ML20217M254
| ML20217M254 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Westinghouse |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1999 |
| From: | WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217M241 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9910270178 | |
| Download: ML20217M254 (33) | |
Text
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PROPOSED SEOUENCE FOR Tile Full SCALE EXERCISE - SEP 21,1999:
Time Event / Action (min) 0000
- 1. A controller initiates the exercise by tipping over a poly pac cart, starting j
the smoke generator and opening the valve to the flange prop. A poly pac j
will be on the floor with the contents spilled. Primary Card #1 (PC#1) will be used if area personnel are confused. Note: the reaction of 63% nitric acid and UO powder generates NO, gases.
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- 2. The Emergency Coordinator is notified of the situation.
- 3. An operator tries to close the manifold valve on the wall of line 5. A
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controller hands PC #7 to the operator indicating the valve has failed open.
- 4. The Emergency Coordinator activates the Emergency Response Organization and assumes or assigns Emergency Director responsibilities.
- 5. The Emergency Coordinator evaluates the situation and instructs the main station guard to use the Voice Communication System to evacuate the area.
- 6. During the evacuation an operator is overcome by the fumes and is rendered unconscious near the scene.
- 7. Brigade, HP Response, Medical and Security Teams are activated, report to appropriate assembly points and await instructions.
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- 8. Section supervisors account for their personnel and report to the Emergency Coordinator. The Emergency Coordinator is notified that one person cannot be accounted for.
- 9. An operator is sent outside to 3 hut off the pump at the nitric acid bulk storage tank.
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- 10. Off duty command staff is notified of the emergency.
- 11. Nitric acid flow is stopped when the pump is shut down.
- 12. The entry team enters and finds the victim. PC #4 is handed to the responder indicating that the employee is unconscious and in respiratory distress.
- 13. The Emergency Coordinator dispatches an HP Technician to the roof to take the appropriate samples. A smoke bomb is used to simulate NOx fumes escaping the building.
- 14. The incident is classified as Local, Alert or Site Area Emergency.
- 15. Proper outside agencies are notified.
- 16. The victim is removed from the hot zone and taken to decon.
- 17. On site Emergency Medical Service is notified of a casualty.
- 18. The spill is confined.
(
0030
- 19. Decon team puts the casualty on oxygen and performs decontamination. A controller hands PC #6 to the HP Responder attached to the Decon team.
- 20. On site Emergency Medical Services contacts the Emergency Coordinator and requests off site assistance - the patient's condition does not improve 1
(PC #17 is issued).
9910270178 990831 PDR ADOCK 07001151 C
PDR l
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Time Event / Action (min)
- 21. The Einergency Coordinator or his appointee calls 911 and requests off site EMS for a contaminated victim.
- 9. The results of the stack sample (PC #10)is communicated to the Emergency Coordinator - minor release of radioactive materials.
- 23. The Emergency Coordinator sends responders downwind with Drager tubes to determine NOx concentrations.
- 24. The Emergency Coordinator establishes a staging area for off site Emergency Medical Service response.
- 25. IIP Response Team takes impact samples near the area of the spill.
- 26. IIP Response Team samples the area surrounding the building.
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- 27. Drager tubes results are communicated to the Emergency Coordinator (PC
- 16).
- 28. Entry team is deconned and checked for contamination.
- 29. Entry team vitals are taken.
- 30. Decon team is deconned and checked for contamination.
- 31. Decon team vitals are taken.
- 32. HP samples are analyzed and results evaluated (PC # 11 through PC #15).
- 33. The casualty is transported to Richland Memorial liospital.
- 34. Command staff decides on the proper method to clean up the spill.
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- 35. When objectives of the exercise have been met the Exercise Controller will give PC # 17 to the Emergency Coordinator and terminate the exercise.
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Emergency Exercise Controllers f
Assignment Name l-Exercise Carlos Aguilar Spencer Gantt Emergency Coordinator Garry Bullock Ralph Jacobs Brigade JeffIlooper Assembly Point Dick Pregnall l
Health Physics Ed Reitler Tommy Shannon
' Security / Medical Phil Stroud i
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i DRA FT CIIECKLIST:
l Step Action Time / Comments 1.
Operator tips over cart. Smoke plume is initiated (if no smoke PC
- 1 handed out).
2.
EC is notified of the incident.
l 3.
Operator tries to close manifold valve. PC#7 is handed out indicating valve fails OPEN.
4.
EC activates the ERO and assumes or assigns ED respor.sibilities. An area evacuation is called.
5.
Operator is overcome by fumes and is unconscious at the scene. This occurs during the evacuation.
6.
Accountability is achieved.
7.
Operator is sent to shut off upstream valve. Smoke bomb is used on the roof to simulate fumes escaping the building.
8.
ERO functions are assigned.
9.
Flow is stopped.
10.
Entry team enters and retrieves victim. (Verify proper level of PPE is used.)
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11.
Spill confined.
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12.
Responders sent downwind to determine nitrogen dioxide levels.
11 On site EMS notified and off site EMS requested 14.
Victim checked for contamination (chemical and radiologicalt
.s 15.
Staging area established to receive off site EMS.
16.
Victim on oxygen and transported.
17.
Entry team deconned.
18.
Richland Memorial llospital uses proper protocol receiving the victim.
19.
Plans established for clean up and verification of clean up.
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4 TIIE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ITEMS WOULD BE CONSIDERED A WEAKNESS:
- FAILURE OF THE EC TO ASSEMBLE THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION.
- FAILURE OF THE EC TO ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS.
- FAILURE OF THE EC TO HAVE SECURITY MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF TIIE EVENT.
FAILURE OF THE EC TO RESPOND TO TIIE POWDER AND/OR NITRIC ACID SPILL.
FAILURE OF THE EC TO ORGANIZE THE EMERGENCY BRIGADE.
- FAILURE OF THE EC TO ESTABLISH A P.LAN OF ATTACK FOR Tile EMERGENCY BRIGADE.
- FAILURE OF THE EC TO ESTABLISH TRAFFIC CONTROL.
- FAILURE OF THE EC TO RESPOND TO THE INJURED PERSON.
- FAILURE OF THE EC TO EVACUATE TIIE APPLICABLE PORTIONS OF THE CHEMICAL AREA.
- FAILURE OF THE EC TO PROPERLY CLASSIFY THE EVENT AS AN ALERT EMERGENCY.
FAILURE OF Tile EC TO ACCOUNT FOR APPLICABLE PERSONNEL.
FAILURE OF THE EC TO RESPOND TO THE STACK RELEASES.
FAILURE OF REGULATORY TO RESPOND TO THE POWDER AND/OR NITRIC ACID SPILL.
FAILURE OF REGULATORY TO RESPOND TO THE STACK RELEASES.
FAILURE OF MEDICAL TO RESPOND TO THE INJURED PERSON.
FAILURE OF MEDICAL TO PROPERLY TREAT THE INJURED PERSON.
FAILURE OF REGULATORY TO MONITOR TIIE INJURED PERSON.
FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURES ON llANDLING Tile INJURED PERSON.
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FAILURE OF TIIE EMERGENCY BRIGADE TO WEAR LEVEL B SUITS WITII SUPPLIED AIR RESPIRATORS.
FAILURE OF REGULATORY TO MONITOR TIIE CIIEMICAL AREA FOR AIRBORNE AND CONTAMINATION FOLLOWING TIIE EVENT.
FAILURE OF TIIE EC/ED TO PROPERLY CLOSE OUT TIIE EVENT.
- FAILURE OF TIIE OFF SITE EMS TO USE PROPPER PROTOCOL IN TREATING TIIE VICTIM.
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TIIE FOLLOWING iS A LIST OF ACCEPTABLE CRITERIA:
EC REQUIRES A SAMPLE OF TIIE SPILLED MATERIAL TO ESTIMATE CRITICALITY POTENTIAL.
EC PLACES Tile SPILLED MATERIAL IN A TANK IN TIIE SCRAP AREA.
- OFF SITE EMS USES PROPER PROTOCOL.
EC RECOGNIZES TIIE [ POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF TIIE GASEOUS RELEASE.
USING LEVEL A PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT.
- IMMEDIATELY PLACING TIIE VICTIM ON OXYGEN PRIOR TO INITIATING DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES.
- DECONTAMINATION IS FOR RADIOLOGICAL AND CIIEMICAL CONTAMINANTS.
EC EVACUATES TIIE CIIEMICAL SIDE ONLY (DEPENDENT ON Tile EXTENT OF GAS RELEASE).
PRIMARY CARD 1
THIS IS A DRILL A POLYPACK HAS FALLEN OFF A CART ONTO THE FLOOR.
THE POLYPACK HAS BROKEN OPEN, SPILLING POWDER ONTO THE FLOOR.
THE POWDER HAS MIXED WITH NITRIC ACID, PRODUCING A BROWN CLOUD.
THIS.IS A DRILL PC # 1 FROM CHEMICAL AREA CONTROLLER TO AN OPERATOR NEAR CONVERSION LINE 5
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9 PRIMARY CARD 2
THIS IS A DRILL NITRIC ACID IS LEAKING FROM A FLANGE ON AN ACID LINE IN THE SCRAP CAGE.
l THIS IS A DRILL PC # 2 FROM CHEMICAL AREA CONTROLLER TO OPERATOR NEAR CONVERSION LI!E 5 i
PRIMARY CARD 3
THIS IS A DRILL l
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NITRIC ACID HAS FLOWED TO THIS POINT ON THE FLOOR, INDICATED BY THE BARRIER TAPE.
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(TO BE USED IF PROP FAILS) l i
THIS IS A DRILL PC # 3 FROM CHEMICAL AREA CONTROLLER TO AN OPERATOR NEAR CONVERS'.ON LINE 5 OR TO A RESPONDER.
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PRIMARY CARD 4
THIS IS A DRILL THIS EMPLOYEE IS UNCONSCIOUS.
HE IS IN RESPIRATORY DISTRESS, i
THIS IS A DRILL PC # 4 ATTACHED TO A SELECTED INJURY VICTIM IN THE CHEMICAL AREA.
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PRIMARY CARD 5
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THIS IS A DRILL l
l THERE IS A THICK CLOUD OF FUMES EXTENDING FROM CONVERSION LINE 5 TO CONVERSION LINE 1 AND PELLET LINE 5.
(TO BE USED IF THE PROP FAILS)
THIS IS A DRILL PC # 5 FROM CHEMICAL AREA CONTROLLER TO RESPONDER.
PRIMARY CARD 6
THIS IS A DRILL INSTRUMENT READINGS OF INJURED EMPLOYEE.
EXTERNAL RADIATION: 0.3MR/HR.
CONTAMINATION: 500 - 1000 CPM ALPHA DIRECT.
THIS IS A DRILL PC # 6 FRO!4 CHEMICAL AREA CONTROLLER TO REGULATORY RESPONDER.
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PRIMARY CARD 7
THIS IS A DRILL CLOSING NITRIC ACID LINE AT THE MANIFOLD DOES NOT l
STOP LEAK.
THIS IS A DRILL PC # 7 FROM CHEMICAL AREA CONTROLLER TO RESPONDER.
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PRIMARY CARD 8
THIS IS A DRILL BROWN CLOUD IS VISIBLE, COMING FROM THE CONVERSION LINE 5 CALCINER COMBUSTION STACK.
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THIS IS A DRILL 1
PC # 8 FROM CHEMICAL AREA CONTROLLER TO RESPONDER OR CHEMICAL AREA OPERATOR.
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PRIMARY CARD 9
1 THIS IS A DRILL i
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l STACK SAMPLE RESULT:
INSTRUMENT READING: 150 CPM ALPHA.
THIS IS A DRILL PC # 9 FROM " SOUTH SIDE" CONTROLLER TO REGULATORY RESPONDER.
1 PRIMARY CARD 10 l
l THIS IS A DRILL II l
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l IMPACTOR SAMPLE TAKEN IN THE AREA OF THE SPILL:
INSTRUMENT READING: 600 CPM ALPHA.
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THIS IS A DRILL i
PC # 10 FROM CHEMICAL AREA CONTROLLER TO REGULATORY RESPONDER.
PRIMARY CARD 11 THIS IS A DRILL IMPACTOR SAMPLE DOWNWIND OF PLUME:
INSTRUMENT READING: 50 CPM ALPHA.
THIS IS A DRILL PC # 11 FROM " ENVIRONMENTAL" CONTROLLER TO REGULATORY RESPONDER.
p PRIMARY CARD 12 THIS IS A DRILL ENVIRONMENTAL 7"ILTER SAMPLE RESULT:
INSTRUMENT READING: 150 CPM ALPHA.
THIS IS A DRILL PC # 12 FROM " ENVIRONMENTAL" CONTROLLER TO REGULATORY RESPONDER.
r PRIMARY CARD 13 THIS IS A DRILL ENVIRONMENTAL FILTER SAMPLE RECOUNT AFTER DECAY:
INSTRUMENT READING: 100 CPM ALPHA.
l THIS IS A DRILL PC # 13 FROM " ENVIRONMENTAL" CONTROLLER TO REGULATORY RESPONDER,
e PRIMARY CARD 14
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THIS IS A DRILL i
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CONTAMINATION AROUND BUILDING:
INSTRUMENT READINGS: 50 CPM ALPHA.
THIS IS A DRILL ll PC # 14 FROM " SOUTH SIDE" CONTROLLER TO REGULATORY RESPONDER.
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PRIMARY CARD 15 THIS IS A DRILL IMPACTOR SAMPLE AFTER RELEASE HAS BEEN TERMINATED:
INSTRUMENT READING: 50 CPM ALPHA.
THIS IS A DRILL PC # 15 FROM CHEMICAL AREA CONTROLLER TO REGULATORY RESPONDER.
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r PRIMARY CARD 16 THIS IS A DRILL RESULTS OF THE DRAGER TUBE SAMPLE: 0.5 PPM THIS IS A DRILL PC #16 FROM BRIGADE CONTROLLER TO RESPONDER
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PRIMARY CARD 17 THIS IS A DRILL THE EXERCISE IS TERMINATED l
i THIS IS A DRILL PC #17 FROM EXERCISE CONTROLLER TO EMERGENCY COORDINATOR
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PRIMARY CARD C1 THIS IS A DRILL l
THIS IS A DRILL m
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PRIMARY CARD C2 THIS IS A DRILL l
THIS IS A DRILL
' PRIMARY CARD C3 i
THIS IS A DRILL I
1 THIS IS A DRILL l
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PRIMARY CARDS I
ARE YELLOW IN COLOR AND ARE GIVEN TO EMERGENCY RESPONDERS TO PROMPT THEM TO "SEE" EVENTS OR CONDITIONS TAKING PLACE WHICH THEY WOULD ACTUALLY SEE AND REACT TO IN A REAL EMERGENCY SITUATION.
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BACK-UP CARDS ARE BLUE IN COLOR AND ARE GIVEN TO EMERGENCY l
i RESPONDERS TO PROMPT THEM TO TAKE SPECIFIC ACTIONS WHICH THEY SHOULD HAVE TAKEN.
THIS PREVENTS THE EXERCISE FROM STOPPING OR FLOUNDERING, OR " GOING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION".
BACK-UP CARDS WILL BE WRITTEN BY EMERGENCY CONTROLLERS AS NEEDED (IF NEEDED).
IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN WRITTEN IN A CHECKLIST FORMAT AND THIS SHOULD MINIMIZE THE NUMBER OF BACK-UP CARDS USED OR ELIMINATE THEIR NEED.
ee THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ITEMS THAT MAY REQUIRE A BACK-UP CARD:
- FAILURE OF THE EC TO ASSEMBLE THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION.
FAILURE OF THE EC TO ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS.
FAILURE OF THE EC TO HAVE SECURITY MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE EVENT.
FAILURE OF THE EC TO RESPOND TO THE POWDER AND/OR NITRIC ACID SPILL.
- FAILURE OF THE EC TO ORGANIZE THE EMERGENCY BRIGADE.
FAILURE OF THE EC TO ESTABLISH A PLAN OF ATTACK FOR THE EMERGENCY BRIGADE.
FAILURE OF THE EC TO ESTABLISH TRAFFIC CONTROL.
FAILURE OF THE EC TO RESPOND TO THE INJURED PERSON.
FAILURE OF THE EC TO EVACUATE THE APPLICABLE PORTIONS OF THE CHEMICAL AREA.
FAILURE OF THE EC TO PROPERLY CLASSIFY THE EVENT AS AN ALERT EMERGENCY.
FAILURE OF THE EC TO ACCOUNT FOR APPLICABLE PERSONNEL.
FAILURE OF THE EC TO RESPOND TO THE STACK RELEASES.-
FAILURE OF REGULATORY TO RESPOND TO THE POWDER AND/OR NITRIC ACID SPILL.
FAILURE OF REGULATORY TO RESPOND TO THE STACK RELEASES.
- FAILURE OF MEDICAL TO RESPOND TO THE INJURED PERSON.
FAILURE OF MEDICAL TO PROPERLY TREAT THE INJURED PERSON.
FAILURE OF REGULATORY TO MONITOR THE INJURED PERSON.
FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURES ON HANDLING THE INJURED PERSON.
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- FAILURE OF THE EMERGENCY BRIGADE TO WEAR LEVEL B SUITS WITH SUPPLIED AIR RESPIRATORS.
- FAILURE OF REGULATORY TO MONITOR THE CHEMICAL l
AREA FOR AIRBORNE AND CONTAMINATION FOLLOWING THE EVENT.
FAILURE OF THE EC/ED TO PROPERLY CLOSE OUT THE EVENT.
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BACK-UP CARD hTITTEN BY:
ISSUED TO:
THIS IS A DRILL THIS IS A DRILL l
REASON FOR ISSUANCE:
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