ML20209C263

Rev 0 to Cse License Annex,Scrap U Processing Sys

ML20209C263
Person / Time
Site:	Westinghouse
Issue date:	06/15/1999
From:	WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:
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ML20209C259	List: ML20209C263
References
NUDOCS 9907090226
Download: ML20209C263 (25)

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CSE LICENSE ANNEX SCRAP URANIUM PROCESSING SYSTEM 9907090226 990630 PDR ADOCK 07001151 C

PDR

CSE LICENSE ANNEX SCRAP URANIUM PROCESSING SYSTEM TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OFCONTENTS i

REVISIONRECORD il Process Summary 1

Procedures and Drawings 1

OPER ATI NG PR OCEDUR ES.............................................................................

...................1 SYSTEMDRAWINGS...........................................................................................................2 Environmental Protection and Padiation Safety Controls 2

Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees 3

CltemicalSafety and Fire Safety Controls 22 InitialIssue Date:

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CSE LICENSE ANNEX SCRAP URANIUM PROCESSING SYSTEM REVISION RECORD REVISION DATE OF REVISION PAGES REVISION NUMBER REVISED RJCORD l

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r CSE LICENSE ANNEX SCRAP URANIUM PROCESSING SYSTEM

)

Process Summary The Columbia plant generates scrap uranium from excess production, off-spec product, and contaminated off-stream materials. The scrap is divided into two general classifications: clean scrap, which includes UO pellets and powder and U 0s powder; and dirty scrap, which incledes 2

3 any contaminated off-stream material that contains significant uranium. The objective of scrap processing is to recover the uranium in the form of clean uranyl nitrate solution which is convertible back to usable UO product. Clean scrap is oxidized to U 0, and dissolved in nitric 2

3 acid to form clean uranyl nitrate. Dirty scrap is first defluorinated, if necessary, via intermediate precipitation as ammonium diuranate (ADU) using ammonium hydroxide or treatment with hydrogen / steam in a calciner. Defluorination protects the dissolving and purification equipment from HF attack during subsequent processing steps. The ADU precipitate is then directly dissolved in nitric acid and the calcined material is oxidized in another calciner pass and then dissolved in nitric acid to convert the uranium contents inio a contaminated solution of uranyl nitrate. The contaminated solution is purified via solvent extraction which produces a clean uranyl nitrate solution suitable for conversion back to UO product.

2 Procedures and Drawings Key procedures and drawings for the Scrap Uranium Processing Systems are identified in the tables below:

Operating Procedures

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COP-815006 Dissolution of Filter Press Cake From Scrap Precipitation Systems COP-815015 Washing Machine and Standpipe Operations COP-815002 11andling of Dirty or Questionable impurity Material in Scrap Cage COP-815010 11andling of Clean Scrap from Pellet Area is Scrap Cage COP-815113 Precipitation Tank System Operation COP-815114 Precipitation Tank System - Plter Press Cleaning COP-815413 Changing Wet Filters in Conversion Scrap Area COP-816002 Processing Dirty Scrap material in ADU Conversion Line 5 COP-816012 Liquid Storage Vessel System Operation COP-836026 Spent Cold Trap Alumina Processing Initialissue Date:

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1 System Drawings L

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' iDRAWING TLE( f $py.. - %,-,.L

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:n 19 333F03P101 1

Precipitation Tanks V 1006A, B and Whshing Machine V-1057 333F03P!02 1

Wet ADU Cake Dissolver 333F08P101 i

Liquid Scrap Storage Vessels 333F03P101 2

Filter Press and Filtrate Holding Vessel 305F02P101 1

Fluoride Stripping - Wet System 500F03AR10 1

Arrangement - Liquid Scrap Vessels (Partial) 500F03AR10 2

Arrangement - Conversion Scrap Area and Rest of Liquid Scrap Vessels 500F03AR02 3

Equipment Arrangement - Bay 3-4 and A-BB 1

Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls q

i To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment i

i l

i i

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Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees 1

Mop and filter Washing machine Control Parameters and Safety Limits:

Control Parameters

• Mass Safety Limits See Table 1 e

1 Bounding Assumptions: (From Table in SNM-1107)

Homogeneous UO 2

Optimum H O Moderation e

2 Partial Reflection Controls Safety Significant Controls j

i i

Passive Engineered Controls (PEC) i Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. The requirements for functional verification are determined from this evaluation.

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P WashMach-1-01 Fixed volume prevents mass COP-815015 No WashMach-1 limit from being exceeded /

Mop head and rag, or bag filter and filter cloth container exceeds 6 gallons /

Proper container stores mop heads, rags bag filters and filter cloths for washing machine P-WashMach-i-02 Fixed volume prevents mass COP-815015 No WashMach-1 limit from being exceeded!

Cartridge filter container exceeds 10.5 gallons /

Proper container stores

{

cartridge filters for washing machine Administrative Controls Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.

Functional verification is not normally required.

1 A-WashMach-i-01 Confirm mass limit not COP-815015 No WashMach-2 exceeded /

Operator fails to weigh container /

Operator weigh; container to verify mass limit not exceeded i

I A-WashMach-I-02 Detect mass limit is exceeded /

COP-815015 No WashMach-3 Operator fails to notice heavier container than usual when lifting /

Operator notices heavier container than usual and investigates cause A-WashMach-1-03 Prevent mass limit from being COP-815015 No WashMach-4 exceeded /

Washing machine operator fails to remove loose UO powder or ADU cake from container with mop heads and rags before washing /

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Operator removes loose UO powder or ADU cake from l

container with mop heads or rags before washing A WashMach-1-04 Prevent mass limit from being COP-812503 No WashMach-5 exceeded /

COP-814325 Area operator fails to remove COP-814602 excess ADU cake from filter COP-815412 cloths or bag filters before COP-815114 entering Scrap Cage /

Area operator removes excess ADU cake from filter cloths or bag filters before entering Scrap Cage A-WashMach-i-03 Prevent mass limit from being COP-815015 No WashMach-4 exceeded /

COP-815412 Washing machine operator fails to remove loose ADU cake from filter cloths or bag filters before washing /

Washing machine operator removes loose ADU cake from filter cloths or bag filters before washing A-WashMach-1-04 Prevent mass limit from being COP-812503 No WashMach-6 exceeded /

COP-814325 Area operator fails to scrape COP-814602 excess ADU sludge from COP-815412 canridge filters before entering COP-815114 Scrap Cage /

Area operator removes excess ADU sludge from cartridge l

filters before entering Scrap l

Cage A WashMach-i-03 Prevent mass limit from being COP-812503 No WashMach-4 exceeded /

COP-814325 Washing machine operator COP-814602 fails to scrape excess ADU COP-815412 sludge from c trtridge filters COP-815114 before entering Scrap Cage /

Washing machine operator removes excess ADU sludge from cartridge filters before entering Scrap Cage A-WashMach-i-05 Prevent mass limit from being COP-815015 No WashMach-7 exceeded /

Operator loads more than two containers of wash per cycle into the washing machine /

Operator loads no more than i

two containers of wash per i

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cycle into the washing machine A-WashMach-1-06 Prevent mass limit from being COP-815015 No WashMach 7 exceeded /

Operator loads a container of wash then refills the antainer twice and loads it into the washing machine /

Operator loads no more than two containers of wash per cycle into the washing machine A WashMacb I-7 Prevent mass limit from being COP-815015 No WashMach-7 exceeded /

Operator loads wash material directly into the washing I

machine without using container /

Operator puts the wash material into an approved container prior to washing Safety Margin Improvement Controls Safety Margin Improvement Controls consist of all types of controls: passive, active, process, administrative with computer assist, and wholly administrative.

These controls do not require periodic functional verification. They are primarily process controls but contribute to the system's margin of safety.

l Water addition thumbwheel COP-815015 indicator set to 10 - 15 gallons for washing machine cycle Timer for water flow shut-off set to add a maximum of 22 gallons of water to the washing machine Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the washing machine is evaluated to be very strong. Double contingency protection exists. Calculations performed in support of this evaluation indicate that k,y s 0.95 for all normal operating conditions and expected process upsets. For any credible process upset, or series of credible process upsets which result in a single contingency, k,y is less than 0.98.

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The parameters that directly affect neutron multiplication for the washing machine are mass and moderator. Criticality Safety Limits (CSLs) and Bounding Assumptions (BA) are established for mass, but not for moderator since credit is not taken for moderation control. A criticality would be possible (k,,2 0.98) in the washing machine given the following combination of credible process upsets:

Mop heads, rags, filter cloths, bag filters, or cartridge filters contain excessive e

amounts of uranium that is not detected by an operator, and more than two containers introde.ces more than 16.5 gallons of material into the washing machine, i

such that the mass safety limit is exceeded. The volume of water in the washing machine would have to be sufficient for criticality to occur.

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Precipitation System in the Scrap Uranium Processing Area Tanks and Vessels Control Parameters and Safety Limits:

Control Parameters I

Geometry e

Safety Limits See Margin of Safety-Bounding Assumptions: (From Table in SNM-1107)

Homogeneous UO F 2 2 Optimum H O Moderation 2

• Partial Reflection Controls Safety Significant Controls Safety Margin Improvement Controls Safety Margin Improvement Controls consist of all types of controls: passive, active, process, administrative with computer assist, and wholly administiative.

These I

controls do not require periodic functional verification. They are primarily process controls but contribute to the system's margin of safety.

h f

Favorable geometry (< 10.9" diameter cylinder) vessels used in system /

Non-favorable geometry vessels used in system /

Prevent non-favorable geometry vessels in system via procedure TA-500 requirements for Regulatory review.

I Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the precipitator vessels, the filtrate receiver vessel, and the drip tank is evaluated to be very, very strong. The parameter that directly affects neutron

. multiplication, assuming 5.0 w/o "U enrichment, is geometry. A criticality is not credible since 2

the vessels are favorable geometry.

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From the NCS Handbook', a partially reflected (1 inch of water) cylinder of homogeneous U(5.0)O F -Il O with a maximum radius of 13.8 cm (5.43") is required to achieve a k,y < 0.95, 2 2 2 assuming optimum moderation. The radii of the precipitator vessels, the filtrate receiver vessel, and the drip tank are 13.2 cm (5.21"),13.2 cm (5.21"), and 10.58 cm (4.16"), respectively. The precipitator and filtrate receiver vessels were verified to be 10" Schedule 10 tanks and the drip 2

tank was verified to be an 8" Schedule 10 tank. Therefore, the geometry of the vessels prevent criticality from occurring. The use of non-favorable geometry vessels is strictly prevented by proper configuration control management through procedure TA-500.

Sperry Filter Press Control Parameters and Safety Limits:

Control Parameters Geometry e

Safety Limits See Margin of Safety e

Bounding Assumptions: (From Table in SNM-1107)

Homogeneous UO F, e

2 Optimum H O Moderation e

2 Partial Reflection e

Controls l

Safety Significant Controls Safety Margin Improvement Controls Safety Margin Improvement Controls consist of all types of controls: passive, active, process administrative with computer assist, and wholly administrative.

These i

controls do not require periodic functional verification. They are primarily process l

controls but contribute to the system's margin of safety.

3 Handbook for the Conduct of Nuclear Criticality Safety Activities at the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility.

2 Favorable Volume / Favorable Geometry Review Documentation, URRS Scrap Processing,11/4/97.

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Favorable geometry (maximum of 7 filter frames can fit into the press) used in system /

Non-favorable geometry used in system /

Prevent non-favorable geometry in system via procedure TA-500 requirements for Regulatory review.

Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the Sperry Filter Press, located in the Scrap Uranium Processing Area, is evaluated to be very, very strong. The parameter that directly affects neutron multiplication, assuming 5.0 w/o "U enrichment, is geometry. A criticality is not credible 2

because the filter press geometry limits the number of filter frames in the system to seven.

From the NCS Handbook', a fully reflected (12 inches of water) sphere of homogeneous U(5.0)O F -H O with a maximum of 25.7 kg of uranium (33.3 kg U(5.0)O F x 0.77271 kg 2 2 2 2 2 U/kg U(5.0)O F ) is required to achieve a k,y < 0.95, assuming optimum moderation. A total 2 2 volume of 23.5 liters' is available for ADU accumulation in the Sperry Filter Press. The maximum amount of ADU cake that could accumulate in 23.5 liters is 42.9 kg (1.825 kg/ liter' x 6

23.5 liters). The percentage of uranium by weight in ADU cake is approximately 0.453, therefore, the maximum amount of uranium that could accumulate in the volume of the filter press is 19.4 kg, which is less than that required to achieve a k,y < 0.95. Therefore, the geometry of the filter press prevents criticality from occurring.

It should be noted that the mass ratio of 0.453 used to calculate the maximum possible amount of uranium accumulation in the filter press is conservative, since actual measurements on cake removed from the scrap cage filter press provide a range of 25.82 - 29.54 w/o U.

The only means to increase the volume available for ADU accumulation in the filter press is to physically reconfigure the press.

The modification of equipment at the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility is strictly prevented by proper configuration control management through procedure TA-500.

8 Handbook for the Conduct of Nuclear Criticality Safety Activities at the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility.

• CRI-94-018 s Westinghouse Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility ADU Conversion ISA.

• lbid.

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Wet ADU Cake Dissolver Control Parameters and Safety Limits:

Control Parameters

. Geometry e Mass Safety Limits See Margin of Safety e

Bounding Assumptions: (From Table in SNM-1107)

Homogeneous UO e

2 Optimum H O Moderation e

2 e Partial Reflection Controls Safety Significant Controls Safety Margin Improvement Controls i

Safety Margin Improvement Controls consist of all types of controls: passive, active,

. process, administrative with computer assist, and wholly administrative.

These controls do not require periodic functional verification. They are primarily process controls but contribute to the system's margin of safety.

kh b

Prevent gross uranium in system /

Gross uranium introduced into system /

Prevent gross uranium in process by requiring the direct transfer of material from the pan to the dissolver without allowing material to accumulate in the ventilation hood.

Favorable geometry (< 10.4" diameter cylinder, < 5.6" thick pan) vessels used in system /

Non-favorable geometry vessels used in system /

Prevent non-favorable geometry vessels in system via procedure TA-500 requirements for Regulatory review.

Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the wet ADU cake dissolver is evaluated to be very, 2

very strong. The parameters that directly affect neutron multiplication, assuming 5.0 w/o "U

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enrichrnent, is geometry. Criticality is not credible because the system is favorable geometry and because there is an insufficient amount of uranium allowed in the system.

From the NCS Handbook', a mass of 38.7 kg UO in a fully water reflected sphere of 2

homogeneous U(5.0)O -H O is needed for criticality to be possible. Two controls limit the 2 2 amount of material that can be transferred to the dissolver; one passive and one administrative.

The size of the pan used to transfer wet feed material, and the amount of material in the pan are limited by the opening in the side of the ventilation hood (passive engineering) that houses the dissolver. By procedure, the feed material must be transferred directly from the pan and not accumulated in the ventilation hood. The pan used to transfer material to the dissolver only has a capacity of about 8 liters. Assuming the maximum density for UO2 Powder (3.6 kg/ liter)', only about 29 kg of UO can fit in one 8 liter pan. Further, the uranium in the system is being 2

dissolved in a strong nitric acid solution that is agitated constantly. This dilutes the concentration of uranium so that, even if a critical mass were introduced into the system, criticality would be prevented.-

From the NCS Handbook', a partially reflected (1 inch of water) cylinder of homogeneous U(5.0)O -H O with a minimum radius of 13.3 cm (5.2") is required for k, < 0.95 assuming 2 2 optimum moderation. The radius of the wet ADU cake dissolver is less than 13.3 cm. Therefore, in addition to the absence of sufficient uranium mass in the system to cause criticality, the geometry of the vessel prevents criticality from occurring. The use of non-favorable geometry vessels is strictly prevented by proper configuration control management through procedure TA-500.

' Handbook for the Conduct of Nuclear Criticality Safety Activities at the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility.

8 Westinghouse Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility ADU Bulk Powder Blending System ISA.

' Handbook for the Conduct of Nuclear Criticality Safety Activities at the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility, i

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m Liquid Scrap Storage Vessels Control Parameters and Safety Limits:

Control Parameters Geometry Safety Limits See Margin of Safety e

Bounding Assumptions: (From Table in SNM-1107)

Homogeneous UO F e

2 2 Optimum H O Moderation 2

e Partial Reflection Controls Safety Significant Controls Safety Margin Improvement Controls Safety Margin Improvement Controls consist of all types of controls: passive, active, process, administrative with computer assist, and wholly administrative.

These controls do not require periodic functional verification. They are primarily process controls but contribute to the system's margin of safety.

d Favorable geometry (< 10.9" diameter cylinder) vessels used in system /

Non-favorable geometry vessels used in system /

Prevent non-favorable geometry vessels in system via procedure TA-500 reauirements for Regulatory review.

Prevent decrease in spacing of the vessels in system /

Spacing of vessels in system reduced to lose neutronic isolation /

Prevent re-arranging vessels in system via procedure TA-500 requirements for Regulatory review.

Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the Liquid Scrap Storage Vessels is evaluated to be very, very strong. The parameter that directly affects neutron multiplication, assuming 5.0 w/o 2"U enrichment, is geometry. A criticality would only be possible if a non-favorable geometry (either a larger cylinder size, or closer center-to-center spacing) were present in the system.

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From the NCS IIandbook, a partially. reflected (1 inch of water) cylinder of homogeneous U(5.0)O F H O with a maximum radius of 13.8 cm (5.43") is required to achieve a k,,r < 0.95, 2 2 2 assuming optimum moderation. The radius of the Liquid Scrap Storage Vessel is 12.7 cm (5.0").

The storage vessels were verified to be 10" Schedule 40 tanks". Therefore, the geometry of the vessel prevents criticality from occurring. The use of non-favorable geometry vessels is strictly prevented by proper configuration control management through procedure TA-500.

The 20 Liquid Scrap Storage Vessels are placed at a 52 inch center-to-center spacing, which is sufficient to neutronically isolate the vessels from each other. The center-to-center spacing was field verified for this CSE. An interaction study was performed for the Liquid Scrap Storage Vesselsia that proved the adequacy of the spacing. To change the spacing of the vessels, an entirely new support structure would have to be fabricated for the vessels. The new support structure with improper center-to-center vessel spacing would be prevented through the TA-500 Configuration Control Procedure.

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' Handbook for the Conduct of Nuclear Criticality Safety Activities at the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility.

" Favorable Volume / Favorable Geometry Review Documentation, URRS Scrap Processing,11/4/97.

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Alumina Processing Equipment Control Parameters and Safetv Limits:

Control Parameters Geometry e

. Concentration Safety Limits See Margin of Safety Bounding Assumptions: (From Table in SNM-1107)

I Homogeneous UO e

2 Optimum H O Moderation 2

Partial Reflection e

235 e 5.0 w/o U enrichment Controls Safety Significant Controls Safety Margin Improvement dontrols Safety Margin Improvement Controls consist of all types of controls: passive, active, process, administrative with computer assist, and wholly administrative.

These controls do not require periodic functional verification. They are primarily process controls but contribute to the system's margin of safety.

Favorable geometry (< 5 gallon) vessels used in system /

Non-favorable geometry (>5 gallon) vessels used in system /

Prevent non-favorable geometry vessels in system via procedure TA-500 requirements for Regulatory review.

Prevent gross uranium in system /

Gross uranium introduced into system /

Prevent gross uranium in process by only processing spent alumina in system.

Margin of Safety j

The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the alumina processing equipment is evaluated to be very, very strong. The parameters that directly affects neutron multiplication, assuming 5.0 wt%

233U enrichment, are geometry and concentration. A criticality would only be possible if sufficient uranium concentration or non-favorable geometry were present in the system.

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From the NCS 11andbook", a mass of 38.7 kg UO in a full water reflected sphere of 2

homogeneous UO/li 0 is needed for criticality to be possible. Based on the nature of the 2

material process in this system (spent alumina), there is no credible means to accumulate sufficient mass in the system for a criticality. Further, the uranium in the system is being dissolved in nitric acid which further dilutes its concentration. Even if a critical mass where introduced into the system, the dilution of the uranium by nitric acid would prevent a criticality.

Also from the NCS Ilandbook", a volume of 5.4 gallons of water in a full water reflected sphere of homogeneous UO/II 0 is needed for criticality to be possible. Since the volume of each 2

vessel in the system is 5 gallons, this is less water than would be necessary for criticality to be possible. Therefore, in addition to the absence of sufficient uranium mass in the system to cause a criticality, there is not sufficient volume to accumulate sufficient moderator to cause a criticality.

The use of non-favorable geometry vessels is strictly prevented by proper configuration control management through procedure TA-500, i

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" Handbook for the Conduct of Nuclear Criticality Safety Activities at the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility.

" Handbook for the Conduct of Nuclear Criticality Safety. Activities at the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility.

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Chemical Safety and Fire Safety Controls To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment.

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