ML20209C235

Rev 0 to Cse License Annex,Urrs Waste Treatment Sys

ML20209C235
Person / Time
Site:	Westinghouse
Issue date:	06/15/1999
From:	WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20209C224	List: ML20209C235
References
NUDOCS 9907090216
Download: ML20209C235 (25)

Text

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9 CSE LICENSE ANNEX URRS WASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM i

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i 9907090216 990630 PDR ADOCK 07001151 C

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l CSE LICENSE ANNEX l

URRS WASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM TABLE OF CONTENTS l

TABLE OF CONTENTS i

REVISION RECORD ll Process Suntmary I

l WATERGLASS LIQUID WASTE EFFLUENT TREATMENT..

.1 Feed Prepa ra t i on..................................................................................... 1 Watet glas s Fil tratio n................................................................................ 2 Release O f F-1 165 Filtrate......................................................................... 3 WARM CAUSTIC WATERGLASS CAKE DISSOLUTION..

..3 Dissolu tion And Filtration.......................................................................... 4 Processing Of Uranium Cake And Recovered WaterglaSs Filtrate........................... 4 AQUEOUS WASTE AND MISCELLANEOUS ActDIC WASTE DISPOSAL.

.5 BLENDER / DRYER OPERATION..

..5 Procedures and Drawings 6

1 OPERATING PROCEDURES...

.6 SYSTEM DRAWINGS.,

... 7 Environntental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls 8

Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees 9

WATERGLASS LIQUto WASTE EFFLUENT TREATMENT..

.9 WARM CAUSTIC WATERGLASS CAKE DISSOLUTION.,

.13 ChemicalSafety and Fire Safety Controls 22 l

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ISA LICENSE ANNEX URRS WASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM REVISION RECORD REVISION DATE OF REVISION PAGES REVISION NUMBER REVISED RECORD

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ISA LICENSE ANNEX URRS WASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM i

Process Summar, The various process wastewater streams leaving the Chemical Area of the plant contain residual or trace uranium. These streams are treated for uranium recovery and/or disposal.

The Wastewater Treatment system includes the following process operations; a brief description of each operation is provided.

1. Waterglass Liquid Waste Effluent Treatment

2. Warm Caustic Waterglass Cake Dissolution

3. Aqueous Waste and Miscellaneous Acidic Waste Disposal

4. Blender Dryer Operation i

Waterglass Liquid Waste Effluent Treatment The Waterglass Liquid Waste Effluent Treatment facility (Waterglass Process) is used to j

recover residual uranium from various process wastewater streams leaving the chemical area of the plant. The main effluent is the wastewater from the ADU Conversion process where UF6 or uranyl nitrate are converted into UO2 powder. Effluents from scrubbers throughout the chemical area and the precipitation process in the Scrap Processing area, containing ammonia and ammonium nitrate, are discharged together with the ADU wastewater to the Waterglass Process.

Another separate feed to the Waterglass Process is effluent from the cylinder recertification process containing traces of uranium from washed UF6 cylinders.

Feed Preparation Waterglass is a common term used for water soluble glass or sodium silicates from

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varied proportions of Na2O and SiO2. Sodium silicate entraps insoluble uranium and I

precipitates soluble uranium out.of the liquid ammonia wastewater. The resulting product is clear ammonia wastewater containing less than 0.20 ppm U and waterglass j

cake containing less than 5% U.

The concentrated waterglass solution is 29% SiO2 and is transferred from a truck to storage tank T-1161. It is diluted with city water to 4-6% SiO2 as it is pumped from T-1161 through a ratio station and static mixer into T-1163. Both tanks have controlled j

heating elements located at the bottom, middle, and top of each tank.

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ADU plant waste from the quarantine pumpout tanks in the Conversion area is pumped intermittently through a heater (HX-1160) to a waterglass feed tank (T-1160 B or C).

At the same time, an amount of waterglass solution from T-1163 set by the waterglass-to-ADU waste volume ratio, is pumped to the feed tank.

The volume ratio of waterglass to ADU waste is controlled within a specified range. This ratio is adjusted

~ depending on ppm U in the filtrate, ppm U in the ADU wastewater, or % WG (SiO2) in T-1163.

It is normal practice to heat the solution to be filtered to facilitate filtration of the waterglass-ADU waste mixture. ADU waste passes through a heat exchanger (HX-1160) heated by hot water. For supplemental heating, T-1160A and T-1160B each have a steam line at the bottom of the tank to heat the mixture if needed.

T-1160B is the tank normally used for processing ADU waste, with T-1160C as the backup. The tank level is maintained to allow enough retention time for efficient uranium removal.

Two other tanks (T-1160A and T-1140) are available for storage of feed material. T-1160A receives effluent from the cylinder recertification process, condensate from the blender / dryer, and filtrate from F-1168 small filter. T-1140, on the other hand, can be used to store ADU waste for the waterglass process, but is normally used as feed to the ammonia recovery system.

Liquid from T-1160A is first transferred to the main feed tanks for waterglass spiking. These 4 tanks are interconnected with common filter feed pumps. T-1160A, B, and C also have their cwn separate agitation pump and spray nozzles used to keep solids from settling. These agitation pumps can be used to transfer liquid from one tank to the other. T-1140, on the other hand, has one recirculation pump that recycles solution to the top of the tank or discharges solution from the tank.

Waterglass Filtration 2

The flocculated mixture is pumped through a 65 ft continuous rotary-pressure filter, F-1165A or B, where the solids containing uranium are removed. There are two large continuous pressure filters used to remove uranium-containing solids from the waterglass-waste mixture. Only one filter is used at a time There are two pumps (P-1160A or B) available to transfer feed to the filter from any one of the feed tanks. The flocculated mixture from the feed tank passes to filter F-1165A or B. The clear liquid (filtrate) passing through the filter media flows into T-1166 receiver tank. At the start of filtration, T-1166 is recycled back to the feed tank until it is clear and the ppm U is

-less than the established limit. Then, it is transferred to the 30,000 gallon storage tanks (T-1107, T-1108, T-117.5, or T-1140) for ammonia recovery.

- The rotating turbines at each plate remove cake from the filter plates to the cake discharge pipe, cake valve, and into a plastic-lined 55-gallon drum. The drum is filled to about 8" freeboard, sampled for ppm U, weighed, and entered into the item control

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system. At the filter cake discharge there is also a cake hopper equipped with a pump capable of transferring cake to the leach tanks T-1167A or T-1167B.

F-ll65 is shutdown when ADU conversion lines are shutdown (i.e., weekends). Just before shutdown, feed is switched to hot water at the 3-way valve upstream of P-1160A or B. This flushes the pump, lines and filter. When the filter is washed with hot water, the water wash at the cake discharge is recycled back to the filter feed tank via the cake hopper and cake pump. The filtrate in T-1166 receiver tank may also be recycled back to the feed tank. As soon as the cake discharge is less turbid, the feed pump is shutoff and filtrate valves closed to leave liquid between the plates.

The filter is also shutdown for felt change when the flow rate is too low and/or the filter pressure is close to maximum design pressure.

Release Of F-1165 Filtrate Filtrate from T-1166 is pumped to one of the ammonia still feed tanks: T-1107, T-1108, T-1175, or T-ll40. During filter operation, a routine sample of T-ll66 is analyzed for ppm U. Waterglass ratio is adjusted, if necessary. If ppm U is high, the

- filtrate is switched to recycle mode until a sample result is within limit. The ratio is increased or the feed tank is spiked manually with waterglass solution, as necessary. If uranium in the filtrate is below the detectable limit for a period of time, the waterglass ratio is reduced so as not to generate too much waterglass cake.

T-1166 filtrate receiver tank also receives bleedoff solution from the NH3 scrubber located above the Waterglass. building.

This stream, however, does not contain uranium.

The ammonia recovery feed tank is isolated and recirculated while it is receiving filtrate from F-1165A or B. When the tank is full or when the tank is needed for the ammonia stills, it is isolated and sampled for uranium. This residual uranium is not recovered, but is include'd in the plant uranium accountability as a measured discard. The tank, or a portion of it, may be recycled back to the filter if a specified limit is exceeded.

Warm Caustic Waterglass Cake Dissolution The warm caustic.waterglass cake dissolution involves dissolving the waterglass cake, generated by the Waterglass Process, in warm sodium hydroxide solution and leaving the uranium in solid form for subsequent recovery and purification. T-1167B is the tank used for i

this process. A similar tank, T-il67A, is not in use at this time.

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1 Dissolution And Filtration e

Caustic ~ solution is transferred to T-1167B to a specified level. The solution is mixed I

with an agitator inside the tank and recirculated by a pump through a heat exchanger.

Steam is used indirectly to heat the slurry. When the solution reaches a specified temperature, two drums of waterglass cake are added to the tank. The slurry is mixed and recirculated through the heat exchanger for a few hours to dissolve sodium silicates before it is Gltered. The elevated temperature of the slurry is maintained during the dissolution step.

The slurry is pumped through a continuous rotary pressure filter (F-1168) which

. separates the clear waterglass solution from the uranium solids.

At the start of filtration, the filtrate collected in filtrate tank T-1169 is recycled back to the slurry tank until it is clear. Then it is pumped to a storage tank for use in the Waterglass Process, i

This recovered waterglass containing excess sodium hydroxide may be stored in T-1160A for bleedoff into the ADU wastewater feed tank. It may also be recycled as 4

waterglass solution together with T-1163 fresh waterglass, via the T-1170 holding tank.

The slurry that comes off the cake valve is collected in a safe-geometry container, (i.e.,

J cream cans and polypaks). This slurry is also recycled back to the slurry tank until a thicker cake is produced.

When T-1167B is empty, hot water is injected to the suction side of the pump to rinse the pump, filter plates, and pipes to and fem the filter. A small amount of uranium with wash water remains in the tank for the next batch.

Since T-1167B is a non-favorable geometry tank, engineered controls are provided to a

limit waterglass cake to 2 drums per batch. These controls reside in a programmable logic controller (PLC) program..

l Processing Of Uranium Cake And Recovered Waterglass Filtrate e

The cream can or polypaks containing wet cake is transferred to the chemical area of the plant for recovery and purification of uranium. Normally, it is dried in the oven and processed as dirty materials for dissolution and solvent extraction.

The filtrate containing dissolved sodium silicates also contains approximately 500 ppm U. The filtrate may be re-used to capture uranium from ADU waste, reducing usage of fresh waterglass solution.

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Aqueous Waste And Miscellaneous Acidic Waste Disposal Aqueous waste is a a by-product of the solvent extraction process. It contains dissolved impurities and excess nitric acid from the uranyl nitrate that was purified by solvent extraction.

. Aqueous waste is pumped from solvent extraction holding' tank, T-1493A or B, to a 10,000 gallon tank,- T-1148, via a gamma monitor, after the batch is sampled and released. The release limit is 5 ppm U, although a batch is typically 1 to 3 ppm U. T-1149 is an identical tank that may be used to store aqueous waste.

The aqueous waste is neutralized _ with lime in a 10,000-gallon tank (T-1147). A pH analyzer

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in the recirculation loop of T-1147 determines when neutralization is complete.

After recirculation of the mixture, a sample is pulled for ppm U.

A limit was established for pumpout of neutralized solution and solids to the west lagoons. If above the established limit, the solution may be transferred to the east lagoon.

Other miscellaneous acidic waste, including HF from T-1173 and water washes from HF bulk storage pad, are neutralized the same way in T-1147.

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' Blender / Dryer Operation The blender dryer is used to dry sludges in order to reduce volume of waste for burial. Feed materials previously processed in the blender / dryer include neutralized nickel waste from the plating room, aqueous waste sludge (when aqueous waste was neutralized in T-1167A), and waterglass residue after nitric acid (HNO3) leaching of waterglass cake. These materials

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contain residual or no uranium. Because of process changes, these materials are not generated at the present time.

Prior to startup, the steam to the blender dryer heating jacket is turned on. Then, the chilled water valves and booster pump are turned' on to the main condenser and condensate tank cooler.

Initially, a vacuum of 20 to 30 inches Hg is established in the blender / dryer chamber by recirculating water or condensate from a previous batch in T-1172 via a jet pump. The suction hose is dipped into the drum of sludge and transfer of the feed starts. When the level in the blender / dryer is 'just above the auger, sludge transfer is stopped. After some liquid has evaporated, transfer from the feed. drum is resumed. This operation is repeated until the specified number of drums for the batch is fed. Depending on the amount of solids in the feed, the batch may consist of 3 to 5 drums.

The water vapor and gases that are driven off pass through a demister, a check valve, and a condenser. The condenser is cooled by chilled water delivered by a booster pump. The Initial issue Date:

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condensate is collected in the condensate tank. In addition, another heat exchanger in the condensate recirculation line also cools the liquid. This heat exchanger is also cooled with chilled water fcom the booster pump.

The batch and blender operation is checked routinely using camera surveillance until the batch is dry. Another indication that the powder is dry is when the offgas temperature decreases and the dryer chamber temperature increases. During drying, the condensate tank receives all the evaporated water from the cake. The liquid level is either automatically or manually controlled by opening the condensate discharge valve to T-1160A.

Once the powder is dry, it is discharged into the receiving drum which is located inside a vented enclosure. The dry powder drops through the discharge valve and into the drum. The drum is filled up to 8-10 inches freeboard. A composite sample from the drum is pulled for grams U/ gram. Then the blender / dryer is visually inspected to make sure it is empty.

The blender / dryer system is normally emptied before a weekend shutdown. If it has to be shutdown while material is still wet, enough water is added to cover the material. To shutdown the blender / dryer unit, the steam and auger are turned off, and the vacuum break valve is opened. Auxiliary system components are then turned off.

Procedures and Drawings Key procedures and drawings for these URRS Waste Treatment Systems are identified in the tables below:

Operating Procedures PROCEDURE NO.

TITLE COP-830501 Operation of F-1165 in Waterglass System COP-830509 Release of F-1165 Effluent for Processing COP-836019 Makeup of 5-7% Waterglass COP-830517 Addition of Extra Waterglass to Feed Tanks COP-830521 Warm Caustic Waterglass Cake Dissolution and Filtration Using F-1168 COP-830523 F-1168 Operations COP-836004 Operation of URRS Neutralization Tank T-1147 COP-836003 flydrofluoric Acid llandling COP-831017 Sludge Blender / Dryer Operation Initial Issue Date:

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System Drawings DRAWING NO.

SIIEET NO.

DRAWING TITLE 620F0lPiOI 1

Sodium Silicate Storage / Mixing Tanks 620F02P101 1

Waterglass ADU Feed 620F02P101 -

2 Waterglass Feed / Storage Tanks 620F03P101 1

Waterglass Filtration F-1165A 620F03PI01 2

Watergiass Filtration F-1165B 623F02P101 1

ADU Waste Storage Tanks 620F04PI01 1

Precipitation & Leaching System 620F04PIO2 1-Filtration System 610F07PIO3 1

Waste Recovery Leach Storage /Feea Tanks 621F01PIO1 1

Ilydrofluoric Acid Storage Tanks T-30 & T-1173 620F07P101 1

Dryer Process Flow Diagram j

620F07PIOl 2

Dryer I'

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Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment l

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i Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees Waterglass Liquid Waste Effluent Treatmen!

Control Parameters and Safety Limits:

Control Parameten, e mass concentration e

Safety Limits

• See Table 1.

Bounding Assumptions: (From Table in SNM-1107)

Homogeneous UO2 Optimum H2O moderation Partial water reflection on bottom, full water reflection on top e

5.0 w/o "Li enrichment 2

e Controls Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)

Passive engineered controls are described in the License and in Regulatory Affairs-108.

The requirements for functional verification are determined from this evaluation.

None active engineered con:rols (AEC)

Active Enginected Controls are defined m the License and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety significant interlocks The requirements for functional verification are defined in RA-108 and/or area operating procedures.

• None Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)

Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

None Administrative controls i

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g Safety Significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Fonn or some other record. Functional verification is not normally required.

. None Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the waterglass process is evaluated to be very strong. The parameters that directly affects neutron multiplication for the waterglass system are mass and concentration. A criticality would only be possible in the waterglass process if suffici:nt uranium concentration and uranium mass were achieved during the process. This evaluation has determined that a uranium concentration or uranium mass sufficient to cause a criticality in the waterglass process is not credible.

Calculations' performed for an accumulation of uranium (in the form of UO /H2O) at the 2

bottom of a large tank showed kerr = 0.95 at 82 kg U, and kerr = 0.98 at 100 kg U. As demonstrated in this evaluation, sufficient uranium is not available to waterglass process to accumulate sufficient uranium for a crit calit3 to be possible.

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Calculations performed for using an infinite mass of water saturated UO showed kerr =

2 235 235 0.95 at IU U ratio of 2040 (198,000 ppm or 19.8 w/o U), and kerr = 0.98 at IU U of 1900 (209,000 ppm or 20.9 w/o U). As demonstrated in this evaluation, no credible mechanism exists in the waterglass process to increase the uranium concentration such that a criticality is possible.

Criticality in the filter press F-1165 is not cred!Sle. Assume that a critical mass of uranium is necessary in the filter press to cause a criticality. For conservatism, thic mass will be determined based on spherical geometry with full water reflection. This minimum critical mass is 34.1 kg uranium. The F-1165 filter press contains 65 ff of surface area to trap solids.

3 Assuming a thickness of 0.5 in. on each filter cloth, the total volume of trapped solids is 65 n2 (0.5/12) fl = 2.7 ff. Therefore, the minimum enneentration of uranium needed in the filter 3

press is 34.; xg U / 2.7 ft = 0.45 kg/l. This ec s

.ntration is much larger than the minimum critical concentration of 20.9 w/o 'U needed fi>r a criticality through the waterglass system.

Therefore, criticality in the F-1165 filter press is not credible based on the controls present on the waterglass treatment process.

8 CRI-994)08, Calculation of Uranium Accumulation ir the Huttom of a Larpe Tank.

8L 98-007J)l. Infmite llomogeneous Mass for Uo2.

'llarut rok for the Conduct of Nuclear Criticality safety Activities at the CrFF, March 1999, Revision 0.

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Summary Of Initiating Events Which Lead To Credible (and Not Credible) Process Upsets Discharge of Iligh Concentration Uranium ADU Waste from Q-Tanks into Waterglass Process IE #1 Gamma Alarms in Q-Tank System Fall to Prevent > 24 ppm U into Waterglass Process IE #2 Q-Tanks Receive High Concentration (>300 ppm U) ADU Waste from Conversion Lines (Not Credible)

IE #3 San:pling ofADU Waste in Waterglass Process Fails to Detect > 24 ppm U liigh Concentration Uranium Caused by ADU Waste Settling in NFG Tanks IE #4 Failure to Sufficiently Agitate Waterglass/ADU Waste Mixture to Prevent Settling Causing Increase in Concentration IE #5 Waterglass/ADU Waste Mixture Contains Heavy Particles Which Settle in the Tank (Not Credible)

Illgh Concentration Uranium in Filter Press F-1165 IE #6 Failure to Sample Waterg* ass Drum Cake or T-1166 Filtrate IE H7 Waterglass Drum Cake Created at >5 w/o Uranium (Not Credible)

Solids Buildup in NFG Tanks IE #5 Waterglass/ADU Waste Mixture Contains Heavy Particles Which Settle in the Tank (Not Credible)

IE #8 Failure to Sufficiently Agitate Waterglass/ADU Waste Mixture to Prevent Settling Causing Buildup ofSolids IE #9 Failure to Annually inspect Tanksfor Solids Buildup Initial Issue Date:

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Warm Caustic Waterglass Cake Dissolution Control Parameters and Safety Limits:

Control Parameters e mass e uranium concentration Safety Limits

. See Table 3.

i Bounding Assumptions:(From Table in SNM-1107)

Homogeneous UO2 e

Optimum H2O moderation -

i e

Full water-equivalent reflection e

• 5.0 w/o 235U enrichment Controls Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)

Passive engineered controls are described in the License and in Regulatory Affairs-108.

The requirements for functional verification are determined from this evaluation.

Control Control Function / '

Procedure

' Funct.. Verif.

Initiating.

ID.

Failure Condition /

Number Required Event (IE) No.

Action j

P-WCD-1 Prevent addition of uranium through n/a no IE #10 j

the recycle line/

Unauthorized design of recycle line/

No changes allowed to system without proper NCS review i

t Active engineered controls (AEC) i Active Engineered Controls are defined in the License and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety significant interlocks The requirements for functional verification are defined in RA-108 and/or area operating procedures.

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Control Control Function /

Procedure-Funct. Verif.

Initiating ID Failure Condition /.

Number Required.

Event (IE) No.

Action -

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WCD-1 Prevent Overcharging of T-il67B N/A yes IE #9 with Waterglass Drum Cake /

Interlock fails to close drum cake feed valve on high-high tank level /

Close drum cake feed valve on high-high tank level.

Administrative controls with computer or alann assist (AC)

Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are pro.apted or assisted by computer output. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

Control.

Control Function /

Procedure Funct. :Verif.

Initiating.

ID -

Failure Condition Action:

Number Required Everd (IE) No.

none Administrative controls Safety Significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record. Functional verificados i3 not normally required.

Control Contrel Function /

Procedct Fura.

Initiating -

ID Failure Condition /

Number Verif.

Event Action Required (IE) No.

' A-WCD-1 Sample filter press solids for high uranium COP-830521 none IE #1 concentration /

Significantly high (>15 w/o) uranium in filter press solids /

Sample filter press solids for high uranium concentration.

A-WCD-2 Prevent use of waterglass cake with >5 w/o COP-830521 none IE #4 uranium /

Drum containing

>5 w/o uranium used in '

process /

Do not select drum containing > $ w/o uranium.

A-WCD-3 Prevent buildup of uranium inside T-1167B/

COP-830521 none IE #5 Uranium - buildup detected inside T-1167B/

Inspect T-ll67B regularly to detect uranium buildup (every 10* drum).

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c a

g.

'.f Control j~

Control Function /m g.

Procedure.

Funct.:

Initiating "y,

4 ID)

Failure Condition /9 ' M '

Number Verif.: '

Event Mtion' Y

Required '

(IE)NU.

A-WCD-4 Prevent more than 20kg U in feed material from COP-830521 none-IE #7 beiag

'added to T-1167B/

More than 20 kg.U, feed material added to T-

!!67B/

Do not add more than 20 kg U feed material to T-1167B.

A-WCD-5 :

Prevent. adding additional drum cake through COP-830521 none IE i8 waterglass cake hopper /

Additional drum cake added through waterglass cake hopper /

Do not add additional drum cake (beyond the 2 specified drums) through waterglass cake hopper.

A-WCD-6 '

Prevent addition of material through recycle of COP-830521 none IE #11 non-empty cream can/

Addition' material (greater than % cream can) added via recycle from empty cream can/

Confirm non-empty cream can at exit of filter press before starting recycle.

)-

. Margin of Safety

,The parameters which 'directly affect the neutron multiplication for the warm caustic waterglass dissolution process are fissile mass, moderator and uranium concentration. A bounding" assumption (BA) exists for the moderator, and mass and concentration are controlled through criticality safety limits (CSL).

As Table 2 indicates,'the minimum uranium mass required for criticality in a (conservative)

. spherical configuration ~ of U(5)O2 in H 0, with interspersed water moderation and full water 2

reflection, is slightly greater than 34 kg. From the same table it is seen that criticality cannot

= occur in this system for uranium concentrations less than 21% by weight.. For this reason, 34 kg uranium'and 21% uranium concentration by weight are used as Criticality Safety

. Limits for this system, where it is seen that even these values are:

- ) Derived from 'a model which is conservative with respect to the chemical constituents, a

. geometry and reflection present'in the warm caustic waterglass dissolution system; b) Inadequate to cause a criticality even if they occur simultaneously; and c) Well in excess of expected system parameters.

Therefore, the warm caustic waterglass dissolution process is strongly protected against the double contingency of mass and concentration required for criticality to be possible.

. Initial Issue Date:

15 JUN 99 Page No.

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. Revision Datei Revision No. _0

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e Summary Of Initiating Events Which Lead To Credible Process Upsets Failure of Process to Limit Uranium Concentration IE #1 Sampling ofFilter Uranium Solids Fails to Detect High Concentration Uranium IE #2 Upset Chemistry Conditions Cause Uranium Concentration to lncrease Failure to Prevent > 5/wo Uranium Concentration in Waterglass Cake Drums Used in Process IE #3 Waterglass Waste Treatment Process Creates a Drum with > 5 w/o Uranium IE #4 Waterglass Cake Drum with >5 w/o Used in Process Failure to Defect Buildup of Uranium Inside T-1167B IE #5 Failure to Regularly inspect T-116.7Bfor Buildup of Uraniurn IE #6 Sigmficant Buildup of Uranium Inside T-1167B Failure to Prevent Excess Waterglass Cake Feed From Being Introduced into T-1167B '

LE #7 Greater than 20 kg U added to T-1167 through 2 or more drums IE #8 Additional waxrglass drum cake added through waterglass cake hopper IE #9 Level Controlin T-1167B Fails to Activate Interlock to Prevent Feeding Material Failure to Prevent Additional Uranium' Introduced During Recycle IE #10 Design of Recycle Line doesn 't prevent additional uraniumfrom entering process IE #11 Recycle begun with % full cream can Initial Issue Date:

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Table 2: Minimum critical uranium mass versus w/o uranium in a spherical configuration of 'U(5)O2 in H20, under conditions of full water reflection *.

11/* U Grams w/o U U mass (kg)

U/ cc 50

-5.003 81.28 %

334.72 1

100 3.378 75.41 %

115.38 i

150 2.550 70.33 %

71.07 200 2.049 65.89 %

53.73 250 1.711 61.98 %

48.04 j

300 1.490 58.50 %

40.06 380 1.190 53.69 %

35.99 420 1.070 51.57 %

34.97 460 1.020 49.60 %

34.41 480 0.974 48.68 %

34.27 500 0.939 47.79 %

34.20 525 0.898 46.72 %

34.23 600 0.795 43.78 %

34.95 650 0.739 42.02 %

35.89 700 0.690 49.39 %

37.19 750 0.647 38.89 %

38.87 800 0.609 37.49 %

40.91 850 0.575 36.19 %

43.42 900 0.545 34.98 %

46.47 1000 0.494 32.78 %

54.28 1200 0.415 29.12 %

82.74 1400 0.358 26.20 %

161.04 1800 0.281 21.82 %

e I

• CRI-994)o3, Continuation of UO2 Min Spherical Volune Calcs" (CRJ-944)49).

Ini'ial Issue Date:

15 JUN 99 Page No.

17 Revision Date:

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Warm Caustic Waterglass Cake Dissolution Process CRITICALITY POSSIBLE Hidilist uo.... O oi,,O.!u.

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MASS DEFENSES MODERATION DEFENSES CONFIGURAflON FAIL FAIL DEFENSES VAIL gig is a

/

I6 Initial Issue Date:

15 JUN 99 Page No.

19 Revision Date:

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I Failure of Process t Fadure to Prevent >5 wt Lmut Uranium anlum Concentration in Concentration Waterglass Cake Drums se<f in Process Waterglass wass Waterglass cake drum Sampling of Fdte, Upset Chem!eM treatment process Solids Falls to Detect Conditions Cause with >6 wIo uranium creates a drum with used in process High Concentration Uranium Concentration

>6 w/o uranium lE #4 Uranium to increase IE #3 i

IE #1 IE E2 1

Q 4 >

4 >

v COP 02)521 COP-830521 Initial.lssue Date:

15 JUN 99 Page No.

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--m of vr.nsum W.t.rgo Can. F d Additenal Uranium T*ac)

From B.ing introduc.d stic Introduc.d Dutmg T-1167B R.cyca.

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F.edl:tg M.aterial l

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PEC COP-830521 COP-830521 (g

COP-83^,521 COP-830521 l

l Initial Issue Date:

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21 Revision Date:

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o 1

Chemical Safety and Fire Safety Controls -

To be provided in a fumre Integrated Safety Assessment.

3 1

4 i

l Initial Issue Date:

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22 Revision Date:

. Revision No.

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