ML20211K496
| ML20211K496 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Westinghouse |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1999 |
| From: | WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211K493 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9909080003 | |
| Download: ML20211K496 (54) | |
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'A CSE LICENSE ANNEX STORAGE OF URANIUM BEARING MATERIALS E8' $8882 U8Silst C
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CSE LICENSE ANNEX STORAGE OF URANIUM BEARING MATERIALS TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS i
REl'ISIONRECORD il Summary 1
Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls 9
Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees 9
Chemical Safety and Fire Safety Controls 51 1
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a CSE LICENSE ANNEX STORAGE OF URANIUM BEARING MATERIALS REVISION RECORD REVISION DATE OF PAGES REVISION i
NUMBER REVISION REVISED RECORD 0
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CSE LICENSE ANNEX STORAGE OF URANIUM BEARING MATERIALS Summary Throughout the Chemical Area of the plant, including operations relating to Conversion, Pelleting, URRS and IFBA, there are various storage structures, such as racks, shelves, carts, etc., that are used for storage of uranium-bearing materials. A brief description of the controls and features of these storage structures that may affect criticality safety analyses and evaluations is provided.
Conversion:
(a)
Offspec " dry" racks are located on the back end of each of the 5 conversion lines. Crit j
signs are posted. The racks are painted blue and are a Kanban for polypacks of calciner product material and any offspec UO2 that contains less than or equal to 1.0 % moisture.
Offspec means that fluorides, O/U, and/or moisture are not within specified limits. The lower packs sit on the floor, and can be stacked up to 4 high. The upper packs sit on a %"
thick shelf (34" from the floor), and can be stacked up to 3 high. The horizontal spacin',
between stacks is 13", with an "X" structure between stacks to prevent packs from being placed in between the storage locations.
(b)
Work in progress (WIP) " dry" shelves are also located on the back end of each of the conversions lines. Crit signs are posted. The racks configuration is shelves (one pack on a shelf). The racks are painted black and are a Kanban for polypacks of(a) UO2 or dried ADU being held for clean D/0, or (b) miscellaneous dried material (press cake, scrubber, calciner vent line, calciner breech) being held for dirty D/O. Vertical spacing between shelves is 12", with the first/ bottom shelf being 1" above the floor. Additionally, the shelves have a raised I" channel around the sides and back that prevent side-to-side misalignment of the pack.
(c)
Wet / dry racks are located within Conversion Scrap Recovery (CSR), a process area located by the conversion control room. A crit sign is posted. The racks are painted tan and are a Kanban for polypacks of potentially wet material awaiting clean D/O processing. This material includes (a) clean UO from Fitzmill/calciner product hoods, 2
calciner tube, discharge system, mill or mill enclosure being held for clean D/0, or (b) i dried ADU from decanters, V-x19 tanks, ADU slurry pumps, dryer, elevator, and calciner feed system. The lower packs sit on the floor, and can be stacked up to 3 high. The upper packs sit on a %" thick shelf 38" from the floor, and can be stacked up to 3 high.
Passive engineered structural material prevents stacking packs more than 3 high. The horizontal spacing between stacks is 13", with an "X" structure between stacks within a InitialIssue Date:
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row to prevent packs from being placed in bctween the storage locations. There is also an "X" structure on the ends of the rack to prevent placing packs between the front and back rows of the rack.
.(d)
- Additional wet / dry racks are located within CSR for material of questionable impurity level. A crit sign is posted.' The racks are painted orange and are a Kanban for polypacks of miscellaneous, potentially wet material awaiting oxidation before further processing.
This material includes bulk blending room vacuum cleanout, lab samples, development lab material, Blue-M furnace and oxidation hood cleanout, material contaminated with oil / grease, UO2F crystals, etc. The lower packs sit on the floor, and can be stacked up to 2
3 high. The upper packs sit on a %" thick shelf 38 from the floor, and can be stacked up to 3 high. Passive engineered structural material prevents stacking packs more than 3 high. The horizontal spacing between stacks is 15", with an "X" structure between stacks to prevent packs from being placed in between the storage locations.
)
(e)
Wet / dry racks are located in the main aisle between CSR and Line 5. A crit sign is posted. The racks are painted orange and are a Kanban for some types of materials of questionable impurity level to be processed in the scrap cage. The racks are approved for i
polypacks and cream cans, but the current use is only for packs; cream cans are expeditiously moved to the CSR area for processing and/or storage. The lower packs sit on the floor, and can be stacked up to 3 high. The upper packs sit on a %" thick shelf (49" from the floor), and can be stacked up to 3 high. Passive engineered structural j
material prevents stacking packs more than 3 high, for the lower packs. The horizontal j
spacing between stacks is 13", with an "X" structure between stacks to prevent packs from being placed in between the storage locations.
(f)
(deleted)
(g)
Wet / dry racks are located in the cage beside Line 5. Crit signs are posted. The racks are painted black and are a Kanban for various high impurity level materials to be processed via D/O. The racks are approved for polypacks and cream cans, but the current use is only for packs; cream cans are expeditiously moved to the CSR area for processing and/or storage. This material includes miscellaneous dried material (e.g., from press cake, scrubbers, calciner vent line and Torits), and miscellaneous grossly contaminated materials from the scrap cage (e.g., Blue-M furnace and oxidation hood cleanout, material contaminated with oil / grease, UO F2 crystals, etc.). The lower packs sit on the 2
floor, and can be stacked up to 3 high. The upper packs sit on a %" thick shelf 48" from the floor, and can be stacked up to 3 high. Passive engineered structural material prevents stacking packs more than 3 high for the lower packs. The horizontal, side-to-side, spacing between stacks is 13", with an "X" structure between stacks to prevent packs from being placed in between the storage locations.
For the back-to-back horizontal array configuration, the nominal distance between rows (back-to-back) is 15",
with passive engineered structures preventing spacing less than 12". There is alsc, an "X" structure on the ends of the rack to prevent placing packs between the front and back rows of the rack.
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(h)
' 8 pack " dry" shelves are located in CSR near pelleting. Crit signs are posted. The racks
- (3 cach) consisting of shelves lx2x4 are painted tan and are a.Kanban for sintered L
material from pelleting to be oxidized in CSR. The material includes pellets, sintered powder from ECO, screenings, etc. Vertical spacing between shelves is 12", with the first/ bottom shelf being'4" above the floor. There are no passive engineered structures between the stacks of shelves, i.e., side-to-side, but it would be very difficult to place packs in the area between the stacks of shelves. Additionally, the shelves have a raised I" channel around the sides and back that prevent misalignment of the pack; This channel
. provides 12" minimum edge-to-edge spacing between packs.
I i(i)
" Dry" shelves are locatedjust outside the bulk blending room. A crit sign is posted. The
. racks configuration is shelves and they are a Kanban for pre-production polypacks of UO2. Vertical spacing between shelves is 12" with the first/ bottom shelf being 6" above the floor. There are no passive engineered structures between the stacks of shelves, i.e.,
side-to-side, but it would be very difficult to place packs in the area between the stacks of shelves.
.(j)
" Dry" racks are located at the QC moisture cage. A crit sign is posted. The racks are for temporary storage of packs of UO2 or U 0s powder at the cage for second moisture 3
sampling. The packs sit on a %" thick shelf 9" above the floor, and can be stacked up to 3 high. The horizontal spacing between stacks is 13", with a metal bar structure between stacks to prevent packs from being placed in between the storage locations.
-(k)
Carts are available for storage of polypacks. Crit signs are posted. UO material that is 2
visually dry may be stored on polypack carts. These structures consist of metal angle iron frames with 4 tiers of pack storage. Each tier is two horizontal stacks of up to 7 packs on rollers and inclined at about 3 degrees. The entire cart may be lifted a few inches for transportation among different areas of the plant.
The centerline-to-centerline spacing of packs on the carts is 22.0" horizontally and 21.0"
' verticality, and 12.5" horizontal distance from the pack centerline to the edge of the rack.
This gives the following edge-to edge spacings:
e. 9.5" diameter packs: 12.16" horizontal within rack, and 11.16" vertical 8" diameter packs: 13.67" horizontal within rack, and 12.67" vertical e
Greater than 15" horizontal between packs on adjacent carts e
The rollers on which the packs rest are supported by a large angle with the "V" pointing up. The horizontal distance between these angles is only about 4.5" such that any pack that. falls in the middle of the cart would be stopped and retained between the two rows of
' angles on that level.
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Pall: ting:
~
(a)
" Dry" shelves are located on the front end of each pellet line. Crit signs are posted. The racks are painted black and are a Kanban for pre-production UO. Vertical spacing 2
between shelves is 12", with the first/ bottom shelf being 4" above the floor. For the rack l
on Line 5, horizontal (side-to-side) spacing is 12". ' There are no passive engineered structures between the stacks of shelves, i.e., side-to-side, but it would be very difficult to l
place packs in the area between the stacks of shelves. Additionally, all shelves have a raised I" channel around the sides and back that prevent side-to-side misalignment of the pack.
(b)-
21 pack " dry" racks are located on the front end of each of the 5 pellet lines. Crit signs are posted. The racks are painted blue and red, and are a Kanban for polypacks of dry U 0s: oxidized grinder sludge, oxidized hard scrap, or blend addback. The lower packs 3
sit on the floor, and can be stacked up to 4 high. The upper packs sit on a %" thick shelf 38" from the floor, and can be stacked up to 3 high. The horizontal spacing between stac ; is 13", with 11" being possible if packs are not placed in the side-to-side middle of the shelf. There are no passive engineered structures between the vertical stacks of packs, i.e., side-to-side, but it would be very difficult to place packs in the area between the storage locations.
(c)
Shelves are available at the Blue M for grinder sludge storage. Crit signs are posted. On each pellet line and on the pilot line, there is a Blue M oxidation oven for oxidizing UO2 pellets and grinder sludge to U 0s. The structure is approx. 28" wide x 20" deep, with 3
two shelves for. pan storage. Each shelf has a passive engineered control (welded structure) to prevent pans from being stacked 2-high; the maximum vertical opening is 4.25 inches. Above the top shelfis a roof sloped from the outside beginning about 3-4" above the shelf to a central peak about 8" above the top shelf. The central peak is l
supported by a vertical bar at the front of the shelf. The pans used measure 12"x18"x24"
' deep.
l (d)
Shelves are available at the sintering furnaces for pellet storage. Crit signs are posted.
On each pellet line there are metal shelves at the front end/ sides of the furnace for pans of 1
pellets. They are up to 3 high, and 16" apart vertically. The width varies, allowing at most 5-6 pans side-by-side and only 1 pan deep. At the back of each line are 5 shelves 28"x58", with the vertical distance between shelves 16k". These locations are used to store pellets in pans awaiting grinding. The pans used are stainless steel 0.029" thick (22 j
gage), measuring 10 3/8" x 12 %" x 2 %" deep, with a tid recessed %". The length and
{
width dimensions include a horizontal lip 3/8" wide. The shelf size limits pans to a 2x5 array, with stacking not allowed.
e)
Carts are available for polypacks storage. Crit signs are posted. Dry UO pellets 2
awaiting oxidation, and visually dry U 0s are stored in 8" polypacks on separate carts in 3
the pellet pilot line area between Lines 1 and 5.
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(f)
Cabinets are available for storage of ADU pellets. Crit signs are posted. There are approximately 266 pellet cabinets used for storage of pellet trays in the ADU part of the
-plant. The 20-tray' cabinets are either carbon steel or stainless steel, with the trays arranged in 5 groups of 4 trays each. Vertical spacing in each group is 1.500"(vs.1.600" in IFBA).- The vertical distance between each group is 8.687", tray-to-tray. ADU tray dimensions (23.00"x15.2") are slightly different from IFBA tray dimensions (23.00"x15.86"),' with corresponding minor width and depth dimensions of the cabinets.
The 18-tray cabinets are carbon steel, and dimensionally differ from the 20-tray version by having only 2 trays in the top group (instead of 4) and are shorter.
All pellet cabinets, ADU and IFBA, were fitted with base stabilizers, or " bumpers",
starting in' about June,1992. Before that time and since 1974, there had been 3-4
" incidents in which casters came off the cabinets, causing them to overturn. Since the addition of the base stabilizers in 1991, no cabinets have turned over even though casters
-have come off. ' Each ADU pellet cabinet is inspected every 2 years for mechanical integrity and proper fit and function of all parts, including doors, casters, base stabilizers, etc.
URRS:
(a)
A 36 pack " wet" rack is located against the MAP wall by the tunnel. Crit signs are posted. The racks me a Kanban for polypacks of >8 mesh material from conversion, pelleting, and IFBA, that is to be milled and pulve:ized before further uranium recovery operations. This material includes UO2, U 0s, and any material that did not sift through 3
an 8 mesh screen. The rack is also approved for metal canisters of dissolver residue. The lower packs sit on the floor, and can be stacked up to 3 high. The upper packs sit on a %"
thick shelf 38" from the floor, and can be stacked up to 3 high. Passive engineered structural material prevents stacking packs more than 3 high. The horizontal spacing between stacks is 13", with an "X" structure between stacks to prevent packs from being
-placed in between the storage locations.-
(b) 84 pack wet / dry racks are located by Fluoride Stripping across the aisle from the dissolvers. Crit signs are posted. The racks are a Kanban for intermediate storage of wet and dry materials before further processing in uranium recovery operations. Tlie racks are divided into separate wet and dry sections. The material mahdy consists of U30s or incinerator ash, but can include UO2 and any other material being processed for uranium recovery (wet dissolver tesidues,704/705 hoods C2 material, IFBA scrap, alumina, etc.).
The rack is also approved for metal canisters of dissolver residue. The lower packs sit on the floor, and can be stacked up to 3 high. The upper packs sit on a %" thick shelf 38" from the floor, and can be stacked up to 3 high. Passive engineered structural material prevents stacking packs more than 3 high. The horizontal spacing between stacks is 12",
with an "X" structure between stacks to prevent packs from being placed in between the storage locations. This spacing could be as little as 10" if not properly centered.
'(c)
A 36 pack dry rack is located against the wall by Dock 3. A crit sign is posted. The racks are for storage of U30s and ash on an as-needed basis. The lower packs sit on the floor, Initial Issue Date:
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and can be stacked up to 3 high. The upper packs sit on a %" thick shelf 39" from the floor, and can be stacked up to 3 high. Passive engineered structural material prevents stacking packs more than 3 high. The horizontal spacing between stacks is 12", with an "X" structure between stacks to prevent packs from being placed in between the storage locations. This spacing could be as little as 10"if not properly centered.
(d).
'A 80 pack dry rack is located just inside the door of the stainless steel " ballroom". A crit
. sign is posted. The racks are for storage of residue standards for the assay machines. The lower packs sit on the floor, and can be stacked up to 4 high. The upper packs sit on a %"
thick shelf 39" from the floor, and can be stacked up to 4 high. Passive engineered structural material prevents stacking packs more than 4 high. The horizontal spacing between stacks is 12", with an "X" structure between stacks to prevent packs from being
- placed in between the storage locations. This spacing could be as little as 10" if not
. properly centered. The containers used are 94" packs and 1-gallon metal cans.
(e)-
A 112 pack dry rack is located against the back wall of the stainless steel " ballroom". A crit sign is posted. The rack is configured for storage of miscellaneous material to be processed in URRS. The lower packs sit on the floor, and can be stacked up to 4 high.
The' upper packs sit on a %" thick shelf 39" from the floor, and can be stacked up to 4 high. Passive engineered structural material prevents stacking packs more than 4 high.
The horizontal spacing between stacks is 12", with an "X" structure between stacks to prevent packs from being placed in between the storage locations. This spacing could be as little as 10" if not properly centered. The containers used are primarily 9H" packs with ash or other residue.
(f)
Carts are available for polypacks of dry U30s. Crit signs are posted. U30s material that is visually dry may be stored on polypack carts for dissolver input. The carts are color coded for the appropriate Kanban for each application.
(g)
Carts are available for polypacks of ash. Crit signs are posted. This is a special yellow 3-tier cart used only for incinerator ash. The cart is filled directly from the pulverizer, and is preferentially processed through the dissolver. The cart is the same as a standard 4-tier cart except that the top tier has been removed. By administrative control, 9H" packs are used only for ash or dissolver derived residues.
(h)
Drum storage racks are located in the stainless steel " ballroom". Crit signs are posted.
. The racks have 4-high shelves for storage of 55 gallon drums containing uranium-bearing material. Per crit sign, close packing of drums is allowed if each is 104 grams U-235 maximum, whereas I foot minimum spacing is required if the drum contains between 104 and.798 grams U-235 maximum. The shelves are approximately 55" x 48", allowing close packing or 12" minimum separation as required. Vertical distance between shelves is approximately 54", giving about 21" vertical separation between drums.
IFBA:
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(a)'
A 40 pack dry rack is located near the Blue M oven and hood. A crit sign is posted. The racks are for storage of dry powder and sintered pellets in packs or 1-gallon metal cans.
The lower containers sit on the floor, and can be stacked up to 4 high, The upper containers sit on a %" thick shelf 38" from the floor, and can be stacked up to 4 high.
j Passive engineered structural material prevents stacking packs more than 4 high. The horizontal spacing between stacks is 13", with no "X" structure between stacks to prevent packs from being placed in between the storage locations. This spacing could be as little as 10" if not properly centered.
(b) 18 pack " dry" shelves are located in various locations near the Blue M oven and hood.
Crit signs are posted.
The racks are for dry powder and sintered pellets.' Vertical spacing between shelves is 14", with the first/ bottom shelf being 6" above the floor.
There are no passive engineered structures between the stacks of shelves, i.e., side-to-side, but it would be very difficult to place packs in the area between the stacks of shelves.
(c) 9 can storage shelves are available for 5-gallon cans. Crit signs are posted. There is one rack in the room with the scrap sorting hood, and four more in the old dissolver area.
Minimum horizontal spacing between adjacent cans within a rack is 12". Minimum horizontal end-to-end spacing between fixed racks is 21+". Side-to-side spacing between racks is 50", with single high can storage in between. Vertical spacing between shelves is 16", with the first/ bottom shelf being 4" above the floor. There are no passive engineered structures between the stacks of shelves, i.e., side-to-side, but it would be very difficult to place cans in the area between the stacks of shelves.
Allowed contents are " uranium bearing materials." Current uses are spent target sand staged for sampling and transfer to URRS, combustible trash in 5 gallon paper bags awaiting detailing for metal, un-screened vacuum cleanout (1 tan can), and screenings awaiting transfer to URRS.
(d)
Cabinets are available for IFBA pellets. Crit signs are posted. The IFBA pellet cabinets and trays were previously described.
There are no procedures or system drawings applicable to the storage structures. Key equipment drawings applicable to any criticality safety analyses and evaluations are identified in the table below:
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C:nversi:n:
l DRAWING NO.
TITLE SK-C 2-28-78 (CRI-93-020-0)
Dry powder storage carts C7110D65 (CRI-93-020-0)
Virgin powder live stg. racks C639F816 (CRI-93-020-0)
Lid and container assembly (9.5" dia. polypack) 360F0lME01 (CRI-93-020-0) lii-enrichment lid and container assembly (8.0" dia.
polypack) 361C03EQ01 Oxidation pa.is l
)
Pelleting:
DRAWING NO.
TITLE i
None Pellet pans (standard food service pans) 364F0lEQO2 ADU Pellet Cabinet,20 Trays, Carbon Steel 364F01EQ03 ADU Pellet Cabinet,18 Trays, Carbon Steel 364F01EQ08 ADU Pellet Cabinet,20 Trays, Stainless Steel 366F01ME01 ADU Pellet Tray 361F08EQ12 Sludge Pan Storage Racks [ grinder sludge]
URRS:
DRAWING NO.
TITLE SK-C-2-28-78 (CRI-93-020-0)
Dry powder storage carts C639F816 (CRI-93-020-0)
Lid and container assembly (9.5" dia. polypack) 360F0lME01 (CRI-93-020-0)
Hi-enrichment lid and container assembly (8.0" dia, j
polypack) j IFBA:
I DRAWING NO.
TITLE 812F01EQO2 IFBA pellet cart 812F01EQ01 IFBA pellet tray 812F0lEQ10 IFBA QC pellet cart 812F01EQ09 IFBA QC pellet tray l
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Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees SAFETY ANALYSIS Environmental Protection Analysis i
To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment Radiation Safety Analysis i
To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment l
Nuclear Criticality Safety Analysis This section describes results of the Safety Analysis of the Storage Structures. The terms used throughout have, for the most part, been defined in Section 5.0 of the " Guidelines for j
Preparing a Baseline Integrated Safety Assessment".
The scope of this analysis includes the structures in the Chemical Area of the plant, including IFBA, that are routinely used for storage of uranium-bearing material.
l Excluded from the scope of this document are the following:
Fuel rod storage (included in the document for Final Assembly).
Temporary storage on the floor of polypaks packs, cream cans, mop buckets, etc.
i UF6 cylinder storage (included in ADU Conversion CSE.
e l
GENERAL INTRODUCTION l
Storage Types Many of the individual storage structures found throughout the plant have been l
grouped into a few common categories or types for this evaluation. A summary of these groupings is shown in Table 5.3.0-1. The presentation of material in InitialIssue Date:
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E Section 5.3 is principally by these types of storsge etructures, rather than by individual applications.
This evaluation lists the current applications of wh type of storage structure, and uses an enveloping analysis and evaluation, where possible, for each type.
. Other applications of a storage type may be added in the future without additional analysis if enveloped by this document.
" Visually dry" powder.
- For the purposes of Nuclear Criticality Safety evaluations, the level of 10 wt. % moisture in powder has been' defined as " visually dry." Visual inspection of powder is an adequate control to verify that moisture is below 10 wt. % moisture. " Visually dry" for heterogeneous material (pellets) means the absence of visible moisture. This is also an adequate control to verify that moisture is below 10 wt. %.
Maximum Wt.' % Moisture for Storage of Heterogeneous Material.
In storage of heterogeneous materials, there is a classification for dry material.
See Appendix for a discussion of the maximum wt. % water that is credible for close-packed pellets.
Polypak Sizes There are 3 sizes of polypaks in use in the Chemical Area: 9.5", 8.0", and 7.5" diameters. By administrative control, the sizes are restricted as follows:
e.
Conversion and conversion scrap recovery area:
8.0" only.
Pelleting:
8.0" except for press feed only, which uses 9.5".
Rod Loading:
8.0" only.
URRS:
9.5" for incinerator ash and dissolver derived residue; all other
]
materials use 8.0".
j e
IFBA:
7.5" for pellets only, 8" for U30s only.
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p Table 5.3.0 Matrix of Storage Structures item -
Description Material Material:
Wet / -
HomoJ "in"~
"on"-
Dry Heter Comments Cony.
3.3.1 a
Offspec rack, back end of each line pack rack dry homo.
Type 11 lx7x(4 +3) b WIP shelves, back of each line pack shelf dry homo.
Type 11 lx1x4 c
Wet rack in CSR by CR for clean d/o pack or rack wet homo.
Type 1 2x6x(3 +3) cream can d
Wet rack in CSR by elect. Pnl. For packs or rack wet homo.
TypeI questionable enrich. lx2x(3+3) cream can e
Wet rack in aisle CSR/Line 5 for packs or rack wet homo.
Type I CSR processing 1x7x(3+3) cream can f
(deleted) g Dirty d/o input racks - black - -
packs and rack wet homo.
Type 1 2x5x(3 + 3) is limiting configuration cream cans h
Dry shelves in CSR near pelleting packs shelf dry heter TypeIV (PK; 1x2x4 I
Dry shelves outside blending packs shelf dry homo.
Type Il j
lx3x4
{
j Dry racks at QC moisture cage / lab packs rack dry homo.
Type II 1x5x3 k
Carts for polypaks packs cart dry homo.
Type V(HO) i Type I Section 5.3.1 wet, homogeneous, pack & can, rack Type II Section 5.3.2 dry, homogeneous, pack, rack & shelf Type III Section 5.3.3 wet, heterogeneous, pans (only), shelf (grinder sludge) i Type IV (PK) Section 5.3.4 dry, heterogeneous, pack (only), rack and shelf Type IV (PN) Section 5.3.5 dry, heterogeneous, pans, shelf Type V(HO) Section 5.3.6 dry, homogeneous, packs, carts Type V(HE) Section 5.3.7 dry, heterogeneous, packs, carts Type VI Section 5.3.11 dry, homogeneous,55 gallon drum, shelf rack Type VII Section 5.3.10 dry, homogeneous,5 gallon cans on shelf rack InitialIssue Date:
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Table 5.3.0 Matrix of Storage Struciares (continued)
Item Description Material.
Material -
Wet /
Homo./
"in"1 "on";
Dry Heter Comments Pellet 3.3.2 a
Pre-prod. shelves on front end of packs shelf dry homo.
Type 11 i
each line lx2x4 limiting b
21 pack rack on each line for U308 packs rack dry homo Type 11 lx7x(4 + 3) c Shelves at Blue M for grinder sludge pans shelf wet heter Type 111 d
Shelves at sintering ovens for pellets pans sheh dry heter Type IV (PN) e Polypak storage carts - pilot line packs carts dry homo & Types V(HO) & V(HE) heter f
ADU pellet cabinets trays cabinets dry heter (none) i TypeI Section 5.3.1 wet, homogeneous, pack & can, rack Type 11 Section 5.3.2 dry, homogeneous, pack, rack & shelf Type til Section 5.3.3 wet, heterogeneous, pans (only), shelf (grinder sludge)
Type IV (PK)
Section 5.3.4 dry, heterogeneous, pack (only), rack and shelf Type IV (PN)
Section 5.3.5 dry, heterogeneous, pans, shelf Type V(HO)
Section 5.3.6 dry, homogeneous, packs, carts Type V(HE)
Section 5.3.7 dry, heterogeneous, packs, carts j
Type VI Section 5.3.11 dry, homogeneous,55 gallon drum, shelf rack Type VII Section 5.3.10 dry, homogeneous,5 gallon cans on shelf rack Initial Issue Date:
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Table 5.3.0 Matrix of Storage Structures (continued)
)
Item.
==
Description:==
Materialc Materiali Wet /.
Homo./
"in" -
-on"'
Dry ~
Heter Comments URRS 3.3.3 a
36 pack dry rack by tunnel for >8 packs rack Dry heter Type IV (PK)
J matl. lx6x(3+3) b 84 pack wet / dry racks by fluoride packs and rack wet homo TypeI j
strip. ' lx7x(3 +3) metal can c
36 pack rack on wall by Dock 3 packs rack dry homo Type 11 1 x6x(3 + 3) d 80 pack rack just inside SS ballroom packs and rack dry homo Type 11 for residue stds. 2x5x(4+4)
I gal c3 e
112 pack rack on back wall of SS packs rack dry homo Type 11 ballroom for misc. matl. 2x7x(4 +4) f Polypak cart - general packs cart dry homo Type V(HO) g Polypak cart - ash. 3 tier packs cart dry homo Type V(IIO) h Dry storage racks 55 gallon shelf dry homo Type VI drums l
Type 1 Section 5.3.1 wet, homogeneous, pack & can, rack Type 11 Section 5.3.2 dry, homogeneous, pack, rack & shelf Type 111 Section 5.3.3 wet, heterogeneous, pans (only), shelf (grinder sludge)
Type IV (PK)
Section 5.3.4 dry, heterogeneous, pack (only), rack and shelf Type IV (PN)
Section 5.3.5 dry, heterogeneous, pans, shelf Type V(HO)
Section 5.3.6 dry, homogeneous, packs, carts Type V(HE)
Section 5.3.7 dry, heterogeneous, packs, carts Type VI Section 5.3.11 dry, homogeneous,55 gallon drum, shelf rack Type VII Section 5.3.10 dry, homogeneous,5 gallon cans on shelf rack InitialIssue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
13 Revision Date:
Revision No.,0
t Table 5.3.0 Matrix of Storage Structures (continued)
Item Description Material Material Wet /
Homo /
"in" "on" Dry Heter -
Comments -
IFBA 3.3.4 a
Dry rack for powder and sintered pellets, packs rack dry both Type IV (PK) lx5x (4 + 4) b Dry shelves for powder and sintered packs and shelf dry both Type IV (PK) pellets. Ix3x6 gal. Cans c
5-gal, can rack for uranium-bearing 5-gal can shelf dry homo Type VII material. lx3x3 d
IFBA pellet cabinets trays cabinets dry heter (none)
Typei Section 5.3.1 wet, homogeneous, pack & can, rack Type 11 Section 5.3.2 dry, homogeneous, pack, rack & shelf Type ill Section 5.3.3 wet, heterogeneous, pans (only), shelf (grinder sludge)
Type IV (PK)
Section 5.3.4 dry, heterogeneous, pack (only), rack and shelf Type IV (PN)
Section 5.3.5 dry, heterogeneous, pans, shelf l
Type V(HO)
Section 5.3.6 dry, homogeneous, packs, carts i
Type V(llE)
Section 5.3.7 dry, heterogeneous, packs, carts Type VI Section 5.3.11 dry, homogeneous,55 gallon drum, shelf rack Type VII Section 5.3.10 dry, homogeneous, 5 gallon cans on shelf rack l
1 i
l l
l f
l Initial Issue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
.l_4 Revision Date:
Revision No. O
WET RACKS (HOMOGENEOUS) - TYPE I Controls Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)
Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108'.
The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
FUNCTIONAL INITIATING i
CONTROLID' CONTROL FUNCTION /.'-
i VERIFICATIONc EVENTL (IE)
. FAILURE CONDITION / r 4
o 1
REQUIRED:
' NUMBER
' ACTION i P-STOR-1 :
Prevent violating NCS configuration / geometry Yes (N/A)
{
assumptions./
)
NCS assumption (s) violated./
Structure of rack maintains proper spacing.
Notes:
j 1.
Items required for functional verification to be determined by NCS and Process Engmeermg and/or Training 2.
Control ID numbers were arbitrarily assigned for the CSE. Different numbers may be assigned I
if necessary.
Active engineered controls (AEC)
)
Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory j
Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The j
requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
(None)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or. assisted by computer output or hard-wired alarm. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
[None]
Administrative controls
= Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls :may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.
Functional verification is not normally required.
[None]
! RA 108, Safety Significant Controls Initial Issue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
J5 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0
i Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin on safety for the wet racks is evaluated to be very strong.
Calculations performed in support of this document indicate that K-eff < 0.95 for all normal operating conditions and expected process upsets. Further, a single credible process upset will not cause criticality.
The parameter that directly affects neutron multiplication is geometry / configuration.
Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (BA) have been established to limit the geometry and moderation of the material in the packs on the racks.
Criticality was determined to be not credible.
Summary of Initiating Events that Could Lead to Possible Criticality Fault tree and initiating events - not applicable.
Common Mode Failure Potential There was no significant common mode failure potential identified for wet rack storage structures.
1
. Summary Tables Not Applicable.
DRY RACKS (HOMOGENEOUS) - TYPE II Controls Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)
Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory 2
Affairs Procedure RA-108.
The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
2 RA-108, Safety Significant Controls initialIssue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
Jf Revision Date:
Revision No. _0
' CONTROL ID -
1 CONTROL FUNCTION /.?
FUNCTIONAL -
INITIATING r
. FAILURE CONDITION /3
- VERIFICATION-EVENT (IE)
ACTION -
. REQUIRED '
' NUMBER P-STOR-2 Prevent violating NCS configuration / geometry Yes (N/A) assumptions./
NCS assumption (s) violated./
Structure of rack maintains proper spacing.
Notes:
1.
Items required for functional verification to be determined by NCS and Process Engineering and/or Training 2.
Control ID numbers were arbitrarily assigned for the CSE. Different numbers may be assigned if necessary.
Active engineered controls (AEC)
Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
(None)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)
Administrative controls _with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard-wired alarm. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
[None]
Administrative controls Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.
Functional verification is not normally required.
[None]
Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the dry racks is evaluated to be very strong.
Calculations performed in support of this document indicate that K-eff < 0.95 for all normal operating conditions and e":cted process upsets. Further, a single credible process upset will not cause c?',anty.
The parameters that directly affects neutron multiplication are is geometry / configuration and moderation. Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (BA) have Initial Issue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
11 Revision Date:
Revision No.,0
o been established to limit the geometry and moderation of the material in the packs on the racks. Criticality was determined to be not credible.
Summary ofInitiating Events that Could Lead to Possible Criticality Figure 6.3.2-1 shows a simplified fault tree for visually dry material stored in racks.
The tree gives groups of events that could lead to a possible criticality, and is truncated at the contingency level because it was concluded that criticality was not credible within the bounding assumptions of this document. A criticality would be possible only if there were wet material in the packs, and a gross breakdown of the geometry / configuration.
Because it was concluded that criticality is not credible within the bounding assumptions of visually dry material, the fault tree is not required. It may be useful, however, in evaluating unanticipated situations that may arise.
Common Mode Failure Potential There was no significant common mode failure potential identified for wet rack storage structures.
Summary Tables Not Applicable.
WET HETEROGENEOUS MATERIAL (GRINDER SLUDGE) - TYPE III STRUCTURES Controls Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)
Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory 2
Affairs Procedure RA-108.
The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
i l
' R A-108, Safety Significant Controls initial Issue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page W J8 Revision Date:
Ret
'o, 0
1
O_
CONTROL ID.
M, c CONTROL FUNCTION /
. FUNCTIONAL
. INITIATING J FAILURE CONDITION /;,
- VERIFICATION.. ' EVENT (IE) 2 ACTION" REQUIRED'
- NUMBER P-STOR-3 Prevent violating 6.30" slab height./
Yes IE 3 Exceeding 6.30" slab height./
Structure of rack maintains proper slab height and spacing.
Notes:
1.
Items required for functional verification to be determined by NCS and Process Engineering and/or Training 2.
Control ID numbers were arbitrarily assigned for the CSE. Different numbers may be assigned, if necessary, as determined by Nuclear Criticality Safety and Process Engineering.
Active engineered controls (AEC)
Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
(None) -
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard-wired alarm. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
[None]
Administrative controls Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.
Functional verification is not normally required.
CONTROLID
- CONTROL FUNCTION / ?
FUNCTIONAL lNITIATING s
1 FAILURE CONDITION /f y VERIFICATION -
EVENT'(IE).'
i
" ACTION ; ^
- REQUIRED L iNUMBERE A-STOR-1 Prevent violating 6.30" slab height./
No IE 1 Exceeding 6.30" slab height in 4 or more pans./
Operator does not pile material >3.0" high in 4 or more pans.
A STOR-2 Independent verification prevents violating 6.30" No IE-2 slab height./
Independent veriCeation fails. to detect material
> 3.0" high in 4 or more pans.
i Independent verification prevents material >3.0" high in 4 or more pans.
Initial issue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
19 Revision Date:
Revision No. O
f-l w
i Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin on safety for the grinder sludge storage racks is evaluated to be strong. Calculations performed in support of this document indicate that K-eff <
l 0.95 for all normal operating conditions and expected process upsets. Further, a single credible process upset will not cause criticality.
l The parameter that directly affects neutron multiplication is geometry / configuration.
l Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (BA) have been established l
to limit the geometry of the material in the pans on the shelf. A criticality would be possible only if the total material height exceeded 6.30".
XSDRN and Keno Va.
1 Summary of Initiating Events that Could Lead to Possible Criticality The fault tree in Figure 6.3.3-1 shows potential initiating events that could lead to criticality. They include repeated errors by operations (piling material too high on 4 pans) [IE 1], failure of the required independent verification by furnace operator [IE 2],
and then stacking the pans on the shelves to achieve a slab height in excess of 6.30" [IE 3]. The shelf design and construction acts as a passive engineered control to prevent stacking more than one pan on each shelf; it will also scrape off any material over 4.25" in slab height' when the pan in slid into the storage rack.
Common Mode Failure Potential There was some common mode failure potential identified for the initiating events associated with this evaluation in that both IE 1 and IE 2 are administrative, and are the only controls for the contingency of excessive heights of grinder sludge in 4 or more
_ pans. The risk is judged to be very small and acceptable because:
The material would not stay mounded, and run over the sides of the pans.
The h/x of the material is not optimum (as assumed in the calculations).
. Finite geometry (vs. infinite X-Y slab assumed),
Strong training and work practice.-
e Strong passive controls on the storage racks.
Summary Tables See Table 5.3.3-1.
1
(
e drawing 361F08EQ12, Sludge Pan Storage Rack.
[
Initial Issue Date:
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20 Revision Date:
Revision No. 0 l
n
=
TABLE 5.3.3-I NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY LIMITS FOR Lrr = 0.90, 0.95, AND DELAYED CRITICAL WET HETEROGENEOUS MATERIAL (GRINDER SLUDGE) - TYPE III STRUCTURES PARAMETER NORMAL BOUNDING CRITICALITY ~
CRITICALITY CRITICALITY OPERATING ASSUMPTION SAFETY SAFETY LIMIT CONDITIONS LIMIT LIMIT Delayed Critical s 0.89 8 s 0.94 s 0.99 8 8
235U Mass N/A N/A l
l 1
Moderator /
Optimum Concentration Geometry Below top of 5.118 inch slab 5.669 inch slab 6.299 inch slab pans (s
2kinches)
I i
Spacing N/A N/A Ilomogeneous -
Density Various Optimum H/X = 220 Absorbers None None Enrichment s 5.0 Wt. %
5.0 Wt.%
Partial Water Reflection (l")
Notes
- 1) 1% bias applied. See text and CRI-944)52.
Initial Issue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
2.Jl Revision Date:
Revision No.,0
c DRY, HETEROGENEOUS MATERIAL'IN PACKS ON RACKS / SHELVES - TYPE IV(PK).
Controls Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered contro' (PEC) g Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory 5
Affairs Procedure RA-108.
The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
. CONTROL ID CONTROL FUNCTION /;
. FUNCTIONAL ';
l INITIATING,
- q FAILURE CONDITION /i VERIFICATION.
EVENT (IE)
UACTION
^ REQUIRED :
vNUMBER u
~
P-STOR-4 Prevent violating NCS configuration / geometry No (N/A) assumptions./
Shelf racks damaged / distorted such that NCS assumption (s) violated./
Structure of rack maintains proper spacing.
Notes:
1.
Items required for functional verification to be determined by NCS and Process Engineering
- and/or Training 2.
Control ID numbers were arbitrarily assigned for the CSE. Different numbers may be assigned if necessary.
3.
Functional verification not required because polypak shelf racks are la almost continuous use, and any damage / distortion will be readily detected, and because any modifications require configuration control.
Active engineered controls (AEC)
Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
4 (None)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator -
actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard-wired alarm. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
[None]
8 RA-108, Safety Significant Controls InitialIssue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
22 Revision Date:
Revision No. O
Administrative controls Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may' require documentation via Control Form or some other record.
Functional verification is not normally required.
[None]
Margin of Safety -
The nuclear criticality margin of safety for pellets in polypaks on these shelf racks is evaluated to be very strong.
Calculations performed in support of this document indicate that K-eff < 0.95 or all normal operating conditions and expected process upsets. Further, a single credible process upset will not cause criticality.
The parameters that directly affects neutron multiplication are geometry / configuration and moderation. Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (BA) have been established to limit the geometry of the material in the pans on the shelf. As discussed below, no credible mechanism was identified that could cause a criticality in these racks.
The evaluation and analysis presented for Type V(HE) storage for pellets in packs on carts very conservatively envelopes the geometry for these racks. The material form is the same. Thus specific calculations are not required.
DRY, HETEROGENEOUS MATERIAL IN PANS - TYPE IV(PN).
Controls Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)
Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108.
The requirements for functional verification are 6
determined by this evaluation.
- RA-108, Safety Significant Controls Initial Issue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
2.3 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0
' CONTROL ID.
- z. CONTROL FUNCTION / -
FUNCTIONAL -
INITIATING FAILURE CONDITION / _
VERIFICATION-EVENT (IE)-
ACTION
. REQUIRED NUMBER -
P-STOR-5 Prevent exceeding 15 wt.% moisture limit./
No IE 3
> 15 wt.% moisture./
Inherent physical characteristics of pellets prevent exceeding 15 wt.% moisture.
Notes:
1.
(deleted) 2.
Control ID numbers were arbitrarily assigned for the CSE. Different numbers may be assigned, if necessary, as determined by Nuclear Criticality Safety and Process Engineering.
3.
The passive engineered control portion of IE-1 and IE-(shelve configuration) are maintained by configuration control.
Active engineered controls (AEC)
Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory
)
Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
(None) l Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard-wired alarm. The j
requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
j 1
[None]
Administrative controls Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.
Functional verification is not normally required.
InitialIssue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
24 Revision Date:
Revision No. 0
CONTROLID; LCONTROL FUNCTION /.
? FUNCTIONAL -
INITIATING,
2 FAILURE CONDITION / :
' VERIFICATION
- EVENT (IE)-
3
- " ACTION -
REQUIRED :
' NUMBER' A-STOR-3 Prevent violating configuration slab height./
No IE I Exceeding 3 high pans on 10x1x3 shelves at front of sintering ovens./
Operator does not stack pans more than 3 high (control limit is I high)
A-STOR-4 Prevent violating configuration slab height./
No IE-2 Exceeding 2 high pans on 5-high shelves at back of sintering ovens./
Operator does not stack pans more than 2 high (control limit is I high)
Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin on safety for the storage racks for pellet pans is evaluated to be very strong. Calculations performed in support of the document indicate that K-eff $ 0.95 for all normal operating conditions and expected process upsets. Further, a single credible process upset will not cause criticality.
The parameters that directly affects neutron multiplication are geometry / configuration and moderation. Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (BA) have been established to limit the geometry of the material in pans on shelves. Within the bounding configuration of this evaluation, a criticality would be possible only if the pans of pellets are fully flooded, and stacked more than 2 high on the 5-high shelves, or stacked more than 3 high on the 10x1x3 shelves.
Summary of Initiating Events that Could Lead to Possible Criticality Fault tree Figure 6.3.5-1 shows the potential initiating events that could lead to criticality in pellet pan storage, and establishes the double contingency required to prevent nuclear criticality. The tree is truncated at the contingency level, and gives two of the most likely configurations that could lead to a possible criticality.
e IE-1 Exceed 10x1x3 Array of Full, Triple-Stacked (3-High) Pans This event can occur if the shelf configuration is modified (passive engineered control), and/or if pans are stacked more than 3-high throughout the array. By administrative control, only 1-high pans are allowed.
- IE-2 Exceed R+C Configuration of Full, Double-Stacked (2-High) Pans This event can occur if the shelf configuration is modified (passive engineered control), and/or if pans are stacked more than 2-high throughout the array (which includes 4 carts surrounding the shelves). By administrative control, only 1-high pans are allowed.
InitialIssue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
M Revision Date:
Revision No. _0 i
- IE-3
> 15.0 Wt. % Moisture As explained in Appendix, this is not credible, even for annular pellets.
Common Mode Failure Potential The only significant common mode failure potential identified for the initiating events associated with this evaluation is the possibility of operations stacking pans of pellets too high on the shelves and/or carts. The common mode failure potential is judged to be acceptably low because of :
The multiple configuration process upsets required (see above), and The strength of the moderation contingency (not credible), and The strength of operator training to not stack pans at all.
Summary Tables See Table 5.3.5-1 and 5.3.5-2.
,','y5
- ' e 3
s-
.s
i ' ' ' ' '
> e 5;.
g
. - ~..,
l Initialissuc Date:
1L$W l
Revision Date:
i J
,.m
..musmend.L/ -
a "
p.
L e-IE-3
> 15.0 Wt. % Moisture -
As explained in' Appendix, this is not credible, even for annular pellets.
Common Mode Failure Potential
)
The.only significant common mode failure potential identified for the initiating events
(
associat'ed with this evaluation is the possibility of operations stacking pans of pellets too high on the shelves and/or carts. The common mode failure potential is judged to be acceptably low because of :
The multiple configuration process upsets required (see above), and The strength of the moderation contingency (not credible), and
-e The strength'of operator training to not stack pans at all.
Summary Tables
' See Table 5.3.5-1 and 5.3.5-2.
l l
1 l
I t
(
l l.
l InitialIssue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
2_fi Revision Date:
Revision No.,0 L'.-
i TABLE 5.3.5-1 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY LIMITS FOR Kerr = 0.90, 0.95, AND DELAYED CRITICAL DRY HETEROGENEOUS MATERIAL IN PANS - TYPE IV(PN) 5-HIGH SHELVES (R+C)
PARAMETER NORMAL BOUNDING CRITICALITY-CRITICALITY CRITICALITY OPERATING ASSUMPTION SAFETY SAFETY LIMIT CONDITIONS LIMIT LIMIT s 0.92 (N/A)
(N/A) 2"U Mass N/A Moderator /
15 Wt. % Water 15 Wt. % Water Concentration Geometry '
Pans 1-High 2-liigh Pans 2-liigh Pans Spacing N/A Density N/A Absorbers None Enrichment s 5.0 Wt. %
5.0 Wt.%
Partial (1"
Reflection water) at Boundary Notes
' es plus 4 surrounding carts)
- 1) R+C configuration (5-hi:::h '
Initial Issue Date:
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22 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0
i TABLE 5.3.5-2 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY LIMITS FOR Kerr = 0.90, 0.95, AND DELAYED CRITICAL DRY HETEROGENEOUS MATERIAL IN PANS - TYPE IV(PN) 3-HIGH 10x1x3 ARRAY PARAMETER NORMAL BOUNDING CRITICALITY CRITICALITY CRITICALITY OPERATING ASSUMPTION SAFETY SAFETY LIMIT CONDITIONS LIMIT LIMIT s 0.%1 (N/A)
(N/A) 1 238U Mass N/A j
i Moderator /
15 Wt. % Water 15 Wt. % Water
{
Concentration Geometry '
Pans 1-Iligh 3-liigh Pans 3-High Pans j
Spacing N/A Density N/A Absorbers None Enrichment s 5.0 Wt. %
5.0 Wt.%
2 Reflection Partial Notes
- 1) 10 x 1 x 3 Array at front of sintering ovens
- 2) Boundary plus contiguous reflection (1" water)
- Initial Issue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
28 Revision Date:
Revision No.,,0 L
m
~ POLYPAK CARTS (HOMOGENEOUS) - TYPE V(HO)
Controls Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)
Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108',
The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
CONTROL ID?
CONTROI; FUNCTION /,
FUNCTIONAL-INITIATING FAILURE' CONDITION //,
VERIFICATION -
EVENT (IE)
~
J ACTION '
't REQUIRED -
NUMBER P-STOR-6 Prevent violating NCS configuration / geometry No (N/A) assumptionsJ Cart damaged / distorted such that NCS assumption (s) violated./
Structure of rack maintains proper spacing.
Notes:
1.
Items required for functional verification to be determined by NCS and Process Engineering and/or Training 2.
Control ID numbers were arbitrarily assigned for the CSE. Different numbers may be assigned if necessary.
3.
Functional verification not required because polypak carts are in almost continuous use, and any damage /dMortion will be readily detected, and t'ecause any 1..odifications require configuration Cc" sul.
Active engineered controls (AEC)
Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
(None)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard-wined alarm. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
[None]
Administrative controls r
(
' RA-108, Safety Significant Controls InitialIssue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
29 Revision Date:
Revision No. 0
p',
x a
. Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually g
occur without prompting from a computer / control panel ahrm or indication. These controls - may; require documentation via Control Form or some other record.
Functional verification is not normallyJequired.
[None]
Margin of Safety The nuclear critic:.lity. margin on safety for the polypak storage carts is evaluated to be strong.
Calculations performed in support of the document indicate that K-eff < 0.95 for all normal operating conditions and expected process upsets. Further, a single credible process upset will not cause criticality.
The parameters that directly affects neutron multiplication are geometry / configuration
~ and moderation. Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (BA) have
- been established to limit the geometry and moderation of the material in the packs on the carts. A criticality would be possible only if there were wet material in the packs on the carts, and a gross breakdown of the geometry / configuration, e.g., placing material between the rollers / rows, or gross spacing violations with other arrays of SNM.
Summary of Initiating Events that Could Lead to Possible Criticality Figure 6.3.6-1 shows a simplified fault tree for visually dry polypaks on carts. The tree gives groups _of events that could lead to a possible criticality, and is truncated at the contingency level because it was concluded that criticality was not credible within the bounding assumptions of this document. A criticality would be possible only if there were wet material in the packs on the carts, and a grosa breakdown of the geometry / configuration, e.g., placing material between the rollers / rows.
Because it was concluded that criticality is not credible within the bounding assumptions of visually. dry material, the fault tree is not required. It may be useful, however, in evaluating unanticipated situations that may arise.
Common Mode Failure Potential There was no.significant common mode failure identified for the initiating events
. associated with this evaluation.
Summary Tables Not Applicable.
POLYPAK CARTS (DRY, HETEROGENEOUS) - TYPE V(HE)
InitialIssue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
10 Revision Date:
Revision No. O
l-Controls Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)
Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory 8
Affairs Procedure RA-108.
The requirements for functional verification are i
determined by this evaluation.
CONTROL ID CONTROL FUNCTION /-.
FUNCTIONAL -
INITIATING FAILURE CONDITION / ?
VERIFICATION.
EVENT (IE)
ACTION -
REQUIRED NUMBER P-STOR-7 Prevent violating NCS configuration / geometry No (N/A) assumptions./
Cart damaged / distorted such that NCS assumption (s) violated./
Structure of rack maintajr.iproper spacing.
Notes:
)
1.
Items required for functional verification to be determined by NCS and Process Engineering and/or Training 2.
Control ID numbers were arbitrarily assigned for the CSE. Different numbers may be assigned if necessary.
3.
Functional verification not required because polypak cans are in almost continuous use, and any damage / distortion will be readily detected, and because any modifications require configuration control.
Active engineered controls (AEC)
Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
(None)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)
Administrative controls with computer or clarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard-wired alarm. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
j
[None]
l Administrative controls Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These l
8 RA-108, Safety Significant Controls InitialIssue Date:
31 AUG 99 Page No.
11 Revision Date:
Revision No. _0 l
O
- Cl
^
c controls 'may L require documentation via Control Form or 'some other record.
Functional verification is not normally required, i
i
[None]
Margin of Safety'.
1The nuclear criticality margin on safety for the polypak storage carts is evaluated to be strong.
Calculations performed in support of the CSE indicate that K-eff _< 0.95 for all normal operating conditions and expected process upsets. Further, a single credible process upset will not cause criticality.
zThe parameters that directly affects neutron multiplication are geometry / configuration and
' moderation.
Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (BA) have been established to limit the geometry and moderation of the material in the packs on the carts. A criticality would be possible only if there were wcter (or other liquid moderator) in the packs on the carts, and a gross breakdown of the geometry / configuration, e.g., placing material
' between the rollers / rows, or gross spacing violations with other arrays of SNM.
Summary of Initiating Events that Could Lead to Possible Criticality Figure 6.3.7-1 shows a simplified fault tree for visually dry polypaks of pellets on carts..The tree gives groups of events that could lead to a possible criticality, and is truncated at'the contingency level because it was concluded that criticality was not credible within the bounding assumptions of this document. ' A criticality would be possible only if there were l wet material in the packs on the carts, and a gross.
breakdown of the ' geometry / configuration, e.g.,
placing material between the rollers / rows.
Because it was concluded that criticality is not credible within the bounding assumptions of visually dry material, the fault tree is not required. It may be useful, however, in evaluating unanticipated situations that may arise.
Common Mode Failure Potential There was no significant common mode failure identified for the initiating events associated with this evaluation.
j Summary Tables.
Not Applicable.
ADU PELLET CABINETS Introduction Initial Issue Date:
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]
n o
i As described in " Process Design and Equipment", the pellet cabinets used in ADU are essentially the same as those in IFBA except that:
' the largest ADU cabinets have 5 groups of 4 trays, with vertical spaces between e
groups (8.687", tray to tray), and the vertical spacing of trays within a group is 1.500" vs.1.600" in IFBA.
e This results in a maximum of 20 trays in an ADU cabinet vs. 26 in IFBA, which has the effect of lowering K-eff. The effect of closer vertical spacing within a group of trays would have a slight increase on reactivity, but is judged not significant in light of the minimal effect of " double fuel" in the IFBA analyses and the already low K-eff.
See below.
Hence the'same conclusion fo: ADU pellet cabinets as for the IFBA pellet cabinets:
criticality is not credible within the bounding assumptions of the evaluation (mainly because there was no credible mechanism found that could allow water into the cabinet and at the same time retain the water). Therefore specific calculations were not required for the ADU pellet cabinets as they are bounded by those for IFBA cabinets.
IFBA PELLET CABINETS Controls Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)
Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs _ Procedure RA-108'.
The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
CONTROL ID CONTROL FUNCTION /
FUNCTIONAL L INITIATING.
ACTION
'f VERIFICATION ~
EVENT (IE)
FAILURE CONDITION /
REQUIRED -
' NUMBER 1 P-STOR-9 Prevent violating NCS configuration / geometry Yes (N/A) assumptions./
NCS assumption (s) violated./
Structure of carts maintains proper spacing.
~ Notes:
1.
Items required for functional verification to be determined by NCS and Process / Mechanical Engineering and/or Training 2.
Control ID numbers were arbitrarily assigned for the CSE. Different numbers may be assigned
-if necessary.
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y Active engineered controls (AEC)
Active Engineered. Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory I
Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
(None)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC).
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard-wired alarm. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
[None]
Administrative controls Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually
. occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.
Functional verification is not normally required.
[None]
Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin on safety for the IFBA pellet cabinets is evaluated to be very strong. Calculations performed in support of this document indicate that K-eff _<
0.95 for all normal operating canditions and expected process upsets. Further, a single _
credible process upset will b ' cause criticality.
As explained below, within the bounding assumptions of this evaluam, criticality is not possible.
The parameters that directly affect neutron multiplication are geometry / configuration and moderation. Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (BA) have been established to limit the geometry and moderation of the material in the carts.
Additional calculations and sensitivity studies are available in CRI-96-048.
SUMMARY
OF INITIATING EVENTS THAT COULD LEAD TO POSSIBLE CRITICALITY:
In postulating initiating events and drafting a fault tree for the IFBA pellet cabinets, it was determined that criticality is not possible within the bounding assumptions made.
Double contingency is not applicable, sad a fault tree is not required.
j
. The IFBA cabinets are constructed such that it in not possible for two trayr to be placed into the same slot.
Therefore the only way geometry / configuration could be lost is the cabinet InitialIssue Date:
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overturned, which is classified as a spill and outside the scope of this document. Similarly it was determined that the only credible way significant quantities of water could accumulate in the
- cabinet is for it to overturn.
Common Mode Failure Potential' There was no significant common mode failure potential identified for the IFBA pellet carts.
Summary Tables Not Applicable.
5 GALLON CAN SHELF RACKS (IFBA) - Type VI Controls Safety Significant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)
Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108'.
The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
CONTROLID z CONTROL FUNCTION /,
FUNCTIONAL 1 INITIATING.
FAILURE CONDITION / J
- VERIFICATION ;
EVENT-(IE) c
^
< ACTION '
REQUIRED -
NUMBER -
P-STOR-10 Prevent violating 12" ETE minimum separation./
Yes IE-2 Spacing between cans < 12" ETE./
Structure of rack maintains proper spacing.
i Notes:
1.
Items required for functional verification to be determined by Nuclear Criticality Safety and
- Process / Mechanical Engineering and/or Training 2.
Control ID numbers were arbitrarily assigned for the CSE. Different numbers may be assigned, if necessary, as determined by Nuclear Criticality Safety and Process Engineering.
Active engineered controls (AEC)
Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The
. requirements for functional verification are determined by this evalua; ion.
(None)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator
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actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard-wired alarm. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
. [None]
Administrative controls Safety-significant administrative _ controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.
Functional verification is not normally required.
CONTROL ID CONTROL FUNCTION /?
FUNCTIONAL.y INITIATING:
FAILURE CONDITION / J VERIFICATION ;
EVENT - (IE)
ACTION
- i REQUIRED NUMBER ~
A-STOR-5 Prevent exceeding 56.4 kg net weight per can No IE-1 (criticality limit)./
Net weight of can exceeds 56.4 kg net./
Operator limits net weight of can to 18 kg (control limit).
A-STOR-6 Prevent can contents from exceeding 15.0 liters No IE-3 water equivalent (criticality limit)./
Can contents exceed 15.0 liters water equivalent./
Operator assures can contents are " visually dry" (control limit).
- Margin of Safety
. The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the 5 gallon shelf racks, with the bounding assumption that no more than 50% of the total net weight will be UO2, is evaluated to be very strong. Calculations performed in support of this document indicate that K-eff
__0.95 for all normal operating conditions and expected process upsets. Further, a l
single credible process upset will not cause criticality.
The parameters that directly affects neutron multiplication are mass, moderation and spacing. Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptiom dA) have been s
established to limit the mass, moderation, and spacing of the material on the shelf racks.
1 Summary of Initiating Events that Could Lead to Possible Criticality Fault tree Figure 6.3.10-1 shows the potential initiating events that could lead to criticality. The tree is truncated at the contingency level, and gives 3 conditions that must be met concurrenuy before a criticality is possible. A criticality would be possible only if there were grossly excessive masses in the cans, and sufficient moderator were also ir 6e cans to bring the material to near optimum moderation, and spacing reduced below sainimum in the calculation.
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Common Mode Failure Potential There was no significant common mode failure potential identified for the initiating events associated with this evaluation.
" Summary Tables i
See Table 5.3.10-1.
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TABLE 5.3.10-1 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY LIMITS FOR Kar = 0.90, 0.95, AND DELAYED CRITICAL 5 Gallon Can Shelf Racks (IFBA) - Type VI 1
PARAMETER NORMAL BOUNDING CRITICALITY CRITICALITY CRITICALITY OPERATING ASSUMPTION SAFETY SAFETY LIMIT CONDITIONS LIMIT LIMIT Delayed Critical s 0.90 s 0.95 s 0.98 2"U Mass s 18 kg ne:
N/A 37.5 kg net 47.4 kg net 56.4 kg net weight /can weight'can weight /can weight /can Moderator /
Visually Dry 15.0 liters water Concentration Geometry N/A i
Spacing 12" E-T-E Min.
12" E-T-E Min.
Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Density N/A 1
Absorbers None Enrichment s 5.0 Wt. %
5.0 Wt.%
Partial Water Reflection (l")
Notes
- 1) Parametric studies for spacing not performed.12" E-T-E assumed.
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STORAGE OF SNM IN DRUMS - TYPE VI Controls
. Safety Significant Controls
. Passive engineered controls (PEC)
Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory 1 Affairs Procedure RA-108".
The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
Active engineered controls (AEC) i Active Engineered Controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
(None)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)
Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC) typically consist of operator actions that are prompted or assisted by computer output or hard wired alarm. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.
. [None}
' Administrative controls Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions that usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record.
Functional verification is not normally required.
1 J
1 o
" RA-108, Safety Significant Controls InitialIssue Date:
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Revision Date; Revision No. 0 C
JCONTROL ID:
CONTROL FUNCTION / -
. FUNCTIONAL
-INITIATING -
7 y
1 FAILURE CONDITION /;
e
'r VERIFICATION '
EVENT (IE)
' REQUIRED NUMBER '
_ jo ACTIONS A-STOR-7 Prevent exceeding 61 kg UO2 in a drum (criticality No IE-1 limit)./
UO2 weight in a drum exceeds 61 kg./
Operator limits net weight of drum to less than 61 kg UO2.
j j
A-STOR-8 Prevent can contents from exceeding 15.0 liters No IE-3 water equivalent (criticality limit)./
4 Can contents exceed 15.0 liters water equivalent./
Operator assures can contents are " visually dry" (control limit).
A-STOR-9 Prevent violating 12" ETE minimum separation (if No IE-2 required)./
Spacing between cans < 12" ETE./
Operator maintains 12" min. ETE spacing if required.
Notes for table:
1.
ControlID numbers were arbitrarily assigned for the CSE. Different numbers may be assigned, if necessary, as determined by Nuclear Criticality Safety and Process Engineering.
Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for storage of drums is evaluated to be very strong. Calculations performed in support of this document indicate that K-eff < 0.95 for all normal operating conditions and expected process upsets. Further, a single credible process upset will not cause criticality.
The parameters that directly affects neutron multiplication are mass, moderation, and spacing.
For drums containing'less than 104 grams U-235 and for pellet archive drums in S. E. Expansion, spacing is not a required criticality parameter. Criticality safety limits (CSL's) and bounding assumptions (BA) have been established to limit the mass, moderation, and spacing of the druins. A criticality would be possible only if multiple contingencies occurred.
Summary ofInitia ing Events that Could Lead to Possible Criticality Figure 6.3.11-1 shows a simplified fault tree illustrating groups of potential initiating events that could lead to criticality in drum storage. The tree is truncated at the contingency level because the initiating event methodology was net used, and because many of the controls are administrative or administrative with computer assistance. it gives three conditions that must be met concurrently before a criticality is possible. A criticality-would be possible only if there w'ere excessive mass in the drum, and Initial Issue Date:
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sufficient moderator were also in the drum to bring the material to near optimum moderation, and spacing were reduced below minimum.
n
' Common Mode Failure Potential There was no significant common mode failure potential identified for the initiating events associated with this evaluation.
Even though mass control is basically administrative, or administrative with computer assist, the processes that precede putting the material. into drums make it very difficult to inadvertently exceed the criticality safety limit, i.e., exceed 61 kg UO2.
Summary Tables See Table 5.3.11-1.
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O e
TABLE 5.3.11-1 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY LIMITS FOR Ker = 0.90, 0.95, AND DELAYED CRITICAL STORAGE OF SNM IN DRUMS - TYPE VI PARAMETER NORMAL BOUNDING CRITICALITY CRITICALITY CRITICALITY OPERATING ASSUMPTION SAFETY SAFETY LIMIT CONDITIONS.
LIMIT LIMIT Delayed Critical s 0.90 s 0.95 5 0.98 2"U Mass s 104 or 798 gm N/A 42 kg UO2 55 kg UO2 61 kg UO2 U " per drum 2
Moderator /
Visually Dry 35 liters water 37 liters water Concentration equivalent equivalent Geometry N/A Spacing 12" E-T-E Min.
12" E-T-E Min.
Note 1 Note 1 Note i Density N/A Absorbers None j
I Enrichment s 5.0 Wt. %
5.0 Wt.%
~
Partial Water Reflection (1")
I Notes
- 1) Parametric studies for spacing not performed. 12" E-T-E assumed.
- 2) 36" concrete in (-)z direction.
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I FIGURE 6.3.3-1 FAULT TREE GRINDER SLUDGE STORAGE RACKS - TYPE Ill i
>6 3(T SLAB HEIGHT. UO2.
ARTIAL E riON l
E.3 WNCY
' ;KE D l2+2)
'E -6 30"
- lGH T j
l l
j IE-2 OPERATOH FOLLOWS INDEFtNULhi PROCEDURE VE
..q..
9
~~
a m,.
NOTES.
1.
Mass & modersuon not venal conungerces because no drect control.
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FIGURE 6.3.5-1 1
FAULT TREE l
515 W/O HETEROGENEOUS MATERIAL (IN PANS ON SHELVES)- TYPE IV (PN)
LRiiH. At if Y PHil LfRSON -
SUFFICIENT CONFIGURATIONI GEOME1RY & MODERAYlON N
l.
< LONTI iENCY >
C'dN I A ION; 4GEO TRY PEC NOTE 4
.. NOTE 2 E
9t' 9 NOTE 1.5 NUTE1 NOTES 1.
Control amat 6 14wgh pa,e by adnwu.tr.tn,. cordro!.
Th.
2.mampi.s.r. yv.n to.ti.mpt to bouno cr.dibl. condiuona. If o cons.o, on..,..ncoonio, may 1.ad to a g.ometryfconhgurabon conhngen.cy.no in.y e,. noi.oo,.
o, boono.,o m Cni. 7+.,4...
,ai.
aio on.no io,.noiy. ii
,.oo,,.o io a.i.
- n..th.r 2
Om.r conf 6gurations
.n on.n y.o -i.on -.
P.n. ara.s.um d fue of p.N.t.. By gr adur. Ih.y a,. appron.14 full (on. boat) 4 n.C w..
. co om..
w,,o on...n.o.
I i
a i
i 1
l I
i Initial Issue Date:
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Revision Date:
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.a i
I FIGURE 6.3.6-1 FAULT TREE (DRY) POLY PACK CARTS (HOMOGENEOUS)- TYPE V (HO)
LHITK At IT Y PHf.UURSOR =
l ET Y A l
uots i at" l l
l
__L
'co"0!JM"
"*%*c'E."s"#!"
'TTen"^v"
%C^4 "2"0?!
CRIT SIGN i
$ ELECTED & STORED STORED WCL. VISUAL
? 2.' L%.**lL"%%"'.";:n.",.:." ?".%l,:L%%:s'"""
I I
i 1
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a es FIGURE 6.3.7-1 FAULT TREE
$_15 W/O HETEROGENEOUS MATERIAL (PELLETS IN PACKS ON CARTS)- TYPE V (HE)
CRmj AL iJ v Pitt COH50N,
SUFFICIENT CONFM3URAT10N/
GEOMETRY & MODERATION l
E..TRY
- u y,'
iENCY NOT CREDIBLE EC NOTE 4
> NOTE 2 E
3EEE l
PEC l
NOTE 5 NOrt.
NOTES:
1.
Tlue evoluaaan le for soud penets stored m packs on carts Appacahon lo annular pellois is admessed separaley 2
Olhet crmeguracons may lead to a geometry!cordgurabon conungency. These 2 examples are given for reference and informaten. N emer configuratene are encountered and they are not addressed or Dounded in this oveaustion, e separate evaluenon and for analyse win to sequesd to deterenene if an unanalyzed conehon occurred 3
Thrs conhngency yields ken appros 0.81. Lager cart arrays and/orlarger pecks required to approach crlhcainy 5
en for the acts metenal 6.
Tius conungency ysside Ken approx. 0568 l
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8 94 5
FIGURE 6.3.10-1 FAULT TREE 5-GALLON CAN SHELF RACK TYPE Vil SUFFICIENT MAS $ AND MODERATOFt AND INSUFFICIENT riPACING 1
O 13-1 E.2 IE 3 M!MM MM NOTES 1,3 CRIT SIGN NOTE 5. t i
COP 471000 CRIf SIGN COP 471100 COP 471060 NOTES.
- 1. (NCLUDES SOUNDING ASSUMPTION OF NO MORE THAN SO% OF NET WEIGHTIS UQ2
- 2. CONTROL LIMIT IS " VISUALLY ORY?
- 3. CONTROL LIMIT IS 18 0 KG NET WEIGHT PER CAN.
- 4. FOR COMBUSTIBLE TRASH IN SGALLON PAPER IMGS. If IS ASSUMED THAT.
A > 664 KG WILL TE.AH THE BAG, AND i
B. THE AMOUNT OF WATE1 EQUIVALENT (PLASTIC. ETC) WILL NEVER EXCEED 16 LITERS.
- 6. SEE TEXT FOR MINIMUM SPALING REQUIRED.
6 MINOR SPACING VIOLATIONS SHOULO NOT RESULT IN NOTIFICATION PROVIDED MASS AND MODERATOR CONTINGENCIES DO NOT OCCUR
\\
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6 ei t
FIGURE 6.3.11-1 FAULT TREE 55-GALLON DRUM STORAGE TYPE VI SUFFCIENT MASS AND SUFFCIENT MODERATOR AND INSOFFICIENT SPACING I
O ats lE-1 IE-3 E-2 NOTE 1 NOTE 2. 4 NOTE 3,5
- 2. DRUMS INSPECTED PRIOR TO USE, AND MATERIAL VISUALLY ORY.
- 3. SPACING REQUIREMENT NOT APPUCABLE TO DRUMS < 104 GM U-235 ON SHELVES.
4 PEC tS DRUM INTEGRITY.
5, MINOR SPAC4NG VIOLATIONS SHOULD NOT RESULT ON NOTIFICATION PROVIDED MASS AND MODERATOR CONTINGENCIES DO NOT OCCUR.
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y...-
APPENDIX OFPARAMETRIC STUDIES CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment, j
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY PARAMETRIC STUDIES
- Calculations
- Applicable calc notes for this evaluation are given in the footnotes above.
Inherent Moderation Limits for Close-Packed Pellets Introduction
.SNM-1107 Section 6.2.4 (k), Process Characteristics, states:
"(k)
Within certain manufacturing operations, credit may be taken for physical and chemical properties of the process and/or materials as nuclear criticality safety controls. When so utilized, this credit will be predicated upon the allows credit for physical and chemical properties of the manufacturing process.
(k.1) The bounding assumptions will be defm' ed through the CSE_ process and operation limits will be identified with the Criticality Safety Analysis (CSA);
and, will be specifically communicated, through treining and procedures, to appropriate manufacturing personnel, l
(k.2) Utilization of such process and/or material characteristics will be based on j
established physical or chemical reactions, known scientific principles, and/or facility-specific experimental data supported by operational history."
The following sections will discuss demonstrations of physical characteristics for solid and annular fuel pellets in a close-packed configuration regarding moderation limits (maximum h/x).
Because the bounding assumptions below are established by the physical characteristics of the pellets, and are not the result of any process characteristic that can be controlled or changed by operations, it is not necessary for this information_ to be communicated to manufacturing personnel. It is, however, appropriate to include this inherent physical process limit in training material for Pellet Operations personnel on a for-information-only basis.
Engineering personnel are knowledgeable of this bounding assumption by virtue of being involved in the preparation and review in this CSE and/or the demonstrations.
InitialIssue Date:
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.:.4 K Solid Pellets JA(1996 internal memo documented the maximum wt. % water physically possible in solid pellets. initial!y dumped into a container (i.e., random orientation) Because of the way the demonstration was conducted, it was judged to be a conservatively high determination. A previous data sheet documents that with handling, the void volume available in containers of
. pellets can be further reduced significantly. There was no credible mechanism identified that
, could increase the void volume to a value higher than those demonstrated above.
Therefore using s 10 wt. % water as a limit for heterogeneous solid pellets dumped randomly.
into a' container for storage has a firm, conservative ' basis established by the physical dimensions and characteristics of the material (sintered UO2). This number therefore becomes a bounding assumption in criticality safety analyses for solid pellets in storage containers, and is established as such in the CSE for Storage.
Annular Pellets Two demonstrations were made to measure the wt. % water of annular pellets (should they be flooded with water in a storage container). In each case, the demonstration involved just covering the pellets with water. This is judged to give a conservatively high value for wt. %
water because of the " extra" water on the bottom and the top of the pellets. It is noted in both demonstrations that care was taken not to shake the pack during filling or otherwise cause settling of the pellets.
The first demonstration used a small amount of material in a polypak (depth approx. 2 inches).
This is judged to be an appropriate number for pellets in a storage pan (maximum depth of 2 inches with lid installed). The second demonstration involved a larger amount of material in a polypak, and would be more representative of annular pellets in a pack.
j Thus it could not be concluded from the demonstrations that annular pellets flooded with water are s 10 wt. % water, which is one of the Evaluation Bounding Assumptions for storage of dry, heterogeneous material.
j Therefore s 15 wt. % water was arbitrarily chosen as a limit for heterogeneous annular pellets dumped randomly into a container for storage. Because it.has a large margin above that i
measured in the above demonstrations, this limit has a firm, conservative basis established by the physical dimensions and characteristics of the material (sintered UO2). This number therefore becomes a bounding assumption in criticality safety analyses for annular pellets in 4
storage containers, and is established as such in the CSE for Storage InitialIssue Date:
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p>
1
.l Chemical Safety and Fire Safety Controls.
l To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment.
i i
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( "_
i l
I t
I 4
I 1
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.