ML20138F315
| ML20138F315 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 10/18/1985 |
| From: | Mcdonald R ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-60030, TAC-60031, NUDOCS 8510250236 | |
| Download: ML20138F315 (145) | |
Text
_
Mailing Address Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 Tej@one 205 783-6090 R. P. Mcdonald Senior Vice President Fhntndge Building Alabama POWCf October 18, 1985 Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention: Mr. S. A. Varga Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 10CFR50.48 and 10CFR50, Appendix R Fire Protection Exemption Requests Gentlemen:
Alabama Power Company submitted exemption requests to the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R by letter dated March 13, 1985 for Unit 2 and shared fire areas. This submittal was supplemented by letters dated June 26, 1985 and July 19, 1985.
An NRC audit of the exemption requests was performed the week of July 19, 1985. Based upon this audit, revisions to several exemption requests were deemed necessary. Attached is a copy of the revised exemption requests identified as a result of the NRC audit. These revised exemption requests include proposed modifications identified during the audit.
Installation of these proposed modifications will be completed during the first outage of sufficient duration subsequent to design and procurement completion, but no later than the Unit 2 fourth refueling outage currently scheduled for the second quarter of 1986.
If there are any questions, please advise.
Yours very truly 8510250236 851018
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PDR ADOCK 05000340
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F PDR R. P. Mcdonald bh RPM /DHJ:ddb-043 Attachments Q
cc: see page 2
7 Mr. S. A. Varga October 18, 1985 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 cc: Mr. L. B. Long Dr. J. N. Grace Mr. E. A. Reeves Mr. W. H. Bradford t
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT l
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
1-3 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
72 LOCATION:
SERVICE WATER INTAKE STRUCTURE (COMMON TO UNITS 1 AND 2 ZONES:
A.
B.
C.
D.
AND E:
Refer to attached figure.
Fire area 72 is separated from areas 7,3 and 74 by 3-h fire-rated walls and are bounded by non-rated exterior walls, floors, and ceilings.
Fire area 72 is separated into five fire zones by non-rated zone i
barriers.
Zone 72A consists of the pump deck at el 188 ft 6
in. and strainer pit at el 167 ft 3 in.
Zone 72A communicates with zone 72C and 72D through non-fire-rated doors in the zone boundary.
Zones 72C and 72D communicate with zones 72C and 72E respectively through open doorways.
Zones 72B and 72E communicate with the outside by non-rated doors.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent it requires enclosure of one train of redundant cables and equipment by a 1-h-rated fire barrier and automatic fire suppression system.
l CONDITION REOUIRING EXEMPTION:
1.
The Unit-2 side of the pump deck contains Unit-2 redundant service water pump lube and cooling water i
pumps.
Suction valves and suction valve local control stations are located under the pump deck.
Eauipment Function 02P16M002A-A Unit-2 Service Lube and Cooling Pump Train A.
Q2P16M002B-B Unit-2 Service Water Lube and Cooling Pump Train B.
Q2P16V719A-A Unit-2 Service Water Lube and Cooling Pump Train-A Suction Valve.
02P16V719B-B Unit-2 Service Water Lube and Cooling Pump Train-B Suction Valve.
02P16G508A-A Local Control Station for Service Water Train-A Valve Q2P16V719A-A.
Q2P16G508B-B Local Control Station for Service Water Train-B Valve 02P16V719B-B.
1-3-1 Rev. 1
J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION The subject pumps, valves, and local control stations are used to provide lube and cooling water to the service water pump bearings, and are located in the sprinklered area of the pump deck.
The pumps are mounted in the southwest corner of the pump deck and have a horizontal separation of 18 in. on center.
The pumps are electrically driven, each having a motor rated 7.5 hp at 550 V-ac.
The pump bearings are oil lubricated with each pump casing having an oil reservoir of 4 oz. The valves are mounted on the west wall of the pump deck at el 192 ft -6 in. and have a horizontal separation of 9 in, on center.
The local control stations are located in the southwest corner of the strainer pit at el 171 ft -3 in. and have a horizontal separation of 5 ft on center.
2.
The Unit-2 side of the strainer pit contains redundant Unit-2 service water header strainer motor operated inlet valves and swing pump motor operated discharge valves.
VALVES FUNCTION 02P16V511-A Service Water Train-A Strainer Inlet Valve.
Q2P16V508-B Service Water Train-B Strainer Inlet Valve.
Q2P16V507-A Service Water Swing Pump Q2P16M001C-AB Discharge to Train A Q2P16V506-B Service Water Swing Pump Q2P16M001C-AB Discharge to Train B i
The strainer valves are separated horizontally by 19 ft - 6 in, on center.
The discharge valves are separated horizontally by 5 ft on center.
3.
The Unit-1 side of the strainer pit contains redundant Unit-1 service water header strainer motor operated inlet valves and swing pump motor operated discharge valves.
VALVES FUNCTION OlP16V511-A Service Water Train-A Strainer Inlet Valve.
1-3-2 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT l
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Q1P16V508-B Service Water Train-B Strainer Inlet Valve QlP16V507-A Service Water Swing Pump Q1P16M001C-AB Discharge to Train A OlP16V506-B Service Water Swing Pump Q1P16M001C-AB Discharge to Train B The strainer valves are separated horizontally 20 ft on center.
The discharge valves are separated horizontally by 6ft -6 in. on center.
4.
Zone A contains redundant safe-shutdown service water Train-A and -B cables shared by Unit 1 and Unit 2.
The redundant cables service the following valves:
REQUIRED VALVE PRE-FIRE POST-FIRE NO.
FUNCTION POSITION POSITION QSP16V505-A Service Water Train-A Dis-Closed Closed charge to Wet Pit.
QSP16V507-A Service Water Train-A Dis-Open Open charge to Storage Pond Flume QSP16V506-B Service Water Train-B Dis-Closed Closed charge to Wet Pit.
QSP16V508-B Service Water Train-B Dis-Open Open charge to Storage Pond Flume.
The analysis of the effects of fire upon the Train-A and
-B circuits located in fire area 72 zone A, shows that the subject valves could change from their pre-fire position.
5.
Zones A and E contain redundant Unit-1 and Unit-2 service water Train-A and -B cables.
The condition exists when the swing service water pumps QlP16M001C-AB and/or Q2P16M001C-AB are lined up to their respective B Trains.
The redundant Train-A cables service the following valves.
REQUIRED VALVE PRE-FIRE POST-FIRE NO.
FUNCTION POSITION POSITION OlP16V507-A Service Water Pump Q1P16M001C-Closed closed AB Discharge to Train A 02P16V507-A Service Water Pump 02P16M001C-Closed Closed AB Discharge to Train A 1-3-3 Rev. 1
f J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION The analysis of the effects of the fire on the Train-A valve circuits located in fire area 72 zones A and E, shows that the subject Train-A valves could change from their pre-fire position.
The pre-fire position of valves QlP16V507-A, and Q2P16V507-A is required to be maintained to insure that the service water headers are not cross-connected when only the B Train of service water pumps are operational.
~
6.
Zones A and B contain redundant Unit-1 and Unit-2 service water Train-A and -B cables.
The condition exists when the swing service water pump OlP16M001C-AB and/or Q2P16M001C-AB are lined up to their respective A Trains.
The redundant Train-B cables service the following valves.
REQUIRED VALVE PRE-FIRE POST-FIRE NO.
FUNCTION POSITION POSITION QlP16V506-B Service Water Pump OlP16M001C-Closed closed AB Discharge to Train B Q2P16V506-B Service Water Pump Q2P16M001C-Closed Closed AB Discharge to Train B The analysis of the effects of the fire on the Train-B valve circuits located in fire area 72 zones A and B, shows that the subject Train-B valves could change from their pre-fire position.
The pre-fire position of valves OlP16V507-B and Q2P16V507-B are required to be maintained to insure that the service water headers are not cross-connected when only the A Train of service water pumps are operational.
7.
Zones D and E contain redundant Unit-1 and Unit-2 service water swing pump cables.
This condition exists when the swing service water pumps OlP16M001C-AB and/or Q2P16M001C-AB are powered from their respective B Trains.
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION QlR18A501A-A Service Water Swing Pump OlP16M001C-AB Train-A Disconnect Switch Q2R18A501A-A Service Water Swing Pump 02P16M001C-AB Train-A Disconnect Switch.
The Train-B cables enter the disconnect switch via bottom entry embedded conduit that is not exposed at any other point in zones D and E.
i 1-3-4 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION 8.
Zones B and C contain redundant Unit-1 and Unit-2 service water swing pump cables.
This condition exists when the swing service water pump QlP16M001C-AB and/or Q2P16M001C-AB are powered from their respective A Trains.
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION OlR18A501B-B Service Water Swing Pump Q1P16M001C-AB Train-B Disconnect Switch Q2R18A501B-B Service Water Swing Pump Q2P16M001C-AB Train-B Disconnect Switch.
The Train-A cables enter the disconnect switch via bottom entry embedded conduit that is not exposed at any other point in zones B and C.
9.
Zone A contains redundant safe-shutdown service water Train-A and -B pumps for Unit 1 and Unit 2.
Equipment FUNCTION OlP16P001A-A Unit-1 Service Water Pump Train A Q1P16P001B-A Unit-1 Service Water Pump Train A OlP16P001C-AB Unit-1 Service Water Swing Punp OlP16P001D-B Unit-1 Service Water Pump Train B OlP16P001E-B Unit-1 Service Water Pump Train B l
Q2P16P001A-A Unit-2 Service Water Pump Train A Q2P16P001B-A Unit-2 Service Water Pump Train A Q2P16P001C-AB Unit-2 Service Water Swing Pump Q2P16P001D-B Unit-2 Service Water Pump Train B Q2P16P001E-B Unit-2 Service Water Pump Train B Subject pumps are separated horizontally by 5 ft on center.
JUSTIFICATION:
1.
The entire pump deck at elevation 188 ft -6 in. is covered by preaction sprinkler systems. which provide coverage for pumps Q2P16M002A-A and Q2P16M002B-B, and valves Q2P16V719A-A and Q2P16V719B-B.
In addition, the service water pumps and the floor area immediately 1-3-5 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION around them are provided with a preaction spray system.
l The strainer pit at el 167 ft - 3 in, also has preaction sprinkler system coverage for local control stations Q2P16G508A-A and Q2P16G508B-B.
Train A of the redundant safe-shutdown raceway that services the subject equipment is protected by a barrier (two 1-in.-thick wraps of Kaowool blanket) having a fire rating greater than that of the projected fire, which is less than 1/2 h maximum severity.
The entire fire area is provided with detection.
Therefore, adequate fire protection features exist to ensure that a fire in zone A will not affect both redundant trains of service water.
As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, a lighting fixture above the subject pumps will be moved to inhance suppression coverage.
2.
The strainer pit at el 167 ft - 3 in has preaction sprinkler system
- erage for the redundant valves Q2P16VS11-A, Q2P16'1508-B, - Q2P16V507-A, and Q2P16V506-B.
The raceways that service Q2P16V511-A and Q2P16V507-A are protected by a barrier (two one-in. thick wraps of Kaowool blanket) having a fire rating greater than that of the projected fire, which is less than 1/2 h maximum severity.
The entire fire area is provided with detection.
The strainer inlet valves are separated by l
19 ft - 6 in. on center and the swing pump discharge l
valves are separated Ly 5 ft on center.
There is l
minimal intervening combustible material between the redundant valves consisting of cable insulation.
In additier., the Train-A cable in the area of these valves is wrapped with Kaowool blankets.
3.
The strainer pit at el 167 ft - 3 in. has preaction sprinkler system coverage for the redundant valves OlP16V511-A, QlP16V508-B, QlP16V507-A, and QlP16V506-B.
The raceways that service OlP16V511-A and Q1P16V507-A are protected by a barrier (two 1-in.-thick wraps of Kaowool blanket) having a fire rating greater than that of the projected fire, which is less than 1/2 h maximum severity.
The entire fire area is provided with detection.
The strainer inlet valves are separated by 20 ft on center and the swing pump discharge valves are separated by 6 ft - 6 in. on center.
There is minimal intervening combustible material between the redundant valves consisting of cable insulation.
In addition, the Train-A cable in the area of these valves has been wrapped with Kaowool blankets.
4.
Valves QSPV16V505-A, QSP16V507-A, QSP16V506-B, and QSP16V508-B - The requirement to shift service water discharge from the circ water canal to recirculate to the service water pond is a long term one, not required for 24 h and can be accomplished by manually 1-3-6 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION repositioning the subject valves as required.
Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the above action for a fire in fire area 72 zone A.
5.
Valves OlP16V507-A and Q2P16V507-A - Placing into service OlP16M001C-AB or Q2P16M001C-AB swing service water pumps is required when one of the normal train pumps is out of service for maintenance or repair.
To preclude the repositioning of the subject valves, after the respective swing pump alignment is performed, the Power will be removed from the appropriate swing pump opposite train discharge valve i.e.
When the swing pump is aligned to Train B, the Train-A service water valve (QlP16V507-A and/or Q2P16V507-A) will be maintained in the closed position by administratively removing power to the valve.
Plant procedures will be revised to incorporate the above action.
6.
Valves OlP16V506-B and Q2P16V506-B - Placing into service OlP16M001C-AB or Q2P16M001C-AB swing service water pumps is required when one of the normal train pumps is out of service for maintenance repair.
To preclude the repositioning of the subject valves, after the respective swing pump alignment is performed, the Power will be removed from the appropriate swing pump opposite the train discharge valve, i.e.,
when the swing Pumps (OlP16M001C-AB and/or Q2P16M001C-AB) are aligned to Train A, the Train-B service water valve (01P16V506-B and/or Q2P16V506-B) will be maintained in the closed Position by administratively removing the power to the valve.
Plant procedures will be revised to incorporate the above action.
7.
The Unit-1 and Unit-2 swing pump power is supplied from 4160 V switchgear Train A, located in zone E, and Train B, located in zone B.
The pump power circuit breaker is key interlocked with its associated disconnect switch.
Therefore power from the redundant Train-A and -B sources will not be in the disconnect switch at one time.
In addition the redundant Train-A and -B disconnect switches are key interlocked, preventing both switches being closed at one time.
The Train-B cables enter the disconnect switch via bottom entry embedded conduit that is not exposed at any other point in zones D and E.
The disconnect switch and switchgear in these zones have an automatic CO2 fif*
detection and suppression system for protection.
Zones D and E are separated from zones A, B,
and C by non-rated reinforced concrete walls.
The sprinkler system in zone A will act as a water curtain to prevent the spread of a fire from zones A, B,
and C to zones D l
l l-3-7 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION and E via the non-rated walls and doors in zone A.
Therefore, adequate fire protection features exist to ensure that a fire in zones A.
B, or C will not effect i
both redundant trains of service water.
8.
The Unit-1 and Unit-2 swing pump power is supplied from 4160 V switchgear Train A, located in zone E, and Train B, located in zone B.
The pump power circuit breaker is key interlocked with its associated i
disconnect switch.
Therefore power from the redundant i
Train-A and -B sources will not be in the the disconnect switch at one time.
In addition the redundant Train-A and -B disconnect switches are key interlocked, preventing bot h switches being closed at one time.
The Train-A cables enter the disconnect switch via bottom entry embedded conduit that is not exposed at any other point in zones B and C.
The disconnect switch and switchgear in these zones have an automatic CO2 fif*
detection and suppression system for protection.
Zones B and C are separated from zones A, D, and E by non-rated reinforced concrete walls.
The sprinkler system in zone A will act as a water curtain to prevent the spread of a fire from zones A, D, and E to zones B 3
and C via the non-rated walls and doors in zone A.
Therefore, adequate fire protection features exist to 1
ensure that a fire in zones A. D, or E will not effect both redundant trains of service water.
9.
The entire pump deck at el 188 ft -6 in. is covered by preaction sprinkler systems which provide coverage for I
the Unit-1 and -2 Train-A and -B service water pump deck area.
Additionally the pumps and the floor area immediately around them are covered by a preaction spray system.
The Unit-1 and Unit-2 service water pumps are separated by a concrete block wall which extends approximately 20 ft out from the south zone barrier onto the pump deck.
The individual unit Train-A and -B pumps are sepa?
id by curbs and partial height barriers of 4
I fire-rate Jonstruction located on either side of the I
swing pump.
These barriers'act as radiant heat shields and prevent the spread of an oil spill from one train to the other.
The installed sprinkler and spray systems l
will act as a water curtain to prevent a fire on the pump deck from spreading to the redundant train or l
opposite unit service water pumps.
The raceways servicing the Train-A service water pumps for both units i
have been protected by a barrier (two 1-in, thick wraps i
)
of Kaowool blanket) having a fire rating greater than that of the projected fire, which is less than 1/2 h l
1-3-8 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION maximum severity.
The entire fire area is provided with detection.
Therefore, adequate fire protection features exist to ensure that a fire in zone A will not effect both redundant trains of service water.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
72 ZONE A MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES ___
TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft21 SEVERITY Service Water Unit-1 Lubricating 240 gal 6,104
<30 min Pump Room A.
B Oil Unit-2 Cable Insul.
3.321 lb 13,330 A. B FIRE AREA:
72 Zone B MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft21 SEVERITY Zone B Unit-1 B Cable Insul.
2775 lb 37,547
<30 min Switchgear Room Train B Unit-2 A, B
FIRE AREA:
72 Zone C MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft21 SEVERITY Zone C 5 kV Unit-1 Cable Insul.
20 lb 255
<30 min Disconnect A, B Switch Room Train B Unit-2 B 1-3-9 Rev. 1 L
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIK "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION l
FIRE AREA:
72 Zone D MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDONN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 2
l TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY i
Zone D 5 kV Unit-1 A Cable Insul.
20 lb 255
<30 min Disconnect Switch Room Train A j
Unit-2 A, B
i l
FIRE AREA:
72 Zone E MAXIMUM l
ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 2
TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY Zone E Unit 1A, Cable Insul.
2701 lb 36,544
<30 min l
Switchgear B
l Room Train A 1
Unit-2 A DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floors, ceilings, and walls forming the area and zone boundry are of reinforced concrete.
Doors: ~ All doors are non-rated with the exception of 3-h doors separating fire areas 72, 73, and 74.
Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:
All wall penetrations through the area boundries are sealed with silicone foam.
4 Ventilation:
The area is normally ventilated.
Floor Drains:
The floor drainage has a capacity of 100 gal /m which discharges to yard drains.
i l
FIRE PROTECTION:
l A smoke detection system that gives local alarm and annunciates in the control room is installed in this zone.
Fire barriers and I
curbs are installed between redundant service water pumps.
Two yard hydrants are installed within the security fence surrounding the service water building.
One preaction spray system is l
provided for the service water pumps and the area immediately around them.
As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, heat collectors are to be installed over each spray nozzle in this system to increase its responsiveness to a fire l
condition.
Two other preaction systems l
1 1-3-10 Rev. I l
.-_ -.---. -.-,,.-_...- ~..- _ - ---_-.--
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
~
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION provide coverage to the entire pump deck, the area in the strainer pit beneath the pump deck, and to safe-shutdown cabling in the upper northeast corner of the service water pump room.
Additional protection in the area covered by the sprinkler system is afforded by enclosing one train of redundant raceway in a fire-rated barrier.
In addition, the automatic CO2 fire detection and suppression system in the cabinets protects the switchgear in this area.
The CO2 system has a local alarm and annunciation in the control room.
Local manual initiation is available.
~
Portable extinguishers are located in fire zones 72A, B,
C. D, and E.
1-3-11 Rev. 1
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.s es JostPH u. FAmLtv 10 CTR 50 APPENDIX "R TIRE HAZ ARDS Alabama Power d
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ANAtysIs REEVALUATION: FIRE APIA UNIT 1 AND UNif 2 72 ZONES A-E EXEMPTION PIO FIG se u,.s 1-3-12 Rev, 1 l
7 ADDEN3UM TO EXEMPTION REQUEST 1-3, FIRE AREA 72 EXEMPTION: Request an exemption from Section III.G.2 to the extent it requires safe-shutdown equipment to be isolated from associated non-safety circuits.
CONDITI'ON REQUIRING EXEMPTION:
An associated circuit review indicated that adequate coordination is not provided between safe-shutdown circuits and associated nonsafe-shutdown circuits powered from 125V DC Distribution Panels 1N, 2N,1M, 2M. The l
safe-shutdown circuits from these distribution panels provide control power for safe-shutdown breakers. A short circuit in an associated cable from one of the distribution panels could result in a loss of power to the panel, and therefore, a loss of control power to the safe-shutdown breakers powered from the affected panel.
JUSTIFIC ATION:
A loss of power to one of the 125V DC Distribution Panels 1N, 2N, IM cr 2M will result in the loss of breaker control power for the following safe-shutdown loads controlled from that panel as shown below.
Distribution Panel IN:
4 kV Breaker DLO2 to Load Center L 600 V Load Center Tie Breaker ELOS Service Water Pump 1C Service Water Pump 1D Service Water Pump 1E 600V Load Center Breaker ELO9 4 kV Tie Breaker DG02 Distribution Panel 2N:
Service Water Pump 2C Service Water Pump 20 Service Water Pump 2E 4 kV Breaker DLO2 to Load Center L Distribution Panel 1M:
4 kV Breaker DK02 to Load Center K 600V Load Center Tie Breaker EK05 Service Water Pump 1A Service Water Pump 1B Service Water Pump 1C 600V Load Center Breaker EK03 Distribution Panel 2M:
Service Water Pump 2A Service Water Pump 2B Service Water Pump 2C 4 kV Breaker DK02 to Load Center K 4 kV Tie Breaker DF02 1-3-13 i
l Addendum to Exemption Request 1-3, Fire Area 72 Page 2 A loss of breaker control power from the single effected panel will not interrupt the operation of the load powered by the breaker. However, electrical control of the breaker including breaker protection circuits and handswi'tch operation will not be functional. A loss of power to one of the subject DC distribution panels will not preclude any necessary control and operation of safe-shutdown equipment. Should the need arise, manual operation of the affected breaker would be possible.
Although not part of the justification for this exemption request, a design change has been initiated to improve the breaker coordination. This design change is currently scheduled to be installed prior to the end of the Unit I seventh refueling outage in 1986. Upon completion, the potential for the fire damage will no longer exist.
DHJ /gri-D30 1-3-14 L
J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
1-7 Rev. 1
[
FIRE AREA:
2-031 (Evaluation of effects on Unit-1 cabling) l LOCATION: UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING CABLE CHASE TRAIN A Fire area 2-031 consists of rooms 2250 (el 121 ft - 0 in, and 139 ft - 0 in.) and 2251 (el 127 ft - 0 in.).
All area boundary walls, floors, and ceilings are 3-h fire rated except for a non-rated bulkhead between this fire area and the cable tunnel i
(area 2-075).
A non-fire-rated watertight door exists between room 2251 and the cable tunnel (area 2-075), and a UL Class-A fire-rated door exists between rooms 2250 and 2235 (area 2-023).
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the water tight door on the fire area 2-075 side.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating.
- CONDITION REQUIRING EXEMPTION:
A fire in Unit-2 area 2-031 could potentially result in fire damage to the electrical circuitry of both Unit-1 and Unit-2 Train-A diesel generators.
This condition along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit I could result irc the f ollowing Unit-1 saf e shutdown equipment and instrumentation being effected.
EQUIPMENT FUNCTION OlN11PV3371A-A
' Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1A) 01NilPV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1B)
Q1NilPV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-lC)
The analysis of the potentiai effects of loss of power for the main steam atmospheric relief valves has shown that the valves could become inoperable in the closed position.
INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION N1B21TE413(LOOP-1)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature. Indication N1B21TE423(LOOP-2)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature. Indication N1B21TE433(LOOP-3)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication OlC55NE0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0032-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor
l J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT l
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION The analysis of the potential effects caused by loss of power to j
the instrumentation listed above has shown that a loss of power to the instrument loops could result.
l JUSTIFICATION:
l l
One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve I
steam release for cooldown.
The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.
i The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.
Both the air i
control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their j
associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible j
despite a fire in area 2-031.
The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit-2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.
Consequently, fire in area 2-031 would not Prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.
Each of the RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loops is powered from 120 V-ac distribution panel lJ.
Distribution panel j
IJ is powered from inverter IF which is powered from 600 V-ac MCC l
1A or 125 V-dc bus lA.
A fire in area 2-031 could result in loss of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter 1F: however, inverter IF l
will continue to operate from 125 V-dc bus lA and will supply l
power to 120 V-ac distribution panel lJ for a minimum of 2 h.
If l
after 2 h power is lost, RCS hot leg temperature is available i
from the core exit temperature indication in the main control room from the core exit thermocouples.
Core exit temperature indication will not be affected by a fire in area 2-008.
In addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 h and core exit temperature indication availability, a design change to be installed as a result of R.G.
1.97.will provide a redundant power supply and provide cable separation and redundant i
signal processing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature loops N1B21TE413, N1B21TE423, and N1B21TE433.
In order to implement this design change, it is required that all design and material be onsite prior to initiation of the modification.
Based upon the R.G.
1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of the modification is currently planned for the seventh refueling 1-7-2 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION 4
outage presently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986.
After plant implementation of this modification, a fire in area 2-031 will not affect the ability to monitor one loop of RCS hot leg temperature.
Post-accident neutron monitor OlC55NE0048A-A is powered from inverter 1F, Source range neutron flux monitors NIC55NE0031-P1 and N1C55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelized inverters lA and 1B vhich are also powered by 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus lA.
Therefore, neutron flux mon'itoring following potential fire damage in area 2-031 and the resultant loss of 600 V-ac MCC 1A wil be available for a minimum of 2 h.
An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RHR system by using portions of the RCS sampling system and RHR HK No.1 and No.2 sample valves OlP15HV3105-B and Q1P15HV3106-B for determination of the boron concentration and shutdown margin following fire in area 2-031.
Unit-1 plant procedures will be written to incorporate above actions for a fire in Unit-2 area 2-031.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
2-031 l
MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL OUANT7TY (Btu /ftal SEVERITY Rooms 2250 A
Cable Insul. 12.303 lb 794,491
<9 h l
and 2251 Cable Chase i
DESIGN FEATURES:
l Construction:
Floors, ceilings, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
A UL Class-A door exists between rooms 2250 and 2235 (area 2-023).
A non-fire-rated watertight door exists between l
room 2251 and the cable tunnel.
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the tunnel-side of the non-rated door with the exception of the hinges.
l Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:
All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Bulkhead between this fire area and cable tunnel (area 2-075) is non-fire rated.
1-7-3 Rev. 1 l
O J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION l
I Ventilation:
There is no normal ventilation for this area and fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.
Floor drains:
There are no floor drains.
FIRE PROTECTION:
A smoke detection system and automatic sprinkler water suppression system is provided in this area.
In addition. the water hoses located in room 2234 (area 2-020) are available for use as backup.
JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION The watertight door between auxiliary building (area 2-031) and cable tunnel (area 2-075) does not comply with 3-h fire-rated boundary requirements.
However a fire in area 2-031 propagating into area 2-075 will not ha.ve any additional impact on Unit-1 safe shutdown because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both areas.
In addition the fire resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under fire protection surveillance program.
l l-7-4 Rev. 1
c J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
1-8 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
.2-075 (Evaluation for effects on Unit-1 cabling) l LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING TO DIESEL BUILDING CABLE TUNNEL TRAIN A Fire area 2-075 consists of a cable tunnel running from the Unit-2 auxiliary building to the diesel generator building.
The fire area boundary walls, floors, and ceilings are 3-h fire rated except for a non-rated bulkhead between this fire area and area 2-031.
A UL Class-A fire-rated door exists between the tunnel and diesel building and a non-fire-rated water tight door exists between the tunnel and auxiliary building (area 2-031).
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the watertight door leading into the auxiliary building.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating.
CONDITION REOUIRING EXEMPTION:
A fire in Unit-2 area 2-075 could potentially result in fire damage to the electrical circuitry of both Ur.it-1 and Unit-2 Train-A diesel generators.
This condition along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit-1 could result in the following Unit-1 safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation being effected.
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1NilPV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1A)
Q1N11PV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1B)
Q1N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1C)
The analysis of the potential effects of loss of power for the main steam atmospheric relief valves has shown that the valves could become inoperable in the closed position.
INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION N1B21TE413(LOOP-1)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N1B21TE423(LOOP-2)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature. Indication N1B21TE433(LOOP-3)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication QlC55NE0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0032-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor s
1-8-1 Rev. 1
r J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION The analysis of the potential effects caused by loss of power to the instrumentation listed above has shown that a loss of power to the instrument loops could result.
JUSTIFICATION:
One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.
The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.
The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.
Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 2-075.
The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit-2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.
Consequently, a fire in area 2-075 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.
Each of the RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loops is powered from 120 V-ac distribution panel lJ.
Distribution panel lJ is powered from inverter IF which is powered from 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus lA.
A fire in area 2-075 could result in loss of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter 1F; however, inverter IF will continue to operate from 125 V-dc bus lA and will supply power to 120 V-ac distribution panel lJ for a minimum of 2 h.
If after 2 h power is lost, RCS hot leg temperature is available from the core exit temperature indication in the main control room from the core exit thermocouples.
Core exit temperature l
indication will not be affected by a fire in area 2-075.
In addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 h and core exit temperature indication availability, a design change to be installed as a result of R.G.
1.97 will provide a redundart power supply and provide cable separation and redundant signal 9rocessing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature loops FIB 21TE413, N1B21TE423, and N1B21TE433.
In order to implement this design change, it is required that all design and material be onsite prior to initiation of the modification.
Based upon the R.G.
1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of 1-8-2 Rev. 1
r J.
M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION the modification is currently planned for the seventh refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986.
After plant implementation of this modification, a fire in area 2-075 will not affect the ability to monitor one loop of RCS hot leg temperature.
Post-accident neutron flux monitor OlC55NE0048A-A is powered from inverter 1F.
Source range neutron flux monitors NIC55NEOO31-P1 and N1C55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelized inverters lA and 1B which are also powered by 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus lA.
Therefore, neutron flux monitoring following potential fire damage in area 2-075 and the resultant loss of 600 V-ac MCC 1A will be available for a minimum of 2 h.
An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RHR system by using portions of the RCS sampling system and RHR Hx No.1 and No.2 sample valves OlP15HV3105-B and OlP15HV3106-B for determination of tne boron concentration and shutdown margin following a fire in area 2-075.
Unit-1 plant procedures will be written to incorporate above actions for a fire in Unit-2 area 2-075.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA: 2-075 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 81 SEVERITY Cable Tunnel A
Cable Insul.
32,650 lb 59,600
<1 h DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floor, ceiling, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
The door to diesel building is UL Class-A fire-rated.
The door between tunnel and auxiliary building (area 2-031) is a non-fire-rated water tight door.
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the non-rated door with the exception of the hinges.
Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:
All wall penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Bulkhead between cable tunnel and auxiliary building (area 2-031) is non-fire rated.
l l
i 1-8-3 Rev. 1
r J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Ventilation:
None Floor drains:
The floor drainage has a capacity of 100 gal /m which discharges to yard drains.
A sump and sump pump are provided.
FIRE PROTECTION:
An automatic water suppression system is installed in this area.
JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION:
The watertight door between auxiliary building (area 2-031) and cable tunnel (area 2-075) does not comply with 3-h fire-rated boundary requirements.
However a fire in area 2-075 propagating into area 2-031 will not have any additional impact on Unit-1 safe shutdown because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both areas.
In addition, the fire-resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under a fire protection surveillance program.
1 l
1-8-4 Rev. 1 I
1 J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
1-9 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
2-030 (Evaluation for effects on Unit-1 cabling)
LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUKILIARY BUILDING CABLE CHASE TRAIN B Y
Fire area 2-030 consists of rooms 2249 (el 121 ft - 0 in. and 139 ft - 0 in.) and 2252 (el 127 ft -0 in.).
All fire area boundary walls, floors, and ceilings are 3-h fire rated except for a non-rated bulkhead between this area and the cable tunnel (area 2-076).
A UL Class-A fire-rated door exists between rooms 2249 and 2235 (area 2-023).
The door between room 2252 and cable tunnel (area 2-076) is a non-fire-rated watertight door.
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the watertight door on the fire area 2-076 side.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating.
CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION AND THEIR JUSTIFICATION:
1.
CONDITION:
Fire area 2-030 contains electrical Train-B l
control cables associated with the shared Diesel Generator 2C start-stop circuit.
An analysis of the effects of a fire 1
upon these cables shows that DG-2C would fail to start and align to 4.16 kV Bus lJ.
JUSTIFICATION:
4.16 kV Bus 1J powers the river water pumps which are considered non-safe shutdown equipment.
Loss of i
river water pumps will not affect Unit-1 safe shutdown.
2.
CONDITION:
Fire area 2-030 contains electrical Train-B control cables associated with the following safe shutdown components.
EQUIPMENT FUNCTION QSP16V506-B Service Water Train-B Emergency Recirc. to Wetpit QSP16V508-B Service Train-B Emergency Recire. to Pond An analysis of the effects of a fire upon these cables shows that the subject valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperable.
In addition Unit-1 service water valve OlP16V538-B, which returns water to wetpit/ pond could fail in the normal closed position due to loss of power to MCC-lP.
1-9-1 Rev. 1
i J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION JUSTIFICATION.
1.
When service water discharge is lined up to the river through open valve Q1P16V545-B (normal operating condition).
1 The requirement to chift the service water discharge from the circulating water canal to recirculate to the service water pond is a long term one, not required for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and can be accomplished by manually repositioning the subject valves as required.
2.
When service water discharge is lined up for recirculating mode to the pond (required when necessary to conserve pond inventory).
The effects of a fire could cause immediate loss of Train-B service water.
However the controls of Train-B service water discharge valve OlP16V545-B to the river are not affected by a fire in area 2-030 and operator action will be taken to open the valve and reinstate Train-B service water..
until recirc to the pond can be re-established by manual operation of the subject valves listed in condition 2 above.
Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the above actions for a fire in Unit-2 fire area 2-030.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
2-030 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL OUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY 2
Rooms 2249 B, C Cable Insul.
5,760 lb 423,898
<8 h and 2252 Cable Chase DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floors, walls, and ceiling forming area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
A non-fire-rated watertight door exists between room 2252 and Train-B cable tunnel (area 2-076) leading to diesel building and an airtight UL Class-A fire-rated door exists between rooms 2249 and 2235 (area 2-023).
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the tunnel side of the non-rated door with'the exception of the hinges.
1-9-2 Rev. 1
l l
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT l
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION
(
Piping and Electrical Penetrations:
All penetrations through the i
area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Bulkhead between this fire area and cable tunnel (area 2-076) is non-fire rated.
i Ventilation:
No normal ventilation is provided.
Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.
Floor Drains:
No floor drains are provided.
FIRE PROTECTION:
A smoke detection system and automatic water suppression system are installed in this area.
The manual hose station located in room 2234 (area 2-020) is available for use in this area.
JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION:
The watertight door between auxiliary building (area 2-030) and cable tunnel, (area 2-076) does not comply with 3-h fire-rated boundary requirements.
However, a fire in area 2-030 propagating into area 2-076 will not have any additional impact on Unit-1 safe shutdown because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both the areas.
In addition, the fire-resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under fire protection surveillance program.
1-9-3 Rev. 1
P s,
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" PIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
1-10 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
2-021 (Evaluation for effects on Unit-1 cabling) l LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING SWITCHGEAR ROOM TRAIN B Fire area 2-021 consists of rooms 2229 and 2233 at el 121 ft -0 in, and is bounded by 3-h fire-rated walls, ceilings, and floors.
The area boundary doors are UL Class-A fire rated.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire-rating and the installation of an automatic fire suppression system.
CONDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTION AND THEIR JUSTIFICATION:
1.
CONDITION:
Fire area 2-021 contains electrical Train-B control cables associated with the shared Diesel Generator 2C start-stop circuit.
An analysis of the effects of a fire upon these cables shows that DG-2C would fail to start and align to 4.16 kV Bus lJ.
JUSTIFICATION:
4.16 kV Bus lJ powers the river water pumps which are considered non-safe shutdown equipment.
Loss of river water pumps will not affect Unit-1 safe shutdown.
j 2.
CONDITION:
Fire area 2-021 contains electrical Train-B control cables associated with the following safe shutdown components.
EOUIPMENT PUNCTION QSP16V506-B Service Water Train-B Emergency Recire. to Wetpit QSP16V508-B Service Train-B Emergency Recire. to Pond An analysis of the effects of a fire upon these cables shows that the subject valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperable.
l In addition Unit-1 service water valve QlP16V538-B which returns water to wetpit/ pond could fail in the normal closed l
position due to loss of power to MCC-lP.
I l
l l
~1-10-1 Rev. 1 l1 -
b J. M.
PARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION l
l JUSTIFICATION:
1.
When service water discharge is lined up to the river through open valve OlP16V545-B (normal operating condition).
The requirement to shift the service water discharge from the circulating water canal to recirculate to the service water pond is a long term one, not required for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and can be accomplished by manually repositioning the subject valves as required.
2.
When service water discharge is lined up for recirculating mode to the pond (required when necessary to conserve pond inventory).
The effects of a fire could cause immediate loss of Train-B service water.
However the controls of Train-B service water discharge valve OlP16V545-B to the river are not affected by a fire in area 2-021 and operator action will be taken to open the valve and reinstate Train-B service water, until recirc to the pond can be re-established by manual operation of the subject valves listed in condition 2 above.
Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the above actions for a fire in Unit-2 fire area 2-021.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
2-021 l
MAXIMUM l
ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE l
TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL OUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVFRITY 2
Rooms 2229 B
Cable Insul.
18,215 lb 109,062
<l-1/2 h and 2233 Panels 44 lb t
l Switchgear Rooms l
DESIGN FEATURES:
l Construction:
Floors, ceilings, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
UL Class-A fire-rated doors are located between room 2229 and 2228 (area 2-020), 2233 and 2228 (area 2-020), and 2233 and 2235 (area 2-023).
Piping & Electrical Penetrations:
All penetrations through the l
area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
1-10-2 Rev. 1
l J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Ventilation:
Normal supply and exhaust is by the non-radwaste H&V system and 600 V load center airconditioning system.
A room cooler serves room 2229.
Fire dampers are provided at duct penetrations.
Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.
Floor Drains:
No floor drains are provided.
FIRE PROTECTION:
An area smoke detection system is installed.
Heat detectors are provided in the 4.16 kV switchgear, the 5 kV disconnect switch, and the four 600 V load centers.
These heat detectors activate the alarm horn located in the area and the total-flooding CO2 systems in each piece of equipment.
A water hose located in room hose reel located 2234 (area 2-020) outside room 2235 and a CO2 in room 2210 (area 2-020) are available as backup.
I i
l l-10-3 Rev. 1 lh-
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
1-11 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
2-023 (Evaluation for effects on Unit-1 cabling) l LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING CRDM SWITCHGEAR ROOM Fire area 2-023 consists only of room 2235 at el 121 ft - O in.
and is bounded by 3-h fire-rated floors, ceilings, and walls.
The area boundary doors are UL Class-A fire-rated doors.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating.
CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION AND THEIR JUSTIFICATION:
1.
CONDITION:
Fire area 2-023 contains electrical Train-B control cables associated with the shared Diesel Generator 2C start-stop circuit.
An analysis of the effects of a fire upon these cables shows that DG-2C would fail to start and align to 4.16 kV Bus lJ.
JUSTIFICATION:
4.16 kV Bus lJ powers the river water pumps which are considered non-safe shutdown equipment.
Loss of river water pumps will not affect Unit-1 safe shutdown.
2.
CONDITION:
Fire area 2-023 contains electrical Train-B control cables associated with the following safe shutdown components.
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION QSP16V506-B Service Water Train-B Emergency Recirc. to Wetpit QSP16V508-B Service Train-B Emergency Recirc. to Pond An analysis of the effects of a fire upon these cables shows that the subject valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperable.
In addition Unit-1 service water valve OlP16V538-B. which returns water to wetpit/ pond could fail in the normal closed position due to loss of power to MCC-lP.
l l
l-11-1 Rev. 1 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION JUSTIFICATION:
1.
When service water discharge is lined up to the river through open valve QlP16V545-B (normal operating condition).
The requirement to shift the service water discharge from the circulating water canal to recirculate to the service water pond is a long term one, not required for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and can be accomplished by manually repositioning the subject valves as required.
2.
When service water discharge is lined up for recirculating mode to the pond (required when necessary to conserve pond inventory).
The effects of a fire could cause immediate loss of Train-B service water.
However the controls of Train-B service water discharge valve Q1P16V545-B to the river are not affected by a fire in area 2-023 and operator action will be taken to open the valve and reinstate Train-B service water, until recirc to the pond can be re-established by manual c eration p
of the subject valves listed in condition 2 above.
Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the above actionc for a fire in Unit-2 fire area 2-023.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
2-023 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COhBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 8
TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY Room 2235 B
Cable Insul.
6,599 lb 68,002
<1 h CRDM Switchgear Panels 43 lb DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floor, ceiling, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
Airtight UL Class-A fire-rated doors are used for area boundaries between rooms 2235 and 2234 (area 2-020): 2235 and 2249 (area 2-030): 2235 and 2250 (area 2-031); and 2235 and 2233 (area 2-021).
l 1-11-2 Rev. 1 l
l
o J. M. PARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:
All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Ventilation:
Normal supply and exhaust is provided by the non-radwaste H&V system.
Fire dampers are provided and are interlocked with total-flooding Halon system.
Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.
Floor Drains:
No floor drains are provided.
Fire Protection:
Ionization smoke detectors are provided which activate total flooding Halon system, activate alarm bell in room 2234 (area 2-020), and annunciate in the main control room.
A water hose installed in room 2234 (area 2-020) outside of room 2235 is available as a back up.
e e
1-11-3 Rev. 1
\\
^*
J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EKEMPTION REQUEST:
1-12 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
2-076 (Evaluation of effects on Unit-1 cabling)
LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUKILIARY BUILDING TO DIESEL BUILDING CABLE i
TUNNEL THAIN B Fire area 2-076 consists of a cable tunnel running from the Unit-2 auxiliary building to the diesel building.
The fire area boundary walls, floor, and ceiling are 3-h fire rated except for i
a non-rated bulkhead between this fire area and fire area 2-030.
A UL Class-A fire-rated door exists between the cable tunnel and the diesel building, and a non-fire-rated watertight door exists between the cable tunnel and the auxiliary building (area 2-030).
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the water tight door leading into the auxiliary building.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the i
extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire detection system.
CONDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTIONS AND THEIR JUSTIFICATI.ON:
1.
CONDITION:
Fire area 2-076 contains electrical Train-B l
control cables associated with the shared Diesel Generator 2C l
start-stop circuit.
An analysis of the effects of a fire upon these cables shows that DG-2C would fail to start and align to 4.16 kV Bus lJ.
JUSTIFICATION:
4.16 kV Bus lJ powers the river water pumps l
which are considered non-safe shutdown equipment.
Loss of j
river water pumps will not affect Unit-1 safe shutdown.
1 2.
CONDITION:
Fire area 2-076 contains electrical Train-B control cables associated with the following safe shutdown components.
EQUIPMENT FUNCTION QSP16V506-B Service Water Train-B Emergency Recirc. to Wetpit QSP16V508-B Service Train-B Emergency Hecire. to Pond l
An analysis of the effects of a fire upon these cables shows that the subiect valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperable.
In addition Unit-1 service water valve QlP16V538-B. which returns water to wetpit/ pond could fail in the normal closed position due to loss of power to MCC-lP.
1-12-1 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION JUSTIFICATION:
1.
When service water discharge is lined up to the river through open valve QlP16V545-B (normal operating condition).
l The requirement to shift the service water discharge from the l
circulating water canal to recirculate to the service water i
pond is a long term one, not required for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and can be accomplished by manually repositioning the' subject valves as
)
required.
2.
When service water discharge is lined up for recirculating mode to the pond (required when necessary to conserve pond inventory).
The effects of a fire could cause immediate loss of Train-B service water.
However the controls of Train-B service water discharge valve Q1P16V545-B to the river are not affected by a fire in area 2-076 and operator action will be taken to open the valve and reinstate Train-B service water, until recirc to the pond can be re-established by manual operation j
of the subject valves listed in condition 2 above.
Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the above actions for a fire in Unit-2 fire area 2-076.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
2-076 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft21 SEVERITY Cable Tunnel B, C Cable Insul.
21,554 lb 39,000
<30 min Train B DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floor, ceiling, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
The door to the diesel building is a UL Class-A fire-rated door.
The door between the cable tunnel and auxiliary building (area 2-030) is a non-fire-rated watertight door.
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the non-rated door with the exception of the hinges.
l l
l-12-2 Rev. 1
h*
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Piping & Electrical Penetrations:
All wall penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Bulkhead between cable tunnel and auxiliary building (area 2-030) is non-fire rated.
Ventilation:
None Floor Drains:
The floor drainage has a capacity of 100 gal /m which discharges to yard drains.
A sump and sump pump is provided.
Fire Protection:
An automatic water suppression system is provided in this area.
JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION:
The watertight door between auxiliary building (area 2-030) and cable tunnel (area 2-076) does not comply with 3-h fire-rated boundary requirements.
However, a fire in area 2-076 propagating into area 2-030 will not have any additional impact on Unit-1 safe shutdown because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both the areas.
In addition,the fire-resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under a fire protection surveillance program.
1-12-3 Rev. 1
i J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10 CFR 50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION GENERIC EXEMPTION REQUEST:
1-41 FIRE AREA: N/A LOCATION: ' FIRE AREAS IN THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 AUXILIARY BUILDING. THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING AND THE SERVICE WATER INTAKE STRUCTURE.
EXEMPTION Request exemption from the provision of 10CFR50, Appendix R III.G.2 to the extent that a deviation from the National Fire Protection Association Standard for Fire Doors and Windows (NFPA 80) which specifies the maximum clearance between the bottom of a fire-rated door and its sill or the floor results in the doors potentially having a rating of less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. NFPA 80.3-6.1 states that the noncombustible clearance between the bottom of flush mounted doors and a raised noncombustible sill shall not exceed 3/8 inch, or where there is no sill, the maximum clearance between the bottom of the door and the floor shall not exceed 3/4 inch. Various doors in the areas referenced above deviate slightly from this standard.
JUSTIFICATION i
Various doors in the fire area boundaries in the above mentioned locations exceed NFPA 80 gap specifications.
In the majority of instances, the NFPA standard is exceeded by less than 1/4 inch.
In one isolated instance, a 3/4 inch departure was noted. Most of the excess clearances result from an unintentional unevenness of or a deliberate slope in the poured concrete floors.
Smoke detection systems are installed on both sides of the affected doors with the exception of those leading into stairways 8 and 10 of the auxiliary buildings and one between the diesel generator building and the Unit 1, Train "B" cable tunnel.
The stairway doors all have smoke detection on their non-stairway side; the cable tunnel door has smoke detection on one side and an automatic water suppression system on the other.
The in-situ combustible loading in the vicinity e
of the bottom of the doors is minimal. Transient loads are unlikely to be located near the doors because access to fire doors is routinely kept clear.
Since the excessive gaps are located at the bottom of the doors, passage of smoke and heat is minimized in the event of a fire.
The results of a liquid spill near a door with excessive clearance would not differ significantly from one near a door with prescribed clearance since a flow path exists under both doors.
Therefore, the existence of the gaps at the bottom fire doors greater than those recommended in NFPA 80 does not prevent each door from performing its intended func tion.
1-41-1 DHJ/06 l
l
[
m%
y
I J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE KAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
1-3 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
'2-015 LOCATION':
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING COMMUNICATION ROOM NO. 2202.
EL 121 FT - 0 IN.
Fire area 2-015 consists only of room 2202 at el 121 ft - 0 in.
and is bounded by 3-h fire-rated floors, ceilings, and walls and has a 3-h fire-rated door.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating.
CONDITION REQUIRING EXEMPTION:
Main Steam Relief This fire area contains electrical Train-A control cables for the following redundant safe shutdown equipment.
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION Q2NilPV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G. 2A)
Q2NilPV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G. 2B)
Q2NilPV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G. 2C)
The analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables has shown that the subject valves would become inoperable in the closed position.
Reactor Coolant Boundary Integrity control cables for the Train-A pressurizer power operated relief j
and blocking valves Q2B31PCV0445A-A and Q2B13MOV8000A-A, and the reactor head vent valves 02B13SV2213A-A and Q2B13SV2214A-A, are l
located in fire area 2-015.
The subject cables are associated with the control function fron'the hot shutdown panel 02H21NBAFP2605G-A.
In addition control cables which shift control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panel via the transfer cabinet Q2H22 LOO 2-A are in this area.
A fire induced fr.ilure having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown via the PORV, and reactor head vent paths.
2-3-1 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION JUSTIFICATION:
Main Steam Relief - Justification One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.
The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without eleptrical controls or air supplies.
The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.
Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 2-015.
The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.
Consequently, a fire in area 2-015 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.
Reactor Coolant Boundary Integrity - Justification Fire induced failure (hot shorts) to the control cables for the transfer relay cabinet Q2H22 LOO 2-A could cause control for the power operated relief and blocking valves and the reactor head vent valves, to shift from the normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel.
Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) of the control cables for Q2B31PCV0445A-A, power operated relief valve. 02B13SV2213A-A, and Q2B13SV2214A-A reactor head vent valves, could result in the valves being energized to open.
The power relief blockings valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position.
In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occuring, this condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manual operation (handle) of the effected relay thereby shifting control to the main control board.
To remove power from the transfer relay open breaker 9 on de distribution panel 2C (Q2R41 LOO 1C-A),
located in Room 2312, fire area 2-004.
Then go to transfer relay cabinet TRC-1 (Q2H22 LOO 2-A) in fire area 2-035 room 2347 and manually shift transfer relays TR1 (Q2B13SV2213A-A), TR2 (Q2B13SV2214A-A), TR3 (Q2B31PCV0445A-A), and TRS 3
(Q2B31MOV8000A-A) placing contol back to the main control board to allow the operator to mitigate the letdown.
Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the required actions for a fire in fire area 2-015.
2-3-2 Rev. 1
1 J. M. PARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
2-015 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 21 SEVERITY 2202, Commu-A, B,
C Cable Insul.
861 lb 26,090
<30 min nication Room and Panels DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floors, ceilings, and walls forming the area boundary are reinforced concrete.
Doors:
UL Class-A door is located between rooms 2202 and 2210 (area 2-020).
Piping & Electrical Penetrations:
All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Ventilatior;:
Normal supply and exhaust is by non-radwaste H&V system.
Fire dampers are installed at the duct penetrations.
Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.
Floor Drains:
No floor drains are provided.
FIRE PROTECTION:
The installed smoke detection system activates an alarm bell l
located in' room 2210 (area 2-020) and annunciates in the control l
room.
A total-flooding Halon system is provided which is I
actuated by the detectors.
A.CO2 hose reel located in room 2210 (area 2-020) is available as backup.
l l
l 2-3-3 Rev. 1
J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION '
EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-8 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
2-005 LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING. EL 100 FT-0 IN.,
CHARGING PUMP ROOMS AND STORAGE AREAS Fire area 2-005 consists of the three charging pump rooms (2173, 2174, and 2181), a hallway (2172), a general storage area (2171), and a contaminated storage area (2182).
The fire area boundary walls, floors, and ceilings are 3-h fire rated except for the containment wall, and all fire area boundary doors are fire rated.
Self expanding cork is installed between the fire area boundary walls and the containment wall.
EXEMPTION:
An exemption to section III.G.2.a is requested to the extent that it requires a 3-h fire barrier between redundant safe shutdown cabling and equipment.
An exemption is requested to section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cable and equipment to be enclosed by a 1-h fire-rated barrier and the installation of an automatic fire suppression system.
CONDITION REQUIRING EXEMPTION:
Physical Separation of the Charging Pumps The fire area contains all three charging pumps, related valves and air handling units.
Each charging pump is redundant to the other two.
The redundant charging pumps, valves, and air handling units are located in separate rooms.
The pump room walls internal to fire area 2-005 are watertight and of 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete.
However, the watertight penetration seals and watertight doors in the subject walls are not fire rated.
Boration/ Makeup Room 2172 in fire area 2-005 contains the redundant RWST isolation valves (LCVil5B and LCV115D) and control cables for CVCS makeup valves (FCV113A-A, FCVll3B-A, FCVil4A-A, and l
FCVll4B-A).
The CVCS makeup valves control the flow of boric acid from the boric acid transfer pumps and control the flow of primary water from the primary water makeup pump.
Fire barriers and full suppression coverage is not provided for the valves or cables.
The analysis of the effects of a fire in the area shows that the RWST isolation valves could become electrically inoperable in the closed position and makeup to either the VCT or charging pump suction header could be isolated.
i 2-8-1 Rev. 1
J.
M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Reactor Coolant Boundary Integrity Control cables of the Train-A pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves 02B31PCV0445A-A and Q2B13MOV8000A-A and the reactor head vent valves 02B13SV2213A-A and 02B13SV2214A-A are located in fire area 2-005.
The subject cables are associated with the control function from the hot shutdown panel Q2H21NBAFP2605G-A.
In addition control cables which shift control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panel via the transfer relay cabinet Q2H22 LOO 2-A are in this area.
A fire induced failure having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown via the PORV, and reactor head vent paths.
JUSTIFICATION:
Physical Separation of the Charging Pumps The redundant charging pumps, valves, and air handling units are located in independent, highly segregated rooms.
Rooms 2171 and 2182 do not contain redundant safe shutdown cabling or equipment.
An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire limited to one of the four areas identified below would not jeopardize the safe shutdown of the plant.
1.
RM 2181 - Train-A Charging Pump Room 2.
RM 2174 - Swing Charging Pump Room 3.
RM 2173 - Train-B Charging Pump Room 4.
RM's 2172, 2171, 2182 - Storage rooms and hallway The following justification is provided to show that a fire would be contained in one of the four areas listed above.
The charging pump rooms (2173, 2174, and 2181) are watertight with 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete walls.
The penetrations in the pump room walls internal to fire area 2-005 are sealed to provide a watertight boundary.
The seals utilized to provide the watertight boundary are of the type (foam, welded plate, or grout) to provide an adequate barrier to inhibit the spread of fire, smoke, or gas.
The doors are watertight and are normally maintained closed.
Lubricating oil and cable insulation are the only combustibles present in the pump rooms.
Lubricating oil would be contained within the individual rooms or would drain into the sump pump servicing the room.
In addition there is a fixed suppression system installed in room 2172 (hallway) which provides additional protection in the area of the pump room doors which communicate with this hallway.
A smoke detection system is installed throughout the area including the three charging pump rooms.
The maximum combustible loading in any l
room of this fire is estimated to be, less than 48,000 Btu /ft' l
with a maximum fire severity of one less than 1 h.
Based upon the evaluation of the protection provided, a credible fire would be contained within the zone of its initiation.
Credit has been l
2-8-2 Rev. 1 l
I J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION taken for the separation afforded by the subject pump room boundaries.
As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, to ensure that the as-built configuration is maintained, the sealed penetrations shall be placed in the surveillance program.
Bora tion /f'akeuo As a result of the NRC site walkdoun of this fire area, Alabana Power Conany proposes to install a fire barrier for raceway sections AHF15A, AHD126, AID 258, AID 12B, AID 15B in Fire Area 2-005.
This barrier Will Protect cables for CVCS makeup valves FCV113A-A, FCV113B-A, FCV114A-A and FCV114B-A in all portions of Area 2-005 outside charging pump room 2181.
In the event of a fire in Room 2181, the Train B RWST isolation valve, LCV115D-B will be operable.
An automatic suppression system covers the raceway to be protected with the exception of 18 feet of raceway sections AHP15A, AHD12B and AID 15B in Room 2172 and 10 feet of AHP15A and AHD12B in Room 2182.
Reactor Coolant Boundary Integrity Cables for the subject reactor coolant boundary integrity valves are also routed in the raceway for which the addition of a fire barrier was proposed under boration/ makeup.
Based on the implementation of the modification proposed under boration/
aakeup, the following scenario applies to a fire in Room 2181 only.
Fire induced failures (hot shorts) to the control cables for the transfer relay cabinet Q2H22 LOO 2-A could cause control for the pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves and the reactor head vent valves, to shift from their normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel.
Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) of the control cables for i
Q2B31PCV0445A-A, pressurizer power operated relief valve i
Q2B13SV2213A-A, and Q2B13SV2214A-A reactor head vent valves.
l could result in the valves being energized to open.
The power i
relief blo: king valves (MOV) could become electrically I
inoperative in the open position.
In the unlikely event of the Cultiple hot shorts occuring, this condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manual operation (handle) of the affected relay thereby shifting control to the i
cain control board.
To remove power from the transfer relay open breaker 9 on de distribution panel 2C (02R41 LOO 1C-A) located in Room 2312, fire area 2-004.
Then go to transfer relay cabinet TRC-1 (Q2H22 LOO 2-A) in fire area 2-035 room 2347 2-8-3 Rev. 1
J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION and manually shift transfer relays TR1 (Q2B13SV2213A-A). TR2 (Q2B13SV2214A-A), TR3 (Q2B31PCV0445A-A), and TR5 (Q2B31MOV8000A-A) placing control back to the main control board to allow the operator to mitigate the letdown.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
MAKIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL OUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY 2
Room 2173 B
Cable Insul.
148 lb 27,563
<30 min l
Charging /
Lube Oil 35 gal Safety Injec-tion Pump Room Room 2174 A,
B, C Cable Insul.
103 lb 28,508
<30 min Charging /
Lube Oil 35 gal Safety Injec-tion Pump Room Room 2181 A
Cable Insul.
625 lb 47,414
<1 h Charging /
Lube Oil 35 gal Safety Injec-tion Pump Room l
Room 2171 Cable Insul.
Combustible Area (a)
Room 2172 A,
C Cable Insul.
2,393 lb(b)31,820(b)<30 min (b)
Hallway Room 2182 A
Cable Insul.
l Cor:tamination f
Storage Area DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floors, ceilings, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Self-expanding cork is installed between the fire area boundary walls and the containment.
a.
Room 2171 is utilized to store combustible material, usually in the form of contaminated clothing, cables, and tools in drums.
b.
Applies to rooms 2171, 2172, 2182 collectively.
s 2-8-4 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFRSO APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION
'l Doors:
A fire-rated airtight door is installed between rooms 2172 and 2161 (area 2-4).
Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:
All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Ventilation:
There is no normal ventilation for the area.
There are four ventilation openings through the area ceiling into room 2223 (area 2-1); UL Class-A fire damper doors are installed in l
these openings.
Fixed smoke removal capability is not provided.
Floor Drains:
A 4-in. diameter floor drain having a 100-gal /m capacity is located in rooms 2173, 2174, and 2181, and drains to a separate sump for each room.
The sumps for rooms 2173 and 2181 are located in the rooms while the sump for room 2174 is located immediately outside the room in room 2172.
The sumps have two 100-gal /m pumps each that discharge to the waste holdup tank or to the floor drain tank.
Pour 4-in diameter floor drains having a 100-gal /m capacity each are located throughout the remainder of the area and drain into the floor drain tank.
FIRE PROTECTION:
A smoke detection system is installed throughout this area.
A manual hose station, CO2 hose reel, portable dry chemical extinguishers, portable CO2 extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment located in the corridor just outside the area are available for use in the area.
An automatic sprinkler system is installed in room 2172.
l l
l 2-8-5 Rev. 1
f J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION f-EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-9 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
2-035 LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING. ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS ROOM TRAIN A.
Fire area 2-035 consists of rooms 2333 and 2347 at el 139 ft -
0 in.
All fire area boundary walls, ceilings, and floors are 3-h fire rated except for the containment wall.
Fire area boundary doors are fire rated.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a 1-hrated fire barrier and installation of automatic fire suppression system.
CONDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTION:
This fire area contains electrical Train-A equipment, power and control cables associated with the following redundant safe shutdown equipment.
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION Q2E21MOV8106-A Charging Pumps Miniflow Isolation Valve Q2E23MOV3764A-A MDAPW Pump Discharge Valve Q2E23MOV3764D-A MDAFW Pump Discharge Valve Q2E23MOV3764F-A MDAFW Pump Discharge Valve Q2E21MOV8131A-A Charging Pump Suction Header Isol. Valve 02E21MOV8133A-A Charging Pump Discharge Header Isol. Valve N2B21TE413-P1 RCS Loop-l Hot Leg Temp. Indication N2B21TE423-P1 RCS Loop-2 Hot Leg Temp. Indication N2B21TE433-P1 RCS Loop-3 Hot Leg Temp. Indication Q2E21MOV8107-A Charging Pump to RCS Isol. Valve The analysis of the potential effects of a fire in this area upon these raceways and equipment shows that subject valves could shift position from their required safe shutdown position and become inoperative, and the plant could loose indication from the instrument loops affected.
In addition, fire area 2-035 contains control cables for the Train-A pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves l
Q2B31PCV0445A-A and Q2B13MOV8000A-A, and the reactor head vent valves Q2B13SV2213A-A and Q2B13SV2214A-A.
The subject cables are associated with control from both the hot shutdown and main control board.
A fire induced failure having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown via the PORV and reactor head vent paths.
Fire area 2-035 contains control cables for the Train-A charging pump isolation valve Q2E21MOV8107-A.
An analysis of the effects l
2-9-1 Rev. 1 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION of a fire upon these cables shows that this valve could fail in the closed position and become inoperable.
This will disable normal charging of the RCS.
Fire area 2-035 also contains instrumentation cables and power supply cables which are not required for post-fire safe shutdown, but due to fire induced failures, could cause initiation of safety signals (SI, CVI, and CI) to safe shutdown components.
JUSTIFICATION:
Valve Q2E21MOV8106-A is required to be maintained open to establish charging pump miniflow.
In the event this* valve fails closed, miniflow will be discontinued.
The charging pump can be run safely with miniflow isolated and with a minimum of 24 gal /m of seal injection flow for a period of up to 1 h.
This will allow the operator time to de-energize MCC-2U and take manual action to open the valve and reestablish miniflow.
In addition, the operating charging pump flow can be increased by opening the following valves from the main control room.
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION Q2E21MOV8801B-B Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isol. Valve Q2E21MOV8803B-B Boron injection Inlet Isol. Valve The increased flow on charging pump will reduce heating of the pump due to miniflow isolation and allow additional time for a manual action to open the miniflow valve.
Letdown path is available through head vent valves Q2B13SV2213B-B and Q2B13SV2214B-B.
Fire induced failures in control cabling could potentially result in closure of motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge valves (Q2N23MOV3764A-A, Q2N23MOV3764D-A, and Q2N23MOV3764F-A).
This would limit the ability to provide auxiliary feedwater to a steam generator for cooldown to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
In addition this same fire would cause the loss of the normal ac supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feed water uninterruptible power supply (UPS) Q2N23 LOOL-AB.
Upon loss of the normal ac supply, the UPS will then be supplied from battery power.
The subject battery has a 2-h capacity and, I
upon depletion, manual control must be taken to continue i
cooldown.
The following is a listing of those components that will require manual operation:
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION Q2N12HV3235A Steam to TDAPW from S/G B J
Q2N12HV3235B Steam to TDAPW from S/G C 2-9-2 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q2N12HV3226 TDAPW Steam Admission Q2N23HV3228A Feed Water to S/G A Q2N23HV3228B Feed Water to S/G B Q2N23HV3228C Feed Water to S/G C l
The 2 h provided by battery power is adequate for existing i
procedures for manual operation to be implemented.
I In lieu of manual operation of the turbine driven AFW pump system, the motor driven AFW pump discharge valves could be manually repositioned.
This would facilitate use of the motor driven AFW pumps.
For a fire in this area, seal injection flow will be established using either charging pump 2C or charging pump 2B aligned to electrical Train-B power.
Valve Q2E21MOV8131A-A (suction header) and valve Q2E21MOV8133A-A (discharge header) are required to be j
maintained in the open position to supply seal injection water from the RWST through charging pump 2B.
Due to the effects of a fire in this area upon the control cables for the subject valves, the valves could fail in the closed position and become l
inoperative.
This will cause the plant to lose seal injection water and seal integrity.
These valves cannot be locked open l
because they are needed for train separation during a LOCA event.
Alabama Power Co. proposes to install disconnect switches l
outside the electrical penetration room during the next outage of sufficient duration subsequent to design and procurement completion currently scheduled for the second quarter of 1986.
In the interim, APC will instruct the operators of the potential inadvertent closure of the charging pump suction and discharge valves in the event of a fire in this area.
Potential loss of all three loops of hot leg temperature indicators could result due to fire induced cable failure in this fire area for RTD's N2B21TE413-P1, N2B21TE423-P1, and N2B21TE433-Pl.
A review of the core-exit thermocouple circuits shows that these cables are outside fire area 2-035 and the plant operator will have core temperature readings available at the in-core rack NGIC2501D-N and plant computer.
In addition to the core exit temperature indication availability, a design change to be installed as a result of R.G.
1.97 will provide cable separation and redundant signal processing and indication for RCS hot leg temperature loop N2B21TE433.
In order to implement this design, it is required that all design and material to be onsite prior to initiation of the modification.
Based upon the R.G.
1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of 2-9-3 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEI NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAEARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION the modification is currently planned for the fourth refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the second quarter of 1986.
Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the required operator actions for a fire in fire area 2-035.
l Fire induced failure (hot short) of the individual control cables for Q2B31PCV0445A-A power operated relief valve, Q2B131SV2213A-A, and Q2B13SV2214A-A reactor head vent valves could result in the valves to be energized to open.
The power operated relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position.
In the unlikely event of the multiple fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) occuring, this condition can be mitigated by removing 125 V-dc power from cables in the shared raceway.
This can be accomplished by opening the breaker on the 125 V-dc switchgear bus 2A (Q2R42B001A-A) for 125 V-dc distribution panels, 2A, 2B, and 2C, NORMAL CHARGING:
Failure of the valve Q2E21MOV8107-A in the closed position will cause loss of normal RCS charging.
Charging pump flow to seal injection is available.
In case of uncontrolled letdown via head vents or PORV's, a manual action to open the valve 02E21MOV8107-A will be initiated.
In addition, control room action can be taken to open the valves Q2E21MOV8801B-B and Q2E21MOV8803B-B for charging through Boron Injection Tank.
l Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the above actions l
for a fire in this area.
Fire induced cable failures in fire area 2-035 to non-post-fire safe shutdown circuitry could potentially result in a false SI, CVI, or CI safety signal initiation from the solid state protection system.
Plant procedures exist, or will be developed, for resetting spurious SI, CVI, and CI signals from the main control room and can be used, if required, for a fire in this area.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
2-035 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY 2
Room 2333 and A
Cable Insul.
8549 lb 83,542
<l-1/2 h and 2347 and Panels Electrical Penetration Room 2-9-4 Rev. 1
-e J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION DESIGN FEATURES:
a Construction:
Floors, ceilings, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
A self expanding cork is installed for the portions of the area boundary along the containment wall.
Doors:
A fire-rated UL Class-A door is installed at the fire area boundary.
Piping & Electrical Penetrations:
All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam.
Ventilation:
No normal ventilation is provided.
Fixed smoke removal capability is not provided.
Floor Drains:
Two 4-in. diameter drains each having capacity of 100 gal /m and draining to floor drain tank are provided.
FIRE PROTECTION:
Ionization smoke detectors are provided to alarm at the main control room.
The water hose station located in Room 2312 (Area 2-004) is available for use in this area.
2-9-5 Rev. 1
5 J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT f
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-10 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA: 2-021 LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING SWITCHGEAR ROOM TRAIN B Fire area 2-021 consists of rooms 2229 and 2233 at el 121 ft -
O in. and is bounded by 3-h fire-rated walls, ceilings, and floors.
The area boundary doors are UL Class-A fire rated.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from secti0n III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables and equipment to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire suppression system.
CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION:
Fire area 2-021 contains electrical Train-B equipment and power and control cable raceways.
The analysis of the potential effects of a fire in this area upon equipment and cabling shows that the plant could lose the entire electrical Train-B system.
Due to loss of the electrical Train-B system, the following redundant safe shutdown equipment could become inoperable in the closed position.
EQUIPMENT FUNCTION N2P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room Q2B13HV2228-B Backup Air /N2 Supply to Pressurizer PORVs Q2B31PCV0445A-A Pressurizer PORV Train A Q2B31PCV0444B-B Pressurizer PORV Train B O2E21HV8145-N Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Control cables for the Train-B pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves Q2B31PCV0444B-B and Q2B13MOV8000B-B, and the reactor head vent valves Q2B13SV2213B-B and Q2B13SV2214B-B are located in fire area 2-021.
The subject cables are associated with the control function from the hot shutdown panel Q2H21NBAFP2605C-B.
In addition, control cables which shift control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panel via the transfer relay cabinet Q2H22 LOO 4-B are in this area.
A fire induced failure having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown via the PORV, and reactor head vent paths.
2-10-1 Rev. 1 L
F l
1
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J. M. FA3 LEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION I
i The door between rooms 2233 (area 2-021) and 2228 (area 2-020) is provided with a removable transom.
The door and transom assembly cannot be certified as UL Class A.
JUSTIFICATION:
Failure of valve Q2E21HV8145-N in the closed position will disable the pressurizer auxiliary spray system which provides one method to achieve depressurization of the RCS.
Pressurizer PORVs Q2B31PCV0445A-A and Q2B31PCV0444B-B provide another means of achieving RCS depressurization.
Valves N2P19HV3885-B and Q2B13HV2228-B will fail in the closed position on loss of Train-B de power.
This will isolate the instrument air supply to the pressurizer PORVs Q2B31PCV0445A-A and Q2B31PCV0444B-B.
PORV O2B31PCV0444B-B will also be inoperable due to loss of the Train-B de power supply.
However, the Train-A de supply to PORV Q2B31PCV0445A-A is not affected due to a fire in this area.
Since only one of the PORVs is required for RCS depressurization, and RCS depressurization is a long term requirement, the operator has adequate time to take manual action to restore the instrument air by hand wheel operation of valve N2P19HV3885-B.
Once air is restored. PORV Q2B31PCV0445A-A will be operable to achieve RCS depressurization.
I Fire induced failures (hot shorts) to the control cables for the transfer relay cabinet Q2H22 LOO 4-B could cause control for the power operated relief and blocking valves and the reactor head vent valves, to shift from their normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel.
Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) of the control cables for Q2B31PCV0444-B, power operated relief valve, Q2B13SV2213B-B, and Q2B13SV2214B-B, reactor head vent valves could result in the valves being energized to open.
The power relief blockings valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position.
In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occuring, this condition can be z.itigated by removing power from the transfer relays, and manual operation (handle) of the effected relay thereby, shifting control to the main control board.
To remove power from the transfer relay open breaker 14 on de distribution panel 2F (Q2R41LOOlF-B), located in room 2209, fire area 2-004.
Then go to transfer relay cabinet TRC-3 (Q2H22 LOO 4-B) in fire area 2-034 room 2334 and manually shift transfer relays TR1 (Q2B13SV2213B-B). TR2 (Q2B135V2214B-B). TR3 (02B31PCV0444-B), and TRS (Q2B31MOV8000B-B) placing control back to the main control board to allow the operator to mitigate the letdown.
l Plant procedures will be revised to include the above action for fire area 2-021.
4 1
2-10-2 Rev. 1
a J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION The door between rooms 2233 (area 2-021) and 2228 (area 2-020) is provided with a removable transom to facilitate the movement of large equipment.
The transom has been certified by the vendor as being constructed of materials and in a manner similar to that of the UL Class A criteria.
The door and transom assembly has not and cannot be certified as Class A: however, this assembly meets the highest fire rating standards and provides sufficient fire retardancy capability.
(Reference APC letter to NRC dated April 16 1981.)
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
2-021 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft21 SEVERITY 2229 and 2233 B
Cable Insul.
18.215 lb 109,062
<l-1/2 h Switchgear Panels 44 lb Room DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floors, walls, and ceilings forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
UL Class-A fire-rated doors are located between rooms 2229 and 2228 (fire area 2-020), 2233 and 2228 (fire area 2-020),
and 2233 and 2235 (fire area 2-023).
Piping & Electrical Penetrations:
All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Ventilation:
Normal supply and exhaust is by the non-radwaste H&V system and 600-V load center air conditioning system.
A room cooler serves room 2229.
Fire dampers are provided at duct penetrations.
Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.
Floor Drains:
No floor drains are provided.
FIRE PROTECTION:
An area smoke detection system is installed.
Heat detectors are provided in the 4.16-kV switchgear, the 5-kV disconnect switch, and the four 600-V load centers.
These heat detectors activate the alarm horn located in the area and the in-cabinet CO2 l
systems in each piece of equipment.
A water hose located in room 2234 (area 2-020) outside room 2235 and a CO hose reel 16cated 2
in room 2210 (area 2-020) are available as backup.
2-10-3 Rev. I t
J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-15 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
2-013 LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING VERTICAL CABLE CHASE Pire area 2-013 consists of rooms 2227 (el 128 ft - O in.), 2300 (el 141 ft - 0 in.), 2466 (el 155 ft - O in.) and 2500 (el 168 ft
-6 in.).
All fire area boundary walls, floors, and ceilings are 3-h fire rated and fire area boundary doors are fire rated.
EXEMPTION:
request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating.
CONDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTION:
Fire area 2-013 contains electrical Train-B power and control cables for the Train-B power distribution system and control cables for the following redundant safe shutdown equipment.
EQUIPMENT
. FUNCTION N2P19M001A-N Service Air Compressor A N2P19M001B-N Service Air Compressor B N2P19M001C-N Service Air Compressor C The analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables shows that the plant could lose the entire electrical Train-B power distribution system and the total service air system.
Due to the loss of the electrical Train-B distribution system and service air, the following redundant safe shutdown components could become inoperable in the closed position.
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION N2P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetrations Room Q2B13HV2228-B Backup Air /N2 Supply to PORVs Q2B31PCV0445A-A Pressurizer PORV Train A Q2B31PCV0444B-B Pressurizer PORV Train B Q2E21HV8145-N Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Fire area 2,013 also contains instrumentation cables and power supply cables which are not required for post-fire safe shutdown, but due to fire induced failures could cause initiation of safety signals (SI, CI, and CVI) to safe shutdown components.
2-15-1 Rev. 1 L
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1 J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT f
10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION JUSTIFICATION:
The only safe shutdown components which require instrument air are the pressurizer PORVs which are required to be operable for RCS depressurization.
RCS depressurization is a long term action required to initiate RHR.
This allows adequate time for manual action to be performed to restore instrument air / backup N2 t0 the pressurizer PORVs.
The plant has existing procedures to restore the instrument air on loss of the service air compressors.
Once air is restored, valve N2P19HV3885-B can be manually operated to restore air to the pressurizer PORVs.
Plant procedures will be developed to include the above action for a fire in area 2-013.
Fire induced cable failures in fire area 2-013 to non-post-fire safe shutdown circuitry could potentially result in a false SI, CVI, or CI safety signal initiation from the solid state protection system.
Plant procedures exist, or will be developed, for resetting spurious SI, CVI, and CI safety signals from the main control room and can be used if required for a fire in this area.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
2-013 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY Rooms 2227 A,
B, C Cable Insul.
16,524 lb 256,281
<3-1/2 h 2300, 2466, and 2500 Vertical Cable Chase DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floors, walls, and ceilings forming the crea boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
A UL Class-A fire-rated door is used between the area and room 2319 (area 2-42) and a UL Class-A fire-rated pressuretight door is used between the area and room 474 (area 1-044 ).
Piping & Electrical Penetrations:
Penetrations through area boundary are sealed with silicone foam.
2-15-2 Rev. 1
-w
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT L
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Ventilation:
Normal supply and exhaust is provided by cable chase supply and exhaust fan.
Fire dampers are provided where ducts penetrate through the floors within the area and where area boundaries are penetrated.
Floor Drains:
A 4-in. diameter floor drain having 100-gal /m capacity is located in the bottom of chase, and drains to floor drain tank.
FIRE PROTECTION:
Ionization smoke detectors are located throughout the area.
An automatic water suppression system is provided for this area.
Fire extinguishers and two water hose stations located outside room 2300 (el 139 ft - 0 in.) in area 2-042 are available as backup.
I I
i t
i i
i 2-15-3 Rev. 1 1
I'
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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-18 Rev. 2 FIRE AREA:
2-034 LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING. ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS
~
ROOM TRAIN B.
AND PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT ROOM Fire area 2-034 consists of 2334 and 2317 at el 139 ft - 0 in.
The walls, ceilings, and floors forming the area boundary are 3-h fire rated.
These rooms communicate via two stainless steel. pipes used in the penetration room filtration system.
The stainless steel pipes are encased in concrete and contain no combustibles.
A self expanding cork is installed for the portions of the area boundary along the containment wall.
UL Class-A fire-rated doors exist between rooms 2334 and 2333 (area 2-034), 2334 and 2322 (area 2-004), and 2317 and 2322 (area 2-004).
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption for section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables and equipment to be enclosed by a 1-h-rated fire barrier and the installation of an automatic fire suppression system.
CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION:
This fire area contains electrical Train-B equipment, power and control cables, electrical Train-A control, and control power supply cables associated with the following safe shutdown equipment.
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION 02P16MOV3130B-B Service Water Inlet to CCW HX-2B i
Q2E21MOV8130B-B Charging Pump Suction Header Isolation Valve Q2E21MOV8133B-B Charging Pump Disch. Header Isolation Valve Q2E21MOV8109A-B Charging Pump 2A Miniflow Valve Q2E21MOV8109B-B Charging Pump 2B (Swing) Miniflow Valve i
Q2E21MOV8108-B Charging Pump to RCS Isol. Valve 02P15HV3333-B RCS Hot Leg Sample Line CTMT Isolation Valve Q2P15HV3765-A RCS Hoc Leg Sample Line CTMT Isolation Valve Q2P15HV3103-A Pressurizer Liquid Sample Line CTMT Isolation Valve Q2P15HV3332-B Pressurizer Liquid Sample Line CTMT Isolation Valve 02N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve.
(S.G.-2A) l l
2-18-1 Rev. 2 L
d.
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT I
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Q2N11PV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-28) l Q2NilPV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2C) j The analysis of the potential effects of a fire in this area upon the cables and equipment shows that the subject valves could j
shift position from their required safe shutdown position or I
become inoperative.
4 Fire area 2-034 also contains instrumentation cables and power supply cables which are not required for post-fire safe shutdown, but due to fire induced failures could cause initiation of safety sig,nals (SI, CVI, and CI) to safe shutdown components.
Reactor Coolant Boundary T
Fire area 2-034 contains control cab 1cs for the Train-B pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves Q2B31PCV0444B-B and Q2B13MOV8000B-B, ar.d reactor head vent valves Q2B13SV2213B-B and Q2B13SV2214B-B.
The subject cables are associated with control from both the hot shutdown and main control board.
A fire induced failure having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown via the PORV and reactor heat vent paths.
i Normal Charging Fire area 2-034 contains control cables for the Train-B charging i
pump isolation valve Q2E21MOV8108-B and regen. HX discharge valve Q2E21HV8146-B.
An analysis of the effects fo a fire upon these 4
cables shows that these valves could fail in the closed position 4
and become inoperable.
4 JUSTIFICATION:
i i
The effects of a fire in area 2-034 upon the control cables of
(
valve Q2P16MOV3130B-B could fail the valve in the closed position J
causing a loss of service water to CCW heat exchanger 2B.
This condition can impact safe-shutdown only when CCW heat exchanger t
]
2B is aligned and operating as the Train A heat exchanger.
Plant 1
procedures will be written to maintain valve Q2P16MOV3130B-B in the open position by racking out the MCC breaker whenever CCW l
exchanger 2B is aligned and operating as the Train A heat j
exchanger.
1 i
c 4
2-18-2 Rev. 2
F.
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION For a fire in this area, seal injection flow will be established using either charging pump 2A or charing pump 2B aligned to electrical Train-A power.
Valve Q2ElMOV8130B-B (suction header) and Q2E21MOV81338-B (discharge header) are required to be maintained in the open position to supply seal injection water fr5m the RWST through charging pump 2A or 2B.
Due to the effects of a fire in this area upon the control cables for the subject valves, the valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperative.
These valves cannot be locked open because they are needed for train separation during a LOCA event.
APC proposes to install disconnect switches outside the electrical penetration room during the next outage of sufficient duration subsequent to design and procurement completion currently scheduled for completion in the second quarter of 1966.
In the interim, APC will instruct the operators of the potential inadvertant closure of the charging pump suction and discharge valves in the event of a fire in this area.
Valve Q2E21MOV8109A-B or Q2E21MOV8109B-B iG required to be maintained in the open position to establish miniflow for charging pump 2A or 2B respectively.
Due to the effects of a fire in this area upon the control cables for the subject valves, the valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperative.
In the event these valves fail closed, the miniflow will be discontinued.
The charging pump can be run safely with miniflow isolated and with a minimum 24 gal /m of seal injection flow for a period of up to I h.
This will allow the operator time to de-energize MCC-2V and take manual action to open the miniflow valve corresponding to the operating charging pump.
In addition, the operating charging pump flow can be increased by opening the following valves from the main control room.
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION Q2E21MOV8801A-A Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isol. Valve Q2E21MOV8803A-A Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isol. Valve The increased flow on charging pump will reduce heating of the pump due to miniflow isolation and allow additional time for a manual action to open the miniflow valves.
Letdown path is available through head vent valves Q2B13SV2213A-A and Q2B13SV2214A-A.
RCS and pressurizer sample line valves Q2P15HV3332-B, HV3333-B, HV3765-A and HV3103-A are required to be maintained in the closed position to maintain RCS boundary integrity.
l 2-18-3 Rev. 2
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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
)
10CFR50 APPENDIF.
"R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Due to the effects of a fire in this area upon the control cables of the subject. valves, the valves, could fail in the open i
position and become inoperative.
The open position of these i
valves will allow an RCS sample to flow to the V'T through the sample coolers.
This flow is of no immediate significance for safe shutdown.
An operator action will be performed to close the manual valves Q2P15V051A and Q2P15V051B
- .o stop the flow of RCS j
and pressurizer liquid.
The valves Q2P15V051A and Q2P15V051B are located in the sample room 2323 cutside of fire area 2-034.
Fire area 2-034 contains de control power supply cable for the main steam atmospheric relief valves 02N11PV3371A-A, 3371B-A, and 3371C-A.
Due to the effect of a fire in this area upon this
?
cable, the subject valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperable.
l i
One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its j
related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.
The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually open or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.
The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.
Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and could be accessible despite a fire in area 2-034.
The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use'of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit-2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.
Consequently, a fire in area 2-034 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.
Fire induced cable failures in fire area 2-034 to non-post-fire safe shutdown circuitry could potentially result in a false SI, CVI, or CI safety signal initiation from the solid state protection system.
Plant procedures exist, or will be developed, for resetting spurious SI, CVI, and CI signals from the main control room and can be used, if required, for a fire in this
- area, i
Reactor Coolant Boundary - Justification l
Fire induced failure (hot short) of the individual control cables for Q2B31PCV0444B-B power operated relief valve and Q2B13SV2213B-B, Q2B13SV2214B-B reactor head vent valves,. could result in the valves to be energized to open.
The power operated relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperable in the open position.
In the unlikely event of the multiple fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) occuring, this condition can be mitigated by 2-18-4 Rev. 2
I.
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION removing 125 V-dc power from cables in the shared raceway.
This can be accomplished by opening breaker on the 125 V-dc switchgear bus 2B (Q2R42B001B-B) for 125 V-dc distribution panels, 2D, 2E, and 2F.
Normal Charging Justification:
Failure of the valves Q2E21MOV8108-B and Q2E21HV8146-B in the closed position will cause loss of normal RCS charging.
Charging pump flow to seal injection is available.
In case of uncontrolled letdown via head vents or PORV's, a control room action can be initiated to open the valves Q2E21MOV8801A-A and Q2E21MOV8803A-A for charging through boron injection tank.
Plant procedures will be developed to include the manual actions as required to achieve safe shutdown for a fire in this area.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
2-034 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 8
TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY Room 2234 A, B Cable Insul.
16,409 lb 90,955
<1-1/2 h Electrical Panels 7 lb Penetration Room Train B Room 2317 A, B Cable Insul.
613 lb 24,606
<30 min Penetration Charcoal 1,548 lb Room.
Filter Filtration Pipe Insul.
7 lb Equipment Room DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floors and walls forming area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
A self expanding cork is installed for the portions of the area boundary along the containment wall.
Doors.
Fire rated UL Class-A doors are installed between rooms 2334 and 2333 (area 2-035), 2334 and 2322 (area 2-004), and 2317 and 2322 (area 2-004).
The tendon access openings in the el 139 ft - 0 in. and 155 ft - 0 in. slabs are covered by a steel plate and a concrete slab having a 3-h fire rating.
The.two rooms of this fire area are connected by two stainless steel pipes used in the enetration room filtration system These pipes are encased n concrete and contain no combustibles.
2-18-5 Rev. 2
f~
il J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Pipe & Electrical Penetrations:
All penetrations through the area boundary in room 2334 are sealed with silicone foam except those through containment walls that are watertight.
All penetrations through the area boundary in room 2317 are sealed to a 3-h fire rating.
Ventilation:
No normal ventilation is provided.
Fixed smoke removal capability is not provided.
Three-h fire-rated dampers are provided at all duct penetrations through area boundaries.
(This limits fire in rooms 2317 and 2334 to each room because ducts are the only fire communication path between the two rooms).
Floor Drains:
Three 4-in.-diameter floor drains, each having 100-gal /m capacity and draining to the floor drain tank, are provided.
FIRE PROTECTION:
Smoke detectors are provided in rooms 2317 and 2334.
A manual hose station located in rooms 2316 (area 2-004) is available for use in this area.
I I
2-18-6 Rev. 2
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t 4
J. M. FARLEY WUCLEAR PLANT 10CFRSO APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-19 Rev. 3 FIRE AREA:
2-009 LOCATION:
TRAIN-B INSIDE CABLE CHASES. AUKILIARY BUILDING EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the I
extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating.
3 CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION:
i j
Instrument Air i
Fire area 2-009 contains electrical Train-B power and control cable raceways.
The analysis of the potential effects of a fire in this area upon cabling shows that the plant could lose the entire electrical Train-B system.
Due to loss of the electrical Train-B system the following redundant safe shutdown valves could become inoperable in the closed position.
j EOUTPMENT FUNCTION N2P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room i
Q2B13HV2228-B Backup Air /N2 Supply to Pressurizer PORVs Q2B31PCV0445A-A Presruriter PORV, Train A Q2B31PCV0444B-B Pressurizer PORV, Train B 02E21HV8145-N Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray i
N2P19HV3825-A Instrument Air to Per.etration Room Reactor Coolant Boundary l
Fire area 2-009 contains control croles for the Train-B
[
pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves Q2B31PCV0444B-B and Q2B13MOV80003-B, and the reactor head vent valves Q2B13SV22138-B and 02B13SV2214B-B.
The subject cables are associated with control frou both the hot shutdown and main l
control board.
A fire induced failure having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown via the PORV and I
reactor head vent paths.
+-
Auxiliary feedwater isolation valves Q2N23MOV3764B.
Q2N23MOV3764C, and 02N23MOV3764E are redundant to one another from the point of view that they isolate flow in redundant auxiliary feedwater supply lines.
Control cables for all three valves are routed through the fire area.
The analysis of the Potential effects of a fire on these control cables shows that spurious operation of the auxiliary feedwater isolation valves could occur.
1 2-19-1 Rev. 3
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION l
Component Cooling Water i
Fire area 2-009 contains a control cable for the CCW heat exchanger 2B service water discharge valve (02P16SV3009-B).
A fire induced failure resulting in a hot short from adjacent i
cables in the same raceway, could energize the solenoid and close j
the valve.
This condition can impact safe-shutdown only when CCW heat exchanger 2B is aligned and operating as the Train A heat exchanger.
JUSTIFICATION:
i Instrument Air - Justification i
Failure of valve Q2E21HV8145-N in the closed position will disable the pressurizer auxiliary spray aystem which provides one method to achieve depressurization of the RCS.
Pressurizer PORVs l
Q2B31PCV0445A-A and Q2B31PCV0444B-B provide another means of achieving RCS depressurization.
Valves N2P19HV3885-B, N2P19HV3825-A and i
Q2B13HV2228-B will f ail in the closed position as a result of fire damage.
This will isolate the instrument air supply to the j
pressurizer PORVs Q2B31PCV0445A-A and Q2B31PCV0444B-B.
PORV Q2B31PCVO444B-B will also be inoperable due to loss of the Train-B de power supply.
However, the Train-A de supply to PORV Q2B31PCV0445A-A is not affected due to a fire in this area.
Since only one of the PORVs is required for RCS depressurization.
l and RCS depressurization is a long term requirement, the operator has adequate time to take manual action to restore the instrument air by hand wheel operation of valve N2P19HV3885-B and N2P19HV3825-A.
once air is restored PORV Q2B31PCV0445A-A will be operable to achieve RCS depressurization.
Reactor Coolant Boundary - Justification Fire induced failure (hot short) of the individual control cables for Q2B31PCV0444B-B power operated relief valve Q2B13SV2213B-B, and Q2B135V2214B-B reactor head vent valves could result in the valves to be energized to open.
The power operated relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position.
In the unlikely event of the multiple fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) occuring, this condition can be mitigated by removing 125 V-dc power from cables in the shared raceway.
This can be accomplished by opening breaker on the 125 V-dc switchgear bus 2B (Q2R42B001B-B) for 125 V-dc distribution panels, 2D, 2E, and 2F.
Auxiliary Feedwater - Justification The control cable associated with at least one of the auxiliary feedwater isolation valves has been protected by two 1-in. layers of Kaowool blanket with an overall layer of Zetex fabric.
2-19-2 Rev. 3
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION The sub.iect valves and associated cables are as follows.
Q2N23MOV3764B:
2VBFV-MSC Q2N23MOV3764C:
2VBFV-Y2C Q2N23MOV3764E:
2VBFV-R2C Component Cooling Water - Justification Valve Q2P16SV3009-B will be de-energized to ensure it remains in the open position whenever CCW heat exchanger 2B is aligned and operating as the Train A heat exchanger.
Plant procedures will be revised to include the above action for a fire in area 2-009.
FIRE PROTECTION:
A smoke detection system and automatic water suppression system are provided throughout the chase.
In addition, water hoses and portable extinguishers located in rooms 2185 (area 2-6) and 2319 (area 2-42) are available for use in the area.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY Rooms 2117, B
Cable Insul.
4,489 lb 2,921,199 <9 h 2198
- 2247, 2338 Cable Chase Rooms 2246, B
Cable Insul.
2,135 lb 180,180 <2-1/2 h 2344 Cable Chase DESIGN PEATURES:
Construction:
Floor, ceiling, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
Airtight UL Class-A doors are located between rooms 2198 and 2185 (area 2-6) and between rooms 2338 and 2335 (area 2-41);
an airtight UL Class-A door exists between rooms 2344 and 2343 (area 2-41).
2-19-3 Rev. 3 L
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Piping and Electrical Penetrations:
All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Ventilation:
There is no normal ventilation for this area.
Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.
Floor Drains:
There are no floor drains.
2-19-4 Rev. 3 t
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EKEMPTION REQUEST:
2-21 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
2-031 LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING CABLE CRASE TRAIN A l
Fire area 2-031 consist of rooms 2250 (el 121 ft - 0 in, and 139 ft - 0 in.) and 2251 (el 127 ft - 0 in.).
All area boundary walls, floors, and ceilings.are 3-h fire rated except for a non-rated bulkhead between this fire area and the cable tunnel (area 2-075).
A non-fire-rated watertight door exists between room 2251 and cable tunnel (area 2-075), and a UL Class-A fire-rated door exists between rooms 2250 and 2235 (area 2-023).
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the watertight door on fire area 2-075 side.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant shaft shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having 1-h fire rating.
CONDITION REOUIRING EXEMPTION:
A fire in area 2-031 could potentially result in fire damage to the electrical circuitry of both Unit-1 and Unit-2 Train-A diesel generators.
This condition along with an assumed loss of offsite power for Unit 2 could result in following safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation being effected.
EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q2NilPV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2A)
Q2NilPV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2B) 02N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2C)
The analysis of the potential effects of loss of power for the main steam atmospheric relief valves has shown that the valves could become inoperable in the closed position.
INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION N2B21TE413(LOOP-1)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N2B21TE423(LOOP-2)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N2B21TE433(LOOP-3)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication Q2C55NE0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor N2C55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N2C55NE0032-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor The analysis of the potential effects caused by loss of power to the instrumentation listed above has shown that a loss of power
- to the instrument loops could result.
2-21-1 Rev. 1
J. M.
PARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 AI
- 0IX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION JUSTIFICATION:
One of the three main oteam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.
The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.
The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.
Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 2-031.
The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit-2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.
Consequently, a fire in area 2-031 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.
Each of the RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loops is powered from channelized inverter 2A.
Inverter 2A is powered from 600 V-ac MCC 2A or 125 V-dc bus 2A.
A fire in area 2-031 could result in loss of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter 2A:
however, inverter 2A will continue to operate from 125 V-dc bus 2A and will supply power to 120 V-ac distribution panel 2J for a minimum of 2 h.
If after 2 h power is lost, RCS hot leg temperature is available from the core exit temperature indication in the main control room from the core exit thermocouples.
Core exit temperature indication will not be affected by a fire in area 2-031.
In addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 h and core exit temperature indication availability a design change to be installed as a result of R.G.
1.97 will provide a redundant power supply and provide cable separation and redundant signal processing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature loops N2B21TE413.
N2B21TE423, and N2B21TE433.
In order to implement this design change, it is required that all design and material be onsite prior to initiation of the modification.
Based upon the R.G.
1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of the modification is currently planned for the fourth refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the second quarter of 1986.
After plant implementation of this modification, a fire in area 2-031 will not affect the ability to monitor onr: loop of RCS hot leg temperature.
2-21-2 Rev. 1 l
t
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Post-accident neutron flux monitor 02C55NE0048A-A is powered from inverter 2F.
Source range neutron flux monitors N2C55NE0031-P1 I
4 and N2C55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelized inverters 2A and 2B.
Inverters 2A, 2B, and 2F are all powered from 600 V-ac MCC 2A or 125 V-dc bus 2A.
Therefore, neutron flux monitoring following potential fire damage in area 2-031 and the resultant loss of 600 V-ac MCC 2A will be available for a minimum of 2 h.
An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RHR system by using portions of the RCS sampling system and RHR Hx No. 1 and No. 2 sample valves Q2P15HV3105-B and Q2P15HV3106-B for determination of the boron concentration and shutdown margin 1
following a fire area 2-031.
Plant procedures will be written to incorporate above actions for a fire in this area.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
2-031 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMEUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 4
i TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 21 SEVERITY Rooms 2250 A
Cable Insul.
12,303 lb 794.491
<9 h i
and 2251 Cable Chase Train A DESIGN FEATURES:
l Construction:
Floors, ceilings, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
l Doors:
An airtight UL Class-A door exists between rooms 2250 and j
2235 (area 2-023).
A non-fire-rated watertight door exists between room 2251 and the cable tunnel (area 2-075).
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the tunnel-side of the non-rated door with the exception of the hinges.
Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:
All penetrations through the i
area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Bulkhead between this fire area and cable tunnel (area 2-075) is non-fire rated, i
Ventilation:
There is no normal ventilation for this area and fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.
Floor drains:
There are no floor drains.
2-21-3 Rev. 1 l
l
T J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION FIRE PROTECTION:
A smoke detection system and automatic sprinkler water suppression system is provided in this area.
In addition, the water hose located in room 2234 (area 2-020) is available for use as backup.
JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION:
The watertight door between auxiliary building (area 2-031) and
~
cable tunnel (area 2-076) does not comply with 3-h fire-rated boundary requirements.
However, a fire in area 2-031 propagating into area 2-075 will not have any additional impact on Unit-2 safe shutdown because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both the areas.
In addition, the j
fire-resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under a fire protection surveillance program.
l l
2-21-4 Rev. 1 1
L
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-22 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
1-031 (Evaluation for effects on Unit-2 cabling) l LOCATION:
UNIT-1 AUXILIARY BUILDING CABLE CHASE TRAIN A Fire area 1-031 consists of rooms 250 (el 121 ft - 0 in. and 139 ft - 0 in.) and 251 (el 127 ft - 0 in.).
All area boundary walls, floors, and ceilings are 3-h fire rated except for a non-rated bulkhead between 'this fire area and the cable tunnel (area 1-075).
A non-fire-rated watertight door exists between room 251 and cable tunnel (area 1-075) and a UL Class-A fire-rated door exists between rooms 250 and 235 (area 1-023).
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the watertight door on fire area 1-075 side.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating.
CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION:
A fire in Unit-1 fire area 1-031 could potentially result in fire damage to the electrical circuitry of both Unit-1 and Unit-2 Train-A diesel generators.
This condition along with an assumed loss of offs.ite power (LOSP) for Unit 2 could result in the following Unit-2,' safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation being effected.
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION 02N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2A) 02N11PV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2B)
Q2NilPV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2C)
The analysis of the potential effects of loss of power for the main steam atmospheric relief valves has shown that the valves could become inoperable in the closed position.
INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION N2B21TE413(LOOP-1)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N2B21TE423(LOOP-2)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N2B21TE433(LOOP-3)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication Q2C55NE0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor N2C55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N2C55NE0032-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor The analysis of the potential effects caused by loss of power to i
l the instrumentation listed above has shown that a loss of power to the instrument loops could result.
2-22-1 Rev. 1 l
L
~
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION JUSTIFICATION:
One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be the operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.
The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.
The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.
Both the air control and air vent valves are loacted in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 1-031.
The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system' temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit-2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.
Consequently, a fire in area 1-031 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.
I Each of the RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loops is powered from channelized inverter 2A.
Inverter 2A is powered from inverter 2F which is powered from 600 V-ac MCC 2A or i
125 V-dc bus 2A.
A fire in area 1-031 could result in loss of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter 2F: however. inverter 2F will continue to operate from 125 V-dc bus 2A and will supply power to 120 V-ac distribution panel 2J for a minimum of 2 h.
If after 2 h power is lost. RCS hot leg temperature is available l
from the core exit temperature indication in the main control room from the core exit thermocouples.
Core exit temperature l
indication will not be affected by a fire in area 1-031.
In addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 h j
and' core exit temperature ind.ication availability, a design l
change to be installed as a result of R.G.
1.97 will provide a redundant power supply and provide cable separation and redundant signal processing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature l
l loops N2B21TE413. N2B21TE423, and N2B21TE433.
In order to implement this design change, it is required that all design and i
material be onsite prior to initiation of the modification.
l Based upon the R.G.
1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of l
the modification is currently planned for the fourth refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the second quarter i
of 1986.
After plant implementation of this modification, a fire I
in area 1-031 will not affect the ability to monitor one loop of l
RCS hot leg temperature.
l l
i t
f 2-22-2 Rev. 1 r
r
_-_,c--
1 l
J.
M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT l-y 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Post-accident neutron flux monitor Q2C55NE0048A-A is powered from inverter 2F.
Source range neutron flux monitors N2C55NE0031-P1 and N2C55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelized inverters 2A and 2B.
Inverters 2A. 2B, and 2F are all powered from 600 V-ac MCC 2A or 125 V-dc bus 2A.
Therefore, neutron flux monitoring following a potential fire damage in area 1-031 and the resultant loss of 600 V-ac MCC 2A will be available for a minimum of 2 h.
An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RHR system by using portions of the RCS sampling system and RHR Hx No. 1 and No.,2 sample valves Q2P15HV3105-B and Q2P15HV3106-B for determination of the boron concentration and shutdown margin follcwing a fire in area 1-031.
Unit 2 plant procedures will be revised to incorporate the above actions for a fire in Unit-1 area 1-031.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
1-031 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 8
TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL OUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY Rooms 250 A
Cable Insul.
12.303 lb 794,491
<9 h and 251 Cable Chase Train A DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floors, ceilings, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
An airtight UL Class-A door exists between rooms 250 and 235 (area 1-023).
A non-fire-rated watertight door exists between room 251 and the cable tunnel (area 1-015).
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the tunnel-side of the non-rated door with the exception of the hinges.
Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:
All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Bulkhead between this fire area and cable tunnel (area 1-075) is non-fire rated.
Ventilation:
There is no normal ventilation for this area and fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.
Floor Drains:
There are no floor drains.
1 I
l 2-22-3 Rev. 1
F.
s e
e J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT e
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION FIRE PROTECTION:
A smoke detection system and automatic sprinkler water suppression system is provided in this area.
In addition, the water hoses located in room 234 (area 1-020) are available for use as backup.
JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION:
The watertight door and bulkhead between auxiliary building (area 1-031) and cable tunnel (area 1-075) does not comply with 3-h fire-rated boundary requirements.
However a fire in area 1-031 Propagating into area 1-075 will not have any additional impact on Unit-2 safe shutdown because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both the areas.
In addition.
the fire-resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under a fire protection surveillance program.
i l
(
l l
l l
l 2-22-4 Rev. 1
p J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-23 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
1-075 (Evaluation for effects on Unit-2 cabling) l LOCATION:
UNIT-1 AUXILIARY BUILDING TO DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING CABLE TUNNEL TRAIN A Fire area 1-075 consists of a cable tunnel from Unit-1 auxiliary building to diesel generator building.
All fire area boundary walls, floors, and ceilings ~are 3-h fire rated, except for a non-rated bulkhead between this fire area and area 1-031.
A UL Class-A fire-rated door exists between cable tunnel and diesel building and a non-fire-rated watertight door exists between tunnel and auxiliary building room 251 (area 1-031).
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the watertight door leading into the auxiliary building.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire detection system.
CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION:
A fire in Unit-1 fire area 1-075 could potentially result in fire damage to the electrical circuitry of both Unit-1 and Unit-2 Train-A diesel generators.
This condition along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit 2 could result in the following Unit-2 safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation being effected.
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION 02N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2A) 02NilPV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2B) 02NilPV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G,.-2C)
The analysis of the potential effects of loss of power for the main steam atmospheric relief valves has shown that the valves could become inoperable in the closed position.
INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION N2B21TE413(LOOP-1)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N2B21TE423(LOOF-2)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N.2B21TE433(LOOP-3)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication Q2C55NE0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor N2C55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N2C55NE0031-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor The analysis of the potential effects caused by loss of power to the instrumentation listed above has shown that a loss of power to the instrument loops could result.
l l
2-23-1 Rev. 1
o s
J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION i
JUSTIFICATION:
One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.
The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened o closed without electrical controls or air supplies.
The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by openihg the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.
Both the air control and air vent valvas are loacted in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 1-075.
The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit-2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.
Consequently, a fire in area 1-075 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.
Each of the RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loops is powered from channelized inverter 2A.
Inverter 2A is powered from 600 V-ac MCC 2A or 125 V-dc bus 2A.
A fire in area 1-075 could result in loss of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter 2F; however, inverter 2F will continue to operate from 125 V-dc bus j
2A and will supply power to 120 V-ac distribution panel 2J for a minimum of 2 h.
If after 2 h power is lost, RCS hot leg temperature is available from the core exit temperature indication in the main control room from the core exit thermocouples.
Core exit temperature indication will not be affected by a fire in area 1-075.
In addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 h and core exit temperature indication availability, a design change to be installed as a l
result of R.G.
1.97 will provide a redundant power supply and provide cable separation and redundant signal processing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature loops N2B21TE413 N2B21TE423, and N2B21TE433.
In order to implement this design change. it is required that all design and material be onsite prior to initiation of the modification.
Based upon the R.G.
1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of the modification is currently planned for the fourth refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the second quarter of 1986.
After plant implementation of this modification, a fire in area 1-075 will not affect the ability to monitor one loop of RCS hot leg temperature.
2-23-2 Rev. 1
(
e 4
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Post-accident neutron flux monitor Q2C55NE0048A-A is powered from inverter 2F.
Source range neutron flux monitors N2C55NE0031-P1 and N2C55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelized inverters 2A and 2B.
Inverters 2A. 2B. and 2F are all powered from 600 V-ac MCC 2A or 125 V-dc bus 2A.
Therefore, neutron flux monitoring following a potential fire damage in area 1-075 and the resultant loss of 600 V-ac MCC 2A will be available for a minimum of 2 h.
An RCS sample can,be obtained after initiation of the RHR system by using portions of the RCS sampling system and RHR Hx No. 1 and No. 2 sample valves Q2P15HV'3105-B and Q2P15HV3106-B for determination of the boron concentration and shutdown margin following a fire in area 1-075.
Unit-2 plant procedures will be revised to incorporate the above actions for a fire in Unit-1 area 1-075.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
1-075 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL OUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY 2
Cable Tunnel A
Cable Insul.
32,610 lb 59.600
<1 h Train A DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floor, ceiling, and walls forming area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
The door to diesel building is a UL Class-A fire-rated door.
The door between tunne1 and auxiliary building (area 1-031) is a non-fire-rated watertight door.
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the non-rated door with the exception of the hinges.
Pipe & Electrical Penetrations:
All wall penetrations through I
the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Bulkhead between cable tunnel and auxiliary building (area 1-031) is non-fire rated.
Ventilation:
None Floor drains:
The floor drainage has a capacity of 100 gal /m which discharges to yard drains.
A sump and sump pump are provided.
Fire Protection:
An automatic water suppression system is installed in this area.
2-23-3 Rev. 1
r-J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION:
The watertight door and bulkhead between auxiliary building (area (1-031) and cable tunnel (area 1-075) does not comply with 3-h fire-rated boundary requirements.
However a fire in area 1-075 propagating into area 1-031 will not have any additional impact on Unit-2 safe shutdown because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both the areas.
In addition, the fire-resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under a fire protection surveillance program.
l l
l l
2-23-4 Rev. 1
f a
s J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-24 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
2-075 LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING TO DIESEL BUILDING CABLE TUNNEL TRAIN A Fire area 2-075 consists of a cable tunnel running from the Unit-2 auxiliary building to the diesel generator building.
The area boundary walls, floors", and ceiling are 3-h fire rated, except for a non-rated bulkhead between this fire area and area 2-031.
A UL Class-A fire-rated door exists between the tunnel and the diesel building and a non-fire-rated watertight door exists between the tunnel and auxiliary building (area 2-031).
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the watertight door leading into the auxiliary building.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating.
CONDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTION:
A fire in area 2-075 could potentially result in fire damage to the electrical circuitry of both Unit-1 and Unit-2 Train-A diesel generators.
This condition along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit 2 could result in the following Unit-2 safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation being effected.
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION 02N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2A) 02N11PV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2B) 02NllPV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2C)
The analysis of the potential effects of loss of power for the main steam atmospheric relief valves has shown that the valves could become inoperable in the closed position.
INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION N2B21TE413(LOOP-1)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N2B21TE423(LOOP-2)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature. Indication N2B21TE433(LOOP-3)
RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication Q2C55NE0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor N2C55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N2C55NE0031-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor The analysis of the potential effects caused by loss of power to i
the instrumentation listed above has shown that a loss of power I
to the instrument loops could result.
2-24-1 Rev. 1
r J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION JUSTIFICATION:
One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be the operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.
The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.
The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air s'pply and by opening the manual air u
vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.
Both the air control and air vent valves are loacted in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 2-075.
The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit-2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.
Consequently, a fire in area 2-075 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.
Each of the RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loops is powered from channelized inverter 2A.
Inverter 2A is powered from 600 V-ac MCC 2A or 125 V-dc bus 2A.
A fire in area 2-075 could result in loss of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter 2F; however, inverter 2F will continue to operate from 125 V-dc bus 2A and will supply power to 120 V-ac distribution panel 2J for a minimum of 2 h.
If after 2 h power is lost, RCS hot leg temperature is available from the core exit temperature indication in the main control room from the core exit thermocouples.
Core exit temperature indication will rot be affected by a fire in area 2-075.
In addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 h and core exit temperature indication availability, a design change to be installed as a result of R.G.
1.97 will provide a redundant power supply and provide cable separation and redundant signal processing and i
indication between RCS hot leg temperature loops N2B21TE413, l
N2B21TE423, and N2B21TE433.
In order to implement this change, it is required that all design and material be onsite prior to initiation of the modification.
Based upon the R.G.
1.97 l
commitment schedule, implementation of the modification is currently planned for the fourth refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the second quarter of 1986.
After l
plant implementation of this modification, a fire in area 2-07's l
will not affect the ability to monitor one loop of RCS hot leg i
temperature.
1 2-24-2 Rev. 1
I i
J.
M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Post-accident neutron flux monitor Q2C55NE0048A-A is powered from inverter 2F.
Source range neutron flux monitors N2C55NE0031-P1 and N2C55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelized inverters 2A and 2B.
Inverters 2A. 2B, and 2F are all powered from 600 V-ac MCC 2A or 125 V-de bus 2A.
Therefore, neutron flux monitoring following a potential fire damage in area 2-075 and the resultant loss of 600 V-ac MCC 2A will be available for a minimum of 2 h.
An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RHR system by using portions of the RCS sampling system and RHR Hx No. I and No. 2 sample valves Q2P15HV3105-B and Q2P15HV3106-B for determination of the boron concentration and shutdown margin following a fire in area 2-075.
Plant procedures will be written to incorporate above actions for a fire in this area.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
2-075 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL OUANTITY (Btu /ftal SEVERITY Cable Tunnel A
Cable Insul.
32,650 lb 59,600
<1 h Train A DESIGN FEATURES:
l Construction:
Floors, ceilings, and walls forming area boundar y are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
The door to diesel building is a UL Class-A fire-rated door.
The door between tunnel and auxiliary building (area 2-031) is a non-fire-rated watertight door.
A fire-resistant l
coating has been applied to the non-rated door with the exception l
of the hinges.
Piping & Electrical Penetrations:
all wall penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Bulkhead between cable tunnel and auxiliary building (area 2-031) is non-fire rated.
Ventilation:
None Floor Drains:
The floor drainage has a capacity of 100 gal /m which discharges to yard drains.
A sump and sump pump are provided.
Fire Protection:
An automatic water suppression system is installed in this area.
2-24-3 Rev. 1
a i
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT i
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION:
The watertight door and bulkhead between auxiliary building (area 2-031) and cable tunnel (area 2-075) does not comply with 3-h fire-rated boundary requirements.
However a fire in area 2-075 Propagating into area 2-031 will not have any additional impact on Unit-2 safe shutdown because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both areas.
In addition, the fire-resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under a fire protection surveillance program.
i l
2 24-4 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-25 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
2-030 LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING CABLE CHASE TRAIN B Fire area 2-030 consists of rooms 2249 (el 121 ft - O in, and 139 ft - 0 in.) and room 2252 (el 127 ft -O in.).
All fire area boundary walls, floors, &nd. ceilings are 3-h fire rated, except for a non-rated bulkhead between this fire area and the cable tunnel (area 2-076).
UL Class-A fire-rated door exists between rooms 2249 and 2235 (area 2-023).
The door between room 2252 and cable. tunnel (area 2-076) is a non-fire-rated watertight door.
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the watertight door on fire area 2-076 side.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating.
CONDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTIONS:
Fire area 2-030 contains electrical power and control cables for electrical Train-B distribution system.
The analysis of the potential effects of a fire in this area shows that the plant could lose Train-B emergency diesel backup power.
In the event of a postulated loss of offsite power along with a fire in this area, the plant could lose the total electrical Train-B system and make the following redundant safe shutdown components inoperable in the closed position.
EQUIPMENT PUNCTION N2P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room Supply to Pressurizer PORVs Q2B13HV2228-B Backup Air /N2 Q2B31PCV0445A-A Pressurizer PORV, Train A Q2B31PCV0444B-B Pressurizer PORV, Train B Q2E21HV8145-N Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray JUSTIFICATION:
Failure of valve O2E21HV8145-N in the closed position will disable the pressurizer auxiliary spray system which provides one method to achieve depressurization of the RCS.
I 2-25-1 Rev. 1
f J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Pressurizer PORVs Q2B31PCV0445A-A and Q2B31PCV0444B-B provide another means of achieving RCS depressurization.
Valves N2P19HV3885-B and Q2B13HV2228-B will fail in the closed position on loss of Train-B de power.
This will isolate the instrument air supply to the pressurizer PORVs Q2B31PCV0445A-A and Q2B31PCV0444B-B.
PORV O2B31PCV0444B-B will also be inoperable due to loss of the Train-B de power supply; however, the Train-A de supply to PORV Q2B31PCV0445A-A is not affected due to a fire in this area.
Since only one of the PORVs is required for RCS depressurization, and RCS depressurization is a long term requirement, the operator has adequate time to take manual action to restore the instrument air by hand wheel operation of valve N2P19HV3885-B.
Once air is restored, PORV O2B31PCV0445A-A will be operable to achieve RCS depressurization.
Plant procedures will be revised to include the above action for a fire in area 2-030.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
2-030 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBtJSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 21 SEVERITY Rooms 2249 B.
C Cable Insul.
5.760 lb 423,898
<8 h
and 2252 Cable Chase DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floors, walls, and ceiling forming area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
A non-fire-rated watertight door exists between room 2252 and Train-B cable tunnel (area 2-076) leading to' diesel building and an airtight UL Class-A fire-rated door exists between rooms 2249 and 2235 (area 2-023).
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the tunnel side of the non-rated door with the exception of the hinges.
Piping and Electrical Penetrations:
All penetrations through the 1
area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Bulkhead between this fire area and cable tunnel (area 2-076) is non-fire rated.
2-25-2 Rev. 1
F
'O J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Ventilation:
No normal ventilation is provided.
Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.
Floor Drains:
No floor drains are provided.
FIRE PROTECTION:
A smoke detection system and automatic water suppression system are installed in this area.
The manual hose station located in room 2234 (area 2-020) is available for use in this area.
JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION:
The watertight door and bulkhead between auxiliary building (area 2-030) and cable tunnel, (area 2-076) does not comply with 3-h fire-rated boundary requirements.
However, a fire in area 2-030 propagating into area 2-076 will not have any additional impact i
on Unit-2 safe shutdown because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both the areas.
In addition.
the fire-resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under fire protection surveillance program.
l 2-25-3 Rev. 1
4 J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT i
10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-26 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
2-076 LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING TO DIESEL BUILDING CABLE TUNNEL TRAIN B Fire area 2-076 consists of a cable tunnel running from the Unit-2 auxiliary building to the diesel building.
The fire area boundary walls, floor, and ' ceiling are 3-h fire rated, except for a non-rated bulkhead between this fire area and area 2-030.
A UL Class-A fire-rated door exists between the cable tunnel and the diesel building and a non-fire-rated watertight door exists between the cable tunnel and the auxiliary building (area 2-030).
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the watertight door.
EXEMPTIONS:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the t
extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating and the installation of automatic fire detection systems.
CONDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTIONS:
Fire area 2-076 contains electrical power and control cables for electrical Train-B distribution system.
The analysis of the potential effects of'a fire in this area shows that the plant could lose Train-B emergency diesel backup power.
In the event of a postulated loss of offsite power along with a fire in this area, the plant could lose the total electrical Train-B system and make the following redundant safe shutdown components inoperable in the closed position.
e EQUIPMENT FUNCTION N2P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room Q2B13HV2228-B Backup Air N2 Supply to Pressurizer PORVs Q2B31PCV0445A-A Pressurizer PORV, Train A Q2B31PCV0444B-B Pressurizer PORV, Train B Q2E21HV8145-N Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray JUST_I F ICATION :
Failure of valve Q2E21HV8145-N in the closed position will disable the pressurizer auxiliary spray system which provides one method to achieve depressurization of the RCS.
i l
2-26-1 Rev. 1
s J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Pressurizer PORVs Q2B31PCV0445A-A and Q2B31PCV0444B-B provide another means of achieving RCS depressurization.
Valves N2P19HV3885-B and Q2B13HV2228-B will fail in the closed position on loss of Train-B de power.
This will isolate the instrument air supply to the pressurizer PORVs Q2B31PCV0445A-A and Q2B31PCV0444B-B.
PORV Q2B31PCV0444B-B will also be inoperable due to loss of the Train-B de power supply; however, the Train-A de supply to PORV Q2B31PCV0445A-A is not affected due to a fire in this area.
Since only one of the PORVs is required for RCS depressurization, and RCS depressurization is a long term requirement, the operator has adequate time to take manual action to restore the instrument air by hand wheel operation of valve N2P19HV3885-B.
Once air is restored, PORV Q2B31PCV0445A-A will be operable to achieve RCS depressurization.
Plant procedures will be revised to include the above action for a fire in area 2-076.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
2-076 MAX 1 MUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 21 SEVERITY Cable Tunnel B.
C Cable Insul.
21,554 lb 39,000
<30 m Train B DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floors, walls, and ceiling forming area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
The door to the diesel building is a UL Class-A fire-rated door.
The door between tunnel and auxiliary building is non-fire-rated watertight door.
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the non-rated door with the exception of the hinges.
Piping and Electrical Penetrations:
All wall penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Bulkhead between cable tunnel and auxiliary building (area 2-030) is non-fire rated.
Ventilation:
No normal ventilation is provided.
Floor Drains:
The floor drainage has a capacity of 100 gal /m l
which discharges to yard drains.
A sump and sump pump is provided.
2-26-2 Rev. 1
e o
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Fire Protection:
An automatic water suppression system is provided in this area, JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION:
The watertight door and bulkhead between auxiliary building (area 2-030) and cable tunnel (area 2-076) does not comply with 3-h fire-rated boundary requirements.
However, a fire in area 2-076 Propagating into the area 2-030 will not have any additional impact on Unit-2 safe shutdown because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both areas.
In addition, the fire-resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under fira protection surveillance program.
l 2-26-3 Rev. I w
a
J. M. FAELEY NUCLEAR PLANT i
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION j
EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-29 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
1-076 (Evaluation for effects on Unit-2 cabling)
LOCATION:
UNIT-1 AUXILIARY BUILDING TO DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING l
CABLE TUNNEL TRAIN B i
Fire area 1-076 consists of a cable tunnel which runs from the Unit-1 auxiliary building to the diesel generator building.
All area boundary walls, floor, and ceiling are 3-h fire rated, except for a non-rated bulkhead between this area and fire area 1-30.
A non-fire-rated watertight door exists between the tunnel and the auxiliary building room 252 (area 1-030) and a UL Class-A fire-rated door exists between the tunnel and the diesel generator building.
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the watertight door leading into the auxiliary building.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemptian from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating and the installation of an autonatic fire detection system.
CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION AND THEIR JUSTIFICATION:
1.
CONDITION:
Fire area 1-076 contains electrical Train-B control cables associated with the shared Diesel Generator 2C start-stop circuit.
An analysis of the effects of a fire upon these cables shows that DG-2C would fail to start and align to 4.16 kV Bus 2J.
JUSTIFICATION:
4.16 kV Bus 2J powers the river water pumps which are considered non-safe shutdown equipment.
Loss of river water pumps will not affect Unit-2 safe shutdown.
2.
CONDITION:
Fire area 1-076 contains electrical Train-B control cables associated with the following safe shutdown components.
EQUIPMENT FUNCTION f
QSP16V506-B Service Water Train-B Emergency Recirc. to Wetpit QSP16V508-B Service Train-B Emergency Recirc. to Pond i
An analysis of the effects of a fire upon these cables shows that the subject valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperable.
2-29-1 Rev. 1
t J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION JUSTIFICATION:
1.
When service water discharge is lined up to the river through open valve Q2P16V545-B (normal operating condition).
The requirement to shift the service water discharge from the circulating water canal to recirculate to the service water pond is a long term one, not required for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and can be accomplished by manually repositioning the subject valves as required.
2.
When service water discharge is lined up for recirculating mode to the pond (required when necessary to conserve pond inventory).
The effects of a fire could cause immediate loss of Train-B service water.
However the controls of Train-B service water discharge valve Q2P16V545-B to the river are not affected by a fire in area 1-076 and operator action will be taken to open the valve and reinstate Train-B service water, until recirc to the pond can be re-established by manual operation of the subject valves listed in condition 2 above.
Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the above actions for a fire in Unit-1 fire area 1-076.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
1-076 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft21 SEVERITY Cable ' funnel B
Cable Insul.
21,554 lb 39,000
<30 m DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floor, ceiling, and walls forming area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
The door to the diesel building is UL Class-A fire-rated door.
The door between the tunnel and the auxiliary building (area 1-030) is a non-fire-rated watertight door.
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the non-rated door with the exception of the hinges.
Piping & Electrical Penetrations:
All wall penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Bulkhead between the cable tunnel and the auxiliary building (area 1-030) is non-fire rated.
2-29-2 Rev. 1
A
)
J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Ventilation:
None Floor Drains:
The floor drainage has a capacity of 100 gal /m which discharges to the yard drairis.
A sump and sump pump is provided.
l Fire Protection:
An automatic water suppression system is Provided in this area.
JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION:
The watertight door and bulkhead between the cable tunnel (area 1-076) and the auxiliary building (area 1-030) does not comply with 3-h fire-rated boundary requirements.
However a fire in area 1-076 propagating into area 1-030 will not have any additional impact on Unit-2 safe shutdown because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both the areas.
In addition, the fire-resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under a fire protection surveillance program.
2-29-3 Rev. 1
o,
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-30 Rev. 1 FIRS AREA:
1-030 (Evaluation for effects on Unit-2 cabling)
LOCATION:
UNIT-1 AUXILIARY BUILDING CABLE CHASE TRAIN B Fire area 1-030 consists of rooms 249 (el 121 ft - 0 in, and 139 ft -0 in.) and 252 (el 127 ft - O in.).
All area boundary walls, floors, and ceilings are 3-h fire rated, except for a non-rated bulkhead between this area and the cable tunnel (area 1-076).
A non-fire-rated watertight door exists between room 252 and the cable tunnel (area 1-076) and a UL Class-A fire-rated door between rooms 249 and 235 (area 1-023).
A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the watertight door on the fire area 1-076 side.
EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating CONDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTION AND THEIR JUSTIFICATION:
1.
CONDITION:
Fire area 1-030 contains electrical Train-B control cables associated with the shared Diesel Generator 2C start-stop circuit.
An analysis of the effects of a fire upon these cables shows that DG-2C would fail to start and align to 4.16 kV Bus 2J.
JUSTIFICATION:
4.16 kV Bus 2J powers the river water pumps which are considered non-safe shutdown equipment.
Loss of river water pumps will not affect Unit-2 safe shutdown.
2.
CONDITION:
Fire area 1 930 contains electrical Train-B control cables associated with the following safe shutdown components.
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION QSP16V506-B Service Water Train-B Emergency Recirc. to Wetpit QSP16V508-B Service Train-B Emergency Recirc. to Pond An analysis of the effects ot a fire upon these cables shows that the subject valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperable.
1 l
l 2-30-1 Rev. 1 N
< \\
I J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT I
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION JUSTIFICATION:
1.
When service water discharge is lined up to the river through open valve Q2P16V545-B (normal operating condition).
The requirement to shift the service water discharge from the circulating water canal to recirculate to the service water pond is a long term one, not required for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and can be accomplished by manually repositioning the subject valves as required.
2.
When service water discharge is lined up for recirculating mode to the pond (required when necessary to conserve pond inventory).
The effects of a fire could cause immediate loss of Train-B service water.
However the controls of Train-B service water discharge valve Q2P16V545-B to the river are n>? affected by a fire in area 1-030 and operator action wil' F taken to open the valve and reinstate Train-B service water, until recirc to the pond can be re-established by manual operation of the subject valves listed in condition 2 above.
Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the above actions for a fire in Unit-1 fire area 1-030.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
FIRE AREA:
1-030 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL OUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY Rooms 249 B
Cable Insul.
5,760 lb 423,898
<8 h and 252 Cable Chase DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floors, walls, and ceilings forming area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Doors:
A non-fire-rated watertight door exists between room 252 and Train-B cable tunnel (area 1-076) leading to diesel building, and an airtight UL Class-A fire-rated door exists between rooms 249 and 235 (area 1-023).
A fire-resistant coating has been i
applied to the tunnel side of the non-rated door with the exception of the hinges.
l 2-30-2 Rev. 1 1
b
e s.
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Piping and Electrical Penetrations:
all penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
Bulkhead between this fire area and cable tunnel (area 1-076) is non-fire rated.
Ventilation:
No normal ventilation is provided.
Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.
Ploor Drains:
No floor drains are provided.
FIRE PROTECTION:
A smoke detection system and automatic water suppression systems are installed in this area.
The manual hose station located in room 234 (area 1-020) is available for use in this area.
JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION:
The watertight door and bulkhead between auxiliary building (area 1-030) and cable tunnel (area 1-076) does not comply with 3-h fire-rated boundary requirements.
However a fire in area 1-030 propagating into area 1-076 will not have any additional impact on Unit-2 safe shutdown, because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both the areas.
In addition, the fire-resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under a fire protection surveillance program.
l 2-30-3 Rev. 1 i
i
~
e+
J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-31 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
2-020 LOCATION:
NON-RAD. SIDE CORRIDOR - AUXILIARY BUILDING. EL 121 FT - 0 IN.
Fire area 2-020 consists of rooms 2234, 2228, 2211, 2213, 2210, 2225, 2244, and 2245 which constitute the corridor battery service areas and battery room mezzanine on el 121 ft -0 in. on the non-rad. side of the auxiliary building.
EXEMPTION:
An exemption to section III.G.2.c is requested to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating.
CONDITION REOUIRING EXEMPTION:
The fire area contains power and control cables associated with the redundant safe shutdown equipment identified below.
EOUIPMENT PUNCTION 02P17M001A-B Train-B CCW Pump Q2Pl7M001B-AB Swing CCW Pump Q2Pl7M001C-A Train-A CCW Pump Q2E21M001A-A Train-A Charging Pump 02E21M001B-AB Swing Charging Pump Q2E21M001C-B Train-B Charging Pump Q2E16M001A-A Train-A Charging Pump Room Cooler Q2E16M001B-AB Swing Charging Pump Room Cooler Q2E16M001C-B Train-B Charging Pump Room Cooler Q2N23M001A-A Train-A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Q2N23M001B-B Train-B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump i
Q2N23P003 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Q2E16M005A-A Train-A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Cooler Q2E16M005B-B Train-B Auxiliary Feedwater Pnap Room Cooler Q2N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2A)
Q2NllPV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2B)
Q2N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2C) 02PllLT515-A Train-A Condensate Storage Tank Level Q2P11LT515-B Train-B Condensate Storage Tank Level l
Q2B13SV2213B-B Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve Q2B13SV2214B-B Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve N2P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room Q2B13HV2228-B Backup Air /N2 Supply to Pressurizer PORVs Q2B31PCV0445A-A Pressurizer PORV, Train A Q2B31PCV0444B-B Pressurizer PORV, Train B O2E21HV8145-N Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray i
i 2-31-1 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION The doors between rooms 2233 (area 2-021) and 2228 (area 2-020),
and 2235 (area 2-023) and 2234 (trea 2-020) are provided with removable transoms.
The door and transom assembly cannot be certified as UL Class A.
JUSTIFICATIONS:
A fire barrier has been provided for the following cable raceways in area 2-020; AHF485. AHF486, and AHF487.
The barrier covers the raceways over their entire route within area 2-020 and consists of two 1 in.-thick Kaowool blanket wraps with one overall layer of Zetex woven fabric.
The power and control cables for the Train-A pumps and pump room coolers, and the swing pumps and pump room coolers operating on electrical Train-A power, are protected in accordance with the requirement of 10CPR50 Appendix R per section III G.2.c.
In addition to the cable protection prescribed above, the steel hatch covers located in the floor and ceiling of room 2234 are Protected by a suppression system designed for extra hazards to limit the spread of fire to adjacent fire areas.
Pumps And Pump Room Coolers The fire barriers described as part of the modification provide adequate 4
protection to ensure that the minimum complement of pumps anti pump room coolers will be available for post-fire safe shutdown.
Atmospheric Relief Valves l
One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.
The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually i
opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.
The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.
Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and.would be accessible despite a fire in area 2-020.
The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit-2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.
Consequently, a fire in area 2-02 would not Prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.
2-31-2 Rev. 1
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J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT l
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Condensate Storage Tank Level Verification of condensate storage tank level is a long term consideration.
In the event that both channels of CST level are disabled, manual operator action can be taken to determine CST level independent of fire area 2-020.
Pressurizer PORVs Failure of valve Q2E21HV8145-N in the closed position will disable the pressurizer auxiliary spray system which provides one method to achieve depressurization of the RCS.
Pressurizer PORVs Q2531PCV0445A-A and Q2B31PCV0444B-B provide another means of achieving RCS depressurization.
Valves N2P19HV3885-B and Q2B13HV2228-B will fail in the closed position on a loss of Train-B de power.
This will isolate the instrument air supply to the pressurizer PORVs Q2B31PCV0445A-A and Q2B31PCV0444B-D.
PORV Q2B31PCV0444B-B will also be inoperable due to loss of the Train-B de power supply.
However, the Train-A de supply to PORV Q2B31PCV0445A-A is not affected due to a fire in this area.
Since only one of the PORVs is required for RCS depressurization, and RCS depressurization is a long term requirement, the operator has adeguate time to take manual action to restore the instrument air by hand wheel operation of valve N2P19HV3885-B.
Once air is rostored. PORV O2B31PCV0445A-A will be operable to achieve RCS depressurization.
Reactor Coolant Boundary Integrity Fire induced failure (hot shorts) to the control cables for the transfer relay cabinet Q2H22 LOO 4-B could cause control for the power operated relief and blocking valves and the reactor heat vent valves to shift from their normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel.
Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) of the control cables for Q2B31PCV0444-B, power operated relief valve, Q2B13SV2213B-B, and Q2B13SV2214B-B reactor head vent valves could result in the valves being energized to open.
The power relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position.
In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occuring, this condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manual operation (handle) of the effected relay thereby shifting control to the main control board.
To remove power from the transfer relay open breaker 14 on de distribution panel 2F (Q2R41 LOO 1F-B),
located in room 2209, fire area 2-004.
Then go to transfer relay cabinet TRC-3 (02H22 LOO 4-B) in fire area 2-034 room 2334 and manually shift transfer relays TR1 (Q2B13SV2213B-B). TR2 (Q2B13SV2214B-B). TR3 (Q2B31PCV0444-B), and TRS (Q2B31MOV8000B-B) placing control back to the main control board to allow the operator to mitigate the letdown.
i 2-31-3 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Unit-2 plant procedures will be revised to include the above action for a fire in Unit-2 area 2-020.
The doors between rooms 2233 (area 2-021) and 2228 (area 2-020),
and rooms 2235 (area 2-023) and 2234 (area 2-020) are provided with removable transoms to facilitate the movement of large equipment.
The transoms have been certified by the vendor as being constructed of materials and in a manner similar to that of the UL Class A criteria.
The door and transom assembly has not, and cannot, be certified as Class A: however, these assemblies meet the highest fire rating standards and provide sufficient fire retardancy capability.
(Reference APC letter to NRC dated April 16, 1981.)
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL OUANTITY (Btu /ft 21 SEVERITY Room 2210 A,
B Corridor Channel 2 Room 2211 B,
A Corridor Channels 3,4 Room 2210 Service Room C
Room 2228 B, C Corridor Room 2234 Cable 2,296 27,754(a) <30 min (a)
Hallway Insul. (a) lb (a)
Room 2244 A,
B Roof Battery-Channels B Room, el 1 and 2 131 ft - 0 in.
Room 2245 B, A Roof Battery-Channels A Room, el 1 and 2 131 ft - 0 in, l
Room 2225 C
Cable Insul.
137 lb 14.556
<30 min l
Battery panels 14 lb Charger (a)
Applies to rooms 2210, 2211, 2213, 2228, 2234, 2244, and 2245 collectively.
2-31-4 2ev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION DESIGN PEATURES:
Construction:
Floors and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete, with removable steel plate hatches between rooms 2234 and 2345 (area 2-042) and between 2234 and 2185 (area 2-6).
A UL Class-A door exists between room 2234 and stairway Doors:
between rooms 2234 and No. 1; two airtight UL Class-A doors exist 2235 (area 2-23); an airtight UL Class-A door exists between rooms 2228 and 2233 (area 2-21); a UL Class-A door exists betweets rooms 2210 and 2254 (area 2-12); a UL Class-A door exists between rooms 2211 and 2226 (area 2-19); a UL Class-A door exists between rooms 2210 and 2201 (area 2-14); a UL Class-A door exists between rooms 2210 and 2202 (area 2-15); a UL Class-A door exists between rooms 2213 and 2212 (area 2-16); a UL Class-A door exists between rooms 2213 and 2214 (area 2-17); a UL Class-A door exists between rooms 2225 and 2224 (area 2-18); a UL Class-A door exists between rooms 2225 and 2226 (area 2-19); and an airtight UL Class-A door exists between rooms 2228 and 2229 (area 2-21).
Piping and Electrical Penetrations:
Penetrations through the area boundary are sealed.
Ventilation:
Normal supply and exhaust is by the nonradwaste H&V There is an individual room cooler serving room 2225.
system.
Fire damper doors are provided at duct penetrations in the area boundaries.
Ploor Drains:
Five 4-in. diameter floor drains having a the area.
These 100-gal /m capacity each are provided throughout drains discharge to a sump in room 2185 (area 2-6) which has two pumps of 100-gal /m capacity each with discharge to the floor drain tank.
FIRE PROTECTION:
An ionization smoke detection system provides coverage to the Automatic water suppression systems cover the entire area.
entire area except room 2225 and portions of the corridor numbered 2211, 2228 and 2234.
Credit is not taken for cable wrapping in the portions of the area not covered by automatic suppression.
hose reel is located in room 2210.
A water hose is A CO2 provided in rooms 2210 and 2234.
Portable extinguishers are provided throughout the area.
EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION JUSTIFICATION:
Room 2225 and portions of the hallway and corridor numbered 2211, and 2234 are not covered by an automatic suppression
- 2228, Rev. I 2-31-5 l
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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION system.
The portions of fire area 2~020 that are not covered by an automatic suppression system do not contain redundant safe shutdown cable or equipment.
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i 2-31-6 Rev. 1 e
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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-35 Rev. 1 I
FIRE AREA:
2-006 l
LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING. EL 100 FT - 0 IN..
121 I
FT - 0 IN.,
127 FT - 0 IN.,
139 FT - 0 IN.,
155 FT - 0 IN.,
AND 175 FT - 0 IN.
Fire area 2-006 consists of the following rooms:
El 100 Ft - 0 In.
Room 2167 Combustible Storage Room Room 2185 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Room Room 2189 Plant Heating Equipment Room Room 2190 Motor Control Center 2E Room Room 2191 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (Train A)
Roor 2192 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (Train B)
Room 2193 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (Turbine Driven)
Room 2194 Lower Equipment Room Room 2195 Access Hatch Area i
El 127 Ft - 0 In.
Room 2236 Duct Chase Room 2241 Main Steam and Feedwater Valve Room Room 2242 Pipe Chase Room 2243 Pipe Chase The floors, walla, and ceilings of fire area 2-006 that form the boundary between area 2-006 and adjacent fire areas are of reinforced concrete and rated for 3-h with the exception of a hatchway with a steel plate cover between room 2185 (area 2-006) i and room 2234 (area 2-020), and a steel bolted access plate in i
the duct chase room 2236 (area 2-006) and room 2346 (area 2-041) on elevation 139'-0".
All electrical and piping penetrations between adjacent fire areas are sealed for a-3-h rating.
All
~
doors between adjacent fire areas are UL Class-A or Class-B rated j
with two exceptions.
There are non-rated doors between stairway i
No. I and room 2190 and between stairway No. I and room 2241.
l These doors are watertight and pressuretight respectively.
l Fire area 2-006 has several openings to the outside.
Most notably,'a checkered steel plate at el 155 ft - 0 in which is i
the outside entrance to the access hatch area (room 2195)-and portions of the walls of room 2241 which are constructed of steel grating.
2-35-1 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION:
An exemption to section III.G.2.c is requested to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cable and equipment to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating and the installation of automatic fire suppression systems.
l CONDITIONS REOUTRING EXEMPTION.
Exemptions are required for cable and equipment of four safe shutdown systems as described below:
a)
Auxiliary Feedwater System Protection and/or separation of auxiliary feedwater system cables and equipment complies with 10CFR50 Appendix R section III.G.2.c throughout fire area 2-006 with the exception of the pump rooms.
The Train-A, Train-B, and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are located in rooms 2192, 2191, and 2193 respectively.
Cabling and equipment within the pump rooms are not protected by fire barriers, automatic suppression is not provided, and all three pump rooms are located in the same fire area.
b)
Component Cooling Water System Protection and/or separation of component cooling water system cables and equipment complies with 10CFR50 Appendix R section III.G.2.c throughout fire area 2-006 with the exception of the component cooling water heat exchanger room (2185).
This room, contains all three component cooling water (CCW) pumps.
The CCW pumps are located on 21-ft centers and fire barriers are provided for the pump control and power cables.
However, there are small quantities of intervening combustibles consisting primarily of cable insulation between the pumps which are not provided with fire barriers.
In addition, the service water inlet valves to redundant component cooling water heat exchangers (MOV3130A-B, MOV3130B-B, and MOV3130C-A) and service water discharge valves from redundant component cooling water heat l
exchangers (SV009A-B, SV009B-B, and SV009C-A) are l
located less than 20 ft apart.
Although the cables for l
the Train-B valves are provided with fire barriers and automatic suppression, the valves themselves are not provided with fire barriers.
Automatic fire suppression is provided over the CCW pumps, CCW valves, and the other protected cables in room 2185.
Hcwever, estomatic l
fire suppression coverage is not provided for the complete room.
As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, the suppression system over the CCW pumps will be modified to provide direct, unobstructed impingement on the CCW pumps.
l 2-35-2 Rev. 1 l
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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION c)
Main Steam Isolation l
Cables for the redundant main steam isolation valves traverse rooms 2185, 2189, 2190, and 2194 on el 100 ft - 0 in., unprotected by fire barriers and in close proximity to one another.
In the main steam and feedwater valve room (2241) on el 127 ft - 0 in., the redundant main steam isolation valves are back-to-back in each of the three main steam lines and the associated valves control cables are separated by less than 20 ft.
An automatic fire detection system is provided in room 2241, but fire barriers are not provided over the redundant main steam isolation valves and related control cabling, and an automatic fire suppression system is not provided.
d)
Main Steam Relief Control cables for the redundant main steam atmospheric i
relief valves (MSARV) traverse rooms 2185, 2189, 2190, and 2194 on el 100 ft - 0 in.,
These cables are separated by less than 20 ft in the rooms mentioned above.
One train of the redundant MSARV control cables is not protected by a fire barrier on el 100 ft - 0 in.
The local control station and related control cabling for all three MSARVs are located together in room 2189.
Fire barriers are not provided to protect the local I
control stations or control cabling.
On el 127 ft - 0 in., the three valves and their control cabling are located in one room (2241).
Adjacent valves are within 20 ft of one another.
Fire barriers are not provided to protect the valves or control cabling and fire suppression is not provided in room 2241.
)
JUSTIFICATIONS:
1 Auxiliary Feedwater System An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire limited to one of the auxiliary feedwater (APW) pump rooms would not defeat the auxiliary feedwater system.
A fire in any one of the pump rooms would impact the AFW system only to the extent that one AFW pump and AFW flow to one steam generator could be disabled.
i The AFW pump rooms are highly segregated watertight rooms with 2-ft thick reinforced concrete walls and watertight doors that are maintained closed.
Lubricating oil and cable insulation are the only combustibles present in the pump rooms.
Leaking oil would be contained within the individual rooms or would drain into the sump servicing the room.
The combustible loading of any one pump room is estimated to be less than 30,000 Btu /ft2 with a maximum fire' severity of less than 30 min.
2-35-3 Rev. 1
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1 J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION A smoke detection system is installed in each of the three auxiliary feedwater pump rooms.
The detection system would provide early warning of a-fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate. time to respond.
A manual hose station, portable CO2 extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use in the area.
The room construction coupled with a low quantity of combustible material, the presence of smoke detection systems, and the availability of equipment for use by the fire brigade substantiates the contention that a fire in one of the AFW pump rooms would be confined to the affected room.
Such a fire would not prevent auxiliary feedwater flow to at least one steam generator.
Credit has been taken for the separation afforded by the subject pump room boundaries.
As discussed.during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, to ensure that the as-built configuration is maintained, the sealed penetrations shall be placed in the surveillance program.
Component Cooling Water System A smoke detection system is installed throughout the area.
An automatic sprinkler system is installed over the CCW pumps and in areas where cables are concentrated.
As previously noted, the sprinkler system will be modified in order to unobstructed impingement on the CCW pumps. provide directThe combusfible loading in the room is less than 35,000 Btu /ft2 with a maximum fire severity of less than 30 min.
The detection system in the room would provide early warning of a fire allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond.
A manual hose station, portable CO2 extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use in the area.
The CCW pumps are located on 21-ft centers.
Heat detectors are provided in the 5-kV CCW pump disconnect switch which alarms locally and in the control room.
The 5-kV disconnect switch cabinets are provided with a total-flooding CO2 system which is activated by the heat detectors.
The CCW pump cables are wrapped with two 1-in. layers of Kaowool with the exception of the Train-A cables for the swing CCW pump which are wrapped with a single 1-in. layer.
All trains of CCW pump cables are covered by an automatic sprinkler system.
Cables for the Train-B service water inlet and discharge valves on the CCW heat exchangers are protected by the 1-in. layers of Kaowool and covered by automatic suppression.
Cables for the Train-A service rater inlet and discharge valves on the CCW heat exchanger are not protected.
Although neither Train-A or i
Train-B service water valves are provided with fire barriers, the i
nearest redundant valves are separated by a distance of approximately 10 ft.
Intervening combustibles between redundant valves are minimal, consisting primarily of cable insulation.
2-35-4 Rev. 1
i J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 2
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION 1
Due to the existing level of fire detection and protection features provided as discussed above, fire damage in room 2185 would be limited such that one train of redundant CCW system components and cabling would be available for safe shutdown.
Main Steam Isolation The fire hazards analysis has shown that a postulated fire in rooms 2185, 2189, 2190, 2194, or 2241 would potentially result in spurious operation of the main steam isolation valves.
In the event that the main steam isolation valves fail to isolate due to fire induced failures in the valves or valve control circuitry, the main turbine stop valves would provide isolation of the main steam lines.
The main turbine stop valves and related control circuitry would not be effected by a fire in area 2-006.
Main Steam Relief The main steam atmospheric relief valves are located in the main steam and feedwater valve room (2241) on el 127 ft - O in.
The i
backup air compressors and local control station for the atmospheric relief valves are located in the plant heating equipment room (2189) on el 100 ft - O in.
The combustible loading of either room is such that the maximum expected fire severity is less than 30 min.
The main steam and feedwater valve roam is a restricted area with limited personnel access during plant operation.
A smoke detection system is installed throughout both rooms.
An automatic sprinkler system covers the plant heating equipment room.
The main steam and feedwater valve room does not have sprinkler coverage because of the high I
temperature piping in the room.
The detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond.
A manual hose station, portable extinguishers and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use in both rooms.
The main steam and feedwater valve room is a large room divided into three bays.
The bays are separated by partial walls, 14-ft in height.
One main steam line lies in each bay.
The main steam lines and their atmospheric relief valves are on 18-ft centers and separation of the valves control cabling for redundant MSARVs is maximized between the bays.
The floor of the main steam and feedwater valve room is watertight.
The only communication between the main steam and feedwater va've room is an equipment hatch.
On el 127 ft - O in. the equit
' hatch area is enclosed in a separate room.
In the event of fire induced failures affecting the redundant MSARV control cables or the local control stations located in rooms 2185, 2189,'2190, and 2194 on el 100 ft - O in., the atmospheric relief valves located in room 2241 on el 127 dt - O in, are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be 2-35-5 Rev. 1
4 J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION manually operated or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.
Due to the degree of separation provided between MSARVs and related control cabling in room 2241, the minimal combustible loading, the presence of an early warning smoke detection system, and the administrative controls imposed at the plant to limit access to room 2241 during plant operations, a
credible fire in room 2241 would not result in the inability to operate the MSARV associated with one steam generator.
P4RE AREA INFORMATION:
MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 2
TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL _
OUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY Room 2167 Cable Insul.
2 lb 5,323
<30 min Combustible Miscellaneous 100 lb Storage Room Material Room 2185 A,
B, C Cable Insul.
10,775 lb Component 5-kV Dis-14 lb 34,775
<30 min Cooling Water connect Heat Exchanger Switch Room Pump Lube Oil 1 gal Room 2191 A
Cable Insul.
463 lb 20,107
<30 min Auxiliary Pump Lube
.25 gal Feedwater Oil
'o Pump Room Room 2192 D
Cable Insul.
553 lb 26,411
<30 min Auxiliary Pump Lube
.25 gal Feedwater Oil Pump Room Room 2189 A, B Ceble Insul.
Plant Heating Lube Oil 1 gal Equipment Room Room 2190 A. B Cable Insul.
Control Center Panel 14 lb 2E Room (panels)
Roam 2193 C
Cable Insul.
6,195 lb(a)27,634(a) <30 min (a)
Auxiliary Pump Lube Oil 6 gal Feedwater Pump Room Cable Insul.
Room 2194 Equipment Room (a)
Applies to rooms 2189, 2190, 2193, 2194, and 2195 collectively.
2-35-6 Rev. 1
l J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 2
TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY Room 2195 Cable Insul.
Access Hatch Room Room 2236 None 0
0 0
Duct Chase Room 2241 Cable Insul.
1,384 lb 3,869
<30 min Main Steam and Feedwater Valve Room Room 2242 Cable Insul.
19 lb 1,287
<30 min Pipe Chase Room 2243 Cable Insul.
30 lb 1,670
<30 min Pipe Chase
. DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floors and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete or are open to the outside.
There is a removable steel hatch between room 2185 and 2234 (area 2-20).
The steel hatch covers located in the north-west corner of room 2185 is protected by a supression system designed for extra hazards to limit the passage of fire to adjacent fire areas.
Doors:
UL Class-A doors exist between rooms 2185 and 2197 (area 2-8) and between rooms 2185 and 2198 (area 2-9).
A UL Class-B door exists between room 2185 and stairway No.
1.
A checkered steel plate is located at el 155 ft - 0 in, at the outside exit of room 2195.
A pressuretight door exists between room 2241 and stairway No.
1.
A watertight door exists between stairway No. 1 and room 2190.
Piping and Electrical Penetrations:
Penetrations through the area boundaries are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.
l Ventilation:
Normal supply and exhaust is by the nonradwaste heating and ventilating (H&V) systen and the lower equipment room H&V system with the exception of rooms 2192 and 2191 which have individual room coolers.
Room 2185 also has two room coolers.
Fire dampers are provided in the duct penetrations in room 2167.
Fire dampers are provided at duct penetrations in room 2236 above el 121 ft - 0 in.
The steel bolted access plate located in the duct chase room 2236 on elevation 139*-0" is constructed to provide a heat barrier as specified on design drawing D-206781.
Fixed smoke removal capability is not provided.
Rooms 2241, 2242, and 2243 are vented to the atmosphere.
l 2-35-7 Rev. 1
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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
,f 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION f
Floor Drains:
Eleven 4-in. diameter floor drains having a 100-gal /m capacity each are provided which drain to sumps located in rooms 2185 (2 sumpr,;, 2191, 2193, and 2189.
Each sump has two 100-gal /m pumps that discharge to the floor drain tank.
In room 2241, there are four 4-in. diameter floor drains having a 100-gal /m capacity that drain to the main steam room drain tank, which has a 65-gal /m pump that discharges to the turbine room drain system.
FIRE PROTECTION:
A detection system covers the entire area except for rooms 2195, 2236, 2242, and 2243.
Room 2167 has a wet-pipe sprinkler system which activates a local fire alarm bell, trouble horn, and annunciates in the control room.
Automatic water suppression systems are provided for rooms 2189, 2190, 2194, and a portion of room 2185.
As previously noted, the suppression system in room 2185 will be modified to provide direct, unobstructed coverage to the CCW pumps.
The auxiliary feedwater pump rooms (2191, 2192, and 2193) are not covered by automatic suppression.
This has 1
been taken into consideration and the consequences are addressed as part of the justification for the auxiliary feedwater system.
Automatic suppression is not provided in the main steam and feedwater valve room (2241) because of the presence of high temperature piping.
This has been taken into consideration and 4
the consequences are addressed as part of the justification for main steam isolation and main steam relief.
Heat detectors are provided in the 5-kV disconnect switch in room 2185 which alarm both locally and in the control room.
The 5-kV disconnect switch cabinets are provided with a total-flooding CO2 system which is activated by the heat detectors.
Two water hose stations, located in rooms 2185 and 2189, are provided.
A portable extinguisher is located in room 2185 outside of room 4
2167.
A hose station in room 2234 (area 2-20) wiki be availah'.e for use in this area.
Automatic water suppression systems are provided for rooms 2185, 2189, 2190, and 2194 to protect electrical cable from exposure fires.-
JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION:
Pipe chases (rooms 2242, and 2243), duct chase (room 2236), and the access hatch area (room 2195) are not provided with automatic fire detection and fire suppression systems in fire area 2-006.
A r.On-fire-rated checkered steel plate is located at el 155 f t -- O in at the outside exit of room 2195.
Rooms 2242, 2243, 2236, and 2195 do not contain any safe shutdown equipment or cabling, and therefore a postulated fire in these rooms will not result in the inability to achieve safe shutdown.
2-35-8 Rev. 1
\\
Tf"
?.
N, J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-36 Rev. 2 FIRE AREA:
2-001 LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING. EL 83 FT - 0 IN..
100 FT - 0 IN., AND 121 FT - 0 IN.
i Fire area 2-001 consists of the following rooms:
El 83 Ft -0 In.
Room 2101 Waste Decay Tank Room Room 2102 Valve Compartment Room Room 2103 Corridor Room 2104 Passageway to Unit 1 Room 2105 Catalytic H2 Recombiner-A Room Room 2106 Catalytic H2 Recombiner-B Room Room 2108 Waste Monitor Tank Room Room 2109 Waste Monitor Tank Pump Room Room 2110 Monitor Control Panel Room Room 2111 Containment Spray Pump Room A Room 2112 Access to Tendon Access Gallery Room 2113 Valve Encapsulation Room 2114 Pipe Chase Room 2115 Hallway Room 2118 Floor Drain Tank Rcom Room 2119 Waste Holdup Tank Room Room 2120 Corridor Room 2121 Floor Drain Tank Pump Room Room 2122 Waste Evaporator Feed Pump Room Room 2123 Pipe Chase Room 2124 Valve Encapsulation Room 2125 Containment Spray Pump Room B Room 2126 Pipe Chase Room 2127 Pipe Chase Room 2128 RHR Heat Exchanger Room Room 2129 RHR Low Head Pump Room B Room 2130 Pipe Chase Room 2131 RHR Low Head Pump Room A El 100 Ft -0 In.
Room 2183 Tendon Access Gallery Entrance Room 2184 Piping Penetration Room Room 2169 Pipe and Duct Chase Room 2196 Tendon Access Gallery El 121 s's -0 In.
Room 2223 Piping Penetration Room 2-36-1 Rev. 2
1 h.
4f'.
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION All of the fire area boundary walls, floors, and ceilings are rated as 3-h fire barriers except for a non-rated steel hatch cover between the ceiling of room 2103 and the floor of room 2163 (area 2-4).
All electrical and piping penetrations sealed for a 3-h rating.
All doors in the boundary walls are UL Class-A or Class-B' rated.
EXEMPTION:
An exemption is requested from section III.G.2.c to the extent it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cable to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating and automatic fire suppression.
CONDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTIONS:
Exemptions are required for safe shutdown related cable and equipment as described below.
Instrument Air Isolation A fire induced failure in the control cable for instrument air isolation valve Q2P19HV3611 may cause the valve to fail closed.
A loss of instrument air causes the normal charging line isolation valve Q2E21HV8146 and the alternate charging line isolation valve 02E21HV8147 to fail open.
It may be necessary to close these valves during the course of shutdown to isolate charging flow.
A fire induced failure in the control cable for the pressurizer PORV backup air /N2 supply valve Q2B13HV2228-B and N2P19HV3825-A may cause the valve to fail closed. If instrunent air isolation valve Q2P19HV3611 or N2P19HV3825-A snd the pressurizer FORV backup air /N2 supply valve Q2B13HV2228-B fail closed, the pressurizer PORVs wil? be inoperable in the closed position.
Operation of the pressurizer PORVs may be required to achieve depressurization of the RCS.
Initiation of Safety Signals Fire area 2-001 contains instrumentation cables associated with the following redundant containment pressure instrument channels.
PT950-P1 CTMT Pressure Channel 1 PT951-P2 CTMT Pressure Channel 2 PT952-P3 CTMT Pressure Channel 3 PT953-P4 CTMT Pressure Channel 4 These instrument loops are not required for post-fire safe shutdown, but due to fire induced failures, the circuitry could cause initiation of safety signals (S?, CI, and CVI).
2-36-2 Rev. 2
9'.
(-
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Control cables attaciated with the three redundant atmospheric relief valves are routed through fire area 2-001.
An analysis of potentia.1 effects of a fire upon these cables has shown that the j
subject valve could become inoperable in the closed position.
j Charging Pump Miniflow
~
Power and control cables associated with charging pump miniflow isolation valve MOV8106-A are routed through* fire area 2-001.
An analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables has shown that MOV8106-A could close and isolate the charging pump miniflow line.
Reactor Coolant Boundary Integrity Control cables for the Train-A pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves Q2B31PCV0445A-A and 02B13MOV8000A-A. and the reactor head vent valves Q2B13SV2213A-A and 02B13SV2214A-A are located in fire area 2-001.
The subject cables are associated with the control function from the hot shutdown panel 02H21NBAFP2605G-A.
In addition control cables which shift control from the main control board to the hot shutdown pas.el via the transfer relay cabinet Q2H22 LOO 2-A are in this area.
A fire induced failure having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown via the PORV, and reactor head vent paths.
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXEMPTIONS:
Instrument Air Isolation - Justification Instrument air isolation valve Q2P19HV3611 and N2P19HV3825-A are equipped with a handwheel to facilitate manual operation.
In the event the valve i
fails closed an operator can manually open them. This action will restore instrument air to the charging line isolation valves and the pressurizer PORVs.
Consequently action would not have to be taken on the pressurizer PORV backup air /N2 supply valve Q2B13HV2228-B.
r l
Initiation of Safety Signals - Justification Fire induced cable failures in fire area 2-001 to non-post-fire safe shutdown circuitry could potentially result in a false SI, CVI, or CI safety signal initiation from the colid state protection system.
Plant procedures exist, or will be developed, for resetting spurious SI, CVI, and CI safety signals from the j
main control room and can be used if required for a fire in this area.
l l
2-36-3 Rev. 2
J. M.
FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION l
Main Steam Atmospheric Relief - Justification One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its It!ated steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.
The atmospheric relief valves are j
provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually j
opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.
~
The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves-to isolate the air supply and by openin'g the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.
Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 2-001.
The capability to control steam i
generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was l
demonstrated during the Unit-2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.
Consequently, a fire in area 2-001 would not Prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.
Charging Pump Miniflow - Justification j
Valve Q2E21MOV8106-A is required to be maintained open to establish charging pump miniflow.
In the event this valve fails closed, miniflow will be discontinued.
The charging pump can be
)
run safely with miniflow isolated and with a minimum of 24 gpm of l
seal injection flow for a period of up to 1 h.
This will allow the operator time to take manual action to open the valve and i
re-establish miniflow.
In the interim, normal charging flow can J
be established.
The increased flow through the operating charging pump will reduce heating of the pump and allow additional time for a manual action to open the miniflow valve.
Reactor Coolant Boundary Integrity - Justification Fire induced failures (hot shorts) to the control cables for the transfer relay cabinet Q2H22 LOO 2-A could cause control for the i
power operated relief and blocking valves and the reaction head vent valves, to shift from their normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel.
Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts for adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) of the control cables for Q2B31PCV0445A-A, power operated relief valve. 02B13SV2213A-A, and 2B13SV2214A-A reactor i
head vent valves could result in the valves being energized to l
open.
The power relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position.
In the unlikely i
l event of the multiple hot shorts occuring, this condition can be l
mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manual f
operation (handle) of the effected relay, thereby shifting control to the main control board.
To remove power from the l
G 2-36-4 Rev. 2
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION e
transfer relay open breaker 9 on de distribution panel 2C (Q2R41LOOlC-A), located in room 2312, fire area 2-004.
Then go to transfer relay cabinet TRC-1 (Q2H22 LOO 2-A) in fire area 2-035 room 2347 and manually shift transfer relays TR1 (Q2B13SV2213A-A), TR2 (Q2B13SV2214A-A). TR3 (Q2B31PCV0445A-A) and TR5 (Q2B31MOV8000A-A) placing control back to the main control board to allow the operator to mitigate the letdown.
Plant procedures will be revised to include the above actions for fire-area 2-001.
FIRE AREA INFORMATION:
MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 21 SEVERITY Room 2101 Cable Insul.
29 lb(a) 1,251(a)
<30 min (a)
Waste Gas Decay Tank Room Room 2102 Cable Insul.
Valve Compartment Room Room 2103 B
Cable Insu).
Corridor l
Room 2105 B
Cable Insul.
490 lb(D) 7,634(b)
<30 min (b)
Catalytic Panels 28 lb i
H2 Re-combiner-A Room l
Room 2106 Cable Panels Catalytic H2 Re-combiner-B Room Room 2104 S
Cable Insul.
Passageway to Unit 1 (a)
Applies to rooms 2101 and 2102 collectively.
(b)
Applies to rooms 2103, 2105, and 2106 collectively.
2-36-5 Rev. 2
I-J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION
=>
MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft'l SEVERITY Room 2109 B
Cable Insul.
417 lb(c) 5,742(c)
<30 min (c)
Waste Monitor Lube Oil 0.25 gal Tank Pump Room Room 2110 Cable Insul.
14 lb Monitor Panels Control Panel Room Room 2108 Cable Insul.
75 lb 19,457
<30 min Waste Monitor Charcoal 375 lb Tank Room Filter Room 2169 None 0
0 Duct and Pipe Chase Room 2118 Cable Insul, 22 lb 831
<30 min Floor Drain Tank Room Room 2119 Cable Insul.
60 lb 2,711
<30 min Waste Holdup Tank Room Room 2120 B, C Cable Insul.
42 lb 5,540
<30 min Corridor i
Room 2121 B, C Cable Insul.
287 lb 21,402
<30 min Floor Drain Lube Oil 0.25 gal Tank Pump Room Room 2122 B, C Cable Insul.
287 lb 21,402
<30 min Waste Lube Oil 0.25 gal Evaporator Feed Pump Room Room 2127 B, C None 0
0 0
Pipe Chase (c)
Applies to rooms 2104, 2109, and 2110 collectively, i
2-36-6 Rev. 2 L
v J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY Room 2128 A, C Cable Insul.
454 lb 2,607
<30 min RHR Heat Exchanger Room Room 2129 E.
C Cable Insul.
217 lb 3,837
<30 min RHR Low Head Pump Room B Room 2130 None 0
0 0
Pipe Chase Room 2131 Cable Insul.
222 lb 6,332
<30 min RHR Low Head Pump Room A Room 2126 None 0
0 0
Pipe Chase Room 2124 Cable Insul.
7 lb 6,329
<30 min Valve Encapsulation Room 2125 Cable Insul.
261 lb 3,569
<30 min Containment Lube Oil 0.25 gal Spray Pump Room B Room 2114 Cable Insul.
7 lb 3.885
<30 min Pipe Chase Cable Insul.
101 lb 3.469
<30 min Room 2111 Containment Lube Oil 0.25 gal Spray Pump Room A Cable Insul.
6 lb 3,333
<30 min Room 2113 Valve Encapsulation Cable Insul.
4 lb 1,655
<30 min Room 2115 Hallway 2-36-7 Rev. 2
I J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
~
l 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION l
MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /
SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL OUANTITY (Btu /ft 21 SEVERITY Room 2112 Cable Insul.
4 lb 175
<30 min Access to Tendon Access Gallery Room 2196 Cab'le Insul.
4 lb 175
<30 min Access to Tendon Access Gallery None 0
0 0
Room 2123 Pipe Chase Room 2183 A
Cable Insul.
1,050 lb(d) 6,405(d)
<30 min (d)
Tendon Access Gallery Entrance Room 2184 Cable Insul.
Piping Penetration Room. El 100 Ft - 0 In.
Room 2223 h,
B Cable Insul.
16,663 lb 40,625
<1 h l
Penetration Charcoal 400 lb Room El 121 Ft -0 In.
(d)
Applies to rooms 2183 and 2184 collectively.
DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floors and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
The ceiling of room 2223 has tendon access openings to room 2334 (area 2-34).
Steel plates with 3-h rated coatings and which are topped by removable concrete slabs have I
been installed over the tendon access openings.
The steel hatch l
cover located in the el 100 ft - 0 in, floor slab between room 2103 (area 2-001) and 2163 (area 2-004) is protected by a suppression system designed for extra hazards to limit the spread of fire to adjacent fire areas.
l l
2-36-8 Rev. 2
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFRSO APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION a
Doors:
An airtight. UL Class-B door is installed between room 2223 and stairway No.
2.
The dcor between room 2184 and room 2162 (area 2-4) is an airtight UL Class-A door.
Nonairtight Class-B doors are installed between room 2110 and 2115 and stairway No. 2.
Piping and Electrical Penetrations:
Penetrations thrrugh the area boundary *are sealed with silicone foam.
Three-h rated fire dampers are installed between 2169 and 2163 (area 2 I.).
i Ventilation:
No normal ventilation exists.
Fixed ruoke removal capability has not been provided.
Floor Drains:
Twenty-one 4-in. diameter floor drains with a 100-gal /m capacity each are located throughout the area.
Sumps are provided in rooms 2103, 2111, 2125, 2128, 2129, and 2131.
The sumps contain two 100-gal /m pumps each.
The sump pumps
. discharge to the waste holdup tank or the floor drain tank.
The floor drains above el 77 ft - 83 in drains to the floor drain tank.
The other floor drains drain to the sumps.
FIRE PROTECTION:
l A detection system covers the majority of the area.
Exceptions to this coverage are roome 2112, 2114, 2115, 2123, 2126, 2127, I
2130, 2169, and 2196.
The western half of the piping penetration room on el 121 ft - 0 in. is the only part of fire area 2-001 covered by automatic suppression.
Portable extinguishers, smoke removal equipment, and water hose cabinets are located throughout the fire area for use by the fire brigade.
JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION:
The rooms in fire area 2-001 without detection (2112, 2114, 2115, 2123, 2126, 2127, 2130, 2169, and 2196.)
contain little or no combustible material and contain no safe shutdown cable or equipment.' The western half of the piping penetration room on el 121 ft - 0 in. is the only part of fire area 2-001 covered by an
[
automatic suppression system.
This is the only part of fire area 2-001 that has cables or equipnent that are associated with redundant hot shutdown systems.
( n train of redundant cables are provided with fire barriers consisting of two 1-in. layers of Kaowool blanket with overall layer of Zetex cloth within this area.
2-36-9 Rev. 2 L
-s
- e
't J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-37 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
,2-004 LOCATION:
UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING. EL 100 FT - 0 IN.,
121 FT - 0 IN..
130 FT - 0 IN..
139 FT - 0 IN.,
155 FT - 0 IN.,
and 184_.FT - 0 IN.
-Fire area 2-004 consist of the following rooms:
El 100 Pt - 0 In.
Room 2151 Waste Gas Decay Tank Rooms Room 2152 Valve Compartment Room Room 2153 Waste Gas Compressor Roon 2
j Room 2154 Waste Evaporator Steam Generator Roon j
Room 2155 Passageway to Unit 1
]
Room 2156 Holdup Tank Room Room 2157 Holdup Tank Room Room 2158 Holdup Tank Room Room 2159 Recycle Evaporator Feed Pump Room Room 2160 Hatch Area Room 2161 Corridor Poom 2162 Hallway t
Room 2163 WDS Control Panel Room i
Room 2164 Storage Room Room 2165 Waste Gas Decay Tank Room Room 2166 Waste Gas Decay Tank Room 1
Room 2168 Chemical and Laundry Drain Tank Roon j
Room 2170 Setdown Heat Exchanger Room Room 2175 llallway Room 2176 l'econdary Spent Resin Storage Tank Room I
Room 2177 Pump Room Room 2178 Filter Room Room 2179 Va.'ve Room / Combustible Storage Room 2180 Rec 1*cle Evaporator Steam Generator Roon Room 2186 Boric Acid Area Room 2187 Hydro Test Pump Room Room 2188 Boric Acid Tank Area
]
[
El 121 Ft - 0 In.
Room 2203 Waste Condenser Tanks and Pump Room Room 2204 Waste Evaporator Package Room Room 2205 Passage to Unit 1 Room 2206 Heat Exchanger Roon Room 2207 Hatch Area Room 2208 Corridor i
Room 2209 Hallway Room 2215 Duct and Pipt Chase 3
2-37-1 Rev. 1
&_ q f
I
~
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Room 2216 Valve Compartments Area Room 2217 Volume Control Tank Roon j
Room 2218 Chiller Unit Room Room 2219 Pipe Chase Room 2220 Valve Compartment Room Room 2221 Primary Spent Resin Storage Tank Room Room 2222.
Corridor Room 2230 Recycle Evaporator Package Room Room 2231 Spent Resin Pump Room Room 2232 Spent Resin filter Room Room 2237 Corridor Room 2238 Cask Storage Area Room 2239 Transfer Canal Room 2240 Spent Fuel Pool Room Room 2253 Valve Compartment El 130 Ft -0 In.
Room 2601 Drumming Area Room 2602 Passageway Room 2603 Drum Storage Area Room 2604 Passage Room 2605 Blowdown Pumps and Surge Tank Room Room 2606 Filter Room Room 2607 Filter Roon i
l Room 2608 Blowdown Heat Exchanger Room i
Room 2609 Storage Room Room 2610 Valve Compartment Room El 139 Ft - 0 In.
Room 2301 Seal Water Filter Room Room 2302 Recycle Evaporator Feed Filter Room Room 2303 Reactor Coolant Filter Room Room 2304 Waste Monitor Tank Filter Room i
Room 2305 Seal Injection Filter Room Room 2306 Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizer Room Room 2307 Valve Compartment Room Room 2308 Waste Condensate and Monitor Tank Demineralizer Room
~
Room 2309 Hatch Area Room 2310 Valve Compartment Room Room 2311 Recycle Evaporator Concentrates Filter Room Room 2312 Corridor Room 2313 Floor Drain and Laundry Tank Filter Room Room 2314 Waste Evaporator Feed Filter Room Room 2315 Recycle Waste Condenser Filter Roon Room 2316 Passage to Unit 1 Room 2321 Sample Panel Room Room 2322 Hallway Room 2323 Sample Room Room 2324 High Activity Radioactive Lab Room 2325 Counting Room i
2-37-2 Rev. 1
y Y
~
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Room 2326 Gas Analyzer Room Room 2327 Valve Access Area Room 2328 BTR Demineralizer Room Room 2329 Pipe Tunnel Room 2330 Chiller Surge Tank Pump Room Room 2331 Valve Access Area Room 2332 MCC 2A Area Room 2340 Demineralizer Compartment Room 2341 Pipe Chase Room 2342 Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Room 2447 Cask Wash Storage Area / Combustible Storage Room 2348 Cask Wash Area El 155 Ft - 0 In.
Room 2402 Passage to Unit 1 Room 2403 New Resin Storage Room 2404 Filter Hatches Room / Combustible Storage Room 2405 Hatch Room Room 2408 Hallway Room 2409 Hallway Room 2410A 600-V Load Center (Station Service Transformer room)
Room 2410B Clean Storage Room Room 2418 Auxiliary Building and Containment Purge Vent Equipment Room Room 2419 Demineralizer Hatch Area Room 2422 Corridor I
Room 2423 Valve Compartment Room 2424 Demineralizer Compartment Room 2425 Demineralizer Compartment Room 2426 Demineralizer Compartment Room 2427 Demineralizer Compartment Room 2429 Containment Purge Air Equipment Room Room 2445 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Room Room 2446 Hallway Room 2448 SFPC Pump Room Room 2449 Demineralizer Room Room 2450 Valve Compartment Room 2451 Filter Room Room 2467 SFP Heat Exchanger Room Room 2478 Motor Control Center Room i
El 184 Ft - 0 In.
Room 2504 Stair No. 6 Room 2505 Spent Fuel Pool Vent Equipment Room Room 2506 Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Room All of the fire area boundary walls are rated as a 3-h fire barrier with all electrical and piping penetrations sealed for a 3-h rating.
Self-expanding cork is installed in portions of the l
2-37-3 Rev. 1
~
f
~
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PL7NT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANAL'fSIS REEVALUATION area boundary along the containment wall.
A steel bolted access plate is installed in the duct chase room 2215 (area 2-004) and room 2317 (area 2-034) on elevation 139'-0".
All doors that are part of'the fire area boundary are UL Class-A doors except for Class-B doors to stairwells used for access and egress and for doors in the fire area boundary leading to the outside which are not rated.
The floors and ceilings of fire area 2-004 which bound other fire areas are rated for 3-h.
All internal floors of fire area 2-004 are reinforced concrete, and exposed structural steel has been protected by fire proofing.
Credit has been taken for the separation afforded by several non fire-rated walls and l
floor slabs internal to the subject fire area, and are defined in i
the exemption justifications.
As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, to ensure that the as-built con-figuration is maintained, those sealed penetrations for which credit has been taken shall be placed in the surveillance program.
EXEMPTION:
An exemption to section III.G.2.c is requested to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cable and equipment to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-h fire rating, the installation of automatic fire suppression systems j
and smoke detection systems.
This exemption is based upon implementation of the proposed modification for this fire area.
f CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION / MODIFICATION:
1 Exemptions are required for cable and equipment of the following safe shutdown functions as described below:
Power Distribution System j
(a)
Fire area 2-004 contains redundant safety related MCCs, (2A) Q2R17B001A-A and (2B) Q2R17B001B-B.
These motor i
i control centers provide power for various Train-A and l
Train-B safe shutdown components respectively.
Power t
supply cabling and subject motor control centers are not protected by fire barriers, full coverage automatic suppression is not provided.
(b)
Fire area 2-004 contains redundant safety-related de distribution panels (2C) Q2R41LOOlC-A and (2F)
Q2R41LOOlF-B.
These 125 V-dc distribution panels provide power for various Train-A and Train-B safe-shutdown components respectively.
The i
distribution panels are not protected by barriers.
1
)
(c)
Fire area 2-004 contains redundant safety related MCCs, 1
(2CC) Q2R17B098-A and (2DD) Q2R17B099-B.
These motor control centers provide power for various Train-A and Train-B safe shutdown service water components respectively.
Power supply cabling and subject motor control centers are not protect by fire barriers, and l
automatic fixed suppression is not provided.
2-37-4 Rev. 1
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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION 1
Instrumentation Fire area 2-004 contains redundant condensate water storage tank level indication Q2P11LT515-A and Q2PllLT516-B, Train-A and Train-B cabling respectively.
The cabling for the subject safe-shutdown components are not protected by barriers, and full coverage automatic fixed suppression is not provided.
Instrument Air Fire area 2-004 contains redundant instrument air system de Power and control cabling which serve N2P19SV3825-A (instrument penetration room isolation valve). Q2P19SV3611-A (instrument air containment isolation valve) Train-A and Q2B13SV2228-B (power relief valve backup air supply)
Train-B.
The de power and control cabling for the subject safe shutdown components are not protected by barriers, and full coverage automatic suppression is not provided.
Auxiliary Feedwater Fire area 2-004 contains redundant power and control cabling of both motor driver AFW pump room coolers, associated feedwater valves, the turbine driver AFW pump, associated steam admission valves and associated feedwater valves.
The subject power and control cabling is not protected by fire barriers, and full coverage automatic fixed suppression is i
not provided.
I l
HVAC Fire area 2-004 contains redundant power and control cabling of battery charging room coolers Q2E16M006A-A, Q2E16M006B-B Trains-A and B respectively.
Battery room exhaust fans and exhaust dampers, Q2V47C012A-A, Q2V47C012B-B, Q2V47MOV3644-A, l
and Q2V47MOV3643-B Trains-A and B respectively.
The subject power and control cabling is not protected by barriers, and t
full coverage automatic fixed suppression is not provided.
Steam Release (Cooldown)
Fire area 2-004 contains de distribution panel (2C)
Q2R41LOOlC-A which supplies solenoid power for atmospheric relief valves, Q2NilPV3371A, Q2N11PV3371B, and i
Q2NilPV3371C.
Subject dc distribution panel is not l
protected by barriers.
1 Service Water Fire area 2-004 contains redundant power and control cabling and equipment MCCs Q2R17B098A, Q2R17B099B, and terminal boxes A2TB025, B2TB025 of service water valves Q2P16V539-A, 2-37-5 Rev. 1
- - = -...
y J. M. PARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Q2P16V546-A, Q2P16V538-B, and Q2P16V545-B Train-A and -B respectively.
The subject cabling and equipment is not protected by barriers, and automatic fixed suppression is not provided.
Neutron Flux Monitoring Fire area 2-004 contains redundant instrumentation cabling and equipment Q2C55NM0048-A of neutron flux monitoring Q2C55NE0048A-A (post accident neutron flux mo.titor),
N2C55NE0031-P1, and N2C55NE0032-P2, (source range neutron flux monitors).
The subject instrumentation cabling and equipment is not protected by barriers, and automatic fixed suppression is not provided.
Boration/ Makeup, Depressurization, RCP Seal Integrity Flow from the charging pumps is required for reactor coolant boration and makeup, reactor coolant system depressurization, and reactor coolant pump seal integrity.
The following independent conditions concern cables related to the charging pumps, charging pump room coolers, and charging system valves.
(a)
Fire area 2-004 contains redundant charging pump Train-A and -B power cables.
One train of redundant power cables is not provided a fire-rated barrier for its entire route in the fire area nor is full suppression coverage provided for both redundant trains throughout their entire route in the fire area.
(b)
Fire area 2-004 contains the Train-B charging pump room cooler, Q2E16M001C-B, power cables which are required for continued operation of the Train-B charging pump Q2E21M001C-B.
The Train-B charging pump room cooler power cable, redundant power and control cabling, and power disconnect switches, Q2R18A001A-A and Q2R18A001B-B, required for operation of the swing charging pump Q2E21M001B-AB, from Train-A power are located in close proximity on el 100 ft - 0 in. of fire area 2-004.
Fire barriers have not been provided to protect the Train-B charging pump room cooler power cable or the redundant power and control cabling and power disconnect switches required for Train-A operation of the swing charging pump.
In addition, a portion of the Train-B charging pump room cooler power cable is routed on el 121 ft - 0 in. above the power and control cabling and disconnect switches required for Train-A operation of the swing charging pump.
An unsealed penetration exists in the floor slab of el 121 ft - 0 in., which separates the charging pump roon cooler power cable on el 121 ft - 0 in from the 2-37-6 Rev. 1 o
l l
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION 1
redundant power cabling and power disconnect switches required for Train-A operation of the swing charging pump located on el 100 ft - 0 in.
('c)
During normal plant operation and during the early stages of shutdown the charging pumps take suction from the volume control tank (VCT).
The capacity of the VCT is such that the letdown line must be open in order to replenish the tank as long as the charging pumps are taking suction from it.
During the shutdown process the charging pump suction is switched from the VCT to the refueling water storage tank (RWST).
Fire area 2-004 contains power and control cables for the redundant RWST to charging pump suction valves (LCV115B and LCV115D), VCT isolation valves (LCV115C and LCV115E), and their power and control cables.
The subject power and control cables and valves are not Protected by fire barriers and full automatic fire suppression is not provided.
t j.
(d)
Fire area 2-004 contains redundant Train-A and -B charging pump room coolers power and control cables.
One train of redundant power and control cables is not provided a fire-rated barrier for its entire route in the fire area, nor is full suppression coverage Provided for both redundant trains throughout the entire route in the fire area.
Smoke Detection Room 2341 (pipe tunnel) and room 2342 (spent fuel pool pump room) have safe-shutdown control and instrumentation cabling which passes through them, and smoke detection is not provided.
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXEMPTIONS Power Distribution System - Justification (a,'
Motor Control Centers 2A and 2B An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire would be limited to one MCC and/or its associated power feed and would not effect the redundant MCC and/or its associated power feed.
Therefore only one train of redundant electrical distribution could be lost due to a credible fire in area 2-004.
MCC 2A is located in room 2332 el 139 ft - 0 in having its pcwer feed continue through room 2312 thence up to el 155 ft - 0 in.
MCC 2B is located in room 2209 I
2-37-7 Rev. 1 l
-~. _ -
~.
L J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT i
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION el 121 ft - 0 in. having its power feed exit this room into an adjacent fire area.
The redundant MCCs are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete floor at el 139 ft - 0 in.
Unsealed penetrations located in the subject floor have been reviewed and will not effect the separation afforded by the concrete floor.
The minimum horizontal separation between redundant components is approximately 66 ft between MCC 2B (el 121 ft - 0 in.) and MCC 2A power feed (el 155 ft - 0 in.).
This 66 ft of horizontal separation has complete automatic suppression coverage at el 121 ft - 0 in.
A smoke detection system is installed in all rooms containing the subject equipment and cables.
The detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond.
Manual hose stations, portable CO2 extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use on the subject elevations.
(b)
DC Distribution Panels 2C and 2F An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire would be limited to one de distribution panel and/or its associated power feed and would not effect the redundant de distribution panel and/or its associated l
power feed.
Therefore only one train of redundant de distribution panels could be lost.
+
Dc distribution panel 2C is located in room 2312 el 139 ft - 0 in, and de distribution panel 2F is located in room 2209 el 121 ft - 0 in.
The redundant de distribution panels are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete floor at el 139 ft - 0 in.
Unsealed penetrations located in the suLject floor have been reviewed and will not effect the separation afforded by the concrete floor.
The minimum horizontal separation between these redundant panels is approximately 55 ft and has complete automatic suppression coverage at el 121 ft - 0 in.
l A smoke detection system is installed in all rooms containing the subject equipment.
The detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond.
Manual hose stations, portable CO2 extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use on the subject elevations.
(c)
Redundant MCCs 2CC and 2DD are located on-el 155 ft - 0 in.
See Service Water Justification.
2-37-8 Rev. 1
..m a
m_
f I
4
) -
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Instrumentation - Justification An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire would be limited to one train of redundant condensate water storage tank level indication cabling.
Train-A cabling is located in rooms 2402, 2410-A, 2409, 2405, 2419, and 2478, el 155 ft - 0 in.
Train-B cabling is located in rooms 2209, 2208, 2222, 2230, and 2231, el 121 ft
- 0 in., and rooms 2605, 2609, and 2608, el 130 ft - 0 in.
The redundant cables are separated by two, 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete floors at el 139 ft - 0 in, and 155 ft -
0 in.
Unsealed penetrations located in the subject floors have been reviewed and will not affect the separation afforded by the concrete floor.
The Train-B cabling at el 121 ft - 0 in. is provided with automatic fixed suppression over 95 percent of its route.
A smoke detection system is installed in all rooms containing the subject cabling.
The detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond.
Manual hose stations, portable CO2 extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use on the subject elevations.
Instrument Air - Justification An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire would be limited to one train of redundant PORV instrument air header isolation valve cabling.
Train-A cabling is located in rooms 2168, 2163, and 2162, el 100 ft - 0 in., and room 2321, el 139 ft - 0 in.
Train-B cabling is located in rooms 2209, 2208,'and 2218, el 121 ft
- 0 in.
The redundant cables are separated by two 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete floors at el 121 ft - 0 in.
and 139 ft - 0 in.
Unsealed penetration in the subject floors have been reviewed and will not effect the separation 4
afforded by the concrete floors.
The Train-A cables have i
full suppression coverage on el 100 ft - 0 in., and Train-B cables full suppression coverage on el 121 ft - 0 in.
A smoke detection system is installed in all rooms
{
containing the subject cabling.
The detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond.
Manual hose stations,' portable CO2 extinguishers and portable smoke removal equipment are available-for use on the subject elevations.
i I
2-37-9 Rev. 1
e 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION I
Auxiliary Feedwater - Justification Fire induced failures'in control and power cabling could potentially result in the loss of redundant motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump room coolers and feedwater regulation valves.
This would limit the ability to provide auxiliary feedwater to a steam generator for cooldown to the turbine driven auxiliary-feedwater pump.
In addition this i
same fire would cause the loss of the normal ac supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feed water uninterruptible Power supply (UPS) Q2N23L001-AB.
2 j
Upon loss of the normal ac supply, the UPS will then be 4
supplied from battery power.
The subject battery has a 2-h capacity and upon depletion manual control must be taken, to 4
continue cooldown.
The following is a listing of those components that will require manual operation:
EOUIPMENT FUNCTION Q2N12HV3235A Steam to TDAFW from S/G 1B Q2N12HV3235B Steam to TDAFW from S/G 1C Q2N12HV3226 TDAFW Steam Admission Q2N23HV3228A Feed Water to S/G 1A j
Q2N23HV3228B Feed Water to S/G 1B Q2N23HV3228C Feed Water to S/G IC The 2-h provided by battery power is adequate for existing i
procedures for manual operation to be implemented.
Plant procedures will be revised to include the above action for a fire in area 2-004.
l HVAC - Justification Fire induced failures in control and power cables could i
potentially result in the loss of ventilation in both the redundant Train-A and -B battery and battery charger rooms.
A failure of the ventilation systems will not result in failure of the redundant Train-A or -B 125 V-dc battery i
systems.
Therefore, the-potential fire induced failure of the power and control cable for the redundant battery and battery charger room ventilation fans and dampers will not i
result in the loss of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hat shutdown conditions.
The safe shutdown i
requirement for battery and battery charger room ventilation i
is a long term requirement.
If ventilation is lost due to a j
fire in area 2-004, either portable ventilation equipment i
will be installed in the effected roon(s) or the damaged j
ventilation system will be repaired within 20 h of post-fire hot shutdown initiation to insure that battery room hydrogen i
concentrations do not exceed acceptable limits.
I 2-37-10 Rev. 1
+ - - - - -.
v.-emi---1--.m---,-.e,,
-w-
,u w.-,,
,-,cy--~._,
-r---,----------..----ry,,..~,y, m.,
s, J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Plant procedures covering these actions will be developed for a fire in area 2-004.
Steam Release (Cooldown) - Justification Loss of de distribution panel 2C would render the main steam atmospheric relief valves electrically inoperable.
One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and related steam generator is required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.
The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.
The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.
Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 2-004.
The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valve's was demonstrated during the Unit-2 natural circulation and i
cocidown startup testing.
Consequently, a fire in area 2-004 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.
Service Water - Justification An exposure fire in area 2-004 could cause a loss of Train-A service water flow.
The effects of the fire upon the control cable for valve Q2P16V546-A could close and cause the loss of Train-A service water flow.
Train-B service water is available.
In addition the effects of a fire upon the power and control cables for valves Q2P10V539-A, Q2P16V538-B, and Q2P16V545-B could cause them to become electrically inoperative.
A long term requirement (greater than 24 h) is to shift the service water discharge from the river and recirc. to the service water pond.
Manual j
operation of the subject valves is required to perform the i
line up of service water to pond recirc.
In addition, aligning Train A to recirc. to pond by manual operation, service water Train A will be restored to service.
Plant procedures will be revised to include the above actions for a fire in area 2-004.
Neutron Flux Monitoring - Justification Instrumentation cables for the source range neutron flux monitors N2C55NE0031-P1 and N2C55NE0032-P2 traverse fire area 2-004 through conduit embedded in the floor slab at el 155 ft - 0 in., and are accessible through embedded pu11 boxes on this elevation.
2-37-11 Rev. 1 L
a..
r --
s J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION The instrumentation cables for the neutron flux monitor Q2C55NE0048A-A are routed through fire area 2-004 on el 100 ft - 0 in., 121 ft - 0 in., and 139 ft - 0 in.
The amplifier Q2C55NM0048-A for neutron flux monitor is located on el 139 ft - 0 in.
The redundant cables are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete floor at el 155 ft - 0 in.
Unsealed penetrations in the subject floor slab have been reviewed and will not effect the separation afforded by the concrete floor.
Therefore, a credible fire in area 2-004 would not cause the loss of redundant neutron flux monitoring.
Boration/ Makeup, Depressurization. RCP Seal Integrity (a)
A fire rated barrier has been installed for Train-A power cable raceway ADDIC, ADD 18A, and ADD 21A. The subject barrier extended the complete route of the Train-A power cables in fire area 2-004.
An analysis was performed based on the above modification to demonstrate that a credible fire would be limited to one train of redundant charging pump power cabling.
Train-A power cabling is located in rooms 2161, 2162, 2163, and 2168.
Train-B cabling is located in rooms 2175, 2160, 2159, 2158, 2157, 2156, 2155, 2154, 2153, 2152, 2165, and 2166.
The redundant power cables are provided with a fire-rated barrier in the following rooms of fire area 2-004:
Train-A in rooms 2161, 2162, 2163, and 2168 Train-B in rooms 2175, 2160, and 2159.
Full fixed suppression coverage is provided in rooms 2163, 2162, 2161, 2160, and 2175.
As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, heat collectors will be installed on all sidewall sprinkler heads in room 2161 to increase their responsiveness to a fire condition.
In addition, the redundant power cables are separated at a minimum with a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete wall bounding rooms 2159, 2158, 2157, 2156, 2155, 2154, 2153, 2152, 2151, 2165, and 2166, with the exception of room 2155 where there is l
approximately 24 ft of separation with no intervening l
combustibles.
Unsealed penetrations in the subject walls have been reviewed and the walls are considered to afford adequate separation.
2-37-12 Rev, 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION A smoke detection system is installed in all rooms containing the subject cabling.
The detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond.
Manual hose stations, portable CO2 extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use on this elevation.
(b)
Raceways BFD02B, BFDO3B, and BFD06B carry the Train-B-charging pump room cooler power cable through the portion of fire area 2-004 on el 100 ft - 0 in. where this cable is in close proximity to redundant Train-A cables.
These raceways have been wrapped with two 1-in. layers of Kaowool and an overall layer of Zetex fabric. An automatic fire suppression system presently covers the area.
In addition, the blockout located 11 ft - 0 in east of Col. M, 2 ft - 4 in. south of Col. 20 which comunicates between el 100 f t - 0 in. and 121 ft - 0 in, will be sealed.
An analysis of the effects of a credible fire in area 2-004 based on the above modifications demonstrates that only one train of redundant charging pump flow could be lost.
(c)
Proposed Modification / Justification As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, the following raceway will be provided with a fire barrier of a rating greater than the maximum fire l
severity of <30 min in the Boric Acid Area (RM 2186),
l to ensure that a source of borated makeup water is l
available from the RWSt and will not require any manual operator action.
The fire barrier is considered l
adequate with the existing detection and no suppression coverage in this room.
Those raceways to the protected are BFD2GD, BFD21B, BHF457 and BHF42.
The analysis of the potential effects of a fire in fire area 2-004 on the power and control cables for VCT isolation valves LCV115C and LCV115E, and in the power and control cables for RWST to charging pump suction isolation valves LCV115B and LCV115D has shown that the i
valves will fail in their pre-fire positions and became 2-37-13 Rev. 1 t
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CPR50 APPENDIK "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION i
electrically inoperable.
The normal operating (pre-fire) position of valves LCV115C and LCV115E is open, and the normal operating (pre-fire) position of valves LCV115B and LCV115D is closed.
The cabling for LCV115D has been protected by the fire barrier installed in the proposed modification above and will not fail in the closed position.
(d)
Justification The above modification associated with item (2)
I above provides a fire rated barrier for the Train-B power and control cables on el 100 ft - 0 in.
Based on the implementation of this modification, one train of the redundant charging pump room cooler power and control cables are protected by a fire rated barrier and has a 40-ft horizontal separation from the opposite i
train cables.
Automatic suppression and smoke detection systems provide coverage for the subject Train-B power and control cables and the intervening 40 ft of separation on el 100 ft - 0 in.
El 121 ft - 0 in. contains the same redundant cables which have a minimum horizontal separation of 40 ft.
The Train-B power and control cables are provided automatic suppression and detection coverage for the entire route on this elevation.
In addition redundant Train-A and -B charging pump room i
cooler power and control cables are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete slab floor at el 121 ft
- 0 in.
Unsealed penetrations in the floor slab at e1 3
121 ft - 0 in have been reviewed and are considered not to effect the separation afforded by the floor.
In I
conclusion a credible fire in fire area 2-004 could not effect both trains of redundant charging pump room cooler power and control cables.
l Smoke Detection Justification i
l l
(a)
Room 2342 (spent fuel pool pump room).
Smoke detection has been added to this room.
l (b)
Room 2341 (pipe chase).
Subject pipe chase contains safe-shutdown cabling.
All cabling in this pipe chase including the subject safe shutdown cabling is enclosed in conduit.
The pipe chase is considered to have no in situ combustible.
The pipe chase exits the auxiliary building at elevation 139 ft - 0 in which is below grade.
This transition from room 2608 to room 2341 has a concrete wall with all penetration considered water 2-37-14 Rev. I l
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT j
10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION tight.
As there is no redundant safe-shutdown cabling i
in room 2341.
Due to the low in situ combustible loading and the very low probability of a transient combustible being introduced, the installation of a f
smoke detection system is not required.
l Reactor Coolant Boundary Integrity - Justification Fire induced failures (hot shorts) to the control cables for the transfer relay cabinet Q2H22 LOO 2-A could cause control for the reactor head vent valves, to shift from their normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel.
Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) of the
{
control cables for Q2B13SV2213A-A and Q2B13SV2214A-A reactor i
head vent valves, would result in the valves being energized to open.
In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occuring, this condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manual operation (handle) of the effected relay thereby shifting control to the main control board.
4 To remove power from the transfer relay open breaker for dc j
distribtulon panel 2C (Q2R41LOOlC-A) on 125V de switchgear j
2A (Q2R42B001A-A) fire area 2-018 room 2224.
Then go to l
transfer relay cabinet TRC-1 (Q2H22 LOO 2-A) in fire area j
2-035 room 2347 and manually shift transfer relays TR1 i
(Q2B13SV2213A-A), TR2 (Q2B13SV2214A-A), TR3 1
(Q2B31PCV0445A-A), and TR5 (Q2B31MOV8000A-A) placing control i
back to the main control board to allow the operator to mitigate the letdown.
If it is found that the sampling line i
isolation valves have not had spurious action as described 3
below then power isolation for the transfer relay may be accomplished by opening breaker 9 on dc distribution panel
)
2C (Q2R41LOOlC-A) fire area 2-004 room 2312.
?
An analysis of the effects of fire upon subject redundant j
sampling line isolation valves shows that it would take multiple hot shorts to energize the solenoids to open all l
the valves.
In the unlikely event of the multiple hot i
shorts (induced from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) occuring, the condition can be mitigated for the Train-A powered valves Q2P15RV3765-A and 02P15HV3103-A by removing power from all cables in the shared raceway.
This can be accomplished by opening the' supply breaker on the 125 V-dc switchgear 2A (Q2R428001A-A) in fire area 2-018 room 2224 for 125 V-dc distribution panel 2C (Q2R41LOOlC-A).
Plant procedures will be revised to include the above l
actions for a fire in area 2-004.
i 2-37-15 Rev. 1
~
i
9 J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft'l SEVERITY Room 2151 A,
B Waste Gas Decay Tank Rooms Room 2152 A, B Cable (a) 1,122 lb(a)
Valve Con-Insulation 15,877(a) <30 min (a) partment Charcoal 810 lb Room Fil,ter Room 2165 A. B Waste Gas Decay Tank Room Room 2166 A.
B Waste Gas Decay Tank
~
Roon Room 2153 A, B Charcoal 570 lb Waste Gas Filter Compressor Cable Insul.
448 lb 34,733
<30 min Room Lube Oil 1 gal Room 2159 B
Cable Insul.
299 lb 26,783
<30 min Evaporator Lube Oil 0.5 gal Feed Pump Room Room 2168 A, B Charcoal 200 lb Chemical Filter 52,037
<1 h and Laundry Cable Insul.
890 lb Drain Tank Lube Oil 0.5 gal Room Room 2175 A, B Cable Insul.
972 lb 29,580
<30 min Hallway Room 2154 B
Waste Evap-orator Steam Gen-erator Room (a)
Applies to rooms 2151, 2152, 2165, and 2166 collectively.
2-37-16 Rev. 1
r
=
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
~10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDONN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY Room 2155 B
Passageway to Unit 1 Room 2160 A, B Cable Insul.(b) 12,531 lb(b)
Hatch Area Lube Oil 0.75 gal 27,995(b) <30 min (b)
Panel 14 lb Room 2161 A
B, C Corridor Room 2162 A, B Hallway R.
2163 A, B VDS Panel Room Room 2177 Pump Room Room 2178 Filter Room Room 2164 A
Cable Insul.
133 lb 3,691
<30 min Storage Room None 0
0 0
Room 2215 Duct and Pipe Chase None 0
0 0
Room 2176 Secondary Spent Resin Storage Tank Room Room 2179 Cable Insul.
56 lb 2,724
<30 min Valve Room /
Combustible Storage (c)
(b)
Applies to rooms 2154, 2155, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2177, and 2178 collectively.
(c)
These rooms are utilized as combustible storage areas, particularly during outage periods.
They have 3-h boundaries, smoke detection systems, and sprinkler systems which provide a density of 0.30 gal /m/ft'.
2-37-17 Rev. 1 l-
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL OUANTITY (Stu/ft*1 SEVERITY Cable Insul.
Room 2180 Recycle Evaporator Steam Gen-erator Room Room 2186 A, B Cable Insul.
2,437 lb(d) 23,636(d) <30 min (d)
Boric Acid Lube Oil 3.75 gal Area Room 2187 Cable Insul.
Hydro Test Lube Oil Fump Room Room 2204 Channel Cable Insul.
183 lb 4,963
<30. min Waste 1
Evaporator Package Room None 0
0 0
Room 2219 Pipe Chase Room 2203 A
Cable Insul.
Waste Condenser Tanks and Pump Roon Room 2205 Cable Insul.
Passageway to Unit 1 Room 2207 B
Cable Insul.
Hatch Area Room 2208 AB Cable Insul.
Corridor Channel Panels 1
(d)
Applies to 2180, 2186, and 2187 collectively.
2-37-18 Rev. 1 L
o J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY Room 2209 A. B Cable Insul.
20.365 lb(') 40,452(') <1 h(*)
Hallway Channel Panels 71 lb 1
6 gal Room 2218 A. B Cable Insul.
Chiller Unit Channel Lube Oil Room 1
Room 2222 AB Cable Insul.
Corridor Room 2237 Cable Insul.
Corridor Room 2253 B
Cable Insul.
Valve Compartment Room 2156 B
Cable Insul.
274 lb 11.029
<30 min Holdup Tank Room Room 2157 B
Cable Insul.
358 lb 13.879
<30 min Holdup Tank Room Room 2158 B
Cable Insul.
27F lb 10,769
<30 min Holdup Tank Room Cable Insul.
111 lb 619
<30 min Room 2188 Boric Acid Tank Area Room 2206 B
Cable Insul 143 lb 6,305
<30 min Heat Exchanger Room Cable Insul.
25 lb 3.200
<30 min Room 2220 valve Compartment Room (e)
Applies to 2203, 2205, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2218, 2222, 2237, and 2253 collectively.
2-37-19 Hev. I t
,~
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAKIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TTTLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stu/ft*1 SEVERITY Room 2230 B
Cable Insul.
S57 lb 17.048
<30 min Recycle Evaporator Package R.?m Room 2231 B
Cable Insul.
134 lb 17,258
<30 min Sluice Pump Room Room 2232 Cable Insul.
296 lb 25,132
<30 min Sluice Filter Room Room 2216 A, B Cable Insul.
40 lb 6,549
<30 min valve Compartments Area None 0
0 0
Room 2217 Volume control Tank Room None 0
0 0
Room 2221 Primary Spent Resin Storage Tank Roon Room 2238 Cask Storage Area Room 2239 Transfer Canal Cable Insul.
204 lb(f) 1,243(f) <30 min (f)
Room 2240 Spent Fuel Pool Room Room 2348 Cask Wash Area (f)
Applies to 2238, 2239, 2240, and 2348 collectively.
2-37-20 Rev. 1 L
~
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY Room 2447 Cable Insul.
8 lb 21.236
<30 min Cask Wash Misc.
100 lb Storage Material Area /
Combustible Storage (C)
Room 2309 Hatch Area Room 2312 Channel Corridor 2,4 A, B Room 2325 Counting Room Room 2322 A, B Hallway Room 2316 A
Passageway to Unit 1 Room 2327 Gas Bottles (9) 34 lb(9)
Valve Access Cable Insul.
6,366 lb 29,950(9) <30 min (9)
Area Panel 22 lb Pipe Insul.
24 lb Room 2332 Channel MCC 2A Area 2,4 A, C Room 2307 A
Valve Compartment Room (c)
These rooms are utilized as combustible storage areas, particularly during outage periods.
They have 3-h boundaries, smoke detection systems, and sprinkler systems which provide a density of 0.30 gal /m/ft 8 (g)
Applies to rooms 2309, 2312, 2325, 2322, 2316, 2327, 2332, 2307, 2310, and 2330 collectively.
2-37-21 Rev. 1
(
E.
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY Room 2310 A
Valve Compartment Room Room 2330 Channel Chiller 2.4 Surge Tanks A
Pump Room Room 2301 Seal Water Filter Room Room 2302 Recycle Evaporator Feed Filter Room Room 2303 A
Reactor Coolant Filter Roon Room 2304 A
Cable Insul.(h) 13 lb(h) 392(h)
<30 min (h)
Waste Monitor Tank Filter Room Room 2311 A
Recycle Evaporator Concentrates Filter Room Room 2313 Floor Drain and Laundry Tank Filter Room (h)~
Applies to rooms 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2311, 2313, 2314, 2315, and 2305 collectively.
2-37-22 Rev. I t
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e J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAk_
OUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY Room 2314 Waste Evap-orator Feed Filter Room Room 2315 Recycle Waste Condenser Filter Room Room 2305 Seal Injection Filter Room Room 2306 None 0
0 0
Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizer R se Room 2308 None 0
0 0
Waste Condensate and Monitor Tank Domin-eralizer Room Room 2321 A,8 Cable Insul.
400 lb 19.455
<30 min Sample Panels 4 lb Panel Room Room 2323 A, B Cable Insul.
515 lb 35,200
<30 min Sample Room Pipe Insul.
3 lb Cable Insul.
998 lb 17,350
<30 min Room 2324 High Pipe Insul.
11 lb Activity Radioactive Lab Cable Insul.
25 lb 1,889
<30 min Room 2326 Clean Pipe Insul.
3 lb 2,003 Storage Room 2-37-23 Rev. 1
(
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY None 0
0 0
Room 2329 Pipe Tunnel Room 2331 A
Cable Insul.
330 lb 10,936
<30 min Valve Access Area Room 2342 Channel Cable Insul.
112 lb 5,247
<30 min Spent Fuel 2,4 Pool Pump 0
0 None Room 2340 Demineralizer compartment None 0
0 0
Room 2328 BTR Domin-eralizer Room Cable Insul.
128 lb 3,859
<30 min Room 2604 Passage Room 2605 B
Cable Insul.
247 lb 8,885
<30 min Blowdown Pumps and Surge Tank Room Cable Insul.
55 lb 7,208
<30 min Room 2606 Filter Room Cable Insul.
3 lb 563
<30 min Room 2607 Filter Room Room 2608 Channel Cable Insul.
85 lb 1,720
<30 min Blowdown 2,4 Heat Exchanger Room Room 2601 Drumming Area Cable Insul.(1) 627 lb(i) 2,141(1) <30 min (i)
Panel 716 Room 2602 Passageway (i) Applies to rooms 2601, 2602, and 2603 collectively.
l 2-37-24 Rev. 1
J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIK "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAKIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDONN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 2
TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY Room 2603 Drum Storage Area / Combustible Storage (k)
Room 2609 Channel Cable Insul.
136 lb 3.891
<30 min Storage Room 2.4 B
Room 2610 Cable Insul.
4 lb 616
<30 min valve Compartment Room Room 2341 Channel None 0
0 0
Pipe Chase 2.4 B
Room 2445 B
Cable Insul.
1.758 lb(3) 24,570(3) <30 min ($)
Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Room Room 2448 SFPC Pump Roon None 0
0 0
Roon 2451 Filter Room None 0
0 0
Room 2449 Demineralizer Room (j)
Applies to rooms 2445 and 2448 collectively.
(k)
This room is utilized as a combustible storage area, particularly during outage periods.
Smoke detectors are operable; howevar, additional work is required to make the sprinkler system operable and all fire boundaries 3-h rated.
Until the modifications are completed, an hourly fire watch will be performed.
These modifications do not affect the safe shutdown analysis and are not required for compliance with Appendix R: therefore, no schedule or exemption is required.
2-37-25 Rev. 1
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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY None 0
0 0
Room 2450 Valve Compartment Room 2409 Channel Hallway 1,2,4, A,B l
Room 2410A Channel 600-V Load 2.4 l
Center A
2 Room 2410B Unassigned Room 2405 B
Hatch Room Cable Insul.
22,752 lb(1)
Panel 36 lb 35.737(1) <30 min (l) l Room 2419 A, B Pipe Insul.
16 lb i
Demineralizer Hatch Area Room 2408 A
Hallway Room 2422 A
Corridor Room 2446 Hallway Room 2423 Valve Compartment Room 2424 None 0
0 0
Domineralizer Compartment Room 2425 None 0
0 0
Domineralizer Compartment (1)
Applies to rooms 2409, 2410A, 2410B, 2405, 2419, 2408, 2422, 2446, and 2423 collectively.
2-37-26 Rev. 1
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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAKIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDONN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Bru/ft*1 SEVERITY Room 2426 None 0
0 0
Domineralizer Compartment Room 2427 None 0
0 0
Domineralizer Compartment Room 2418 Cable Insul.
561 lb 58,754
<45 min Auxiliary Charcoal 7,400 lb Building Filter and Contain-ment Purge Vent Equip-ment Room Room 2404 Channel Cable Insul.
30 lb 306
<30 min Filter 1
Hatches Room /Com-bustible Storage < >
Room 2403 Resin 1,000 lb 10,000
<30 min New Resin Storage Room 2402 A
Cable Insul.
6,337 lb 57.839
<45 min Passage to Unit 2 Cable Insul.
65 lb 1,704
<30 min Room 2467 SFP Heat Exchanger Roon Room 2429 Channel Cable Insul.
6.015 lb 188,885
<2-1/2 h Containment 2
Panel 7 lb l
Purge Air A, B Charcoal 23,000.b Equipment Filter Room (c) These rooms are utilized as combustible storage areas, particularly during outage periods.
They have 3-h boundaries, smoke detection systems, and sprinkler systems which provide a density of 0.30 gal /m/fts, 2-37-27 Rev. 1
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o J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPEl3 DIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAKINUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDONN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 8
TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY Room 2478 A, B Cable Insul.
7,403 lb 39,085
<30 min Motor Control Panel 7 lb Center Room Cable Insul.
51 lb 925
<30 min Room 2504 Stairwell No. 6 Floor El 184 ft-0 in.
Cable Insul.
661 lb Room 2505 Spent Fuel Charcoal 3,800 lb 27.117
<30 min Pool Vent Panel 14 lb Equipment Room Room 2506 Cable Insul.
28 lb 947
<30 min Component Cooling Surge Tank Room Room 2170 A. B Cable Insul.
61 lb 2.198
<30 min Letdown Heat Exchanger Room DESIGN FEATURES:
Construction:
Floors and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.
Portions of the area boundary along the containment wall which are also boundaries for other fire areas are self expanding cork.
Doors:
Doors that are a part of the area boundary are UL Class-A doors except for Class-B doors to stairways, and for doors in the area boundary leading to the outside that are not rated.
An open-head water curtain is installed in the open-doorway between rooms 2420 (area 2-92) and 2408.
Piping and Electrical Penetrations:
Penetrations through the area boundary are sealed to a 3-h fire-resistance rating.
Ventilation:
This area is served by both the radwaste and nonradwaste HVAC systems.
Fire damper / doors are installed in duct penetrations through the area boundary.
The steel bolted l
2-37-28 Rev. 1
O J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION access plate located in the HVAC duct chase room 2215 on elevation 139'-O" is constructed to provide a heat barrier as specified on design drawing D-206781.
Floor Drains:
The 111 4-in. diameter floor drains having a 100-gal /m capacity drain to either the waste holdup tank or the floor drain tank.
Fire Protection:
Smoke detection systems are installed in all rooms containing safe-shutdown equipment (except room 2341) or appreciable combustible material.
Automatic suppression is provided in the following rooms 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2175, 2179, 2205 (partial), 2207, 2208, 2209, 2312 (partial), 2316, 2322, 2402, 2403, 2404, and 2447.
As previously noted heat collectors will be installed on all sidewall sprinkler heads in room 2161 to increase their responsiveness to a tire condition.
The 5-kV disconnect switches in room 2161 have an automatic heat-actuated CO2 suppression system.
Hose stations are installed to satisfy the requirements of NFPA 14.
Portable CO2 extinguishers and portable smoke removal equipment are provided on each elevation.
2-37-29 Nov. 1
o J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION GENERIC EXEMPTION REQUEST:
2-38 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA:
NLA LOCATION:
FIRE AREAS IN UNIT 2.
UNIT 1. AND FIRE AREAS SHARED l
BY UNITS 1 AND 2 EXEMPTION:
Request exemption from 10CFRSO, Appendix R in that it requires enclosure of the safety-related tray and conduit supports by a 1-h-rated fire, barrier.
JUST!PICATION:
All safety-related tray and conduit supports which support raceways that are protected by a fire barrier for Appendix R analysis have been evaluated to determine the effects of a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ASTM E-119 exposure fire.
This evaluation considered the following two aspects:
1.
The structural integrity of the supports in an ambient room temperature of 1700 P.
This is the temperature which corresponds to the one hour mark on the ASTM E-119 time-temperature curve.
The properties of steel at the elevated temperature that was used in the analysis were as given in the American fron and Steel Institutes Fire-Resistant Steel-Frame Construction Manual.
2.
The structural integrity of the tray and conduit supports due to thermal expansion (growth)of restrained supports at these elevated temperatures.
The results of the subject anal'ysis shows that the support system
^
cs installed provides adequate strength to ensure that those protected raceway will retain their integrity for the required I hour duration.
Therefore it is concluded that no additional protection to those supports is required.
1 i
2-38-1 Hev. 1
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