 does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech Spec),'especially Tech Spec 3.5.1.As mentioned before, the guidance provided in EO-100/200-102 conforms with SSES design.The use of the High Pressure Coolant Injections (HPCI)System to maintain the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPY), as outlined in EO-100/200-102, will not produce Suppression Pool water levels in excess of Tech'Spec limits for events which fall within the plant design.In addition, the use of the HPCI System in this manner enhances HPCI reliability through more effective cooling of HPCI lube oil.As a result, the response to any event which requires high pressure RPV make up is enhanced.

95%90~L,tl;d The proposed revision to EO-100/200-104, (Secondary Containment Control)decreases the Maximum Normal Operating Radiation Level from 200 mR/hr to 100 mR/hr.SiUMHhfD'o.

FSAR Sections 7.3.1.A.1.4 and?.3.1.1A.1.4 were reviewed with respect to this procedure change.The implementation of EO-100/200-104 does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The actions specified in this procedure preserve the function of the Secondary Containment relied upon in the FSAR safety analyses for the control of radioactivity releases.The actions specified in this procedure use plant equipment as it was intended to be used to ensure that plant Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC)Systems are running when they should be running and ensure that plant HVAC Systems are not running when they should be isolated.II'o.Considering the above, the proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in.the FSAR.Ill No.The proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech Spec), especially Tech Spec 3/4.3.2 and 3/4.11.2.The implementation of EO-100/200-104 involves actions that use plant equipment as it was intended to be used, in a manner that is consistent with the.FSAR Assumptions, and in a manner that is consistent with actions specified in the Tech Specs 94491 The proposed revision to EO-100-113 (Level/Power Control)gives procedural guidance for mitigation of Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)events.I I No.FSAR Section 15.8 was reviewed for this proposed revision.Although Section 15.8 of the FSAR presents a brief discussion of an ATWS event, this accident is beyond the plant design basis.Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.EO-100-113 is only executed after an ATWS event has occurred.The procedure is only executed when the plant is in a configuration that is beyond the design, basis.Therefore, the procedure does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.EO-100-113 only specifies operator actions that would be carried out with the plant in a configuration that is beyond the design basis.Therefore, the procedure does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-092 The proposed revision to EO-100/200-112 (Rapid Depressurization) has been made to prevent uncontrolled Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)injection from low pressure and intermediate pressure systems as the depressurization transient continues.

No.The actions specified in EO-100/200-112 use'plant systems and components whose intended function is to accomplish an RPV depressurization.

Implementation of EO-100/200-112 is required only after the transient has proceeded to the point that depressurization is needed.Therefore, the procedure does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.The result of the rapid RPV depressurization transient that will occur through the implementation of EO-100/200-112 is a decrease in Reactor Coolant Temperature

'and a decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory, both of which have already been analyied in the FSAR.Therefore, the proposed action does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR..III No.The proposed action allows the rapid depressurization of the RPV in a manner that will be no more severe than the depressurization transient associated with an Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)actuation.

The existing Technical Specification (Tech Spec)basis 3.5.1.D accepts this level of severity.Therefore, the margin of safety for the Tech Specs is not reduced and bounds the action proposed in EO-1 00/200-1 12.

95%93 GD The purpose of this modification is to set the Maximum Combined Flow Limiter (MCFL)to 125%of the turbine rated flow.This allows all five bypass valves to open when demanded by the pressure regulator.

No.FSAR Sections 7.7.1.5, 10.2, 10.4.1, 15:1.3, 15;2,1, 15.5, and 15A were reviewed for this modification.

Compared in the analysis shown in the FSAR, increasing the MCFL to 125%will increase the rate of reactor vessel depressurization during a Pressure Regulator Failure-Open transient.

The modification will also allow more steam to flow through the bypass valves during increased steam flow transients.

This increased steam flow can be accommodated by the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV), steam piping, and'ondenser designs and will not increase the frequency of occurrence of any accident analyzed in the FSAR., Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of'an accident or malfunction of equipment previously analyzed in the FSAR.II No.The limiting Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)transient is a Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)closure, so the MCFL setting has no effect.The non-limiting ATWS Pressure Regulator Failure Open was analyzed with 125%steam flow, so this transient would be unaffected by the MCFL increase.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a differe'nt type than any evaluated in the FSAR..III No.Technical Specification.(Tech Spec)Sections 2.0 and 3/4.2 and their bases were reviewed for this modification.

Considering the evaluation performed by Nuclear Fuels Engineering,'ncreasing the MCFL to 125%will not significantly reduce the thermal margin and will not violate the MCFL.safety limit for any transient event.Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%94 CP DCP 94-9024, Unit 2 The purpose of this modification is to add new level wind systems equipped with an anti-rotation bar on both the monorail auxiliary hoist and the frame mounted auxiliary hoist for both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 refuel bridges.This will eliminate the cable damage caused by the cable, unraveling from the drum.No.FSAR Sections 9.1.4.1, 9.1.4.2.7.1, and Table 3.2-1 were reviewed for this modification.

The modification does not change the original design function of the hoists.It will enhance the hoisting operation by better directing the cable onto the drum reeves and eliminate binding points in the cable and also remove the possibility of cable damage caused by the spring mounted cable keepers.'herefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.The refueling bridge hoists and their sob components, do not serve any safety related functions.

The modification will also conform to all of the design requirements specified in the FSAR.The modification does not adversely affect the performance'of the bridge nor any other associated equipment.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.The modification does not involve a precursor of or contributor to any evaluated accidents involving off-site dose..Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to'afety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.Considering the above, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident oi malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR." I III No.Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3/4.9.6 provides surveillance requirements for the refueling bridge/platform to demonstrate that it is operable prior to its use.The proposed modification enhances the hoists by improving its cable drum winding capability and decreases the possibility of cable damage.Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95C95 DCP->>,UiC The purpose of this modification is to replace the existing R-10 rectifier with a 90V, 50A rectifier for Diesel Generators A through D and install dropping resistors for the cathodic protection system of the Diesel Generator A through E Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area.The higher voltage rating will boost the current output of the anodes driven by the rectifier in order to improve the structure-to-soil potential levels.No.The cathodic protection system is a nonwafety related system designed to provide corrosion protection for the diesel fuel oil storage tanks and associated piping.The protection system is designed to operate continuously and its performance is monitored through annual anode current measurements.

It does not interface with the control, operation or shutdown of the fuel oil storage equipment., The proposed action will correct deficiencies in the system'to prevent gradual deterioration of the storage equipment due to ineffective corrosion protection.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.In accordance.

with FSAR Section 9.5.4.2, the storage tank exteriors are painted with enamel or polyester resin, wrapped with a fiberglass mat, have extra thickness for corrosion allowance, and are furnished with cathodic protection.

Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or yaaIfunction of'a different type than ariy evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No;The Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)do not apply to the cathodic protection system for corrosion prevention.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

9M96 DCP, il i The modification Rill change the magnetic circuit breaker setting and'rovide overload heaters for the Drywell Floor Drain Sump Pump.The modification is needed to coordinate with the new motor characteristics caused by the new pump assembly.No.The modification does not affect the closure of the Drywell Sump Containment Isolation Valves under accident conditions.

Also, this modification does not affect the ability of the Drywell Leakage Detection System to support the Leak-Before-Break Detection Analysis.The ability to measure unidentified drywell leakage, as described in FSAR Section 5.2.5.1.2.4 is not affected by this modification.

The affected Drywell Sump Pump has no safety related function.The proposed action provides for continued design basis operation of the pump and does not adversely affect the function of the Liquid Radwaste Handling System or the Dryweli Leakage Detection System,'o system logic changes occur.Therefore, the modification

.does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.Changing circuit breaker magnetic settings and overload heater sizes will have no impact on pump operation.

The.pump assembly is the manufacturer's suggested replacement, therefore the pump parameters will remain the same.The modification has no direct connection to any safety related equipment and will have no effect on any structure; system, or component that:performs a safety function.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as'reviously evaluated'in the FSAR.The proposed action does not involve a precursor of or a contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.~Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The new replacement pump as'sembly is deemed functionally equivalent to the original equipment and will not result in any risk to public health and safety.No new accident scenarios or malfunctions of a different type can result because no adverse equipment or circuit effects are possible.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The function of the Drywell Leakage Detection System described in Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Section 3/4.4.3 is not changed by pump assembly replacement.

The modification" will prov'ide the necessary AC power supplies to meet the requirements listed in Tech Spec Sections 3/4.8.3.1 and 3/4.8.3.2.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95%97 DCP 94-3025, Unit 2 The purpose of this modification is to reinforce the connection of th'e sensing lines to their lower standoff brackets on Unit 2 Jet Pumps¹13 and¹14.This will assure an intact support point at this location.SUhthlhRY'o.

The modification improves the securing of the jet pump sensing lines and reduces the probability of failure qf the sensing lines.The modification will not impair the function nor the structural integrity of the jet pump diffuser and as such the addition of sensing line clamps does not affect the ability to reload the core to the top of the jet pump as discussed in FSAR Section 5.4.1.4.Also, this change does not have an impact on the reactor recirculation system malfunctions that pose threats of damage to the fuel barrier that are described and evaluated in FSAR Chapter 15.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.A review of the clamping force, structural integrity, loose parts, and clamp materials confirmed that this mo'dification has no effect on the existing design requirements of reactor vessel system and components.

Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech Spec), especially Tech Spec Section 3.4.1.2.The modification will not affect the operability of the jet pump.The failure of the sensing line is not a safety problem since it would not affect jet pump operation.

95%98 The purpose of TP-262-032 is to control the replacement of Reactor Vessel Instrumentation Condensing Chamber XY-B21-2D004A.

The replacement of this chamber is'needed to correct the problem with the chamber being outside the design tolerance for elevation.

SUhihlhlK:

I No.I FSAR Section 6.3.1.1 states that the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)is to provide for any primary line break up to and including the double ended break of the largest line.During this test the worse case leak will be the instrument penetration plug dislodging, which is less severe than either accidents described in the FSAR.If the plug was to dislodge, the operable A'oop of Core Spray and Residual Heat Removal (RHR)will be sufficient to provide makeup.FSAR Section 9.1.2 discusses the potential draining of the spent fuel pool through failed fuel pool gates.The fuel racks and the contained fuel will remain covered with water.Such an event would require a'plug to fail while the fuel pool gates were removed.FSAR Section 15.0.3.2.1.1 states that transient and accident scenarios should consider an initiating event comprised of operator error or equipment failure.Since the plug will not be subjected to any pressure except head pressure from cavity level, which will maintain the plug in the nozzle, the probability of the plug falling into the vessel or core is minimal.The plugs will be tied off with a lanyard to prevent the plug from falling.Therefore, the TP does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously described in the FSAR..II No III No The accidents or malfunctions that could occur would be the failure of the nozzle plugs to cause the draining of the reactor vessel/cavity and spent fuel pool.These events are described in FSAR Section 6.3.1, 15.6, and 9.1.2, which results in maintaining the fuel in the vessel, spent fuel pool racks covered with water, even without makeup.Since the calculated leakage of 55gpm is well within the available makeup capability of Loop A of Core Spray or RHR or two loops of Emergency Service Water (ESW)via Unit 2 ESW, water level can be maintained at 22 feet above the racks and fuel.Therefore, a reactor vessel/draindown event with refuel gates removed would not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3.9.8 requires at least 22 feet over the top of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)flange during handling of irradiated fuel assemblies or when irradiated fuel asseniblies are seated in the RPV, while in Condition 5.Tech Spec 3.9.9 requires at least 22 feet over irradiated spent fuel in the fuel pool.The basis of these Tech Specs is to ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99%of the assumed 10%iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly.This minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.The calculated leakage through the RPV penetrations, with no plug installed, is well within the makeup capabilities of the systems available therefore ensuring minimum water level is met.Therefore, the TP does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Specs.95-099 The modification will add three new manually operated isolation valves to'cross-tie piping to the Common Recombiner Skid.The valves will provide the'double isolation function needed to prevent the main steam, off-gas, and hydrogen from leaking-by in the service Recombiner Skids to the Common Recombiner Skid when it is out-of-service.

The additional isolation valves will'also provide isolation of Motor Operated Valves (MOVs)for valve maintenance activities.

No.The modification will be designed and installed to be consistent with the original design and construction requirements of the Off-gas Recombiner System Skid piping.The modification wilt also be utilizing proven double isolation installations and valve types that currently exist in some recombiner cross-tie piping.The modification will not change the function of the Off-Gas Recombiner System.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the.occurrence of any accidents described in FSAR Chapters 6 and 15.The Off-Gas Recombiner

.System is not a safety related system.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.FSAR Section 15.7.1 bounds any failure that may occur with this system, including a total release of radiological activity normally processed by the Off&as Treatment System being discharged directly into the Turbine Building.Since the system and components.

affected by this modification still comply with the original design and construction codes, there will be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR..No.The modification enhances.'the ability to isolate an out-of-service Recombiner Skid from other in-service skids thereby aiding in the prevention of personnel and area contamination and personnel safety hazards due to hydrogen leaks.There are no new concerns created should any of the new manually operated isolation valves be accidentally left closed following maintenance activities and the recombiner room is vacated.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of the Gaseous Radwaste System or any plant system governed by the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), especially Tech Spec Sections 3I4.11.1, 3I4.11.2.4 and 3/4.11,2.6.

None of the parameters that are the bases for the Tech Specs will be adversely impacted by this modification.

The modification will assist in out-of-service Recombiner Skid isolation so that potentially harmful"leak-bys" do not occur.Therefore, the modification does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95-1 00 The modification will add three new manually operated isolation valves to cross-tie piping to the Unit 1 Recombiner Skid.The valves will provide the double isolation function needed to prevent the main steam, off-gas, and hydrogen from leaking-by'n the service Recombiner Skids to'the Unit 1 Recombiner Skid when it is out~service.

The additional isolation valves will also provide isolation of Motor Operated Valves (MOVs)for valve maintenance activities.

No.The modification will be designed and installed to be consistent with the original design and construction requirements of the Off-gas Recombiner System Skid piping.The modification will also be utilizing proven double isolation installations and valve types that currently exist in some recombiner cross-tie piping.The modification will not change the function of the Off-Gas Recombiner System'.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the.occurrence of any accidents described in FSAR Chapters 6 and 15.The Off-Gas Recombiner System is not a safety related system.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.FSAR Section 15.7.1 bounds any failure that may occur with this system, including a total release of radiological activity normally processed by the Off&as Treatment System being discharged directly into the Turbine Building.Since the system and components affected by this modification-still comply with the original design and construction codes, there will be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR: ll No The modification enhances the ability to isolate an out-of-service Recombiner Skid from other in-service skids thereby aiding in the prevention of personnel and area contamination and personnel safety'hazards due to hydrogen leaks.There are no new concerns created should any of the new manually operated isolation valves be accidentally left closed following maintenance activities and the recombiner room is'acated.

Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of the Gaseous Radwaste System or any plant system governed by the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), especially Tech Spec Sections 3/4.11.1, 3/4.11.2.4 and 3/4.11,2.6.

None of the parameters that are the bases for the Tech Specs will be adversely impacted by this modification.

The modification will assist in outwf-service Recombiner Skid isolation so that potentially harmful"leak-bys" do not occur.Therefore, the modification does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

0 95-101 The modification will add three new manually operated isolation valves to cross-tie piping to the Unit 2 Recombiner Skid.The valves will provide the double isolation function needed to prevent the main steam, off-gas, and hydrogen from leaking-by'n the service Recombiner Skids to the Unit 2 Recombiner Skid when it is out-of-service.

The additional isolation valves will also provide isolation of Motor Operated Valves (MOVs)for valve maintenance activities.

No.The modification will be designed and installed to be consistent with the original design and co'nstruction requirements of the Off-gas Recombiner'System Skid piping.The modification will also be utilizing proven double isolation installations and valve types that currently exist in some recombiner cross-tie piping.The modification will not change the function of the Off-Gas Recombiner System.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of any accidents described in FSAR Chapters 6 and 15.The Off&as Recombiner System is not a safety related system.Therefore,'the.

modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.FSAR Section 15.7.1 bounds any failure that.may occur with this system, including a total release of radiological activity normally processed by the Off-Gas Treatment System being discharged directly into the-Turbine Building.Since the system and components affected by this modification still co'mply with the original design and construction codes, there will be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important, to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.The modification enhances the ability to isolate an out-of-service Recombiner Skid from other in-service skids thereby aiding in the prevention of personnel and area contamination and personnel safety hazards due to hydrogen leaks.There are no new concerns created should any of the new manually operated isolation valves be accidentally left closed following maintenance activities and'the recombiner room is , vacated.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.lll No.The modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of the Gaseous RadwasteSystem or any plant system governed by the.Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), especially Tech Spec Sections 3/4.11.1, 3/4.11'.2.4 and 3/4.11.2.6.

None of the parameters that are the bases for the Tech Specs will be adversely impacted by this modification.

The modification will assist in out-of-service Recombiner Skid isolation so that potentially harmful"leak-bys" do not occur.Therefore, the modification does not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-102 The purpose of this action is to approve the operation of the Reactor Building Chilled Water (RBCW)System and Closed Cooling Water System (CCWS)with Sodium-24 levels up to and including 2E-6 pCi/ml.'L I No.The sodium levels are, controlled by the limits on nitrite and conductivity while the neutron flux is determined by reactor power;although the flux seen by the chilled water does vary during the cycle, being at its maximum at the beginning of the cycle.This means that the levels of activity will not increase significantly above a maximum level of 1.1E-6 pCi/ml.However, dose calculations and an administrative limit have been set at 2E-6 pCi/cc for Na-24 to allow for somewhat higher levels of sodium and for uncertainty in calculation of maximum neutron Aux (including increase due to power uprate).The action does not affect the operation of any system, The dose consequences, should all of the activity contained in the RBCW System be released to the environment via the ai*orne pathway is 1.57E-7 mrem (whole body)and via the waterborne pathway is 3.02E-7 mrem (whole body).The corresponding Technical Specification (Tech Spec)limit for the airborne pathway is 7.5mrem/quarter and for the liquid pathway is 3.0mrem/quarter for 2 units.The dose release from release of the entire RBCW System would be the same should it be used for containment cooling.Therefore; the proposed action does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The only possible consequence of operating the RBCW System and Chilled Water System with the low level of Na-24 contamination is that it would get released to the environment unmonitored.

This is no different than the potential unmonitored release evaluated in Section 15 of the FSAR.The consequences of this potential release are less than those analyzed previously, and are of the, same type.Therefore, the proposed action does not create the possibility for an accident or.malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.ill No.The potential dose consequences from this action are all well below the Tech Spec limit of 15 mrem/yr as outlined in Tech Spec 3.11.2.3b.

The Tech Spec limits are based on nuclides w/T 1/2>Bd.Also Na-24 has a half life of 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />.Therefore, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-103 The purpose of this action is to approve the operation of the Reactor Building Chilled Water (RBCW)System and Closed Cooling Water System (CCWS)with Sodium-24 levels up to and including 2E-6 pCi/ml.No.The sodium levels are controlled by the limits on nitrite and conductivity while the neutron fiux is determined by reactor power;although the flux seen by the chilled water does vary during the cycle, being at its maximum at the beginning of the cycle.This means that the levels of activity will not increase significantly above a maximum level of 1.1E-6 pCi/ml.However, dose calculations and an administrative limit have been set at 2E-6 pCf/cc for Na-24 to allow for somewhat higher levels of sodium and for uncertainty in calculation of maximum neutron flux (including increase due to power uprate).The action does not affect the operation of any system.The dose consequences, should all of the activity contained in the RBCW System be released to the environment via the airborne pathway is 1.57E-7 mrem (whole body)and via the waterborne pathway is 3.02E-7 mrem (whole body).The corresponding Technical Specification (Tech Spec)limit for the airborne pathway is 7.5mrem/quarter and for the liquid pathway is 3.0mrem/quarter for 2 units.The dose release from release of the entire RBCW System would be the same should it~be used for containment cooling.Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II'o.The only possible consequence of operating the RBCW System and Chilled Water~System with the low level of Na-24 contamination is that it would get released to the environment unmonitored.

This is no different than the potential unmonitored release evaluated in Section 15 of the FSAR.The consequences of this potential release are less than those analyzed previously, and are of the same type.Therefore, the proposed action does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The potential dose consequences from this action are all well below the Tech Spec limit of 15 mrem/yr as outlined in Tech Spec 3.11.2.3b.

The Tech Spec limits are based on nuclides w/T 1/2)Sd.Also Na-24 has a half life of 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />.Therefore, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-104 DCP 94-9043, Unit 2 The purpose of this modification is to provide the means to reset the Unit 2 Cooling Refrigeration System Panel 2C288A and 2C288B trouble signals after a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP).This will be done immediately after the Diesel Generators load onto their buses.The modification will prevent the inadvertent tripping of 2V222A (B)and lockout of 2K210A (B)for contact miscoordination within the 2K210A (B)control circuitry.

It will also return the Cooling Refrigeration System to its original design which is to have the trouble signals reset before the systems are calle'd upon to operate.No.The timing for the starting and stopping of 2V222A (B)and 2K210A (B)by the 2K210A (B)is unaffected by the proposed action.The tripping of 2K210A (B)by the 2K210A (B)protective functions are unaffected by the proposed action.Resetting of the trouble signals upon the loading of the Diesel Generators onto their buses does not affect any boundary to the release of radiation.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.The proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.The.timing for the initiation of the Emergency Switchgear Cooling System is not changed by the proposed action.There is no malfunction caused by the proposed action that can change this timing.Also, the tripping of 2K210A (B)by its protective functions is'unaffected by the proposed action.III No.Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Section 3.8.3.1 and 3.8.3.2 deal with the Onsite Power Distribution System that requires the Unit 2 Class'1E 4160 Vacuum Switchgear and Class 1E 480 Vacuum Load Centers to be operable.The Unit 2 Emergency Cooling System is required to maintain the Switchgear Room temperature below the Environmental Qualification temp'erature.

The'proposed action assures that the Unit Emergency Cooling Systems are available for a contact miscoordination in the 2K210A (B)control circuitry.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-105 DL'>>C,, E,U i d The purpose of this modification is to install a flow sensor to measure cooling tower blowdown water flow discharge to the Susquehanna river.I No.The modification does not add or change any components whose failure would initiate an accident, and does not change the'function or performance of the liquid radwaste system.The modification increases the reliability of th'e plant discharge flow measurement system, thus reducing the potential for failing to detect an unplanned radioactive release to the public.The.modification does not change the I.iquid Radwaste System.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.The new enclosure for the Cooling Tower Blowdown Composite Sampler Interface performs the same function as the existing station.Although the sample is taken from a different location, the new enclosure design limits the spread of a spill and a drain line returns the spill to the'manhole.The new station has similar components to those in the existing system and any failures would be similar.III No.The modification does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech Spec), especially Tech Spec Sections 3.3.7.10, 3.11.1.1, 3.11.1.2, 3.11.1.3, 4.3.7.10, 4.11.1.1, 4.11.1.2, 4.11.1.3.1, 4.11.1.3.2 and Tables 3.3.7.10-1 and 4.3.7.10-1.

The new instrumentation will measure the total water'flow to the river, including both cooling tower flows and spray pond overflow, The new instrumentation will be more accurate than the existing system, since the existing system measures only cooling tower blowdown flow and ignores the spray pond overflow.It will also increase the implied margin of safety from the existing system, based on measurement of total flow, including spray pond overflow.Also, by increasing the reliability of the sampling system, the reliability of the environmental sampling program will be increased.

DCP 94-3006, Unit 2 This Design Change Package (DCP)will be used as the configuration control mechanism for updating the required Unit 2 Power Uprate drawings and documents.

There is no physical work associated with this DCP, No.The subject DCP is used as the configuration control mechanism for updating drawings and documents associated with the Power Uprate that are not part of a Power Uprate modification or setpoint change package.This Power Uprate DCP is limited to drawing and document updates and.therefore does not involve any physical work.Therefore, the DCP does not increase~the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The DCP does not authorize any physical or operational changes to the plant.'Therefore, the DCP does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.Technical Specification (Tech Spec)changes associated with the Power Uprate have been approved by the NRC.This DCP is only required to update specific design drawings and documents associated with the Power Uprate and do not involve any Tech Spec changes.Therefore, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-107 SEPI dSC)3,U i d The purpose of this modification is to change the Condensate Demin Effluent Conductivity A'larm setpoint of O.l pmho/cm to~0.1 pmho/cm.This modification will also change the Condensate Demin inlet Conductivity Alarm setpoint of 0.2 pmho/cm to 60.2 pmho/cm, This will allow adjusting the instrument alarm points to more conservative values consistent"with'plant administrative procedures.

No.FSAR Section 10.4 was reviewed for this modification.

The change only affects annunciation w'hich will improve operator response to reactor water chemistry excursions, Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.FSAR Section 10.4.6 provides basis.for the setpoint values used to determine~compliance with Table 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.56.The proposed action does not modify the conductivity limit or affect the operation of any system and has no effect on any safety related system.'Therefore, the modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than ariy evaluated previously in the FSAR.III.No.Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3.4.4 provides basis and limiting conditions of reactor water quality.The lowering of the Condensate, Feedwater, and Reactor Water Conductivity Alarm setpoints does not change the existing limiting conditions.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any.Tech Spec.95-108 The purpose of this modification is to remove and blankwff a portion of the 2" drain line (JBD-288)downstream of the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU)ASME Section III Class I drain line isolation valves 244F029 and 244FQ30.The modification will also plug the existing connection from this piping to the 4'BD Liquid Radioactive Waste (LRW)Collection Header feeding the Drywell Equipment Drain Tank 27218.This will stop the valve seat leakage problems thereby preventing further degradation of the valves'eating capabilities.

FSAR Section 15.6 was reviewed for this modification.

The addition of the blind flange acts to contain minor leakage past the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB)isolation valves only.The change does not alter the system contents, functions, or boundaries in any manner that would.increase the radiological consequences of the Losmf&oolant Accident described in FSAR Section 15.6.5.The postulated failure of the jBD piping does not present a new mode of failure for the los~coolant accident discussed above.The stress levels in the jBD'piping have been determined to meet the break exemption criteria.The effect of the modification is merely to permit pressurization of the jBD piping downstream of.the RCPB isolation valves 244F029/030.

This in no way affects the normal operation of the RWCU or the RCPB.The proposed action does not involve a precursor of or contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as'reviously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.Considering the above, the modification does not increase or create a possibility of an accident'or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR III No.The Unit 2 Technical Specification (Tech Spec)limits applicable to'the RWCU System with respect to this modification are described in Tech Spec Sections 3/4.4.3 and 3/4.4.8.With the new configuration, any leakage through the bolted flange connection or other portion of this piping would be collected as unidentified leakage, and restricted to the 5 gpm Tech Spec limit or else require a unit shutdown.The modification has no adverse impact on the structural integrity of the ASME Code Class 1 Components nor will it impede any periodic inspection or hydrotesting procedures.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margi'n of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-109 The purpose of this modification is to install tube stakes in accessible'areas of the main condenser and install top hat baffles over the air removal hoods of the upper bundles.This will limit tube vibrations in affected areas of the condenser and will decrease the occurrence of tube failures due to vibration and will result in extended tube life.I No.The modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident evaluated in the FSAR.FSAR Sections 10.4 and 15.2.7 were reviewed for previously evaluated accidents.

The intent of the tube staking and installation of top hat baffles is to eliminate vibration type tube failures in the affected areas of the main condenser.

The new self-locking stake design is an improvement to'previous stake installations, resulting in reducing the probability of loosening during operation.

The main condenser is not safety related or required for safe shutdown of the reactor or mitigation'of a design basis accident.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.There are no accidents evaluated in the FSAR that involve the condenser or require condenser operability.

The only accident evaluated in the FSAR related to the condensate system is loss of feedwater and.consequent reduction of primary coolant inventory.

Mitigation of this accident depends on actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)and/or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC),Systems, not on the condensate system.Since loss of feedwater due to pump trip has already been evaluated, the consequences of an accident are not increased.

Use of the condenser tube stakes or baffles do not increase the potential for failure or malfunction of the condenser or a pump in the condensatelfeedwater stream.Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.II No.The modification does not chan'ge the operating characteristics o'r function of the main condenser or the condensate/feedwater system.No other different types of malfunctions are identified.

Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)reviewed for margins of safety applicable to the components and systems affected by this modification are Tech Spec Sections 3.3.7.11, 3 4.4, 3.7.8, 3.11.2.6, and 3.11.2.7.The modification does not change any instrumentation, setpoints, flow rates of noble gases, generation of hydrogen or oxygen, and does not have effect on radioactive gaseous effluent or control radioactive leakage.Compatible materials are used to prevent adverse effects.Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Tech Specs.

95-1 10 C 3-The purpose of this modification is to install larger springs in eight fire dampers located in the Control Structure.

This will ensure that the fire dampers fully close during a fire.I No F FSAR Sections 9.4, 9.5, 9.5.1.1.1.6,15.0, 15.6, an'd 15.7 were reviewed for this modification.

It was determined that the components within the Control Room Floor Cooling, Computer Room Floor Cooling, and Fire Protection Systems do not cause or initiate any of the accidents or events described, Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident as previously evaluated in the FSAR.A review of FSAR Sections 15.6 and 15.7 revealed that fire dampers in the Control Structure ductwork in general are not relied upon to mitigate any plant accidents analyzed in the FSAR.The modification is designed to enhance the capability of the dampers to close for a.fire condition without degrading the safety function of the damper that is to remain open to ensure.the continued operation of the Control Room Floor Cooling and Computer Room Floor Cooling Systems.Therefore, the modification does, not increase the consequen'ces of an accident as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The modification does not reduce the fire resistance capability of the fire dampers.The modification ensures full closure'f the dampers.It will increase the fire dampers capability to function as 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barriers in accordance with the original design intent.The new springs are.designed, manufactured, and qualified to the same UL standards as the original springs.Therefore, the modification does not increase the'robability of the occurrence or a maffun'ction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The installation of the new springs does not impact the operation or performance of any of the equipment in the Control Room Cooling and the Computer Room Floor Cooling Systems.Th'erefore, the modification does not increase the'consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.No new operating modes are created for any system.The use of the same standards as the original springs for design, material, and qualification ensures the function and integrity of the fire dampers to perform as fire barriers with a fire resistance rating equivalent to the originals.

Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The Technical Specification (Tech Spec)'ases reviewed for margins of safety applicable to the equipment affected by this modification were 3/4.3.7, 3/4.3.7.9, 3/4.7.2, and 3/4.7.7.Considering the above, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for ariy Tech Spec.

The purpose of this modification is to modify the Rod Position Information System (RPIS)logic to indicate Full-In if any one of switches SOD, S51, or S52 are closed.This will eliminate the temporary loss of the Full-In indication during a reactor SCRAM or normal drive.action.I No.FSAR Section 15.4 provides the accident" analyses for reactivity and power distribution anomalies.

The Reactor Manual Control System (RMCS)has no safety function as stated in FSAR Section 7.7.1.2.1.

The RMCS'does not include any of the circuitry or devices used to automatically or manually SCRAM the reactor.A change to the Rod Position Information System (RPIS)logic change will have no impact on the functional requirements of the Control Rod Drive (CRD)System or on its ability to control core reactivity because no circuit interconnection occurs.No impact occurs to the shutdown margin nor to reactivity control.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurr'ence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.The modification does not affect any structure, system, or component in performing its safety function, and will prevent inappropriate operator actions.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR, The proposed action does not involve a precursor of or a contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.The proposed change does not adversely affect the operation of the CRD System as delineated in FSAR Section 4.6.1 nor on the reactivity regulation function as mentioned in FSAR Section 4.1.3.Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The change will not result in any risk to public health or safety.The change does not create any new'ailure modes or mechanisms for the associated circuitry.

The proposed action does not.change any function that existed previously.

The modification will not alter the above mentioned design basis.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs)and surveillance requirements concerning control rod, and rod position indication, are referenced in Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3/4.1.3.The proposed changes will have no adv'erse affect on the shutdown margin which ensures that: 1)the reactor can be made sub-critical from all operating conditions, 2)the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3)the reactor will be maintained sufficiently suWritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95-1 12 The purpose of this modification is to modify the Rod Position Information System (RPIS)logic to indicate Full-In" if any one of switches SOO, S51, or S52 are closed.This will eliminate the temporary loss of the Full-In" indication during a reactor SCRAM or normal drive action.No.II No.FSAR Section 15.4 provides the accident analyses for reactivity and power distribution anomalies.

The Reactor Manual Control System (RMCS)has no safety function as stated in FSAR Section 7.7.1.2.1.

The RMCS does not include any of the circuitry or devices used to automatically or manually SCRAM the reactor.A change to the Rod Position Information System (RPIS)logic change will have no impact on the functional requirements of the Control Rod Drive (CRD)System or on its ability to control core reactivity because no circuit interconnection occurs., No impact occurs to the shutdown margin nor to reactivity control.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.The modification does not affect any structure, system, or component in performing its safety function, and will prevent inappropriate operator actions.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The proposed action does not involve a precursor.

of or a contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.The proposed change does not adversely affect the operation of the CRD System as delineated in FSAR Section 4.6.1 nor on the reactivity regulation function as mentioned in FSAR Section 4.1.3.Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.P The change will not result in any risk to public health or safety.The change does not create any net failure modes or mechanisms for the associated circuitry.

The proposed action does not change any function that existed previously.

The modification will not alter the above mentioned design basis.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs)and surveillance requirements concerning control rod, and rod position indication, are referenced in Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3/4.1.3.The proposed changes will have no adverse affect on the shutdown margin which ensures that: 1)the reactor can be made sub-critical from all operating conditions, 2)the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3)the reactor will be maintained sufficiently suWritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

,U>>d The purpose of this new procedure is to address the acceptability of maintai'ning the SSES fuel pools crosstied through the cask storage pit during nonrefueling and refueling outage periods.I No.Draindown consequences through the evaluated paths are bounded by the consequences of the gate seal leak addressed in FSAR Section 9.1.2.2.Pool draindown via the fuel.pool gate seals has been addressed in the FSAR.Draindown via the four lines evaluated herein to the minimum level is not deemed credible given the multiple barriers,.seismic design, numerous diverse and redundant level alarms, and the alarm response procedures.

The probability of pool boiling is decreased by this change and the probability of pool draindown in the crosstied pool configuration is sufficiently low.Therefore, the procedure does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an'ccident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.The FSAR discusses draindown in Section 9.1.2.2.It determines that in the unlikely event of a pool gate seal failure, that the fuel would remain covered.The worst case gate seal failure would drain to an elevation lower than the drain elevation of the subject lines.The effect of losing pool inventory through a failed gate seal is no worse than losing pool inventory through one of the subject lines.Therefore, the procedure does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (Tech Spec), especially Tech Spec 3/4.9.9.The implementation of this procedure does not impact the ability to maintain fuel pool water inventory.

Any decrease in level caused by this leakage will be detected and alarmed locally and in the control room so that prompt actions can be taken.Alarm response procedures and offnormal procedures instruct that makeup be provided and actions be taken to isolate the leak.95-114 The purpose of the modification is to implement the operator actions required to prevent deficient Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)Spray Cooling conditions and to return the spray pond administrative temperature and alarm limits to those consistent with the 88 F Technical Specification (Tech Spec)limit.This will ensure that the spray nozzle pressures are high enough to effectively coot the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW)/Emergency Service Water (ESW)water and maintain the UHS maximum temperature design limit of 97 F.I No.FSAR Sections 6.2, 7.1, 7.3, 8.3, 9.2.5, 9.2.6, 9.2.7, and 15.6.5 were reviewed for this modification.

The modification has no adverse effect on the safety functions of the ESW, RHRSW, and UHS.systems and components.

The radiological consequences of relevant postulated accidents are not affected.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the~FSAR, II No.The modification does not introduce failure modes not considered in the FSAR since it does not create a possibility for failure-of more than one loop of ESW/RHRSW/UHS.

Therefore, the modification does not create a possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III'No.The bases for the containment depressurization, Residual Heat Removal Service Water, Emergency Service Water, and Ultimate Heat Sink Systems were reviewed in Tech Specs 3/4.6,2, and 3/4.7.1.The bases for the Containment Depressurization System Tech Specs, such as.Suppression Pool temperature and volum'e, are taken into consideration in the containment safety analyses.Since the RHR HX's performance assumed in the containment safety analyses has been shown to be bounding at the reduced RHRSW flowrate, this modification has no effect on the containment depressurization safety mar'gins defined in the Tech Spec for this system.Considering this and the above, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.I'95-115 SCP j942036, Units 1 and 2 The proposed action restores the spray pond high temperature alartn'setpoint to 85'from 82'.This will reduce.the likelihood of experiencing

'nuisance alarms and allow plant operations to take compensatory actions thereby keeping spray pond temperature below the spray pond design limit (97')and the Technical Specification (Tech Spec)limit (88').KIJbbdhfE:

I No.No FSARwnaiyzed accident or malfunction relies on the spray pond high temperature alarm for the initiation of mitigating actions.This alarm, or its failure cannot cause an'y FSAR accident or malfunction.

Changing the alarm set point to a slightly higher value provides the operator with information that the operator can act upon to reduce spray pond temperature while still ensuring that the spray pond design temperature is not exceeded even under worst-case meteorological conditions.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of, an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the'FSAR.E II No.The restoration of the Spray Pond High Temperature Alarm setpoint to 85'from 82'only affects the pond temperature at which this alarm is received.There are no automatic actions associated with the receipt of the alarm.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.Tech Spec 3.4.7.1 addresses spray pond parameters.

Restoring the high temperature alarm setpoint to 85'from 82'returns the setpoint to the previous value.Previous experience has shown that the 85'alarm setpoint provides sufficient margin to ensure that the Tech Spec limit (88')is not exceeded.Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

This safety evaluation is intended to demonstrate that the difference between wide and narrow range level instrumentation observed during normal operation and Unit 2 power ascension testing is safe and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.I No.The change in the point at which the affected equipment actuate's does not in any way change the probability of the occurrence of an accident nor does it affect the probability of the malfunction of that equipment.

The potential effect on operator actions, and the potential for incorrect actions as a result of misleading information has no adverse impact.The effect on the vessel nozzles is acceptable because the increase in the probability of injections does not change the severity or effect of the injections.

Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of the'ccurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as prev'iously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The proposed change doe's not change the way in which any of the equipment works nor does it change the sequence in which the equipment will function.It just changes the point at which the equipment will function.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.~III No.The change, in certain instances, results in actuation occurring at a vessel level greater than that assumed in the calculations that resulted in the existing Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).These bases and their associated Tech Specs are configured to assure that th'e core remains adequately cooled.Due to the flow velocity level error there is actually a higher water level than detected by the equipment.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Tech Spec.95-117 The purpose of this modification is to replace the current Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI)Outboard Throttle Valves HV-151F017A(B) and HV-251F017A(B), the Opening Logic Seal-In Time Delay Relay E111A-K45A(B) with new time delay relays and reduce the current 5 minute time delay setting to approximately 45 seconds.This modification will allow the operators, to the extent possible, the maximum flexibility to respond to a broad spectrum of accident and transient events.No.FSAR Sections 15.1.6, 15.2.9, 15.6.2, 15.6.4, 15.6.5, 6.3, 15.2.8, 15.6.6, 15.7.1, and 15.8 were reviewed for this modification.

The modification enhances the operating flexibility to cope with the spectrum of accident and transient events postulated for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)System.The modification does not affect the Shutdown Cooling mode of the RHR and does not alter the RHR System instrumentation and control functions.

The available voltage to the RHR Relay Vertical Panel is not'reduced with this modification.

Also, the modification does not affect the LPCI Outboard Throttle Valves mentioned above.Therefore,'he modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to'safety as.previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.Considering the above, the modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.Technical Specification (Tech Spec)bases'3/4.3.3, 3/4 4.9, 3/4.5.1, 3/4.5.2, 3/4.6.2, 3/4.8.2, and 3/4.9.11 were reviewed for this modification.

The RHR.Systems

~initiation logic is not affected by this modification.

The modification does not affect the RHR Shutdown Cooling mode of operation.

Considering this and the statements above, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-118 The purpose of this modification is to remove the existing, Wet Pipe Sprinkler Alarm Valve Pressure Safety Valves (PSV), and if installed, its associated PSV isolation valves and PSY line strainers.

The modification will also replace the Alarm Valve Bypass Check Valves with Bypass Check Valves containing an orifice in the valve disk.This will eliminate the problem with Fire Protection Water weeping from the PSV valves to the floor drain system.No.The ability of the wet pipe sprinkler fire protection systems to provide protection of the Safe Shutdown (SSD)equipment has not been altered.The function and operation of the Wet Pipe Sprinkler Fire Protection-System to prowde fire suppression to the affected areas has not been altered.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident evaluated in the FSAR.The Wet Pipe Sprinkler Fire Protection System does not provide any direct safety function nor does it interface with equipment important to safety.Therefore,'he modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or consequences of a malfunction or equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.There are no accidents evaluated in the FSAR that are related to the Wet Pipe Sprinkler Fire Protection System.Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of an accident as previously.evaluated in the FSAR.II No.A review of the FSAR, SER, and FPRR Sections.revealed that there are no new accidents or malfunctions of equipment important to safety created by.these modifications.

Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR..III No.Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Section 3/4.7.6 was reviewed for this modification.

The affected.Wet Pipe Sprinkler Fire Protection System components do not provide protection for areas containing safety related equipment.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis foi any Tech Spec.

95-1 19 The purpose of this modification is to add a new Containment Radiation Monitor (CRM)and Wetwell Sample System with separate containment sample lines that will replace the existing CRMs.The new CRM and Wetwell Sample System will significantly reduce the maintenance effort required to'keep the CRMs operable, eliminate operational problems caused by the degraded condition of the existing CRM System and to provide a representative containment air sample to the new CRMs within acceptable plateout limits.I No.'I FSAR Chapters 6 and 5 were reviewed for this modification.

The CRMs are only an informational system that is not important to safety.The CRMs do not generate any signals used for any Safety Systems actuation.

The sample pumps in the new CRMs are a different design with operating conditions that are less demanding so that oil contamination of the new containment sample lines will not occur.The new CRM and Wetwell Sample Rack containment isolation valves and all of the components that comprise the valve'control circuitry including the accident signal and the position indication circuitry are all qualified devjces.The new CRMs are Class 1E electrical equipment and are qualified to meet R.G.1A5.However, they are not environmentally qualified.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The CRM Sample Panels, CRM Local Control Panels, CRM Remote Control, and Indication Inserts, the new nitrogen bottle racks, the new relay panels, and the new local component boxes are mounted/anchored in accordance with the dynamically tested and/or analyzed configuration for the subject equipment:

The sample piping to the CRM Sample Panels and Wetwell Sample Rack is installed in accordance with Specification M-1041.Routing and installation of the'nitrogen purge lines comply with Specification G-1006.Routing and installation of raceway, terminal boxes, and junction boxes are in accordance with Specification C-1035: Installation of the cables and the termination of cables and internal panel wiring is in accordance with existing approved cable installation and termination procedures.

Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Sections 3/4A.3, 3/4A.3.2, 3/4.6.3 and Table 3.6.3-1 were reviewed for this modification.

The new CRMs provide the monitoring and detection of the airborne particulate radioactivity and the'airborne gaseous radioactivity associated with system leakage.The proposed action does not affect the operability requirements or surveillance requirements of the CRMs.The new CRM and,Wetwell Sample Rack sample line isolation valves are solenoid valves that close immediately on an accident signal.Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-120 DCP-,~CP->>, d C-.IIThe purpose of the modification is to install 2" stainless steel shaped port ball valves to replace the full port valves in the Emergency Service Water (ESW)System.The modification will also install a spacer ring between the downstream end of.the new valve and the adjacent flange.The modification will assure that the cooling coils will perform their original design function.I No.FSAR Sections 3.6, 6.2, 6.3, 9.2.5, 9.4.2.2.2, and Table 3.2-1 were reviewed for this modification.'he installation of the V-port ball valves does not adversely affect the overall performance and operability of the ESW System, The existing ESW System piping and pipe supports have been analyzed to confirm that the additional weight of the new valve assemblies will not over-stress the piping during a seismic event.The modification will comply with the ESW System design and performance requirements.

The modification will satisfy NUREG%776 requirements for ESW System redundancy; physical separation, and accessibility.

Since the replacement control valves are specifically designed for the throttling service, these modifications provide increased assurance that the affected equipment will perform it's intended safety function under accident conditions,.

The replacement valves and ESW, piping configuration satisfy all the ASME Code and.seismic design criteria established in Section 9.2,5 and Table 3.2-1 of the FSAR.None of the postulated failure modes for the equipment affected by these modifications is.more likely to occur with the replacement valves than with the original or the, temporary valves.Therefore, the modification does not increase the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.~Considering the above, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.ill No.Unit 2 Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Section 3.7.1.2 requires operability of the ESW System, including an operable flow path from the spray pond to the system heat exchangers.

The valve replacement modifications are designed to improve the reliability of ESW flow to the pump room unit coolers and thereby assure that the flow path operability is maintained.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as described in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-121 The purpose of TP-145%11 is to determine the accuracy of the Unit 1'feedw'ater flow elements and the attached Feedwater Flow instrumentation.

BlkRKE: I No.II'o.The temporary equipment used to perform this test will not affect any control logic or control room indication.

The only affect on the plant will occur if the tubing to the temporary equipment develops a leak.The temporary equipment will have isolation valves installed with the temporary tubing.Also, the root valves at the feedwater piping can be isolated.The effects of the leak will be the same as a leak on permanent feedwater piping and instrumentation and therefore is bourided by previously evaluated events.The Reactor Feed Pumps (RFPs)will be operated within the bounds of existing operating procedures during this test procedure.

Therefore, with one RFP in manual mode, any transient will be bounded by existing analyses.The test procedure allows.the operator to return the RFP to automatic.control at any time that is deemed necessary.

Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.FSAR Sections 5.2.3.2.2,7.7.1.4.1.2,?.?.2.4.2, 15.1.2, and 15.2.7 were reviewed forthis modification.

Feedwater control is a non+system with no seismic requirements, EQ requirements, or divisional requirements.

The tubing used in this procedure will be assembled and hydrotested to 2500 psig prior to hook-up to plant'iping.

The steel tubing will be assembled to meet thermal expansion considerations.

The existing instruments and tubing will not be modified or functionally impacted by the installation of this temporary tubing.Therefore, the proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.Technical Specification Bases 3/4.4.4, 3/4.4.5 and Section 3.3.2 were reviewed for this procedure.

The permanent feedwater'low transmitters will continue to provide all of the required functions, including input to the core thermal power heat balance throughout the period of time that this technical procedure will be run.Increases in the Main Steam Line radiation levels due to N'nd C'" are insignificant.

Therefore, this test will not cause and will not prevent a valid Main Ste'am Line Isolation on High Radiation as described in Tech Spec Section 3.3.2.There'fore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Bases for any Tech Spec.95-122 The purpose of this modification is to allow for a thermal power increase of 3441 MW thermal speeds up to and including 1515 rpm.This action is being done in light of the recent observed vibration phenomena, experienced while Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP)speeds were in the range of 1570-1584.

No.The proposed actions are within those previously analyzed by PPKL and are NRC approved via License Amendment 103 to NPF-22.The operating limitations are more restrictive as proposed here than those in the Amendment and its supporting analysis reports.Transients are predicted to exceed the proposed limit but have been evaluated to be of such short duration that even if the vibration phenomenon is triggered, no consequences from the vibration will be.encountered.

Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment to'safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR..II No.The only potential unacceptable effects of the observed vibration phenomena would be pipe cracking/breaks or Reactor Vessel internal cracking.The vessel internals have been analyzed prior to and,after the events and are not susceptible to damage even if vibrations were to occur.The pipe cracking while judged not to be a concern, is not assumed for the full range af Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)analysis.Therefore, the proposed action does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.H U III No.Analysis performed has shown that operation in the proposed region is fully justifiable and the proposed limit will prevent onset of vibration.

Therefore, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

e 95-123 OCP>>.Iii The purpose of the modification is to'add three 2"$drain lines at low points in the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)ductwork on the South side of the Unit 1 Reactor Building.This will eliminate the moisture generated by the boiling Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)which condenses and collects in the Recirculation Plenum and SGTS ductwork.!illhSLKL No.The modification does not impose any unanalyzed loads on the ductwork or interfacing structures.

The duct drain lines and their associated components are designed tp maintain their pressure retaining capability during dynamic loads, maximum pressures and temperatures anticipated during accident conditions.

The installed drains and its associated.

piping components meet the same seismic and dynamic qualifications as the SGTS ductwork and therefore will not affect the structural integrity of the SGTS ductwork.The modification improves the capability of the Standby Gas Treatment System to perform it's intended safety.function during the postulated SFP boiling event.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.Considering the above, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.The modification does not alter the SGTS operation and ensures that sufficient iodine removal capability be available during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), as defined in Technical Specification (Tech Spec)3/4.6.5.Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

95-1 24 The purpose of the modification is to replace six indicators on the control room panel 1C651of the Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC)System.The indicators will have e'xpanded ranges that will eliminate the problem with them reading near the top of their scales.Also, Diode Function Generator (DFG)cards (located in EHC cabinet 1C663 card rack B)must be recalibrated with this modification.

No.The EHC Turbine Control System's described in FSAR Sections 10.2.1 and 10.2.2.5.The indicator rep'lacement portion of this modification merely changes the scale range.All physical and electrical characteristics are identical.

The remaining recalibration of the EHC Main Turbine Control equipment results in a small change in Turbine Control Valve (TCV)positioning, but the sequencing of the TCV's remains the same.The modification does not involve the addition of equipment or changes in the type of existing equipment.

The i'ndicator replacement portion of this modification merely changes the scale range.All physical and electrical characteristics are identical.

The remaining recalibration of the EHC equipment is within the range of the instruments and interfaces with other equipment are unchanged.

The EHC equipment has no function related to controlling the.release of radioactivity after an accident nor does it affect any equipment that does.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.Considering the above, the modification does not create the possibility for an~accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.lll No.Functions performed by the equipment within the scope of this modification are not mentioned in the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Specs.95-125 DCP 93-30448, Unit 1 The purpose of the modification is to add a second Steam Line Resonance Compensator (SRLC)card to both the primary and secondary pressure sensing loops.The new cards will be part of the Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC)System.This modification is required to accommodate the increased generating capacity implemented by the SSES Power Uprate Project.I No.FSAR Sections 6 and 15 were reviewed for this modification.

The function of the sensing loop in the EHC System and its interface with other equipment is unchanged.

The EHC pressure signal has no impact on the limiting conditions mentioned in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.The EHC equipment has no function related to controlling the release of radioactivity.

after an accident nor does it affect any equipment that does.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as pre'viously evaluated in the FSAR.P'l No.The modification does no't create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.The possible failure modes of the EHC equipment and its interfaces with other equipment are unchanged.

III No.The EHC System and functions performed by the equipment within the scope of this modification are not mentioned in the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Specs.95-126 These modifications require that the flow transmitters and pressure transmitters within the Reactor Recirculation System (DCP 93-3085A)and Feedwater System (QCP 93-30858)have their loops spanned and indicators scaled.The purpose of this is to ensure that the flow transmitters and pressure transmitters coincide with the Power Uprate.I No.This modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of any accident evaluated in the FSAR.This DCP does not involve the addition of equipment or changes in the type of existing equipment.

This modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment.

The new process conditions are within the range of the instruments and interface with other equipment is unchanged, The Recirculation Flow Control System flow instrumentation and its operation and functions are not changed by this modification.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of an accident, nor does it increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment.

This modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of any accident evaluated in the FSAR.The transmitter is calibrated to 10'lo of its published specification upper range limit.This extension beyond its normal range is within its capabilities by design.This modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment.

The Power Uprate conditions are within the capabilities of the instrument and interface with other equipment is unchanged.

This modification does not increase the consequences of'a malfunction of equipment since there are no system operations or functions changed by this modification.

II No.These modifications do not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR because the spanning and re-scaling of the Recirculation Flow Control System flow instruments merely changes calibration and scale range, all physical and electrical characteristics are identical.

Since there is no equipment change involved other than indicator scales, these modifications do not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR.III No.Review of the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)shows that the functions performed by the equipment within the scope of these modifications are not mentioned in the Tech Specs.Therefore, the modifications do not reduce the margin of safety as defined by the basis for any Tech Spec.95-127 The purpose of the modification is to install new 1" manual ball valves between the Instrument Air (I/A)headers and solenoid valves SV-18742 (Reactor Building Chilled Water (RBCW)Zone 1)and SY<8965 (Radwaste Building Chilled Water (RWCW))to provide localized isolation capabilities between the VA and the above mentioned chilled water systems.This will prevent chilled water intrusion of the VA System during maintenance activities.

No.FSAR Sections 9.2.12.3, 9.2.12.4, 9.3.1.1, Chapters 6 and 15, and Table 3.2-1 were reviewed for this modification.

The modification will have no adverse affects on the operation or function of the RBCW Zone 1, RWCW, or I/A Systems as defined in the FSAR.The modification will satisfy all the design requirements of the ANSI B31.1 Code and FSAR Table 3.2-1.There are no new safety features or accident scenarios that would be affected by the actions taken in this modification.

The proposed actions do not involve a precursor of or contributor to any evaluated accidents'involving offsite dose.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The RBCW Zone 1 and RWCW Systems will be enhanced by the installation of these ball valves.Therefore, the modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of.a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The modification will meet all the design requirements as specified in the FSAR and the structural integrity of th'e altered piping will be maintained.

The operation and function of the RBCW Zone 1 and RWCW coil freeze protection piping will not be changed by the actions taken by this modification.

None of the parameters that are the basis for the Unit 1 Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)will be affected by this modification.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Tech Specs.

95-128~L-The purpose of NL-94-014 is to address the intent not to maintain eleven check valves located on the Liquid Radwaste (LRW)Influent Header.No., FSAR Sections 15.7, 15.7.2, 15.7.2.1, 11.2, and 11.3 were reviewed for this proposed action.Complete failure of the check valve combined with failure of other barriers would at worst result in the unintended transfer of water to another plant collection sump or another plant system.This would require failure of a second check valve, or a normally closed valve.Hence, there is an additional barrier in each case to stop the flow of water.However, if this barrier also failed, the offsite dose resulting from this potential spill would likewise be negligible.

Also, no system components are likely to fail as a result of the proposed action.'herefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of ari accident as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.llf No The only failure that could be postulated would be a total check valve failure.As described above, this failure would have no effect on operation of any equipment.

Therefore, the proposed action does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.Technic'al Specification (Tech Spec)Section 3/4.11.1.2 specifies the limits on the dose to a member of the public from radioactive materials in.liquid effluents released from each reactor.All liquid'eNuent would be treated similarly, no matter what path it takes to the LRW System.Theiefore, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety.as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-129 DC.9,U The purpose of the modification is to replace the Thermo-Lag partition heat shield partition between MCC OB136 and panel OC8778 with PROMAT-H a fire retarding wallboard.

This will prevent a transient fire from damaging both redundant panels.No.II No.FSAR Sections 3.8.4.3, 3.12.3.2, and 3.12.3.4.1 were reviewed for this modification.

Installing the heat shield wall eliminates the direct consequences of a single design basis fire, damaging or destroying MCC OB136 and Control Panel OC8778 simultaneously.

The wall will be designed to withstand seismic and hydrodynamic events to preclude safety impact item concerns.The proposed change has no impact on any existing accident analysis nor on any anticipated transient.

The modification will not adversely affect any structure, system,'or component in performing its safety function, and in fact provides the means to maintain equipment design basis operation.

The proposed action does not involve'a precursor of or a con'tributor to any evaluated accidents that have radi'ological consequences.

The heat shield wall ensures that OB136 and GC8??8B are able to perform their safety shutdown functions in the event of an Appendix R fire in.their location.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.The wall will be designed as a Category 1 Structure.

The wall has no connection to any plant operational system.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.No.Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Sections 3/4.6.5 and 3/4.7.2 were reviewed for this modification.

The'modification will eliminate the possibility of having the direct effects of a design basis fire from disabling both trains of safety systems, such as the Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System (CREOASS)and Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS).Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Specs.

0 0 95-130 The purpose of the modification is to replace six existing 1 instrumentation isolation valves on SP-DCB-112.for Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)level and pressure instrumentation.

This will provide positive shut-off for isolation of the instrumentation when so desired and ensure that the valve's indicated position is reliable as reflected by the stem position.No.FSAR Sections 6.3 and 15.6.2 were reviewed for this modification.

The modification will be designed and installed to be consistent with the original design and construction requirements of the Safety Related Display Instrumentation (SRDI).The modification will not change any function nor any operational requirements of the system or any component in the system.The valves will be replaced with a design and manufacture proven to be superior and more reliable than the existing valves.The modification will enhance the operation of the SRDI.FSAR Section 15.6.2 bounds any failure that may occur due to this modification, Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.Cons'idering the above, the modification does not create the possibility for an*accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.Section 3/4.3.7 of the Unit 1 Technical Specification (Tech Spec)defines.the limiting conditions of operation that will be followed while the modification work is being performed.

None of the parameters that are the bases for the Tech Specs will be adversely impacted by this, modification.

Therefore, the modification will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.I 95-131 DCP->>,Ui The purpose of the modification is to seal three unidentified penetrations existing from the Control Structure 729'estibule into the Unit 1 Control Room.Also twine inch fire protection conduits will be sealed.No.FSAR Chapters 6 and 15 were reviewed for this modification.

There are no engineered safety features or accident scenarios that would be impacted by the'ctions taken by this modification.

The modification will conform to all the design criteria as specified in the FSAR.There is no equipment important to the safe shutdown of the plant that could be impacted by this modification:

The modification will not increase the radiation exposure to any plant operating personnel or the general public.The proposed actions will not involve a precursor of nor a contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.Therefore, the modification does'ot increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to s'afety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.Following the implementation of this modification, both the structural integrity and fire rating of the Control Room walls will be maintained in accordance with the requirements and guidelines provided in the FSAR.The modification will be consistent with other similar plant penetration installations.

Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.None of the basis for the Unit 1 Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)will be affected by this modification.

Therefore, the modification will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-132 The purpose of the setpoint change is to change the setpoint of the relief valves on the Service Air Compressor Discharge Piping to 145 psig.This will prevent the spurious actuation of the relief valves.~lhhhlE: No.FSAR Section 9.3 and Table 3.2-1 were reviewed for this setpoint change.The setpoint change will not affect the function of the Service Air System.The setpoint change will improve the reliability of the Service Air System by preventing relief valve actuation during normal operation.

The Service Air System and its components do not perform any safety related function.Therefore, the setpoint change does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.'The new setpoint change will not cause the pressure ratings of the components from being exceeded and will not adversely affect the pressure capabilities of the system.Therefore, the proposed action does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III.No.The Service Air System has no safety design basis and is not covered in the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).Therefore, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-133 C*>>*,.C, , dD P>>,.C,,Ill The purpose of these modifications is to replace eight motor lube oil cooler coils in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)System with coils made of a more corrosion resistant material.The modifications will add flanges to the Emergency Service Water (ESW)supply and return piping for the'A','C', and'D'HR pump motor oil cooling coils.This will enhance the RHR pump motor lube oil cooling coil reliability and increase the coil life.No.FSAR Sections 3.10a, 6.3, 6.3.4, 9.2.1, 9.2.5.2,'nd 15.0 were reviewed for this modification.

The modifications do not cause any new ESW single failures.There is no impact on the dynamic qualification of the RHR Pump Motor.The modifications do not affect the performance or operability of the RHR Pumps.The modifications do not alter the ability to contain and"convey ES water to the ECCS components it services.The piping changes are constructed to ASME BAPV Code,Section III, Class 3 requirements.

The modifications do not change the effective heat transfer rate for the design ESW flow to maintain the bearing oil temperature below the maximum allowable temperatures and assure proper RHR operation.

Therefore, the modifications do not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an.accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.Considering the above, the modifications do not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different typ'e than any evaluated previously in the'SAR.III No.Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Bases 3/4.4.9, 3/4.5.1, 3/4.5.2, 3/4.6.2, 3/4.7.1, and 3/4.9.1 lwere reviewed for this modification.

The modifications will not affect the RHR shutdown cooling mode of operation.

The replacement of the RHR pump motor oil cooling coil does not inhibit the performance of the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI), Containment Cooling/Spray mode of the RHR, or Shutdown Cooling mode of the RHR refueling operation.

Therefore, the modifications will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.94-134 CP DCP 94-3021A-F DCP 94-3022A-F Units 1 and 2 The purpose of these modifications is to correct the problem with excessive resin heel in the Condensate Demineralizer Service Vessel, resin segregation during resin transfer, and the lack of knowledge of the status.of the drained Condensate Demineralizer Service Vessel.No.FSAR Sections'9.2.10, 10.4.6, 11.2, 11.3, and 15.2.7 were reviewed for this modification, The proposed action does not affect the primary condensate or feedwater flow path.The function and operation of the condensate or feedwater system is unchanged.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability'f occurrence or the consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR.The Condensate Demineralizer or the Condensate Transfer and Storage systems are not'safety related or required for safe shutdown of the reactor, or mitigation of a design basis accident.Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II.No.The proposed action could~result in a new flow path from the Condensate Demineralizer Vessel to the Condenser in the event of a valve leakage or misalignment.

This flow path could create a possibility for a malfunction of a'ifferent type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.However, a flow path through the Condensate Transfer System to the Condenser presently exists through the current resin inlet line.'n addition, a reliable check valve will be installed in this potential flow path to preclude/minimize flow to the condenser due to valve misalignment or valve leakage.Therefore, the modifications do not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any, evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The affected systems and components are addressed in Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Bases 3/4.4.4 and 3/4.8.The conductivity monitoring equipment will not be affected by this modification.

Electrical separation and protection device coordination of the non-Class 1E power circuit ensure that the availability'nd the operability of the upstream Class 1E power sources to Panels 1Y128 and 2Y128 are not affected by the modification.

Therefore, the modifications do not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-135 CP.d C P.>>.C i d The purpose of these modifications is to modify and replace the'existing components of the Taprogge Type HE-4 Condenser Tube Cleaning System (CTCS)ball strainer sections, with Taprogge Type MF design strainers.

The modifications will improve condenser performance and gross electrical output by enhancing the CTCS ball collection efficiencies and effectiveness, thereby allowing continuous operation of the CTWS and maintaining optimum condenser tube cleanliness.

II No.FSAR Sections 8.3.1, 10.4.5, and 15 were reviewed for these modifications.

The Circulating Water (CW)and CTCS Systems are not safety related or required for safe shutdown of the reactor, or mitigation of a design basis accident.The modifications provide strengthened CTCS strainer sections and therefore the potential for a failure of the CTCS strainer sections is reduced.Therefore, the modifications do riot increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.'onsidering the above, the modifications does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The Technical Specifications (Tech Specs)for Units 1 and 2 do not address the non safety related CW and CTCS Systems.Therefore, the modifications do not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.95-136 OC-,IliC The purpose of the modification is to physically isolate the Cement'Silo Building (CSB)from the Radwaste Solidification System (RWSS).This will provide positive isolation between the Radwaste Building and the Cement Silo Building as well as the outside environment.

This will also eliminate the possibility of an incorrect system alignment that could lead to an inadvertent".radioactive contamination event within the Cement Silo Building.No.FSAR Sections 11A.2.2, Chapter 15, and Table 3.2-1 were reviewed for this modification.

The modification will have no adverse affect on the operation or function of the Radwaste Solidification System.None of the equipment-or components being removed or abandoned by this modification serve any safety-related functions nor interact with any safety related equipment.

The proposed action will not contribute to the loss of eNuent from system components nor will it cause site boundary doses to exceed the allowable offsite limits.The modification will comply with the original construction codes and regulatory requirements.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or'he consequences of an accident'or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.Considering the above, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.Ill No.The modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of any plant system governed by the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).None of the parameters that are the bases for the Tech Specs will be adversely impacted by this modification.

Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech'Spec.95-137 DC*,U i The purpose of this modification is to implement a disk-based archive/ret'rieval system to replace the magnetic tape-based Security Data Management System (SDMS)currently in use.The modification will make the archive/retrieval system faster and less labor intensive.

It will also make the data more reliable.No.The proposed changes do not functionally change the operation of the physical Security Computer System.The modification will make it more reliable and make the data more maintainable.

The SSES Physical Security Plan, outlined in FSAR Section 13.6, does not identify the Security Computer System as a safety system nor as a system related to safety.Implementation of the proposed action will not alter the intent of the computer-based SDMS.The proposed action is non-quality related and non-safety related, according to the definitions in the Quality Assurance (QA)program.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an acciderit or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.The Security Computer System cannot control plant functions.

The action does not affect the ability of the Security Computer System to monitor actual or potential security violations.

Therefore, the modification does.not create the possibility for an accideiit or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The modification has no effect on any Technical Specification (Tech Spec)Bases.Therefore, the modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec.

0 95-1 38 This modification package installs larger size springs in four Control Structure fire dampers.No.The proposed actions do not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR.The fire dampers are installed in ducts of the Control Room Floor Cooling a'nd Computer Room Cooling System.Neither the fire dampers nor th6 cooling systems are initiators of any accidents evaluated in the SAR (FSAR Sections 9.4, 9.5, 15.6, and 15.7).The fire dampers in the Control Structure ductwork are not relied upon to mitigate any plant accidents analyzed in the SAR.No.The proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type'han evaluated in the SAR (FSAR Section 9.4).No new operating modes are created for any of the systems in which the dampers are installed.

The replacement springs comply with the same Underwriter's Laboratory standards as the original which ensures the function and integrity of the dampers to perform as.fire barriers.III No.The proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

The modifications maintain the margin of safety in Tech Specs 3/4.3.7, 3/4.3.7.9, and 3/4.7.2 because.they do not impact the operation of the.systems in which the dampers are installed.'he modifications maintain the margin of safety in Tech.Spec.3/4.7.7 because they maintain the original damper's fire rating and integrity.95-139 OC>>.FIC Ui.d Install a 120 VAC noise suppresser at Unit 1 Cooling Tower Flow'Transmitter FT-11503 and a Unit 2 Cooling Tower Flow Transmitter FT-21503.I'o.The proposed modifications will.install a noise suppresser to provide cleaner 120 VAC power supply for FT-11503 and FT-21503.The proposed modifications will provide a more reliable instrument loop operation because the existing hardware will perform all the same functions as before and have the added benefit of increased.

availability.

II No.There are no other accidents or malfunctions not previously analyzed in the SAR that could occur due to the new configuration either during or after installation of these modifications.

In addition to this, no new mechanism which would result in a dose to the public is being created by this component addition.No.The new configuration will not affect the existing instrument loop accuracy;therefore, the loop will continue to use 5000 gpm for the minimum blowdown flow permissive to ensure minimum dilution.flow is available prior to allowing radwaste eNuent discharge valves to be opened.Since the new configurations will not affect the minimum requirements for cooling tower blowdown dilution flow, the proposed modifications will.not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

~

95-140 ECPE-,Il I>>Change setpoints for Unit 1 125 VDC Battery Monitor 96-1D691;96-1D692, 96-1D693'nd 96-1D694.I No.Battery monitors do not initiate/perform any safety function and do not prevent the safety related Class lE 125 VDC System from meeting its minimum performance requirements.

The battery monitor setpoint changes do not increase the probability of occurrence of consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.No.Failure of the battery monitors, connected to the battery and battery chargers, does not prevent the Class 1E 125 VDC System from meeting its minimum performance requirement.

FSAR Table 6.3-5 has evaluated battery or battery charger failure.The setpoint cha'nges do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a.different type than any evaluated previously in SAR.III No.The margin in the Class 1E 125 VDC System is not affected by this setpoint change package.

,u l Add an additional manual isolation valve directly upstream of each of.three feedwater drain valves (206092, 206093, and 206132).This double isolation is an effort to eliminate additional Liquid Radwaste (LRW)caused by a single leaking valve.Qlh5KE: I No.This modification will add new manual gate valves as backups to existing drain isolation globe valves 206092, 206093, and 206132." The new gate valves will be normally closed and have a negligible impact on the flow characteristics in the 4" GBD-215 drain lines for feedwater heater strings A, B, and C.This modification will have no adverse affects on the operation or function of the.Condensate/Feedwater System as defined in the SAR.The modification will satisfy all the design requirements of the ANSI B31.1 Code;thereby, satisfying the design requirements'as specified in FSAR Table 3.2-1, The SAR has been evaluated, specifically in FSAR Sections 10.4.7, Condensate and Feedwater";

FSAR Chapter 6,"Engineered Safety Functions";

and FSAR Chapter 15, Accident Analysis" with special attention to Accident 15.1.1,"loss of Feedwater Heating".Based on the above, the actions taken in this modification will not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR.No.The function and performance of the 4" GBD-215 condensate/feedwater drain piping will be enhanced by the addition of these manual gate valves due to the~double isolation function they provide in conjunction with globe valves 206092, 206093, and 206132.The new manually operated gate valves will be located adjace'nt to the existing manually operated globe valves.Both valves (in each line)will be normally closed and both valves would require opening to drain the system.Based on the above, the proposed actions do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than andevaluated previously in the SAR.III No.The piping and components affected by the actions taken in this modification are not specifically addressed in, the basis for any Unit 2 Technical Specification.

This modification only provides enhancement to the isolation capabilities for (3)normally closed'drain lines.Based on this and the fact that the modification meets all applicable design criteria as specified in the SAR, the proposed actions will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

The first portion of this test provides a small portion of Unit 2 Service Water flow (approximately 20-30 gpm)to the Unit 1 Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water (TBCCW)B Heat Exchanger to determine the maximum amount of flow available with temporary hoses and the second portion of the test fully opens the Service Water TCV for the TBCCW Heat Exchangers to permit'data gathering needed to evaluate the plugging of additional Cu-Ni tubes.No.FSAR Section 9.2.1.3 states that The SWS operation has no related function and failure of the system will not compromise any safety related system or component or prevent a safe nuclear shutdown." The actions of this test have the potential to adversely affect Unit 1 and 2 operating systems, but the margin to design values and controls of the test are adequate to accommodate these actions and potential actions.Therefore, the performance of TP-115%08 does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or.malfunction of.equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.FSAR Section 9.2.1.3 states that"The SWS operation has no safety related function and failure of the system will not compromise any safety related system or component or prevent a safe nuclear shutdown." The actions of this test have the , potential to adversely affect Unit 1 and 2 operating systems, but the margin to design'values and the controls of the test are adequate to accommodate these actions and potential actions.Therefore, the performance of TP-115-008 does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.The activities of this test are expected, to be accommodated by the systems affected and have no adverse effects on the operation of those systems.Based on this, the test will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-143 DCP.94-9077, Unit 2 An isolation valve will be added in each 5/8" tubing run downstream of SYs 22365, 22366, 22368, 22369 and upstream of SV22361.A test connection with a root valve will also be added in the tubing downstream of Valves SV22366 and SY22369.These actions will provide the isolation and'testing connections to perform test SE-273<00 in a timely and efficient manner.I No.II No This modification will, add new manual valves to isolate portions of existing Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)system in order to perform test SE-273-400 in a more efficient, timely manner.The valves will be normally open until needed for isolation.

This modification will have no adverse affects on the operation or function of the PASS as defined in the SAR.The modification will satisfy all design requirements of the ANSI B31.1 Code;thereby satisfying the design requirements as specified in FSAR Section 18.1.21, Post Accident Sampling.Also, the SAR has been evaluated, specifically FSAR Chapter6, Engineered Safety Functions and FSAR'Chapter 15, Accident Analysis which revealed that the proposed action does not involve a precursor of or contributor to any accidents involving offsite dose.Therefore, there will be no in'crease in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR.U This modification will meet the design basis criteria as specified in the SAR.The testing capabilities for the function and performance of the PASS System will be'nhanced by the addition of the manual isolation valves and additional test connections.

Based on the above, the proposed actions do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.III No.The tubing and components affected by the actions to be taken in this modification are addressed in Section 6.8.4.c of the Unit 2 Technical Spe'cification.

The PASS is a program required to be established, implemented and maintained by the Procedures and Programs Section (6.8)of Technical Specification Section 6.0, Administrative Controls.There are no Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCO)involved with the program requirements.

This modification only provides enhancement to the isolation and testing capabilities for the PASS system.Based on this and the fact the modification meets all applicable design criteria as spe'cified in the SAR, the proposed actions will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for Technical Specification.

c This modification will eliminate a loop seal in the stator cooling water storage tank vent in order to provide a free flow design and maintain ideal oxygen levels in the stator cooling water, which will reduce corrosion of the stator windings.Q85bhhRY'No.The proposed modification only affects components in the Stator Cooling System.The Stator Cooling System does not perform any safety functions required to prevent or mitigate the consequences of abnormal operational transients or accidents.

Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR..II No.The proposed modification does not alter the design basis, the function, nor the operation of the non-safety related Stator Cooling System.Therefore, the proposed modification does not create a possibility for'an accident or malfunction of.a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.ill No.The proposed modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of the Stator Cooling System or any plant system governed by the.Technical Specifications, specifically Section 3/4.8, Electrical Systems.None of the parameters that are the bases for the Technical Specifications will be adversely impacted by the modification.

Therefore, the actions taken by the proposed modification will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-145 This modification will remove the permanent connection to the portable radiation monitor (PING)and qualify/retain the bulk of the 1/2 tubing for use by Chemistry.

No.FSAR Chapter6, Engineered Safety Features" and FSAR Chapter15, Accident Analysis" specifically accident scenario15.7.1,'Gaseous Radwaste System Leak or Failure have been reviewed.There are no engineered safety features or accident scenarios, including leakage or failure of the Gaseous Radwaste System, that would be impacted by the actions taken per this modification.

The 1/2'tainless steel sample tubing and tubing supports will be qualified to meet all the applicable design requirements as specified per the SAR.The actions taken by this modification will not adversely impact the function or operation of the Offgas System;therefore'his modification will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.The Offgas System is not a safety related system.There is no equipment important to the safe shutdown of the plant that could be impacted by this modification; therefore, the actions taken by this modification will not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR.FSAR Section 15.7.1, Gaseous Radwaste System Leak or Failure", bounds any failure which may occur with this system, including a total release of radiological activity normally processed by the Offgas Treatment System being discharged directly into the: Turbine Building.Since the system and components affected by this modification will continue to comply with the original design and construction codes, there will be no increase in the consequences of an accident or'malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR.I No.This modification will not alter the.design basis for the Offgas System, which is part of the Gaseous Radwaste System and will comply with the original design and construction codes.'t enhance's the Chemistry's ability to acquire monthly offgas post treatment samples from the inlet and outlet piping of HEPA outlet filter 1F302.Any failure of the tubing would be bounded by the previously analyzed accident'Gaseous Radwaste System Leak or Failure".Therefore, the actions taken by this modification do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR.III No.This modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of the Gaseous Radwaste System or any plant system governed by the Technical Specifications, specifically Section 3/4.3.7.11,'Radwaste Gases Effluent Instrumentation";

Section 3/4.11.2.4, Gaseous Radwaste Treatment System;and 3/4.11.2.6, Explosive Gas Mixture".Therefore, the actions taken by this modification will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-146 This modification will remove the permanent connection to the portable radiation monitor (PING)and qualify/retain the bulk of the 1/2" tubing for use by Chemistry.

No..FSAR Chapter6, Engineered Safety Features" and FSAR Chapter15,"Accident Analysis" specifically accident scenario15.7.1, Gaseous Radwaste System Leak or Failure have been reviewed.There are no engineered safety features or accident scenarios, including leakage or failure of the Gaseous Radwaste System, that would be impacted by the actions taken per this modification.

The 1/2'tainless steel sample tubing and tubing supports will be qualified to meet all the applicable design requirements as specified per the SAR.The actions taken.by this modification will not adversely impact the function or operation of the Offgas System;therefore'his modification will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.-The Offgas System is not.a safety related system.There is no equipment important to the safe shutdown of the plant that could be impacted by this modification; therefore, the actions taken by this modification will not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.FSAR Section 15.7.1, Gaseous Radwaste System Leak or Failure", bounds any failure which may occur with this system, including a total release of radiological activity normally processed by the Offgas Treatment System being discharged directly into the Turbine Building.Since the system and components affected by this modification will continue to comply with the original design and construction codes, there will be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR.This modification will not alter the design basis for the Offgas System which is part of the Gaseous Radwaste System and will c'omply with the, original design and construction codes.It enhances the Chemistry's ability to acquire monthly offgas post treatment.

samples from the inlet and outlet piping of HEPA outlet filter 1F302.Any failure of the tubing would be bounded by the previously analyzed accident"Gaseous Radwaste System Leak or Failure".Therefore, the actions taken by this modification do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR.III No.This modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of the Gaseous Radwaste System or any plant system governed by the Technical Specifications, specifically Section 3/4.3.7.11,"Radwaste Gases Effluent Instrumentation; Section 3/4.11.2.4,"Gaseous Radwaste Treatment System";and 3/4.11.2.6, Explosive Gas Mixture.Therefore, the actions taken by this modification will not'reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-147 The purpose of this Safety Evaluation is to provide an assessment of the use of the Supplement Decay Meat Removal (SDHR)permanent piping to supply either or both Unit's Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (FPCCU)Heat Exchangers with cooling water from temporary plant equipment operating outside of the Reactor Buildings.

The scope of this safety evaluation is for both the instillation and operation of the cooling equipment used.~lhhhlK, I No.The addition of the new SDHR piping, valves, supports, installation, wall attachments, and penetrations as well as the operation of the SDHR system itself are not initiators of any other accidents evaluated in the SAR, therefore, these modifications do not affect the probability of occurrence of an accident.A malfunction of the SDHR equipment does not increase the consequences of an accident as previously evaluated in the SAR due to the fact that the design'basis accident scenario for the Fuel Pool is a seismic event that results in both Unit's FPCCU systems being non-functional and other means are relied upon to achieve cooling of the Spent Fuel Pools and both Reactor Vessels (i.e., RHR Shutdown Cooling and RHR Fuel Pool Cooling Assist).The SDHR system cooling equipment will maintain the required positive pressure greater than the FPCCU Heat Exchanger shell continuos radiation monitoring in conjunction with periodic chemistry radiological sampling will maintain the ability to monitor for cooling water contamination.

Therefore, the radiological analysis (and source terms used)in the FSAR analysis (Appendix 9A, 15.6.2, 15.6.5, and 15.7.4)are bounding and no increased doses to operating personnel or the general public.exist.Thus, no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is incurred.No.The only new malfunction possible is the failure of the SDHR system itself.If the SDHR system failed to provide cooling water to the outage Unit's FPCCU Heat Exchangers, there would be no new accident created since this failure is bounded by failure of either or both of the FPCCU systems during operation.

Additionally, a failure of the SDHR cooling equipment or piping could drain the SDHR system.However, periodic sampling as well as system design and operation ensures that radioactivity releases would not exceed the evaluated for the existing Service Water effluent pathway.No.The operation of the SDHR system does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the bases of any Technical Specification.

The maximum Tech.Spec.temperature limit for operation in Condition 5 is 140'F in the Reactor Vessel.The FSAR Spent Fuel Pool temperature limit is 125'F.Addition of the SDHR system will enable the outage Unit's FPCCU system to remove decay heat (from both-Units Spent Fuel Pools and the Reactor Core)as well as the operating Unit's FPCCU system.This approximately doubles the heat removal capacity available via FPCCU during a refueling outage when (in past outages)Service Water and RHR Shutdown Cooling are Out of Service (OOS).The SDHR'system will be designed and opened on an outage specific basis to accommodate this greater heat load and keep both Fuel Pools below the administrative limit of 115'F (and thereby 125 FSAR and 140 Tech.Spec..limits).95-148 Improve Zone III temperature control by regarding Zone III heater and cooling coil operation via Zone III exhaust air temperature rather than Zone III supply air temperature.

Rlh51hfE: No.Normal temperature control for Reactor Building ventilation is not a safety function;nor, can it affect a safety function.The only function of the Reactor Building ventilation system is its ability to isolate and maintain secondary containment integrity.

The isolation function of the Reactor Building ventilation system is unaffected by this activity.No.The only risk incurred is the potential to freeze a Zone III cooling coil.Worst case, freezing of a cooling could result in the loss of Reactor Building Chilled Water system.Loss of the Reactor Building Chilled Water system is currently evaluated in the FSAR and would be bonding for this event.r III No.Temperature control of the Reactor Building ventilation system is not contained within system is not contained within Tech Specs.Tech Specs only address the isolation function of the Reactor Building ventilation system and its ability to maintain building pressure at>0.25 WIC vacuum.The proposed action does not impact these functions or their basis as identified in Tech Specs.

This modification will install additional shielding below the refueling floor high exhaust radiation monitors.I No.The existing seismic qualification of the ducting, monitors, and the ductin/monitoring supports precludes any safety impact concerns from occurring and assures no adverse affects will be imposed on the system integrity.

The modification will not change any function or operation of the Process Radiation Monitoring System.Therefore, this modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction'of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.This modification will not alter the design basis for the Process Radiation Monitoring System and will comply with the original construction codes.It enhances the ability of the monitors to detect unacceptable radiation levels in the refuel floor high exhaust ducts by providing additional shielding to protect them from background areA radiation levels below them.All aspects of the system will conform to its original requirements'nd functions as specified in the SAR.Therefore, this modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR.III No.This modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of the Process Radiation Monitoring System or any system governed by the Unit.1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

Those sections specifically identified are Section 3/4.3.2, Isolation Actuation Instrumentation, and Section 3/4.6.5, Secondary Containmeht, which includes 3.6.5.2, Secondary Containment Automatic Dampers.None of the parameters that are bases for the Unit1 and Unit2 Technical Specifications will be adversely impacted by this modification.

The'modification will protect the monitors from backgrou'nd radiation effects without reducing their ability to monitor exhaust duct radiation levels.Therefore, the actions taken by this modification will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification,95-150 Installs permanent Supplemental Decay Heat Removal (SDHR)piping with an alternate Service Water (SW)Process Radiation Detector and Rx Building Chilled Water piping that will connect to temporary cooling units located outside the Rx Building.No.The proposed actions do not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident of malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.The new piping, valves, supports, insulation, wall attachments and'penetrations, radiation detector, preamplifier, and cabling are not initiators of any accidents evaluated in the SAR, other than postulated moderate energy pipe cracks (FSAR3.6)which were found acceptable.

The modifications have a negligible effect on the Service Water and the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup response to the Normal and Hydrodynamic Loads.No.III'o.The Rx.Building Ventilation Zones are unaffected by this modification and the Secondary Containment safety related functions of maintaining A radioactive barrier and a negative pressure of.25" wg are assured.These modifications have no effect on the Rx.Building structural, radiation and fire barrier functions.

The radiological analyses included in FSAR'Appendix 9A, 15.6.2, and 15.7.4 are not affected.The proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.The new piping has been'designed for all Normal and Hydrodynamic Loads similar to the SW and FPCC existing piping.The Class 1E power supply is properly isolated from the new radiation detection equipment and there are not new cable faults which can damage affiliated Class 1E cables.The failure of the portable non-safety cooling equipment could drain the SDHR or the Rx Building Chilled Water piping;however, no new malfunctions of equipment impoitant to safety are created.The proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

DCPs94-3057/3058, provide the capability to continuously monitor Liquid Effluents and maintain the margin of safety.r DCPs 94-3053/3054 maintain the margin of safety in Tech Specs 3/4.6.5&5,2.3 by requiring all Rx.Building penetrations to be appropriately sealed, ensuring that the three Rx.Building Ventilation Zones are preserved.

the new penetration in the Rx.Building walls are sealed with a material and depth that ensures that the 3-Hour.Fire Barrier is reestablished (Tech Specs 3/4.7.7).

~-

SCP E95-2008, Unit 2 Change setpoints for Unit2 125 YDC Battery Monitor 96-2D691, 96-'2D692,96-2D693; and 96-2D694 No.Battery monitors do not initiate/perform any safety function and do not prevent the safety related Class 1E 125 VDC System from meeting its minimum performance requirements.

The battery monitor setpoint changes do not increase the probability of occurrence of consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.Failure of battery monitors, connected to the battery and battery chargers, does not prevent the Class 1E 125 VDC System from meeting it minimum performance requirement.

FSAR Table 6.3-5 has evaluated battery charger failure.The setpoint changes do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in SAR.III No.The margi'n in the Class 1E 125 VDC System is not affected by'this setpoint change package.

The purpose of this procedure is to allow tie in of a temporary outage"chiller system to the Reactor Building Chilled Water (RBCW)System during a Unit 1 Outage.No.Sections 9.2.12.3"Reactor Building Chilled Water'" and 9.4.2"Reactor Building Ventilation" were reviewed.The FSAR does not specifically address the affected plant systems during outage conditions.

However, installation of this temporary system will not impact operation of Primary Containment Isolation, the only safety function of the RBCW System.Normal operation of the Reactor Building Ventilation System will not be impacted by installation of'the temporary chiller system.Additionally, installation of this equipment'will not impact Secondary Containment requirements.

Therefore, this activity does not increase the probability'r consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.I No.The only new malfunction possible would be failure of the temporary system itself.If the temporary chiller system failed to provide cooling, there would be no new accident created since this failure is bounded by failure of the Reactor Building Chillers during plant operation.

If the temporary system were to fail such that it caused a complete loss of RBCW inventory, there would be no new accident since this is too bounded by a loss of RBCW during plant operation.

Since RBCW is a non-safety related system, there is no impact on plant safety.III No.Tech Spec Section 3.6'.3 addresses Primary Containment Isolation Valves and is not affected by the proposed action.Section 3.6.1.7 addresses Drywell Average Air~Temperature during Conditions 1, 2, and 3.Since the proposed activity will be performed during a unit outage, this section is not affected.Section 3.6.5.1 Secondary Containment Integrity is no affected since the, installation and operation of the temporary chiller will ensure the boundary is not violated.Therefore, the margin of safety is to reduced for any Technical Specification basis.95-153 CP>>I UC DCPs 94-3042A and 94-3043, install new 42" diameter ductile iron River Water Makeup (RWMU)piping and abandon the existing 42" RWMU prestressed concrete cylinder piping (PCCP).KklhL4dK\I No.The proposed actions do not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.No accidents are initiated by, nor require the RWMU system for safe shutdown of the reactor, or mitigation of a design basis accident (FSAR Section 9.2, 9.5, 10.4, 15).The RWMU system is not safety related.II No.The proposed actions do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.No new accidents or malfunctions of equipment important to safety are postulated as a result of this modification since there'are no plant systems important to safety.that rely directly upon RWMU system operability.(FSAR Section 9.2, 9.5, 10.4)No.The pro'posed actions do not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

The modifications do not reduce the margin of safety since'1)the Technical Specifications do not address the non-safety related RWMU system and 2)there are no impacts on any Technical Specification systems.The bases for Technical Specification 3/4.7 addressing the Engineered Safeguard Service Water Systems which use river water as normal make-up are not affected since their limits pertain to the spray pond level which is not affected.

95-1 54 Three manually operated valves will be added to piping on the Recombiner Skid.These valves will provide double isolation of the Recombiner Skid when it must be taken out of service for maintenance, testing, etc.No.This modification will be designed and installed to be consistent with the original design and construction requirements of the Off-gas Recombiner System Skid Piping.Quality Group D Augmented piping is required to'meet NRC Branch Technical Position ETSB-11-1 which requires that the piping is to be hydrostatically tested to the extent practicable.

The Off-gas Recombiner'System is not safety related and the modification will not change any function of the system.The modification will be utilizing proven double isol'ation installations and valve types that currently exist in existing recombiner cross-tie piping.FSAR Section 15.7.1, Gaseous Radwaste System Leak on Failure, bounds any failure which may occur with this system.Therefore, the proposed actions do not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.This modification enhances the ability to isolate an outwf-service recombiner skid from other in-service skids thereby aiding in the prevention of personnel and area contaminations and personnel safety hazards due to hydrogen leaks.There are no new concerns created should any of the new manually operated isolation valves be accidentally left closed following maintenance activities and the recombiner room is vacated, Existing procedures require re-entry.to the room to reposition other manually operated valves to take the skid from stand-by to in-'service.

If any of the new valves were inadvertently mispositioned this would be readily evident to the operator stationed at the Off-gas Recombiner Panel on Elev.656', and the room would be re-entered and the valves correctly positioned during the normal start-up routine.All aspects of the system will conform to the'original design requirements and functions as specified in the SAR.Therefore, this modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR.III No.This modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of the Gaseous Radwaste System or any plant.system governed by the Technical Specification, specifically Section 3/4.11.2, Gaseous Effluents, which includes 3/4.11.2.4, The Gaseous Radwaste Treatment System, and 3/4.11.2.6 Explosive Gas Mixture.Therefore, the actions taken by this modification will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

0 95-1 55 OCP,R iii,Ui Three manually operated valves will be added to piping on the Recombiner Skid.These valves will provide double isolation of the Recombiner Skid when it must be taken out of service for maintenance, testing, etc.fillh5ihlE:

No.This modification will be designed and installed to be consistent with the original design and construction requirements of the Offgas Recombiner System Skid~Piping.Quality Group D Augmented piping is required to meet NRC Branch Technical Position ETSB-11-1.

which requires that the piping is to be hydrostatically tested to the extent practicable.

The Off-gas Recombiner System is not safety related and the modification will not change any function of the system.The modification will be utilizing proven double isolation installations and valve types that currently exist in existing'recombiner cross-tie piping.FSAR Section 15.7.1, Gaseous Radwaste System'eak on Failure, bounds any failure which may occur with this system.Therefore, the proposed actions do not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.This modification enhances.the ability to isolate an outwf-service recombiner skid from other in-service skids thereby aiding in the prevention of personnel and area contaminations and personnel safety hazards due to hydrogen leaks.There are no new concerns created should any of the new manually operated isolation valves be accidentally left closed following maintenance activities and the recombiner room is vacated.Existing procedures require re-entry to the room to reposition other manually operated valves to take the skid from stand-by to in-service.

If any of the new valves were inadvertently mispositioned this would be readily evident to the operator stationed at the Off-gas Recombiner Panel on Elev.656', and the room would be reentered and the valves correctly positioned during the normal start-up routine.'ll aspects of the system will c'onfirm to the original design requirements and functions as specified in, the SAR.Therefore, this modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR.III No.This modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of the Gaseous Radwaste System or any plant system governed by the Technical Specification, specifically Section 3/4.11.2, Gaseous ENuents, which includes 3/4,11.2.4, The Gaseous Radwaste Treatment System, and 3/4.11.2.6 Explosive Gas Mixture.Therefore, the actions taken by this modification will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-156 Three manually operated valves will be added to piping on the RecOmbiner'Skid.

These valves will provide double isolation of the Recombiner Skid when it must be taken out of service for maintenance, testing, etc.No.This modification will be designed and installed to be consistent with the original design and construction requirements of the Off-gas Recombiner System Skid Piping.Quality Group D Augmented piping is required to meet NRC Branch Technical Position ETSB-11-1 which requires that the piping is to be h'ydrostatically tested to the extent practicable.

The Off-gas Recombiner System is not safety related and the modification will not change any function of the system.The modification will be utilizing proven double.isolation installations and valve types that currently exist in existing recombiner cross-tie piping.FSAR Section 15.7.'1, Gaseous Radwaste System Leak on Failure, bounds any failure which may occur with this system.Therefore, the proposed actions do not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety,,as previously evaluated in the SAR..No.'his modification enhances the ability to isolate an out-of-service recombiner skid from other in-service skids thereby aiding in the prevention of personnel and area contaminations and personnel safety hazards due to hydrogen leaks.There are.no new concerns created should any of the new manually operated isolation valves be accidentally left closed following maintenance activities and the recombiner room is vacated.Existing procedures require re-entry to the room to reposition other manually, operated valves to take the skid from stand-by to in-service.

If any of the new valves were inadvertently mispositioned this would be readily evident to the operator stationed at the Off-gas Recombiner Panel on Elev.656', and the room , would be reentered and the valves correctly positioned during the normal stait-up routine.All aspects of the system will conform to the original design requirements and functions as specified in the SAR.Therefore, this modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR.III No.This modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of the Gaseous Radwaste System or any plant-system governed by the Technical Specification, specifically Section 3/4.11.2, Gaseous Effluents, which includes 3/4.11,2.4, The Gaseous Radwaste Treatment System, and 3/4.11.2.6 Explosive Gas Mixture.Therefore, the actions taken by this modification will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-157 Change Setpoints for Unit 2 250 VDC Battery Monitor 96-2D295 and 2D296.SlhllhlhlE:

No.Battery Monitors do not initiate/perforn1 any safety function and do not prevent the safety related Class 1E 250 VDC System from meeting its minimum performance requirements.

The battery monitor setpoint changes'do not increase the probability of occurrence of consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.Failure of the battery monitors, connected to the battery and battery chargers, does not prevent the Class lE 250 VDC System from meeting its minimum performance requirement.

FSAR Table 6.3-5 has evaluated battery or battery charger failure.The setpoint changes do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in SAR.III No.The margin in the Class 1E 250 VDC System is not affected by this setpoint change package.95-158 Change Setpoints for Unit 1 250 VDC Battery Monitor 96-1D695 and'1D696.

No..Battery Monitors no not initiatelperform any safety function and do not prevent the safety related Class 1E 250 VDC System from meeting its minimum performance requirements.

The battery monitor setpoint changes do not increase the probability of occurrence of consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.Failure of the battery monitors, connected to the battery chargers, does not prevent the Class 1 E 250 VDC System from meeting its minimum performance requirement.

FSAR Table 6.3-5 has evaluated battery or battery charger failure.the setpoint changes do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in SAR.P III No.The margin in the Class lE 250 YDC System is not by this setpoint change package.95-159 On the Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water (TBCCW)inlet and outlet of each Instrument Air Service Air Compressor is installed a drain valve with a quick disconnect hose connection.,These connections are used to facilitate draining of the compressor during maintenance.

These piping arrangements are not a part of the original skid supplied by the vendor and were installed outside of the modification process.Drain plugs were installed as.part of the original compressor design.This modification will legitimize the existing installation on each compressor skid and update configuration control documentation.

SilhQdMY: No.Base upon a review of the FSAR (Sections 7.2, 7.3, 9.2, 9.3, 15, Question 211.7), Fire Protection Review Report (Section 6.2), and SSES Safety Evaluation Report (Section 9.0, 9.3, 15.2), no accident analyzed will have their probability increased as a result of this modification (i.e., the addition of drain valves)because neither the Loss of Instrument Air, Service Air, not TBCCW serve as an, initiating event for an accident analyzed in the SAR.Therefore, this modification will not result in an increase in the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.Neither the Instrument Air, Service Air, nor TBCCW System is a system important to safety as described in the SAR.This modification meets all of the same requirements for these existing systems and there is no change to the function or operation of these systems as described in the SAR.Therefore, this modification will not result in an increase in the probability of a malfunction of equipment to safety.In accidents analyzed in the SAR, it is assumed that Instrument Air Serv'ice Air are lost.In addition, components which are essential for safe shutdown of the plant and require Instrument Air to function are designed to assume their"safe position" upon loss of Instrument Air or are supplied by safety-related accumulators.

Therefore, tliis modification to the Instrument Air.and Service Air systems will not result in an increase in the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.This modification does not add to, eliminate, or alter the function or design basis of the Instrument Air, Service Air, or TBCCW system as described in the FSAR Sections 9.2 and 9.3, nor does it interact with any component served by Instrumerit or Service Air.Components added by this modification are not a precursor nor a contributor to any malfunction of equipment or accident previously analyzed in the SAR.Therefore, this modification will not result in an accident or malfunction of a different type being created.III No.Neither Instrument Air, Service Air, nor TBCCW are included in the SSES Technical Specifications.

As stated previously, components served by Instrument Air are unaffected by this modification.

Therefore, this modification does not reduce any margin of safety which serves as the basis for any Technical Specification.95-160 OC 9.Ili 2 On the Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water (TBCCW)inlet and outlet of each Instrum'ent Air Service Air Compressor is installed a drain valve with a quick disconnect hose connection.

These connections are used to facilitate draining of the compressor during maintenance.

These piping arrangements are not a part of the original skid supplied by the vendor and were installed outside of the modification process.Drain plugs were installed as part of the original compressor design.This modification will legitimize the existing installation on each compressor skid and update configuration control documentation.

Kh1hhhK I No.Base upon a review of the FSAR (Sections 7.2, 7.3, 9.2, 9.3, 15, Question 211.7), Fire Protection Review Report (Section 6.2), and SSES'Safety Evaluation Report (Section 9.0, 9.3, 15.2), no accident analyzed will have their probability increased as a result of this modification (i.e., the addition of drain valves)because neither the Loss of Instrument Air, Service Air, not TBCCW serve as an initiating event for an.accident analyzed in the SAR.Therefore, this modification will not result in an increase in the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated'in the SAR, C Neither the Instrument Air, Service Air, nor TBCCW System is a system important to safety as described in the SAR.This modification meets all of the same'requirements for these existing systems and there is no change to the function or operation of these systems as described in the SAR.Therefore, this modification will not result in an increase in the probability of a malfunction of equipment to safety.In accidents analyzed in the SAR, it is assumed that Instrument Air Service Air are lost..ln addition, components which are essential for safe shutdown of the plant and require inst'rument Air to function are designed to assume their'safe position" upon loss of Instrument Air or are supplied by safety-related accumulators.

Therefore, this modification to the Instrument Air and Service Air systems will not result in an increase in the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.This modification does not add to, eliminate, or alter the function or design basis of the Instrument Air, Servic'e Air, or TBCCW system as described in the FSAR Sections 9.2 and 9.3, nor does it interact with any component served by Instrument or Service Air.Components added by this modification are not a precursor nor a contributor to any malfunction of equipment or accident previously analyzed in the SAR.Therefore, this modification will not result in an accident or malfunction of a different type being created.III No.Neither Instrument Air, Service Air, nor TBCCW are included in the SSES Technical Specifications.

As stated previously, components served by Instrument Air are unaffected by this modification.

Therefore, this modification does not reduce any margin of safety which serves as the basis for any Technical Specification.

Replace the motor and actuator gearsets in HV 1/252FOOSA&B to change the Overall Actuator Ratio (OAR)from 52.56 to 84.No.The modification does not increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction as previously evaluated in'he SAR as follows: The valve/piping system pressure boundary and seismic Category 1 qualification are not adversely affected per FSAR Sections 5.2 and 6,2.4, Core Spray (CS)System logic is not changed per FSAR Section 6.3 and 7.3 valve shutoff capability and seat leakage acceptance criteria described in FSAR Sections 6.2.6 and 6.3.4 are not changed, CS system performance in response to all LOCAs will assure all margins of safety are maintained, and the hydraulic characteristics of HV-1/252F005A/B are not changed so that the CS pumps can pass their design flow rate as shown in FSAR Figure 6.3.75.In addition, the AC distribution system addressed in FSAR Section 8.3 is not affected by the modification.

II No.The modification does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously analyzed in the SAR as described below: The effects of the modification are limited to increasing HV-1/252F005A/B stroke time and allowing these valves to stall for about 7 seconds during certain non-LOOP events.Neither of these effects create the possibility of a new accident or malfunction.

III No.The margin of safety'defined in Tech Spec Bases B3/4.5.1 and B3/4.5.2 arid the CS actuation instrumentation in Tech Spec Section 3.3.3-3 limits fuel peak clad temperature to below 2200 F.A reevaluation of the LOCA analyses has demonstrated that there is negligible effect on reactor water level and no effect on fuel peak clad temperature throughout all LOCA timelines.

Therefore, the margin of safety defined in the above Tech Specs are not reduced.Tech Spec 3/4.6.1.1 (Primary Containment Integrity) ensures that the release of radioactive materials is restricted to the leak paths and rates assumed in the accident analyses.Tech Spec 3/4.6.1.2 (Primary Containment Leakage)ensures the total containment leakage value will not exceed the value assumed in the accident at peak accident pressure.Tech Spec 3/4.6.3 (Primary Containment Isolation Valves)ensures the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of radioactive release or containment pressurization.

The modification does not reduce the margin of safety in these Tech Specs since valve/piping pressure boundary integrity is not affected, seat leakage criteria is not changed and the slight increase in stroke time results in a negligible change in loss of coolant due to the presence of the inboard check'valve.95-162 This modification provides studs, grating clips, and floor grating and support steel to support floor grating on Elevation 738 in the Unit 2 Primary Containment.

the grating was removed due to not being restrained suAiciently to prevent its dislodgment during transients, nor being supported adequately to prevent personnel safety concerns.No.The floor grating addressed by this modification is part of the Primary Containment System, Reference FSAR Sections 3.1.2.2.7, 3.8.3.1.5, and 3.6;DAR Sections 1.4.1.2 and 6.1:1.The grating and grating supports do not serve any safety related function but must be adequately restrained to withstand certain transients to.prevent them from becoming"missiles and damaging safety related components in the area.The modification will assume that all work on the affected grating will conform to all original plant design and construction codes and thereby prevent the possibility of the proposed action from increasing the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR.I No.The proposed modification will meet all the design basis criteria as specified in the SAR.The affected grating and grating supports will be designed and installed per the original requirements of existing grating in Primary Containment and is thereby bounded by any existing accident and malfunction analysis and/or evaluations.

Therefore, the proposed actions do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type thari evaluated previously in the SAR.III No.The components affected'by the actions taken in this modification are not specifically addressed in the basis for any Unit2 Technical Specification.

The Primary Containment System is addressed in Technical Specification Section 3/4.6.1.Based on this and the fact that the modification.

meets all applicable design criteria as specified in the SAR, the proposed actions will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-163 DCP 94-9064, Units 1 and 2 Provide permanent 480 VAC power for Unit'1 and Unit 2 refueling activities.

Install new power panels and associated receptacles on the 818'valuation.

I No.Since all new equipment will be op'crated within design basis requirements, there are no adverse effects to the existing power distribution system.Therefore, there is no increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences'of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.Failure of the power feed cables could ultimately result in the trip of non-safety related 2B810633 or 2B260421 load centers.Failure of these load centers does not create a different type accident/malfunction.

Therefore, the proposed actions do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.'I The AC power supplies necessary to meet safe shutdown requirements are listed n Tech.Spec.Sections 3/4.8.3.1 and 3/4.8.3.2.

Load centers 2B810 and 2B260 are not necessary to provide power required for operation or shutdown of the unit or for mitigation of the consequences of an accident.Therefore, the proposed actions will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in.the basis for any Technical Specification.95-164 OCP i I.Ui d Provide a Refuel Floor Wetlift System consisting of three subsystems,'i.e., Watertight Hook Box for Steam Dryer/Steam Separator Strongback/Sling Assembly, Main Steam Line (MSL)Plugs including MSL Plugs Restraint Ring and MSL Plugs I/R Tool and Rigid Pole Handling System for the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)disassembly and reassembly activities during the refueling outages.for Units 1 and 2.No.No accidents or malfunctions in the FSAR are specifically related to the disassembly and reassembly of the RPV or the Refuel Floor Wetlift System.However, accidents concerning fuel handling load drops over fuel are described in FSAR Section-15.7.4.

Other load drop accidents have been evaluated in response to NUREG 0612 and have been performed under guidelines of PP&L's Heavy Loads Program which has been reviewed and accepted by the NRC, thereby, forming part of the'licensing basis for SSES.The proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety.II No.The only accidents or malfunctions that could result by the use of the Refuel Floor Wetlift System.would be a load drop as discussed above, coolant leakage through the MSL Plugs, or cross tying of HVAC Zones.MSL Plugs are designed to remain intact during a seismic'event and limit leakage to be well within the available makeup capability.

Also, potential cross tying of HVAC Zones due to MSL Plugs'ent and fill hoses will be tracked and accounted for by procedures.

Therefo're, the potential for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR does not exist.No.The Technical Specifications do not address the use of the Refuel Floor Wetlift System or other activities involved with the disassembly and reassembly of the RPV.Basis for Technical Specification Sections 3/4.9.8 and 3/4:9.9 address the water levels in the Reactor Cavity and Spent Fuel Storage Pools.Administrative controls and available makeup capability will assure the required water level is maintained in the event of the postulated accident discussed above.The basis for Technical Specifications 3/4.9.6 do address the handling of fuel or irradiated components within the RPV using the Refueling Platform.Administrative controls prohibit use of Rigid Pole Handling System for handling fuel assembly anywhere or handling control blades in the RPV.The proposed actions do not reduce the margin of safety defined in the bases of any Technical Specifications.

The purpose of this procedure is to allow tie in temporary'outage chiller(s)

'to the Reactor Building'hilled Water (RBCW)System during a Unit 1 Outage.h5hKY;No.Sections 9.2.12.3 Reactor Building Chilled Water" and 9.4.2 Reactor Building Ventilation were reviewed.The FSAR does not specifically address the affected plant systems during outage conditions.

However, installation of this temporary system will not impact operation of Primary Containment Isolation, the only safety function of the RBCW System.Normal operation of the Reactor Building Ventilation System will not be impacted by installation of the temporary chiller.Additionally, installation of this equipment will not impact Secondary Containment requirements.

Therefore, this activity does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No., The installation of this temporary system does not'adversely impact the operation or safety function of any existing installed equipment.

The only new failure possible would be failure of the temporary system itself.If the tempprar'y chiller(s) failed to provide cooling, there would be no new accident created since this failure is bounded by failure'of the Reactor Building Chillers during plant operation.

III No.Tech Spec Sections 3.6.3, 3.6,1.7 and 3.6.5.1 have been reviewed and are not affected since the installation and operation of the temporary chiller(s) will be during Conditions 4.5, or defueled.Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced for any Technical Specification basis..95-166 This modification installs a permanent support (guide)on a vertically run span of 2 SPjBD288-1 piping between supports SPjBD288-H2603 and jBD288-H17.

This piping was discovered to be insufficiently restrained and the addition of this support/guide will prevent it from becoming over stressed during transient events.No.The affected piping is part of the Liquid Radwaste Processing Subsystem (FSAR Section 11.2.2.2)of the Liquid Waste Management System (LWMS)as defined in FSAR Section 11.2.Per FSAR Section 11.2.1, Design Bases, The LWMS has no nuclear safety related function as a design basis;therefore, the affected components have no safety related function.The LWMS has no Safety Functions and is separated from the Reactor Vessel and Accessories System (the Reactor Head Vent Line is ASME Section XI)by anchor SPJBD-,H2603.

This boundary anchor is not adversely affected by the addition of the new support on the LWMS, and, in fact, will have its integrity improved by reducing the piping loads on it.This modification does not alter the design basis or operation as described within FSAR Section 11.2.1, Liquid Waste Management Systems".The modification creates no adverse'change to system operation or function;it will, however, enhance the piping system's integrity.

The possibility of a pipe rupture has been evaluated against the Accident Analyzes in Chapter 15 of the FSAR, specifically Section 15.7.2-Liquid Radwaste System Failure.The changes made to the LWMS do not alter the system'operation as discussed above and no safety related function of any system associated with the LWMS will be affected.Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or'the consequences of an accident or malfuriction of equipment related to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.Implementation of this modification will not change the normal operation of the Liquid Radwaste Management Systems, specifically the Liquid Radwaste Processing Subsy'stem.

The system will continue to operate in accordance with its original design bases;and the piping modifications comply with the original construction codes (ANSI B31.1)and regulations.

Therefore, the proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR: III No.The Technical Specification sections that are applicable to the Liquid Radwaste Processing Subsystem are 3/4.11.1.1, 3/4.11.1.2, and 3/4.11.1.3.

The addition of a new pipe support enhances the integrity of that portion of the LRW processing piping.This modification does not change the piping configuration nor adversely affect system operation and will remain in accordance with the system's original design basis, construction codes, and regulatory requirements.

None of these modifications affects the concentration of radioactive materials released in the liquid radwaste effluents (Reference 3/4.11.1.1), nor the doses of the radioactive material in those effluents (Reference 3/4.11.1.2), nor the operability/availability of the LRW Processing Subsystem (Reference 3/4.11.1.3), and therefore, will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-167 Change setpoints for Non Class 1E Security 125 VDC Battery Bus'OD572 Undervoltage Relay 27<D572 and Auxiliary Time Delay Relay 27XZD572.BUhRlhRY;I No.Security non class lE 125 VDC Battery Bus OD572 Undervoltage Relay 27-0D572 and Time Delay Auxiliary Relay 27X-OD572 do not initiate/perform any safety function and do not prevent any safety related System from meeting its minimum performance requirements.

The setpoint changes do not increase the the probability of occurrence of consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.I'ailure of the Undervoltage Relay 27-OD572 and the Auxiliary Time Delay Relay 27X-OD572 do not prevent Class 1E 125.VDC System from meeting its minimum performance requirement.

FSAR Table 6.3-5 has evaluated Class lE battery or battery charger failure.Security 125 VDC Batter'y OD570 is non Class lE.'he setpoint changes do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different'type than any evaluated previously in SAR.III No.The margin of safety in the Class 1E 125 VDC is not affected by this setpoint change package.95-168 The scope of this project is to provide the instrumnetation on Unit 1 Recirculation and RHR piping within primary containment that will provide necessary information to assess the dynamic response of piping, valves and other associated components.

No.This vibration instrumentation system provides no plant control or protective trip'unction.It collects and analyzes dynamic input signals while the plant is operating in transient or steady-state modes.It is not required to assure safe shutdown or mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents.

The vibration instrumentation system by nature of its small size, low mass, low level signals and means of attachment of existing reactor recirculation and RHR piping valves does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety.II No.The new accelerometers and supporting hardware, although attached to the pipe and valves, do not intrude on the reactor coolant pressure boundary.'Failure of the instrumentation system does not involve a change in system operation or add a different failure mode which would affect this evaluation.

III No.The vibration monitoring system has no effect on the operation of the reactor recirculation system;'RHR system nor does it impair the functionally of the ECCS strainers.

It is therefore concluded that installation of the vibration monitoring system will have no impact on the Technical Specifications and does not affect the margin of safety defined in the basis for Technical Specification.

DCP 94-3015 6 94-3016, Units 1, 2 and Common This modification replaces the existing computer systems and functions with a new updated integrated plant computer system (PICSY).No.The functions and analyses of PICSY are the same as the function's and analyses described in FSAR Section 7.7 for the individual systems that are being replaced.Chapters 3, 7, 8, 9, 15,.and 18 of the FSAR, the Design Assessment Report, the current Reload Analysis and NUREG<776 were reviewed to determine if the proposed action has an effect on the spectrum of postulated initiating events for which transients or operational occurrences and accident conditions were analyzed.The replacement of the Plant Computers does not affect any of the postulated initiating events identified in Chapters 3, 7, 8, 9, 15, and 18 of the FSAR, the Design Assessment Report, the current Reload Analysis and NUREC<776.

No.A review of chapters 3,'6, 7, 8, 9, 15, and 18 of the FSAR did not identify any postulated initiating event that would create the possibility of an accident of a different'ype.

The possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR will not be created.The system being utilized for this modification will not create the potential for any type of accident since the functions and analyses of PICSY are the same as the functions and analyses described in FSAR Section 7.7 for the individual systems that are being replaced.The PICSY equipment installation'does not change the functional interface with~operating plant systems.Potential issues of safety impact, combustible loading, Appendix R, fire detection and suppression, electrical separation have been addressed in the design.Therefore, the PICSY installation does not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type.No.PICSY equipment and functions are fully consistent with previously existing computer equipment and functions and by meeting these requirements, these changes do not impact the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

The plant computers are not required to function in order to safely operate, startup, or take the plant to a safe shutdown condition.

Technical Specification section 3/4.1, 3/4.2, 3/4.3, 3/4.6, 3/4.?, 3/4.8, 3/4.10 and their bases were reviewed in making this determination.

95-1?0 The proposed action is to increase the instantaneous magnetic trip setpoint of the Class lE Load Center breakers 2B21021 and 2822021 so that the breakers coordinate with the Non-Class 1E breakers in.the SPDS UPS 2D288 and 2D289.K'I No.Chapters 6 and 15 of the FSAR, the Design Assessment Report, the current Reload Analysis and NUREC<776 were reviewed.The increasing of the instantaneous magnetic trip setpoint of the Class lE Load Center breakers 2B21021 and 2B22021 does not affect any of the postulated initiating events identified in Chapter 6 and 15 of the FSAR, the Design Assessment Report, the current Reload Analysis of NUREC 0776.The increasing of the instantaneous magnetic trip setpoint of the Class 1 E Load Center breakers 2B21021 and 2B22021 does not represent a change in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of the equipment.

The changing of the trip setpoint of the breaker does not change the probability of failure the breaker.The consequences of an accident is not changed by the proposed action.The increasing of the instantaneous magnetic trip setpoint of tlie Class 1E Load Center breakers 2B21021 and 2B22021 does not affect the actuation of the breaker trip circuitry.

The increasing of the trip setpoint assures the MCCs 2B216 and 2B226 are operable for failures in the SPDS UPS 2D288 or 2D289.II No., The proposed action does not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type.The instantaneous magnetic trip setpoint for Class 1E Load Center breakers 2B21021 or 2B22021 is applied in accordance with existing approved plant procedures.

The consequences of a random single failure of either Load Center breaker 2B2102.1 or 2822021 is the same as the existing consequences.

The review did not identify a postulated initiating event which would create the possibility for an accident of a different type.III No.The Load'Centers 2B210 and 2B220, breakers 2B21021 and 2B22012 and MCCs2B216 and 2B226 are part of the Onsite AC Power Distribution System whose operability is governed by Technical Specification Sections 3/4.8.3 entitled"Onsite Power'Distribution Systems.The bases for operability of the Load Centers, the breakers-and the MCCs are to ensure that sufficient power if available to supply the safety related equipment required for the safe shutdown of the facility and mitigation and control of accident co'nditions.within the facility during operation.

The bases for operability of the Load Centers, the breakers and MCCs during shutdown and refueling is to ensure that the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods and sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status.The proposed action does not affect the operability requirements, surveillance requirements or any existing margin of safety defined in Technical Specification Section 3I4.8.3.95-171 This modification enhances the operation of the Liquid Radwaste Filters (OF302 A&B), as described in FSAR Section 11.2.2.2.The modification replaces existing high and low level sensors with more reliable sensors, installs a redundant high level overfill control and installs a new analog level indication system.No.The proposed modification does not impact any station design features (such as limits on tank sizes, operating procedures, radiation monitoring capability, etc.)that are used in radioactive release analysis for postulated radwaste system failures.All pressure boundary changes are designed and installed in accordance with the Group D (Augmented) quality assurance requirements.

Therefore, no concerns are raised by this change over an increase in the probability of vessel or associated piping failure.Failure analysis for the proposed changes thus would be enveloped by the Accident Analysis,"Postulated Radioactive Releases due to Liquid Radwaste'Tank Failure, (FSAR Section 15.7.3).The proposed control logic changes reduce the probability of misoperation of.the liquid radwaste system and provide more reliable information to the operator.II.No.Worst case scenarios for any accident or malfunction of the radwaste system have been conservatively analyzed in the FSAR Section 15.7.3.The proposed changes do not involve a change in system operation or add a more severe type of failure'ode which would have an effect on this evaluation.

Therefore, the proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.Technical Specification 3.11.1.3 relates only to liquid waste system operability.

This modification will provide an upgrading of the existing filter level instrumentation.

These changes will not degrade current system operability.

They are designed to enhance operability.

The proposed change has no impact on the Technical Specification, and will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

95-1 72 The action proposed is to document the current Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU)Penetration Room supply register louver position via the Bypass Program.This'Bypass(es) will remain in effect until a long term solution is implemented.

SUJHldBEY; I No.The Steam Leak Detection System monitors the differential temperature in the RWCU Penetration Room.Upon a differential temperature of 39'F, a RWCU System isolation is initiated.

Since the Steam Leak Detection System is a monitoring system only, the proposed action does not increase the probability of any accident discussed in Chapter 15.With the supply register louvers adjusted, it is not possible to detect a 25 gpm leak under the design basis summer conditions.

The estimated detectable leak rate is 30-55 gpm within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.The radiological consequences of a 50 gpm RWCU leak for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> was calculated.

This calculation was very conservative in that it assumed the maximum Equivalent Iodine I-131 concentration in the primary coolant, and no credit was taken for filtration, holdup, or decay.The calculated dose is well below those currently state FSAR Tabje 15.6-18'Loss of Coolant Accident Radiological Effects'hereby ensuring both 10CFR100 offsite doch limits and 10CFR50, Appendix A;GDC-19 control room does limits are met.Due to the conservative assumptions in this calculation, it bounds the proposed action.No.The proposed action does not affect any systems other than Differential Temperature Steam Leak Detection in the RWCU Penetration Room.The proposed action will ensure spurious isolations of RWCU can be avoided, which is the primary design base consideration.

The existing setpoint and louver position should be capable of detecting leaks in the range of 30-55 gpm.The consequences of this size leak have been evaluated and are bounded by the Steam Line Break analysis in FSAR Section 15.6 4 and the Design Basis Accident analysis in Section 15.6.5.III No.The bases for the Steam Leak Detection instrumentation is described in Tech Spec Section 3/4.3.2.The above listed design basis is different than that posed by the NRC, in that the detectable leak rate should not be based solely on the critical crack size, but rather set high enough to avoid spurious isolation.

The proposed action meets the primary de'sign base objective of avoiding spurious isolation.

The expected detectable leak is 30-55 gpm during worst case summer operation.

The radiological consequences of this size leak during the design conditions does not exceed the current FSAR offsite or control room dose projections.

While it is true that the proposed action reduces the margin of safety regarding leak detection capability, it is increases the margin of safety regarding avoidance of spurious isolations and challenges to plant operations.

The proposed action ensures that the SLD system will function properly and meet the primary design objective while still being capable of detecting a leak as small as possible.Therefore, it can be concluded that the overall margin of safety has been increased.95-173 C 9 This modification will provide the Unit 1 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)software changes identified in the Power Uprate Project which are not part of, or included in other Power Uprate Project Design Change Packages, and also will define the testing required to assure the overall SPDS functionality post Power Uprate Project modifications.

I No.The SPDS computers and software are not safety-related and do not impact any FSAR analysis.In accordance with NUREG 737, Supplement 1, the SPDS and its displays are designed using human factor engineering principles and validated by testing to ensure that the displayed information is valid and can be readily perceived and comprehended so as not to mislead the operator.This modification updates the alarm limits changed by Power Uprate so that the validity of the displayed information is not affected.Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences.of an accident or malfunction of equipment related to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.The failure modes after this modification remain the same, for the same systems, as'hat before the modification.

The modification will in no way affect the availability of SPDS.Therefore, the proposed modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The SPDS displays are used by the Shift Technical Advisor (STA)and other control room Operations personnel as a quick indication of the reactor state in relation to the various EOP limits, as well as trends of reactor parameters either toward or away from these limits.SPDS displays do not replace the use of the actual EOP procedures and safety related instruments.

Because the proposed software changes to SPDS do not affect any sysf'ems or functions addressed in the Technical Specifications, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-174 This evaluation documents the safety aspects regarding a revision to the quantities of unqualified paint in the containments.

SLlkRlhRY:

No.Section 6.1.2 of the FSAR discusses the quantities, types, and quality classification of coatings installed in the SSES containments.

It also describes the potential impact of containment coatings on ECCS system safety functions following a DBA.In no way do containment coatings impact the initiation of a DBA or increase the probability of the occurrence of an accident.'ollowing a DBA, paint failure can occur in the form of particulate, chips or flakes.The debris can be introduced to the suppression pool, become suspended in the pool water and be drawn onto the ECCS suction strainers'.

Flow blockage could result.Smaller quantities of unqualified coatings reduce the amounts of potential post-LOCA debris.A reduction of debris reduces the possibility of ECCS suction strainer flow blockage.Reducing the potential for ECCS suction strainer f)ow blockage reduces the consequences of an accident.II No.Section 6.1.2 discusses the impacts of coatings on ECCS system functions following DBA.Containment coatings can contribute to post-LOCA debris.Debris can cause ECCS suction strainer blockage.A reduction in the amount of coating that can contribute to post-LOCA debris reduces the possibility of suction strainer blockage and, therefore, reduces the possibility of ECCS malfunction.

A reduction in the amount of unqualified containment coating will not cause a malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated.

Containment c;oatings do not create or cause any of the accidents disc'ussed in the FSAR.The reduction in the quantities of unqualified containment coatings, do not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction not already evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The Technical Specifications do not discuss containment coatings or their impact on the consequences of accidents or ECCS system operability.

With respect to a reduction in the quantity of unqualified coating in the SSES containment, the above question is riot applicable.

The unqualified coatings reduction, however, increases the margin of safety associated with the operability of the ECCS systems and the Suppression Pool as defined in Section 3/4.5.1 through 3/4.5.3.The reduced quantity of unqualified coatings reduces the potential quantity of post-LOCA debris.Less'debris following a DBA reduces the possibility of ECCS strainer flow blockage.Therefore, the actions increase rather than reduce the margin of safety associated with the operability of the ECCS systems and Suppression Pool, as described in the basis of the Technical Specifications.95-176 This change revises the two setpoints for the Reactor Manual Control Rod Power and Alarm First Stage Turbine Pressure alarm units P&C12-1N654A and PS-C12-1N654B according to General Electric Report, Susquehanna'Steam Electric Station Setpoints for Power Uprate," GE-NE-901<26-0592.51lh1hlhlE:

I No.FSAR Sections 4.1.3, 4.1.6.1.2.6, 7.1, 7.6, 7.7 and Chapter 15 were reviewed.The proposed action includes adjusting the LPSP and LPAP setpoints of P~12-1N654A and P&C12-1N654B for power uprate conditions using more realistic turbine fire stage pressure versus reactor power data.The revised setpoints provide adequate margin to the allowable values for power uprate conditions.

This setpoint change does not change the function or performance of the rod sequence control system or any equipment or components associated with these devices.In addition, these devices are not required to mitigate any accidents.

Therefore; the proposed action does not increase the probability, of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.Changing the process setpoint of P&C12-1N654A and PS-C12-1N654B, RMCS Power and Alarm First Stage Turbine Pressure interlocks does not change the function or performance of the instruments, and this system is not used in an accident.Therefore, it does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create a possibility foi malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.III No.~Plant Technical Specification Sections 3.1.4.2 and 4.1.4.2 state that the RSCS must be operable in operational conditions 1 and 2 when thermal power is less than or equal to 20%of rated.The minimum allowable low power setpoint is 20%of rated thermal power.The setpoint'is established to protect against exceeding the analytical limit of 20 lo as power referenced in the above Technical Specification.

Since the new setpoint is in compliance with the Technical Specification, the proposed action will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of the Technical Specification.95-177 ,u The purpose of this Safety Evaluation is to address the use of Unit 2'Service Water to cool Unit 1 TBCCW Heat Exchangers, which is a departure from normal plant design and operating philosophy.

No.FSAR section 9.2.3.3 states that'Since the TBCCW system has no safety-related function, failure of the system will not compromise any safety-related system or component or prevent a safe shutdown of the plant.FSAR section 9.2.1.3 states that The SWS operation has no safety related function and failure of the system will not compromise any safety related system or component or prevent a safe nuclear shutdown." The actions of this procedure have the potential to adversely affect Unit 1 6 2'operating systems via the development of a leak of Unit 2 Service Water in the temporary fiowpath, but the margin to design values and the controls of the test and other plant operating procedures'are adequate to accommodate these actions and potential actions.Therefore, the performance of TP-115%09 does not'increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety;as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.The actions of this procedure have the potential to adversely affect Unit 1 8 2 operating systems, but the margin to design values and the controls of the test and other plant operating procedures are adequate to accommodate these actions and potential actions.Therefore, the performance of TP-11509 does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.III No.Performance of this procedure does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.

The activities of this procedure, which divert 40-50 gpm from Unit 2 Service Water at the Unit 2 TBCCW Heat Exchangers, are expected to be accommodated by the Unit 2 Service water system due to the large margin to design flow values, Field experience from the performance of TP-115-008, Temporary Flow Test of TBCCW Heat Exchangers, supports this conclusion.95-178 EO-1 00/200-1 02, RPV Control, is revised as part of the power uprate project.No.Sections 7.3.1.1A.1.4, 6.3.2.2.1, were reviewed.Manual control of ADS, Bypass of HPCI Auto Section Transfer, Large and Small Break LOCA and Bypass of RCIC Low Steam Pressure Isolation were reviewed.This action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No.As stated above, the issues of concern associated with the implementation of EX-100/200-102 are the manual control of ADS, the authorization to use HPCI with suction from the CST, bypassing high suppression pool water level interlocks as necessary, and the authorization to use RCIC with its low steam supply pressure isolation bypassed.Each of these issues was reviewed and does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.No.The basis for Technical Specification 3.5.1 (ECCS)indicates that use of ADS (given HPCI failure)for small break LOCA will limit fuel cladding temperature to less than.2200'F.

Use of ADS as specified in the BM!ROG EPG (which is the basis for EO-100/200-102, as well as other SSES EOP steps)also limits fuel cladding temperature to less than 2200'F.'hus the Margin of Safety is not reduced.'I The authorization to operates HPCI with it's automatic suction swap logic defeated does not reduce the Margin of Safety in any Plant Technical Specification basis.As was mentioned above, use of HPCI in this manner (auto swapover defeated when SP temperature

)140'F)will not produce Suppression Pool water levels in excess of Technical Specification limits for events which fall within the plant design basis.The direction to operate RCIC with the low steam supply pressure isolation logic defeated does not reduce the margin of safety in any plant technical specification basis.As was mentioned above, use of RCIC in this manner is not expected to oc'cur for events which fall within the plant design basis en'velope.

In addition, the FSAR safety analysis does not reply on the use of RCIC for accident.mitigation purposes.As already discussed, defeating this single input to the RCIC steam leak detection logic is compensated for by EOP direction regarding the conditions for which manual RCIC steam line isolation is appropriate.95-179 EO-100/200-1 13, Units 1 and 2 Safety evaluation of EO-100/200-113, Level/Power Control" which provides procedural guidance for mitigation of ATWS events.No.Although Section 15,8 of the FSAR presents a brief discussion of ATWS, this accident is beyond the plant design basis, and therefore this section of the Safety Evaluation is not applicable.

II No.The proposed actions (EO-100/200-113) are only executed after an ATWS event has occurred.Therefore, these actions are only executed when the plant-is in a configuration which is beyond the design basis.Consequently, this Section of the Safety Evaluation is not applicable.

Itl No.The proposed actions do not affect any Technical Specification requirements.

EO-100/200-1 13 only specifies operator actions that would be carried out with the plant in a configuration which is beyond the design basis..95-180 This modification eliminates a potential failure mode (release of nonwondensate gases in reference leg during RPV depressurization) for the water level instruments.

I No.The proposed action would noT increase the probability of occurrence of an accident or equipment malfunction because it only provides mitigate steps which are carried out after the accident has already occurred.EO-100/200-114 specifies operator actions which could be carried out during a large~break LOCA which has been analyzed in the FSAR (Section 6.2.1.1.3.3)..

However, for a large-break LOCA, the reactor pressure could not be maintained 66psi above suppression chamber pressure, and this procedure would be exited at Step RF-9.Therefore, this procedure does not increase the consequences of the large-break I.OCA because it directs operator action to another procedure (Containment Flooding, EO-100/200-115)'which has been reviewed for unresolved safety question.No.'he proposed actions do not create a possibility, for an accident or malfunction of'a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR because this procedure only specifies operator actions which are carried out once an accident involving loss of level indication has occurred.Furthermore, the purpose of this procedure is to ensure adequate core cooling when level indication is not available.

This procedure provides guidance which ensures adequate core cooling so the proposed actions would not cause'the plant condition to progress into some previously unanalyzed accident condition.

III No.The RPV Flooding procedure specifies requirements which must be satisfied before injection to the vessel can be terminated.

These requirements are listed in Step RF-11.Adequate core cooling is assured when the'active core is covered with liquid or two-phase mixture.The requirements specified in step RF-11 prevent termination of injection before the RPV is flooded above the top of active fuel.Technical Specification 2.1.4 states that RPV water level shall be maintained above top of active fuel.EO-100/200-114 does not specify any operator actions which would lead to violation of this Technical Specification whenever water level indication is available.

95-1 81 The proposed action will inhibit the operation of the KT106 Relay in the Alarm and Trip Circuit of the Main Turbine EHC for the purpose of replacement.

I No.Temporarily bypassing and changing out the KT106 Card in Panel 1C663 Bay D does not increase the probability or the"'consequence of an accident or a malfunction of equipment important to safety.During the pe'riod the card is bypassed and changed all other Turbine Protection features are functional as well as Operator available features to perform a manual trip.No inputs to RPS are affected during this proposed action.P FSAR 7.2.1.1.4.2d 5 e Reactor Trip System Initiating'Circuits, with respect to Main Turbine Stop Valve and Control Valves and subsequent increases in Reactor pressure, was reviewed and the proposed action does not affect or change that analysis.FSAR 10.2.1 was reviewed.EHC during this proposed action will still be capable of controlling speed, load, steam pressure and steam flow under startup, shutdown, transient and steady state conditions; therefore, this proposed action does not affect that analysis.II No.Although the proposed action defeats one of the Main Turbine protective features for a short period of'time, there are redundant features of the Turbine protection system which will perform the same function.With respect to the FSAR Sections reviewed, it is concluded that the proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.Technical Specification 3/4.7.8 for Main Turbine Bypass Valves and'3/4.3.8 for Main Turbine Overspeed Protection System were reviewed an'd it is concluded that the proposed action will have no affect on the.margin of safety as previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed action does not reduce the safety margin as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

95-1 82 DCP-94-5000, Unit Common With this modification,,the responsibility for the daily Security Data'Management System (SDMS)archive will shift from the Security Controllers to personnel from the NSE Computer Group.I No.The proposed changes do not functionally change the operation of the physical Security Computer System.They only serve to make it more maintainable and reliable, The SSES Physical Security Plan (FSAR Section 13.6)does not identify the Security Computer System as a safety system nor as a system related to safety.Implementytion of the proposed action will not alter the intent of the computer-based SDMS.The proposed action has been determined to be non-quality related and non-safety related, according to the definitions in the QA program.'I II No.The proposed action is a software change which does not change the'function of the Security System.The Security Computer System cannot control plant functions.

The action does not affect the ability of the Security Computer System to monitor actual or potential security violations.

Therefore, it does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The modification has no effect on any Technical Specification bases, setpoints or margins, nor can it cause any adverse affect to any safety-related systems.Therefore, the margin of safety defined in the bases for any Technical Specifications is not reduced.

The proposed action involves locating new relay equipment in four new panels designated OC190A, OC190B, OC191,&OC192 in the Turbine Building Switchgear Room I-301 (04/714')&ll-301 (13/714').

No.The probability of occurrence of an accident or the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased by the proposed action to improve separation and replace existing Non<lass 1E 230KV transmission line protective relay equipment with state of the art equipment.

The consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased as a result of the proposed action.Component failure modes for the new relaying are the same as for existing relaying.As such, the new relaying could initiate the same events as today's relaying and consequences are bound by FSAR Chapter 15.0'Accident Analysis'nd the failure modes&effects analysis of FSAR Appendix 15.A'Nuclear Safety Operational Anafysis (NSOA)'.II No.The proposed action does not create a possibility'for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the SAR based upon the review of FSAR Chapter 6, FSAR Chapter 15.0, and FSAR Appendix 15.A*.The new fiber optic based solid state relay equipment is'unctionally equivalent to the existing relaying in providing trip signals to Unit Protection, the synchronizing breaker, and remote terminal circuit breakers.Also, the failure modes for the new relay equipment; i.e., unnecessary trip signal initiation or delayed trip signal initiation, are identical to failure modes for the existing relay equipment.

Based on the above, the transient events which could evolve from failure of the new relaying are the same as the events associated with failure of existing relaying which are analyzed in the failure modes and.effects analysis of FSAR Appendix 15.A.III.No.Technical Specification Bases'General Design.Criteria 17 of Appendix"A to 10CFR50'nd Regulatory Guide 1.93'Availability of Electrical Power Sources're the bases for ensuring that the minimum required independent and redundant power sources are available for various operating modes and for ensuring suitable out of service times for the power sources which include'offsite supplies are established.

These bases are intended to assure that sufficient power is available for safe shutdown of the plant, mitigation 8 control of accident conditions, and maintaining the plant in shutdown or refueling conditions.

Improved reliability and independence of the offsite power supplies as a result of the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for the Technical Specifications.

DC,3-,uiC This change will modifythe POWERPLEX Core Monitoring System Software (CMSS)to implement the new PFPR preconditioning limit provided by the Siemens Power Corporation for all 9X9 fuel.No.The POWERPLEX CMSS is not designed as a system important to safety and does not affect any safety related systems.The POWERPLEX software is considered critical software and the changes described will be performed in compliance with that procedure.

Testing will be performed to verify that the routines in POWERPLEX which calculate core reactivity, core power distribution, core exposure, and thermal limits are not changes.Therefore, installation of this change does not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety.II No This change only requires changes to the POWERPLEX CMSS resident on the RDAS computer system.The changes only affect the PFPR fuel preconditioning criteria established by the fuel vendor, Siemens Power Corp.This change does not change any routi'nes which calculate core reactivity, core power distribution, core exposure, or thermal limits.POWERPLEX does not provide input to any safety related systems, and a's a result, station response is not modified as a result.Therefore, this installation does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than already evaluated in the FSAR.III No.This'change does not jeopardize or'degrade the function or operation of any station system or component governed by Tech Specs.The proposed modification will not change the calculation or co're reactivity, core power distributions, core exposures, or ther'mal limits.Therefore, this does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Tech Specs.95-185 This modification will remove the Process Valve Stem Leakoff Collection System from all 14 of'the Unit 1 bleeder trip valves (BTVs).The purpose of this action is to permit replacement of existing BTV double packing with single packing to ensure that all BTVs meet the requirements of the General Electric Free Swing Criteria".

No.The removal of the Stem Leakoff Collection System from the BTVs and subsequent utilization of a single packing arrangement will serve to enhance the overall performance and reliability of the BTVs by eliminating additional frictional forces on the disc arm shaft assembly.The SAR has been evaluated, specifically FSAR Sections 10.2.2.4,"Extraction System Check Valves", 10.2.2.6, Overspeed Protection; 10.4.1Q,"Extraction Steam and Feedwater Heater Drains and Vents System';15.0,"Accident Analysis';

.1.2.2.8.15,"Process Valve Stem Leakoff System",'11.3.2.4.32,"Turbine Building';5.2.5.2,"Leak Detection Devices for NSS-System; 5.4.12,"Valves".Based on the above, the actions taken in this modification will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety." I II No.Deleting the stem leakoff connection to the BTVs will have no adverse affect on any~system or system functions and will increase system performance and improve the environmental conditions of the area in which the BTVs are located.A potential condenser leak will be eliminated with the removal of the stem leakoff isolation valves and capping of the process valve stem leakoff collection headers.Based on the above, the proposed modification does not create a possibility for an',accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.No.Removing the valve stem leakoff from the BTVs will have no adverse effects on the ,Extraction Steam, the Feedwater Pump Turbine and the Turbine Steam Seals and Drain Systems;to the contrary, the reliability of these systems and the BTVs will be greatly enhanced by this modification.

The removal of the Process Valve Stem Leakoff Collection System from these BTVs will have no affect on the offsite iodine release rate limits given in Section 3/4.11.2,"Gaseous Effluents" of the Unit 1 Technical Specifications.

None of the parameters that are the bases for the Technical Specifications will be adversely impacted by this modification; therefore, the actions taken by this modification will.not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

95-1 86 TP-145411, Feedwater Flow Measurements by Chemical Tracer, will determine the accuracy of the Unit 1 feedwater flow elements and the attached Feedwater flow instrumentation (FE-1N001A/B/C Br FT-C32-1N002A/B/C).

The results of the test will be used to adjust the flow coefficient for computer points NFF52/53/54.

No.FSAR Section 5.2.3.2.2, Table 4.44, Table 11.1-4 and 10CFR61 were reviewed for the effect TP-14M11 would have oh Stress Corrosion Cracking, Fuel Failure, Coolant Activity, Offgas Activity, and Radwaste Activity.Based on this review discussion, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety.No.The FSAR has been reviewed.In particular, Section 7.7.1.4.1.2 states that feedwater control is a power generation system and is classified as not related to safety.Section 7:7.2.4.2 states that feedwater control is not required for safe shutdown of the plant, nor is it required during or after accident conditions.

The RFP's will be operated within the bounds of all existing operating procedures throughout the duration of this procedure, therefore with one RFP in manual, accidents are bounded by existing analyses.Per FSAR 15;1.2, Feedwater Controller Failure to maximum demand results in feedwater pumps and main turbine trip and a'reactor scram.Per FSAR 15.2.7, loss of feedwater flow results in low level (L3)reactor scram.III No.The proposed test will not change any Tech Spec water chemistry parameter except for conductivity.

The T.S.basis for requiring conductivity measurements is to be able to detect abnormal condition.

From the T.S.Bases 3/4.4.4 Chemistry-"When the conductivity is within limits", (51 pmho/cm)," the pH, chlorides and other impurities affecting conductivity must also be within their acceptable limits.By limiting the conductivity to S 0.3 pho/cm during the test period, the ability to detect other impurities and pH above their limits will not be compromised.

The other effect of the test will be to increase slightly the activity of the coolant due to production of K4z.However, as mentioned in Section III, the insignificant fractional increase in total activity will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for limiting specific activity of the coolant to 100/E pCI/g.T.S.Bases 3/4.4.5 Specific Activity when to ensure that the two hour thyroid and whole body doses resulting from a main steam line failure o'utside containment during steady state operation will not exceed a small fraction of dose guidelines of 10CFR100.The specific activity limit of 100/E is presently 122 pCi/g on Unit 1 while the specific activity of the coolant is generally-0.1 pCI/g.Based upon a review of the Technical Specifications and the above discussions, it is determined that the performance of this TP does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Bases for any Technical Specification.

C 95-187 The proposed action installs a Hydran 201R Gas Monitoring System to detect and monitor fault gases dissolved in transformer dielectric oil.I No.Accident scenarios pertaining to the interruption of the AC power are discussed in FSAR Section 15.2.6-Loss of AC Power.Main transformer failure is not mentioned in FSAR Section 15.2.6 nor is it an analyzed occurrence in any other sections of the FSAR since it is bounded by the analysis for total loss of offsite power.The modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of the accident described in FSAR Chapters 6 and 15 since there is no adverse impact on any plant equipment as a result, of the proposed action.This modification has no direct connection to any safety related equipment and will have no adverse effect on any structure, system, or component which performs a safety function.Therefore, there will be no increase in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.The proposed action does not involve a precursor of or a contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.The proposed change does not adversely affect the operation of any power distribution equipment required for safe shutdown.This modification can have no effect on the accidents that have radiological consequences.

Therefore, there will be no increase in'the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR.The Unit 1 main transformers are connected to the utility power, as delineated in FSAR Section 8.1.2, and do not supply power directly to the ESF loads.Consequently, the proposed action does not affect the plant electrical system which prqvides normal and emergency AC power to reactor protection and safety features equipment as referenced in FSAR Section 8.3.1.3, Class lE AC Power System.The Class 1E power system supplies all ESF loads, and other loads that are needed for safe and orderly shutdown, and for keeping the plant in a safe shutdown condition.

The proposed modification will'ot alter or affect that design basis.III No.The Tech.Spec.Basis for Electric Power Systems, Section 3/4.8 requires sufficient power be available to supply safety related equipment required for safe shutdown and the mitigation and control of accident conditions.

Also, power services to maintain the facility in the shutdown or refueling conditions for extended periods and'ufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status.The AC power supplies necessary to meet these requirements are listed in Sections 3/4.8.3.1 and 3/4.8.3.2 and do not include nor depend upon the Unit 1 Main Transformers 1X101 and 1X102.The gas monitoring instrumentation is not required for, and has no affect upon, operation or shutdown of the unit or for mitigation of the consequences of an accident.Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.

95-188~DCP 93-"3088A, B Unit 1 Install eight additional vibration transducers in each reactor recirculation pump to monitor vibratory behavior.No.This modification does not increase the probability'of an accident evaluated in the SAR, including FSAR Sections 6 and 15, or in'the Design Assessment Report (DAR).The addition-of vibration transducers and wiring from the transducers provides monitoring capability of the dynamic behavior of the rotating elements of the reactor recirculation pumps.The installation of this equipment or its failure would not be an initiating cause for the events analyzed in FSAR Sections 6 and 15.II No.This modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.FSAR Section 15.3 discusses two reactor recirculation pump failure events, specifically, pump seizure and pump shaft breakage.This modification enhances diagnostic capabilities relating to pump dynamic behavior and can provide early indication of potential pump problems, but is not important to safety.Since the modification enhances pump monitoring capabilities a decrease in the probability of a malfunction of equipment is expected.This modification doe's not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR since non-safety equipment is being added to monitor pump vibration and failure of this equipment will not result in an" accident of a different type than previously evaluated.

The modification does not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type.Failure of the proposed equipment does not involve a change in system operation.

or add a different failure mode which would affect this evaluation.

III No.Recirculation Pump vibration instrumentation is not discussed in the Technical Specification.

Reactor Recirculation System limiting conditions for operation are addressed in Technical Specification Sections 3.4.1.1.1, 3.4.1.3 and 3.4.1.4.'This modification has no affect on system operation.

The proposed action to enhance capability to monitor reactor recirculatio'n pump vibration.has no impact on the Technical Specification and does not affect the margin of safety defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications.95-189 This change adds a clamp to the APRM rod block so that the alarm and rod block will come in at the proposed setpoint of 108%thermal power due to Power Uprated conditions.

No.Upon review of FSAR Sections 7.1, 7.7 and 15.4, it was concluded that the changes being proposed for this modification will not increase the probability of a postulated accident previously identified and evaluated in the SAR because the safety related trip functions of the APRM are not changed.The existing APRM setpoints remain unchanged from that presently identified in Technical Specification Table 2.2.l-l,and Section 3.2.2.Therefore, this modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment.

This modification does not alter the safety-related or non-safety functions of the APRM System as described in FSAR 7.1.2a.l.4.4.1 or 7;1.2a.1.4.4.3.

The modification does put a limit on the value of the rod block and alarm setpoint but does not affect the trip function.Therefore, the modification does not increase the consequences of an accident or introduce a new safety related function.No.The APRM flow biased SCRAM trip setpoints provide a variable setpoint signal based on the equation (s 0.58W+59)%.This circuit is provided with a clamp which limits the value to 113.5%.This function is not changed.All other existing functions of the APRM system and circuits remain the same.Upon review of the FSAR Sections 7.1, 7.6, 7.7 and 15.4 relative to changes being made by this modification, it is concluded that this modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.III No.The modification to the APRM Flow Control Trip Reference Unit adds a clamp to the APRM upscale alarmlrod block, and limits the setpoint valve to 108 lo based on the equation 0.58W+50.This function is consistent with the proposed Unit 2 Technical Specification Change Request, specifically, Technical Specification Table 3.3.6-2, Control Rod Block Instrumentation Setpoints, and Section 3/4.2.2 subitem 3.2.2.Based on the above review, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifi'cation.95-190 DC S This change will modify LRW Chemical Waste and Chemical Waste Neutralizer piping for the purpose of eliminating eductor blockage so that proper mixing of the tanks contents can be performed in order to achieve accurate representative tank content samples, to eliminate the material build-up to reduce area dose rates and to mitigate blockage.Kh&ARY I No./This modification does not alter the design basis or operation as described within FSAR Section 11.2.1,'Liquid Waste Management Systems".The modifications detailed in Section II.A create no adverse change to system operation or function;they will, however, enhance the piping system's performance.'he Liquid Waste Management System itself has no direct nuclear safety related function as a design basis.Safety systems do empty radioactive wastewater into the LWMS aAesigned; however, since the changes made to the LWMS do not alter the system operation as discussed above, no safety related function of any system associated with the LWMS will be affected, Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment related to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II No Implementation of this modification will not change the normal operation of the Liquid Radwaste Management Systems, specifically the Liquid Radwaste Chemical Processing Subsystem.

The system will continue to operate in accordance with its original design bases,'and the piping'modifications comply with the original construction codes (ANSI 831.10)and regulations.

Therefore, the proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.The Technical Specification sections that are applicable to the Liquid Radwaste Processing Subsystem are 3/4.11.1.1, 3/4.11.1.2, and 3/4.11.1.3.

Th hese modifications do not change the piping configuration nor adversely affect system operation and will remain in accordance with the system's original.design basis, construction codes, and regulatory requirements.

None of these modifications affects the concentration of radioactive materials released in the liquid radwaste effluents (reference 3/4.11.1.1), nor the doses of the radioactive material in, those effluents (reference 3/4.11.1.2), nor the operability/availability of the LRW Processing Subsystem (reference 3/4.11.1.3),, and therefore, will not reduce.the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

DCP9 D,ll This change will modify LRW Chemical Waste and Chemical Waste Neutralizer piping for the purpose of eliminating eductor blockage so that proper mixing of the tanks contents can be performed in order to achieve accurate representative tank content samples, to.eliminate the material build-up to reduce area dose rates and to mitigate blockage.I No.'his modification does.not alter the design basis or operation as described within FSAR Section 11.2.1, Liquid Waste Management Systems.The modifications detailed in Secti'on II.A create no adverse change.to system operation or function;they will, however, enhance the piping system's performance.

The Liquid Waste Management System itself has no direct nuclear safety related function as a design basis.Safety systems do empty radioactive wastewater into the LWMS a&esigned; however, since the changes made to the LWMS do not alter the system operation as discussed above, no safety related function of any system associated with the LWMS will be affected.Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment related to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.II.No.Implementation of this modification will not change the normal operation of the Liquid Radwaste Management Systems, specifically the Liquid Radwaste Chemical Processing Subsystem.

The system will continue to operate in accordance with its original design bases, and the piping modifications comply with the original construction codes (ANSI B31.10)and regulations.

Therefore, the proposed action does not create a possibility'for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR III No The Technical Specification sections that are applicable to the Liquid Radwaste Processing Subsystem are 3/4.11.1.1, 3/4.11.1.2, and 3/4.11.1.3.

These modifications do not change the piping configuration nor adversely affect system operation and'will remain in accordance with the system's original design basis, construction codes, and regulatory requirements.

None of these modifications affects the concentration of radioactive materials released in the liquid radwaste effluents (reference 3/4.11.1.1), nor the doses of the radioactive material in those effluents (reference 3/4.11.1.2), nor the operability/availability of the LRW Processing Subsystem (reference 3/4.11.1.3),.

and therefore, will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-192 NL-9+016, Unit 2 The proposed action is to reconfigure the present wiring scheme for'nveiter alternate supply to bypass the failed circuit board necessary for voltage regulation in the Computer UPS.This will eliminate the voltage regulating feature of the UPS.Once bypassed the failed board(s)will'be removed.'6ll6hlhRY:

No.Installation of this bypass to eliminate this feature exposes the system'to voltage fluctuations.

However, it is determined that for voltage swings within the plant's designed limits there will be no adverse effects on the system.Installation of this bypass will restore present unavailable backup power for'the plant's computer system thereby increasing their reliability.

Finally, as mentioned in FSAR 8.3.1.8 and 7.5.c, the affected systems while essential are not safety related.This change does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment related to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR..No This modification will restore the alternate supply of the Computer UPS (2D656)thereby improving its reliability.

FSAR 7.5(c)explains that those features provided by the DCS necessary to safety are provided with hardwired backup.In addition, these systems (PMS and DCS)are not Class 1E.The unregulated alternate supply per the plant's AC system design will still be adequate*to maintain the present UPS loads.Installation of this bypass does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously in the SAR.III No.The Computer UPS (2D656)is not mentioned in the Technical Specification.

Similarly DCS and PMS are not mentioned directly, however, the NSS computer provides data to RDAS which is used to calculate the core thermal lim'its every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.Loss of 2D656 will affect the NSS computer thereby pieventing calculation of the core thermal limits per T.S.3.2.1, 3.2.3, 3.2.4 and initiating a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO.The bypass installation will improve the reliability of the NSS computer'y making available the backup alternate supply for'2D656.Therefore, this change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specification.

95-1 93 C To prevent a turbine trip, the water level in the MS drain tanks shall be lowered 10 inches to accommodate the higher level transient associated with Power Uprate.Also, a check valve will be installed in the MS drain tank drain line of each loop to limit flashing during rapid reduction of unit power.No.The modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of any accident evaluated in the SAR, including FSAR Sections 6 and 15.The hardware relocations portion of the modification will provide the same functions and meet the same design basis for the MS drain tank level instrumentation.

Potential failure modes of the relocated level transmitters have not changed.This modification

'does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment, as previously'valuated in the SAR.The modification is relocating and recalibrating'xisting equipment, adding a new check valve, and rerouting condenser Area Cooling System ducting as required, while retaining the design bases of the original sy'tem.The modification does not increase the consequences of an accident since.the modification does not affect any safety functions.

This modification does not-increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment.

The modification does not affect any safety related equipment.

The only equipment malfunction that the MS drain tank level control system could'nitiate and the check valve could cause would be loss of level control of the'drain tank.The consequence of a level control system failure high is a turbine trip.The consequence of a level control system failure low is steam entry into the FW heaters.Neither failure would result in a radiation release and therefore there will be no change to the offsite dose to the public.II No.Potential failure modes of the relocated and recalibrated equipment are the same as those at the existing location.Failure of the relocated and recalibrated equipment would have the same effect on the system as failure of the equipment in its current location.Lowering the MS drain tank level approximately 10 inches has no adverse effect on the operation of the feedwater heaters and increases scram avoidance margin.III No.The Technical Specifications do not govern operation of the MS drain tank level instruments.

Therefore, this proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-194 The action involves issuing a setpoint change package that changes the Motor Operated Valve (MOV)allowable torque switch setting range as listed on the Motor Operated Valve Data Detail Drawing.No.The proposed action does not increase th'e probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety.The only equipment affected by this action is the motor operated valve assembly itself.The valve's function within the system does not change.Valve stroke time remains unaffected.

Therefore, the valve stringy~time still conforms to the stroke time requirements (as applicable as listed in 6t(R Table 6.2.12).II No.The action does not adversely affect the ability of the MOV to perform its design intended function, does riot affect the valve stroke time, does not:adversely affect.the MOV dynamic qualification, and does not affect any other equipment.

/Based upon the above, it is concluded that the proposed action does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for~any Technical Specification.

The proposed action does not affect MOV stroke time.The proposed action has no affect on system operation'and the valve design basis function is maintained.

NDAP-QA<23,"Station Pump Valve Testing Test Program," and NDAP-QA-412,"l.eak.Rate Test Program," referenced in the setpoint change package assure conformance to Technical Specification leakage requirements.95-195 C HPCI Valve HV-155F003 actuator will be modified by replacing the 80 ft-lb motor with a 60 ft-lb motor.No.The modification has no impact on the dynamic qualification of the MOV as discussed in Section 3.9.3.2b.2 of the FSAR since the actual accelerations at the valve during a dynamic event are less than the allowable accelerations.

The modifications will maintain the MOV design stroke time within the FSAR and Technical Specification limit of 50 seconds.The valve leakage criterion is not changed by this modification.

LLRT requirements of FSAR Section 6.2:6.3 and Table 6.2-22 will be maintained.

'I Changing HV-155F003 motor actuator will provide sufficient thrust to ensure the valve functions during all design conditions.

The valve's pressure retaining capability is maintained, the leakage characteristics are unaffected, and the stroke time remains within the design basis.The analysis described in FSAR Section 6.2.4 and 6.2.4.3.2.7 and FSAR Table 6.2-12 are still valid.No.The modification does not alter the'motor control center environmental or.seismic qualifications, does not decrease the available voltage at the motor terminals below the required level, does not affect the motor power supply system, and does not affect any other equipment in the HPCI or interfacing systems.'ased on the above and previous analyses, it is concluded that the proposed modification does not create the possibility for an accident'or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the SAR, III No.The modification does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the bases of any Technical Specifications.

Tech Spec bases 3/4.5.1, 3/4.6.1.1, 3/4.6.1.2 and 3/4.6.3 and 3/4.8.2 were reviewed for this evaluation (Emergency Core Cooling Systems, Primary Containment Integrity, Primary Containment Leakage, and,Primary Containment Isolation Valves, Electrical Power.Systems, DC Sources).95-196 The modification work includes replacing portions of the existing'fir'st, second, third and fourth extraction steam piping between the main turbine and closed feedwater heaters.KhlhL48E: No.FSAR Section 15.1.1 evaluates a decrease in core coolant temperature caused by loss of feedwater heating.The use of CORRONIX piping will not increase the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment.

Decrease in reactor coolant inventory is evaluated in FSAR Section 15.6.4 The consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment as discussed in FSAR Section 15.6.4 or 15.6.6 have not increased as a result of the use of CORRONIX for the extraction steam piping.Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety will not increase with the implementation of the planned modifications..

II No.The first, second, third, and fourth extraction piping systems do not perform a safety related function nor do they interface with safety equipment or systems.The proposed actions ensure piping integrity and enhance plant reliability.,Therefore, the planned extraction piping modifications do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.There is no Technical Specification section applicable to the Extraction Steam piping.'iping replacements will not impact system operations, The change in pipe material has no impact on the chemistry requirements for systems discussed in the Technical Specifications.

The more erosion/corrosion resistant piping material installed will provide a reduction.'in wear rates resulting in lower metal contributions in the feedwater system.Therefore, the planned modifications will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

95-1 97 This modification will install an Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS)keylock bypass switch on the Unit Operating Benchboard l(2)C651.The bypass switch will replace the need to install jumpers per Emergency Support Procedure ES-156(256)401, Bypassing RSCS Rod Block" to inhibit RSCS rod block for rod insertion only.No.FSAR Chapters 7 and 15 were reviewed.The proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident regardless of the operating conditions including the ATWS event.Compliance with all the applicable design and installation considerations along with detailing the purpose and intended use of the bypass switch in the applicable emergency response procedures assures that the proposed action doi;s not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety, as.previously evaluated in the SAR.This modification does not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.'he addition of the bypass switch and indication lights to the RSCS logic does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.A review of FSAR Sections 7 and 15 did not identify any postulated initiating event relative to the proposed action which would create the possibility for an accident of a different type.Misoperation of the RSCS Bypass switch or failure of the RSCS will not cause an accident of a different type.The RWM provides a backup to the RSCS in case of failure of misoperation to maintain rod block monitoring.

Plus, according to Technical Specification Section 3.1.4.1, if the RWM is out of-service a second operator will be present to monitor rod movement which ensures a backup to RSCS.The proposed action, bypassing the rod block function of RSCS, is only executed after an ATWS event has occurred.Therefore, these actions are only executed when the plant is in a configuration which is beyond the design basis.Ill No.The installation of the RSCS bypass switch does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

Operation of the RWCS Bypass switch will be permitted through entry into Emergency Operating Procedure EO-1 00(200)-113.

Emergency Operating Procedure EO-1 00(200)-1 13 specifies operator actions that should be carried out w'ith the plant in a configuration which is beyond the plant design basis.

95-1 98 Eight Scram Discharge Volume (SDV)vent line pipe supports require structural modifications.

These supports which exceed their design limits based on the new waterhammer loads are to be modified to increase their design capacities to insure that all SDV piping and pipe supports are maintained within their applicable Code design limits.No, The applicable design.basis accidents in the SAR which address the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV)piping of the Control Rod Drive (CRD)system affected by this modification are described in FSAR Sections: 1)15.4,"Reactivity and Power Distribution Anomalies, and 2)15A.6.5.3, Event Definition and Operational Safety Evaluations

.The specific evaluations are described in FSAR Sections: 1)4.6.2, Evaluations of the CRDS, 2)15.4.9,"Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA)".Proposed modifications neither alter CRD system function nor performance.

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction'of the equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR will not increase with the implementation of the planned modifications.

Il No.Planned modifications do not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.Breaching of the Scram Discharge Volume vent piping is not required.All work as planned is external to the piping system and will result in increasing supporting capacities of the previously installed components.

The proposed actions ensure piping and pipe support structural integrity and enhance Unit 1 reliability.

lll No.Technical Specification 3/4.1.3, Reactivity Control System-Control Rod Operability, is applicable to the Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain piping.Planned modifications restore applicable safety design margins by increasing pipe support hardware capacities.

in accordance with Code design requirements.

The planned modifications will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-199 This change will raise the setpoint of TSH-11206A/B to the new Residual'Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW)design temperature of 97'F.No.FSAR Sections 1.2, 2.4, 7.3, 9.2, and 15.2 were reviewed.The operator actions associated with the alarm response procedure AR-1'09401 will not change as a result of this SCP.The operator actions from AR-109%01 will be performed at 97 degrees F instead of 95 degrees F.This is acceptable since the affected equipment has been evaluated at the revised 97 degree F design temperature.

Therefore, since there are no changes in operator response to this alarm, the proposed SCP will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment, as previously evaluation in the FSAR.The instrument loops are non-safety and provide an alarm in the.control room if RHRSW inlet temperatures reach the design limit.The process setpoint of TSH 11206A/B are raised to be consistent with the revised design temperature limits.The switches and temperature elements will operate within their normal operating ranges.II No.,This setpoint change does not involve any hardware or system function changes.The TSH-11206A/B switch provides an alarm when the RHRSW design temperature has been reached.This setpoint change will allow the subject alarm to retain its function at the new RHRSW design temperature.

There are no automatic actions associated with this alarm response procedure and no operator actions required that could initiate any operational transients.

Therefore, this setpoint change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.Technical specifications related to RHRSW system include technical specifications

,3/4 7.1.1 and 7.1.3.The proposed setpoint change from 95 to 97'F is required to be consistent with the present function of this instrument and will thus maintain the margin of safety as defined in the basis of the above referenced technical specifications.

Since the margin of safety is maintained, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any.technical specification.95-200 d The proposed action is to revise off-normal Procedures ON-135(235}401 Loss of Fuel Pool Cooling/Coolant Inventory to prepare the plant for increasing temperatures and humidifies resulting from a loss of fuel pool cooling by: A)Securing the Reactor Building Recirculation Fans during Secondary Containment Isolations involving Zones I and/or II and 8)Opening the duct drains on the connecting ductwork to SGTS.I No.A review of FSAR Chapters 6 and 9 indicate that the proposed action will not increase the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety.Analysis has shown that'all equipment to plant safety will not be impacted by the proposed action.II No.A review of FSAR Chapters 6 and 9 indicate the proposed action will not create an accident or malfunction of a different'type.

The proposed action does not affect the reactor pressure coolant boundary, thus no accident of a different type can occur.The proposed action ensures all ECCS arid safety related systems perform their design functions.

III No.Technical Specification 3I4.6.5 requires that secondary containment integrity shall be maintained.

As previously discussed, with the recirculation fans off and drains on the ductwork connecting to SGTS open, Secondary Containment integrity can be maintained.

Thus, no reduction in the margin of safety will occur due to the proposed action.95-201 The proposed revision to EO-100/200-104, Secondary Containment Control, changes criteria for isolating secondary containment HVAC from Secondary Containment area radiation level exceeds the Maximum Normal Operating Radiation Level to'Reactor Building SPING release rate exceeds the Maximum Normal Level'.This change reduces the likelihood of having to isolate reactor building HVAC when the radioactivity release rate from Secondary Containment is still within the allowable limit.I No.The actions specified in EO-100/200-104 use existing plant equipment as it was intended to be used and are consistent'with the assumptions for the use of that equipment as described in the FSAR.The specified actions are intended to, and are capable of preserving the Secondary Containment function which is relied upon in the FSAR Safety Analyses.The actions comply with SSES Tech Spec requirements as described above, and finally, the specified actions are mitigative in nature, taken in response to abnormal Secondary Containment parameters which could only be expected to be experienced as a result of a severely degraded plant condition.

Therefore, the actions specified in EO-100/200-104 do not increase the probability'of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment as previously evaluated in the FSAR.No.The proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than has already been evaluated in the FSAR.As mentioned above, the actions specified in the EO-100/200-104 are mitigative in nature and are capable of preserving the Secondary Containment function.The manual control of ADS will introduce a plant transient which is less severe than the large break LOCA analyzed in Section 15.7 of the FSAR.(see FSAR Table 3.9-15).The actions specified to perform a manual reactor shutdown or scram also introduce transients which are within the bounds of FSAR Chapter 15 analyses.The actions specifying the use of HVAC and sump pump systems, and the verification of the proper operation of these HVAC and s'ump pump systems, operate these systems as they were intended to,be used, and cannot initiate an accident of a different type than has already been analyzed in the FSAR.III No.The actions specified in the proposed version of EO-100/200-104 allow compliance with existing SSES Technical Specifications in that the action statements associated with The Spec-3/4.3.2 (Isolation Instrumentation) and 3/4.11.2 (Radioactivity Release)are complied with.In addition, as mentioned above, the specified actions use plant equipment as it was intended to be used and as FSAR analyses have assumed.The transients introduced by the proposed use of plant equipment to initiate a reactor scram or RPV depressurization are bounded by existing FSAR Chapter 15 Accident Analysis for LOCA and scram-producing events.Therefore, because the implementation of EO-100/200-104 involves actions which use plant equipment as it was intended to be used, and in a manner which is consistent with the FSAR Assumptions and because the actions specified are consistent with the actions specified in the SSES Technical Specifications, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety in the basis of any plant Technical Specification.95-202 This modification provides an alternative method of power line conditio'ning.

A Conditioning Power Module rated for 75 KVA equivalent to the existing alternate source Computer UPS regulating capacity will be installed.

5UhihSIE;I No.The affected systems, as mentioned in FSAR Sections'7.5C and 8.31.8, while essential, are not safety related.No adverse system logic changes occur.The proposed action will have no functional impact on the design basis operation of the Computer UPS.No adverse impact to the Class 1E electrical supply system occurs.Moreover, this modification increases the reliability of the Computer UPS alternate power supply and will have no effect on any structure, system or component which performs a safety function.The proposed action does not involve a precursor of or a contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.The p'roposed changes does not adversely effect the operation of the Plant Computer System as mentioned in FSAR Section 7.5C.This modification can have no effect on the accidents that have radiological consequences.

No.This modification will restore the alternate supply of the Computer UPS (2D656), as mentioned in FSAR Section 8.3.1.8 to its original design basis configuration, thereby improving its reliability.

The new equipment per the existing plant's AC system design will still be adequate to maintain the present UPS loads.In addition, these system loads (PMS and DCS)are not-and do not influence any-Class 1E systems.Therefore, the proposed action'does not create a possibility'for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously in the SAR.III-No.The Computer UPS (2D656)is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

'However, loss of 2D656 could affect the NSS computer thereby preventing calculation of the core thermal limits.Resulting backup computer calculations would be done to maintain Technical Specification 3.2.1, 3.2.3, and 3,2.4 requirements and prevent a 24-hour LCO.The proposed action will improve the reliability of the NSS computer by providing a reliable alternate power supply for 2D656.The relocation of TSH-22260C will not impact the CO<System as delineated in Technical Specification 3.7.6.3 because no functional change occurs and it is not a Technical Specification device.No additional surveillance requirements are needed.Based on the above, the proposed change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the respective Technical Specifications.95-203 Install permanent ventilation seals at the reactor head piping penetrations in the Unit 1 refueling seal plate.This modification will provide an interim barrier until the dome covers are installed between Zones I and III during a refueling outage.No.The addition of permanent ventilation seals at the reactor head piping penetrations in the refueling seal plate will reduce the probability of cross tying Zones 1 and III during a refueling outage based.on the present configuration and the use of temporary seals.In addition, the proposed action will not affect any of the postulated initiating events identified in Chapters6 and 15 of the FSAR, the Design Assessment Report or NUREG%776.

II No.Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SARI Section 5.2.5 (5.2.5.1.2.4.1) of the FSAR, Chapters 6 and 15 of the FSAR, the Design Assessment Report and NUREGZ776 were reviewed to determine if the proposed action had the potential for creating a postulated initiating event which was not within the spectrum of events anticipated.

The review did not identify any postulated initiating event which would create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type thari previously evaluated in the SAR.III No.The requirements for the integrity.

of the Secondary Containment are addressed by Technical Specification 3/4.6.5.Section 4.5.1.c.3 provides the limits for.leakage from Zone I and Zone III during the refueling outage.Once the drywell airlock interlocks are removed, the drywell becomes part of Zone I.By adding the permanent ventilation seals to the refueling seal plate, no detectable additional leakage at the reactor head piping penetrations will occur during the reactor head piping removal and dome cover installation.

Therefore, the actions taken by modification will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

This change raises the process setpoint of the RCIC turbine electronic overspeed system to 5093 rpm to account for power uprate conditions.

The overspeed margin will remain at 10 percent above rated turbine rotor speed.No.Reviewed FSAR Sections 15.2.7.2.3, 15.2.9.3.2, 15.2.tI.3.2.1, 15.2.9.3.2.2, 15.2.9.3.2.3, 7.1.2a.1.18, and Tables 7.1-2, 7.1-3, and 7;1-9.Per GE SIL382, the electronic overspeed device is not required and only'provides a backup function'o the mechanical overspeed trip device.The electronic overspeed trip device does not provide a safety function, and the reliability of this device is not affected by the newly proposed setpoints.

This setpoint does not exceed the trip setpoint which was previously recommended in GE SIL 382.Civerspeed trip malfunction was not evaluated in the FSAR.Design analysis by GE confirms that the RCIC.pump will operate at the higher loads required by power uprate.Changing the electronic overspeed trip setpoint does not make failure more likely or affect the consequences in any manner.Therefore,'the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SARI II No.This process change'does not involve any hardware changes or changes to system functions.

The'uprate process setpoint compensates for increased RCIC turbine speed required to generate the increase in pump head at the uprate power level.The function and operability of the equipment is not altered by the setpoint change.The trip setpoint is within the recommended setting of GE SIL 382.This setpoint change does not,create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.~III No.A review of the technical specifications (specifically Section 3/4.3.5)confirmed that the RCIC electronic overspeed trip for the RCIC turbine.is not referenced.

Therefore, this setpoint change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification.95-205 This modification will install three new 4 manual gate valves to the 4 GBD-115 condensate/feedwater piping.No.This modification does not adversely affect the operation or function of the 4" GBD-115 condensate/feedwater piping and the modification will meet all the design requirements as specified in the SAR.The proposed action does not involve a precursor of or contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.Therefore, there.will be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.This modification will meet all the design criteria as specified in the SAR.The function and performance of the 4" GBD-115 condensate/feedwater drain piping will be enhanced by the addition of these manual gate valves due to the double isolation function they provide in conjunction with existing globe valve 106092, 106093, and 106132.The new manually operated gate valves will be located adjacent to the existing manually operated globe valves.Both valves (in each line)will be normally closed and both valves would require opening to drain the system.Based on the above, the proposed actions do not create a possibility'for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.ill No.Tlie piping and components affected by the actions taken in this modification are not.specifically addressed in the basis for any Unit1 Technical Specification.

This modification only provides enhancement to the isolation capabilities for (3)normally closed drain lines.Based on this and the fact that the modification meets all applicable design criteria as specified in the SAR, the proposed actions will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-206 Replace existing Appleton Baymaster 1000 watt incandescent high bay luminaries (61 per unit), located on the 818'levation of the Refuel Floor in the Reactor Building, with Appleton Baymaster 400 watt high pressure sodium (HPS)luminaries with integral ballast and replaces the remaining, existing Appleton Baymaster 1000 watt incandescent high bay luminaries on the Refueling Floor (5 per unit).No.FSAR Sections 8.3.1, AC Power Systems, and 15, Accident Analyses", were reviewed for previously evaluated'accidents.

No accidents were initiated, nor require the Lighting and Miscellaneous Distribution System for safe shutdown of the reactor, or mitigation of a design basis accident.The.Lighting and Miscellaneous Distribution System is not Safety related or'required for safe shutdown of the reactor, or mitigation'of a design basis accident.No accidents evaluated in the SAR involve the Lighting, Miscellaneous Distribution System or require its operability.

Therefore, these modifications will not increase probability of.occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously analyzed in the SAR.No.The electrical power lighting circuits, which remain unaltered, are installed as a non<lass 1E system and adhere to the electrical separation criteria (FSAR Section 3.12.3.4).Based upon the above, it is concluded.

that the proposed modifications do not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the SAR.III No.The modifications do not reduce the margin of safety defined in the bases of any Technical Specifications, since 1)the Technical Specifications do not address the non-Safety Related Lighting and Miscellaneous Distribution System 2).there are no impacts to any other Technical Specification systems.95-207 C~,U i C Modification of 13 Appendix R fire dampers with springs or larger springs to assume the dampers will fully close in response to a Ruskin 10CFR21 report.No.FSAR Section 9.4, 9.5, and 15.0 were reviewed to determine which accidents involved the Control Room Floor Cooling and the Computer Room Floor Cooling systems, Control Structure HVAC systems and the Fire Protection System.It was determined that these systems or the components within the systems do not cause or initiate any of the accidents or events described.

A review of FSAR Sections 15.6'nd 15.?and the corresponding section in the SER, revealed that fire dampers and access doors in the Control Structure ductwork in general are not relied upon to mitigate any plant accidents analyzed in the SAR.The fire dampers are important to safety.Replacement of springs does not reduce the capability of the fire dampers to perform their safety functions during.all safe shutdown events.The addition of access doors not reduce the capability of the affected duct sections to perform their safety function (i,e., remain intact)during all safe shutdown events.II No.The proposed'action does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than evaluated in the FSAR.The accidents of FSAR Section 9.4 were reviewed.No new operating modes are created for any system.The use of the same standard as the.existing springs for.design, material, and qualification ensures the function and integrity of the fire.dampers to perform as fire barriers with a fire resistance rating equivalent to the originals.

The use of the standard details for design and materials for the access doors ensures the function and integrity of the affected duct sections.Therefore the possibility of a different type of accident is not created.III No.I Technical Specifications 3/4,3.7, 3/4.3.7.9, 3/4.7.2, and 3/4.7.7 were reviewed.Also, the Technical Specification bases were reviewed for margins of safety applicable to the equipment affected by the modification.

The proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-208 This modification installs automatic high level alarms in the Batch Lube Oil Tank in conjunction with the existing LT-11901 instrument loop.No.The modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of the accidents described in FSAR Chapters 6 and 15 since there is no adverse impact on any plant equipment as a result of the proposed action.'he proposed action will have no functional impact on the design basis operation of the 1T119 oil level instrument loop.No adverse impact to any power distribution equipment occurs.Moreover, this modification increases the reliability during oil transfers and will have no effect on any structure, system, or component which performs a safety function.Therefore, there will be no increase in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR.The proposed action does not involve a precursor of or a contributor to any evaluated involving offsite dose.The proposed change does.robot adversely affect the function of the Lube Oil Transfer and Purification System nor can it degrade the operation of the Class 1E AC Power System as referenced in FSAR Section 8.3.1.3.This modification can have no effect on the accidents that have radiological or environmental consequences.

Therefore, there will be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR..No.The installation of 1T119 high level alarms cannot cause an environmental event since no direct connection to any oil transfer equipment or logic occurs.Moreover, the n'w installation provides a means of protecting the environment by alerting operators to overfill conditions thereby reducing the risk of an environmental accident.Therefore, the proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any pervasively in the SAR.III No.The Lube Oil Transfer and Purification System, is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

The proposed action provides level instrumentation that is not required for, and has no affect upon operation or shutdown of the unit or for mitigation of the consequences of an accident.'I Based on the above, the margin of safety for any Technical Specification is not reduced.95-209 This modification installs automatic high level alarms in the Batch Lube Oil Tank in conjunction with the existing LT-11901 instrument loop.No.The modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of the accidents described in FSAR Chapters 6 and 15 sihce there is no adverse impact on any plant equipment as a result of the proposed action.The proposed action will have.no functional

~impact on the design basis operation of the 1T119 oil level instrument loop.No adverse impact to any power distribution equipment occurs.Moreover, this modification increases the reliability during oil transfers and will have no effect on any structure, system, or component which performs a safety function.Therefore, there will be no increase in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR.The proposed action does not involve a precursor of or a contributor to any evaluated involving offsite dose.The proposed change does not adversely affect the function of the Lube Oil Transfer and Purification System nor can it degrade the operation of the Class 1E AC Power System as referenced in FSAR Section 8.3.1.3.This modification can have no effect on the accidents that have radiological or environmental consequences.

Therefore, there will be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR..No.The installation of 1T119 high level alarms cannot cause an environmental event since no direct connection to any oil transfer equipment or logic occurs.Moreover, the new installation provides a means of protecting the environment by alerting operators to overfill conditions thereby reducing the risk of an environmental accident.Therefore, the proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any pervasively in the SAR.III No.The Lube Oil Transfer and Purification System, is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

the proposed action provides level instrumentation that is not required for, and has no affect upon operation or shutdown of the unit or for mitigation of the consequences of an accident.Based on the above, the margin of safety for any Technical Specification is not reduced.95-210 The proposed action is a revision of OP-ORF%07, Underwater Fuel Inspection and Repair.Kh51hRY: No.Fuel handing and fuel pool criticality were reviewed against the Fuel Handling Accident given in PL-NF-94-002, Susquehanna SES Unit 2 Cycle 7 Reload Summary Report", April 1.994.The proposed repair of the bundle containing a failed tie rod does not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, while the bundle is being inspected, repaired, and stored in the fuel pool.I II No.The proposed removal and inspection of a failed tie rod and repair of the fuel bundle with a modified tie rod does not create any hazards other than those previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed procedure does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the SAR.No., Fuel inspections and repair are not precluded by or described in the Technical Specifications.

The proposed inspections will not reduce any margin of safety because (1)the equipment is designed to perform fuel inspections, (2}a minimum of seven feet of water shielding will be maintained above irradiated equipment, (3)the radiological consequences of fuel damage that could occur during the removal, inspection, and repair are less than those previously evaluated in the SAR, (4)the replacement of an enriched rod with a natural rod will not cause.the repaired bundle to exceed the enrichment criterion for fuel pool criticality, and (5)all fuel handling operations will be performed'in accordance with approved procedures for moving irradiated fuel~Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis of the.Technical Specification will not be reduced.95-211 sc The proposed change to NDAP+A-1104,"ARM Setpoint Changes, will allow non-Technical Specification Area Radiation Monitors (ARM')to have their high radiation (upscale)setpoints listed as"field set in the appropriate database.This will allow the upscale setpoints to be changed under the requirements of HP-TP-441.

No.The Area Radiation Monitoring System performs no safety or ope'rational function other than alarm and indication and directly interfaces with no other system other than its power source.The change of an ARM setpoint does not affect the ability of the ARM or any other equipment.

The consequences of an accident are not changed by the proposed action.There is.no direct affect on any other equipment that may be part of the accident initiation or mitigation.

Also, the function of the ARM system is not changed by this action.The consequences of, equipment malfunction are not affected by a setpoint change.The area radiation monitoring system does not directly affect any automatic function and this change only enhances the administrative process associated with changing an ARM setpoint.Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.The area radiation monitoring system does not perform an active function other than alarm and indication.

This setpoint change does not change the physical configuration of the system in any way.As such, it does not affect the'potential of the system to be an accident initiator.

A review of FSAR Chapter 15 and associated documentation indicates that area radiation monitoring is not a potential accident initiator.

III No.A review of the Technical Specifications indicates that the only Area Monitors covered are those that are criticality monitors (ref.Table 3.3.7.1-1).

None of the channels encompassed by this procedure change are criticality monitors.Also;as pointed out above, this system does not provide direct support for any other system including those covered by the Technical Specification.

As a result, this change does not affect the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.95-212 ocp*,u i This modification will install a 6 diameter penetration through the Unit 1 Turbine Building West exterior concrete wall between column lines 16 and 17 at approximately 7'-6 above Elev.676'-0" to provide more direct and safer access to the Unit 1 condenser area for Hydrolazer activities.

Q/hfhSIE: I No.FSAR Chapter 6,'Engineered Safety Features and FSAR Chapter 13,"Accident Analysis have been reviewed.There are no engineered safety features or accident scenarios that would be impacted by the actions taken per this modification.

This modification will conform to all the design criteria as specified per the SAR, thus the structural integrity of the, Unit 1 Turbine Building concrete wall, in which the new penetration will be installed, will be assured.The new penetration will meet the design and shielding requirements as specified in the SAR.Since the nevr penetration will be properly sealed during normal full power operations of the plant in which the radiation levels are the highest in the condenser area, this modification to the Turbine Building wall will not increase the radiation exposure to plant operating personnel or the general public.II.No.Following the implementation of this modification both the structural integrity and quality of shielding protection for the Turbine Building wall will be maintained in accordance with the requirements and guidelines provided in the SAR.~Based on the above, this modification will not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different typ'e than any evaluated previously in the SAR.Ill No.This modification represents an equivalent condition to the existing condition in that both the structural integrity and the quality of radiation protection of the Unit 1 Turbine Building wall has been maintained.

None of the parameters that are the basis for the Unit 1 Technical Specifications will be affected by this modification.

Based on the above, this modification'will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification.95-213 The process setpoint for reactor steam dome ATWS-RPT high'pressure switches PS B21 1N045A,B,C,D will be increased from 1108 psig to 1123 psig for power uprate conditions due to Power Uprate.No.The ATWS-RPT trip instrumentation is described in FSAR Section 7.1.2a.1.30, and associated accident scenarios are discussed in FSAR Section 15.8 and Appendix 15A.II No, Since, for the analyzed events, the associated Technical Specifications trip setpoints and allowable value remain unchanged and the safety function of the switches remains unchariged, this setpoint change does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.Since, for the analyzed events, the associated Technical Specifications trip setpoint and allowable value remain unchanged and the safety function of the switches remains unchanged, this setpoint change does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR.Since, for the analyzed events, the associated Technical Specifications trip setpoint and allowable value remain unchanged and the safety function of the switches remains unchanged, this setpoint change does not create the possibility of.a malfunction of equipment of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR.III No.The Technical Specification Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value for the reactor steam dome pressure for ATWS-RPT are'iven in Table 3.3.4.1-2 of the Technical Specifications.

It should be noted that the ATWS-ARI function is not part of the plant technical specifications.

The existing Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value are 1135 psig and 1150 psig, respectively.

The Trip Setpoint of 1135 psig and Allowable Value of 1150 psig remain unchanged by Setpoint Change Package j94-2042.Therefore, since the Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value for PS B21 1N045A,B,C,D remain unchanged, and since there are no adverse effects on safety functions as a result of this setpoint change, this SCP does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-214 Increase the high pressure alarm setpoint for switch PSH C32 1K636 to 1050 psig based on Power Uprate conditions.

The alarm shall warn the operator that reactor pressure is increasing and approaching the scram setpoint.No.FSAR Sections 7.2, 7.5, 7.7, 10.3 and 15.2 were reviewd.The Reactor Protection System is described in FSAR Section 7.2.Reactor scram on high reactor pressure is also discussed in FSAR Section 15.2 The only events for which the high reactor pressure scram is relied upon are Pressure Controller Failure-Closed (FSAR Section 15.2.1)and Turbine Trip at Low Power with Failure of Bypass (FSAR Section 15.2.3.2.2.3).

However, the reactor pressure alarm is not considered for this FSAR evaluation.

Switch PSH C32 1K636'is non-safety and only provides an alarm on high'reactor dome pressure.Since the instrument loop is non-safety, only provides a warning alarm for high reactor dome pressure, and the equipment operates within its design capability at the increased pressure, this setpoint change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident of a malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.No.This setpoint change does not involve any hardware or system function changes.The power uprate setpoint provides an alarm which warns the operator that reactor dome pressure is increasing and approaching the reactor scram setpoint.This revised process setpoint affects a non-safety instrument loop, and the function of the devices is not changed.The possibility of a different type of accident, not previously analyzed, is not applicable.

Therefore, this modification does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.The revised process setpoint affects a non-safey instrument loop.The operability of the devices is not affected.There is no possibility of a.different type of malfunction due to this setpoint change.Therefore, this modification does not create the possibility for a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.III No.A review of the Technical Specifications confirms that the reactor pressure vessel alarm setpoint for PSH C32 1K636 is not required to enforce any Technical Specifications.

Therefore, this setpoint change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-215 icPI Revise the two setpoints for the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM)Steam Flow Interlock and Alarm flow switch FSL-C32-1K608 according to General Electric Report,"General Electric Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Setpoints for Power Uprate," GE-NE-901-0264592, Section 2, dated 7/10/92, for the related loop, as revised in GE Letter SPU-9399, dated December 1, 1993.No.FSAR Sections 4.1.3, 4.1.6, 1.2.6, 7.1, 7.2, 7.6, 7.7 and Chapter 15 2 were reviewed.Increasing the setpoints of FSL-C32-1K608, RWM Steam Flow Interlock and Alarm does not add or change any components whose failure would initiate an accident or which would be used prior to an accident.Increasing the setpoint of FSL-C32-1K608, RWM Steam Flow Interlock and Alarm does not change the function or performance of the RWM or Steam Flow Totalizing systems.These are not required to mitigate an accident.Increasing the setpoints of FSL-C32-1K608, RWM Steam Flow Interlock and'Alarm does not add or change any components whose failure'would initiate an accident or which would be used prior to an accident.The RWM and Steam Flow Totalizing systems'are not required to mitigate an accident.Therefore, it does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment as previously evaluated in the FSAR with regard to radiological consequences or the health and safety of the public.No.Increasing the setpoints of FSL-C32-1K608, RWM Steam Flow Interlock and.Alarm does not change the function or performance of the instrument and this system is not used in an accident.Further, the increases of the setpoints remain within the acceptable operating range.of the switch.Therefore, it does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type or the possibility for malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.III No., Plant Technical Specification Sections 3.1.4.1 and 4.1.4.1 of Unit 1 state that the RWM must be operable in operational conditions 1 and 2 when thermal po~er is less than or equal to 20%of rated.The minimum allowable low power setpoint is 20%of rated thermal power.The setpoint was established to protect against exceeding the analytical limit of 20%power as referenced in the above Technical Specifications.

Since the new'setpoint is in compliance with the Technical Specifications, the proposed action will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.95-216 This changes the setpoints of the process non-technical specification'setpoints for the Rod Block.Monitor (RBM), Channels A and B, for both single and two loop reactor recirculation operation for Power Uprate.I No.The rod block monitor and associated setpoints'are described in FSAR Section 7.7.1:11.The rod block monitor does not perform any safety function and is not required for the safe shutdown of the plant per Section 7.7 of the FSAR.This setpoint change does not change the function of the RBM.This setpoint change does not represent a change from current limits.'Based on the above, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the'consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.ll No.Ill No.Since the proposed action is required to ensure all rod block monitor trip setpoints are consistent with the cycle specific control rod withdrawal error analysis and since the proposed action will not change the function of the RBM and any other plant equipment, this setpoint change does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.r The technical specifications applicable to the, RBM include technical specification 3.3.6, Table 3.3.6-2, technical specification 3.4.1.1.2.5.a, and bases 3/4.4.1.These technical specification apply to the RBM trip setpoints which have been evaluated and justified by the technical specifications changes, safety assessment and Significant Hazards Considerations evaluation included in the proposed Licensing Amendment No.168 prepared for Unit 1 for Power Uprate.Therefore, these technical specification setpoints do not need further evaluation and are not considered part of this Safety Evaluation Report.The RBM setpoints evaluated by this Safety Evaluation Report are the non-technical specification related setpoints that were revised to maintain operating margin from the revised technical specification setpoints.

However, since these setpoints are not technical specification related, the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specifications is not reduced.95-217 To eliminate the solenoid actuator damage, this modification will install two replacement solenoid mounting brackets welded to the safety break frame, two small hydraulic shock absorbers, a new style end plate with a shock pad, and a replacement safety brake cover with a window for safe viewing on'the refueling platforms'ain hoists.I No.FSAR Section 9.1.4, Table 9.1.6A, 9.1.6B, Sections 3.2-1 and 15.7.4 have been reviewed.Dropping of a fuel assembly onto the reactor core by the refueling platform is an analyzed condition as outlined in Section 15.7.4"Fuel Handling Accident.The normal main hoist motor brake will remain unchanged; however, the safety brake improvements will increase the overall reliability of the braking system to control the rate of vertical movement of fuel.This modification does not adversely affect or change the design function of the'refueling bridge main h'oist and will comply with all the design requirements as specified in the SAR.The proposed modification does not involve a precursor of or contribu'tor to any evaluated accidents involving off-site dose.Therefore, there will be no increase in the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.The proposed modification will not result in the loss of safety brake function.The proposed improvements will help to decrease the damage and problems associated with the present configuration that have faced SSES and other plants...This modification will meet all the design basis criteria as specified in the SAR.Based on the above, the proposed modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.III No.Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specification 3/4.9.6 provides surveillance requirements for.the refueling bridge/platform to demonstrate that it is operable prior to its use.Although verification of Safety Brake operation is not a Tech Spec required surveillance, the proposed modification will increase the brake system reliability (thereby increasing the margin of safety)in controlling fuel movement and preventing fuel drop accidents.

Based on the above, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-218 This modification accomplishes the necessary installation, connections, and testing to establish functionality of the Local Area Network (LAN's)and LAN backbone interconnections in the Power Blocks.Rlh5$fE;I No.The LAN does not interact physically nor functionally with equipment important to safety.There is no LAN equipment installed in primary containment, Interconnections between the LAN equipment locations are by nonconducting optical fiber.The FSAR was revised, particularly the accidents described in Chapter 15.The system does.not affect accident prevention, detection, mitigation, supporting systems, and does not'create any additional consequential threats to mitigation.

Therefore, the modification does not increase the probability of an accident evaluated in the FSAR.The modification does not increase the consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR.The modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety..The modification does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.II No.The equipment.

housing are standard Hoffman boxes mounted in as part of modification 94-3016A with supports designed to accommodate the specified weight limits.The heat loads also have substantial margin before reaching limits requiring formal evaluation.

There.are no fluids contained within nor connected to the LAN equipment.

Non'-conducting optical fibers'interconnect the equipment housings.The only energy source within the box is the supplied 120 VAC which is installed with standard plant methods, and is supplied via circuit breakers.Functionally, the LAN provides a communications system which is not required for any plant safety response.Therefore, the modification does not create the possibility for an accident of a different type that any previously evaluated in the FSAR.The modification does i1ot create the possibility for a malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.III No.The modification installs a new communications system.The system does not physically interact with systems required for the safe operation of the plant."fhe heat loads added at each location are less than 300 watts and are well'within allowable values.The electrical supply is from non-Class lE lighting panels, power panels, or, in two cases', a security 120 VAC distribution panel.The units are seismically mounted in seismic buildings.

The new system is not a Tech Spec system nor does it perform'ny function important to safety.Therefore, the proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification.95-219 Demonstration that Power Uprate test plan changes do not represent unreviewed safety questions for Test 11-LPRM Calibration, Test 12-APRM Calibration, Test 22-Pressure Regulator, Test 23-Feedwater System, Water Level Setpoint, Test 24-Turbine Valve Surveillance, and Test 49-Main Steam Line'Radiation Monitor.'No.FSAR Section 14.2.12.6 was reviewed for each test.The objectives of each test are still met.Therefore this change does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.The Unit 2 Power Uprate Test Program did not alter the objectives of the tests as descrbed in Chapter 14 of the FSAR.All the changes were made to avoid areas of instability, avoid exceeding the licensed power level, and avoid spurious scrams.'The changes conformed to all Technical Specifications in effect at the time the tests were conducted.

Therefore the changes to the test program did not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.III No.The changes identified above conform strictly to the post power uprate Technical Specifications.

All the changes to the test program were made to insure that there was adequate margin between plant operating parameters and Technical Specification limits.It can thus be concluded that the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was never reduced.95-220 This modification will install a Cheng Rotation Vane (CRV)in the discharge head of River Water Makeup (RWMU)pumps OP503A, CBD to suppress destructive flow abnormalities that create undue wear on the impeller shaft bearings, thus necessitating numerous pump reworks.I No.The River Water Makeup System, in particular'umps OP503A, C and D, serves no safety related function.The only connection RWM pumps OP503A, C and D have with safety related systems or components is as one source of makeup water supply to the spray pond.FSAR Section 9.2.7, Ultimate Heat Sink, Subsection 9.2.7.1, states,"The ultimate heat sink is capable of providing sufficient cooling water without makeup to the spray pond for at least 30 days...".FSAR Chapters 6 and 15 have been reviewed in relation to this modification, and based on the above, the proposed actions do not increase the probability of occurrence or the.consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to'safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.This modification will only enhance the'performance of the RWMU pumps OP503A, C and D by eliminating or reducing pump discharge flow abnormalities, thereby minimizing pump maintenance on the shaft bearings.The modification will ensure that RWMU pumps OP503A, C and D are more reliable components and can perform their design functions as a source of makeup water to the spray pond.Based on this, and the fact that the River Water Makeup pumps are not dedicated to help during plant emergency situations, the proposed'action of this modification does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.III No.The bases for all potentially affected Technical Specifications, including 3/4.4.9, 3/4.7.1, 3/4.7.2 and in particular 3/4.7.3, have been reviewed, and do not address the River Water Makeup System nor the RWMU pumps.This modification shall enhance the performance and reliability'of the RWMU pumps by preventing the fluid separation at the discharge elbow that leads.to turbulent flow and excessive stress on the shaft bearings.Consequently, the addition of a CRV to the discharge heat of RWMU pumps OP503A, C and D will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.95-221 OC 5 I I I ,U i d Installs permanent Supplemental Decay Meat Removal (SDHR)piping with an alternate Service Water Process Radiation Detector and Rx Bldg.Chilled Water piping that will connect to temporary cooling units located outside the Rx Bldg.S/hihlhfE:

No.The proposed actions do not increase th'e probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR, The new piping, valves, supports, insulation, wall attachments and penetrations, radiation detector, preamplifier, and cabling are not initiators of any accidents evaluated in the SAR, other than postulated moderate energy pipe cracks (FSAR 3.6)which were found acceptable.

The modifications have a negligible effect on the Service Water and the Fuel Pool Cooling a'nd Cleanup response to the Normal and Hydrodynamic Loads.The Class 1E power supply is adequately isolated from the non-safety related radiation monitoring equipment and physical damage to the new cabling will not adversely'impact existing Class 1E cables in common raceway.The Rx Bldg.Ventilation Zones are unaffected by this modification and the Secondary Containment safety related functions of maintaining a radioactive barrier and a negative pressure of.25" wg are assured.These modifications have no effect on the Rx.Bldg.structural, radiation and fire barrier functions.

The radiological analyses included in FSAR Appendix 9A, 15.6.2, 15.6.5, and,15.7.4 are not affected.II No.The proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.The new piping has been designed for all Normal and Hydrodynamic Loads.The Class 1E power supply is properly isolated from the new radiation detection equipment and there are no new cable faults which can damage affiliated Class 1E cables.The failure of the portable non-safety cooling equipment could drain the SDHR or the Rx Bldg.Chilled Water piping;however, no new malfunctions of equipment important to safety are created.No.The proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

DCPs 94-3057/3058 maintain the margin of safety in Tech Specs 3/4.3.7&3/4.11.1 by adding a second process radiation detector and preamplifier in the discharge of the common 12 SDHR piping which duplicates the function of the presently installed detector and preamplifier during SDHR.use.DCPs 94-3053/3054 maintain the margin of safety in Tech Specs 3/4.6.5 8 5.2.3 by requiring all Rx.Bldg.penetrations to be appropriately sealed, ensuring that the three Rx.Bldg.Ventilation Zones are preserved.

The new penetrations in the Rx.Bldg.walls are sealed with a material and depth that ensures that the 3-Hour Fire Barrier is reestablished (Tech Specs 3/4.7.?).95-222 The proposed action will provide a Refuel Floor Wetlife System consisting o'f three subsystems,'.e., Watertight Hook Box for Steam Dryer/Steam Separator Strongback/Sling Assembly, MSL Plugs including MSL Plugs Restraint Ring and MSL Plugs I/R Tool and Rigid Pole Handling System.No.Currently, there are no accidents or malfunctions in the FSAR that are specifically related to the disassembly and reassembly of the RPV or the Refuel Floor Wetlift System.However, there are accidents evaluated in the FSAR concerning load drops over fuel.The specific event analyzed in the FSAR covering objects falling onto the fuel is the fuel handling accident described in Section 15.7.4.The Watertight Hook Box has been designed to meet the requirements of NUREC 0612 and PPAL's Heavy Loads Program.Evaluation of Watertight Hook Box's additional weight for load drops has been evaluated.

The proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident ot malfunction of.equipment important to safety.No.The only accident or malfunction that could result by the.use of the Watertight Hook Box would be a heavy load drop of the Steam Dryer or Steam Separator.

Heavy load drop heights and load paths for the Steam Dryer and Steam Separator have not been impacted by the proposed action.The drop heights are lower than.those pieviously evaluated and the load paths are the same, therefore, the potential for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR does not exist.Ill No.The Technical Specifications do not address the use of the Reactor Building Cranes with a Watertight Hook Box for Refuel Floor Wetlift System or other activities involved with the disassembly and reassembly of the RPV.Technical Specification Sections 3/4.9.8 and 3/4/9.9 address the water levels in the Reactor Cavity and Spent Fuel Storage Pools which are required to be 22 feet over the top of the RPV flange and 22 feet over the tope of spent fuel assemblies.

Makeup capability is available to maintain the required water level in the event the Steam Dryer or Steam Separator drops and penetrates the liner of the Equipment Storage Pool as postulated in the heavy loads drop analysis.The proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-223 This change installs cables and raceway for 1)the future replacement

'of existing computer systems with Plant Integrated Computer System Replacement (PICSY)and 2)a new Local Area Network (LAN).This change includes installation of cables in the Reactor, Turbine, and Radwaste Buildings, and the Control Structure.

No.Chapters, 3, 7, 8, 9, 15 and 18 of the FSAR, the Design Assessment Report, the current Reload Analysis and NUREGC776 were reviewed.The addition of LAN and PICSY Cables does not affect any of the postulated initiating events identified in Chapters 3, 7, 8, 9, 15, and 18 of the FSAR, the Design Assessment Report, the current Reload Analysis and NUREG-0776.

Therefore, the cable, raceways, and equipment housings installed does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.The possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be created.The cables installed do not create the potential for any type of accident since they are installed in accordance with plant specific procedures.

The cable installation'does not affect the'plant computer or any other system: The equipment housings and patch panels are seismically mounted in seismic buildings.

Potential issues of safety impact, combustible loading, Appendix R, fire detection and suppression, and electrical separation have been addressed in the design.Therefore, the cable and equipment housings do not create the pos'sibility of a malfunction of a different type.III No Based upon review of the Technical Specifications, their implied bases, the FSAR and NUREG 0776, Safety Evaluation for SSES, including Supplements 1 through 7, the addition of LAN and PICSY cables do not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-224 TP->>, The purpose of TP-264-021 is to gather data while operating the reactor recirculation pumps above speeds of 1515 RPM.I No.Licensing Topical Report NE<92-001 and GE SIL 551 were reviewed, Based on this review it can be concluded that that performance of TP-26~21 will not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR or Licensing Topical Report NE<92-001.

II No.TP-264-21 returns Vnit,2 to increased core flow conditions.

These conditions are the same conditions described in Licensing Topical Report NE<92%01 which was reviewed and approved by the NRC.The worst possible outcome of performing TP-264-021 is the development of a leak inside containment.

The Susquehanna units are designed to collect, detect, and measure unidentified leakage in the containment.

The description of the installed leakage detection'systems and the plants response to a leak is described and analyzed in Section 5.2.2 (Detection of Leakage Through Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary)of the FSAR.Therefore it can be co'ncluded that the performance of TP-264-021 does not create the possibility for , an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR oi Licensing Topical Report NE-092%01.

III No.TP-264-021 does not deviate from any of the conditions previously reviewed 4y the NRC;therefore the Technical Specifications, as modified by Amendment 103, bound operation as directed TP-264-021 and therefore the margin of safety is unchanged.

The subject test procedure adds conservative administrative controls and additional data gathering requirements when operating at core flows greater than 100 Mlb/hr.Therefore, the performance of TP;264-021 does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

~95-225 C.U This modification will eliminate a loop seal in the stator cooling water storage tank vent in order to provide a free flow design and maintain ideal oxygen levels in the stator cooling water, which will reduce corrosion of the stator windings.I No.The proposed modification only affects components in the Stator Cooling System.The Stator Cooling System does not perform any safety functions required to prevent or mitigate the consequences of abnormal operational transients or accidents.

Therefore, the proposed action does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluation in the SAR.ll No.The proposed modification does not alter the design basis, the function, nor the operation of the nonaafety related Stator Cooling System.Therefore, the proposed modification does not.create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.III No.The proposed modifi'cation does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of the Stator Cooling System or any plant system governed by the Technical Specifications, specifically Section 3/4.8, Electrical Power Systems.None of the parameters that are the bases for the Technical Specifications will be adversely impacted by the modification.

Therefore, the actions taken by the proposed modification will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the'basis for any Technical Specification.95-226 NL-94015, Units 1 and 2 Changes the HPCI and RCIC pumproom cooler inlet temperature setp'oints to agree with the room ambient setpoints.

I No.The FSAR does not specifically analyze the small leaks on which the temperature setpoints are based.Other accidents which result in coolant leakage outside containment are analyzed in FSAR Sections 15.6.2 (Instrument Line Break)and 15.6.4 (Steam System Piping Break Outside Containment)

~Both of these are assumed accidents with no causes identified.

The analysis in Section 15.6.4 is the enveloping evaluation for pipe breaks outside containment.

The proposed 25 gpm leakage rate basis is well below the leakage corresponding to a catastrophic pipe failure for the applicable system piping and does not significantly increase the risk of a break.II No.'The proposed setpoint change does not affect any systems other than the HPCI and RCIC steam leak detection systems and does not affect the ability to detect and isolate leakage.Although a 25 gpm leak is not specifically analyzed in the FSAR, it is bounded by the analysis in Chapter 15.6.4.Therefore, the proposed setpoint change does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously analyzed in the FSAR.No.The temperature switches and setpoints are listed in Technical Specification 3.3.2"Isolation Actuation Instrumentation" but the Technical Specification Bases do not discuss the setpoint basis with respect to leakage rate, process conditions, or time to detection.

The proposed setpoint change affects only the process setpoint, not the Allowable Value or Trip Setpoint listed in the Technical Specifications.95-227 Modify and replace the existing components of the Taprogge Type HE<CTCS ball strainer sections with Taprogge Type MF design strainers to improve condenser performance and gross electrical output.SJlHhfBRY:

No.FSAR Sections 8.3.1, 10A.5 and 15 were'reviewed for previously evaluated accidents.

No accidents were initiated by, nor require the CW or CTCS systems for safe shutdown of the reactor, or mitigation of a design basis accident.The CW and CTCS systems are not safety related or required for safe shutdown of the reactor, or mitigation of a design basis accident.The worst case malfunction of equipment that can be postulated is the failure of the CTCS strainer sections.These modifications provide strengthened CTCS strainer sections and therefore thi's potential is reduced.None of the items of the CTCS equipment are safety related.Therefore, these modifications will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously analyzed in the SAR.h II No.-As a result of the review of the FSAR sections referenced, no new accidents or malfunctions of equipment important to safety are postulated as a result of this modification.

Based upon the above, it is concluded that the proposed modifications do not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the SAR.III No.The modifications do not reduce the margin of safety defined in the bases of any Technical Specifications since 1}the Tethnical Specifications do not address the non safety related, CW and CTCS systems and 2)there are no impacts to any other Technical Specification systems.95-228 DCP 94-9090 This design change will replace the Zener diodes in the Feedwater Control System with conventional diodes with an 800 Vdc peak inverse voltage.The diodes (reverse biased}in parallel with the relays, will perform to prevent arc suppression by allowing the stored energy in the relays to circulate through the relays at contact opening.No.The diode replacement does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, as previously evaluated in the SAR.The Feedwater Control System is not considered as safety related equipment.

The proposed design change will increase the reliability of the Feedwater Control System, by preventing a plant condition (battery in the equalize mode)which could'lead to an erroneous fe'edwater flow signal which could leak to a transient.

The probability of occurrence of the transient evaluated in FSAR Section 15.1.2, level transients during normal operating conditions, spurious turbine trips, and.any challenges to safety systems from spurious Level 8 trips are reduced;Conditions resulting in the diodes creating a short or open circuit have been evaluated, and found not to have safety implications.

No.The proposed action does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.The proposed change is a component replacement, The existing Zener diodes will be replaced with conventional diodes, meeting the original design intent for arc suppression.

III No.The proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

The Technical Specifications mention.the main turbine trip input from the Feedwater Control System in Section 3/4.3.9 and Table 3.3.9-1.By replacing the diodes, increasing the reliability of the high level circuitry, we will ensure that the Technical Specification requirement is not violated by a failure of the diode.95-229 Installation of a flow sensor to measure cooling tower blowdown water flow discharge to the river.No..Sections 10.4.5, 11.2.6, 11.5 and Chapter 15 of the FSAR were reviewed.Adding a'ew measurement of total water flow discharge to the river for use in the LRW discharge valve logic does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident as previously evaluated jn the FSAR because the modification does not add or change any components whose failure would initiate an accident.Adding a new measurement of total water flow discharge to the river for use in the LRW discharge valve logic does not increase the consequences of an accident as previously evaluated in the FSAR with regard to radiological consequences or the'ealth and safety of the public because the modification does not change the function or performance o'f the liquid radwaste system.Adding a new Cooling Tow'er Blowdown Composite Sampler Interface Enclosure to provide'sa'mple taps, returns, and electrical interface for a portable composite sampler does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident as previously evaluated in the FSAR because the modification does not add or change any components whose failure would initiate an accident.II No.Adding the new enclosure does not increase the consequences of.an accident as previously evaluated in the FSAR with regard to radiological consequences or the health and safety of the public because the modification does not change the function or performance of the liquid radwaste system.The modifications due not change the function or performance of the LRW.Failure of the modifier would only result i'n loss of liquid radwaste Aow recording.

Therefore, the proposed action does not create a possibility for an accident or'alfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.Tech.Specs.3.3.7.10, 4.3.7.10, 3.11.1.1, 4.11.1.1, 3.11.1.2, 4.11.1.2, 3.11.1.3, 4.11.1.3.1, 4.11.1.3.2 and 3.12.1 were reviewed.This modification does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the basis for any Tech.Spec.95-230 This change controls the replacement of existing reactor vessel instrumentation condensing chambers XY-B21-1D004A and B, respectively.

The new chambers have been modified with an outlet for an additional vent, piped to the instrument variable leg, The vent allows for removal of nonwondensable gases from the condensing chamber.SURlhlhlUQ No.FSAR Section 15.6.2'Instrument Line Breaks states that it is less severe and therefore bounded by FSAR Section 15.6.5'Loss of Coolant Inventory.Loss of coolant inventory is assumed at worse case of double ended break of the largest line while at normal plant operating temperature, pressure and flow.In plant Condition 5, the reactor is at 0 psig (except for hydrostatic load due to water level), at approximately 110'F vs 540'F, and'no flow.In Condition 5, the probability of an accident is extremely low.Additionally, FSAR Section 6.3.1.1 states that ECCS is to provide for any primary line break up to and including, the doubled ended break for the largest line.During this test, the worst case leak would be the plug dislodging, which is less severe than either accidents described in the FSAR due to being in Condition 5.If a plug was to dislodge, the available loop of Core Spray and ESW will be sufficient to provide makeup.FSAR Section 9.1.2 discusses the potential draining of the spent fuel pool through failed fuel pool gates.The fuel racks and the contained fuel will remain covered with water.Section 15.0.3.2.1.1 states that transient and accident scenarios should consider an initiating event comprised of operator error equipment failure.Since the plug will not be subjected to any pressure except head pressure from cavity level, which will maintain plug in nozzle, the'robability of nozzle falling into vessel or core is minimal.The plugs will be tied off with a lanyard to prevent plug from falling into the reactor vessel.If the plugs'were to fall into vessel, no core/fuel damage will occur since the plug weight (approx 5 lbs.)is bounded by fuel drop accident.Therefore, this TP does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously described i'n the SAR.The only accident or malfunction that could occur would be the failure of nozzle plugs to cause draining of the reactor vessel/cavity and spent fuel pool.This event is described in FSAR Sections 6.3.1, 16.6 and even 9.1.2, which results in maintaining the spent fuel pool racks and spent fuel covered with water, even without makeup.Since the calculated leakage of 55 gpm is well within the available makeup capability (one loop of Core Spray or two loops of ESW via Unit 1 ESW and/or Unit 2 ESW through Spent Fuel Pool Crosstie via Cask Storage Pit), water level can be maintained at 22 feet above the racks and fuel.Therefore, a reactor vessel/draindown event with refuel gates removed would not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.III No.Technical Specification 3.9.8 requires at least 22 feet over top of RPV flange during handling of irradiated fuel assemblies or when irradiated fuel assemblies are seated in the RPV, both while in Condition 5.Technical Specification 3.9.9 requires at least 22 feet over irradiated spent fuel in the fuel pool.The basis for these Tech Specs is to ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99%of the assumed 10%iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly.This minimum watei depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis".

Therefore, this TP does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

0 95-231 Installs new supports to Unit 1 and adds bracing to existing supports for the skimmer surge tank makeup lines between the skimmer surge tanks and the makeup stations on both Units 1 and 2, I No.The modifications do not affect safety related equipment or systems.It therefore does not affect the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated in the FSAR.No.The modifications do not affect safety related equipment or systems.It does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type previously evaluated in the FSAR.The modifications enhance the structural capability of the subject lines such that their integrity is not compromised by a design basis seismic event.III No.Technical Specifications do not address fuel pool makeup during normal operation.

Technical Specifications do address minimum required fuel pool level.The minimum required fuel pool level as defined in Technical Specification 3/4.9.9 requires 22 feet of water above the irradiated fuel assemblies (elevation 816').This.minimum required fuel pool level is below, the fuel pool skimmer weir plate elevation of 817'/2" (SEA-ME-418 Revision 0).Therefore, the skimmer surge tank and connections thereto do not affect the minimum required fuel pool level requirements in Technical Specifications.

The modification does not affect the margin of safety as defined in Technical Specifications.95-232 DCP 93-9070, Unit 1 This modification will provide studs, grating clips, and floor grating and support steel to replace Elevation 738 floor grating around the 151F060B valve in the Unit 1 Primary Containment.

SJhQdhfE: I No.The floor grating addressed by this modification is'part of the Primary Containment System, Ref.FSAR Sections 3.1.2.2.7, 3.8.3.1.5, and 3.6 and DAR Sections 1A.1.2 8 6.1.1.The grating and grating supports do not serve any safety related function but must be adequately restrained to withstand certain transients to prevent them from becoming"missiles" and damaging safety related components in the area.The modification will assure that all work on the affected grating will conform to all original plant design and construction codes and thereby prevent the possibility of the proposed action from increasing the probability of occurrence.

or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR.II No.The proposed modification will meet all the design basis criteria as specified in the SAR.The affected grating and grating supports will be designed and installed per the original requirements of existing rating in Primary Containment and is thereby bounded by any existing accident and malfunction analysis and/or evaluations.

Therefore, the proposed actions do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.III No.II The components affected by the actions taken in this modification ar'e not specifically addressed in the basis for any Unit 1 Technical Specification.

The Primary Containment System is addressed in Technical Specification Section 3/4.6.1.Based on this and the fact that the modification meets all applicable design criteria as specified in the SAR, the proposed actions will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-233 An isolation valve will be added in each 5I8" tubing run downstream of SVs 12365, 12366, 12368, 12369 and upstream of SV12361.A test connection with a root valve will also be added in the tubing downstream of valves SV12366 and SV12369.SUhiM1E: No II No This modification will add new manual valves to isolate portions of existing PASS system in order to perform test SE-173<00 in a more efficient, timely manner.The valves will be normally open until needed for isolation..This modification will have no adverse affects on the operation or function of.the PASS as defined in the SAR.The modification will satisfy all the design requirements of the ANSI B31.T Code;thereby satisfying the design requirements as specified in FSAR Section 18.1.21, Post Accident Sampling.Also, the SAR has been evaluated, specifically FS'AR Chapter 6, Engineered Safety Functions and FSAR Chapter 15, Accident Analysis which revealed that the proposed action does not involve a precursor of or contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.Therefore, there will be no increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR.The modification will meet all the design basis criteria as specified in the SAR.The testing capabilities for the function and performance of the PASS system will be enhanced by the addition.of the manual isolation valve and additional test connections.

Based on the above and Section III, the proposed actions do not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR.No.The tubing and components affected by the actions to be taken in this modification are addressed in Section 6.8.4.c of the Unit 1 Technical Specification.

The Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)is a program required to be established, implemented and maintained by the Procedures and Programs Section (6.8)of Technical Specification Section 6.0, Administrative Controls.There are no Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCO)involved with the program requirements only that it is to exist and be maintained.

This modification only provides enhancement to the isolation and testing capabilities for the PASS system.Based on this and the fact the modification meets all applicable design criteria as specified in the SAR, the proposed actions will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.95-234 This contingency modification will provide for additional support of the small 1 drain lines off the bottom of the Reactor Recirculation discharge valves HV-143F031A and HV-143F0318 if it is confirmed that their present natural frequencies fall within the range between 120 and 133 Hz.This will prevent fatigue overstress in the 1 drain welds from harmonic vibration caused by the Vane Passing Frequency of the Reactor Recirculation pumps under uprated power operating conditions.

No.FSAR Chapters 6 and 15 have been reviewed for the possibility that the actions taken by this modification could increase the probability of occurrence of a previously evaluated accident.Particular emphasis during this'eview was paid to FSAR Sections 6.2.1.1.3.3.1,'Recirculation Line Rupture';15.3, Decrease in Reactor Coolant System Flow Rate;and 15.6,'Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory.This modification will insure the integrity of the Reactor Recirculation 1'rain piping from discharge valves HV-143F031A/B during increased core flow power uprated conditions by altering the natural frequency of the lines so they do not coincide with the Vane Passing Frequency of the Reactor Recirculation pumps and lead to fatigue stress failures.The DAR has also been reviewed, with particular attention to Chapter 5, Load Combinations fo'r Structures, Piping, and Equipment".

This modification does not adversely affect or change the operation or'function of the Reactor Recirculation System and the modification will meet all the design requirements as specified in the SAR.The proposed action does not involve a precursor of or contributor to any evaluated accidents involving offsite dose.Therefore, because this modification improves upon the existing design and meets all the applicable design bases and codes as specified in the SAR, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR, including those noted above,'ill not be increased.

No.This modification will not significantly change the original design arrangement of the small drain piping hangers SP-DCA-151-H2008/H2010 of the Reactor Recirculation System.The primary change involves an additional vertical support point to alter the natural frequency of each subject 1" drain jines and prevent the coinciding of frequencies with the Vane Passing Frequency of the Reactor recirculation pumps.Since the modification will ameliorate the support design scheme of the drain lines and be acceptable per all the requirements of the SAR, this modification will not create a possibility for an, accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR..III No.This modification does not jeopardize or degrade the function or operation of any plant system governed by the Technical Specification.

None of the parameters that are the bases for the Technical Specifications will be adversely impacted by this modification.

The actions taken by this modification to the Reactor Recirculation small pipe hangers shall guarantee the integrity of the recirculation piping by ensuring the drain line piping has a natural frequency that is outside of the critical range 120-133 Hz.This modification will allow the Reactor Recirculation Piping System to meets its design basis as specified in the SAR;therefore, the actions taken by this modification will not reduce any margin of safety as defined in the basis to any Technical Specification.

I 7~'1*