ML20217D142
| ML20217D142 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Westinghouse |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1999 |
| From: | WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217D114 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9910150022 | |
| Download: ML20217D142 (20) | |
Text
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1 CSE LICENSE ANNEX i
LABORATORIES l
9910150022 990930 PDR ADOCK 07001151 C
I, 1
i CSE LICENSE ANNEX i
LABORATORIES TABLE OF CONTENTS i
i TABLE OF CONTENTS i
REVISIONRECORD 11 ANAL YTICA L SER VICES LABORA TOR Y (CHEM LAB) 1
- I PROCESS
SUMMARY
PROCEDURES z 1
..,.. =
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECrlON AND RADIATION SAFETY CONTROLS.-
.2 i
NUCLEAR CRITICAUTY S AFETY (NCS) CONTROLS AND T/.*d.T TRLES--
2 CHEMICAL SAFETY AND FIRE SAFETY CONTROLS.;
.4 CHEMICAL PROCESS DEVELOPMENT LABORA TOR Y 5
PROCESS
SUMMARY
=5 PROCEDURES --
-5 i
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND RADIATION SAFETY CONTROLS -
.5 NUCLEAR CRITICAUTY S AFETY (NCS) CONTROLS AND FAULT TREES..
- 5 CHEMICAL SAFETY AND FIRE SAFETY CONTROLS.:
.5 HEALTHPHYSICS LABORAT01 Y(HPLAB) 6 6
PROCESS SUMr ARY.
PROCEDURES =
-.6 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND RADIATION SAFETY CONTROLS.
....... 6 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY (NC3) CONTROLS A?!D FAULT TREES...
.; 6 CilEMICAL SAFETY AND FIRE SAFETY CONTROLS--
.6 l
MECHANICAL DEVELOPMENTLABORATORY 7
PROCESS
SUMMARY
7 PROCEDURES..
-7 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND RADIATION SAFETY CONTROLS -
-7
- NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY (NCS) CONTROLS AND FAULT TREES..
.8 CHEMICAL SAFETY AND FIRE SAFETY CONTROLS:.
.15 METALLURGICAL LABORA TORY (METLAB) 16 PROCESS
SUMMARY
.16 i
PROCEDURES :-
.16 j
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND RADIATION SAFETY CONTROLS.
. 16 NUCLEAR CRrrlCALITY SAFETY (NCS) CONTROLS AND FAULT TREES -
.16 l
CHEMICAL SAFETY AND FIRE SAFETY CONTROLS-
.17 f
1 i
l l
InitialISSue Date:
30 SEP 99 Page NO.
i Revision Date:
Revision NO.,_0 i
L
CSE LICENSE ANNEX Laboratories REVISION RECORD REVISION DATE OF PAGES REVISION NUMBER REVISION REVISED RECORD 0
30 SEP 99 All CSAs CONVERTED TO CSEs for CIIEM LAB ITP LAB CPD LAB MET LAB MEC DEV LAB CSE WAS INCORPORATED INTO THIS I'9CUMENT I
)
i i
Initial Issue Date:
30 SEP 99 Page No.
ii Revision Date:
Revision No. _0 L_.
s CSE LICENSE ANNEX ANALYTICAL SERVICES LABORATORY (CHEM LAB)
Process Summary The Analytical Services Laboratory (Chem Lab) is responsible for providing support for the
' Columbia Plant. This includes routine analytical chemistry analysis for process control, product quality assurance, waste treatment and disposal, radiological and environmental control, and special nuclear material accountability. The Chem Lab analyzes several uranium compounds, including ADU, UO2 powder, UF6, U30s, uranyl nitrate, and UO2 pellets. There are numerous function specific laboratory rooms within the facility. Specifically, the Chem Lab performs the following analyses:
gravimetric, titrametric, pH, and ion specific electrodes wet chemistry techniques; e
surface area (BET), bulk density, porosity and particle size, and density or specific gravity; e
mass spectrometry; e
.. atomic absorption, emission spectroscopy, and laser and x-ray fluorescence; gas analysis (LECO);
e and ultraviolet visible spectrophotometry.
e Each function follows a similar process including sample preparation, : nlysis, residue collection, temporary storage, anct return to the chemical area. Each annytical function is dictated by an approved procedure which is listed in the QCI and COCL indices.
The total quantity of SNM in the lab at anytime will not exceed 60 kg uranium distributed in the various rooms of the lab. The majority of the SNM is in production polypaks of dry uranium powder which are brought into QC lab 2 and placed in a hood for sampling. These packs remain in QC lab 2 for only a short time. Refer to the CSE for Hoods and Containment, Section 5.3.37, for criticality safety analysis of material in hoods in the lab.
The process control room and QC Lab 1 have one scrap polypak each, which contains up to approximately 5 kg SNM. The remaining laboratory rooms handle less than 1 kg.
Procedures Designation Title Analytical Services Laboratory Manual L-01 Uranium Concentration of Waterglass Samples A44 Preparation of Uranium Spectrographic Standards U-04
% Uranium and Oxygen to Uranium Atomic Ration in Uranium Oxides QCI 1199(M Analytical Chemistry Laboratory Log-In Procedure QCI-I19907 Analytical Services Lab Storage of U-235 A-01 Determination of Metallic Impurities in Uranium Compounds U-02 Preparation of Samples for Uranium Analysis U-01 Uranium by Potentiometric Titration U-05 Determination of Total Uranium in UF6 M-01 Determination ofisotopic Composition of Uranium P-(M Water by Coulometric Karl Fisher Titration f
Initial Issue Date:
30 SEP 99 Page No.
I t
Revision Date:
Revision No. _0 L-
g e,p j
L' CSE LICENSE ANNEX.
.,..l.
Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment L
' Nuclear Criticality Satiety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees
' ControlsL
- Safety Significant Contmis
- Passive engineered controls'(PEC)
Passive e.sgineered controls are described in'the License and in Regulatory Affairs-108.
LThe requirements for functional' verification are determined from this evaluation..
.e' None :
Active engineered controls (AEC)
Active Engineered Controls. are defined -in the License and in.. Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108'. They are also called safety significant interlocks ' The requirements for functional verification are defined in RA-108 and/or area operating procedures.
a e None Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
I
- None
. Administrative controls Safety Significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indica. ion. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.' Functional verification is not normally required.
.. D. None Safety Margin Improvement Controls
' Safety. Margin Improvement Controls. consist of all types of controls: passive, active,
- process, administrative with ' computer assist, and wholly administrative. These controls 1
- do not require periodic' functional verification..They are primarily ' process controls but
' contribute to the systAls margin of safety. They typically are identified in the Fault Tree.
y e-
- CONTROL FUNCTION /., W
- IE # t j
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, FAR,URE CONDITION /J + N; t.& g i
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?ACT'ON 'i
+
- Prevent placing 7 packs of material into hood /
CHE1 7 packs in hood /,
Operator prevents placing 7 packs.in hood.-
Initial Issue Date:
30 SEP 99 Page No.
2
- Revision Date:
Revision No. _0 4
L=
F L."
L CSE LICENSE ANNEX 1
Detect and remove excessive packs before accumulating 7 in hood /
CHE2 l
- s 7 packs accumulate in hood /
~
Operator detects & corrects before 7 packs in hood
(
. Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the Chem Lab is evaluated to be very strong.
Criticality is considered not credible. However, to ensure that the strong margin of safety is maintained, the Chem Lab is under geometry control for handling and storage of small sample containers, and mass control for the scrap.polypaks, Calculations performed for the Hoods and Containment CSE show that kerr s0.95 for all normal operating conditions in the Chem Lab-Further, no single credible process upset will result in criticality being possible.
l The parameters that directly affect neutron multiplication for Chem Lab, assuming 5.0
' wt% "U enrichment, are geometry and mass, as stated above. Criticality is not credible 2
for the small sample containers. Criticality with scrap polypaks would be possible given the following combinations of process upsetsi A sufficient number of polypaks of material at optimum density are created, brought e.
into the laboratory, and arranged in a close-packed array, and they become optimally moderated, such that a critical configuration is formed.
1 Summary Of Initiating Events.Which Lead To Credible Process Upsets
= IE #CHE 1 Technicians stockpile scrap material polypaks IE #CHE 2 Personnel in lab fail to detect accumulation of polypaks CRI-96-036 Initial Issue Date:'
30 SEP 99 Page No.
3 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0
CSE LICENSE ANNEX Fault Trees.
FIGURE 6.3-1 4
ANALYTICAL SERVICES LABORATORY (CHEMLAB)
DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PROTECTION FOR SCRAP MATERIAL POLYPAKS CRITICAUTY POSSISLE
- I s CRITICALITY PRECURSOR >
oRavER m N mE urm LMNTS OF MASS, t000ERATOR, AND GEOMETRY E
I CONFIGURATION MASS MODERATOR DEFENSES DEFENSES Fall DEFENSES FAIL FML m
]
- CONTNIGENCY *
- CONTNIGENCY > u.
MTm
'iT amur RieuNvinnarEivuur
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omCnosvmaNv cue =.As c=""S a gumAL YTIME
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W POL N S MO N QUI OF
,ot wC mtAs Accumut e s, J'
fCD E 11 J
J (CD E 81' D
D l
ewan oac Sheet.0 nm Chemical Safety and Fire Safety Controls
.To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment.
l i
l Initial Issue Date:
30 SEP 99 Page No.
4 Revision Date:
Revision No.
O L_
F CSE LICENSE ANNEX l
CHEMICAL PROCESS DEVELOPMENT LABORATORY Process Summary.
The Chemical Process Development Laboratory (CPD Lab) is used for process research, prototype development, and equipment. check-out prior to installation in the manufacturing lines. Typical activities include uranium chemical processing, powder preparation and characterization, pelleting and sintering studies, development of rod loading techniques, uranium recovery and waste treatment applications, and material handling improvements to enhance airborne radioactive control.
Hence, material is brought into the laboratory, either in very small quantities for studies and analyses, or in larger quantities for the purpose of performing operational tests of development projects. In the former, criticality safety is covered in the Hoods / Containment CSE and l
VENTILATION ISA. Concerning the latter, the responsible engineer completes a configuration control request form which is routed to Regulatory Affairs for evaluation. Any 3
development project that includes SNM is evaluated by the criticality function on a case-by-case basis to ensure that double contingency protection exists.
Our Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan requires that the transfer of larger quantities of SNM into or out of the lab be in the form of items which are tracked by an item control system. The item control system requires that each item is defme i in terms of unique identity, location, quantity, and create and consume dates.
Procedures Designation Title FA-105 PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANT SYSTEMS CAPITAL PROJECTS FA-107 JOB ACCEI'TANCE TA-500 COLUMBIA MANUFACTURING PLANT CONFIGURATION CONTROL RA-104 REGULATORY REVIEW OF CONFIGURATION CilANGE AUTHORIZATION COP-881003 OPERATING THE SIEVE SHAKER COP-881004 OPERATING THE CPD LAB GRANULATOR COP-881007 INSTRON CRUSH TEST FOR UO2 PELLETS COP-881009 DETERMINATION OF OPEN POROSITY IN SINTERED 002 PELLETS j
COP-8810ll URANIUM SAMPLE INVENTORY SYSTEM COP-881012 URANIUM IN SOLUTION SAMPLE INVENTORY SYSTEM Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees A criticality safety analysis is performed on the planned activities and equipment on a case-by-case basis and prior to operation of the process.
l.
Chemical Safety and Fire Safety Controls To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment.
Initial Issue Date:
30 SEP 99 Page No.
5 Revision Date:
Revision No. J
E CSE LICENSE ANNEX I
6
' HEALTH PHYSICS LABORATORY (HP LAB)
)
l Process Summary The Health Physics Laboratory (HP Lab) is used by the Regulatory Engineering and l
- Operations Department to provide radiation and environmental measurement and protection l
. services for the chemical manufacturing ~ lines. Typical activities include monitoring inplant l
airborne radioactivity concentrations, monitoring radioactivity levels in' effluents discharge to 2
the environment, and analyzing uranyl nitrate for "U concentration. In fact, the only function i
j performed in the HP. Lab that is of criticality safety significance is the UNH measurement l
function.
Procedures Designation Title ROP 45-071.
Lab Waste Segregation and Removal from Lab i
ROP 45-075 :
UN Sample i
Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees At any one time, several 60 mi sample bottles are in the lab awaiting analysis on the Tennelec Germanium system. The sample bottles are received in the pneumatic tube and taken to the Tennelec counter where they are counted. They are then taken to the scales at the density stadon for weighing, and stored in a pan until returned to URRS.
Some discussion is appropriate to justify the conclusion that a criticality is not credible. First, the UN samples received are on the order of concentrations of 5.0 g 235U/ liter or less. The analysis is performed as part of double contingency protection for pumping the UN to the UN bulk storage tanks. Uranyl nitrate at this concentration is suberitical in any quantity as long as the uranium remains in soludon. In the HP Lab, the UN is always kept in 60 mi sample bottles. It is not stored
-in any bulk container. It is never accumulated in large quantities. Hence, it does not present a criticality issue. The HP LAB is clearly well inside the safe concentration envelope. Therefore, no further analysis is required.
Chemical Safety and Fire Safety Controls
. To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment.
i l
Initial Issue Date':
30 SEP 99 Page No.
6 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0
CSE LICENSE ANNEX -
MECHANICAL DEVELOPMENT LABORATORY Process Summary The Mechanical Development lab performs various test procedures on fuel rods and/or assemblies. SNM does not exist in any other form inside this lab. All rods are loaded outside of_ the lab in normal rod loading production areas under special controls / routings or procedures.
The Mechanical Development Lab maintains an inventory of SNM as fuel rods ranging in enrichment from 0.2 to 0.8 % U-235. Under no circumstances are SNM of enrichments higher than 1.0% permitted in the Mechanical Development Lab. Also, the total. quantity of U-235 of i
enrichments between 0.711 and 1.0 % U-235 are limited to 10 kilograms.
Various test and/or measurement equipment are employed to performed planned experiments on fuel rods and assemblies. Tests in the VIPER loop must be approved by Regulatory Affairs prior to' implementation. All other test facilities do not allow enough SNM to make a criticality possible.
The VIPER test loop is a two fuel assembly test loop used to simulate fuel rod vibration and pressure drop conditions. Each test in the VIPER loop is detailed in a Test Prospectus. The Test Prospectus details the fuel assemblies to be used for the test, the dimensions of the flow housing and parameters and procedures important to the test objective. It is necessary to test fuel assemblies which contain fuel rods with UO2 pellets to simulate actual reactor conditions of water flow. The UO2 enrichment of the fuel rods in the assembly is less than 1.0 w/o 235U.
Procedures Designation Title CF-50-009 check list for manual valves CF-50-010 Check List For Hand Operated Valves - Viper System CF-504)ll PLJuct Engineering Laboratory Safety Significant Controls Functionality Verification Form CF-50-012 PE Test Lab Fuel Assembly And Fuel Rod Channel Receipt Log CF-50-013 PE Test Lab Fuel Assembly Configuration And Fuel Rod Channel Tracking Log MOP-500118 General Safety Requirements Product Engineering Lab" MOP-$00119 Functi. mal Verification Of Safety Significant Controls-Product Engineering Development Laboratory" MOP-500120 Vibration Investigation And Pressure-Drop Experimental Research MOP-500121 Special Nuclear Material (SNM) Item Control In The Mechanical Development Lab 500!!9-1 Safety Significant Controls - VIPER System Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment i
Initial Issue Date:
30 SEP 99 Page No.
7 Revision Date:
Revision No.
O u
CSE LICENSE ANNEX
. Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees
. Controls -
Administrative controls
,CONTROLi
$4,N00NTROL FUNCTION /?, %%
- FUNC110NALA
' INITIATING "
dM IDQ77 -.x-.M.J PAILURE'COND1 TION /WdA@
VERfPICATIONI n- ) EVENT (IE)f 4
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0; W edE i ACTION > # ' ~i Nh NREQUIRED '
ENUMBER A-VIPER-01.
Prevent F/A or Channel from being loaded with rods of unverified enrichment /
No IE #1 F/A or Channel is loaded with rods of unverified enrichment /
Special Routing specifies that rod enrichment is verified.
A-VIPER-02 Prevent F/A or Channel from being loaded with rods of >1.0 w/o "U enrichment /
No IE #2 2
F/A or Channel is loaded with rods of > 1.0 w/o 2"U enrichment /
Special Routing specifies that rod enrichment is
< 1.0 w/o "U.
2 A-VIPER-03 Prevent F/A or Channel from being reconfigured/
No IE #3 F/A or Channel is not tampered sealed per Special Routing /
Special Routing specifies that F/A or Channel is tamper sealed.
A-VIPER-04 Prevent wrong F/A or Channel from being loaded into shipping container destined for PE No IE #4 lab /
Wrong F/A or channel not built for PE lab is loaded and shipped to PE lab /
Special Routing specifies F/A or Channel is to be shipped to the PE lab.
A-VIPER 4)5 Prevent - wrong F/A or Channel from being loaded into shipping container destined for PE No IE #4 lab /
Wrong F/A or channel not built for PE lab is 3
loaded and shipped to PE lab /
j Special Routing specifies NCS verifies shipping container loading prior to shipment to PE lab.
j A-VIPER-06 Prevent acceptance of F/A or Channel with unverified enrichment into the PE lab /
No IE #5 F/A or Channel with unverified enrichment
)
accepted into PE lab /
CF-50-12 requires PE lab to verify rods have known enrichment prior to receiving the F/A or Channel into the PE lab.
l Initial Issue Date:
30 SEP 99 Page No.
8 l
Revision Date:
Revision No. _0 l
I L
P# J JCSE LICENSE ANNEX.
! ~
0000EROL; ppjg CONTROI2 FUNCTION /g73 f,
tFUNCTIONAL:.
. INITIATING.
qIDr ~
tg:'; yeFAILURECONDITION/?. A i, VERIFICATION.
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TRE N 4 NUMBER' A-VIPER 07 Prevent acceptance of F/A or Channel with
> 1.0 w/o "U enrichment into the PE lab /
No IE #6 2
2 F/A or Channel with >1.0 w/o "U enrichment accepted into PE lab /
/
CF-50-12 requires PE lab to verify rods have 2
<l.0 w/o "U prior to receiving the F/A or Channel into the PE lab.
.)
A VIPER-08 Prevent wiauthorized receipt of F/A or Channel j
into the Pillab/
No IE #7
]
F/A or Channel not authorized for PE lab use j
accepted into PE lab /
]
MOP-500121 requires PE lab to document on CF-50-12 any F/A or Channel received into the PElab.
A-VIPER-09 Prevent choosing a F/A not in the Test Prospectus for loading into the VIPER test loop No IE #8 vessel /
F/A chosen for loading into the VIPER test loop vessel that is not in the Test Prospectus /
MOP-500121 requires any F/A chosen for loading into the VIPER test loop be specified in the Test Prospectus.-
A-VIPER-10 Prevent improperly conficated F/A from being loaded into the VIPER test 160 vessel /
No IE #8 F/A improperly configured is loaded into the VIPER test loop vessel /
MOP-500121 requires proper reconfiguration of a F/A by completing CF-50-13/
A-VIPER-Il Prevent choosing a F/A not in the Test Prospectus for loading into the VIPER test loop No IE #9 vessell F/A che m for loading into the VIPER test loop vessel that is not in the Test Prospectus /
MOP-500121 requires NCS verification that any F/A chosen for loading into the VIPER test loop is specified in the Test Prospectus.
A-VIPER-12 Prevent improperly configured F/A from being loaded into the VIPER test loop vessell No IE #9 F/A improperly configured is loaded into the VIPER test loop vessel /
MOP-500121 requires NCS verification that proper reconfiguration of a F/A was performed on CF-50-13/
Margin of Safety The parameter that directly affects neutron multiplication for the VIPER test loop vessel is l
. enrichment. Sufficient moderator is present in the vessel and two fuel assemblies in close proximity is non-favorable geometry. A criticality (keff < 1.0) would be possible in the VIPER test loop vessel given one of the following configurations:
i Initial Issue Date:
30 SEP 99 Page No.
9 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0
h N
CSE LICENSE ANNEX Two 17x170FA fuel assemblies loaded with UO2 fuel rods at an enrichment of 3.4
)
e l
w/o "U (Reference 1).
2 l
e. One 17x170FA fuel assembly containing 2.0 w/o.235U enriched fuel rods and one L
17x170FA fuel assembly containing 5.0 w/o 235U enriched fuel r' ds.
o Further bculations were performed to determine the keff of the VIPER test loop vessel assuming one fuel assembly at 1.0 w/o and one at 5.0 w/o. The keff for this condition was less than 0.959. This demonstrates that with one fuel assembly exceeding the VIPER
)
2 I
test loop vessel enrichment limit of 1.0 w/o "U (up to the maximum licensed enrichment in the plant, 5.0 w/o), criticality is not possible.
Because two fuel assemblies exceeding the enrichment limit are required for criticality in the VIPER test loop vessel and the controls identified in this analysis, the. nuclear criticality margin of safety for the VIPER test loop vessel is evaluated-to be strong.
Double contingency protection exists.
Calculations performed in support of this evaluation indicate that ken is well below 0.95 during normal operations, and, clearly, many unlikely process upsets are necessary to make criticality possible.
Summary Of Initiating Events Which Lead To Credible Process Upsets IE //1, Fuel Assembly or Fuel Rod Channel loaded with rods of unverified enrichment L
IE #2, Fuel Assembly or Fuel Rod Channel loaded with rods of > 1.0 w/o 235U IE #3, Fuel Assembly or Fuel Rod Channel is not tamper sealed per Special Routing IE #4,-Improperly documented Fuel Assembiy packaged for shipment to PE lab
. IE #5,' PE lab accepts Fuel Assembly er Fuel Rod Channel containing unverified fuel rod enrichment IE #6, PE lab accepts Fuel Assembly or Fuel Rod Channel'containing > 1.0 w/o 235U i
1 fuel rod enrichment IE #7, Fuel Assembly or Fuel Rod Channel received into the PE lab is not recorded on the PE lab Receipt Control Form i
IE #8, PE lab personnel fail to select correct assembly and verify contents before loading into the VIPER vessel
. IE #9, NCS function fails to verify assembly selection and verify contents before loading l
into the VIPER vessel 1
L l
Initial Issue Date: - 30 SEP 99 Page No.
10 Revision Date:
Revision No.
O
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'l CSE LICENSE ANNEX Fault Trees VIPER Test Loop Vessel Double Contingency Protection cRmeAun rOSSan r R' HL Ai if Nii URvW Tuc Fuel ?
^"- wm
- 3 4 udo 8"U are introduced inlo lho VIPER Tout Loop Vessel l
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MASS (ENRJCHMENT)
MODERATION DEFENSES CONFIGURATION DEFENSES Fall FML DEFENSES FML
/NA e m
_:AV.WBLE I
NA SUFFICIENT OEOIETRY OF AFAM OF TWO FUEL E V 4 TOR ASSEMBUES IS NOT FAVORABLE A
A Initial Issue Date:
30 SEP 99 Page No.
12 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0
CSE LICENSE ANNEX
~
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s A
f,
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W?W
't'","4""
EN empmem mP sab PtA er Caannel EN g
W.'". C Ea s- =*o qp q>
speciai nounne sp.a nou==
s-nouan.
Initial Issue Date:
30 SEP 99 Page No.
13 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0
r CSE LICENSE ANNEX
-/
Falure of PE Lab to A3 Prevent Accepeng Groeter then 1.0 Wo '80 F/A nt Rnde FIAorChannel received into the PE lob in not recorded on the PE Lab of Form FfA FAoC n C
E containing ening unvertfled fuel
>1.0 w/o "*U rod enrichment W rod d EM EH j
MOP-500121 CF-50-012 MOP-500121 MOP-500121 CF-50-012 CF-50-012 l
l Initial Issue Date:
30 SEP 99 Page No.
14 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0 e
i it CSE LICENSE ANNEX l
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F =. v.
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itCS Function faits to PE Lab personnel fall to NCS Func.on fans NM mmh m aFIAh h ht is chosen for atton F/A i
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l Chemical Safety and Fire Safety Controls f
To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment.
Initial Issue Date:
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CSE LICENSE ANNEX METALLURGICAL LABORATORY (MET LAB)
Process Summary The Metallurgical Laboratory (Met Lab) performs porosity measurement, and microstructure and grain size analysis on representative pellet samples. The analyses are performed to provide data for ongoing quality studies, and to support research and development efforts. Met Lab analyses are not used for production release.
Pellet samples are prepared for metallurgic evaluation in a multistep process; cutting and mounting, rough grinding, polishing, ultrasonic cleaning, and etching. Approximately half of each pellet is removed from the sample during preparation.
Procedures Designation Title QCI 108813 Sample Documentation And Disposition Practices For The Metallurgical Laboratory QCI 108814 Sample Preparation of Boride Coated Pellets QCl 108815 Preparation Of UO2 Pellets For Porosity, Microstructure, And Grain Size Analysis QCI 108861 UO2 Pellet Microstructure Surveillance Program Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Asses.sment Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees The Met Lab processes a minimal quantity of UO2 pellets per year. The lab is under mass control, restricted to a total of 1000 grams U ".
Laboratory personnel maintain a U n 2
2 inventory log in accordance with QCI 108813. A review of the log shows the following:
fotal Im entor)
Total Total -
Total No.
Year Pellets gt "
Adjustment g-t :2" g-t g-l:O:
Receis ed Receiu#
tg L ")
in I.ah in Lab in I,uh 1994 1261 l
253.4 l
133.57 386.97 7739.4 l
8780.80 l
l 1995 1797 l
316.855 l
-94.021 222.834 4456.68 l
5056.36 l
l 1996 1584 l
326.416 l
108.442 434.858 8697.16 l
9867.44 l
l 1997 1083 l
243.235 l
-120.82 122.415 2448.3 l
2777.74 l
l 1998 772 l
181.408 l
-74.29 107.118 2142.36 l
2430.63 l
The actual mass in inventory is approximately one half the recorded amount because the laboratory immediately returns or grinds off up to 50% of each pellet received for analysis.
The Met Lab pellet throughput is fairly regular. The table below shows the number of pellets returned to the chemical area for each of the past five years.
Year
- Pellets Returned 1994 1768 1995 974 1996 187 -
1997 2767 Initial Issue Date:
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e CSE LICENSE ANNEX
_1998 8u3
' The data indicate that Met Lab personnel would have to stockpile pellets for several years in order to collect enough material to form a critical configuration. Several factors make this an incredible.
The entire Met Lab staff would have to stop returning analyzed pe!!ets to the Chemical Area for disposition.
The annual physical inventory would have to fail to detect the accumulation.
The inventory increase would have to remain undetected by any supervisory, management, and regulatory personnel.
It is suspected that the prepared pellets,.which are half pellets encased in epoxy and
{
Quickmount, form an ovennoderated configuration. Hence, these pellet samples would 1
have to be released from their mountings. (Note that there is no analysis to verify this)
. Another point of consideration for criticality is the filtration system on the pellet grinder / polisher. As described in QCI 108815, the filtration system features a bag filter and l
cartridge (CUNO) filter housing in series. These filters are monitored by Met Lab personnel, j
and changed out as necessary in accordance with QCI 108815. Dirty filters are sent to the j
scrap cage (Conversion) for proper disposal.
j The inherent margin of suberiticality and margin of safety for the Met Lab processes are q
obviously extremely large. It is not credible that a critical configuration could be accumulated, either with pellets or filters. The License requirements for the Met Lab, given in SNM-1107, Section 6, under laboratories, indicates that geometry or mass are the controlled parameters.
The Met Lab is clearly well inside the safe mass envelope. Therefore, no further analysis is required.
Chemical Safety and Rre Safety Controls To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment.
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