ML20207B037

Rev 0 to Criticality Safety Evaluation License Annex Hoods & Containments

ML20207B037
Person / Time
Site:	Westinghouse
Issue date:	02/28/1999
From:	WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20207B030	List: ML20207B025 ML20207B037
References
NUDOCS 9903050389
Download: ML20207B037 (54)

Text

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i CSE LICENSE ANNEX HOODS AND CONTAINMENTS i

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9903050389 990228 PDR ADOCK 07001151 C

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CSE LICENSE ANNEX HOODS AND CONTAINMENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS i

REVISIONRECORD ill Process Summary 1

EQUIPMENT DIMENSIONS AND MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION.................. 2 VENTILATION SYSTEMS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED HOODS AND ENCLOSURES.5 S Y ST EM D RAW I N G S........................................................................... 6 O PE RATI N G PROC E D U R ES................................................................. 7 Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls 9

Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trec*

10 N UCLEAR CRITICALITY S A FETY ANALYSIS.......................................... 10 GeneralIntroduction andScope.

. 10 Polypak Hoods (2 ca.) in ADU Bulk Blending doom [ Homogeneous]..

.13 Bulk Container Feeder Valve Cleaning Hood [ Homogeneous]..

. 13 Bulk Container Cover Cleaning / Storage Hood [ Homogeneous]..

.13 Blue Af Oven Hoods, Conversion Lines & Scrap Cage [ Homogeneous or Heterogeneous]..

. 13 Fit:milland Calciner Product Hoods [ Homogeneous]..

.I9 K-Tron Feeders (Homogeneous]..

.. ] 9 Acrison Feeders [ Homogeneous]..

.19 Decontamination / Cleaning Hood [ Homogeneous]..

.19 Blue Af Oven Hoods, Scrap Recovery Area (Heterogeneous or Homogeneous]..

.. ] 9 Ventilation Filters Cleaning Hood, UF6 Bay [ Deleted]..

.19 Cleaning Hood. Scrap Recovery Area [ Homogeneous]...

.I9 Pellet Impection Hoods [ Heterogeneous]..

. 20 Pellet Blue AlHoods [ Heterogeneous]..

. 20 Pellet Rahbon Blending Hood [ Heterogeneous or Homogeneous]..

. 25 Pellet Addhack Area Hood (Homogeneous]..

. 30 Pellet Roll Hood..

.30 Pellet Pilot Line Hood [ Heterogeneous or Homogeneous]..

.30 A sial Blanket inspection Hool[ Heterogeneous]...

. 30 BET Compactability Press Hood [ Heterogeneous]..

. 30 Line 5 Alic Hood [ Heterogeneous or Homogeneous]..

. 31 Powder Transfer Hood (Furnace SC) (Heterogeneous or Homogeneous]..,

. 31 URRS Weighing Hood (Homogeneous]..

. 31 URRS Blue Af Hoods (704 & 703) (Homogeneous]..

. 31 Incinerator Hoods..

. 31 LLRWSorting Hood [ Homogeneous]..

. 31 C4 Dissolvers input Hoods.

. 34 C4 Dissolvers Output Hoods..

. 34 706 Hoodfor Processing C4 Dissolver Residue [ Homogeneous]..

. 34 Rod Reclamation Station Hoods [ Heterogeneous]..

,. 34 Fuel Rod Lathe Station Hood [ Heterogeneous]...

. 34 Rod Loading Stations Hoods [ Heterogeneous]..

. 34 1

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Rod Rework Station Hood [ Heterogeneous]...

. 35 IFBA Inspection Hoods [ Heterogeneous]..

. 35 IFBA UnloadingStation[ Heterogeneous]...

. 35 IFBA Blue Al[ Heterogeneous]..

. 35 IFBA ZrB Stripping Hood [ Heterogeneous]..

. 35 2

QC Ventilation Hoods " Cage" Area [ Heterogeneous or Homogeneous]..

. 40 Chemical Development Lab (CDL) Ventilation Hoods - Office / Lab Area & Floor [ Heterogeneous or Homogeneous]..

. 40 QC Ventilation Hood-Aloisture Cage [ Homogeneous]..

,. 40 Dissolver Hood in CSR [ Homogeneous]..

. 40 Filter Cleaning Hood [ Homogeneous]..

. 45 Comainments/ Enclosures [ Homogeneous]..

. 47 ChernicalSafety and Fire Safety Controls 53 Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

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CSE LICENSE ANNEX j

HOODS AND CONTAINMENTS REVISION RECORD REVISION DATE OF PAGES REVISION NUMBER REVISION REVISED RECORD 4

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Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

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7 CSE LICENSE ANNEX HOODS AND CONTAINMENTS Process Summary The Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility utilizes numerous hoods and enclosures to provide personnel protection, product containment and interior environmental control. These systems caver both the chemical and mechanical areas of the facility.

Within the context of this CSE, a hood is defined as a confined space (not a room) with hand holes, small openings, etc., and with exhaust ventilation / scrubbing connections, in which the operator places or removes material for further processing. The processing steps in hoods include, but are not limited to, cleaning, disassembly, screening, oxidation, drying, sieving, inspection, loading and unloading fuel tubes, etc.

Enclosures are defined as confined spaces around process equipment for the purpose of preventing the spread of airborne radioactive material, but are not normally opened except for checking the space for a buildup of material. Examples of containments are the ADU bucket elevators, the Fitzmill enclosures, and the pellet powder lift enclosures.

Laboratory-type hoods, production hoods, and/or other primary enclosures where uncontained nuclear material is handled, provide an average face velocity of at least 100 linear feet per minute at all openings during work operations. Face velocity measurements for ventilated equipment are performed, and documented, on at least a quarterly basis when such equipment is in operation. Systems found not to meet the minimum flow velocity are discontinued from operation, tagged-out and then measured on at least a weekly basis until a documented evaluation demonstrates the minimum flow velocity can be maintained.

l Where containment of uranium dust by conventional ventilation hoods is not possible, or is impractical, gloveboxes are used. Ventilation systems for gloveboxes, and similar enclosed devices, are designed and operated with a nominal negative internal pressure of at least 0.1 inches of water with respect to room atmospheric pressure. Gloveboxes are equipped with instrumentation for measuring differential pressure, and such instrumentation is routinely checked for proper operation on at least a monthly basis when the enclosed equipment is in operation.

Ventilation hoods and gloveboxes are constructed of metal, using glass and/or fire resistant plastic for viewing areas. Plastics conform to a Class-I fire rating.

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28 FEB 99 Page No.

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This section provides the details of process design and equipment, including those that may affect criticality safety analyses and evaluations.

EQUIPMENT DIMENSIONS AND MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION

ID ;

EQUIPMENT

't

. DIMENSIONS J LOCATION

MATERIALS OFm DESCR#rION-CON 5rIRUCTION O Hoods and Enclosures IIDI Polypak Dump liomls (2) 36x49

24fl Conversion Bulk Blendmg Stamless Steel with Plexiglass llD2 Feeder Valve Cleaning llorxl 60x41x4 Mil Conversion Bulk Blendmg Stainless Steel with Plexiglass 1103 1700 Kg Cover Cleanmg/ Storage limxl 30x31x2611 Converuon Bulk Blendmg Cartum Steel IID4 Conversion Line 5 Drying limxt and 72x30x3611 Converuon Stainless Steel with Plexiglass Blue M Oven 35x40 5x34.511 IIDS Conversion Lme 4 Drying limxt arki 29x48x3611 Conversion Stamless Steel with Plexiglass Blue M Oven 41 x40.5x3411 IID6 Conversion Line 3 Drymg flood and 29x48x3611 Conversion Stainless Steel with Plexiglass Blue M Oven 4 t x40.5434ll llD7 Lme i Fitzmill Enclosure 60x60x4711 Conversion Carbon Steel llDM Line i Calciner Product Hmxt 26x27x26H Conversion Stainless Steel with Plexiglass jlD9 Line 1 Calcmer Product Catch llomi 13x15xl8 Conversion Stamless Steel with Plexiglass llD2 Line 1 Fitzmill Prmiuct ifomi 28x3Mx20ll Conversmn Stainless Steel with Plexiglass 11D11 Q ! Fitzmdl Product Catch limal 13x15x1811 Conversion Stainless Steel with Plexiglass IID12 Line 2 Fitz> nill Enclosure 48x64x40H Conversion llD13 Line 2 Calcmer Prmfuct limxt 26x27x26fl Conversion Stainless Steel with Plexiglass llD14 Line 2 Calcmer Pnxiuct Catch Ilmx!

13x18x1011 Conversion Stainless Steel with Plexiglass HDIS Line 2 Fitzmd! Pnxtuct ilom]

3Hx2Hx20H Conversion Stainless Steel with Plexiglass IID16 Line 2 Fitzmdi Product Catch Homi 13xlMx10ll Conversion Statnless Steel with Plexiglass IIDl7 Lme 3 Fitzmill Enclosure 4xx60x4711 Conversion Carbon Steel HDIN Line 3 Calciner Product limal 26x27x26H Conversion Stamless Steel with Plexiglass llD19 Line 3 Calciner Product Catch limxt 13:18x1011 Ccnversion Stamiess Steel with Plexiglass llD20 Line 3 Fitzmill Pnxluct Homi 2Hx36x2111 Conversion Stainless Steel with Plexiglass llD21 Line 3 Fitzmill Prmiuct Catch Hmui 15xlRx13H Conversion Stainless Steel with Plexiglass llD22 Line 4 Fitzmdi Enclosure 4xx61x47H Conversi<m Cartum Steel 11D23 Line 4 Calciner Pnxiuct ilmxi 28x26x2611 Conversion Stamless Steel with Plexiglass HD24 Line 4 Calc. Catch lid 13x15x1H Conversum Stainless Steel with Plexiglass HD25 Line 4 Fitzmill Pnxiuct ilmsl 28x32x21H Conversion Stainless Steel with Plexiglass llD26 Line 4 Fitzmill Pnxtuct Catch limal 15xl8x13H Conversion Stamless Steel with Plexiglass IID27 Line 5 Fitzmill Enclosure 4Hx5Mx4711 Conversion Cartum Steel IID28 Line 5 Calciner Pnniuct Ilmsl 28x31x2tli conversion Stainless Steel with Plexiglass 3

ilD29 Lme 5 Calciner Prmiuct Catch Hmxi 15x15x1311 Conversxm Stamless Steel with Plexiglass j

IID30 Lme 5 Fitzmill Pnxtuct limxt 25x36 t21H Conversion Stainless Steel with Plexiglass llD31 Line 5 Fitzmill Pnxtuct Catch limal 16x t Nx13H Conversion Stainless Steel with Plexiglass ilD32 Line 1 K-Tnm Feeder 34x24x61H Conversion Stainless Steel Frame with Plexiglass HD33 Line 2 K Tron Feeder 34x24x61H Conversion Stainless Steel Frame with Plexiglass llD34 Line 3 Acrison Feeder 45x26x2411 Conversion Stainless Steel Frame with Plexiglass HD35 Line 4 K-Tron Feeder 34x24x6111 Conversion Stainless Steel Frame with Plexiglass llD36 Lme 5 K-Tron Feeder 34x24x6111 Conversion Stainless Steel Frame with Plexiglass HD37 Decontammation/Cleanmg liood (2) 23x17x261I Conversion Stainless Steel Frame with Plexiglass LID 38 Blue M Oven and Drying limx!(2) 35x40.5x34.511 Conversion Scrap Cafe Stamiess Steel with Plexiglass 92x30x36H llD39 Filter Cleaning Haxi 78x36x34H URRS Stainless Steel with Plexiglass HD40 Lincoln Pump Cleanmg Hmx!

72x30x3611 Co tversion Scrap Cage Stamless Steel with Plexiglass

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28 FEB 99 Page No.

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. EQUIPMENT ~

c DIMENSIONS

LOCATION; <

j MATERIAL 8 OFF 3

c DESCRIPTIONi

> CONSTRUCTION :

IID41 Pellet inspections lloud 61x30x221I Pellet Area Line I-5 Stamless Steel 2 Per Line ilD42 Pellet Lme I-5 Blue M Oven and 40 40 0 711 Pellet Area Lme 15 Stainless Steel with Plexiglass Drying licxnts 96x24x3611 ilD43 Pellet Line 1-5 Pellet RMum Blendmg 87x30x35ft Pellet Area Lme 15 Stamiess Steel with Plexiglass 4

i II<xul llD44 Pellet Line 15 Addhack Area lhxxl 104x30x3511 Pellet Area Stainless Steel with Plexiglass ilD45 Pellet Lme I 5 Polypak Roll flood 10Hx30x35lI Pellet Area Stamless Steel with Plexiglass 11D46 Pellet Pilot Line llund 72x30x3611 Pellet Area Stainless Steel with Plexiglass llD47 Axial Hlanket inspecuan thxxl 59x24x24fl Pellet Area Stainless Steel with Plexiglass llD4x HET Compactabihty Press flood 56x31x6311 Pellet Area Stamless Steel with Plexiglass llD49 Line 5 Mix lhxxl M400:3511 Pellet Area Stainless Steel with Plexiglass t

ilDio Powder Transfer thun!

57x30x3511 Pellet Area Stamiess Steel with Plexiglass 2

IID51 URRS Weighing thxxl (Stand Alone 72x30x3611 URRS Stamless Steel with Plexiglass II<xsli j

11D52 URRS Blue M Ovens (2) 96x24 0611 URRS Stainless Steel with Plexiglass i

llD53 Incinerator thuxis (2) 94x24x5411 URRS Stainless Steel with Plexiglass llD54 Sortmg flood 104x3043511 URRS Stamless Steel with Plexiglass Polypak INx15x2211 IID55 C4 Input il<xxis (3) 40 5x20x2611 URRS Stamless Steel with Plexiglass llD56 C4 Output thunts (3) 36x26x2611 URRS Stamiess Steel with Plexiglass llD57 706110<n1 for Processmg C4 Dissolver W 26x36ft URRS Stainless Steel with Plexiglass Residue Oven -40x40x3711 IID5M Rod Reclamation Station thxxis (2) and 36x24x96fl Pellet Cartxm Steel Frame with R(x! Lathe 36x25x3611 Plexiglass Lathe-36x36x2411 IID59 Fuel Rrxl Lathe Station ikxxl 36 07x2411 Pellet Stainless Steel with Plensglass IID60 Rod Loadmg Statmn floods (4) 54x26xxil Rod Area Cartion Steel Frame with j

Plexiglass Doors I

IID61 Risi Rework Station thwal 35x2NxlHil Rod Area Stainless Steel with Plexiglass i

IID62 IFilA Inspection lloods (2) 3900x2411 IlllA Stainless Steel with Plexiglass llD63 IFBA Unioadmg St.ition 30x24x49H IFBA Stainless Steel with Plextglass Glove Hos IID64 11TIA Blue M 92x30x3411 IFBA Stamiess Steel with Plexiglass llD65 IFBA ZrB2 Strippmg thuxl 14600x2Xil Stainleu Steel with Plexiglass llD66 QC lhxn!(Moisture Sampimg fl(xn!)

72x30x3611 Chem Lab Stamless Steel with Plexiglass i

llD67 Chem Development Lab Dry t hxxis 70x30x4811 Chem Development Lab Stainless Steel with Plexiglass (10)

IID68 Filter Press Diuolver 'lood 36x22x2ill Conversion Scrap Cage Stamleu Steel with Plexiplass llD69 Huoride Stripping Filter Press 54x36x7811 URRS Stamless Steel Frame with Open Front IID70 Lme 15 Vaporizer Tents 36 diameter x 90li Conversion Plastic ilD71 Cylmder Wash Filter Press 24x69x6211 URRS Stamless Steel Frame with Open Front flD72 Safe Geometry Filter Press (2) 69x22x5911 URRS Stainless Steel with Plexiglass

$406x591l llD73 IFBA Mop Water Filter Press

$4x36x7811 IFBA Stainless Steel Frame with Open Front llD74 Ack! Strippmg flax!

146x30x2811 IFBA Stainless llD75 Chem Lab thxxh (4) 60x30x6111 IFDA Stamless with Plexiglass IID76 Conversion Lmes I-5 Scrubber Fdter 69x22x60ll Conversion Stamless a

Press (2 Per Line) llD77 Line i Bucket Elevator, Duplex Valve Top-15x35x2211 Conversion

Stamiess, Stainless with and Feed Screw Enclosure Bottom-15x33xl711 Plexiglass Duplex Valve Enclosure 15x27x36fl Feed Screw-24xl4x1311 IID78 Line 2 Bucket Elevator, Duplex Valve Top-15x35x22il Conversion Stainless, Stainless with and Feed Screw Enclosure Bottom 34x16x1711 Plexiglass

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Duplex Valve Fnclosure Initial issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

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Revision No. _O

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- EQUIPMENTm

DIMENSIONS '

LOCATION 0-MATERIALS OFJ

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"CONSTRUC110N?

vi DESCRitTION?

i' m 28x3611 Feed Screw-24x14:1411 IID79 Lme 313ucket Elevator, Duplex Valve Elevator-26x18x243fl Conversion

Stamless, Stainless with and Feed Screw Enclosure Duplex Valve Enclosure Plexiglass 10x28x3611 Feed Screw 30x33x5tli ilD80 Lme 4 Ilucket Elevator. Duplex Valve Elevator 19x26x24311 Conversion

Stamiess, Stainless with arxl Feed Screw Enclosure Duplex Valve Enclosure Plexiglass 15x26x3611 Feed Screw 24:14:14l1 IIDMI Lme 5 liucket Elevator, Duplex Valve Llevator 19:26x243f t Conversunt

Stamiess, Stamiess wuh and Feed Screw Enclosure Duplex Valve and Feed Plexiglass Screw Enclosure -

32x22x6tli

_ _IIDM2 Precipitator Filter Press 44:54x8xil Conversion Scrap Cage Stamless Steel

~ ilD83 R$3-Press Enclosure (Line 1-5) 32x21x24fl Peliet Area Stainless.

Stainless with Plexiglass llD84 RS3 Conveyor (Lirw 15) 22x36x3411 Pellet Area llD85 Iloat f.eader Enclosure Line (1-5) 32x12:12il Pellet Area Stamless Steel with Plexiglass llD86 Powder Lift Enclosure (Lmes 1-5) 38x42x4511 Pellet Area Stainless Steel llD87 Torit 2200 (Lines 15) 12x12xl511 Peilet Area Stainless Steel wnh Plexiglass Griskler flowl Feeder floixl Polypak flood 14x14:1211 llD88 Torrt 2200 (Lunes 15) 12x21x10ll Pellet Area Pleaiglass Pellet Stroker llD89 Torit 2200 (Lines 1-5) 21x32x8311 Pellet Area Cartxm Steel aini Plexiglass Tray Elevator 11D90 Torit 2200 (Lines 15) 22x1331811 Pellet Area Stamiess Steel Furnace Exit Stacing thxxl(3 Per Line)

IID91 Toria 2200 (Lines 1-5) 36x72x3611 Pellet Area Stamless Steel Pilot Line Work Station llD92 Torit 2200 (Lines 1-5) 96x28x40ll Pellet Area Stainless Steel with Plexiglass -

Pilot Line Oxidatum Polypak 27x23x18tl Plexiglass i

ilD93 Torit 220C (Lmes 1-5) 40x40x3711 Pellet Area Cartxm Steel

}

Illue M Oven 11D94 Turit 2200 (Lines 15) 16x10x1711 Feller Area Stainless Steel with Plexiglass -

Grirxler ihxxl Plexiglass llD95 Torn 2200 (Lmes 1-5) 60x32x20ll Pellet Area Cartxm Steel Tray leader IID96 incinerator Charge thur 52x6x2 Mil URRS Carix n Steel llD97 incmerator Fitznull and Pulveruer Fitznull-82x26x6511 URRS Stainless, Stainless with thun!s Polypak 22x28x2111 Plexiglass Pulverner 94x24x5411 PP22x28x2111 IID9M SW 1)ccon Toric Polypak IIcxxl(2) 24 20x2111 URRS Stainless Steel with Plexiglass 4

ilD99 Rixt to Tube Transfer thxxl 47x36x10ll Pellet Stamless Steel with Plexiglass i

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28 FEB 99 Page No.

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Revision No.

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l VENTILATION SYSTEMS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED HOODS AND ENCLOSURES System Comp (ments (By Code-See Table 3-1) wei Venuisitan systems

)

+

o S2A/S2B Scrubbers llD 69,70 and 71.

(Stack l AllB)

S1056 Scrubber llD 4, 5, 6, 40, 68 and 38, (Stack 2A/2B)

SOLX Scrubber ilD 55,56, and 72.

(Stack 8A/88)

S1008 Scrubber llD 37,76.

(Stack 1008)

IFBA Scrubber ilD 64. 73 and 74.

' Dry Verdilation Systems n

s Chemical Development Lab flD 67 Conversum Containment (Stack 4C/4D)

IID 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 77. 78. 79, 80 and 81.

Incmetator Doors ilD %

(Stack 5A)

Scrap Cage llD 82 (Stack 7A) li BA Combined fixhaust ilD 62,63,65, and 75.

Bulk Blendmg Room IID 1, 2 and 3.

Conversion Lme 1 Tont ilD 7,8,9,10, and 11.

Conversion Line 2 Tont IID 12,13,14,15 and 16.

Conversion Line 3 Torit ilD 17,18,19,20 and 21.

Conversion Line 4 Toric ilD 22,23,24. 25, and 26.

Conversion Line STorit ilD 27,28,29,30 and 31.

Pellet 2200 Torit lid 46, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 48, 93, 94, 95 and 99.

Pellet Line 1-41:abnmax

!!D 42,43,44,45,83,84,85 and 86.

Pellet Line 5 B124's IID 42. 44,45,49,50,83,84,85 and 86.

Rod Pellet Scrap Torit

.!!D 47 and 58.

SW Decon Rmm Venulation IID 39 and 98.

Solvent Extraction flood Ventilation llD $1 Incinerator Tont 11D 53 and 97.

QC Moisture Ventilation System 11D 66 Rod Loading Stations IID (A) l Rod Repair Station IID 59, and 61.

Fluonde Stnppmg ilD 52 and 57.

UF. Hav Dock #4 ilD 54 QC Pellet inspection Ventilation ilD 41 1

1 Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

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Revision No, _O m

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This section provideS a listing of the documents and drawings that pertain to the Hoods and Containment Systems.

SYSTEM DRAWINGS 12.

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. SYKFEM -

+1 Y,s HTmL

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52A/S2B Scrubbers 3131 VIP 102 Process Ventilanon Flow Diagram / Scrubbers S1056 Scrubber 333F02P!01 Process Ventilation Flow Diagram i

SOLX Scrubber 30lfU9P109 Process Ventilation Flow Diagram 301F09P!03 UN Praduct Filtration / Filter Presses 51008 Scrubber 334F05P101 Calcmer System Line i P&lD 335F05P101 Calciner System Line 2 PalD 336F05P101 Calciner System Line 3 P&ID 337F05P101 Calciner System Line 4 P&lD 338F05P101 Calciner System Line 5 P&lD IFDA Scrubber 807IU4P101 Mop Water Treatment 807FolP101 Acid Stripping Bath Conversion Containmerit 334F05P101 ADU Line i Calciner Scrubber and Futer System 335F05P101 ADO Line 2 Calciner Scrubber and Fdter System 336R)5PI01 ADU Line 3 Calciner Scrubber and Filter System 3

337f 05P101 ADU Line 4 Calciner Scrubber and Filter System 338Fo$P101 ADU Line 5 Calciner Scrubber and Filter System Incinerator Doon 3(MFOIPl04 Incinerator Door Vent P&lD 4

Scrap Cage 333F03P102 Filter Press Cake Dissolver and Filter i

IFDA Combmed Exhaust 813F0lP101 IFBA. Air Filter (FL-7100) P&ID Bulk Hieruimg Room 348F03P106 ADU Bulk Blendmg FL-911 A&B Ventilation P&lD Conversion Line i Torit 334F09P101 Conversion Line 1 Dust Collection Conversion Line 2 Torit 335F09P101 Conversion Line 2 Dust Collection Conversion Line 3 Torit 336R)9PIO!

Conversion Line 3 Dust Collection Conversion Line 4 Toria 337F09P101 Conversion Line 4 Dust Collection i

Conversion Line 5 Torit 338F09P101 Conversion Line 5 Dust Collection I

Pellet 2200 Tont 361F08101 Pellet Grindmg Ventilation Dust Collectors PalD 321F06P102 Pellet Line i Dust Collection Ventilation 322F06P101 Pellet Lire 2 Dust Collection P&lD 323F06P101 Pellet Line 3 Dust Collection P&ID 324F06P101 Pellet Line 4 Dust Collection P&lD Pellet Line 1-4 Fabrimaa 321F07P101 Pellet Line 1 Fabnmax P&iD 322F07P101 Pellet Line 2 Fabrimax P&lD j

323F07P101 Pellet Line 3 Fabnmax P&lD 324FO7P101 Pellet Line 4 Fabrimax P&lD Pellet Line 5 B124's 325F12P!01 Pellet Line 5 B124 P&ID Rod Pellet Scrap Bag Torit 500F0311V12 Ventilation Bay 6 aial 7 C and D SW Dacon Room 372FO5P101 Southwest URRS Decon Room Dust Collector i

Solvent Estraction limsi None Incmcrator Tont 304F10P101 Fitznull and Pulverizer Venulation QC Moisture limxl None Fluork!c Senpping 3051U2PIO2 Fluorxle Stripping - Dry System j

305R72P103 Fluoride Stripping - Offgas Scrubber l

UF, Bay Dock #4 372F10P101 U.R.R.SJUF6 Bay - Process Ventilation for Compactor, Shredder & Filter Breakdown ilomi Decon Rooms 339F03P101 Conversion Decon Room InitialIssue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

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i SYSTEM i

. W DRAWING '# <

! TITLE i

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Chemical Devektpment Lab Dry Vent 303FilP102 CPD Dry Vent System Diagram QC Pellet inspection ihxxis 321F07P102 Pellet Line 1 QC Inspection llood Ventilation P&lD 322F07P102 Pellet Line 2, QC Inspection flood Ventdation P&lD 323F07PIO2 Pellet Line 3, QC Inspection flood Ventilation PalD 324F07PIO2 Pellet Line 4, QC Inspection llood Ventilation P&lD l

325F07P102 Pellet Line 5. QC Inspection Ihnt Ventilation P&lD

]

OPERATING PROCEDURES SYSTEM PROCEDURE #.

TITLE:

,).

.k S2A/S215 Scrubbers IID 6% Fluoride Stnpping Press COP-830133 Fluoride Stripping Wet System IID 70- Line 1-5 Vaporizacon thuis COP-810098 UF6 Cylinder Instalianon and Removal llD 71 Cylmder Wash Filter press COP-833010 UF6 Cylmder Wash Cleaning Filter Press S1056 Scrubber llD 4--Conversmn Line 5 Drying thxxl and Blue M Oven COP-8l4612 & 816009 Drying Off-Stream Material-Screening Suspect Metallic Contaminated UO2 Powder ilD 5-Conversion Line 4 Drying thul and Blue M Oven COP 814612 & 816009 Drying Off-Stream Matenal-Screening Suspect Metallic Contaminated UO2 Powder ilD 6--Conversion Luw 3 Drying ihn! and Blue M Oven COP-814612 & 816009 Drying Off-Stream Material-Screetung Suspect Metallic Contaminated UO2 Powder IID 44-Lincoln Pump Cleaning Ihni Nonerovered by Crit Sign 4

llD 68-Fiher Press Dissolver ikxxl llD 38-Blue M Oven and Dry lloint COP-814612,815002 &

Drying Off-Stream Material, llandling Cat C2-Grossly 8150010 Contaminated Scrap and llandling Cat Bl/Cl Scrap Material 1

SOLX Scrubber IID $$-C4 Input ikxxis COP-866025 C4 Clean Dissolver Start up and Operation llD SbC4 Output thuis COP-866025 C4 Clean Dissolver Start-up and Operation llD 72-Safe Geonwtry Filter Press COP-836028 C4 Dirty Filter Press Cleanout 4

S1008 Scrubber llD 37-Decontamination C caning ihn1 COP 811101 Calciner Off-Gas Scrubber llD 7hConversion Lines 1-5 Scrubber Filter Press COP-811101 Calciner Off-Gas Scrubber j

IFBA Scrubber llD 64-ill3A Blue M Oven COP-874030 Blue M Oxidation System i

ilD 73-IFBA Mop Water Filter Press COP-874NO IFBA Mop Water System IID74-Acid Stnpping thul COP-874050 Coated Pellet Acid Stnpping and Recovery I

Chemical Development Lab IID 67-Chemical Development Dry thuis None-Covered By Crit Sign Conversion Containment ilD 32-Line 1 K Tron Feeder COP-810910 Feedmg Dry Material the K Tron Feeder ilD 33-Line 2 K Tron Feeder COP-810910 feedmg Dry Material the K-Tron Feeder ilD 34-Line 3 Acrision Feeder COP-810911 Feeding Dry Matenal via Acrison Feeder llD 35-Line 4 K-Tron Feeder COP-810910 Feedmg Dry Material the K-Tron Feeder ilD 36-Line 5 K-Tron Feeder COP-810910 Feedmg Dry Material the K-Tron Feeder ilD 77-Line 1 Bucket Elevator, Duples and Feed Screw COP-815415 Inspection Of Non-Favorable Geometry Enclosure llD 78-Line 2 Bucket Elevator, Duplex and Feed Serew COP-8 l5415 Inspection of Non-Favorable Geometry Enclosure llD 7%-Line 3 Bucket Elevator. Duplex and Feed Screw COP-815415 Inspecnon Of Non-FavoraNe Geometry Enclosure llD 80-Line 4 Bucket Elevator. Duplex and Feed Screw COP 815415 Inspection Of Non-Favorable Geometry Enclosure Initial issue Date:

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7 Revision D.te:

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-.~ --._=

- -. ~ _ _ -

i 6

' SYSTEM PROCEDURE #..

TITLE' IID 81-Lme 5 Bucket Elevator. Duplex and Feed Screw COP-815415 Inspection Of NorFFavorable Geometry Enclosure incinerator Doors llD 96tncmerator Charge Door MCP-1081(M Changing Roof Top Absolute. Intermediate and Prefilters Scrap Cage 11D 82-Precipitator Fdter Press COP-815l li Precipitator Tank and Filter Press System l

IFBA Combined Exhaust flD 62-IIBA Inspection floods MOP 44016, 974071, COP-Manual Collator! operator Procedure, Rod Rework Glove Box, llD 63-IFBA Unioadmg Glove Box 872050, QCl-910101 Pellet inspection Procedure Outhne i

llD 65-IFBA ZrD2 Senppmg ihud COP-874050 Coated Pellet Acid Strippmg and Recovery ilD 75-Chem Lab lhxds None-Covered by Crit Sign j

llulk Blending Room ilD l-Polypak Dump floods COP-814747 & 814751 Transfer Material To Bu:k Container to Polypaks. Gathermg a j

llD 2-Feeder Valve cleaning ikxx!

COP-814748 Blend and Transferring Material From Polypaks to Bulk Cont, Installation and Removal of Feeder Valve.

j llD 3-1700 KG Cover Cleanmg/ Storage lhxal Covered by Crit Sign i

Conversion Line 1 Torit ilD 7-Line i Fiumill Enclosure COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector ilD 8-Line 1 Calcmer Pnsluct thxxl COP-814327 Torit Dust Collector

]

IID 9-Line 1 Calciner Catch ihxxl COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector ilD 10-Lme 1 Fitznull Pnshset thus!

COP-814327 Toric Dust Collector IID 11-Lme 1 Fiumill Catch thxxl COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector Conversion I.ine 2 Torit 11D 12-Line 2 Frunull Enclosure COP 814327 Tont Dust Collector llD 13-Lme 2 Calciner Pnx!uct thxx!

COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector llD 14--Lme 2 Calemer Catch flood COP-814327 Torit Dust Collector y

4 IID 15-Line 2 Fitzmill Pnsluct ihxxl COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector d

llD lbline 2 Fiumill Catch thxxl COP-814317 Torit Dust Collector i

Conversion Line 3 Torit llD 17-Line3 I itzmill Enclosure COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector lib '8-Line 3 Calemer Pnx!uct thux!

COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector i

llD 19-Line 3 Calemer Catch thxxl COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector ilD 20-Lme 3 Fiumill Pnduct thxxl COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector llD 21-Lme 3 Fiumdl Catch thxx!

COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector Consersion Line 4 Torit llD 21-Lme 4 Fiunull Encimure COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector llD 23-Line 4 Calciner Pnsluct thxxl COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector d

ilD 24-Line 4 Calemer Catch thxxl COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector a

llD 25-Line 4 Fiumdi Pnsluct thxxl COP-814327 Torit Dust Collector IID 26-Line 4 Fitzmill Catch Ihux!

COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector

^

Consersion Line 5 Torit ilD 27-Line 5 Fitznull Enclosun:

COP-814327 Torit Dust Collector llD 28-Litw 5 Calemer Pnsluct thxxl COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector llD 29-Line 5 Calciner Catch thxx!

COP-814327 Torit Dust Collectrer IID 30-Line 5 Fitzmill Pnsluct thxxl COP-814327 Tont Dust Collector llD 31-Lme 5 Fitzmill Catch Ihn!

COP-814327 Torit Dust Collector l

Pellet 2200 Torit llD 4hPellet Pilot Line ikxxl COP.820116 Manual Press Feed Preparanon 18D 48-BET Compactabdity Press thxx!

None-Covered by Crit Sign IID 87-Tont 22(X) Line t-4 Gntuler Bowl Feeder lhud COP-82(401 Gruxler Pellet Line 1-4 IID 88-Torit 2200 Line I 4 Pellet Stroker COP-82(M(M Clean Pellet Grirxler System 1

IID 89-Tont 22m Line 1-4 Pellet Tray Elevator COP-82N08 Clean Out Pettet Grinder Initial Issue Date:

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SYSTEM -

PROCEDURE #-

TITLE IID WTont 2200 Lme 1-4 Furnace Exit Staggmg flomi COP-820301 Smtenng Furnace Operatums llD 91-Tont 2200 Pilot Line Work limal COP-822518 Weighmg and Stackmg Pellets llD 92-Tont 2200 Pilot ime Oudation limxl COP-829uu7 Oxxiaton/ Screening Reject Pellets. Clinkers ars! Grinder Sludge llD 93-Tunt 2200 Pilot Line Blue M Oven COP-829W7 Oxidaten/Screenmg Reject Pellets, Chnkers and Grusler Sludge llD 94-Torit 2200 Line 1-5 Gritxler limd COP 82(M01 & 82pM Grinder Pellet and Clean Pellet Grirder System IID 95-Tont 2200 Line 15 Tray leader COP 42MM Clean Pellet Gnnder System llD 99-Road to Tube Transfer limxi MOP-750302 Rai To Tube Transfer llomi Pellet thae 1-4 Fabrirnax 11D 42-Blue M Oven and Drying limds COP 825101 Oxidation Lines 1-4 IlD 43-Pellet Ribixm Blending limxl COP-820116 Manual Press Feed Preparaten llD 44-Add Back limxl COP-820116 Manual Press Feed Preparaten llD 45-Polypak Roll limd COP-820ll6 Manual Press Feed Preparatam IID 83-R-53 Press ikxxl COP-822521 Pellet Press Operanons llD 84-R 53 Conveyor flood COP-822521 Pellet Press Operations llD MS-Boat Loader lhux!

COP-822524 Pellet Press t$ oat Loader Operatons llD WPowder Litt limx!

COP-H20ll6 Manual Press Feed Preparanon Pellet Line 5 B124's llD 42-Blue M Oven and Drymg Ilmnis COP-829007 Oxxiation/ Screen Reject Pellets. Clinkers and Grinder Sludge.

IID 44-AJJ Back limd COP-820l l6 Manual Press Feed Preparanon llD 45-Polypak Rolllimd COP-820ll6 Manual Press Feed Preparanon llD 49--Line 5 Mix iloin!

COP-M20ll6 Manual Press Feed Preparanon llD 5G-Powder Transfer thxxl None-Covered by Crit Sign llD H3-R 53 Press limal COP-822521 Pellet Press Operanons llD 84-R 53 Conveyor lloid COP 822521 Pellet Press Operations llD 85-Boat leader !!mni COP-822524 Pellet Press Boat Loader Operations llD WPowder Lift thxxl COP-820ll6 Manual Press Feed Preparation Rod Pellet Scrap flag Torit ilD 47-Axial Blanket inspection limal COP-822518 Weighing and Stacking Pellets. Axial Blunted ilD 58-Rod Reclamation Station and Lathe lhxxis MOP-750556 Fuel Pellet and or Fuel Tube Scrappmg SW Decon room ilD 39-Filter Cleanmg flood COP-831019 Filter Disassemble Process

!!D 98-SW Decon Polypak llant COP-836022 Cutung RoonullEPA Ventilanon Down Flow Cartndge System Solvent Extraction llood incinerator Torit IID SI-URRS Weighmg Ihxxl None-Covered by Crit Sign j

incinerator Torit j

ilD $3-Incmerator 11 ni COP-830219 Tont Down How System llD 97-Fitinull Ami Pulveriter floot!

COP-830219 Tont Down Flow System i

()C Moisture Ventdation ilD WQC Monture Sampimg ihxxl (Chem lab)

QCl 910222 QC Secotsj Moisture Venfication Of Polypaks i

i Rod Loading Stations 1

IID 60-Lme 1-4 Pellet Tray to Rods MOP-7503(M Loat] Pellets into Bottom Pre-We'1 Tubes Rod Repair Stations j

llD 59-Fuel Rod Lathe 11 xxi MOP-750297 & 750301 Renoving Top End Plugs-Depressurization of Fuel Rods ilD 61-Rml Rework thnl MOP-750299 Regagimr Reworked Fuel Rmis i

Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls i

TO be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment i

i Initial Issue Date:

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l

Nuclear Cddcality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY ANALYSIS General Introduction and Scope introduction This section describes results of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Analysis for Hoods and Containments. The terms used throughout have, for the most part, been defined in Section 5.0 of the " Guidelines for Preparing a Baseline Integrated Safety Assessment."

Definitions See " Process Description" for a definition of " hood" and " containment" as used within the context of this document.

Since control of material in hoods is primarily accomplished by administrative controls, it was difficult to precisely define normal, expected upset, credible upset, and not credible conditions. After performing many calculations and evaluating the various situations, maximum credible upset conditions were established and are presented below.

Additional conditions or exceptions will be included in the material for a particular hood, as appropriate.

Scope The scope of this safety analysis is the hoods and containments, as defined above, i

throughout the plant. Hoods used to process product material are normally discussed in the evaluation for that system. Hoods for non-process operations such as recycle and scrap recovery are normally discussed in this analysis. Documentation for analysis of containments may be included in the evaluation for that process, or may be part of this document.

This analysis does not include the following:

Process ventilation and/or scrubbing systems that support the hoods and

+

enclosures.

1 i

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The main process served by the hood or enclosure, if applicable.

e Storage of material in the area.

These systems are addressed separately in their respective evaluations.

Maximum Credible Upset for lieterogeneous Material For processing heterogeneous material (pellets) in Blue M hoods, see " Pellet Blue M 4

Hoods." All other hoods used to process heterogeneous material are discussed below.

For all other hoods processing heterogeneous material (e.g., pellets in rods, on trays, or in oxidation pans), the maximum credible condition was established as a 4.5" X-Y infinite slab of close-packed (see item "i" below) pellets, fully moderated internally / interstitially (note: not optimum), with partial (1" water) external reflection. This is judged to be a very conservative definition of credible upsets involving heterogeneous mat: rial in hoods because:

a)

" Spills" of large quantities of material are not credible (see above).

b)

The deepest hoods have a depth of approx. 30" (from front to back). Thus an infinite X-Y slab conservatively envelopes all hood configurations.

c)

Storage of pans is normally accomplished elsewhere, e.g., on shelves provided.

d)

There is no motivation to put large numbers of pans into a hood. Placing more than one or two additional pans into a hood restricts work space.

e)

The only approved arrangement of pans containing material, in hoods or anywhere else, is side-by-side, with no stacking allowed. This is in procedures and emphasized in training and Regulatory inspections.

f)

The maximum credible condition includes stacking of pans 2-high, forming a 4.5" slab (an arbitrary assumption). Stainless steel pellet pans are 2%" high, less

%" recess for lids. All oxidation pans have a height of 2.0-2.25".

g)

Pellets in stainless steel pans normally have covers in place, preventing water from entering. CRI-93-015, p. 58, shows that without interstitial moderation, and the other modeled conditions being the same, K-inf is very small (0.144). If pellets in rods or on trays are exposed to water, it would flow off and not provide significant intemal moderation.

h)

Pans are normally only partially filled for oxidation because the material swells significantly.

i)

"Close-packed" was defined to be 0.500" pitch, with a pellet diameter of 0.400".

j)

CRI-93-015, p. 58, shows the reactivity for close-packed pellets, fully interstitially moderated, full external reflection to be approx. 0.915, assuming 0.400" diameter pellets with a rectanguhtr pitch of 0.500".

k)

Even with optimum moderation (i.e., optimum pitch between pellets, a condition not physically achievable), K-inf for a 4.5" slab is less than 0.99 by XSDRN-PM.

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KENO calculations yielded K,y of 0.992 for a 4.23" slab, and 1.052 for a 4.935" slab. Including 1/32" stainless steel for pan thickness reduced K,yfrom 1.052 to 1.008. There was good agreement between the two codes. (CRI-93-015.)

Maximum Credible Upset for llomogeneous Material For hoods involving homogeneous material (UO and U 0, powder, and ADU), the 2

3 maximum credible condition was established as a triangular pitch "3x3" array of packs (note: 12 packs total), fully moderated internally, with partial (l" water) external reflection, no interspersed moderator between packs, and no vertical stacking of packs.

The surface area taken up by this array is approx. 29.5"x43.9" CRI-96-036 shows that for this triangular pitch array of packs, K,y (with bias and uncertainty) does not exceed 0.97 for a "3x3" triangular array. This is judged to be a very conservative definition of the condition for maximum credible upsets involving homogeneous material in hoods because:

a)

" Spills" oflarge quantities of material are not credible.

b)

The deepest hoods have a depth of 30" (front to back). Thus an array of 4xX would not physically fit into any hood, and 3xX is the maximum credible depth.

c)

Storage of packs is normally accomplished by placing packs in racks or on the

floor, d)

There is no motivation to put large numbers of packs into a hood. Placing more than one or two packs into a hood significantly restricts work space; 12 packs would make working essentially impossible in any hood.

e)

There is no motivation to stack packs on top of one another; in many hoods it is physically impossible because of the height of the hood or internal obstructions.

f)

Increasing the array in the x-directions (increasing hood width) does not have a significant effect on reactivity. See CRI-96-036. A triangular "3x5" array (22 packs total) has a K,y of 1.013 maximum; a "3x7" array (32 packs total),1.017 maximum.

j g)

A "3x5" triangular array (22 packs) is approx. 49.2"x43.9".

h)

CRI-96-036 also shows that any tinite array up to 6x6 with a rectangular pitch, full intemal moderation, and I" external Reflection, is less than 0.98.

i)

The effect of interspersed moderator between packs on a "3x3" array (see CRI-96-036) is a function of the II/U-235 ratio, is as much as plus approx. 4%, and is calculated to take K,y as high as 1.0041. Ilowever, essentially all boods have large holes, openings, or gaps that act as passive engineered safeguards to limit any water accumulation to a few inches, at most. The only possible exceptions to this are (a) the IFBA glove box / hood against the back wall, and (b) two of the pellet ribbon blending hoods and the Pellet Line 5 mixing hood. The IFB A glove box / hood is well sealed and seldom used, and would be extremely difficult to get any water into. The pellet hoods do have smaller openings at the bottom of the Initial Issue Date:

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i hoods that would leak, and normally contain dry powder. It is judged that these hoods do not invalidate the assumption of no interspersed water among packs.

j)

The maximum K, occurs at an H/0235 ratio of approx. 200, which corresponds to a mixture density of approx. 3.11 g/cc (UO2+ water). Twelve packs (volume =

8712 cc each) at this density would contain approx. 325 kg material.

k) 9.5" diameter packs were assumed.

4 Polypak Hoods (2 ea.)in ADU Bulk Blending Room (Homogeneous) j Polypak dump hood, which is used to dump packs of dry, QC released material into bulk l

containers. Criticality isjudged to be not credible.

Polypak hood under cons _olidation station. Criticality is judged to be not credible. Also, it is noted that the margin of safety is greatly increased because this hood is in the bulk 4

blending room - a Modcon Area.

Bulk Container Feeder Valve Cleaning Hood (Homogeneous)

Cliticality is judged to be not credible. Also, it is noted that the margin of safety is greatly increased because this hood is in the bulk blending room - a Modcon Area.

j Bulk Container Cover Cleaning / Storage Hood (Homogeneous]

Criticality is judged to be not credible. Also, it is noted that the margin of safety is greatly increased because this hood is in the bulk blending room - a Modcon Area.

i Blue M Oven Hoods, Conversion Lines & Scrap Cage (Homogeneous or l

Heterogeneous]

j

" Blue M" is a trade name for an oven and associated hood used to oxidize or dry 1

material, typically several hundred "C for a few hours.

The process is operator j

in/ operator out, and on the conversion lines usually involves homogeneous material. If needed, the ovens can also be used for oxidizing heterogeneous material (pellets).

When used for homogeneous material, material input forms such as ADU, UOi, and j

calciner offgas solids are used. The material is brought into the hood in a pan, pack or i

vent pot, transferred to a pan if necessary, and placed into the oven.

After oxidation / drying in pans 12"x18"x2%", the material moisture is approximately 1% or

{

less, and is transferred into a pack for further processing at another location. The hood can also be used for miscellaneous operations such as sieving, transferring from one Initial Issue Date:

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- +,,

~

f a

container to another, or any operation in' which it is desirable to control airborne radioactive contamination.

Controls Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)

Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108'.

The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

(None)

Active engineered controls (AEC)

Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory 2

Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

(None) i Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)

Administrative controls with computer or alarm assi.st (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard-wired alarm.

4 l

The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

[None]

i Administrative controls Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually

)

occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.

Functional verification is not normally required.

l i

i j

1

' RA 108, Safety significant Controls Initial Issue Date:

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4FUNCTIONALT tNtRA2900 4 CONTROI;lDl: sd

' QCONTROLLFUNCTION/ps o f; s a i9FAILURECONDITIONLKgy' $ ;JVERIFIC& TION; sW

• WVBl(T(Sh

_ NtMERR DNW ' ' MACTIONN W A A

' ? REQUIRED *

,s A-Ilood-x-01 Prevent placing > 12 packs of material into hood /

No Hood-l

> 12 packs in hood /

Operator prevents placing > 12 packs in hood.

A-Itood-x-02 Detect and remove excessive packs before accumulating > 12 in hood /

No flood-2

> 12 packs accumulate in hood /

4 Operator detects & corrects before > 12 packs in hood 1

i Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety is evaluated to be strong. Calculations perfonned 1

in support of the CSE indicate that K,y < 0.95 for all normal operating conditions and i

expected process upsets, Further, a single credible process upset will not take K,,> 1.0.

The parameter that directly affects neutron is mass. Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (bas) have been established to limit the amount of material in the hoods. A criticality (K,y = 1.0) would be possible, assuming a planar array, given the following combinations of credible process upsets:

Criticality is not credible if the floor space in the hood is not big enough to accommodate the "3x5" triangular array, which is just suberitical (29.5"x43.9");

or Placing more than 12 packs of optimally moderated material into a hood in a triangular pitch array.

l Initiating Events that Lead to Credible Process Upsets i

i j

The fault tree in Figure 6.3.4-1 shows potential initiating events that could lead to criticality. It requires repeated attempts by operations to place packs into a hood (IE #

llood-1), and a failure by that operator and any other persons in the area to realize the error (s) and stop the actions (IE # Hood-2). Further, it requires a hood size that will physically hold >l2 packs, assuming a planar array.

Common Mode Failure Potential i

4 Technically, the exclusive use of administrative controls is subject to common mode failure because the same operator can violate procedures repeatedly and fail to detect the Initial Issue Date:

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error. Ilowever, in this application, the controls are very strong because in reality no one would perfonn these repeated, erroneous actions because:

Storage of packs is normally accomplished by placing packs in racks or on the floor.

There is no motivation to put large numbers of packs into a hood. Placing more than one or two packs into a hood significantly restricts work space: 12 packs would make working essentially impossible in any hood, The packs would have to be removed before any work could be accomplished in e

the hood.

i Initial Issue Date:

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~_

TABLE 5.3.4-1

SUMMARY

OF DEFENSES PROVIDED AGAINST A SINGLE FAILURE IIOODS PROCESSING WET IIOMOGENEOUS MATERIAL General Descriptor :

, Prevent

'Regulatel Detect //

PreventY C, Regulate'_- : Detect /s C

Y React i

React '

PREVENT DEFENSE l

Prevent Placing > 12 Polypaks flood-l Detect and Correct Before > 12 mto flood liood-l Polypaks Accumulate in flood DETECT REMOVE DEFENSE Detect and Correct Before > 12 Ilood 2 Prevent Placing > 12 Polypaks into flood Polypaks Accumulate in flood i

NOTES:

)

1) See above regarding assumptions of the array of polypaks.

2) See above for a discussion of common mode failure potential.

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TABLE 5.3.4-2 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY LIMITS FOR K rr = 0.90, 0.95, e

AND DELAYED CRITICAL IIOODS PROCESSING WET HOMOGENEOUS MATERIAL PARAMETER NORMAL-BOUNDING

- CRITICALITY:

CRITICALITY.

. CRITICALITY--

OPERATING.

'ASSUMITION SAFETY SAFETY LIMIT LCONDITIONS

- LIMIT.

LIMIT -

' Delayed Crkical-'

.t'

'i s 0.90 ;

s 0.943 8-(0.968) '

2"U Mass 7 packs $

12 packs

• i Moderator /

Optimum Concentration 4

Geometry N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Spacing N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A flomogeneous -

Density Various Optimum 2

2.051 gUO,/cc i

Absorbers None None None None None Enrichment s 5.0 Wt. %

< 5.0 Wt.%

s 5.0 Wt. %

s 5.0 Wt. %

s 5.0 Wt. %

Partial Water Reflection (l")

Notes

1) These are not criticality safety limits per se. They are the Kds corresponding to 7 and 12 polypaks, respectively, in a triangular array.

2) This is the mixture density corresponding to the most reactive 11/U235 = 200.

3) 142 kg UO or 190 kg UO + IIzO (CRI-96-036) 2 2

~

4) 244 kg UO or 326 kg UO + II 0 (CRI-96-036) 2 2

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t Fitzmill and Calciner Product Hoods [ Homogeneous]

These hoods are included in the ISA for ADU Conversion.

K-Tron Feeders (Homogeneous]

2 These hoods are covered in a separate CSE,

Acrison Feeders (Homogeneous]

2 These hoods are covered in a separate CSE,

1 Decontaminatio.FCleaning Hood (Homogeneous)

Criticality is judged to be not credible.

i i

Blue M Oven Hoods, Scrap Recovery Area [ Heterogeneous or Homogeneous]

The principal use of these hoods is for processing homogeneous materials from the 5 conversion lines. However, they are also used for oxidation of material from the pellet lines (heterogeneous).

If the operation involves homogeneous material, it is bounded by the analysis and evaluation in " Blue M Oven Hoods, Conversion Lines and Scrap Cage." If the operation involves heterogeneous material, it is bounded by the analysis and evaluation in " Pellet Blue M lloods."

Ventilation Filters Cleaning Hood, UF6 Bay [ Deleted]

Cleaning Hood, Scrap Recovery Area (Homogeneous)

Operations in this hood are bounded by the evaluation in " Blue M Oven lloods, Conversion Lines and Scrap Cage."

2 Connguration Control 896-068, Acrison Feeder to Replaec K Tron Feeder including CsA for Acrison Feeder for ADU Conversion.

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i-l' Pellet inspection Hoods [ Heterogeneous)

Criticality is judged to be not credible.

Pellet Blue M Hoods [ Heterogeneous)

" Blue M' is a trade name for an oven and associated hood used to dry or oxidize pellet line material, typically at several hundred 'C for a few hours. There is a Blue M at the-I front end of each of the 5 pellet lines, plus one on the pilot line near Line 1. The process.

j is operator in/ operator out, and involves heterogeneous material (pellets, hard scrap-pellets, clinkers, and grinder sludge).. Hard scrap is normally brought to the. hood in' stainless steel pans or polypaks, and placed into the hood one container at a time for screening and/or transferring into oxidation pans. Grinder sludge is brought to the hood already in oxidation pans, and allowed to air dry in nearby racks before placing into the oven for oxidation. After oxidation / drying in pans 12"x18"x2%", the material moisture

]

is approximately 1% or less, and is transferred into a pack for further processing at another location. The hoods can also be used for miscellaneous operations such as l

sieving, transferring from one container to another, or any operation in which it is desirable to control airborne radioactive contamination.

t j

Controls i.

Safety Significant Controls l

Passive engineered controls (PEC) i Passive engineered controls are described in the License and in Regulatory Affairs 4

Procedure RA-108'. The requirements for functional verification are determined by 7

this evaluation.

i (None)

?

1 Active engineered controls (AEC)

Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory j

Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The i

requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

i (None)

- Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)

Administrative controls with coraputer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of a

' 8 RA 108. safety significant Controls

-Initial Issue Date:

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operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard-wired alarm.

The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

[None]

Administrative controls Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.

Functional verification is not normally required.

E Control..IDi

1. Control Function /f Q iFunctionalD.

t Event (IE) 4 Initiating;

Failure Condition /

n M&

LVerification *

= Ahtion N

J ~ qinifed's

? Number =

Re A-flood-x -05 Prevent operator stacking material > 4.0" No Hood-5 slab height /

>4.0" slab height throughout hood /

Operator prevents stacking material >4.0" slab height.

A-Ilood-x-06 Detect and correct before 4.0" slab height exceeded /

No Hood 6

> 4.0" slab height throughout hood /

Operator detects and corrects before exceeding 4.0" slab height.

Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin on safety for the Blue M hoods is evaluated to be strong.

Calculations perfonned in support of the CSE indicate that K,y < 0.95 for all normal operating conditions and expected process upsets. Further, a single credible process upset will not take K,n > 1.0.

The parameter that directly affects neutron multiplication for the Blue M hoods is geometry (slab height). Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (bas) have been established to limit :he amount of material in the hoods. A criticality (K,y = 1.0) is not possible if the maximum depth of heterogeneous material is maintained s 4.0", assuming optimum moderation and other conservative conditions.

Initiating Events that Lead to Credible Process Upsets The fault tree in Figure 6.3.13-1 shows potential initiating events that could lead to criticality. It requires repeated attempts by operations to stack pans of material in the hood (IE # llood-5), and a failure by that operator and any other persons in the area to realize the error (s) and stop the actions beture exceeding 4.0" throughout the hood (IE #

Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

21 Revision Date:

Revision No. _0

Hood-6).

Actually, to exceed the assumptions in the analysis, this must occur simultaneously in two immediately adjacent (back-to-back) hoods. Other variations may be postulated involving placing multiple packs of material into the hood, recognizing that the material depth in the pack must exceed 4.0" and the ;xtra pack (s) must be spaced closer than 12" from the slab in order to violate the assumptions.

Common Mode Failure Potential Technically, the exclusive use of administrative controls is subject to common mode failure because the same operator can violate procedures repeatedly and fail to detect the error. Ilowever, in this application, the controls are very strong because in reality no one would perform these repeated, erroneous actions because:

Storage of pans and packs is normally accomplished elsewhere, i.e., on shelves or in racks provided.

There is no motivation to put large numbers of pans or packs into a hood. Placing more than one or two additional pans or even one additional pack into a hood significantly restricts work space.

The only approved arrangement of pans containing material, in hoods or anywhere else, is side-by-side, with no stacking allowed. This is in procedures and/or crit signs, and emphasized in training and Regulatory inspections.

The packs would have to be removed before any work could be accomplished in the hood.

1 l

Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

22 Revision Date:

Revision No. _0

TABLE 5.3.13-1

SUMMARY

OF DEFENSES PROVIDED AGAINST A SINGLE FAILURE l

OXIDATION IIOODS FOR PROCESSING WET HETEROGENEOUS MATERIAL

e,

^

General Descriptor[

MIN eep.g,g y;.

p.g.,,, g,g 3 7

.y 4

.g.-

1 Prevent (

' Regulate -

Detect />

Prevent-Regulate Detect /

l i

React V

React PREVENT DEFENSE Prevent of flood-5 Detect and Correct Before Stackinb" Pans

>4 Deep liood-5

>4.0" Slab lieight Throughout l

Material l

Throughout liood in llaM l

DETECT REMOVE DEFENSE Detect and Correct Before liood-6 Prevent Stacking Pans of

>ci" Slab licight Throughout

$'ojal >f'l r

P hou ia f hxxl

.1 1

NOTES:

1) See above regarding assumptions for slab height.

2) See above for a discussion of common mode failure potential.

I l

l Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

23 Revision Date:

Revision No. _0

TABLE 5.3.13-2 l

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY LIMITS FOR K,rr = 0.90, 0.95, AND DELAYED CRITICAL O.XIDATION IIOODS WITH WET IIETEROGENEOUS MATERIAL 1

I

. PARAMETER NORMAL BOUNDING

CRITICALITY 1. CRITICALITN CRITICALITY.-

OPERATLNG :

ASSUMI7' ION SAFETY SAFETY

. LIMIT!

CONDITIONSL LIMIT-

.a L LIMIT '-

Delayed Critical s 0.90-s 0.945 '-

(0.98) ' '

2"U Mass 2

Moderator /

Optimum Concentration l

Geometry

< 24" s 2.5" s 4.0" licicht Spacing N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A s

2 Density Optimum Absorbers None None None None None Enrichment s 5.0 Wt. %

< 5.0 Wt.%

s 5.0 Wt. %

s 5.0 Wt. %

s 5.0 Wt. %

s Reflection 12" Water 12" Water 12" Water 1

Notes

1) These are not criticality safety limits per se. They are the K,,,'s corresponding to certain material heights.

2) 11/X = 150-250 Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

24 Revision Date:

Revision No. _0

Pellet Ribbon Blending Hood [ Heterogeneous or Homogeneous)

Pellet Lines 1-4 each has a ribbon blending hood, measuring 88"x30", the main purpose of which is to house automated equipment that blends small batches of press feed before roll compaction. The hood is also used for miscellaneous operations on each line that require containment. The blending equipment takes up a good portion of the left end, leaving an open area on the right approx. 48"x30" plus a 15" strip in front of the equipment. The left end of each hood has a Lexan panel with large to small gaps (approx. 3/4"), depending on the line, that would allow fluid to drain from the hood surface, and a large, open hand hole at an elevation of 9".

If the operation involves homogeneous material, it is bounded by the analysis and evaluation in " Blue M Oven lloods, Conversion Lines and Scrap Cage."

If the operation involves heterogeneous material, it is bounded by the analysis and evaluation in this section.

Controls Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)

Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory 4

Affairs Procedure RA-108.

The requirements for functiona verification are determined by this evaluation.

(None)

Active engineered controls (AEC)

Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-Il07 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety significant interlocks. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

(None)

Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)

Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard-wired alarm.

The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

• RA-198, safety significant Controls Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No..

25 Revision Date:

Revision No.

O

[None]

Administrative controls Safety Significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These j

controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.

Functional verification is not normally required.

Cean64Q 7 >y.y f~_Canteg M QzGQip y,;

J

,' M g ; pf m. %jp'_s_Q gggy%y p

9, d ondidail # W y ~<

v y

>7 g

g%

h

=

A-Ilood-x-03 Pievent operator stacking material >4.5 slab No Hood-3 height /

> 4.5" slab height in hood./

Operator prevents exceeding 4.5" slab height in hood.

A-Hood x-04 Detect and correct before 4.5 slab height exceeded /

No Hood-4

> 4.5" slab height in hood /

Operator detects and corrects before >4.5" slab in hood.

Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin on safety for operations in hoods involving heterogeneous material is evaluated to be very strong. Calculations performed in support of the CSE indicate that K,, < 0.95 for all normal operating conditions and expected process upsets.

Further, a single credible process upset will not take K,y > 1.0.

The parameter that directly affects neutron is geometry (slab height). Criticality safety j

limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (bas) have been established to limit the slah height of material in the hoods. A criticality (K,, = 1.0) is not possible within the bounding assumption of a maximum depth of heterogeneous material of 4.5", plus concurrent full interstitial moderation.

Initiating Events that Lead to Credible Process Upsets The fault tree in Figure 6.3.14-1 shows potential initiating events that could lead to criticality. It requires repeated attempts by operations to stack material into a slab exceeding 4.5" in height throughout the hood (IE # Hood-3), and a failure by that operator and any other persons in the area to realize the error (s) and stop the actions before exceeding 4.5" (IE # Hood-4).

Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

26 Revision Date:

Revision No. _0 i

Common Mode Failure Potential Technically, the exclusive use of administrative controls is subject to common mode failure because the same operator can violate procedures repeatedly and fail to detect the error. However, in this application, the controls are very strong because in reality no one would perform these repeated, erroneous actions because:

Storage of pans is normally accomplished elsewhere, i.e., on shelves provided.

There is no motivation to put large numbers of pans or packs into a hood. Placing more than one or two additional containers into a hood significantly restricts work space.

The only approved arrangement of pans containing material, in hoods or anywhere else, is side-by-side, with no stacking allowed. This is in procedures and/or on crit signs, and emphasized in training and Regulatory inspections.

The containers would have to be removed before any work could be accomplished in the hood.

Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

27 Revision Date:

Revision No. _0

TABLE 5.3.14-1

SUMMARY

OF DEFENSES PROVIDED AOAINST A SINGLE FAILURE IIOODS FOR PROCESSING WET IIETEROGENEOUS MATERIAL PELLETS, FUEL RODS, & MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONS

,, Us. '

Defense set 1;

' Defense set 2 :

n-

. vi.

wpp 1., lg '

7 y^

React -

' ii :

React PREVENT DEFENSE Prevent Stacking Material to a flood-3 Detect and Correct Before Depth >4.5" Throughout flood flood,>4.5" Slab lieight Throughout m flo<xi DETECT REMOVE DEFENSE Detect and Correct Before Prevent Stacking Material to a

, 4.5" Slab IIcight Throughout flood-4 Depth >4.5" Throughout flood m Hood NOTES:

1) See above regarding assumptions for slab height.

2) See above for a discussion of common mode failure potential.

l l

t i

l Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

28 Revision Date:

Revision No. __0

TABLE 5.3.14-2 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY LIMITS FOR K, = 0.90, 0.95, AND DELAYED CRITICAL HOODS WITH WET IIETEROGENEOUS MATERIAL PELLETS, FUEL RODS, & MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONS PARAMETER -

NORMALT-BONNDING,

CRITICALITY l ' CRITICALITY

- CRITICALITY [

OPERATING ASSUMITION SAFETY.

SAFETY

. LIMITJ..

j LIMIT.

- LIMIT : " '-

Delayed Critical

CONDITIONS -

's 0.880 '

s 0.915 2 ~

8 2"U Mass Moderator /

None Full Interstitial Full Interstitial 2 Full Interstitial 2 2

Concentration g

Geometry 6 2%"

$ 4.5" s 4.0" s 4.5" lleight Spacing N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Density 96.5% T.D.

J Absorbers None None None None None Enrichment s 5.0 Wt. %

<5.0 Wt.%

s 5.0 Wt. %

s 5.0 Wr. %

s 5.0 Wt. %

Full Water Full Water Full Water Reflection (12")

(12")

(12")

Notes

1) These are not criticality safety limits per se. They are the Kds corresponding to certain material heights.

2) Pellets are close-packed and assumed full flooded i-ternally with water.

Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

29 Revision Date:

Revision No. _0 I

i Pellet Addback Area Hood [ Homogeneous)-

Criticality isjudged to be not credible.

s Pellet Roll Hood 5

Calculations for optimally moderated powder forming-a hemisphere with. partial i

2 P us a minimum of 35.5 liters of water reflection indicate that a minimum 'of 65 kg U0 l

are needed (homogeneous mixture) before a criticality is possible. These numbers would be slightly smaller (<5%) for heterogeneous material, but give a good. idea of the amount

'i of material required. As given above, the pack in the roll hood shuts off the granulator (and the supply of material) when approx.18 kgs is sensed on the load cell. Also, the j

process control batch counter interlock will stop the process if the accumulated batches j

re >ches a limit (currently set as 7). When the process is in operation, the roll hood is in almost constant attendance.

l It was therefore concluded that it is not credible for this amount of powder (> four batches), concurrent with over 35 liters of water, to process through the compactor-l granulator and fall undetected into the roll hood.

Therefore, no further evaluation is necessary, and no fault tree is provided.

l Pellet Pilot Line Hood [ Heterogeneous or Homogeneous)

If the operation involves homogeneous material, it is bounded by the analysis and evaluation in " Blue M Oven Hoods, Conversion Lines and Scrap Cage." If the operation j

involves heterogeneeus material, it is bounded by the analysis and evaluation in " Pellet

]

Blue M Hoods."

i Axial Blanket inspection Hood (Heterogeneous]

Criticality isjudged to be not credible.

BET Compactability Press Hood [ Heterogeneous]

Criticality isjudged to be not credible.

.I 8 CRIM016, (NcsE]: Uranium oxide Moderated with Water Hemispherical ocometry - Critical Radius searches (26cm-32cm)

Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

30 Revision Date:

Revision No.

O j

i

\\

I

Line 5 Mix Hood [ Heterogeneous or Homogeneous)

If the operation involves homogeneous material, it is bounded by the analy' sis andf evaluation in " Blue M Oven Hoods, Conversion Lines and Serap Cage." If the operation.-

[

involves heterogeneous material, it is bounded by the analysis and evaluation in " Pellet Blue M lloods."

Powder Transfer Hood (Fumace SC) [ Heterogeneous or Homogeneous) i If the operation involves homogeneous material, it is bounded by the analysis and evaluation in " Blue M Oven floods, Conversion Lines and Serap Cage." If the operation involves beterogeneous material, it is bounded by the analysis and evaluation in " Pellet Blue M Hoods."

URRS Weighing Hood [ Homogeneous)

All material processed in this hood is homogeneous, and therefore bounded by the l

analysis and evaluation in " Blue M Oven lloods, Conversion Lines and Serap Cage."

r URRS Blue M Hoods (704 & 705) (Homogeneous)

All material processed in these hoods is homogeneous, and therefore bounded by the analysis and evaluation in " Blue M Oven Hoods, Conversion Lines and Serap Cage."

Incinerator Hoods These hoods are included in the documentation for that area.

4

)-

LLRW Sorting Hood [ Homogeneous]

l 4

a.

Controls Safety Stanificant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC) l Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

31 Revision Date:

Revision No.

O l

3 I

.1

Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108t The requirements for_ functional verification are j

^

determined by this evaluation.

(None)

I Active engineered controls (AEC)

Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory i

Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

(None)

Administrative controls with computer or alagT1 assist (AC) j Administrative controls with computer or a? arm assist (AC) typically consist of i

operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard-wired alarm.

l The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

1

[None]

l Administrative controls Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.

Functional verification is not normally required.

• RA 108, Safety siginficant Contmis Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

32 Revision Date:

Revision No. _0

dCON'IROU;1_Db p JCONTROLFUNCTION/J

~by

.. FUNCTIONAL;,1NtflAGl$

J4 ph * !! FAILURE CONDITION /$ "n7 WERIFICATf0Ne tBVIBl4t$

? >, ' + Wi$

Ne i PACTIONU' I UM NREQUIREDM I ME N

M A Hood-SORT-01 Prevent placing > 12 packs of material into hood /

No Hood-1 (URRS)

> 12 packs in hood /

Operator prevents placing > 12 packs in hood.

A-Hood-SORT-02 Detect and remove excessive packs before (URRS) accumulating > 12 in hood /

No Hood-2

> 12 packs accumulate in hood /

Operator detects & corrects before > 12 packs in hood Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin on safety is evaluated to be strong. Calculations performed in support of the CSE indicate that K,y < 0.95 for all normal operating conditions and expected process upsets, Further, a single credible process upset will not take K,y >_ l.0.

The parameter that directly affects neutron is mass. Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (bas) have been established to limit the amount of material in the hoods. A criticality (K,y = 1.0) would be possible, assuming a planar array, given the following combinations of credible process upsets:

Placing more than 12 packs of optimally moderated material into the hood in a triangular pitch array.

initiating Events that Lead to Credible Proceu Upsets The fault tree in Figure 6.3.4-1 shows potential initiating events that could lead to criticality, it requires repeated attempts by operations to place packs into a hood (IE #

Ilood-1), and a failure by that operator and any other persons in the area to realize the error (s) and stop the actions (IE # liood-2). Further, it requires a hood size that will physically hold >l2 packs, assuming a planar array.

Common Mode Failure Potential Technically, the exclusive use of administrative controls is subject to common mode failure because the same operator can violate procedures repeatedly and fail to deter the error, llowever, in this application, the controls are very strong because in reality i.s one would perform these repeated, erroneous actions because:

Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

33 Revision Date:

Revision No. _0

Storage of packs is norrnally accomplished by placing packs in racks or on the floor.

There is no motivation to put large numbers of packs into a hood. Placing more than one or two packs into a hood significantly restricts work space; 12 packs would make working essentially impossible in any hood.

The packs would have to be removed before any work could be accomplished in the hood.

For the Sorting flood, there are no packs of production material (UO or U 0,) in 2

3 the area.

C4 Dissolvers input Hoods These hoods are included in the documentation Ihr that area.

C4 Dissolvers Output Hoods These hoods are included in the documentation for that area.

706 Hood for Processing C4 Dissolver Residue [ Homogeneous)

All material processed in this hood is homogeneous, and therefore bounded by the analysis and evaluation in " Blue M Oven Hoods, Conversion Lines and Scrap Cage." It is further noted that, because of the very low levels of uranium in the dissolver residue, that the reactivity in the 706 hood for normal operations and expected process upsets would be very much lower than that in the bounding evaluation.

Rod Reclamation Station Hoods [ Heterogeneous) l Criticality is judged to be not credible in either hood.

l 1

Fuel Rod Lathe Station Hood [ Heterogeneous)

Criticality isjudged to be not credible.

1 Rod Loading Stations Hoods [ Heterogeneous) l Criticality is judged to be not credible.

Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

34 Revision Date:

Revision No.

0 1

~

f Rod Rework Station Hood [ Heterogeneous]

Criti-fity is judged to be not credible.

IFBA Inspection Hoods [ Heterogeneous]

Criticality is judged to be not credible.

!FBA Unloading Station [ Heterogeneous]

. Criticality is judged to be not credible.

IFBA Blue M [ Heterogeneous]

The operation involves heterogeneous material, and is therefore bounded by the analysis and evaluation in " Pellet Blue M Hoods."

IFBA ZrB Stripping Hood [ Heterogeneous]

2 Controls Safety Significant Centrols Passive engineered controls (PEC)

Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory 7

Affairs Procedure RA-108.

The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

[None]

Active engineered controls (AEC)

Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety significant interlocks. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

(None) 1

' RA-108. safety Significant Controls Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

35 Revision Date:

Revision No.

0 l

Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)

Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard-wired alarm.

The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

[None]

Administrative controls Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.

Functional verification is not normally_ required.

1. ControlIDU

?

la>

Control Puncaca/s >; /

cFunedeonth 9

Nfqa 'iS %gf%//j Failure'hl % "" 3Nefestkin* NBveid N

W@i" > ~Actio66 MOW 2W O ' Regelred M l.

'ns;n" C

(

~"

A flood-ZRST-Prevent operator stacking material >5.8 slab No liood-9 09 height /

> 5.8" slab height in hood./

Operator prevents exceeding 5.8" slab height in hood.

A-ifood-ZRST-Detect and correct before 5.8 slab height 10 exceeded /

No llood-9

> 5.8" slab height in hood /

Operator detects and corrects before >5.8" slab in hood.

Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the IFBA ZrB stripping hood is evaluated to 2

be strong, involving a ecmbination of passive engineered and administrative controls.

K,y 5.'15 fo; all normal operating conditions and expected process upsets. Further, a G

single credible process upset will not take K,y> 1.0.

The parameter that directly affects neutron multiplication for the ZrB hoods is geometry 2

(slab height). Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (bas) have been established to limit the material slab height. A criticality (K,y = 1.0) is not possible t

if the maximum depth of heterogeneous material is maintained s 5.82" i

Initiating Events that Lead to Credible Process Upsets -IFBA ZrB, Stripping Hood l

Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

36 Revision Date:

Revision No. _0 i

l

The fault tree in Figure 6.3.36-1 shows potentia! initiating events that could lead to criticality. It requires repeated attempts by operations to stack material into a slab exceeding 5.8" in height throughout the hood (IE # Hood-9), and a failure by that operator and any other persons in the area to realize the error (s) and stop the actions before exceeding 5.8" (IE # llood-10).

Common Mode Failure Potential Technically, the exclusive use of administrative controls is subject to common mode failure because the same operator can violate procedures repeatedly and fail to detect the error. However, in this application, the controls are very strong because in reality no one would perform these repeated, erroneous actions because:

Storage of baskets and pans is normally accomplished elsewhere, e.g., on shelves provided.

There is no motivation to put large numbers of baskets or pans into a hood.

Placing more than one or two additional containers into a hood significantly restricts work space.

The only approved arrangement of baskets or pans containing material, in hoods or anywhere else, is side-by-side, with no stacking allowed. This is in procedures and/or crit signs, and emphasized in training and Regulatory inspections.

The containers would have to be removed before any work could be accomplished in the hood.

i I

1 l

Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

37 Revision Date:

Revision No.

0

l.

TABLE 5.3.36-1

SUMMARY

OF DEFENSES PROVIDED AGAINST A SINGLE FAILURE ZrB STRIPPING IIOOD 2

Defenad Set 1) x qep 3

[ Defense" Set N [ [

.g i">

General Descriptor -

4 t'

Preventj!..Regulatef Detectl Prevents

Regulatk f Detect /i ir

" React ? <

~

React i PREVFNT DEFENSE Prevent Stacking" Material to a flood-9 Detect and Correct Before >

Depth >

5.8 Threa;, Lout flood-9 5.8* Slab Ileight Throughout in llood licrod DETECT REMOVE DEFENSE Detect and Correct Before >

Prevent Stacking Material to a 5.8" Slab IIcight Throughout in 11ood-10 Depth > 5.8" Tinoughout flood flood NOTES:

1) See above regarding assumptions for slab height.

2) See above for a discussion of common mode failure potential.

f I

l

'I

(

t Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

38 Revision Date:

Revision No. _0

=

TABLE 5.3.36-2 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY LIMITS FOR K,y = 0.90, 0.95, AND DELAYED CRITICAL ZrB STRIPPING IIOOD 2

l PARAMETER -

' NORMAL <

BOUNDING ^

i CRITICALITYi J CRITICALITYf f CRITICALITY m:

OPERATING L eASSUMPTION

. SAFE'IY LSAFETY LIMITi Q4 LIMITE

. LIMIT :

LDelayed Critical 1, s

' CONDITIONS 15 0.95:

(< 1.0);

y

.p 235 U M ass 2

Moderator /

< 4.0" depth Optimum Optimum Optimum Concentration Geometry 5 2.85" s 5.28" s 5.82*

Height (Pellets)

Spacing N/A N/A N/A N/A Density Close-Packet Optimum Optimum Optimum Pellets Absorters None None None None Enrichment s 5.0 Wt. %

<5.0 Wt.%

s 5.0 Wt. %

s 5.0 Wt. %

4 Reflection Partial (l")

Partial (l")

Partial (l")

Notes R

1)

ZrB hood has passive overflow to prevent moderator depth >4.0" 2

Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

39 Revision Date:

Revision No. _0 t

i QC Ventilation Hoods " Cage" Area [ Heterogeneous or Homogeneous]

Criticality is judged to be not credible in either hood.

Chemical Development Lab (CDL) Ventilation Hoods - Office / Lab Area & Floor

[ Heterogeneous or Homogeneous]

It is concluded that criticality is not credible.

QC Ventilation Hood - Moisture Cage [ Homogeneous]

Operation of this hood is bounded by the analysis and evaluation in " Blue M Oven lloods, Conversion Lines and Scrap Cage."

Dissolver Hood in CSR [ Homogeneous)

Controls Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)

Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108'.

The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

(None)

Active engineered controls (AEC)

Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

(None)

Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)

Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard-wired alarm.

8 RA 108, safety signirwant Controls Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No. _ 40 Revision Date:

Revision No. _0

s The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

{None]

Administrative controls Safety Significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These 4

controls may require documentation -via Control Form or some other record.

Functional verification is not normally required.

RCOtmtO!!IDp !Mgg;[ CONTROL PUNCTION/ggi,fL XPUNCflONAR :

9.

VERIRICATIO$E [M..4 ac h

' in dFA&URKCONDmON//W:

pMlyc,

VWP14[M s'

4NN C TM8 I

• MM 4

A-flood-CSR-07 Prevent operator placing >78.4 kg mixture No flood-7 into hood /

>78.4 Kg mixture in hood /

Operator prevents accumulating >78.4 Kg mixture in hood A flood-CSR-08 Detect and remove excessive material before accumulating >78.4 kg mixture in hood /

No Hood-8

>78.4 Kg mixture in hood /

Operator detects and corrects before >78.4 Kg mixture accumulates in hood Margin of Safety 4

The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the CSR dissolver hood is evaluated to be very strong. Calculations performed in support of the CSE indicate that K,y < 0.95 for all normal operating conditions and expected process upsets, Further, a single credible process upset will not take K,y > 1.0.

The parameter that directly affects neutron multiplication for the hood is mass.

Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (bas) have been established to limit the amount cf material in the hoods. A criticality (K,y = 1.0) would be possible t

given the following combination of process upsets:

Mounding a mass of material in the hood into a hemisphere exceeding 24 cm radius (18.9" diameter). Note: this is based on optimally moderated UO + water, 2

1" water reflection, and is in addition to material in a full hopper under the hood.

Initiating Events that Lead to Credible Process Upsets - Dissolver Hood in CSR 4

Initial Issue Date:

28 FEB 99 Page No.

41 Revision Date:

Revision No. _0 i

s s

The fault tree in Figure 6.3.40-1 shows potential initiating events that could lead to criticality, it requires repeated attempts by operations to mound material in the hood, in spite ofinterference ofincoming pans (IE # Hood-7), and a failure by that operatar and i

]

any other persons in the area to realize the error (s) and stop the actions before exceeding a hemisphere 24 cm radius (dia. = 18,9") in a hood that is only 22" deep (IE # llood-8).

Common Mode Failure Potential Technically, the exclusive use of administrative controls is subject to common e

I

. mode failure because the same operator can violate procedures repeatedly and fail to detect the error. However, in this application, the controls are very strong because in reality no one would be able to perform these repeated, erroneous actions.

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TABLE 5.3.40-1

SUMMARY

OF DEFENSES PROVIDED AGAINST A SINGLE FAILURE CSR DISSOLVER HOOD

.. +

t A:

Y,<

w T,

-Defense Set I :

Defense Set 2

bensrel Descriptort..

^

g, iDetect/

Prevent 3 Regulate DetectE-oi:

c Prevent '

Regulate

. React 1 1 React '

. c.-

PREVENT DEFENSE Prevent Mounding Material in flood 7 Detect and Correct Before flood Exceeding 18.9" Dia.

Ilood-7 Accurnulating Mound Exceeding flemisphere 18.9" Dia. IIemisphere DETECT REMOVE DEFENSE Prevent Mounding Material in Detect and Correct Before flood-8 Ilood Exceeding 18.9" Dia.

Accumulating Mound llemisphere Exceeding 18.9" Dia.

IIemisphere NOTES:

1) See above regarding assumptions.

2) See above for a discussion of common mode failure potential.

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1 TABLE 9.3.40-2 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY LIMITS FOR K,, = 0.90, 0.95, AND DELAYED CRITICAL CSR DISSOLVER IIOOD 1,

PARAMETER NORMAL /1 J BOUNDING 4 CRITICALITY '

CRITICAIJIY:

CRITICALITY?

W 3 OPERATING.

LASSUMPI' ION =

SAFETY SAFETY:-

LIMIT,

A

' CONDITIONS ;

ELIMITE LIMIT. ' '"

Delayed Crkical

' s 0.89 3 ~

is 0.95 --

1(I.0) :

10.3 KgU 27.8 KgU 48.0 KgU 2"U Mass (16.8 kg (45.4 kg (78.4 kg mixture) mixture) mixture)

Moderator /

Optimum Concentration Geometry N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Spacing N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Ilomogeneous -

Density Optimum il/X = 250 2 Absortwrs None None None None None Enrichment s 5.0 Wt. %

<5.0 Wt.%

s 5.0 Wt. %

s 5.0 Wt. %

$ 5.0 Wt. %

Partial Water Partial Water Partial Water Partial Water Reflection (l")

(l")

(l")

(l")

Notes

1) K,y for equivalent hemisphere volume of one polypak.

2) This is the mixture density corresponding to the minimum volume.

3)

.",ee CRI-96-032.

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a Filter Cleaning Hood [ Homogeneous) l Controls 1

4 -

Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)

Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory -

Affairs Procedure RA-108'.

The requirements for functional verification-are.

determined by this evaluation.

(None) l Active engineered controls (AEC)

Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory i

Affairs Procedure RA-108.~ They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

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(None)

E i

Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)

Administrative controls with computer or. alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard-wired alarm.

i.

The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

[None]

x.

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Administrative controls Safety-significant administrative. controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or 'some other' record.

^

Functional verification is not normally required.

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i MITIATRIO!

nCONTROL PURICTION/g,%d, rVERNICATIOE 'BVENT M

. FUNCTIONALi f

ECONTROlilD; g

\\ Ggm y

tFAILURE CONI !flONflbg"

N RBOUIRED* %NUM8liR" W

' "ACTIONi

>m u,

l A Ilood FILT-01 Prevent placing > 12 packs of material into No flood 1 (URRS) hood /

> 12 packs in hood /

Operator prevents placing > 12 packs in hood.

4 A flood-FILT-02 Detect and remove excessive packs before (URRS) accumulating > 12 in hood /

No Hood-2

> 12 packs accumulate in bood/

Operator detects & corrects before > 12 packs in hood Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety is evaluated to be strong Calculations performed in support of the CSE indicate that K,y < 0.95 for all normal operating conditions and expected process upsets, Further, a single credible process upset will not take K,y > 1.0.

The parameter that directly affects neutron is mass. Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (bas) have been established to limit the amount of material in the hoods. A criticality (K,y = 1.0) would be possible, assuming a planar array, given the following combinations of credible process upsets:

I Placing more than 12 packs of optimally moderated material into the hood in a e

i triangular pitch array.

Initiating Events that Lead to Credible Process Upsets The fault tree in Figure 6.3.4-1 shows potential initiating events that could lead to criticality. It requires repeated attempts by operations to place packs into a hood (IE #

llood-1), and a failure by that operator and any other persons in the area to realize the error (s) and stop the actions (IE # Ilood-2). Further, it requires a hood size that will physically hold >l2 packs, assuming a planar array.

Common Mode Failure Potential Technically, the exclusive use of administrative controls is subject to common mode failure because the same operator can violate procedures repeatedly and fail to detect the error. Ilowever, in this application, the controls are very strong because in reality no one would perform these repeated, erroneous actions because:

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Storage of packs is normally accomplished by placing packs in racks or on the floor.

There is no motivation to put large numbers of packs into a hood. Placing more than one or two packs into a hood significantly restricts work space; 12 packs would make working essentially impossible in any hood.

The packs would have to be removed before any work could be accomplished in -

th: hood.

For the Filter Cleaning Hood, there are no packs of production material (UO or 2

U 0 ) in the area.

3 Containments / Enclosures [ Homogeneous)

An evaluation was performed of the enclosures listed in " Process Design and j

Equipment." It was concluded that criticality is not credible in these enclosures.

Therefore double contingency is not required, and fault trees are not provided.

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FIGURE 6.3.4-1 1

]

FAULT TREE FOR HOODS l

PROCESSING HOMOGENEOUS WET MATERIAL 1

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>12 POLYPAKS WITH SNM PLACED INTO HOOD (SEE NOTES)

)

l

^

i lE# HOOO-1 IE# HOOD-2 1

CRIT SIGN i

f i

i i

{

l s

l

1. BOUNDING ASSUMPTION: NO STACKING OF PACKS INSIDE HOOD.

2. AS A MINIMUM, HOOD SURFACE AREA >29.5"x 43.9* IS REQUIRED BEFORE CRITICAL ARRAY IS POSSIBLE.

i SEE CRI-96 036.

3. SEE SECTION 5.3.0 FOR BASIS OF 12 PACK LIMIT.

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I --....

..-. ~.

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FIGURE 6.3.13-1 j

l FAULT TREE FOR j.

OXIDATION IIOODS (HOMOGENEOUS WET MATERIAL) i

>4.0" SLAB HEIGHT OF SNM l

THROUGHOUT ENTIRE HOOD 1

i IE# HOOD-5 IE# HOOD-6 l

i 1

CRIT SIGN (SAME) CRIT SIGN i

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{

1. SEE CSE SECTION S.3.13 FOR A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF ASSUMPTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH 4.0" SLAB j

HEIGHT.

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FIGURE 6.3.14-1 FAULT TREE FOR IIOODS PROCESSING IIETEROGENEOUS WET MATERIAL i

F i.

l

>4 5" SLAB HEIGHT OF SNM THROUGHOUT ENTIRE HOOD IE# HOOD-3 IE# HOOD-4 i

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(A E) CRR SIGN j

CRIT SIGN I,

i l

l

1. HETEROGENEOUS MATERIAL MOST LIMITING.

2. SEE SECTION 5.3.0 FOR BASIS OF 4.5" SLAB HEIGHT.

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i l

1 1

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FIGURE 6.3.36-1 1

FAULT TREE FOR IFBA ZrB STRIPPING HOOD 2

l l

l l

>5.8" SLAB HEIGHT OF SNM THROUGHOUT ENTIRE HOOD IES HOO49 IE# HOOD-10

._.u.._.

WEtM I

4 >

CRIT SIGN SAME CRIT SIGN l

1. HOOD DESIGN PREVENTS MODERATION DEPTH >4 0"(THE CONTROL LIMIT) VS. THE MORE CONSERVATIVE BOUNDING ANALYSIS AT 5 8"(SAFETY LIMIT)

2. BECAUSE OF HOOD DESIGN (OPEN FRONT), CNLY LEFT MOST BASIN CAN ACHIEVE 24 0" DEPTH OF MODERATOR.

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FIGURE 6.3.40-1 FAULT TREE FOR DISSOLVER IIOOD IN CSR CRITIC AllI Y PRECURSOR OPTIMALLY MODERATED UO2 MOUNDED INTO HEMISPHERE >24 CM RADIUS

(>78 4 KG MIXTURE)

Ib I

lEs HOOD-7 IEW HOOD-8 LENCY -

TEMP TS TO (G MIX TURE l

m CRIT SIGN (SAME) CRIT SIGN l

l t

f

1. HOOD SIZE (22" FRONT TO BACK)WILL BARELY ACCOMODATE POSTULATED HEMISPHERE (24 CM RADIUS = 18.9" DIAMETER).

2. HOOD GEOMETRY ALLOWS ONLY PANS TO BE TRANSFERRED INTO HOOD, E.G. PACKS WILL NOT FIT.

l 3 MATERIAL IN HOOD IS IN ADDITION TO MATERIAL IN HOPPER (ASSUMED FULL).

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ll l

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Chemical Safety and Fire Safety Controls I

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To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment.

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