ML20205H254
| ML20205H254 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Westinghouse |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1999 |
| From: | WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205H251 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9904080114 | |
| Download: ML20205H254 (46) | |
Text
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i CSE LICENSE ANNEX LLRW PROCFSSING SYSTEM i
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1 CSE LICENSE ANNEX i
LLRWPROCESSING SYSTEM TABLE OF CONTENTS l
TABLE OF CONTENTS I
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REVISIONRECORD il Process Summary
_1 TRASII COLLECTION:.
.2 ASSAY OPERATIONS:
.4 ROTARY SIIEAR SIIREDDER:.
.5 INCINERATION:
.6 ASilliANDLING:
.7 COMPACTION:.
.8 DECON/CtrlTING ROOM:.
.9 LIQUID llONING:
.9 UI.TRASONIC CLEANING:.
.. I i PARTS WASIIER:.
12 GRIT BLASTER:...
. 13 Procedures andDrawings 13 TRASil COLLECTION:.
. 13 ASSAY OPERATIONS:
. 14 ROTARY SIIEAR SIIREDDER:..
. 14 INCINERATION:
. 14 ASil RECOVERY:
.15 COMPACTOR:.
,.16 DECON/CUTTINO ROOM:
.16 LIQUID HONING:.
.16 ULTRASONIC CLEANING:.
.17 PARTS WASilER:.
. 17 i
.17 I
GRIT BLASTER:,
Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls 19 Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees 20 TRASil COLLECi10N :
.20 ASSAY SYSTLM..
.27 ROTARY S' DEAR SilREDDER..
.27 INCINER/ TOR..
.31 j
ASIIIIANDt NG..
.37 COMNCTOR...
..38 DECON/CUTnNO ROOM..
.38 j
LIQUID HONINO..
.38 ULTRASONIC CLEANER..
.43 i
PARTS WAS!!ER..
.43 GRIT BLASTER...
.43 ChemicalSafety and Fire Safety Controls 43 Initial issue Date:
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ISA LICENSE ANNEX SAFE GEOMETRY DISSOLVER SYSTEM REVISION RECORD REVISION DATE OF REVISION PAGES REVISION NUMBER REVISED RECORD l
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L ISA LICENSE ANNEX l
LLRWPROCESSING i
i Process Summary The Columbia plant generates both combustible and non-combustible forms of waste l
material. Scrap material of all types, created by departments throughout the chemical l
area in the normal course of operation, is sent to Uranium Recycling and Recovery Services (URRS) for disposal. Every reasonable effort is made to avoid waste burial; the ever-rising cost of volume and uranium surcharges for burial shipments is the economic driving force for much of the on-site decontamination and volume reduction processes. The combustible wastes ne incinereted on site and the ash and clinker residue is leached (chemically reacted with nitric acid) to remove uranium in the form of uranyl nitrate.
The non-combustible wastes are prepared for burial, or decontaminated for release from the piani or recycle. " Free Release" is the desired disposition, Metallic material that cannot be sufficiently decontaminated for " free release" might be deemed sufficiently clean for " metal melt" disposition. This material is placed into a container for shipping to a wacte processor for smelting into ingots to be used as shielding blocks for the U.S. nuclear industry. Various processors also provide the service of further decontaminatic. or compacting our waste prior to burial.
All radioactive material transfers from the plant controlled areas are surveyed to determine the appropriate disposition. Regulatory Engineering & Operations (REO) oversees the survey and containerization of all material transfers to the Low-Level Waste Storage Building, other contaai %d material storage areas outside the plant, and off the plant site. For unrestricted, t release of an item (including transfer of item to a " clean" area of the plant), compreaensive surveys must be performed by REO for both smearable and fixed alpha contamination and beta-gamma radiation.
For restricted off-site release of an item (i.e. for testing, repair, rework, etc,), these surveys would be determined on a case-by-case basis, and generally would require item surveillance throughout transport and off-site handling by an approved Westinghouse employee.
Contaminated items designated for temporary storage and further processing, are surveyed to specified limits and containerized to prevent dispersion of radioactive materials.
Of the various instruments available for measuring contamination, the Canberra n5 Computer Based Gamma Scanning Systems (for determining U content in containers of medium to low density waste and process scrap), the " Pac-4G Gas Proportional Alpha Instrument" (for determining alpha radiation count rate as counts per minute, cpm) and the "E-120 Geiger Instmment" (for determining U concentration as g/10 u3 Initial Issue Date:
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liters) are typically used by REO for establishing the disposition of LLRW. Qualified URRS personnel also use the Pac-4G to decide internal material staging and metal melt disposition.
l The LLRW processing system includes the following process stages; a brief description l
of each stage is provided.
- 1. Trash Collection
- 2. Assay Operations
- 3. Rotary Shear Shredder
- 4. Incineration
- 5. Ash Handling j
- 6. Compaction
- 7. Decon/ Cutting Room
- 8. ';. quid Honing
- 9. ditrasonic Cleaning
- 10. Parts Washer
- 11. Grit Blaster (proposed)
Trash CoIIection:
The segregation of collected trash requires the cooperation of all departments that generate trash throughout the chemical area in that all bagged trash be devoid of metal, wet rags or mopheads, wet filter media (cloths, cartridges, bags) or oil. Each trash collection point consists of containers for combustible tra '.. with a limited number of locations having a separate container for non-combustible trash. All wet materials, such as filter cloths, cartridges, mop l
heads, and wet rags are first placed in wet storage containers located in the Scrap Recovery area then washed in the Washing Machine.
The washed materials are eventually brought to URRS and placed in one of the two 55-gallon drums designated for staging wet materials; URRS-source wet materials are directly disposed of in the other drum.
All gross contamination must be removed before placing any material in any scrap container. Large plastic items such as hardhats, polypaks and Lexan sheets are placed on a cart and delivered to URRS personnel; these items will be l
shredded for incineration. Special procedures apply to the disposal of ADU and IFBA fuel rod scrap (i.e. tubes, components, zircaloy lathe turnings), UF.
pigtails and moly scrap, with emphasis on removing gross uranium contamination (i.e. pellet fragments, powder or other questionable material) and preparations for subsequent handling and decontamination.
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All bags of collected combustible trash are first processed through a metal detector. Exceptions are honing grit, met lab combustibles, and sludges with minute particles; these should not be passed through the metal detector, but may be added to the dmm if the drum is to be consumed in the incinerator prior to inventory (i.e. inventory is more than a month off or the drum is going directly to the incinerator). Rejected trash is resorted. Combustible scrap is then staged for weighing (mass control), assay (measure total U content) and incineration.
235 There are four scales available for use to ensure the mass limit requirements for assay and incineration of combustible trash are met. The drums may be filled with bags of trash that have been successfully scanned through the metal detector. The dmm fill weight (net) is limited to 66 pounds. If the scale weight limit light (red) comes on (66 lbs), the operator will remove the last bag added to the drum. Filling the drum past the " weight limit" point risks reaching the "high weight" alarm (90 lbs) which requires issuing a "Redbook Incident Report" or a " Data Pak Report" (119 lbs).
Non-combustible scrap includes both metallic and non-metallic materials. All metallic, non-combustible scrap is sorted for either hand cleaning or size reduction (Decon/ Cutting Room) and/or staged to be cleaned for free release, metal melt or recycle use. These assorted metallies include vessels, structures, tools, equipment, piping, and hardware. Non-metallic, non-combustible scrap is sorted for volume reduction (shredding or compaction). This category of scrap includes materials such as insulation, furnace brick, lexan, plexiglass and light gauge metal items (i.e. aluminum foil and wire) not suitable for metal melt disposition. This scrap category material is weighed to ensure the assay station loading weight limit of 500 pounds is not exceeded, assayed for g U content, 235 and then staged for dumping into a container for shipment to a waste processor for further volume reduction and eventual burial at Barnwell. Insulation, the largest volume of this scrap category, is generally not compacted or shredded in-house. Owners of the scrap generated are responsible for the segregation of scrap and removal of gross contamination.
Metallic scrap is staged for decontamination as necessary. Decontamination is accomplished using one or more of several operations: (1) hand cleaning, (2) torch removal of surface oxidation and scale, (3) liquid honing treatment, (4) ultrasonic cleaning, and (5) automated parts washing. Other honing processes have been proposed.
Scrap that is a combination of non-combustible and combustible materials (i.e.
235 235 HEPA, pre-filters and AC bags) is staged according to U content; <5 g U
235 and > 5 g U. All of these materials may be dismantled and segregated inside the Decon/ Cutting Room. These same materials may also be brought into the Decon/ Cutting Room solely to prepare material for dismantling and then Initial Issue Date:
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velivered through a wall opening into a " Dismantling and Separation Hood."
Combustible and non-combustible materials are placed in appropriate containers for further processing. There is also a totally self-contained " Sorting Hood,"
located outside the Decon/ Cutting Room, planned for like service, but not presently in operation. Filter dismantling is required to separate any aluminum foil or wire spring from filter media and to collect loose uranium residue.
Assay Operations:
The Canberra Computer Based Gamma Scanning Systems are designed to determine the amount of specific radioactive nuclides present in containers of medium to low density waste and process scrap using an attenuation corrected gamma-ray measurement technique developed at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Two systems are used in this endeavor: System #2, a Segmented Gamma Scanner (SGS) for non-combustible waste, and System #3, a Q Passive 2
Gamma Measurement System for combustible trash and incinerator ash.
The Segmented Gamma Scanner (SGS) is a Germanium detector, passive 235 gamma measurement system used to measure total U content in 55 gallon drums.
Non-combustible waste destined for burial, metal melt or decontamination are assayed for accountability.
Wet cartridge filters, mop heads or rags, washed or judged to be lightly contaminated, are routinely assayed to determine the need for further washing and incineration.
Molybdenum scrap in 1-gallon paint cans and dried press cake in polypaks may also be assayed. The limits for items measured in the SGS - Assay #2 are:
235 235 Drums - 42.0 g U, and wet material (Cuno) - 104.0 g U. All assay results are verified below the posted limits; otherwise, they are repackaged and assayed. The criticality control limit for any 55 gallon drum is 104 g U. The 235 assay result for each drum is entered into a computerized material traceability j
system and recorded on the drum label; this is critical for managing drum shipments to GTS Duratek for processing or to Barnwell for direct burial, both 235 of which have a site limit of 325 g U. Any drum counted for the purpose of spacing must be measured on Assay #2 (SGS) and assigned a gram U value j
235 prior to shipment or inventory.
2 The Q Waste Assay Passive Gamma Measurement System is a Nal passive 235 gamma measurement system used to measure total U content in large polypaks containing incinerator ash (milled ash,1/8"-screen unpulverized ash, pulverized ash, or Torit fines) and combustible trash in 52 or 55 gallon drums destined to be burned.
Incinerator ash materials are assayed only if not processed within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. HEPA filters (24" x 24" x 12" size) may also be I
235 assayed, but only if having a scanned survey value of < 1.0 g U/10 liters and only for criticality control; not to be used for inventory or shipment. Filters
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i 235 having a survey or assay value of > 1.0 g U/10 liters are to be dismantled and i
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sorted prior to incineration. The limits for items measured in the Q - Assay #3 2
are: drums of trash - 17.0 g U, and Ash - 91.0 g "U.
j 235 l
If the assay system is down, drum filling may continue, accumulating weighed drums of trash nTording to appropriate spacing requirements. Also, assayed l
drums may be combined to a' more condensed storage if appropriate assay / weight guidelines are satisfied Rotary Shear Shredder:
1 The rotary shear shreddec is used for two basic operations: (1) non-combustible scrap volume reduction prior to shipping to a waste processor and eventual burial, and (2) shredding combustibles such as filter boards and assorted large plastic pieces (i.e. polypaks, hard hats, Lexan sheets) prior to incineration.
Non-combustible, non-metallics designated for volume reduction are verified free of visible contamination, or decontaminated as necessary. Decontamination is generally not a consideration (i.e. refractory brickj, but can be accomplished by hand cleaning the material (i.e. large plastic pieces) in the URRS Decon/ Cutting j
Room or Sorting Hood. Once the material is judged to be clean, it is staged for cither shredding or compaction in 55 gallon drums.
l To prepare absolute (ABS) filters (HEPA and intermediate filters) for it.cineration, the filters are changed and surveyed for disposition. Dirty filters are segregated into two catuories; those containing 15 g "U/10 liters, and those 235 greeter. Filters that are 15 g U/10 liters may be staged in a close-pack array; 235 filters reading >) g U/10 liters should be staged with a 12 inch minimum spacing between bagged filters. These filters are not shredded, but sent to the URRS Decon/ Cutting Room for disassembly..any filter bundle not marked as to 235 survey cout:t are assumed >5 g U/10 liters and are not shredded. IFBA-source j
l filters are stored in the IFBA area until ready for disposal in URRS.
The shredding operation proceeds as follows: Operetors place a drum onto the feed elevator which lifts the drum and dumps its contents into the shredder feed hopper. The material is shredded, falling into one of two receiver drums.
Following the shredding operation, the material in the receiver drums may be compacted. For non-combustibles, the full receiver drums are weighed and 235 assayed to determine g U content, and then staged for dumping-into a compaction box for shipment to GTS Duratek and eventual burial. For filters, 235
' the two full receiver drums are weighed and assayed to determine g U content, and staged for incineration.
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Incineration:
Low-level radioactive combustible scrap at the Columbia plant is incinerated to permit the recovery of uranium and to minimize the volume of waste disposed of at licensed burial grounds. This incineration process consists of primary and secondary combustion chambers, off-gas scrubbing and filtration system, and an ash transfer milling and leaching system. The off-gas filtration and ash leaching systems are described and analyzed in other Safety Evaluations.
The URRS incinerator is a controlled air, gas-fled unit with two chambers.
The lower ignition chamber operates at a somewhat lower temperature than the upper combustion chamber.
System controls for ignition chamber draft (negative pressure), temperature of lower / upper chambers and exhaust filter house HEPA filter pressure drop are provided to ensure safe and efficient operation.
Typical incinerator solid feed materials include uranium contaminated paper, shoe covers, gloves, mops, plastic bags, tape, and fiberboard containers. There is a semi-automatic ash removal system at the rear cf the ignition chamber.
Paper bags filled with contaminated combustible wastes are delivered to the incinerator area where they are monitored for metal, assayed for U content, 235 and weighed (mass control). The amount of waste and associated U charged 235 to the incinerator are limited for criticality safety purposes. A limit of 100 g 235U may be charged to the incinerator at one time, and a total of 1,386 g U
235 may be charged to the incinerator during a " burn" campaign. The inc
.Itor operator must ensure the feed dmm is controlled and used only for transporting feed materials from the staging area in the UF bay to the incinerator. Nothing 6
is to be added to the drum until it is moved back to the UF bay. When uranium-bearing, nan-hazardous, liquid waste (i.e. oil, ethylene glycol) is to be burned, small amounts of it are manually added to the bagged waste just prior tolhe waste being loaded into the incinerator feed system. Likewise, materials sucn as conpor resin, zirc-contaminated shavings or fines, floor sludge, sanitary sludge and kerosene may be charged to the incinerator in limited quantities and with appropriate handling.
After placing the trash inside the incinerator charging bay, trash loading to the incinerator is started with remote controls to sequence the closing of the outer door, opening the inner door and pushing the trash into the incinerator. The lower chamber burner and ash pile are readily observed from the viewport on the lower chamber door. The incinerator operator will manually stir the ash pile inside the lower chamber to ensure volume reduction and a complete trash burn. Additional trash charging is made, making sure that the material charged for a particular " burn" does not exceed the mass control limits.
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An operator rakes the ash from the lower chamber into the ash cleanout chute, l
where a ram pushes it toward a cooling chamber. After allowing the ash to l
cool, the operator rakes the ash into an elevator skip bucket which delivers it up i
to a ventilated hood where metal is sorted out. This is the beginning of the Ash Handling process.
The incinerator off-gas is treated by scrubbing and filtration. Exhaust gases are i
drawn from the upper combustion chamber and enter a quench tower where they are cooled by a spray of recirculating scrubber solution. The gases are drawn from the quench tower through a venturi scrubber and thc.La packed scrubber where scrubber solution falls through the column packmg material, counter-current to the gas flow. The scrubber solution is treated with sodium hydroxide to maintain a slightly acidic pH, pumped through a bank of cartridge filters, and cooled using a heat exchanger.
Eress scrubber solution is j
automatically or manually transferred to liquid waste treatment. Off-gases from the packed scrubber (covered under another Safety Evaluation) pass through a condeuer and a " knock-out" tank to reduce the moisture in the gas stream.
The condensed liquid is returned to the scrubber system for reuse.
Ash Handling:
i As indic sted, incinerator ash is cooled and conveyed to a ventilated hoo.1 where tramp metal is sorted out. This is the beginning of the Ash Handling process.
The ash is then milled for size reduction. This milling is typically done in two stages. Primary milling involves use of a Fitzmill comminuting (hammermill) machine. The secondary milling, if needed, is done using a Mikro-Pulverizer.
l The milling system ventilation is provided by a Torit Downflo Cartridge Filter i
System.
The cooled ash drops from the elevator skip bucket into a chute. The chute extends into a ventilated hood and has a disch...ge trap door. With the Fitzmill running, the operator opens the trap door, allowing the ash to flow onto a sorting screen. A vibrator with foot pedal control is mounted on the e evator discharge chute to promote ash flow. The operator inspects the ash for tramp metal using a magnet and visual inspection. The metal is removed, put in a polypak and staged for disposal. Material passing through the sorting screen drops into the mill feed throat, through the rotor chamber and discharges into a polypak. The milling action is achived by the impact of high-speed hammers, l
and the forcing of the ash onto a mill throat breaker plate and through a perforated screen.
Ash is fed to the Fitzmill until the "polypak full" alarm is activated; the mill will shut off automatically. Milling will continue until the ash chute is empty.
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The milled ash is staged for either acid leaching (dissolution) or pulverizing using the Mikro-Pulverizer.
The operator puts a polypak with milled ash to be pulverized into the Pulverizer hood. Using gloveports, the operator removes the lid from the polypak and mat tally empties the solids onto the impact surface of a vibratory feeder. The feed 'r moves the solids along a screen. The " oversize" solids travel the length of tLe screen and fall into another polypak. Solids passing through the screen are vibrated into the pulverizer inlet chute above the pulverizer feed screw. A l
level of solids is maintained above the feed screw to prevent blowback into the hood by sequencing the operation of the pulverizer feed screw and vibratory feeder. The feed screw pushes the solids into the pulverizer chamber. A l
retaining screen at the bottom of this chamber controls the particle size of the product. Air also enters the pulverizing chamber through 2 ports located on either side of the chamber. Solids passing through the retaining screen fall i
through a discharge chute, sliding gate valve and associated ductwork, and are collected in the fines polypak. When the fines polypak is full, the feed screw I
motor stops but the pulverizer motor continues to operate.
After the full polypak is removed and replaced with an empty polypak, the filling cycle is repeated.
l The pulverized ash is staged for acid leaching (dissolution). The " oversize" material is staged for remilling through the Fitzmill.
The air entering the pulverizing chamber of the Pulverizer is vented from the l
discharge chute through 2 ports on either side of the conical hopper, which is connected to a filtration system (Torit Downflo Cartridge Filter System). The Torit system also provides ventilation for Fitzmill and Mikro-Pulverizer hoods and enclosures. Torit fm' es are collected in a polypak. This material is staged for processing through the acid leaching process (dissolution).
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Compaction:
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A low pressure compactor is used to compact designated scrap for volume reduction. The compactor is generally used for compacting light gauge metals (i.e. wire, alaminum from filters) that are unacceptable for " metal melt" disposition, but not for combustible materials, trash, or absolute filters. The compactor may also be used to compact drums that are to be dispositioned for metal melt.
The drum of scrap is positioned into the compactor. Compaction is limited to only slightly contaminated LLRW. Metal bars or pieces that might penetrate the drum are not to be compacted. The compactor ram is activated witen the 1
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compactor door is closed. Material compaction is continued until the drum is full with compacted scrap, but not to exceed a 500-pound gross weight limit for the Assay Station. The drum of compacted scrap is staged for weighing and then assayed to confirm contents does not exceed 104 g U (criticality control 235 limit), and then readied for shipment for eventual burial.
Generally, this category of material will have a very low assay result (<10 g U) and a 235 weight of <250 pounds.
Decon/ Cutting Room:
The Decon/ Cutting Room is used for the decontamination, cutting and dismantling of equipment.
Occasionally, materials decontaminated in the Decon/ Cutting Room are released for transfer to the outside, on-site storage areas (i.e. Low-Level Waste Storage Building, trailers, pads). Large metal pieces are cut into sizes small enough for subsequent decontamination and disposal. Two electric driven saws are used for assorted sheet metal, pipe ard HEPA filter dismantling. Two different torches are used to cut other, ver/
large metal pieces; a p;asma torch is used to cut stainless steel; a natural gas / oxygen torch is used to cut other scrap metals. Torch burning is also used to remove paint and corrosion from these non-flammable materials. Also, all areas of an item that would be inaccessible to survey for contamination is cut out.
A Torit Downflo Filter System is provided for room / work station ventilation.
l Material collected from the Torit system is dispositioned as contaminated scrap, l
and brought to Scrap Reprocessing for oxidizing.
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Liquid Honing:
j Non-combustible scrap classified as large, heavy metal pieces is segregated for decontamination using liquid honing. Paint and corrosion should be removed prior to liquid honing; this is done in the Decon/ Cutting Room. Very large pieces to be cleaned are cut up in the Cutting Room before being sent to the honing booth for decontamination. Parts cleaned in the Liquid Honing Booth are generally expected to be disposed of as either " free release" on " metal melt."
The URRS liquid honing process removes surface contamination along with surface finishes, including portions of base metals being decontaminated. The system consists of an enclosed walk-in work chamber which contains one operator station with rubber glove ports, safety glass sight window, and control console.
Small parts to be cleaned are staged on the booth grating at the glove port station.
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i The booth has a dow which allows for the entrance of large parts on a trolley along with an operator for interior cleaning.
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i The Honing process uses a closed loop system to circulate an abrasive media I
slurry ofinert alumina and water. The media slurry is pumped through a mixing chamber to the process decontamination guns. After removal of surface debris and contamination, the slurry mixture is returned to the sump for recirculation and reuse. A ganuna monitor is i.. stalled externally on each of the two sump chambers to assure criticality safety. A passive overflow precludes overfilling the
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sump.
The surface finish obtained on the parts and aggressiveness of the cleaning action are irfinitely variable by the operator across the equipment operating range. The lubricating action of the water buffers the action of the abrasive media and also prevents the surface debris removed from becoming airborne.
The station sump is initially filled with water, with over-flow water draining to a settling tank (weir box). A prescribed amount of honing media is added to the sump. Water is added to sump until weir box 5 full. The weir box is maintained near-full during operation to ensure sufficient water for rinsing parts, trolley and grating. An air-operated pump is used to circulate the rinse water. An abrasive
" blast" pump is uwd to circulate water and media for parts honing. For " walk-in" cleaning operation, a " dead-man gun" is used, with safety-trigger control of flow of media and blast air. For small parts washing from the outside operator station, a " blast gun" with separate air regulator is used.
A cyclone separator is supplied, mounted inside the enclosure, to separate used abrasive media and debris from the water. This operation is performed when the basic charge of abrasive media has broken down and it is noted that the cleaning effectiveness has been reduced and more time is required to complete a cleaning operation and/or when the contamination increases to an activity level approaching' 3x10-5 pCi/cc. Cycloning the solids out of the sump will usually decrease the contamination level significantly and the water in the equipment may be retained and nixed with a new charge of abrasive media. The solids are spun-out and discharged through the bottom of the cyclone separator into a bucket placed on the grating.
The spent grit is disposed of as combustible trash. Eventually the water will also have to be replaced as determined by contamination level. The Honing Booth water is pumped from the weir box, through a cartridge filter, to one of the two Parts Washer Check Tanks, sampled, and pumped to the contaminated sump if 4
<3x10 pCi/cc; if not, the water is filtered using the Parts Washer filter press until below this release limit.
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Ultrasonic Cleanirg:
The URRS ultrasonic cleaning system is designed to remove surface contamination on small parts and metallic waste that would otherwise be discarded for burial, but may be cleaned sufficiently well for free release or metal melt.
The system uses ultrasonic power to remove surface contamination. The addition of nitric acid or other cleaning agents or "decon chemicals" to the bath water l
facilitates the cleaning. Nitric acid will also etch surface finishes and remove I
portions of base metals being decontaminated.
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The Ultrasonic Cleaner (UT) converts electrical energy at an ultrasonic i
l frequency into mechanical sound energy for cleaning through magnetostrictive l
transducers metallically fused to the bottom of the cleaning chamber. The electrical energy is supplied by the generator station. The energy from the i
transducers is coupled into the cleaner solution through the diaphragm of the sonic chamber to produce intense cavitation in the solution. Cavitation is the creating of hollow particle vacuole bubbles in the cleaning solution. It is the imploding action occurring when the cavitation bubbles collapse against the surfaces of the item being cleaned that produces the scrubbing action. The ultrasonic action also generates substantial heat energy, resulting in an increase in bath temperamre. The increasing of bath temperature enhances cavitation deaning effectiveness.
The UT system' essentially consists of two basin sinks and a filter press, through which the water and cleaning agent from either tank is circulated as needed.
Each tank has a high level overflow, and any tank overflow is drained to the floor which has a 4" high curb. Each tank is also equipped with a gamma monitor for activating an emergency (high-high activity at 5 g "U/ liter) dump 2
valve drain, and a low-level probe interiocked to stop both ultrasonic transducers of the affected tank and the system pump. A high gamma alarm sounds a horn and engages a panel light at 1 g "U/ liter.
2 The basins are filled to a prescribed level with city water. Nitric acid or decon chemical is added to the wash tank per engineer's instructions. A ventilation system is provided to service all system hoods designed to capture water vapor and chemical fumes emitting from work areas.
Putting parts in the tank should not result in liquid overflow; but if there is excess liquid in the tank, it is pumped to the fluoride stripping system feed tank for uranium recovery. If the water in either tank is dirty oi discolored, it is recirculated through a filter press until it is clear and void of parta:les. If the water cannot be cleaned, it is pumped to the fluoride stripping system fee.d tank for uranium recovery, and fresh city water and cleaning agent are added, if the fluoride stripping system feed tank cannot receive solution, or if the liquid Initial Issue Date:
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4 discharge is small, the solution may be transferred into a pail or other favorable j
geometry container and delivered to Scrap Reprocessing.
Metal parts to be cleaned are placed in one of several perforated cleaning baskets and lowered into the wash tank using an overhead hoist. After a specified washing time, the parts are raised from the tank and rinsed with water.
The basket is momentarily placed on the drain table, then lowered into the rinse tank. The iinse tank water is pumped from the tank, through a filter press, and returned to the rinse tank until visibly clean. Again, the basket is raised to permit rinsing of the parts. The basket is placed on the final drain table. The parts may be air-dried in the basket, or removed to dry on the sorting table.
Scrap Zircaloy tubing is commonly cleaned using the Ultrasonic Cleaner. To facilitate cleaning of the tubing, the tubes are first split using a machine called a Tube Crusher. The 3/8" tubes have a cut length of about 3 feet. These are fed, one at a time, into he crusher feed fixture that directs the tube through a set of dual rollers that split the tube. The two tube halves exit a discharge fixture, falling into a receptacle (i.e. drum). After UT cleaning, the split zire tubes are surveyed by REO personnel for free release for sale to a processor for the steel industry. The free released zire may also be shipped to Western Zirconium for needed add-back material to their smelting process.
Parts Washer:
The parts wasi Ng system is designed to clean parts for either " free-release,"
" metal meh"
(>
uranium reduction. Presently, the primary use of the Parts Washer is for cleaning weld slag to achieve " metal melt" disposition. The washing machine can accept washing trays for parts of various sizes. A sink is provided to remove gross contamination before taking parts to the washer. A washing tray full of parts to be cleaned is manually loaded to the washer. The last tray of washed parts is' removed manually from the rinsing section of the machine. City water is used for parts cleaning, with two heaters in series used to heat the water.
The washer and rinse sink discharges drain to an open reservoir tank (stand-pipe). This tank is also used to collect drained liquid from the systen filter press; the liquid is poured into the tank with a strainer basket in place. No other liquids are to added to this tank. An air-operated pump is used te send this wash and/or rinse tank water to either of two Check Tanks. Th.: tank contents is circulated through a filter press before sampling for activity. The solution is released for discharge to the contaminated sump if the activity is 4
<3x10 pCi/ce; filtering is continued as needed. Tne Check Tanks are also Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
12 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0_
used to stage contaminated solution from the Liquid Honing Booth weir box for filtering and sampling prior to discharge to the contaminated sump.
Grit Blaster:
The system described here is not yet operational. The intended purpose of the Grit Blaster is to serve as another liquid honing process for cleaning small metal items to " metal melt" release limits. The specific system proposed may be used for cleaning moly boats for repair rather than being cleaned in the larger liquid honing booth previously described. The Grit Blaster may also be used to clean other small parts for like utility or free-release.
As with the honing booth, the Grit Blaster ejects a mixture of abrasive particles and water in a circulated system from a special gun at high velocity and is directed against the object to be treated.
Procedures and Drawings Key procedures and drawings for these LLRW Processing Systems are identified in the tables below:
Trash CoIIection:
5 PROCEDURN NO.
' TITLE <
COP-831001 Handling, Processing, & Disposing LLRS COP-831007 Sorting Hood Operation COP-831016 Metal Detector Operation COP-836033 Combustible Trash Collection Scale System COP-841000 IAw-Level Radioactive Scrap Handling COP-843002 Control of Non-Favorable (leometry (NFG) Containers in the Chemical Area ROP-01-004 Pac 4-G Operation ROP-01-009 Geiger Counter Model E-120
,n%.
.4 i>>
k DRAWING NO.
^
- TITLE 500F03AR01-1 Equipment Arrgmt. Bay 1-2 & BB-CC 500F03AR01-2 Equipment Arrgmt. Bay 1-2 & AA-BB
$00F03AR20-2 Equipment Arrgmt. Bay 1-101 & AA-BB Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
13 Revision Date:
Revision No. _O
l
\\
Assay Operations:
-J T.
'iTITLE E 4I 1 PROCEDURE NOU i
l COP-830251 Standard and Replicate Checks for SGS/Q2 l
COP-831001 Handling, Processing, & Disposing LLRS COP-831012 Operation of Canberra Segmented Gamma Scanner (SGS)
COP-835510 Operation of Canberra Q System 2
1 COP-843002 Control of Non-Favorable Geometry (NFG) Containers in the l
Chemical Area
?#..
...a...t
?
I 7 DRAWING NO.-
iTITLE E-500F03AR01-2 Equipment Arrgmt. Bay 1-2 & AA-BB Rotary Shear Shredder:
l A w 2;h :,..
/ PROCEDURE NO!
- TITLE:
COP-814610 Pigtail Disposal COP-815003 Cleaning Absolute Filters and Prefilters COP-831001 Handling, Processing & Disposing LLRS COP-831013 Shredder Operating Procedure COP-841000 Ixw-Level Radioactive Scrap Handling i
l COP-843002 Control of Nonfavorable Geometry (NFG) Containers in the Chemical Area
)
MCP-108110 Changing In-Plant Absolute (HEPA), Intermediate and Pre-Filters ROP-05-008 Surveying Filtration Devices for "U 2
l pir t -.
1.....
[
', ' ' 'Ih3 -
4,~
b ' DRAWING NO.' -
O.' TITLE 500F03AR01-1 Equipment Arrgmt. Bay 1-2 & BB-CC 500F03AR01-2 Equipment Arrgmt. Bay 1-2 & AA-BB Incineration:
~.......
- . i,, '
~
- 1..
-g
~
O PROCEDigg NOf
.1
. TITLES '
s COP-830210 Incinerator Operation COP-831001 Handling, Processing & Disposing LLRS COP-836033 Combustible Trash Collection Scale System l
CCP-841000 Low-Level Radioactive Scrap Handling j
COP-843002 Control of Nonfavorable Geometry (NFG) Containers in the Chemical 1
Area Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
14 l'
Revision Date:
Revision No.
0 1
~
l
DRA NG NO.
TITLE 304F01EQ01 Incinerator Area Contactor Tube and Quench Pot Details 304F01EQO2 Incinerator Absorber and Water Weir Details 304F01EQ06 Incinerator Refractory Layout 304F01EQ12 Incinerator Lower Chamber Air Tube and Hearth Modifications j
304F0lHV02 Incinerator Upper Chamber to Quench Column Cross Over 304F0lPI01-1.2 Incinerator Burner Controls & Instrumentation List 304F01P102-1-4 Incinerator Off-Gas 304F01P103 Incinerator Valve & Instrument List 304F0lP104 Incinerator Door Vent P&lD 304F06EQO2-1 Incinerator Ash Handling System 304F06EQO2-3 Incinerator Cooling Chamber Detail 304F06EQO2-4 Incinerator Skip Bucket Frame 30$F06EQ02-5 Skip Bucket Details 304F06EQO2-6 Incinerator Skip Bucket and Hopper Details 500F03 AR02-3,4 Equipment Arrangement Bay 2-3 & A-BB S10-0470-D Metaullics Systems Co. L.P. Drawing, Model 10-168 Impervite Heat Exchanger S-111-C-18B Metaullics Systems Co.
L.P.
Drawing, " Alternate Vertical &
Horizontal Movable Supports, Series "BC" Heat Exchangers" Ash Recovery:
PROCEDURE NO.-
' TITLE COP.C30210 Incinerator Operation COP-830219 Torit Downflo Cartridge Filter - Startup, Operation, & Shutdown COP-830220 Mikro Pulverizer - Startup, Operation, and Shutdown COP-836032 Fitzmill Startup, Operation, and Shutdown y
4# DRAWING NO.
- TITLEi 304F01EQ15 incinerator Fitzmill Model V-DAS06-SSB 304F06EQO2, 2, 3, 9,12 Ash Handling System 304F09EQ01,1-6 Ash Handling Hood 30$F09EQO2 Pulverizer Sound Enclosure 500F03AR02-2,3 Equipment Arrgmt. Bay 2-3 & A-BB 21914-D MikroPul Drawing, "2 Mikro Pulverizer" D-214133 FMC Syntron, Link-Belk & Aseeco Products Drawing, " General Arrangement SFH-22 Feeder with Spec.12"Wx62" LG. Trough" Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
15 Revision Date:
Revision No. _O
Compactor:
' tPROCEDURE NO.-
~
{-q Llt'; y a,
TITLE" COP-831001 Handling, Processing, & Disposing LLRS COP-831006 LLRS Low Pressure Compactor COP-843002 Control of Non-Favorable Geometry (NFG) Containers in the Chemical Area o,
..... -U
.J Jni i DRAWING NO.2 FTITLE ? W r
500F03AR01-1 Equipment Arrgmt. Bay 1-2 & BB-CC Decan/ Cutting Room:
l o>t
,f l
^ PROCEDURE NO.:
- J2 ETITLE 3 P.
a COP-831007 Sorting Hood Operation COP-836020 Operation of Plasma Torch COP-836021 Operation of Natural Gas / Oxygen Cutting Torch l
COP-836022 Cutting Room Ventilation Downflo Cartridge Filter }:ouse
.e~,
? DRAWING NO;
' TITLEl 500F03AR20-1 Equipment Arrgmt. Bay 1-101 & BB-CC 500F03AR20-2 Fquipment Arrgmt. Bay 1-101 & AA-BB t
Liquid Honing:
i
~i..
- M m
TI LEM TPROCEDURE NO.'
COP-831001 Handling, Processing & Disposing LLRS COP-831014 Liquid Honing COP-841000 low-Level Radioactive Scrap Handling
?DRAWIN'G N'
.J
+
Ie iTITLE E
O 372F02PIO3 Liquid Honing & Aux. Equipment P&ID 500F03AR19-1 Equipment Arrgmt. Bay 101-102 & BB-CC Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
16 Revision Date:
Revision No. _O
Ultrasonic Cleanira:
' n;.
Az 1 PRO' CEDdRE NO.NO
-l TITL5! " "
COP-831001 llandling, Processing & Disposing LLRS COP-836029 Tube Crushing Station COP-836030 Ultrasonic Cleaning Station for Metallic Parts Free Release or Reuse COP-841000 low-Level Radioactive Scrap Handling COP-843002 Control of Non-Favorable Geometry (NFG) Containers in the Chemical Area RA-402 Material Transfer to LLRW Storage ROP-02-0N Abandonment or Disposition of Material or Equipment W
?d.f M DRAWING NOM
- TITLE t 372F02EQN Ultrasonic Cleaning - Wash Hood 372F02EQ05 Ultrasonic Cleaning - Rinse flood 372F02EQ07 Perferated Cleaning Basket 372F02EQ08 Ultrasonic Cleaning Wash Tank T-984 372F02EQ09 Ultrasonic Cleaning Wash Rinse T-985 372F02P101 Ultrasonic Cleaning P&lD 372F02PP02 Ultrasonic Cleaning Piping Plan 372F02EQ10 Ultrasonic Cleaning Drainboard & Table 372F0211V02-1,2 Ultrasonic Cleaning Ventilation Elevation 500F03AR19-1 Equipment Arrgmt. Bay 102-103 & BB-CC 500F03AR19-2 Equipment Arrgmt. Bay 101-102 & BB-CC 4
I Parts Washer:
M i PROCEDURE NO.'
, TITLE 4 COP-831015 Operation of Parts Washer COP-843002 Control of Movable NFG Containers in the Chemical Area e-4 ETITLE '
? DRAWING NO.
372F02PIM Parts Wash:r P&lD l
Grit Blaster:
This system is not yet operational.
Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
17 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0 i
The following Vapor-Blast Manufacturing Co. drawings were reviewed for the CSE.
' Gi
<-A
.3..,...
- i. DRAWING NO.
TITLE ~
C49-35 Floor Plan & Utilities Connection Dwg D55-290 General Assembly of Spec. 3030 VELH Machine C87-1583 Air Slurry & Hydro-Cyclonic Rinse Piping C87-1584 Fresh Water Rinse & Drain Piping Diagram A82453 Exhaust Collection Tank for 5" Fan D125-94 2" Dia. Tumbling Barrel Sub Assembly l
l 1
I Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
18 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0
p_
l i
l Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls l
To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment l
i l
Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
19 Revision Date:
Revision No.
O
Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees Trash Collection Control Parameters and Safety Limits:
4 i
Control Parameters
{
dry combustible trash
(
- mass
)
wet combustible trash
. mass Safety Limits See Table 1 (Dry)
See Table 2 (Wet)
Bounding Assumptions: (From Table in SNM-1107)
Heterogeneous UO2 plastic - moderated (Dry)
Homogeneous H2O - water moderated (wet)
Partial water-equivalent reflection all around e
l
- 5.0 wt% enrichment Controls Safety Significant Controls Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) l Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output. The requirements for functional verification are determit:ed by this evaluation.
- e VRg
%Wo6th/
~?F R$0cedute. %
Penet. "/Verif.? laitistlag6g J h$ f Afb Oeddnn/h.;$ 1ib 's 3n?
4 NassC$ lis Ra'falsedN F-
'. Event (IB) Ndd
%QD %qff
'"J " gln, jgg WW m.*
'a
" "'*: A AC-DRY-1-01 Prevent mass limit from being COP-836033 yes DRY-5,6 exceeded /
Trash collection scale fails and operators do not detect /
Operator conduct regular checks
(
Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
20 l
Revision Date:
Revision No. _0 t
AC-DRY-1-02 Prevent mass hmit from being COP-836033 yes DRY.7 exceeded /
Trash collection scale light comes on at HI level /
Operator stops filling drum AC-DRY-1-03 Prevent mass limit from being COP-836033 yes DRY-8 exceeded /
Trash collection scale alarm sounds at HI HI level /
Operator notifies Team Manager, fills out Redbook repor' Administrative controls Safety Significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These
]
controls may require documentation via Control.P.orm or some other record.
j Functional veriGcation is not normally required.
%%$CititMBRaell0lifgp"f' mW Pmosilme:^My~ 'PteethVerifg Initiating n,;;j' MPD h-WiM M '@MG '
14eeder kastuited^ "
' Event (IE)Noi
~
- t"'
p,
.n S#
e n f " My Wpfpp ;&A < gggggij e
A-DRY-1-01
-Prevent mass limit from being COP-84100 No DRY-1 exceeded /
Gross uranium or pellets in trash /
Area aperators ensure no gross j
uranium or pellets in trash A-DRY-1-02 Prevent mass limit from being COP-831003 DRY-3 exceeded /
Gross uranium or pellets in trash /
URRS operators ensure no gross uranium or pellets in trash A-WET-1-01 Prevent excessive mass in URRS COP-841000 WET-1 drum /
I Wet trash reach-s drum without caked-on material removed /
i Operators remove caked-on material A-WET-1-02 Prevent excessive mass M URRS COP-841000 WET-2 drum /
Wet trash reaches URRS drum without being washed /
Area operators wash wet trash before taking to URRS Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the trash collection process is evaluated to be very strong. - Calculations performed indicate that k rr s 0.95 for all normal e
operating conditions and expected process upsets. Further, for any credible process upset, or series of credible process upsets which result in a contingency, k,,,is less than 0.98.
Initial Issue Date: _31 MAR 99 Page No.
21 Revision Date:
Revision No. _O 4
The parameter that directly affects neutron multiplication for wet and dry combustible trash is mass. Criticality safety limits (CSLs) and Bounding Assumptions (BA) have been established. A criticality would be possible with combustible trash given the following conditions:
e combustible crash contains excessive amounts of uranium which is not detected by an operator, and it is placed in a drum such that the safety limit is exceeded.
Noncombustible trash does not pose a criticality concern.
1 l
l o
Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
22 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0
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DRY COMBUSTIBLE TRASII CRITICAUTY POSSIEtLE I
i
<camCAuTyPneCunson >
1 GREATER THAN THE SAFETY LIMITS OF MASS.
MODERATOR, AND GEOMETRY j
" II MODERATOR CONFIGURAT)Oh y
DEFENSES Fall DtiFENSES FAIL wA wA g
ST@d E '.',.4 N 1p;p ?
<ep &A 4. g......y a
i
.( $
a Fadure Of Controts To Prevent Fanure Of Controls To Prevent Excessive Amount Of Uranium TotalWeigtt Of Drum From From Gothng into Combustibie Reacidng OthcaMy UmM (11g Trash Bags tt )
]
. 4 ada=== Fua e -
e,. '
- aasumallFalL13 J me==
Faiure Of Contrais To Prevent f ailure Of Controts to Prevent Use Of Malfunchoning Scale Operator From Overfilling A Drum NA Reaching The a easumt rama s
-l Criticamy limit
' s BansuBR FAa,$ = "
J l'
I I
operator rens is Scale Falls Detect With Daily Check (DRY-6)
Q L"J l
i AC Operator Fan To Operator Falls To St P M
St p At HI Leve AC-DRY-141 (DRY.7)
(DRY 4)
Area Operatore Fall To Kee Transpr1ng URR$ Operators Operators Fall To Fall To Notke Metal Detector Excess W touce Excessive >
Excessively Heav, Falls To Detect AC gg Uranham Out Of Heavy Bage Bage (Metals On%)
g ACORY-1-02 (DRY 2)
(DRY 4)
(DRY 4)
DRY M (DRY 1)
M)RY141 METAL Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page F:.
25 Revision Date:
Revision No.
O t
P l
l NON-URRS GENERATED WET COMBUSTIBLE TRASII l
CRITICALITY POSSIBLE I
l
< CRITICALITY PftECURSOR >
GREATER THAN THE SAFETY LIMITS OF MASS, MODERATOR. AND GEOMETRY MASS DEFENSES MONTOR CNIGURATIM pggg DEFENSES FAIL DEFENSES FAIL l
N/A N/A l
l g sD l
% %18 1
E.IS'k
,MUiMllN ?S 4 " S:gt;. y b.
b :.f., c '. ". WWi
(
4 v.
l Y
f Fadure Of Controls To Remove 8
Excessive Uranium From Wet Failure Of Controls To Prevent Combustible Trash Total Weight Of Drum From Reaching 300 lb
., m,g
~esamuutFMI.8m 8
I l
Aro.eper tore 1
I i
Fall To Remove Trans, porting Operator Fails To Fall To Send Wet Caked @
Operatore Fall To Stop 8efore 300 Trash To Wuhig Uranium Froen N W ee Grose Lb. Gross j
Ma hlw Trash Contamination On i
Wet Tresh OAfET-4)
MT-2)
(WET 3)
A-WET-101 AWET 142 1
Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
26 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0
Assay System Criticality in the assay systems is not a concern. The two assay systems are used for determining the "U content of LLRW prior to further processing. Proper assay is 2
crucial to ensuring an acceptable margin of safety for the downstream LLRW processes.
This section describes the two assay systems, their application, and measurement cortrol Rotary ShearShredder Control Parameters and Safety Limits:
Control Parameters e mass Safety Limits e See Tab;.
Bounding Assumptions: (From Table in SNM-1107)
Homogeneous UO2 Optimum H2O moderation e
Partial water-equivalent reflection all around 5.0 wt% enrichment Controls l
Safety Significant Controls Administrative controls Safety Significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record. Functional verification is not normally required.
4%l3Wgpggefy' kjh /3 W,$. ', I NM s.M(ggggn, ' M' M-f5 N 'NEc:
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A-SIID 1 Maintenance Properly Surveys and MCP-108110 none SilD l-3 Sorts Filters A-SHD 2 Operators shred only HEPA filters COP-831001 none SIID 4 marked " < 5" Initial Issue Da'e:
31 MAR 99_,
Page No..
27 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0
1 Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the shredding system is evaluated to be very l
strong. This evaluation has determined that a criticality due to accumulation of fissile material while shredding non-combustibles is not credible. Therefore, criticality is credible, though unlikely, only while shredding ABS filters.
Note that the current practice is not to shred any HEPA filters at all, but to disassemble them in a ventilated hood in order to separate the non-combustible aluminum foil from the combustible material.' The combustible material is then loaded into drums (see Section l
5.3.1), assayed, and incinerated. Powder that comes loose during disassembly is collected in a polypak. The aluminum is treated as non-combustible.
The parameters that directly affect neutron multiplication for the shredding system, assuming 5.0 wt% 2"U enrichment, is mass. Double contingency protection consists of preventing ABS filters with excessive SNM from getting to the shredder, and then preventing accumulation m the shredder system, most likely in the receiver drums.
Criticality safety limits (CSLs) and Bounding Assumptions (BA) are established for mass. A criticality would be possible in the shredder system given the following combinations of credible process upsets:
Sufficient material at optimum density gets into the shredder and sufficient moderator is introduced such that the powder is at optimum moderation, and the mixture forms a spherical configuration either in the feed hopper, the shredder, or one of the receiver drums.
1 1
Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
28 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0 l
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i R^TARY SHEAR SHREDDER 1
rRmcAUTY POS$18LE I
< CRITICAUTY PRECURSOR >
OREATER THAN THE SAFETY UMITS OF MASS, MODERATOR, A.ND GEOMETRY I
I MODERATOR MASS CONFIGURATION DEFENSES DEFENSES FAIL DEFENSES Fall FAIL N/A NI
@%f/MM ma
. n.:
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,3 F AILUF.E TO PREVENT A GROUP OF ABS FAILURE TO PREVENT GREATER THAN THE FILTERS WITH TOYAL MASS U GREATER TH(N SAFETY LIMIT OF MASS IN A GROUP Cf THE SAFETY LIMIT OF MASS FROM BECOMING ABS FILTERS FROM ACCUMULATING AVAILABLE TO THE SHREDDER.
EITHER IN THE FEEDER HOPPER OR THE RECEIVER DPUMS
- c M PAES > '
' < BARRIER FAILS
- 1 m
1 i
n A Group Of ABS Fmers With Tatst URRS Operator Opwater MeseUL w FeNo To Detect Overbatches Dperator Allowe ThenThe W Melntenance F.,all.e y, g,,,,,,,
g
=>g=FmeroAnd SN Pvtor Receiver Drume Limit Of Mene le
, Operator Error gu,,,y e peers For stages Them For To Activation Of To Overnli O'n**L InMrument P*dermiaS Diosamenewy Shredene Shrth McNuneson Surveys On AB (SHD T)
Faers (SHD 4)
(SHD 5)
(SHD 8)
(SHD 1,2)
(SHD 3)
- 6 o
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A4HD401 A-SHD 142 A-SHD-144 Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
30 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0 J
t incinerator Control Parameters and Safety Limits:
Control Parameters e mass Safety Limits e See Table 4 I
Bounding Assumptions: (From Table in SNM-1107) l Homogeneous UO2 e
Optimum H2O moderation e
Partial Reflection e
5.0 wt% enrichment e
Controls Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (ACj Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation, coppgmas g,w y
,?j@
Pnmedes.. ~ > Peopteverif;.Initiming dyj h.
M5 6g i '
See Trash Collection Controls IE# INC 1 (Sect 5.3.1)
AC-ASY-X-01
-Prevent unqualified operator from COP-831012 IE# ASY l using Assay System COP-835510
- unqualified operator uses System
-assay system will not allow operator to proceed AC-ASY-X-02
-ensure accurate measurements COP-831012 IE# INC 4
-out of range instruments may give COP-335510 inaccurate measurements COP-830251
-operators perform required Daily or FNMC Weekly calibration checks or standards and replicates checks AC-ASY-X-03
-ensure accurate measurements COP-831012 IE# ASY 5
-uncalibrated instruments may give COP-835510 inaccurate measurements COP-830251
-Operators perform required FNMC calibrations Administrative controls Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
31 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0
1 Safety Significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.
Functional verification is not normally required.
c ajgpgr y {
gg1 "
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- vi ~ >
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n See Trash Collection Controls IE# INC 1 (Sect 5.3.1)
A-ASY-X-01
-ensure accurate measurement COP-831012 IE# ASY 1
-Incorrect curve selected 10 times COP-835510 consecutively
-Proper Calibration Curve Selected A-ASY-X-02
-ensure accurate measurement FNMC IE# ASY 4,5
-Failure to calibrate
-Measurement Control Program
)
Ensures Proper Calibration A-ASY-X-03
-ensure accurate measurement FNMC IE# ASY 3 Calibration standards not maintained
-Calibration Standards Properly Fabricated and Maintained A-INC-1-01
-record correct assay value from COP-830210 no IE# INC 3 drum
-operator records incorrect value 2
-Operator Records correct gram "U data for each drum i
A INC-1-02
-ensure low manium concentration COP-830210 no IE# INC 3 i
in incinerator
-increase in uranium concentration in incinerator j
-Operator Limits Each Charge to 100 grams zug A-INC-1-03
-keep incir:rator grams "U below COP-830210 no IE# INC 3 2
safety limit
- grams "U exceeds safety limit 2
- Operator Terminates Burn at 1386 grams "U 2
A-INC-1-04
-ensure low u*anium mass in COP-830210 no IE# INC 4 incinerator
-operator allows ash to accumulate from one burn to another
-Operator Removes Ash Following Burn Margin of Safety Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
32 Revision Date:
Revision No. _O 4
{
l i
The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the incinerator system is evaluated to be very strong. Calculations indicate that k,y s 0.95 for all normal operating conditions. Further, for any credible process upset, k,, < 0.98.
The parameter that directly affects neutron multiplication for the incineratcr system, assuming 5.0 wt% 2"U enrichment, is mass. Nuclear criticality' safety consists of preventing high uranium concentration (or dcnsity) material from becoming available to the incinerator, and preventing an accumulation cf uranium in the incinerator that exceeds the safety limit for mass. The former is accomplished by keeping the wt% U in the combustible trash extremely low, and the Intter by limiting the total uranium mass in the incinerator (unburned material and ash) to less than the safety limit.. Criticality safety limits (CSLs) and Bounding Assumptions (BA) on the combustible trash are established for mass.
Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
33 Revision Date:
Revision No.
O i
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< CRITICALITY PRECURSOR k GREATER THAN THE SAFETY LIMITS OF MASS, MODERATCR, AND GEOMETRY I
I D FENS S F L DEFE Fall p g N/A N/A i
MODERATOR TO CONFIGURATION IS
(
INCINERATOR IS NOT NONFAVORABLE CONTROLLED DURING DURING NORMAL NORMAL OPERATIONS.
i OPERATIONS.
I
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PE~vig&M${hh
.t,_
4,a, LLRWANNEX
' DRAFT. DOC Page-1 3/31/99 i
Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
35 Revision Date:
Revision No.
O
1 I
1 INCINERATION i
i pFCGG9MWICY V"TS h-f5
.tl1 i i C.j%R r i.. i"W8 7gggggy Q j
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=
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QCOIMNTRATW115 r. S i
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. wqg s-,
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j Failure Of Controls To Prevern Groster Failure Of Controls To Prevent Greater I
Than The Minimum Critical Uranium Than The Safety Limit Of Uranium Concentration From Becomin0 Available To From Romaning in The incinerator The incinerator
= SARRIER Fall 5
- 4 BARRIER FAILSb '
$9 Contamination uurupie operators l
Screening Of Charge Deyond The Multip.e Operators Combustible A INC-1-01 Process Limitin A Fall To Remove i
Scrap Falls A INC-142 Single Burn Ash Before Safet)
A INC-103 Limit is Reached j
(INC 1)
(INC 3)
)
k Secten 5.3.1 A-(NC-1-04 Failurn of Controis to Prevent Failure of Controis to Prevent Use 10 Consecutive Drums From of Uncalibrated Assay System Being incorrectly Assayed
. s AARRIER FALe >
< SARfilER FAEa >
a a
g Failure To Perform Failure To Property l
l Fabricate And Required Failure to Perform Repeated Failure To Walntain Calibratior Calibration Checks Required Failure To Select Property Perform The Standards a '
Correct Calibration Fonowing:
p p,
, chec Curve 10 (ASY 3)
(ASY 6)
Consecutive Times
-Record Data
(^
-Preserve Containerintegrtt)
(ASY 1)
-Repacks High Count k
A-A Y-Xd A-ASY. -02 A-ASy.X42 6
AC-ASY-X42 AC-ASY-X-03 A-ASY-X41 AC-ASY-X-01 AC-ASY-X-01 LLRW ANNEX DRAFT. DOC Page-1 3/31/99 Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
36 Revision Date:
Revision No. _O
l Ash handling 1
j Control Parameters and Safety Limits:
j Control Parameters e mass geometry e
Safety Limits
< 21.6 wt% U e
Bounding Assumptions: (From Table in SNM-1107)
{
Homogeneous UO2
)
+ Optimum H2O moderation Partia.1 Reflection 5.0 wt% enrichment No neutron absorbers in system
)
Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the ash handling system is evaluated to be l
very strong. In fact, criticality is not credible.
The parameters that directly affect neutron multiplication for the calciner product hood, assuming 5.0 wt% 2"U enrichment, are mass (uranium concentration) and geometry.
1 Previous analysis determined that the minimum H/ "U ratio necessary for criticality of 2
an infinite amount of saturated UO2 Powder is 1800, which corresponds to 21.8 wt%
U. The ash produced in the LLRW incineration process averages 10 wt% U, and does not exceed 15 wt% U. The extremely low uranium concentration is due to the layers of controls placed on combustible trash in the trash colle:Gon. assay, and incineration processes. and the inherent process characteristics of the incineration process.
Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
37 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0 u
Compactor The compaction unit is used for volume reduction of noncombustible material that was previously determined to be free of gross contamination in the originating area, and verified to be free-of-gross contamination by the URRS operator before being placed into the compactor. Hence, criticality is not credible.
w
~
Decon/ Cutting Room The decon/ cutting room is used for decontamination, dismantling, and cutting of equipment. All gross contamination must be removed from equipment before being taken into the room. As such, criticality is not credible.
Liquid Honing Control Parameters and Safety Limits:
Control Parameters 3
Concentration e Mass Safety Limits See Table 5 f
Bounding Assumptions: (From Table in SNM-1107) e' Homogeneous UO2 Optimum H2O moderation Full water-equivalent reflection all around 5.0 wt% enrichment e
Controls Safety Significant Controls Administrativt. controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
38 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0 m
hj% [ReiMP@f94NI8nfhigh4 s E M
ja y Rincedists M1%actional.
5laitiallegg dc 4QnPMup% @W
% sficatione $BmaGByh 4
ber yd gi @ & fagog bw h
N 24 4'
'8ssaired#
%Nutsher "
I s
AC-HON-01
- Prevent fligh Uranium Concentration /
COP-831014 Yes IE# HON 6,7
- RT-998A and 998B alarm at 20 gU/ liter /
- Operators stop process and contact team manager i
Administrative controls Safety Significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually j
occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record. Functional
)
verification is not normally required.
1 PitQsdats diPunctional T $Insttatingh yQtqtst$glN, gh% 'Congt4ShacGont gjn hged%,%g; yg i g@t pggggg p g';gf% k g g,ganginfg g gE(
gg+fr
- $ghW
@y;mg J"'gGE%
gkan g s
gQ-
- T; 17
+
Number" A-HON-01
-Prevent grossly contaminated COP-841000 No IE# HON 1 components from getting into Honing /
-Generating Area Does tiot Properly Sorts Noncombustible Trash /
- Remove gross contamination A-HON-02
-Prevent grossly contaminated COP-831001 No IE# HON 2 components from getting into Honing /
-URRS does not sort Noncombustible Trash /
4
- Return items with gross contamination to scuding area A-HON-03
-Prevent grossly contaminated COP-831014 No IE# HON 3 components from getting into Honing /
-Honing Operator does not check for contamination /
- Removes gross contamination Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the liquid honing system is evaluated to be very strong. The liquid honing system is an extremely low risk system with respect to nuclear criticality safety. Criticality is so unlikely so as to be not credible.
The parameters that directly affect neutron multiplication for the liquid honing system, assuming 5.0 wt% "U enrichment, are mass and concentration. Double contingency 2
protection consists of preventing an accumulation of fissile material in alumina-water slurry. Criticality safety limits (CSLs) and Bounding Assumptions (BA) are established for mass and concentration.
Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
39 Revision Date:
Revision No. _O J
A criticality would be. possible in the liquid honing system given the following combinations of credible process upsets:
Sufficient material accumulates in the alumina-water slurry such that the mixture forms a critical configuration.
i l
l
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i i
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i Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No. ~ 4n Revision Date:
Revision No.])
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CRITICAUTY POSSISLE I
'. < CRITICAUTY PRECURSCA >.
GREATER THAN THE SAFETY UMITS OF MASS, MODERATOR, AND GEOMETRY MODERAT(,it MASS CONFIGURATION DEFENSES Fall OEFENSES Fall DEFENSES FAIL l
l 1
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a m'W 7
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FAILURE TO PREVENT GREATER THAN THE SAFETY LIMIT OF MASS j
FROM BECOMING AVAILABLE TO FAILURE TO PREVENT F ALLURE TO DETECT INCREASE THE HONING SYSTEM IN A"SHORT.
GREATER THAN THE SAFETY IN CONCENTRAT.ON IN THE l
nemnn m wur14u m UMIT OF MASS FROM ALUMINA WATER SLURRY ACCUMULATING IN THE 4 aanMM FaES
- ALUMINA-WATER SLURRY.
<emnusafansS ?
i I
I I
l
.iperators Fall 7:
Cenerating URRS Hear Audible Area Fails To Ope,ators Fall D""
Liquid Honing Property Sort To Properly pg (HON 8)
And Sort bd Operators To Detect Fall To Dperators FallTo l
3 Decontarninete Decontaminate (HON 3)
Replenish MonMor Honiry Scrap Scrap g,
(HON 1)
(HON 2)
Alumina And System Water Both y
Allow U To AHowing U Monitors Dama W Or Accumulate.
Concentracon To Experience (HON 4) incmase.
Calibratkm O
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i
[,*L"';3
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(" " ')
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("o" 7)
A. HON.o, cano2 A.yOSo3 b
AC HONo1 Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No, 42 Revision Date:
R.evision No-, _0
g i
Ultrasonic Cleaner Given the bounding assumptions, as stated in the License. and the nature of the operation
)
surrounding the ultrasonic cleaner, a criticality in the system is not credible. Calculations show j
that more than 150 kg uranium plus water must get into a basin in order for a criticality to be possible, either to form a critical uranyl nitrate concentration or an oxide mixture.
Parts Washer The parts washer process is an extremely low risk system with respect to criticality. criticality is considered not credible.
J Grit Blaster
{
The Grit Blaster is in design and procurement phase.
Chemical Safety and Fire Safety Controls i
To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment.
I I
l l
Initial Issue Date:
31 MAR 99 Page No.
43 Revision Date:
Revision No.
O