ML20070A178

Informs That Util Will Not Be Revising Qos 6500-1 & Qos 6500-4 as Stated in Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations as Noted in Insp Repts 50-254/93-12 & 50-265/93-12,transmitted by NRC

ML20070A178
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	06/21/1994
From:	Tucker L COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9406280226
Download: ML20070A178 (3)

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June 21,1994 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attn: Document Control Desk

Subject:

Quad Cities Power Station Units 1 and 2; NRC Docket Number 50-254 and 50-265; NRC Inspection Report Numbers 50-254(265)/93012

Reference:

Edward G. Greenman letter to R. Pleniewicz dated July 30, 1993, transmitting Notice of Violation.

Inspection Report 50-254/93012; 50-265/93012 Enclosed is Commonwealth Edison's revision to the response to the Notice of Violation (NOV) transmitted with the referenced letter. The NOV cited two Level 111 and one Severity Level IV violation, pertaining to concerns on the operability of the 1/2 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump.

The following commitments are being changed by this letter:

1. The Station will not be revising OOS 6500-1 as stated in corrective steps taken to avoid further violations.

2. The Station will not be revising QOS 6500-4 as stated in corrective steps taken to avoid further violations.

If there are any questions or comments concerning this letter, please refer them to Marcia Jackson, Regulatory Performance Administrator at (708) 663-7287 Respectfully, L. Tucker, ,

e hnical Superintendent Q ad Cities Station Attachment cc: J. Martin, Regional Administrator, Rlll C. Patel, Project Manager, NRR C. Miller, Senior Resident inspector, Quad Cities -

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VIOLATION:

Technical Specification 3.9.A.1 requires that the reactor shall not be made critical unless the unit 1/2 diesel generator is operable.

Technical Specification 3.9.E.1 requires, in part that whenever the reactor is in start-up/ hot standby or run mode and the shared diesel generator is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days provided that certain requirements are met.

Technical Specification 1.0-2.M defines a system, subsystem, train, component, or device as operable when it is capable of performing its specified function (s),

assuming that all necessary attendant cooling water equipment, among other things, that is required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its function (s) are capable of performing its related support function.

Contrary to the above, on numerous occasions from August 15,1972 until March 6,1993, the Unit 1/2 diesel generator was inoperable in relation to Unit 2, and Unit 2 was made critical, or was in Start-up/ Hot Standby or Run modes for periods of time greater than 7 days. Specifically, the Unit 1/2 diesel generator cooling water pump, required for the Unit 1/2 diesel generator to perform its intended function, was incapable of starting during a Unit 2 loss of cooling accident coincident with a total loss of offsite power.

CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION:

In the corrective actions taken to avoid further violation, the station made the  ;

following commitment: l As a conservative measure OOS 6500-1 and OOS 6500-4 will be revised to ensure  !

that testing bounds a dual unit LOOP event. This will be completed prior to their r next use during the next refueling outage.

The station wishes to revise the above comrnitment as follows for the reasons provided: -;

Summarv of Bus 28 Loaic (OOS 6500-4):  !

Due to the undervoltage relay contact added in the Bus 28,1/2 DGCWP breaker logic, in M04-0-93-003A, the 1/2 DGCWP would re-start on Bus 28 after an undervoltage condition. Therefore, OOS 6500-4, which has the power selector switch for the 1/2 DGCWP selected to "28", would prove that the 1/2 DGCWP would re-start on Bus 28 in a dual unit LOOP /U2 LOCA. No revisions to the procedure are required. ,

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Summarv of Bus 18 Loaic (OOS 6500-1):

The present logic for the 1/2 DGCWP is such that the 1/2 DGCWP would not re- I start on Bus 18 after the pump is tripped due to an undervoltage condition if the l power selector switch is selected to "18". Presently, there is a caution card on the  !

power selector switch stating that the switch should be left in the NORMAL position to alleviate this concern during normal plant operation. M04-0-91-003B (to be performed in Q1R13) will install an undervoltage contact in the closing circuit for the 1/2 DGCWP feed breaker from bus 18. This will reset the anti-pump logic of the breaker to allow the pump to re-start when voltage on Bus 18 is restored after an undervoltage condition. This is the same corrective action taken_for the Bus 28 logic in Q2R12 (M04-0-93-003A). QOS 6500-1 performs the undervoltage surveillance (during refueling) with the 1/2 DGCWP power selector switch selected to "18".

However, this surveillance will not be performed until after the logic modification noted above is completed in Q1R13. After completion of the modification, QOS  ;

6500-1 will function as written, and will prove that the 1/2 DGCWP would re-start t on Bus 18 after an undervoltage condition, in a dual unit LOOP /U1 LOCA. Therefore no revision to the procedure is required.

DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED:

Full compliance was achieved on April 27,1993 when modification M04-0-93-003A was completed and authorized for operation. This modification corrected the design deficiency on Bus 28 and restored operability to the 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator to Unit 2.