ML20137N688

Forwards Rev 2 to Exemption Request 2-008 Re Requirements of 10CFR50,App R Per NRC Audit,Correcting Error in Installation of Fire Barriers in Area 2-005.List of Fire Doors to Be Included in Exemption Request 1-041 Encl

ML20137N688
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	01/27/1986
From:	Mcdonald R ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:	Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC-60030, TAC-60031, NUDOCS 8602040210
Download: ML20137N688 (15)

Text

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Milling Addrets Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street

, Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham. Alabama 35291 Telephone 205 783-6090 t R. P. Mcdonald Senior Vice President Flintridge Building [jh[g)){g % g [

'^

4 January 27, 1986 '

Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 9

Di rector, Nuclear R. actor Regulation

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D.C. 20555

Attention: Mr. L. S. Rubenstein Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 l 10CFR50, Appendix R Exemption Request Revisions a

Gentlemen:

Alabama Power Company (APCo) submitted exemption requests to the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, based upon an NRC audit by letter dated

- October 18, 1985. This submittal supplemented letters dated March 13, 1985, May 31, 1985, June 26, 1985 and July 19, 1985. .

In, these exemptibn requests, APCo committed to a schedule of no later than the Unit 2 fourth and Unit 1 seventh refueling outages for development j of detailed shutdown procedures for all fire areas other than a cable spreading room fire. During the development of the detailed shutdown procedure for exemption request #2-008 (fire area 2-005), an error in the  :

exemption request was discovered. Installation of fire barriers for the cable trays in this area will not enture a source of RCS makeup water since the solenoids and their associated calles for the valves are unprotected.

As a result, attached is a revised copy of exemption request #2-008.

In addition, APCo was requested serbally by the NRC Staff to provide a list of fire doors to be included in g eneric exemption request #1-041.

Attached is a revised copy of the exemption request that includes a list of the fire doors.

8602040210gh$34e PDR ADOCK PDR ['I

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fir. L. S. Rubenstein January 27, 1986 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Page 2 If there are any questions, please advise.

Yours very trul O y ,

( ( d'

/ iv' R. P. Mcdonald RPM /DHJ:ddb-043 Attachments cc: fir. L. B. Long Dr. J. N. Grace Mr. E. A. Reeves Mr. W. H. Bradford Mr. Dan Turner

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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION j .

EXEMPTION REQUEST: 2-8 Rev. 2 FIRE AREA: 2-005 LOCATION: UNIT-2 AU1ILIARY BUILDING. EL 100 FT-0 IN.. CHARGING PUMP ROOMS AND STORAGE AREAS Fire area 2-005 consists of the three charging pump rooms (2173, 2174, and 2181), a hallway (2172), a general storage area (2171), and a contaminated storage area (2182). The fire area boundary walls, floors, and ceilings are 3-h fire rated except 4

for the containment wall, and all fire area boundary doors are fire rated. Self expanding cork is installed between the fire area boundary walls and the containment wall.

EXEMPTION: An exemption to section III.G.2.a is requested to the extent that it requires a 3-h fire barrier between redundant safe shutdown cabling and equipment. An exemption is requested to section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cable and equipment to be enclosed by a 1-h fire-rated barrier and the installation of an automatic fire suppression system.

CONDITION REOUIRING EXEMPTION:

Physical Separation of the Charging Pumps The fire area contains all three charging pumps, related valves and air handling units. Each charging pump is redundant to the other two. The redundant charging pumps, valves, and air handling units are located in separate rooms. The pump room walls internal to fire area 2-005 are watertight and of 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete. However, the watertight

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penetration seals and watertight doors in the subject walls are not fire rated.

Boration/ Makeup Room 2172 in fire area 2-005 contains the control cables and valves for the RWST charging pump suction (LCV11SB and LCV11SD),

the control cables and valves for the RWMT charging pump suction and boric acid dilution injection to the VCT (FCV0ll3B-A and FCV0ll4A-A). In addition control cables for the RWM to the boric acid blender a.id boric acid flow control valves (FCV0114B-A and FCV0t13A-A) transit this room. These components provide redundant suction of makeup water from the RWMT or the RWST. Complete fire barriers and full suppression coverage is not provided for the valves or cables. The analysis of the offects of a fire upon the subject cables in the area shows that 1

the RWST isolation valves could become electrically inoperative in the closed position or makeup to either the VCT or charging pump suction header could be isolated.

2-8-1 Rev. 2

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i J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT l

10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Reactor Coolant Boundary Integrity Control cables of the Train-A pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves Q2B31PCV0445A-A and Q2B13MOV8000A-A and the reactor head vent valves Q2B13SV2213A-A and Q2B13SV2214A-A are located.in fire area 2-005. The subject cables are associated with the control function from the hot shutdown panel Q2H21NBAPP2605G-A. In addition control cables which shift control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panel via the transfer relay cabinet Q2H22 LOO 2-A are in this area. A fire induced failure having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown via the PORV, and reactor head vent paths.

JUSTIFICATION:

Physical Separation of the Charging Pumps i The redundant charging pumps, valves, and air-handling units are located in independent, highly segregated rooms. Rooms 2171 and 2182 do not contain redundant safe shutdown cabling or equipment. An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire limited to one of the four areas identified below would not

jeopardize the safe shutdown of the plant,

1. RM 2181 - Train-A Charging Pump Room

2. RM 2174 - Swing Charging Pump Room

3. RM 2173 - Train-B Charging Pump Room 3

4. RM's 2172, 2171, 2182 - Storage rooms and hallway The following justification is provided to show that a fire would be contained in one of the four areas listed above.

The charging pump rooms (2173, 2174, and 2181) are watertight i with 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete walls. The penetrations in the pump room walls internal to fire area 2-005 are sealed to provide a watertight boundary. The seals utilized to provide the watertight boundary are of the type (foam, welded plate, or grout) to provide an adequate barrier to inhibit the spread of fire, smoke, or gas. The doors are watertight and are normally i maintained closed. Lubricating oil and cable insulation are the only combustibles present in the pump rooms. Lubricating oil would be contained within the individual rooms or would drain into the sump pump servicing the room. In addition there is a fixed suppression system installed in room 2172 (hallway) which provides additional protection in the area of the pump room doors which communicate with this hallway. A smoke detection system is installed throughout the area including the three

charging pump rooms. The maximum combustible loading in any room of this fire is estimated to be, less than 48,000 Btu /ft*

i with a maximum fire severity of less than 1 h. Based upon l the evaluation of the protection provided, a credible fire would 2-8-2 Rev. 2

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION be contained within the zone of its initiation. Credit has been taken for the separ-ation afforded by the subject pump room boundaries. As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, to ensure that the as-built configuration is maintained, the sealed penetrations shall be placed in the surveillance program.

Boration/ Makeup A fire barrier has been provided for raceway sections AHF15A, AHD128, AID 258, AID 12B and AID 15B in rooms 2182 and 2172 of fire area 2-005. These barriers protect cables for the boric acid flow control and the RWM to the boric acid blender valves (FCV0113A-A and FCV0114B-A) as they transit rooms 2182 and 2172 of fire area 2-005.

These subject barriers also provide protection for the RWMT charging pump suction, boric acid dilution injection to the VCT cables (FCV0113B-A and FCV0114A-A) and the redundant RWST charging pump suction train A cables (LCV0115B-A), with separation of approximately 19 feet. Partial suppression coverage is provided for the subject cables and valves in this area of FCV0113B-A and FCV0114A-A. There is approximately 15 feet of separation between the RWMT charging pump suction valve and cables (FCV0113B-A) and the redundant train B RWST suction valve and cables (FCV0113B-A) and the redundant train B RWST suction valve and cables (LCV01150-B). Again partial suppression coverage is provided in the area of FCV0113B-A and FCV0114A-A. Detection is provided in the aNa of the subject components. Due to the barriers provided; the spatial separation, detection and partial suppression coverage and the low insitu combustible loading (much of which has now been covered in a fire barrier) a credible exposure fire would not affect both redundant sources of borated makeup water. In the event of a fire in Room 2181, the Train B RWST isolation valve, LCV115D-B will be operable. An automatic suppression system covers the raceway to be protected with the exception of 18 feet of raceway sections AHF15A, AHD12B and AID 15B in Room 2172 and 10 feet of AHF15A and AHD12B in Room 2182.

In the unlikely event that a fire in this area caused a loss of these three independent sources of reactor makeup water, the additional fire barriers that have been installed in Rooms 2182 and 2172 will ensure that a fire induced RCS letdown will not exist thus increasing the time margin available to establish makeup.

Reactor decay heat will be sufficient to maintain RCS temperature and thereby prevent shrinkage of the RCS until manual action can be taken to restore makeup water. In addition, the Reactor Coolant Pump seal integrity can be maintained by the normal seal injection flow path f rom the VCT or by using Component Cooling Water. These flow paths will not be affected by a fire in this area; therefore, the integrity of the pump seals will not be jeopardized while makeup is being established.

Reactor Coolant Boundary Integrity Cables for the subject reactor coolant boundary integrity valves are also routed in the raceway for which the addition of a fire barrier was implemented under boration/

makeup. t$ased on the implementation of the modification implemented under boration/

makeup, the following scenario applies to a fire in Room 2181 only.

Fire induced failures (hot shorts) to the control cables for the transfer relay cabi-net Q2H22L002-A could cause control for the pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves and the reactor head vent valves, to shift from their normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel. Subsequent fire induced f ailures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) of the control cables for 2-8-3 Rev. 2

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" PIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION

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Q2B31PCV0445A-A, pressurizer power operated relief valve Q2B13SV2213A-A, and Q2B13SV2214A-A reactor head vent valves, could result in the valves being energized to open. The power relief blocking valves (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position. In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occuring, this condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manual operation (handle) of the affected relay thereby shifting control to the main control board. To remove power from the transfer relay open breaker 9 on de distribution panel 2C (Q2R41LOOlC-A) located in Room 2312, fire area 2-004. Then go to transfer relay cabinet TRC-1 (Q2H22 LOO 2-A) in fire area 2-035 room 2347 and manually shift transfer relays TR1 (02B13SV2213A-A), TR2 (Q2B13SV2214A-A), TR3 (Q2B31PCV0445A-A), and TRS (Q2B31MOV8000A-A) placing control back to the main control board to allow the operator to mitigate the letdown.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION:

MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft21 SEVERITY Room 2173 B Cable Insul. 148 lb 27,563 <30 min Charging / Lube Oil 35 gal Safety Injec-tion Pump Room Room 2174 A, B, C Cable Insul. 103 lb 28,508 <30 min Charging / Lube Oil 35 gal Safety Injec-tion Pump Room Room 2181 A Cable Insul. 625 lb 47.414 <1 h Charging / Lube Oil 35 gal Safety Injec-tion Pump Room i

Room 2171 Cable Insul.

Combustible Area (a)

! Room 2172 A, C Cable Insul. 2,393 lb(b)31,820(b)<30 min (b) l Hallway l Room 2182 . A Cable Insul.

Contamination i Storage Area

a. Room 2171 is utilized to store combustible material, usually in the form of contaminated clothing, cables, and tools in drums.

b. Applies to rooms 2171, 2172, 2182 collectively.

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J. M. PARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION DESIGN FEATURES:

Construction: Floors, ceilings, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete. Self-expanding cork is installed between the fire area boundary walls and the containment.

Doors: A fire-rated airtight door is installed between rooms 2172 and 2161 (area 2-4).

Pipe and Electrical Penetrations: All penetrations through the area' boundary are scaled with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Ventilation: There is no normal ventilation for the area. There are four ventilation openings through the area ceiling into room 2223 (area 2-1): UL Class-A fire damper doors are installed in these openings. Fixed smoke removal capability is not provided.

Floor Drains: A 4-in. diameter floor drain having a 100-gal /m capacity is located in rooms 2173, 2174, and 2181, and drains to a separate sump for each room. The sumps for rooms 2173 and 2181 are located in the rooms while the sump for room 2174 is located immediately outside the room in room 2172. The sumps have two 100-gal /m pumps each that discharge to the waste holdup tank or to the floor drain tank. Four 4-in. diameter floor drains having a 100-gal /m capacity each are located throughout the remainder of the area and drain into the floor drain tank.

FIRE PROTECTION:

A smoke detection system is installed throughout this area. A manual hose station CO2 hose reel, portable dry chemical extinguishers, portable CO2 extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment located in the corridor just outside the area are available for use in the area. An automatic sprinkler system is installed in room 2172.

l 2-8-5 Rev. 2

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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION GENERIC EXEMPTION REQUEST: 1-41 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA: N/A LOCATION: FIRE AREAS IN THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 AUXILIARY BUILDING, THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING AND THE SERVICE WATER INTAKE STRUCTURE.

EXEMPTION Request exemption from the provision of 10CFR50, Appendix R III.G.2 to the extent that a deviation from the National Fire Protection Association Standard for Fire Doors and Windows (NFPA 80) which specifies the maximum clearance between the bottom of a fire-rated door and its sill or the floor results in the doors potentially having a rating of less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. NFPA 80.3-6.1 states that the noncombustible clearance between the bottom of flush mounted doors and a raised noncombustible sill shall not exceed 3/8 inch, or where there is no sill, the maximum clearance between the bottom of the door and the floor shall not exceed 3/4 inch. The attached list of doors deviates slightly from this standard.

JUSTIFICATION Various doors in the fire area boundaries in the locations identified in the attachment exceed NFPA 80 gap specifications. In the majority of instances, the NFPA standard is exceeded by less than 3/4 inches. Most of the excess clearances result from an unintentional unevenness of or a deliberate slope in the poured concrete floors.

Smoke or heat detection systems are installed on both sides of the affected doors except as noted on the attached list. There are fourteen exceptions.

Eleven of these exceptions ir tolve stairwells; nine instances wherein the stairwell does not have detection, and two instances where small unprotected vestibules (Rooms 115 and 2115) are adjacent to protected stairwells. The remaining three exceptions involve doors between the diesel generator building switchgear rooms and the diesel generator-auxiliary building cable tunnels. These doors all have smoke detection on their diesel generator building side and automatic water suppression systems on their tunnel side.

The in-situ combustible loading in the vicinity of the bottom of the doors is minimal. Transient loads are unlikely to be located near the doors because access to fire doors is routinely kept clear. Since the excessive gaps are located at the bottom of the doors, passage of smoke and heat is minimized in the event of a fire. The results of a liquid spill near a door with excessive clearance would not differ significantly from one near a door with prescribed clearance since a flow path exists under both doors.

Therefore, the existence of the gaps at the bottom of the fire doors greater than those recommended in the NFPA 80 does not prevent each door from performing its intended function.

LIST OF FIRE DOORS THAT EXCEED NFPA MAXImlM GAP ALLOWANCE REFERENCE GENERIC EXEMPTION REQUEST 1-41 UNIT 1 000R NO. BETWEEN ROOMS LOCATION DESCRIPTION ELEV.

101 104 & Unit 2 Hallway to Unit 2 - WS 83' 150 155 & Unit 2 Hallway to Unit 2 - WS 100' 163 183 & 162 Hallway E of Spray Add Tank 100' 155 172 & 161 Corridor to Chg Pump Area 100' 102 103 & 107 Corridor to Storage Room 83'

• 105 Str. #2 & 115 Stairwell - WS to Spray Pumps 77' 165 116 & 185 Entry to Cable Chase - CCW 100' 169 Str. #1 & 185 Stairwell to CCW 100' 201 254 & Unit 2 HSP Room to Unit 2 121' 207 202 & 210 Communications Room 121' 202 205 & Unit 2 Hallway to Unit 2 - C 121'

• 205 208 & Str. #8 Stai rwell - ES 121' 203 207 & Unit 2 Corridor to Unit 2 - ES 121' 210 212 & 213 Battery Room 1B 121' 217 226 & 225 SWGR 1B to Charger Room 121' 216 213 & 225 Charger Room to Corridor 121' 211 213 & 214 Corridor to Battery Room A 121' 219 228 & 229 Corridor to SWGR Room - N 121' 223 234 & 235 Corridor to CRDM Room - N 121' 224 234 & 235 Corridor to CRDM Room - S 121'

• This door has automatic smoke / heat detection on one side only.

LIST OF FIRE DOORS THAT EXCEED NFPA MAXIM)M GAP ALLOWANCE REFERENCE GENERIC EXEMPTION REQUEST 1-41 UNIT 1 000R NO. BETWEEN ROOMS LOCATION DESCRIPTION ELEV.

225 234 & Str. #1 Stai rwell - WS 121' 227 233 & 235 CRDM to SWGR Room 121' 240 250 & 235 Half Door to Cable Chase - E 121' 301 319 & Unit 2 Corridor to Unit 2 - WS 139' 302 316 & Unit 2 Corridor to Unit 2 - C 139' 304- 309 & Unit 2 Big Door to Unit 2 - ES 139' 318 333 & 334 Room between Elect. Pen Rms - W 139' 311 317 & 322 Pen Filt Room 139' i 312 318 & 319 Corridor to Cable Spr Room - N 139' 324 335 & 338 SWGR Room to Cable Chase - M 139'

_ 322 343 & 339 Corridor to SWGR Room - S 139' 447 429 & Str. #2 Stairwell to Radwaste Vent Room 155' 402 405 & Unit 2 Double Doors Corridor to 2 - ES 155' 411 409 & Str. #2 Stai rwell - WS 155' 0333 604 & Str. #10 Hallway to Stairwell 130' DIESEL BUILDING 0732 56C & Cable Tunnel SWGR Room to West Tunnel 155' i

734 56A & 56B Center Foyer to E SWGR 155' OThis door has automatic smoke / heat detection on one side only.

LIST OF FIRE DOORS THAT EXCEED NFPA MAXIMUM GAP ALLOWANCE REFERENCE GENERIC EXENPTION REQUEST 1-41 UNIT 1 000R NO. BETWEEN ROOMS LOCATION DESCRIPTION ELEV.

715 56A & 61 SWGR to 1-2A Diesel Room 155' 716 56A & 60 SWGR to 1C Diesel Room 155' 717 568 & 59 Foyer to 2B Diesel Room 155' 718 56C & 58 SWGR to IB Diesel Room 155' 719 56C & 57 SWGR to 2C Diesel Room 155' 701 71 & 61 South Hillway to 1-2A Diesel 155' 704 71 8 60 South Hallway to 1C Diesel Room 155' 707 71 & 59 South Hallway to 2B Diesel Room 155' 710 71 & 58 South Hallway to 1B Diesel Room 155' 713 71 & 57 South Hallway to 2C Diesel Room 155' 700 71 & 66 Hallway to 1-2A Day Tank Room 155' 703 71 & 65 Hallway to IC Day Tank Room 155' 706 71 & 64 Hallway to 2B Day Tank Room 155' 709 71 & 63 Hallway to IB Day Tank Room 155' 712 71 & 62 Hallway to 2C Day Tank Room 155'

• 731 56A & Cable Tunnel SWGR Room to East Tunnel Unit II 155'

• 733 56C & Cable Tunnel SWGR Room to West Tunnel Unit II 155' SERVICE WATER BUILDING 851 72C & 73 Foyer to IB Battery Room 155' 853 72D & 74 Foyer to 1A Battery Roon 155'

• This door has automatic smoke / heat detection on one side only.

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LIST OF FIRE DOORS THAT EXCEED NFPA MAXIM)M GAP ALLOWANCE REFERENCE GENERIC EXEMPTION REQUEST 1-41 UNIT 2 DOOR BETWEEN NO. ROOMS LOCATION DESCRIPTION ELEV.

• 2105 Str. #2 & 2115 Stair No. 2 77'

• 2154 Str. #8 & 2160 Stair No. 8 100' 2155 2172 & 2161 Corridor 100' 2159 Str. 2 & 2162 Hallway 100' 2163 2183 & 2162 Hallway 100' 2165 2197 & 2185 CCW HX Room 100' 2167 2198 & 218 CCW Hx Room 100' 2169 Str. #1 & 2185 Stair No.1 100'

• 2205 Str. #8 & 2207 Hatch Area 121' 2207 2202 & 2210 Corridor 121' 2212 Str. #2 & 2209 Hallway 121' 2215 2224 & 2225 Battery Charger Room 121' 2216 2225 & 2213 Battery Service Room 121' 2217 2226 & 2225 Battery Charger Room 121' 2222 2233 & 2228 Corridor 121' 2223 2235 & 2234 Hallway 121' 2224 2235 4 2234 Hallway 121' 2225 2234 & Str. #1 Stai r No. I 121' 2227 2235 & 2233 Switchgear Room 121'

• This door has automatic smoke / heat detection on one side only.

c LIST OF FIRE DOORS THAT EXCEED NFPA MAXIRM GAP ALLOWANCE REFERENCE GENERIC EXEMPTION REQUEST 1-41 UNIT 2 DOOR BETWEEN NO. ROOMS LOCATION DESCRIPTION ELEV.

2241 2249 & 2235 Control Sys. Cab. Room 121'

• 2305 Str. #8 & 2309 Hatch Area 139' 2312 2318 & 2319 Corridor 139' 2317 2334 & 2322 Hallway 139' 2318 2333 & 2334 Elec. Pene. Room 139' 2319 2337 & 2335 Load Center Room 139' 2322 2343 & 2339 Corridor 139' 2324 2338 & 2335 Load Center Room 139' 2329 2604 & 2602 Blow Down Panel Room 130'

• 2333 2604 & Str. #10 Stai r No.10 130'

• 2335 2609 & Str. #10 St ai r No.10 130' 2403 2405 & 406 Decon Room 155' 2404 2408 & 407 Hot Machine Shop 155' 2406 2405 & 407 Hot Machine Shop 155'

• 2407 2405 & Str. #8 Stair No. 8 155'

• 2431 2422 & Str. #10 Stair No. 10 155' 2439 2452 & Str. #1 Stair No. I 155' 2447 2429 & Str. #2 Stai r No. 2 155' 2327 2339 & 2346 MG Set Room 139'

• This door has automatic smoke / heat detection on one side only.

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