ML20217D131
| ML20217D131 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Westinghouse |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1999 |
| From: | WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217D114 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9910150018 | |
| Download: ML20217D131 (12) | |
Text
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j CSE LICENSE ANNEX IFBA PROCESS 9910150018 990930 PDR ADOCK 07001151 C
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CSE License Anex IFBA Process.
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Process Summary.....
l-RECEIVE PELLETS AND LOAD FIXTURES -
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SPUTTER COATING OF PELLETS-
.... 2 UNLOAD COATED PELLETS......
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REWORK OF COATED PELLETS...........
=2 STRIPPING / RECOATING -
3 SCRAP RECOVERY......
3' IFBA FUEL ROD MANUFACTURING.
3-Procedures and Drawings..........................
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. REFERENCE DRAWINGS.
4 SYSTEM DRAWINGS..
... 4 MANUFACTURING OPERATING PROCEDURES............. -.
4 Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls-
.......4-Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls...............................
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. Fixture Carts.......
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. IFBA Conter--
j Mop Water System..........
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. Chemical and Fire Safety Controls...
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Initial Evaluation Date:
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WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY CLASS 2 IFBA PROCESS ANNEX REVISION RECORD REVISION DATE OF PAGES NUMBER REVISION REVISED REVISION REASON 0
30 SEP 98 All COMPLETE RE-WRITE Initial Evaluation Date: 30 JUN %
Page No. _ii Revision Date:
30 SEP 98 Revision No. _2
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! 4-i i-CSE License Annex L
IFBA Process Process Smnmary..........-......
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.2 RECEIVE PELLETS AND LOAD FIXTURES SPUTTER COATING OF PELLETS--
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' UNLOAD COATED PELLETS
..2 REWORK OF COATED PELLETS---
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STRIPPING / RECOATING -
-3 SCRAP RECOVERY............. =
=3 IFBA FUEL ROD MANUFACTURING ;
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- Procedures and Drawings -
.4 REFERENCE DRAWINGS........
.4 SYSTEM DRAWINGS....
-4 MANUFACTURING OPERATING PROCEDURES :
=4 Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls.-
.4 Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls =
.5 Fixture Carts =
.5 IFBA Coater........
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Mop Water System..
7 Chemical and Fire Safety Controls..
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c CSE Lice se A=ex
~ IFBA Process Process Summary The scope of this document includes the process description of the, systems and components used in the IFBA Fuel Rod Manufacturing area. Processes are listed in sequential order and portions addressed in other CSEs are identified.
RECEIVEPELLETS AND LGAD RXTURES
' Pellets are received from the ADU Pellet area in ADU Pellet carts. The carts are staged jue outside IFBA, in the southeast expansion area. The pellet trays from one cart are scanned into a Run Card using the item control system. 'Abis represents the material to be coated in the batch.
The ADU Pellet trays are then brought into the IFBA area one tray at a time, where the pellets are pushed off the pellet trays and loaded into Fixtures. The ADU Pcliet trays are then wiped and returned to the ADU Pellet carts. The Fixtures are placed into a Fixture Can.
Non-coated pelSts needed for the Collator are received by a tray-to-tray transfer under item control from ADU Pellet trays to IFBA Pellet trays. The ADU Pellet trayr do not enter the IFBA area. The IFBA Pellet trays are placed in IFBA Pellet carts.
SPUTTER COATING OFPELLETS Twelve Fixtures are loaded into slots in the fixture drum of a Coater. The Coater is placed under vacuum, leak checked, and then sputter coating of ZrB on the pellets proceeds to the desired 2
S mg-B /in value. On completion of sputter coating, the Fixtures are removed from the Coater and placed back into a Fixture Cart.
UNLOAD COATED PELLETS Fixture carts are staged at the Unloading station. Fixtures are removed one at a time from the Fixture can, vacuum cleaned, and inspected. Pellets are removed from the fixtures and pushed onto IFBA Pellet trays. When a tray is full, a representative sa~ ple of pellets is pulled for m
chemical analysis. When all fixtures fer a run have been unloaded, placed on IFBA Pellet trays, and loaded into IFBA Pellet carts, the Pellets carts are moved to a holding area to wait for chemical analysis results.
REWORK OFCOATED PELLETS
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CSE Lice:se Anex IFBA Process When the mg-B' /in coating is too low, coated pellets are placed back into fixtures. Tlic fixtures are loaded into fixture carts. From fixture carts, fixtures are reloaded into a coater for additional sputter cot. ting.
l STRIPPING /RECOATING When the mg-B10/in coating is too high, coated pellets ate stripped with sulfuric acid to remove all boron coating. Coated pellets are removed from trays and placed into baskets. Baskets of pellets are cycled through various stages of the acid bath. Pellets are dried and placed on pellet trays. Additional chemical r.nalysis is performed for sulfur and boron. If results are acceptable, pellets are recoated. If results are not acceptable pellets may be acid stripped one more time.
SCRAP RECOVERY The spent acid solution from the acid stripping system is sent to the Spent Acid Holding Tank for cooling and neutralization / precipitation. Sodium hydroxide is added to the cooled acid to neutralize it and precipitate zirconium and traces of uranium that dissolve during the stripping process. This solution is then introduced to the Mop Water System. The Mop Water System processes mop water, Goor sump liquid, and spent stripping acid to a condition suitable for discharge. Periodically, the solids are removed from the Mop Water Filter Press, dried, packaged in small polypaks, and sent to the dirty dissolver area for recovery of the uranium content.
After clean IFBA UO2 pellet scrap is stripped of its ZrB2 coating, it is oxidized to U308 powder using a Blue-M Oxidation Oven. The resulting powder is screened to remove any unoxidized portions and stored in medium polypacks. The polypaks of powder are sampled to assure they are free of boron and sulfur then transferred to the C4 dissolver system to convert it into uranyl nitrate solution in the main plant.
IFBA FUEL ROD MANUFACTURING The remainder of the processes in the IFB A area are addressed in the IFBA Fuel Rod Manufacturing CSE.
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i CSE License A=ex 4
IFBA Process Procedures and Drawings
. REFERENCE DRANNGS Drawing Number Equipment -
500F08AR01 IFBA Facility Equipment Arrangement 500F08AR02 IFBA Facility Equipment Arrangement -
500F08AR03 IFBA Facility Equipment Arrangement 500F08AR04 IFBA Facility Equipment Arrangement SYSTEM DRAMNGS -
Drawing Number Equipment 366FOIME01 ADU Pellet tray 812FOlEQ01 IFBA Pellet Tray 812FOlEQO2 IFBA Fellet Qart 812F01EQ11 Fixture Cart 802F08FX02 Fixture 15X15 802F08FX04 Fixture 17X17 802F11EQ03 (Fixture) Drum Assembly 807F04PI01 IFBA Facility / Mop Water 807F08PI01-IFBA Scrap Recovery / Effluent Monitoring MANUFACTURING OPERATING PROCEDURES Document Number Document Title COP-871080 IFBA Production-Process Outline COP-871170 Transfer of Uncoated Pellets into IFBA Facility 1
i COP-872020 IFBA Facility Coating Fixture Loading COP-872070 IFBA Facility Pellet Coater Ope ation COP-872050 IFBA Facility Pellet Coater Fixture Unloading COP-874040' IFBA Mop Water System -
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COP-874082 Use of Gamma Monitor AE-7092 Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment..
Initial Evaluation Date:
30 Sep 99 -
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CSE License A nex.
IFBA Process l
. Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls i
nxture carts Control Parameters and Safety Limits:
I Control Parameters
. Geometry.
Moderator.
Safety Limits See Margin of Safety.
e Bounding Assumptions:
Heterogeneous UO.
2 FullInterstitial Moderation.
Partial Reficction.
' Controls Safety Sienifleant Controls i
j None.
- Margin of Safety j
The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the Fixture carts is evaluated to be very, very strong. The parameters that directly affect neutron multiplication are geometry and moderator. A nuclear criticality is not possible with the designed geometry of the Fixture carts even assuming optimum interstitial moderation and full water reflection.
i The favorable geometry slab height for heterogeneous UO2 powder is known to be 4.3 inches'. The design of the Fixture carts is such that each stack of Fixtures is less than 4" in total depth. Each stack is separated by 12 inches. Even with full interstitial moderation and full external water reflection, the kar of the Fixture certs will remain suberitical.
Furthermore, there is no credible means to flood the entire Fixture cart with water. Even small amounts of water would be detected in the cart and certainly would be detected before full interstitial moderation would exist. Therefore, a nuclear criticality is not possible in the Fixture carts with the geometry in place as designed.
' CRI-96-002, NCSA: Slab Thickness Reduction Due to Hetero 3cnic Effect ofIncreasing Particle Size.
i Initial Evaluation Date:
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- CSE License Annex IFBA Process IFBA Coater Control Parameters and Safety Limits:
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Control Parameters
' Geometry.
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- Moderator.
Safety Limits See Margin of Safety.
e U
Bounding Assumptions:
Heterogeneous UO2.
FullInterritial Moderation.
.- Partial Reflection.
1 Controls Safety Significant Controls None.
Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the IFBA Coater is evaluated to be very strong.
The parameters that directly affects neutron multiplication are geometry and moderator. A nuclear criticality is not possible with the designed geometry of the IFBA Coater even assuming optimum moderation and full water reflection.
The favorable geometry slab height for heterogeneous UO2 powder is known to be 2
4.3 inches. The design of the annulus of the IFBA Coater is such that only one layer of Fixtures with a pellet depth less than 0.5 inches exist inside the Coater. To determine if the 3
layer of Fixtures can be treated as an infmite slab, the following equation must be true :
Dr/r < 0.2 o
2 CRI-96-002, NCSA: Slao Thickness Reduction Due to Heterogenic Effect ofIncreasing Panicle Size.
3 ARH-600, II.B.2-5.
Initial Evaluation Date:
30 Sep 99 Page No.
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CSE Licerse Annex i
IFBA Process where,.
Dr = thickness of annulus, and r = inner radius of annulus.
o Evaluating this equation for the IFBA Coater where Dr = 0.5 inches and r = 15 inches o
gives 0.033. This is well below the 0.2 criteria. Therefore, the IFBA Coater can be treated as an infinite slab.
Since the IFBA Coater can be examined as an infinite slab, nuclear criticality is not possible i
in the IFBA Coater considering the designed geometry. For criticality to be possible, a considerable number of pellets would have to escape the Fixtures and form a critical geometry. This upset condition is not considered credible since no credible means exists to cause Fixtures to fail while in the Coater.
Another condition, also not credible, is significant amount of water entering the IFBA Cc,ater. The process of coating pellets is performed with a vacuum inside the Coater and no moderating material. The only moderating material present during operation is the water for cooling seals. This water is maintained outside of the Coater unit in a separate system and is prevented from cross-over into the Coater by seal integrity. Any cross-over of water into the Coater would be immediately detected by the IFBA Coater instrumentation and cause the system to shutdown.
In conclusion, a nuclear criticality is not possible in the IFBA Coater with the geometry as designed.
Mop Water System Control Parameters and Safety Limits:
Control Parameters J
Geometry.
j e
- e. Mass.
j Safety Limits j
See Margin of Safety.
e Bounding Assumptions:
Homogeneous UO2.
i e
l-Optimum H O Moderation.
2 Partial Reflection.
Initial Evaluation Date:
30 Sep 99 Page No.
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CSE License A=ex y-u m
IFBA Process s
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- Controls -
Safety Sienificant Controls l-
, None.
Margin afSafety:
The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the Mop Water system is evaluated to be very -
strong. The parameters which directly affect neutron multiplication are geometry and mass.
. This evaluation has determined that a nuclear criticality in the Mop Water system is not credible.
The Mop Water Stand Pipe X-7092, Mop Water Hold Vessel V-7092, and Mop Water Filtrate Vessel V-7093 are all 8.6 inch diameter cylindrical tanks. The Cartridge filter is a cylinder with a diameter of 8.7 inches. The diameters of these vessels are less than the 10.4 inch diameter calculated as the minimum permissible value Uranium Oxide Cylindrical Sub-critical Geometry Limit for ken =0.94. 4 This diameter was calculated for an infinite cylinder with 1 inch water reflection and an H/Uus Ratio of 250. This minimum permissible i value conservatively bounds these components.
L The nuclear critic ~ lity margin of safety for the filter press is also evaluated to be very a
strong. There is very little uranium present in the Mop Water system due to the nature of the process. The only significant source of uranium into the system is from the spent stripping acid. The amount of time pellets are allowed to spend in the stripping bath allows only minute amounts of uranium to dissolve. The pellets are sintered UO2 which does not dissolve quickly in sulfuric acid. Historically, the amount of uranium found in the filter
- press cake is approximately 3 w/o ( =0.15 w/o U235). The only time it has exceeded this historical average is on the rare occasion when it has been necessary to strip ZrB from 2
pellets which, due to some process error, have been pattially oxidized (i.e have a th;n layer of U30s beneath the ZrB coating). With this condition the amount of uranium on the filter-2 press cake has not exceeded 10 w/o.
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. Calculations on the Sperry Filter Press were performed to demonstrate that 6 filter plates
. were subcritical with UO2 dens'ities less than 62 w/o U. - Since a concentration of uranium 1 this high can not be achieved, (Even assuming 100% uranium compounds in the press cake, I
the theoretical concentration of uranium would still be below 50 w/o U.), the filter press is e,
subcritical with 6 filter plates present. A criticality would only be possible if more than 6 filter fram'es were used and the concentration'was significantly increased. Therefore, the l
- Handbook for the Conduct of Nuclear Criticality Safety Activities at the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility
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8 CRI-94-018, NCSA: Sperry Filter Press / Homogeneous Uranium Oxides / Saturated with Water.
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CSE License A=ex IFBA Process
' number of filter press plates and concentration of uranium in the filter press prevents a nuclear enticality.
Chemical and Fire Safety Controls 1
To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment.
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f Initial Evaluation Date:
30 Sep 99 Page No.
2 Revision No.
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