ML20153C783
| ML20153C783 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Westinghouse |
| Issue date: | 08/12/1998 |
| From: | WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20153C750 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9809240197 | |
| Download: ML20153C783 (3) | |
Text
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a CSE LICENSE ANNEX IFBA FUEL ROD MANUFACTURING j
REVISION RECORD
' REVISION DATE OF PAGES REVISION NUMBER-REVISION REVISED RECORD j
1 12 AUG 98 ii,14, 21 Revised maximum number of rodo at scrap J
. station.
2 1
j l
i l
l l
s 9e09240197 900915 ?
InitialIssue Date:
31 JUL 98 Page No, ii Revision Date:
12 AUG 98 Revision No. _1
a)' Water as a fire supprecsant is used as a spray or mist. IE-10. Periodic training of personnel in area is required.
.b) Only about 3 maximum fuel rods are out of a channel at the scrap workstation at any one time.l IE-20. Continuous, periodic performance verification by operators and supervisors is required.
Margin of Safety The margin of safety is adequate, and also quite large, because the Bounding Conditions are much more reactive than conditions expected for normal, and expected or credible upset conditions.
Calculations assume full interstitial moderation and full water reflection. The calculations indicate that k,for the normal and expected upset conditions will not exceed 0.95. No credible upset will cause k, to > 1.0.
The parameters that affect neutron multiplication, given the bounding assumptions, are geometry and moderation. The controls on these parameters are both engineered and administrative in nature.
Criticality would be possible only if fuel rods were placed in a large container of water or other moderator.
The fuel rods would also have to exceed the boundaries of a safe slab. Since such containers are not available in the IFBA Area, such a scenario is not credible.
The double contingency principle has been satisfied.
Summary OfInitiating Events that Lead to Credible Process Upsets 1
i No credible initiating events have been identified for this system that could lead to a criticality (km = 1.0).
For moderation control, the plane of the safe slab is well above the floor so that flooding is not credible. Accidental (roof leaks) or deliberate (fire suppression) sources of moderator would be low density materials so that optimum moderation is not credible. For geometry control, credible process upsets would not violate the safe slab limit. The safe volume control on stack pellets and scrap pellets is subject to configuration control. Dropped pellets, if any, will assume a safe slab configuration.
The fault tree figure 6.3-2 (fuel rods) considers certain potential initiating events, none of which lead to. criticality. These initiating events are discussed herein to demonstrate timt they are very l
unlikely.
IE-1. Deleted
)
e
- IE-2. The roof, overhead pipes, etc., provide integrity to prevent sources of moderator.
Even if the integrity were lost, the moderator would affect only a small portion of the infinite Initial'Iss se Date:
31 JUL 98 Page No. __ 4
. Revision Date:
12 AUG 98 Revision No. _1 l
!a FIGURE 6.3-2 FAULT TREE IFBA ROD MANUFACTURING AREA (RODS) l-INTERST O
O t
CONTI
'E NC %
INif N RT 1 Ot R HON-6h k
k I
i IE 7 IE4 IE-19 l
l IE 9 i
SMI CONTROt.
~ s(
DEPTH llY FAILURE OF GOOO 15 HOUSEKEEMMO PRACTICES F All ui i
t e
a 6
PEC MOP-750353 PEC immimmuS MOP-961210 l
l E2 IE4 IE 18 IE 10 SMI CCNTROL MODE T OM LURT OF CONTROLS ON SOLUTION!
IfV
)
k NOTE 6 MOP-750353 EPB41 NOTES:
- 1) IE-3,IE-d IE 6 AND lE 11 DELETEO.
- 2) E-1 AND IE 12 THROUGH IE-17 NOT APPLICABLE.
'NO COMhmON MGDE FAILURE IDENTIFIED FOR MODERATOR AND LOS8 OF GEOMETRY CONTROL, InitialIssue Date:
31 JUL 98 Page No.
21 Revision Date:
12 AUG 98 Revision No. _1 l
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