ML20151U055

Rev 0 to Cse License Annex,Cylinder Washing

ML20151U055
Person / Time
Site:	Westinghouse
Issue date:	08/31/1998
From:	WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20151U048	List: ML20151U044 ML20151U055
References
NUDOCS 9809100262
Download: ML20151U055 (16)

Text

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.I CSE LICENSE ANNEX CYLINDER WASHING b

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l CSE LICENSE ANNEX l

CYLINDER WASHING TABLE OF CONTENTS i

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TABLE OFCONTENTS l

REVISIONRECORD ll Process Summary 1

Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls 2

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Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees 2

Controls..

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Afargin ofSafety...

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Common Afode Failure Potential..

.4 Summary OfInitiating Events Winch Lead To Credible Process Upsets..

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Summary Tables..

.3 Fault Trees..

.7 Chemical Safety and Fire Safety Controls 13

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31 AUG 98 Page No.

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Revision Date:

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CSE LICENSE ANNEX l

CYLINDER WASHING i

REVISION RECORD l

REVISION DATE OF PAGES REVISION l

NUMBER REVISION REVISED RECORD I

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Initial Issue Date: _ 31 AUG 98 Page No, ii Revision Date:

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4 CSE LICENSE ANNEX CYLINDER WASHING Process Summary The Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility utilizes an ADU conversion process to produce a ceramic grade uranium oxide powder. The main process input material, UF gas, is delivered 6

to the plant in 30B sized cylinders which are emptied via vaporization at the Columbia Plant then recycled bacir to the UF. supply facilities for re-filling. The cylinders must be internally washed and cleaned priodically to remove residues and corrosion products that cling to the inside walls after the vaporization process used to remove the UF at Columbia is complete.

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Every five years the cylinders must also be recertified for structural integrity and supplied with a new valve.

l Both the washing and the.recertification processes are performed on the Columb!a site.

Cylinders belonging to Westinghouse and to other fuel fabricators are processed with the same procedures.

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The washing process consists of rolling the cylinder on its side with a five gallon increment of water er rinse water solution inside. The rolling equipment consists of a Ransom table mounted on weigh scales with provision for supporting and rotating the cylinder.

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increments _of water / solution are added and removed separately. The cylinder is rolled in I

'three positions: horizontally, tipped up, and tipped down with each increment.

Each irerement of wash liquid is removed from the cylinder in turn and pumped to storage and further to subsequent use or uranium recovery steps.

- Wast d cylin&rs are moved to the recertification facility where they undergo external and internal inspectior.s, ultrasonic wall thickness testing, hydrostatic testing at 400 psig with water, internal drying, new valve installation, pressure testing at 100 psig with nitrogen, and evacuation to 28" Hg vacuum. Successful completion of all the above steps qualifies the cylinder for recertification allowing it to be used in UF, service for five more years.

Key drawings and procedura for cylinder washing and recertification are identified in the tables below:

- SYSTEM DRAWINGS h

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UF. Cylinder Wash System P & I Diagram 372F07P102 1

3 UF. Cylinder Wash Solution Storage P & I Diagram 372F07PIO4 1

3 UF. Cylinder Recertification Facility P & I Diagram 1583F66 1

1 Initial Issue Date: 31 AUG 98 Page No.

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i MANUFACTURING OPERATING PROCEDURES

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COP-833001 UF. Cylinder Recertification COP-833002 UF Cylinder Revalving COP-833010 UF. Cylinder Cleaning System l

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Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment i

Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees i

I Controls j

Safety Significant Controls l

I Passive engineered controls (PEC) l Passive engineered controls are descrikd in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. The requirements for functional verification are detennined i

from this evaluation.

I P-WASH-1-01, Crane stops on crane rail prevent moving heavy cylinders to wash e

area.

No periodic functional testing required. Crane stops will be listed in RA-108 as I

nuclear criticality safety significant controls thus preventing their removal without i

proper approvals.

P-WASH-1-02, Overflow on B-09 Glass Column j

No periodic functional testing required.

Overflow provides pressure relief for j

cylinder vacuum which draws water into the cylinder. By procedure, the cylinder vacuum is equalized to allow water to be pumpe ' from the cylinder after washing.

c Active engineered controls (AEC)

Active Engineered Controls are defined in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs l

Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety significant interlocks. The requirements l

for functional verification are defined in RA-108 and/or area operating produres.

WASH-1-01, Tilt Stand Load Cell Interlock Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) 1 i

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Initial Issue Date: 31 AUG 98 Page No.

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Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output.

The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

l AC-WASH-1-01, UF Bay Scale.

6 Administrative controls Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.

Functional verification is not normally required.

1 A-WASH-1-01, COP-833010, Observe and document wash solution transferred to

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wash solution storage vessel.

A-WASH-1-02, COP-833010, Water staged in B-09 column before transfer to e

cylinder.

A-WASH-1-03, CF-83-062, Document initial water transfer to cylinder.

'A-WASH-1-04, COP-833010, Observe and document increasing weight on load cell.

A-WASH-1-05, COP-814529, Scale calibration done using correct standaim A-WASH-1-06, COP-814529, Scale check done each shift when heels are to be weighed.

A-WASH-1-07, NMM-CP-710, Shipper / receiver weight difference corrects tare entry.

A-WASH-1-08, TR-303, Cylinder selected for washing is a heel.

A-WASH-1-09, COP-833010, Operator verifies that cylinder accepted for washing is i

on ICS listing.

A-WASH-1-10, TR-300, Cylinder damage is detected and documented.

Safety Margin Improvement Controls Safety Margin Improvement Controls consist of all types of controls: passive, active, process, administrative with computer assist, and wholly administrative. These controls do not require periodic functional verification. They are primarily process controls but contribute to the system's margin of safety. They typically are identified in the Fault Tree.

• None Margin of Safety The parameters that directly affect neutron multiplication for the UF cylinder washing 6

process, assuming 5.0 wt% 2"U enrichment, are mass and moderator. Criticality safety limits (CSLs) and Bounding Assumptions (bas) are established for mass and moderator.

. A criticality (1, = 0.95* ) would be possible in the UF cylinder during the washing 4

6 process given the following combinations of credible process upsets:

• criticality limits conservatively set at k,=0.95.

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'A UF cylinder containing 292.16 lbs 032.8 kg) UF reacts to 255.64 lbs (116.2 kg) o 6

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UO F (with the addition of 29.92 lbs [13.6 kg] H O) and an additional 133.54 lhs 2 2 2

, 60.7 kg) H O is introduced into the cylinder. '

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As a result of this analysis, the nuclear criticality margin of safety for the UF cylinder 6

washing process is evaluated to be very strong. Double contingency protection exists.

Calculations performed in support of this evaluation indicate that km is well below 0.95 during normal operations, and, clearly, many unlikely process upsets are necessary to i

make criticality possible.

Comnion Mode Failure Potential The administrative controls present in this system are mostly carried out by one operator i

(with overchecks by the chief operator).

The only credible scenario that creates a potential CMF related to this is the observation and documentation of the load cell decreasing and wash solution storage vessel level increasing. These controls prevent that I

addition of water to a cylinder without properly draining _the cylinder of the previous

. batch of water. Since the chief operator is required to sign off the control form after the first wash to verify these values, the CMF potential is reduced.

Another CMF potential exists if valve FV-01 fails open. This will completely defeat the tilt stand load cell interlock allowing water to enter an overweight cylinder. Since the operator is required to verify the weight of the cylinder before opening the cylinder valve -

to allow water to enter the cylinder, this CMF potential is lessened.

Summary Of initiating Events Which Lead To Credible Process Upsets IE #1, Cylinder Exceeds 25 pounds net weight, measurement error IE #2, Cylinder Exceeds 25 pounds net weight, wrong data entry for cylinder tare IE #3, Cylinder Exceeds 25 pounds net weight, cylinder damage reduces tare IE #4, Cylinder Exceeds 25 pounds net weight, wrong cylinder selected for washing IE #5, Cylinder Exceeds 25 pounds net weight, wrong cylinder accepted for washing IE #6, Cylinder Exceeds 25 pounds net weight, cylinder accepted from processing area IE #7, Cylinder Exceeds 25 pounds net weight, addition of wash solution from previous cylinder IE #8, Tilt Stand Load Cell Interlock Fails, Scale Out of Calibration IE #9, Tilt Stand Load Cell Interlock Fails, Scale Range Set too Wide

'IE #10, Tilt Stand Load Cell Interlock Fails, Low Tare Cylinder with Excessive Uranium IE #11, Tilt Stand Load Cell Interlock Fails, Scale Weight Adjusted By Operator IE #12, Tilt Stand Load Cell Interlock Fails, Water Addition Valve Fails Open IE #13, Water Staged in B-09 Exceeds Control Limit of 6.0 gallons IE #14, Valve Failures Cause Single Batch Addition Failure IE #15, Multiple Water Additions to Single Cylinder without Subsequent Removal InitialIssue Date: 31 AUG 98 Page No.

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Summary Tables Table 5'.3-1: Summary of Defenses Provided Against a Single Failure for the UF Cylinder 6

Washing Process Defense Set 1 Defense Set 2 General Descriptor Prevent Regulate Detect /

Prevent Regulate Detect React p:

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Cylinder Exceeding Process 1, 2, 3, 4, Tilt Stand Moderator Control Control Weight Placed on Tilt 5, 6 Load Cell Stand Interlock Tilt Stand lead Cell Interlock 8, 9, 10, 11, Moderator Control

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Fails 12 m-g m-ye s

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'3 Single Addition of Water 13 Mass Control Exceeds Limit Multiple Additions of Water 14 15 Mass Control Exceed Limit 4

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Table 5.3-2: Nuclear Criticality Safety Limits for km of 0.90 and 0.95 for the UF Cylinder 3

Washing Process Is

CRITICALITY?

s CRITICALITYh

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,0-TCONDITIONSi 7s: 0.90 J

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2"U MASS

< 25 L bs UF Unrestricted 170 Lbs (77.28 kg) 197.56 Lbs (89.8 6

U in UO F kg )

2 2 U in UO,F, MODERATOR /

Under-Moderated Optimum i16.6 lbs (14 133.54 lbs (16 CONCENTRATI Moderation Gallons)

Gallons)

ON Water Water GEOMETRY 30-B Cylinder 30-B Cylinder SPACING N/A DENSITY UF Optimum Density 6

UO F 2 2 ABSORBERS None ENRICHMENT s 5.0 Wt% 2"U 5.0 Wt% aug REFLECTION Partial Water Partial Water Reflection Reflection Initial Issue Date: 31 AUG 98 Page No.

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Fault Trees FIGURE 6.3-1 CRmCAUTY l

POS$1BLE N6 UNAC#*PT* %E QUANTIFY OF MAf

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I MASS DEFENSgg MODERATION DEFENSES CONFIGURATION FAIL FAK-DEFENSES FAL 4

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133 54 LOS OM j

UNFA LE j

i TR ANSF FI I-i GEOMETRY l

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CYUNDER MODEL zB 1

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l' FALURE OF CONTROt2 FALURE OF TrLT TO PREVENT CYUNDER STAND LOAD CELL THAT EXCECOS THE INTERLOCK PROCESS CONTROL fE so f2 WEIOHT FROM BEING PLACED ON THE WASH TLT STAND AEC 3

WASH 101

• PARAMET2R UMfTS CONSERVATIVELY SET AT K,=0 95 i

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FIGURE 6.3-1 (Cont'd) 1 I

F AILURE OF CONTROLS TO PREVENT CYLINDER THAT EXCEEDS THE PROCESS CONTROL WEIGHT FROM BEING PLACED ON THE j

1 WASH TILT STAND i

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FCJLURE OF CONTROLS FAILURE OF CONTROLS FAILURE OF CONTROLS FAILURE 07 CONTROLS f SAILURE OF CONTROLS TO PREVENT TO PREVENT EXCEEDING TO PREVENT EXCEEDING TO PREVENT EXCEEDING 10 PREVENT EXCEEDING EXCEEDING MASS LNTT MASS LNIT DUE TO MASS LNIT DUE TO MASS LNIT DUE TO MASS LIMIT DUE TO DUE TO MEASUREMENT INCORRECT DATA ENTRY CYLINDER DAMAGE SELECTION OF WRONG ADDITION OF WASH CONTROLS lE 82

/E #3 CYLINOER SOLUTION FROM

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1. E #4 5 & 6 PREVIOUS CYLINDER A

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S INCORRECT OR DAMAGED INCORRECT WASH WATER MEASUREMENT CONTROL ERROR CYLINDER TRANSFER Initial Issue Date: 31 AUG 98 Page No.

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FIGURE 6.3-1 (Cont'd) i FAILURE OF CONTROLS TO PREVENT EXCEEDING MASS LIMIT DUE TO 3

MEASUREMENT CONTROLS IE st i

4 TRACEABLE MEASUREMENT STANDARDS NOT I

USED OR DAMAGED DURING USE

-- v A-WASH-105 l

COP-814529 SIX-MONTH SCALE CAUBRATION FAILS I

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24 HOUR ICS SCALE ICS FAILS TO VERIFICATIONS NOT RESTRICT SCALE PERFORMED USE AFTER TIME AC ACCORDING TO ALLOTMENT PROCEDURES EXCEEDED A-WASH-106 COP-814529 l

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I-FIGURE 6.3-1 (Cont'd) i a

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FAILUME OF CONTROLS FAILURE OF CONTROLS TO PREVENT TO PREVENT EXCEEDING j

EXCEEDING MASS LIMIT MASS LIMIT DUE TO a

DUE TO INCORRECT CYLINDER DAMAGE d

d DATA ENTRY 5

gg g3 AE #2 SHIPPER /RECl.lVER WEIGHT DIFFERENCE RESOLUTION CYLINDER DAMAGE 5 YEAR RECERTIFICATION FAILS TO WRONG TARE WEIGHT ENTRY FAILS TO CUARECT WRONG RESULTING IN DETECT / CORRECT CYLINDER WITH TARE ENTRY REDUCED TARE NOT REDUCED TARE DETECTEDI DOCUMENTED k

=

A A

A-WASH-147 NMM-CP 710 A WASH 110 TR 300 Initial Isete Date: 31 AUG 98 Page No.

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FIGURE 6.3-1 (Cont'd) s F ALLURE OF CONIROLS P AILURE OF CONTROLS TO PRMNT EXCEEDING TO PREVENT EXCEEDING MAES UMT DUE TO MASS UMrf DUE TO SELECTION OF WRONG ADDITION OF WASH 6

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SOLUTION FRQM FSJSA6 PREVIOUS CYUNDER I

I URE TO MSERW FAILURE TO OBSERVE ANO DOCUMENT M40 DOCUMENT WASH D @OSS CRANE RAll $1 OPS SOLUTION RECEMNQ CYUNDER WEIGHT

[A FAIL TO PREVENT CYUNDER VESSEL LEVEL T

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FROM PROCES$1NG AREA ENTERING INCREASE WASH AREA ET D E

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A.WASW144 WRONG CYUNDER WRONG CYUNDER p.WASgt.01 kWASH 141 COP-833010 SELECTED FOR M"CEPTED FOR WASHING COP-833010 WASHING lCS

. lCS USTING USTING SELECTION VERIFICATION EN E ms AC AC A WASH 146 AWASS149 TR-303 COP-833010 Initial Issue Date: 31 AUG 98 Page No.

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FIGURE 6.3-1 (Cont'd)

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1 FAILURE OF CONTROLS FARWE W WW l

TO UMIT WASH WATER CN ENSURE COMPLETE l

ASH WATER REMOVAL T i

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I FAILURE TO DOCUMENT INITIAL BATCN ADDITION OF WATER 609 GLASS COLUMN WATER TRANSFER f AsLUHk TO 0%ERvE FROM TRANSPARENT VESSEL OVERFLOW FAIL 8 TO TO CYUNDER AND DOCUMENT FAILURE TO OBSERVE AND WITH 5 0 OALLONS FAILS OVERFLOW TO FLOOR AT 6 0 E#f4 INCREASED OROSS DOCUMENT WASH WATER CALLONS CYUNDER WEICHT RECEMNO VESSEL LEVEL l

RECISTERED BY TILT.

INCREASE M 8fS STAND,LO, A,,D CELL 9

C kWAsn103 A-WASW142 CF-63062 WMO P WAshi.02 A WASH 1-04 A-WASH 101 SINGLE ADDITION OF WATER COP-833010 COP-833010 MULTIPLE ADOITIONS OF WATER f

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Chemical Safety and Fire Safety Controls To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment.

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