ML20209C250
| ML20209C250 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Westinghouse |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1999 |
| From: | WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209C246 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9907090221 | |
| Download: ML20209C250 (10) | |
Text
.
l 1
CSE LICENSE ANNEX SOLVENT EXTRACTION HR7%88EA7J88??si C
l l
l 1
f CSE LICENSE ANNEX SOLVENT EXTRACTION TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS i
REVISIONRECORD Li Process Summary i
Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls 2
Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees 3
Controlled Parameters and Criticality Safety Limits:..........
.......................................3 Bounding Assumptions:.............
........3 Controls..................................................................................................
.......3 Margin of Safety............
...................................................................5 Chemical Safety and Fire Safety Controls 7
Initial Issue Date: 30 JUN 99 Page No.
i Revision Date:
Revision No.
0 1
t
CSE LICENSE ANNEX SOLVENT EXTRACTION REVISION RECORD REVISION DATE OF PAGES REVISION NUMBER REVISION REVISED RECORD initial Issye Date: 30 JUN 99 Page No.
E Revision Date:
Revision No.
0 l
o t
CSE LICENSE ANNEX
]
SOLVENTEXTRACTION Process Summary
-The Columbia plant generates contaminated uranium from production upsets, equipment cleanouts, combustible trash incineration, off-stream material accumulation, general housekeeping, and miscellaneous processing. All of the materials are converted to contaminated uranyl nitrate solution via oxidation and dissolution in nitric acid in other equipment. The contaminated uranyl nitrate solution is delivered to the Solvent Extraction Area through piping for the Conversion Scrap Area, the C4 Dissolver Area, or the UN Storage Tani: Area. The objective of Solvent Extraction is to separate the uranium from the contaminants present, recover
)
it as clean uranyl nitrate' solution and deliver it to storage tanks so that it may be converted back to usable product UO2
. The Solvent Extraction System comprises two sets of glass extraction columns, a primary set to recover the maje:ity of the uranium and a secondary set to scavenge the last of the uranium from the raffinate prior to its discharge as a free-release waste stream. Each set of columns features an extraction column, where a' solvent mixture containing tributyl phosphate (TBP) extracts uranium from a high-acid content uranium-bearing feed; and a stripping column, where the uranium is removed from the solvent with clean water forming a purified uranyl nitrate solution.
I All.the columns are pulsed with large diaphram pumps to facilitate movement of the solvent through perforated plates that are installed in the columas to provide a mechanism for breaking the solvent into small droplets as it passes through each column.
The primary and secondary systems both have steam-heated product concentrators to increase the uranium solution strength of the product coming off the stripping columns in order to satisfy subsequent processing requirements for the product nitrate solution.
Additional ancillary equipment, vessels, and pumps are utilized to contain and supply the solvents, water, and acid Lcomponents necessary for the process. The entire system features automatic flow controls for liquid and steam requirements and a central control computer to control the process parameters.
Pertinent Operating Procedures and Process and Instrument Drawings are as follows:
Initial Issue Date: 30 JUN 99 Page No.
1 Revision Date:
Revision No.
0
4 j
j OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCEDURE NO.
TITLE j
COP-830109 Solvent Extraction - Feed Concentrator j
COP-830110 Solvent Extraction Columns & UN Evaporator - Startup & Operation
]
COP-83011I Solvent Extraction & UN Evaporator System II - Startup & Operation j
COP-830ll4 Pumpout of Solvent Extraction Clean Product j
COP-830116 Solvent Extraction & UN Evaporator System 1 - Shutdown
]
COP-830l l7 -
Solvent Extraction & UN Evaporator System II - Shutdown i
COP-830120 Solvent Extraction Kerosene Wash Caange COP-830124 Solvent Extraction Emergency Shutdown - Trouble Shootmg COP-830128 Adjusting and Making UP Solvent Extraction
)
i SYSTEM DRAWINGS l
DRAWING NO.
SilEET DRAWING TITLE NO 301F0lPI01 1
Solvent Extraction /UN Purification Process Nitric Acid & Water 30l F0lP101 2
Solvent Extraction /UN Purification Soix I Feed Vessels 30lF0lP101 3
So! vent Extraction /UN Purification Solvent Extraction System I 301F01P102 1
Solvent Extraction /UN Purification Solvent Extraction System 11 301F0lP103 i
Solvent Extraction /UN Purification Aqueous Waste System 301F02P101 1
Solvent Extraction /UN Product Concentrator Systems 1 & 11 j
301F02P102 1
Solvent Extraction /UN Product Concentration iloiding Vessels V.
j 1087A Thru V-1087D I
301F02P102 2
Solvent Extraction /UN Product Concentration IIolding Vessels V-1487A & V-1487B i
Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls i
To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment l
Initial Issue Date: _3_0 JUN 99 Page No.
2 Revision Date:
Revision No.
O
4 Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees Controlled Parameters and Criticality Safety Limits:
Controlled Parameters - individual units Concentration l
e Geometry Controlled Parameters - array Spacing
]
e Concentration Geometry e
Criticality Safety Limits Single Unit: See Table 0-1 e
Bounding Assumptions:
Homogeneous uranyl nitrate Optimum RO Moderation e
Partial Reflection sides and top e
14 inches Concrete below e
Controls Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)
Passive engineered controls are described in the License and in Regulatory Affairs-108. The requirements for functional verification are determined from this evaluation.
None Active engineered controls (AEC)
Active Engineered Controls are defined in the License and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety significant interlocks The requirements for functional verification are defined in RA-108 and/or area operating procedures.
None Initial Issue Date: 30 JUN 99 Page No.
3 Revision Date:
Revision No.
0
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) i Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output. The requirements for functional J
verification are determined by this evaluation.
None Administrative controls Safety Significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record. Functional verification is not normally required.
None
)
Safety Margin Improvement Controls Safety Mafgin Improvement Controls consist of all types of controls: passive, active, process, administrative with computer assist, and wholly administrative. These controls do not require periodic functional verification. They are primarily process controls but contribute to the system's margin of safety. They typically are identified in the Fault Tree.
Contrul Function / Failure Condition / Action -
Favorable geometry for nitrate (< 15.4 inch diameter cylinder) vessels used in system /
Non-favorable geometry vessels used in system /
Prevent non-favorable geometry vessels in system via procedure TA-500 requirements for Regulatory review.
Prevent decrease in spacing of the vessels in system /
Spacing of vessels in system reduced to lose neutron-interaction isolation /
Prevent re-arranging vessels in system via procedure TA-500 requirements for Regulatory review.
No unauthorized NFG vessels allowed in areal Nitrate-bearing portable NFG vessel brought into area /
Prevent unauthorized portable NFG vessel in area via procedure RCOP-843002 Prevent High Concentration in SOLX-I Loop /
RE-1084 fails to function or operators disregard indications /
Operators monitor RI-1084 indications to control SOLX-I nitrate concentration to s 5.0 gb5U/t Prevent High Concentration in SOLX-II Loop /
RI-1081 fails to function or operators disregard indications /
Operators monitor RI-1081 indications to ensure SOLX-II feed (SOLX-I aqueous) s 0.05 g"5U/f Prevent High Concentration in Feed Concentrator Loop /
RE 1095 fails to function or operators disregard indications /
Operators monitor RE-1095 indications to control Feed Concentrator nitrate concentration to s 5.0 g-
"' Ult InitialIssue Date: 30 JUN 99 Page No.
4 Revision Date:
Revision No.
O r
)
I Margin of Safety
)
The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the Solvent Extraction System is evaluated to be very strong. Analysis shows that the 95/95 keff s 0.95 for all normal operating conditions.
Further, for any credible process upset, the 95/95 keff < 0.98.
Double Contingency Protection has been demonstrated for SOLX for both single unit criticality and neutron interaction among units in a fixed array. The controlled parameters that 233 directly affect neutron multiplication for the single unit criticality are geometry and U
concentration. The controlled parameters that dircctly affect neutron multiplication for neutron 235 interaction among units in an array are U concentration and spacing.
Single unit criticality could be possible given the following conditions:
. ~ cylinder-diameter greater than or equal to 15.4 inches, fills with uranyl nitrate with uranium concentration of 50 g 235U/t, and becomes fully reflected.
Criticality resulting from neutron interaction among units could be possible given the following conditions:
numerous cylinders each containing uranyl nitrate with uranium concentration of 50 g-e 235U/t are positioned close enough to each other such that the resulting configuration behaves like a single nonfavorable geometry cylinder, with full water reflection.
l Initial Issue Date: 30 JUN 99 Page No.
5 Revision Date:
Revision No.
O
l les s~
e V
no i
tcar tx n
E o
l Y
a r
i l t
e t
T c
e cd d
n i
1 t
t e
/
)
eo Y
I eD e L U
l v
TITi t
mI eM r
c f
C 2"
A E M i
a r
l r
i" rO o C F t
e e
g D4 eN d
s S
I I
TALy t
r 5
n 0
Gl aE y
I S a
U F(
WK 5
r R le N
l n
te C '
D lui m
F oe G
e n
l o
b i l t
e r
cd a
d 1
e) e o r
E e
/U dD eM l
o ST5 c
nI t
f r
v NI 9 i
t 2
i r
y 6".
rO a
EM0 l
se g
eN F
CILs c
t 0
3 rn G1 aE I
a L
U F(
WK l
5 c
l n
i lui p
F yT 0_
6 a
r o
o
.N f
d l
r a
e
/
e) o n 1
U dD o
- c T
t 1
c nI Ni i
"2 i
1
- 9. I i
s t
r ly 5" ei oM i
t 0 r I
e g
c.
gv s
eC sL 2
a e r
0 G (1 PR l
n 5
bd U
F ae Ty a leD dna N
e GO r
t
/
a e
1 5
NI U
t r n a
T io e
9 t
I W
DP n
A Ni n
t 0
t 2
/
u o
w l
NM g
N yl N
0 i
l a
0 U U 0
n o t
aS 5
r 9
OS 5
r a
0 BS U
P A
a kro f
s t
n S
i rD o
)
e r
i m
G N t
t LN 1
e a
/
e ar n L
AI O r
U dO t
i a
t t
t io e
TI n
fy7 u
o 0
a w
W in" A
Ni n
M AIT e
2 5
t y
/
c t
R RD n
g c
N yl N
l l
e o
5 i
f OEN o
5 0
n t
C G1 aS r
s a
a NPO s
Fs U
P 9
r S
O C e
(
e 9
y S
N t
i U
lac J
i 0
t N
3 ir O
C R
I T
e E
/T r
T R A S
N N
a t
a E
O R Y
R E
O Dt e e
F M
S T
R E
M T
I a
l u
A S
A N T
G Y
B e
c C
uD l
N R
A R E E
N T
R lC E
s E C M
I I
s n A
M C
S O
L D N O
A N
S R
F I
I o
P U
O O E
P E
B N
E ai i
l s
MC G
S D
A E
R v
i 2
tienR I
f M
Chemical Safety and Fire Safety Controls To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment.
f k
, Initial Issue Date: 30 JUN 99 -
Page No.
7 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0 l