ML20237C854

Responds to Alleged Violations Cited in 871103 Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties. Reduction in Severity Level of Two Violations & Withdrawal of Proposed Civil Penalties Requested

ML20237C854
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	12/17/1987
From:	Mcdonald R ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM), NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE)
References
EA-87-142, NUDOCS 8712220226
Download: ML20237C854 (46)

Text

e Alabama Power Company l 600 North 18th Street i Post Office Box 2641 ,

Birmingham. Alabama 35291-o400 0 Telephone 205 250-1835 A

R. P. Mcdonald i Senior Vice President Alabama Power

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December 17, 1987 Docket Hos. 50-348 50-364 I

Director, Office of Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissior.

ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen: .

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Inspections of May 11-22, June 1-5 and June 11-July 10,1987 RE: Notice of Violation and Proposgdt Imposition of Civil Penalties Regarding Enforcement Action 87-142 This letter transmits Alabama Power Company's response to the alleged violations cited in the Staff's Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Peralties (NOV) dated November 3,1987, relating to inspection of Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. Attachments 1 and 2 _to this letter are Alabana Power Company's " Reply to the ?!atice of Violation" (see 10CFR $2.201) and " Answer to the Notice of Violation" (see 10CFR $2.205),

respectively.

As set forth in the two attachments, Alabama Powr Company denies in part each of the two Severity Level III violation:.' proposed by the Staff and maintains that the as-found condition of the equipment associated witf j each finding raised no significant safety concercs. Further, Alabam::Fower Company submits that the two proposed violatidns are each inapproprin 7y aggregated and that the individual findings comprising the two violeyras should be categorized, at most, as Severity level IV or Y violations; Un addition, the NOV is based on information as pruented in a July 27, 1987 Inspection Report. This report contains ina>.T,tracies which have bron documented by a separate letter to the NRC dated December 17, 1987. Theep inaccuracies should be considered in viewing tt"t context of the NOV and Alabama Power Company's response.  ? < <

Alabama Power Company requests that the two violations be. reduced in ' '

severity level and the proposed civil penal'cles be withdrawn. Alabapa Power Company also provides factors which, in the alternative, warrant complete mitigation of the proposed civil penalties.

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E  ; .y l Alabama Power Company t1Nes very seriously the specific issues raised by the

, Staff in its NOV, ead etheir generic implications. We have attempted to;show that we have take'n prompt and comprehensive corrective actions wherevec the NRC indicated a concern, despite our contentions that in some cases corrective actions were not warranted. We do not intend to minimize the importance of any finding where there is a factually-based concern about any E g>

level of :htail of an issue.

For several years prior to this audit, as Senior Vice President, I hase personally icestled with problems involving the availability and utilization of technical information, the adequacy of replacement equipment and parts, and effectiver.ess of corrective actions in scope, detail and timeliness.

,3 This NOV f adicates that we uust devote still greater discipline of effort in

, -' some facets of these activities. . Although we are confident that the specific e issues in thi21NOV do not indicate degradation of overall safety margin, we

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know that we mht achieve greater consistency of performance.

' Should you have ar.y questions regarding the idormation transmitted by this

, 1 letter or ot'aer concerns relating to this area, please contact me.

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- Respectfully submitted,

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ALABA!M POWE P Y /

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ATTACHMENT 1 '

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY Farley Nuclear Plant Reply to Notice of Violation Enforcement Action 87-142 Inspection Report Nos.60-348, 364/87-11 and 50-348, 364/87-14 1

! l Alabama Power Company provides this reply to the NRC Staff's Notice of Violation j (Enforcement Action 87-142). The Staff proposes in the Notice of Violation L

(NOV) to impose two civil penalties, pairing four underlying alleged violations '

(identified as. Items I.A, I.B and II. A , II.B), as two Severity Level Ill Violations. As set forth fully in the following sections, Alabama Power Company {

denies in part each violation.

I.A. INADEQUATE CONTROL AND INSTALLATION OF PURCHASED EQUIPMENT 1

l ALLEGED VIOLATION 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion Vll, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, requires that measures be established to assure that purchased material, equipment, and services conform to the procurement documents. These measures shall include provisions, as appropriate, for source evaluation and selection, objective evidence of quality furnished by the contractor or subcontractor, and inspection at the source. Documentary evidence that material and equipment conform to the procurement requirements is required to be available at the nuclear power plant prior to installation or use of such material and equipment.

Contrary to the above, at the time of the inspections, the licensee had nine circuit breakers with unconfirmed seismic qualification and voltage ratings installed in safety-related motor control centers at Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. The circuit breakers were sold by Satin American Corporation as seismically qualified safety-related circuit breakers acceptable for installation into 600V motor control centers. The vendor provided inadequate justification for seismic and 600V qualification. No testing or analysis that  ;

would qualify the use of these breakers as installed had been done either by 2 the licensee or the vendor. Moreover, although the vendor represented that the circuit breakers were fully qualified for 600V applications, the licensee should have been alerted to a possible problem since the breakers were still j affixed with an Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. rating of 480V.

f ALABAMA POWER COMPANY RESPONSE i

Admission or Denial j l

Alabama Power Company denies that the violation occurred as described above.

Attachment 1

I.A Inadequate Control and Installation of Purchased Equipment: ]

Page 2' -

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Reason for Denial

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A. Activities Performed Prior To The NRC Inspection As- a result of routine maintenance / replacement. efforts, Alabama Power Company 0

. attempted in 1986 to- purchase Siemens-ITE (ITE) safety-related 600V HE-frame replacement breakers and found that ITE no longer- manufactured HE-frame

' breakers with a 600V Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL). listing. Satin .

American Corporation indicated that they could supply ITE breakers suitable for 600V safety-related service. Alabama Power Company obtained a copy of

. Satin American's Quality Assurance'(QA) Program Manual, which was' reviewed and accepted by Alabama Power Company's Safety Audit and Engineering Review Group. Subsequent to placing the purchase order with Satin American, Alabama Power Company was advised by Satin American that an insufficient number.of-600V UL labeled breakers existed' to meet the. purchase order requirements and requested that it be allowed to provide 480V UL labeled breakers which would be qualified for 600V service as a substitute for the balance of the purchase order, where 600V UL labeled breakers were not available. Alabama Power Company questioned Satin American concerning the upgrading of 480V UL labeled breakers' .for. service in 600Y applications. Satin American stated that

' sufficient documentation would be provided to support qualification of the breakers for 600V; safety-related service. On. the ' basis of the response provided by Satin American and. the fact that Satin American had an acceptable QA program; Alabama Power Company issued a purchase order to Satin American in June 1986 for 206 (18 different types) safety-related HE-frame 600V molded case circuit breakers. Satin American obtained documentation from the-manufacturer (ITE), by letter dated August 19, 1986, that the 480V UL labeled breakers are the same as the breakers that were previously UL listed at 600V.

The documentation received from the manufacturer stated that (1) the 480V UL labeled breakers have not had any structural or electrical changes from the 600V UL labeled breakers manufactured previously, (2) the breakers built today with the 480V UL label are the same as the breakers produced years ago with

'the 600V UL label, and (3) the 480V UL labeled breakers can be safely used in lieu of the 600V UL labeled breakars for replacement purposes.

Satin American requested the assistance of Ecotech Inc. to provide the necessary documentation to qualify selected commercial-grade breakers. The Ecotech qualification was based on the certification of the spare / replacement breakers to the technical requirements of the original breakers, which was l predicated on the manufacturer's documentation that the 480V UL labeled breakers were the same as the 600Y UL labeled breakers originally supplied.

Ecotech determined that the approach to the qualification demonstration, or dedication process, was consistent with ANSI /ASME-NQA-1 and IEEE 467. In addition to dedicating the replacement breakers as basic components (as defined in 10CFR21), Satin American and Ecotech performed an engineering evaluation to determine which tests should be performed to provide further assurance of the acceptability of the replacement breakers for use in 600V

' applications. Accordingly, Satin American performed a visual inspection and a dielectric voltage-withstand test on each breaker. Satin American also

Attachment 1

'I. A Inadequate Control and Installation of Purchased Equipment Page 3  !

performed a calibration test on one breaker of each amperage rating included in the purchase order, and a short circuit test on the smallest and largest amperage ratings of both the magnetic trip only breakers and the thermal-magnetic trip breakers. All of these tests were based on UL-489 and were performed to provide further assurance that the breakers were j satisfactory for 600V applications. Satin American and Ecotech also performed an engineering evaluation of the seismic qualification and determined that the seismic qualification performed on the original breakers remained valid for these replacement breakers. Thus, Ecotech and Satin American concluded that seismic qualification tests for these breakers were not required on the basis that the breakers provided by Satin American were like-for-like replacements of the original breakers. Satin American also concluded that, as the use of the replacement breakers would not degrade the seismic characteristics of the motor control centers in which they are placed, re-qualification of the breakers was unnecessary.

By February 1987, Satin American provided all of the safety-related breakers required by the purchase order to Alabama Power Company along with a certificate of conformance to the requirements of the purchase order and a dedication package documenting the dedication of the commercial grade . items as basic components. The breakers also contained a label affixed by Satin American indicating that the breakers were acceptable for use in 600Y applications. The certificate of conformance specifically stated that the breakers supplied met the most stringent seismic requirements of the Alabama Power Company equipment specification, and the dedication package specifically addressed the 600V and seismic qualification of the breakers provided by Satin American. Alabama Power Company reviewed the certificate of conformance as part of the receipt / inspection process for formally receiving the breakers.

Alabama Power Company accepted these breakers based on Satin American's engineering judgement and the fact that the Satin American QA Program had been reviewed and was acceptable to Alabama Power Company. Additionally, Alabama Power Company performed trip tests on each circuit breaker immediately prior to installation (only nine of these breakers were installed). Upon successful completion of the trip test, these nine circuit breakers were installed in various locations throughout the plant. Only six of the breakers were installed in safety-related motor control centers which is contrary to the NRC Notice of Violation which states that nine circuit breakers were installed in safety-related motor control centers.

B. Activities Performed Af ter the NRC Inspection Af ter the first two weeks of the NRC Procurement and Vendor Interface Program inspection of Farley Nuclear Plant, ITE, by letter dated June 3,1987, wrote Satin American objecting to Satin American's use of the August 19, 1986 letter as authority to indicate that the use of its 480V UL labeled breakers in a nuclear facility would be proper. ITE agreed that the 480V UL labeled breakers could be safely used in 600V applications; however, it declined to

Attachment 1

'I. A fnadequate Control and Installation of Purchased Equipment Page 4 make any representation regarding the appropriateness of the breakers with regard to seismic and nuclear aging parameters. When questioned by Alabama Power Company, ITE stated that the reason for the June 3,1987 letter was its legal concern related to its own liability exposure as ITE did not qualify breakers for use in nuclear service. ITE stated that it manufactures standard commercial breakers and sells those breakers to third parties who qualify and dedicate the breakers for nuclear service.

The June 3,1987 ITE letter stated, "This means that where consideration for seismic and nuclear aging parameters were required, we did not state nor did I imply that our breakers had not changed in any areas as they related to these requirements." Also, this letter clearly reconfirmed that for voltage applications, the 480V UL labeled breakers would be acceptable for use in 600V applications. Additionally, aging was never a concern because the breakers were not purchased for use in a harsh environment where aging considerations must be addressed. However, the June 3,1987 letter did present a question regarding the validity of the seismic evaluation performed by Satin American because the letter implied that the currently manufactured 480V UL labeled breakers differ from the previously manufactured 600V UL labeled breakers.

As a result of NRC questions on the Satin American breakers raised during the inspection, Alabama Power Company and its architect / engineer (Bechtel) initiated discussions with Telemecanique, Inc. on May 22, 1987 regarding dif ferences between circuit breakers supplied commercial grade and those supplied as Class 1E. Telemecanique is the previous division of ITE that performed the seismic qualification of the 5600 Series Motor Control Centers (MCCs) and the breakers within these MCCs, including the HE-frame breakers, originally supplied to Farley Huclear Plant. On May 26, 1987, Alabama Power Company requested that Telenecanique review the ITE manufactured breakers with respect to changes made which could adversely af fect seismic qualification.

ITE provided information to Telemecanique on changes made to the HE-frame breakers since 1971, the date of seismic qualification of the original breakers. Telenecanique reviewed these changes. By letter dated June 5,1987 and in a subsequent telephone conversation on September 2,1987, Telemecanique concluded that, (1) none of the changes would have any detrimental impact on the seismic performance of these breakers, (2) the seismic test results for the breakers tested in 1971 can be extrapolated and used for the breakers manufactured up to the present time, and (3) the HE-frame breakers being manufactured today meet the same seismic requirements as specified for the original safety-related 5600 Series Motor Control Centers and corresponding HE-frame breakers. It is Alabama Power Company's opinion that the Telemecanique evaluation confirmed the results of the Satin American seismic qualification and addressed any uncertainty regarding the seismic qualification created by the June 3,1987 ITE letter. The Telenecanique evaluation also reconfirmed Alabama Power Company's position that the breakers met the seismic qualification requirements.

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Attachment 1 1.A Inadequate Control and Installation of Purchased Equipment Page S -

In addition to'the above prompt actions, after the NRC first raised a question concerning the Satin American dedication process, Alabama Power Company requested independent review of the Satin American dedication process by the 3 architect / engineer for Farley Nuclear Plant. The architect / engineer concluded I that.the Satin American process provides reasonable assurance that the breakers would perform their intended function when used in 600V applications. This review by the architect / engineer reaffirmed Alabama Power q Company's belief that the breakers have always been acceptable for use in.600V

• safety-related mild-environment applications.

C. Issues In The Notice Of Violation The NRC has stated that the installation of the Satin American breakers, with unconfirmed seismic qualification and voltage ratings, into safety-related MCCs did not conform to the requirements of Criterion VII of 10CFR50, Appendix B. Alabama Power Company's Quality Assurance (QA) Program Manual, Chapter 7, describes how Alabama Power Company complies with Criterion VII of 10CFR50, Appendix B. The QA Program has been reviewed and approved by the NRC as part of the issuance of the operating license for Farley Nuclear Plant. Procedures to implement Chapter 7 of the QA Program exist and the NRC has previously audited the Criterion VII measures of control by auditing Alabama Power Company procurement activities against these procedures. As indicated by the Notice of Violation, the NRC apparently believes the justification provided by Satin American for seismic and 600V qualification .was insufficient. As discussed previously, Satin American dedicated the 480V UL labeled commercial grade breakers as basic components for use as 600V breakers prior to shipping the breakers to Alabama Power Company. The dedication approach was determined by Ecotech to be consistent with ANSI /ASME-NQA-1 and IEEE 467. The dedication of the commercial grade breakers as basic components was also founded upon the documentation provided by the breaker manufacturer (August 19, 1986 l etter) that demonstrated similarity between the replacement breakers and the breakers originally supplied by the manufacturer.

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Although the Notice of Violation alleges otherwise, testing was also performed by vendors and Alabama Power Company. As discussed previously, a dielectric voltage-withstand test was performed on each breaker, a calibration test was performed on one breaker of each amperage rating, and short circuit tests were performed on additional representative sets of the breakers. Alabama Power Company performed trip tests on each breaker immediately prior to installation and verified the trip time was within the manufacturer's time values.

Therefore, the NRC statement "No testing or analysis that would qualify the use of these breakers as installed had been done either by the licensee or the vendor" is not correct.

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Attachment 1

'I. A l'nadequate Control and Installation of Purchased Equipnent Page 6 The NRC also states in the Notice of Violation that "... the licensee should have been alerted to a possible problem since the breakers were still affixed with an Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. rating of 480V." Alabama Power Company was aware that the breakers were UL labeled for 480Y and that the 600V UL listing had been dropped by the manufacturer for economic reasons.

Additionally, Alabama Power Company is not aware of any regulatory requirement to maintain a UL listing for these breakers. In any event, Alabama Power Company had no reason to believe the breakers would not be acceptable for use in 600V applications, as implied by the above statenent from the Notice of Violation. Conversely, the August 19, 1986 ITE letter, which stated there had l been no structural or electrical changes to the breakers, together with the Satin American agreement to document the proper support for the breakers being suitable for 600V use, provided assurance to Alabara Power Company that the breakers would be acceptable for use in 600Y applications. Further, subsequent to the NRC raising questions concerning the breaker qualification, Alabama Power Company requested a review by the architect / engineer for Farley Nuclear Plant of the original qualification information provided by Satin l American, as well as subsequent documentation obtained from Satin Anerican, Telemecanique, and Farley Nuclear Plant, to determine the acceptability of the breakers. The architect / engineer concluded, based on this information, that the breakers provided by Satin American are acceptable for use in 600V safety-related applications at Farley Nuclear Plant when the breakers are installed in a mild environment. The breakers had not been purchased for use in a harsh environment.

D. Summary l As the facts discussed above reflect, a violation did not occur as alleged in the Notice of Violation. Alabama Power Company believes its procurement process provided reasonable assurance of the adequacy of these components prior to their installation. The reviews made subsequent to the NRC inspection confirmed the adequacy of the original Alabama Power Company '

procurement process. In summary, the issues associated with the alleged l

j violation are not significant from a safety standpoint.

Action Taken To Reinforce Continued Compliance Once the NRC questioned the qualification of the Satin American breakers, Alabama Power Company removed all Satin American breakers from service and replaced them with spare breakers supplied as original equipment. All Satin American breakers were placed "on hold" pending further evaluation. Alabama Power Company notes that these breakers were immediately removed from service solely for the purpose of resolving any potential operability questions. As the tests and analyses discussed above have demonstrated, the Satin American breakers are still acceptable for use in safety-related applications in a mild environment.

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Attachment 1 1.B Inadequate Design Control Page 7 Additional Information A source for obtaining seismically qualified, 600V UL listed direct-replacement breakers has yet to be identified. Obtainable breakers may require the complete redesign of cubicles within motor control centers or replacement of motor control centers in their entirety. Due to the potentially large expense involved with these options, Alabama Power Company

. wishes to resolve the breaker issue with the NRC. l I.B INADEQUATE DESIGN CONTROL ALLEGED VIOLATION 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires that measures be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. It also requires that measures be established for the selection and review for suitability of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of structures, systems and components.

Contrary to the above, the licensee installed a number of commercial grade parts at Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 without adequately evaluating their suitability for use in safety-related applications. These parts were in use at the time of the inspections indicated above. Specifically:

1. Connercial grade circuit breakers were installed into safety-related motor i control centers 10 and 2U.

2. A commercial grade "Namco" limit switch was installed as a replacement for a safety-related switch for the accumulator tank' isolation valve.

3. A commercial grade torque switch was installed into a safety-related Limitorque motor actuator. Limitorque has stated that although the safety-related and commercial grade torque switches for outside containment are the same, the switches ordered as safety-related received additional quality assurance checks at Limitorque that were not performed on the commercial grade switches. There was no evidence that the licensee q made additional quality assurance checks on the torque switch, i 4. Commercial grade hinge pin bushings were installed in safety-related Anchor / Darling tilting disk check valves in the auxiliary feedwater system.

5. A commercial grade Agastat timing relay ( ATR) was installed as a replacement in safety-related panel #Q2R16B007-B, 600V load distribution panel. Additionally, commercial grade ATRs were found in other safety-related electrical enclosures including two ATRs in diesel generator load sequencer panel #Q2R43E5018-B [ sic], and two ATRs in diesel generator relay terminal box #Q1R43E506-B.

~ Attachment 1 1.B Inadequate Design Control Page 8 ALABAMA POWER COMPANY RESPONSE i The above alleged violation identified five instances of evaluations considered by the NRC to be inadequate. These instances are addressed individually below.

INSTANCE 1:

Commercial grade circuit breakers were installed into safety-related motor i control centers 10 and 2U.

Admission or Denial Alabama Power Company admits that the decision to procure the items commercial grade did not include documented evaluation or dedication of parts procured as commercial grade for use in safety-related applications. Further, no documented evaluation / dedication was done prior to installation. However,  !

pre-installation trip tests were performed at the time of installation, j Reason for Violation  !

l Inadequate procedural guidance resulted in the failure to document fully evaluation of the suitability of commercial grade parts for installation in safety-related applications. i Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved The subject breakers were removed from service on June 4,1987 and replaced l with breakers that were provided as original equipment for this application, jl Although the circuit breakers were purchased as commercial grade, subsequent l evaluations and tests of the two breakers have been performed. The results of i these evaluations and tests have shown that, even though the breakers were  ;

purchased as commercial grade, the breakers were qualifiable for use in '

safety-related applications. Because the breakers installed in Motor Control Centers 1U and 20 were capable of performing their intended function, no significant safety issue was involved.

Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations

1. Prior to completion of the NRC inspection, on June 4,1987 plant procedures were revised on an interim basis to require written evaluation and approval of the use of commercial grade parts prior to use in safety-related applications. This action was intended to be an interim measure until a dedication program was approved, which occurred on November 13, 1987.

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1.B Inadequate Design Control i Page 9

2. Procedures have been revised to require an engineering review of l commercial grade parts prior to installation in safety-related applications. If the commercial grade part does not perform a safety function, a basis for acceptance is provided and the part is released for installation. If the part performs a safety function, the part is not released for installation unless it is subsequently dedicated as a basic component for the intended application.

3. A dedication program has now been included in procedures to provide clear guidance on the use of commercial grade items in safety-related applications where the item performs a safety function. This program i requires an engineering review of the item to determine critical-to-function attributes and provides methods to verify the item's compliance with these attributes. This information is documented in a dedication plan which is included in the receipt inspection requirements for the item. The dedication plan includes acceptance criteria when tests or measurements are required for dedication. j Date of Full Compliance l 1

Applicable Farley Nuclear Plant procedures were revised on November 13, 1987.

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. Attachment 1 i 1.B Inadequate Design Control Page 10 INSTANCE 2:

A commercial grade "Namco" limit switch was installed as a replacement for a l Safety-related switch for the accumulator tank isolation valve. l I

i Admission or Denial )

Alabama Power Company admits that at the time of installation of this limit switch it did not have documented evaluation or dedication of the limit switch for safety-related use.

Reason for Violation Inadequate procedural guidance resulted in an inadequate evaluation of the suitability of commercial grade parts for installation in safety-related applications.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved A letter was obtained from NAMCO on June 1,1987 stating that the subject switches are qualified per NAMC0 Test Report QTR107 and thus are acceptable for use and hence no significant safety issue was involved.

Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations

1. Prior to completion of the NRC inspection, on June 4,1987 plant procedures were revised on an interim basis to require written evaluation and approval of the use of commercial grade parts prior to use in safety-related applications. This action was intended to be an interim measure until a dedication program was approved, which occurred on November 13, 1987.

2. Procedures have been revised to require an engineering review of commercial grade parts prior to installation in safety-related applications. If the commercial grade part does not perform a safety function, a basis for acceptance is provided and the part is released for installation, if the part performs a safety function, the part is not released for installation unless it is subsequently dedicated as a basic component for the intended application.

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. Attachment 1 1.B Inadequate Design Control Page 11 4

3. A dedication program has now been included in procedures to provide clear guidance on the use of commercial grade items in safety-related applications where the item performs a safety function. This program requires an engineering review of the item to determine critical-to-function attributes and provides methods to verify the item's compliance with these attributes. This information is documented in a dedication plan which is included in the receipt inspection requirements for the item. The dedication plan includes acceptance criteria when tests or measurements are required for dedication.

Date of Full Compliance Applicable Farley Nuclear Plant procedures were revised on November 13, 1987.

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. Attachment 1 1.B In' adequate Design Control

'Page 12 i INSTANCE 3:

A commercial grade torque switch was installed into a safety-related Limitorque motor actuator. Limitorque has stated that although the safety-related and commercial grade torque switches for outside containment are the same, the switches ordered as safety-related received additional quality assurance checks at Limitorque that were not performed on the commercial grade switches. There was no evidence that the licensee made additional quality assurance checks on the torque switch.

Admission or Denial Alabama Power Company admits that the installation of the torque switch did not include documented evaluation or the dedication of the torque switch for safety-related use.

Reason for Violation Inadequate procedural guidance resulted in an inadequate evaluation of the suitability of commercial grade parts for installation in safety-related applications.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved The MOV had been stroked af ter' installation of the torque switch in January 1984 and on at least five subsequent occasions, the latest of which was in October 1986. This provided the necessary assurance that the installed torque switch was operating properly. At the time of discovery, a safety-related torque switch was not available on site. An evaluation was therefore performed on June 5,1987 to justify removing power from the valve until a safety-related torque switch could be installed. The commercial grade torque switch was replaced on December 10, 1987 with a switch that was procured safety-related.

The vendor stated that the only difference between safety-related and non safety-related torque switches are that torque switches designated safety-related receive post-manufacturing Quality Control (QC) checks. The commercial grade torque switch in question was returned to the vendor for inspection to obtain such inspection / tests.

The vendor could not perform these QC checks on the comrnercial grade torque switch removed from Farley Nuclear Plant since the contacts were bent, possibly during removal or shipment. To verify if the commercial grade torque switch performed its intended function while it was installed, a review of surveillance procedures was conducted. From this review it was determined that the valve operated properly and stroked within the required time thus confirming that the torque switch, while installed, performed its intended function and hence no significant safety issue was involved.

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' I.B f nadequate Design Control Page 13 i i

Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations I

1. Prior to completion of the NRC inspection, on June 4,1987 plant procedures were revised on an interim basis to require written evaluation and approval of the use of commercial grade parts prior to use in safety-related applications. This action was intended to be an interim measure until a dedication program was approved, which occurred on November 13, 1987. ,

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2. Procedures have been revised to require an engineering review of commercial grade parts prior to installation in safety-related applications. If the commercial grade part does not perform a safety function, a basis for acceptance is provided and the part is released for installation. If the part performs a safety function, the part is not released for installation unless it is subsequently dedicated as a basic component for the intended application.

3. A dedication program has now been included in procedures to provide clear guidance on the use of commercial grade items in safety-related applications where the item performs a safety function. This program requires an engineering review of the item to determine critical-to-function attributes and provides methods to verify the item's compliance with these attributes. This information is documented in a dedication plan which is included in the receipt inspection requirements for the item. The dedication plan includes acceptance criteria when tests or measurements are required for dedication.

Date of Full Compliance The commercial grade torque switch was replaced on December 10, 1987.

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. Attachment 1 1.B Inadequate Design Control.  ;

-Page 14 l

l INSTANCE 4:

Commercial grade hinge pin bushings were installed in safety-related Anchor / Darling tilting disk check valves in the auxiliary feedwater system.

1 Admission or Denial l Alabama Power Company admits that the procurement documents for the installed item did not specify the items as safety-related and no documentation of an evaluation for their use in a safety-related application existed.

Reason for Violation The bushings were procured as non safety-related (commercial grade) and installed without properly documenting an evaluation or dedication process.

This was a result of a personnel error in that a bushing failure was thought not to prevent the valve from performing its intended function. l Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved The vendor subsequently stated that these bushings were manufactured and inspected as safety-related without regard to the purchase requirements.

Therefore, the bushings procured and received as commercial grade were the same bushings that would have been received fran the manufacturer if they had been procured as safety-related. The bushings would have performed their "

safety-related function.

Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations Plant and corporate personnel involved were instructed on the safety significance of the bushings. The procurement classification for these items was changed to require purchase as safety-related items.

Date of Full Compliance Full compliance was achieved upon receipt of the vendor letter dated May 29, 1987 stating that the installed bushings were treated as safety-related during the manufacturing and inspection process.

I Attachment 1

' !.B inadequate Design Control Page 15 INSTANCE 5:

A commercial grade Agastat timing relay (ATR) was installed as a replacement in safety-related panel #02R16B007-B, 600V load distribution panel.

Additionally, commercial grade ATRs were found in other safety-related electrical enclosures including two ATRs in diesel generator load sequencer panel #Q2R43E501-B [ sic], and two ATRs in diesel generator relay terminal box

1. Q1R43E506-8.

Admission or Denial Alabama Power Company admits that at the time of installation of the ATRs it did not have documented evaluation or dedication of the ATR for safety-related use in the load distribution panel #Q2R16B007-B. The portion of the alleged violation associated with commercial grade ATRs in diesel generator load sequencer panel #Q2R43E501-B and two ATRs in diesel generators relay terminal ,

box #Q1R43E506-B is denied.

Reason for Violation Inadequate procedural guidance resulted in an inadequate evaluation of the suitability of commercial grade parts for installation in safety-related applications.  ;

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved At the time of discovery, a safety-related ATR was not available on site.

Actions were taken on June 5,1987 to provide an alternative power source to panel #Q2R168007-B. The commercial grade relay in panel #Q2R160007-B was replaced with a safety-related relay on September 13, 1987. The commercial grade relay was tested at Wyle and determined to meet the Farley Nuclear Plant safety-related requirements associated with its installed location. The remaining four relays were part of the originally supplied panel and were therefore qualified by the original vendor. To verify that the ATR relays in panels #Q2R43E501-B and #Q1R43E506-0 were those originally supplied with these panels, Maintenance Work Requests and material issue forms were reviewed.

This review revealed that no Maintenance Work Requests or material issue forms had been written to replace these relays.

Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations 1

1. Prior to completion of the NRC inspection, on June 4,1987 plant procedures were revised to require written evaluation and approval of the I use of commercial grade parts prior to use in safety-related f

applications. This action was intended to be an interin measure until a dedication program was approved, which occurred on November 13, 1987.

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. Attachment 1 I.B Inadequate Design Control Page 16 I

2. Procedures have been revised to require an engineering review of commercial grade parts prior to installation in safety-related applications. If the commercial grade part does not perform a safety function, a basis for acceptance is provided and the part is released for i installation. If the part performs a safety function, the part is not released for installation unless it is subsequently dedicated as a basic component for the intended application.

3. A dedication program has now been included in procedures to provide clear

_ guidance on the use of commercial grade items in safety-related applications where the item performs a safety function. This program requires an engineering review of the item to determine critical-to-function attributes and provides methods to verify the item's compliance with these attributes. This information is documented in a dedication plan which is included in the receipt inspection requirements for the item. The dedication plan includes acceptance criteria when tests or measurements are required for dedication.

Date'of Full Compliance Applicable Farley Nuclear Plant procedures were revised on November 13, 1987.

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. Attachment 1 I.B Inadequate Design Control Page 17 GENERAL DISCUSSION In recent years concerns have arisen within the nuclear power industry regarding the replacement of existing equipment. These concerns result from the fact that, as the industry has matured, procurement policies implemented during the initial years of plant operation, which were based on the industry conditions at that time, may not now be fully adequate. There have been significant changes (i.e., vendors no longer in business, vendors oropping QA programs) in the environment in whicn plants are operated, particularly with regard to the procurement of replacement items. It was common industry practice, including that of Alabama Power Company, to use a "like-for-like" or " replacement-in-kind" analysis to determine the appropriate replacement parts. Alabama Power Company began to question its (and the industry's) philosophy as a response to the continuing changes in vendor QA policies. As a result of this industry and internal concern, Alabama Power Company began an evaluation of its procurement program to ensure that adequate controls were provided concerning replacement of the existing equipment. Many suppliers who were in the market originally had changed the way they did business to the point that they no longer supply nuclear grade equipment; whereas, others who were not in the market originally 1 had begun providing parts and services to fill a void left by the original equipment manufacturers which have gotten out of the nuclear business.

The changing environment, and Alabama Power Company's heightened sensitivity to the concerns within the industry, led Alabama Power Company in 1985 to make some major decisions with regard to enhancing its procurement program. These enhancements which are being made with involvement of the senior management of Alabama Power Company are very costly and time consuming. Some of the significant points with regard to enhancing its program are as follows:

In February 1985 the site mainframe computer project was approved for Farley Nuclear Plant. This $8,500,000 project includes a major upgrade in the material controls system for Farley Nuclear Plant. This includes a computerized procurement program, including parts classification. It is anticipated that the procurement part of this project will be completed in 1988.

In 1985 Alabama Power Company entered a contract valued at $500,000 with l General Physics Corporation to gather the technical data to develop a j database to support parts classification under the mainframe project.

Associated with an EPRI-supported group, which is developing guidelines for the utilization of commercial grade items for use in nJClear safety-related applications.

Alabama Power Company has put into place a dedication process by which the evaluations are made and commercial grade items are dedicated for use in safety-related applications. As regulatory guidance has not been provided I

. Attachment 1 1.B Inadequate Design Control Page 18 relative to this new, emerging area, Alabama Power Company does not believe that it is appropriate to- require the industry, through enforcement proceedings such as the NOV, to implement prograr; for dedication of commercial grade items.

Alabama Power Company will work with the NRC and industry committees in an effort to finalize guidelines for dedication of commercial grade items for use in safety-related applications.

CONCLUSION Based on the review and evaluations conducted by Alabama Power Company, no significant safety issue resulted fran the use of commercial grade parts in the above applications; however, it is acknowledged that deficiencies existed in evaluating the use of certain commercial grade items. The results of evaluations described herein clearly establish that in each case the components were capable of performing their intended function. The absence of a significant safety issue associated with the NRC examples cited illustrates that there were sufficient controls established by the overall material control program to preclude a condition significantly adverse to safety. In all of these cases, the items procured were made by the manufacturer of the original items; thus, there was additional assurance that the original requirements were satisfied. In some cases, evaluations, such as contacting the vendor to determine if parts supplied as safety-related and non safety-related were the same, were performed, although not documented. In view of the circumstances discussed above, the deficiencies identified do not justify a Severity Level III Violation.

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. Attachment 1 j l

II.A Inadequate Corrective Actions j Page 19  !

II.A INADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ALLEGED VIOLATION l 10CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires that ,

measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, w-5 as '

failures, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are prongdy identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, measures are required to assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action is taken to preclude repetition. The identification of the significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken are also required to be documented and reported to appropriate levels of management.

Contrary to the above, the inspectors identified five instances where at the time of the inspections, the licensee had failed to take adequate corrective action:

1. A 10 CFR Part 21 notification by the Henry Pratt Company in May 1985 detailed problems with Pratt valves using Limitorque operators. This problem was not correctly or completely dispositioned in that seven valves were determined to be defective after the NRC inspection.

2. A 10 CFR Part' 21 notification by the Anchor / Darling Valve Company in June 1985 detailed failures with tilting disk check valve hinge pin bushings.

This problem was not completely dispositioned in that only check valves in the Auxiliary Feedwater System were inspected. Other safety-related systems were not inspected.

3. A Colt Industries Service Information Letter (SIL), A-2, dated February 1985, entitled " Blower Installation," was evaluated by the licensee, but not all the corrective actions determined to be appropriate by the Alabama Power Company engineering review were implemented in that SIL A-2, which gives service instructions, was never placed in the Colt Industries Emergency Diesel controlled vendor manual .

4 Maintenance Work Request Nos. 44439 [ sic] and 67875, which have implemented corrective actions to the four control room fire damper electrical circuits to ensure that the circuits would function as desired, were not completed.

5. In April 1986, the licensee identified cracks in a number of cells of the safety-related station batteries. Despite the fact that NRC Information Notice 84-83 identified that such conditions can be caused by the use of hydrocarbon-based solvents for cleaning purposes, the licensee had not updated one of three pertinent electrical maintenance procedures to address the problem.

. Attachment 1 II.A Inadequate Corrective Actions Page 20 ALABAMA POWER COMPANY RESPONSE The above alleged violation identified five instances of corrective actions l considered inadequate by the NRC. These instances are addressed individually below.

INSTANCE 1:

A 10 CFR Part 21 notification by the Henry Pratt Company in May 1985 detailed problems with Pratt valves using Limitorque operators. This problem was not i correctly or completely dispositioned in that seven valves were determined to be defective after the NRC inspection.

Admission or Denial Alabama Power Company admits that the problem was not completely resolved; however, all seven affected valves were determined to be operable in the "as found" condition.

Reason for Violation Seven Henry Pratt valves with valve stems below horizontal were identified by Alabama Power Company during a survey completed in August 1980. This survey was performed in response to IE Circular 80-12 dated May 14, 1980. Work requests were prepared to stake the key and valve shaft on five Unit 1 valves and instructions were issued to the Alabama Power Company Startup Group to j perform the same action on two Unit 2 valves. This was considered to complete I the response to IE Circular 80-12. 1 In May 1985, a 10 CFR Part 21 notification was issued by the Henry Pratt Company identifying problems with the actuator spline to valve shaft pressfit keyway connection. The previous response to IE Circular 80-12 was reviewed at  ;

that time by Alabama Power Company and, due to personnel error, it was i erroneously concluded that this response adequately addressed the concerns of the Henry Pratt letter.

During May 1987, the status of IE Circular 80-12 was reviewed and it was determined that the work requests for Unit 1 had been voided and the required work had not been accomplished. In addition, the documentation could not be located to verify that the required work had been performed on Unit 2. New work requests were written and the stem to actuator keys were staked on seven val ves . Inspection prior to staking revealed that all the stem to actuator keys were firmly seated in the correct position. Three of the valves also had the splined adapter identified in the 1985 Part 21 notification. Two of the three spline adapter keys were still in their original position. One of the splined adapter keys had dropped approximately 3/4 inch leaving a key engagement of approximately 21/4 inches. All seven valves were determined to be able to perform their design function and therefore were not defective in their as-found condition. l l

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Attachment 1

' II.A' Inadequate Corrective Actions Page 21 Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved

1. All affected valves were inspected and the stem to actuator keys were staked on seven valves and splined adapters were staked on three of the seven valves.

2. An additional review was conducted and it was verified that all valves in both units with operators mounted below horizontal had been identified.

i Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations

1. Maintenance procedures have been revised to address staking of keys and spline adapters on valves with actuators below horizontal.

2. Plant procedures have been revised to separate and expedite Part 21 notification reviews from other industry events to emphasize the need for prompt, accurate review and corrective action as required.

3. The procedure governing Maintenance Work Requests (MUR) was revised on March 16, 1982. For MWRs which have not been released for work, the reason for voiding, and the signature and date of the individual voiding, -3 the MWR is required. If the MWR has been released for work, the procedure also requires the reason for voiding, the signature, and the date from the releasing individual. This revision should reduce the probability of personnel erroneously voiding MWRs.

Date of Full Compliance ,

By May 28, 1987 all seven actuator keys and spline adapters had been staked.

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. Attachment 1 II.A Inadequate Corrective Actions Page 22 INSTANCE 2:

A 10 CFR Part 21 notification by the Anchor / Darling Valve Company in June 1985 detailed failures with tilting disk check valve hinge pin bushings. This problem was_ not completely dispositioned in that 'only check valves in the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System were inspected. Other safety-related systems were not-inspected.

l Admission or Denial Alabama Power Company denies the alleged violation.

Reason for Denial The AFW valves were the only safety-related valves installed in Farley Nuclear Plant requiring inspection as a result of the 10CFR Part 21 notification.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved N/A Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations N/A Date of Full Compliance N/A I

_ _ - - - - - - - - _ - - - - J

. Attachment 1 II.A Inadequate Corrective Actions Page 23  !

INSTANCE 3:

A Colt Industries Service Information Letter (SIL), A-2, dated February 1985, entitled " Blower Installation," was evaluated by the licensee, but not all the corrective actions determined to be appropriate by the Alabama Power Company engineering review were implemented in that SIL A-2, which gives service instructions, was never placed in the Colt Industries Emergency Diesel controlled vendor manual.

Admission or Denial Alabama Power Company admits that the instance occurred as described but considers that the actions taken in response to this SIL were adequate to assure operability.

Reason for Violation A Colt Service Information Letter, SIL A-2, was issued on February 18, 1985 concerning precautions regarding blower installation procedures for Model 38TD8-1/8 diesels. This SIL was received and evaluated in accordance with Farley Nuclear Plant procedures for evaluation of vendor technical information. A Problem Report was issued on March 29, 1985 recommending that the SIL be entered in the diesel generator instruction manual. Verification that the SIL had been entered in the manual was received on August 29, 1985; however, no update to the manual was actually made due to personnel error.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved 1

SIL A-2 was added to the diesel generator instruction manual.

Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations This is considered to be an isolated incident. In addition, it should be noted that no blower replacement was performed during this period. Even if such a replacement had been required, Farley Nuclear Plant standard practice would have required a manufacturer's representative to be present during any such repair or replacement. This event has been discussed with Document Control personnel.

Date of Full Compliance SIL A-2 was added to the diesel generator instruction manual on June 3,1987.

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. Attachment 1 II.A Inadequate Corrective Actions

'Pa9e 24 INSTANCE 4:

l Maintenance Work Request Nos. 44439 [ sic] and 67875, which have implemented corrective actions to the' four control room fire damper electrical circuits to ensure that the circuits would function as desired, were not completed.

Admission or Denial Alabama Power Company admits that the above violation occurred as described.

Reason for Violation NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-348/87-14 and 50-364/87-14 dated July 30, 1987 cited this same instance as a Severity Level IV Violation. By letter of August 25, 1987, Alabama Power Company responded to the NRC. In this response it was stated that an engineering evaluation had determined that the smoke release device circuits on the control room fire dampers were not required. 1 It is considered by Alabama Power Company to be inappropriate for the November 3,1987 Notice of Violation to include this issue as part of a Severity Level ,

III Violation since the same instance has already been cited as a Severity i Level IV Violation in the July 30, 1987 Notice of Violation. The above information is reflected in the July 27, 1987 NRC Inspection Report on Page 19.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved 4

See the August 25, 1987 Alabama Power Company response.

Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations See the August 25, 1987 Alabama Power Company response.

Date of Full Compliance See the August 25, 1987 Alabama Power Company response.

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. Attachment 1 II.A Inadequate Corrective Actions Page 25 JETANCE5:

In' April 1986, the licensee identified cracks in a number of cells of the s,afety-related station batteries. Despite the fact that NRC Information Notice 84-83 identified that such conditions can be caused by the use of hydrocarbon-based solvents for cleaning purposes, the licensee had not updated one of three pertinent electrical maintenance procedures to address the j p robl em.

Admission or Denial Alabama Power Company denies the alleged violation.

Rcason for Denial IE Notice 84-83, "Various Battery Problems," which was issued by the NRC Staf f on November 19, 1984, discussed overloading D.C. buses and solvent induced battery case cracking. The subject notice detailed three cases in which battery case cracking had occurred. The notice attributed the cracking in two cases to the use of a solvent, trichlorethylene, which was used to clean battery posts while the third case of cracking was attributed to the application of a hydrocarbon based grease to the vinyl straps on the battery racks to aid in installation of the cells. IE Notice 84-83 stacr., " Licensees may wish to review their maintenance and surveillance procedures for station batteries to ensure that the use of solvents in the vicinity of batteries is carefully monitored and in accordance with procedures approved by the battery manufacturer's service department." The notice did not make any recommendation for cleaners to be used. The electrical maintenance procedures at Farley Nuclear Plant for battery cleaning have always required, in the material section, that bicarbonate soda be used. The use of bicarbonate soda for cleaning of batteries is also included in the training of maintenance personnel.

Alabama Power Company provided adequate procedural guidance for cleaning batteries since only bicarbonate soda was listed in the maintenance procedures. The response to IEN 84-83 was adequate since procedures specified the proper cleaning material and only electrical maintenance personnel are authorized to clean batteries. A precautionary note instructing personnel not to use solvents was added to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 procedure for cleaning the auxiliary building batteries. Although a precautionary note was not included in the procedure for cleaning the service water batteries, there is no evidence that solvents have ever been used on them. Therefore, there was no inadequacy of corrective action in this case.

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.Attachbeht1 II.A Inadequate Corrective Actions Page 26 ,

Procedural guidance is provided for the purpose of directing the activities to be performed. It is not the intent of procedural guidance to provide l

precautions against all possible inappropriate actions. The addition of a

, precaution against use of hydrocarbon based solvents is a procedural enhancement which is not mandatory for adequate corrective action. Therefore, there is no basis for a violation of Appendix B, Criterion XVI.

, During a refueling outage on April 17, 1986, Alabama Power Company identified what appeared to be cracks on 12 cells for Auxiliary Building Battery 2A and on one cell for Auxiliary Building Battery 28. Based on the battery manufacturer's recommendation, Alabama Power Company replaced two cells on Train 2A immediately and the remaining 11 cells within four weeks. Two additional Train 2B cells with apparent cracks were identified on April 30, 1986 and replaced on May 3,1986.

Subsequent to the NRC inspection, Alabama Power Company selected four cells, including one of the worst cells, and contracted with the battery manufacturer to perform seismic testing using Farley specific response spectra curves.

Wyle Report 48857-1 dated July 17, 1987 states that, based on the seismic test of the four cells, the specimens possessed sufficient integrity to withstand, without compromise of structure, the prescribed simulated seismic envi ronment . The testing and inspections described herein demonstrate that no sdfety issue resulted.

Actions Taken To Reinforce Continued Compliance As a result of the Notice of Violation, additional provisions were added to provide precautions against battery cell contact with hydrocarbon-based sol vents . These enhancements were added to procedures for other than Auxiliary Building batteries and signs were placed on the battery room doors cautioning against the use of solvents on battery cells.

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. Attachment 1 N 4 j II.B Inadequate Inspections II.B $

J Page 27 s ,c t

II.B INADEQUATE INSPECTIONS I

ALLEGED VIOLATION I

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix. B, Criterion X, Intpection, as implemented by Section 17 of the Final Safety Analysis Report and the Joseph M. Farley Operations Quality Assurance Policy Manual, requires that inspection of activities ,

af fecting quality be established and executed to verify conformnce with tae' documented instructions, procedures, and drawings for accomplishing the activity. / ,

Contrary. to the above, on June 2,1987 [ sic], both Train _ B,125V Service Water (SW) battery racks, were found to be improperly installed and mounted creating an unanalyzed condition concerning seismic qualification. Specifically, the concrete anchor bolt nuts on all Train B battery rack anchors were backed off and used as leveling nuts for the rack, thus providing no preload on the concrete anchors. The battery racks were improperly installed in the SW Train B battery room approximately one year prior to this inspection and remained in this unanalyzed condition until 4t was identified by the NRC inspector on June 2, 1987 [ sic].

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY RESPONSE Admission or Denial Alabama Power Company admits that anchor bolt installation was not properly performed in accordance with procedures; however, subsequent testing i demonstrated that the installed configuration resulted in no significant j safety issue.

Reason for Violation New SW battery racks were installed on July 16, 1986 by Farley Nuclear Plant personnel. A misunderstanding of the proper installation of these concrete anchors related to the use of leveling nuts, by the installing individual and inspecting engineer, rc:ulted in an improper installation. The edundant batteries were not required but were installed as a safety enhancement as a j' result of upgrading the SW baL+eries from one 125 volt 25 amp-hour battery per i Train A ano B to two 123 volt 7S amp-hour batteries for each train. One of the two 125 volt 75 amp-heur batteries on each train is utilized as the back-up to the other battery, therety increasing the system reliability.

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. Attachment l' II.B Inadequate Inspection.s

} Page 2b #

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, a CorrectiveAction[TaienandResultsAchieved At 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> on June 3,1987, tne NRC Staff advised Alabama Power Company of a potential problem on the Train B SW battery racks (identified. as Rack 3 and Rack 4). By 2100 h>iurs con June 3,1987, Alabama Power Company completed an evaluation of the iristalled configuration and declared an LCO as required by Technical Specifications for the Train B SW D.C. distribution system.

inspections had determined that the A train battery racks were not affected.

Repairv on Rack 3'were completed by 0207 hours0.0024 days <br />0.0575 hours <br />3.422619e-4 weeks <br />7.87635e-5 months <br /> on June 4,1987 and the LC0  ;

conditiod was cleared. '

M abama Power Company performed seismic response testing and equivalent static Q' ' seismic. load testing for the Rack 4 in the as-found condition. Results of this testing revealed the as-found anchorage was fully capable of performing the intended function during the design basis earthquake. Therefore, no significant safety issue resulted from the improper anchor bolt installation.

After the completion of ahe testing on Rack 4, the anchor bolt installations were placed in the correct design configuration.

Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations Plant Modifications Engineers (Inspectors) were trained by August 6,1987 on the existing procedure for installation and inspection of concrete anchor i bolts.

A training program, which is currently scheduled for the first quarter 1988, has been established to instruct Alabama Power Company maintenance personnel on proper anchor bolt installation.

A review and inspection of previous concrete anchor bolt installations by electrical maintenance personnel is being performed. Results obtained to date have identified some installation discrepancies with individual anchor installations but no problems of the magnitude discovered with the SW battery rack.

Date of Full Compliance One of the redundant B Train battery rack installations was corrected on June 4, 1987. The other B Train battery rack installation was corrected after seismic load testing.

ATTACHMENT 2 ALABAMA POWER COMPANY Joseph M. Farley. Nuclear Plant Answer to Notice of Violation Enforcement Action 87-142 l Inspection Report Nos. 50-348, 364/87-11 and 50-348, 364/87-14 Denial of Alleged Violations, Objection To Aggregation And Severity Level Classification And Request For Further Mitigation

- Alabama Power Company denies herein certain of the violations alleged in Enforcement Action 87-142 and, whether or not ultimately affirmed, objects to the proposed aggregation and classification of the alleged violations. The NRC proposes in the Notice of Violation (NOV) to impose two civil penalties, pairing four underlying alleged violations as two Severity Level III Violations.

Alabama Power Company's bases for denial of particular alleged violations are I presented below. Alabama Power Company also demonstrates that the aggregation of the alleged violations is inconsistent with NRC enforcement practice and

. policy. Further, if properly assessed, the alleged violations constitute at most separate Severity Level IV or V Violations not warranting civil . penalties (10CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Supplement 1). Accordingly, Alabama Power Company requests.that each proposed violation should be withdrawn or reduced to a l Severity Level IV or V, as appropriate, and the proposed civil penalties removed. In the event the Staff does not withdraw the proposed civil penalties, Alabama Power Company maintains that they should each be fully mitigated.

ALLEGED VIOLATION I - Inadequate Control and Installation of Purchased Equipment Introduction The first alleged violation- set forth in the NOV is addressed below. The violation is premised on the aggregation of two separate and distinct findings, noted as Items I.A and I.B in the NOV. The first finding concerns activities alleged to be in violation of 10CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, " Control of Purchased Material and Equipment". The second finding concerns activities alleged to be in violation of Criterion III of Appendix B, " Design Control".

With respect to the first finding, Alabama Power Company denies a violation of Criterion VII occurred. With respect to the second, Alabama Power Company denies, in part, a violation of Criterion III occurred. In addition, Alabama Power Company asserts that the above findings involve separate and distinct conditions not appropriate for aggregation under applicable Commission enforcement guidance and that, when considered separately, constitute at most lesser. severity violations not warranting imposition of a civil penalty.

Finally, Alabama Power Company demonstrates that even if sustained, full mitigation of the assessed civil penalty is warranted.

. Attachment 2 Alleged Violation I - Inadequate Control and Installation of Purchased Equipment Page 2 I. Alabama Power Company Denies Alleged Violation I.A., Concerning 10CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII A. Measures Taken by Alabama Power Company Prior to Installation of Circuit Breakers Provided Reasonable Assurance That Breakers Satisfied Applicable Seismic Qualification Requirements and Voltage Ratings, In Accordance With Appendix B, Criterion VII  ;

1. 10CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII. l l

The NRC alleges that measures taken by Alabama Power Corrpany to provide assurance of quality of the circuit breakers prior to installation did not satisfy Appendix B, Criterion VII. That criterion provides, in applicable  !

part, as follows:

Measures shall be established to assure that purchased material, equipment, and services, whether purchased directly or through contractors and subcontractors, confonn to the procurement documents. These measures shall include provisions, as appropriate, l for source evaluation and selection, objective evidence of quality I furnished by the contractor or subcontractor source, and examination of products upon delivery. Documentary evidence that material and equipment conform to the procurement requirements shall be available ,

at the nuclear power plant or fuel reprocessing plant site prior to 1 installation or ut,e of such material and equipment.

[10CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII (Emphasis Added).] i 1

To implement Criterion VII, Alabama Power Company established procedures which provide, in part, that certain measures be taken to assure quality of purchased materials. These procedures and underlying commitments are discussed in Attacnment 1 (at Section I.A., Reason for Denial, Subsection C ) .1/ Indeed, as also discussed in Attachment 1 (Section I.A., Reason for {

Dental, Subsection C), the relevant portions of Alabama Power Company's QA {

program have previously been reviewed and accepted by the NRC.

-1/ Alabama Power Company's " Reply to a Notice of Violation," Attachment 1 to Alabama Power Company's letter of December 17, 1987, addressing this Notice of Violation (Attachment 1) (by reference to portions of Attachment 1, Alabama Power Company incorporates those discussions herein.)

Attachment 2 Alleged Violation I - Inadequate Control and Installation I of Purchased Equipment Page 3

2. NRC Findings The NRC contends that contrary to Appendix B, Criterion VII, at the time of the inspections there were nine circuit breakers installed in safety-related applications "with unconfirmed seismic qualification and voltage ratings. "2/ The NRC provides two bases for this contention in the NOV. First, the YRC states that "the vendor provided inadequate justification for seismic and 600V qualification." Second, it is claimed that "no testing or analysis that would qualify the use of these breakers as installed had been done either by the licensee or the vendor".3/

3. Measures Undertaken by Vendor and Documented in the Dedication Package Provided to Alabama Power Company upon Delivery Provided Reasonable Assurance of Quality (Seismic Qualification and Voltage Rating) Prior to Installation.

As demonstrated below, the measures taken by Alabama Power Company prior to installation of the above breakers satisfied applicable Appendix B criteria, as implemented in procedures approved for the Farley Nuclear Plant. Specifically, these measures provided reasonable assurance of the

" qualification" of the breakers for the intended purposes.4/ Thus, Criterion VII was satisfied by actions taken prior to installation of the components. Further, measures taken following the NRC inspection reconfirm the appropriateness of the determinations made in the procurement process.

~2/

As noted in Attachment 1 (at Section I. A., Reason for Denial, Subsection A), three of the breakers identified in the original inspection report as having been installed in safety-related applications were actually ,

installed in non safety-related applications, i

~3/ The NRC also asserts that the existence of 480V UL stickers on the breakers should have " alerted" Alabama Power Company to "possible problem." This point is, however, irrelevant to the matters at hand. The very question being addressed in the. procurement process was the qualification of the 480V UL-labeled breakers for 600V applications.

Thus, the existence or non-existence of the label (which is neither

! required nor relied upon for qualification) had no bearing on the ultimate qualification determination. In short, Alabama Power Company was fully aware of the 480V UL labels and pursued through the procurement process appropriate verification of the circuit breaker's suitability for 600V applications. As discussed, Alabama Power Company appropriately resolved this matter.

-4/ The Staf f's use of the term " qualification" should not be confused with 10CFR $50.49 requirements that are not applicable here because all bremrs of concern were located in mild environments.

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. Attachment 2 Alleged Violation I - Inadequate Control and Installation of Purchased Equipment Page 4 I

As discussed in Attachment 1 (at Section I.A., Reason for Denial, i Subsection A), measures were taken prior to the installation of the breakers to assure they satisfied applicable seismic qualification and voltage ratings. These measures, undertaken in accordance with Criterion VII, provided reasonable assurance that the subject circuit breakers satisfied applicable procurement provisions prior to installation in the pl ant. The measures undertaken included:

a. Upon learning that Siemens-ITE (ITE), the vendor who had previously supplied breakers for this application, was no longer willing to do so, Alabama Power Company identified another vendor, Satin American Corporation (Satin), who stated that it could supply those breakers for safety-related purposes. '

b. Alabama Power Company obtained a copy of the Satin QA Manual. In accordance with Alabama Power Company's approved procedures, the Alabama Power Company Safety Audit and Engineering Review Group reviewed and accepted Satin's QA Program.

c. Subsequent to issuing a purchase order to Satin to supply the breakers, Alabama Power Company was notified that some of the required breakers were not available with 600V UL labels. Al abama Power Company contacted Satin to ascertain its plans regarding the qualification of the breakers for 600V applications. Satin provided an adequate explanation of its intentions.

d. Upon delivery of the breakers, Satin provided a certificate of conformance and a dedication package documenting the dedication of the commercial grade items as basic components. This package presented documentary evidence of Satin s qualification efforts, including:

Written confirmation from the manufacturer (ITE) that the 480V UL 1abeled breakers were the same as breakers previously manufactured and OL listed as 600V. (See item e, below.)

Obtained assistance of Ecotech Inc. to provide documentation of qualification. Ecotech followed a process consistent with appropriate ANSI /ASME and IEEE procedures, using the above-noted ITE confi rmation.

Satin also performed numerous tests and inspections itself in addition to documentation of the qualification. These are described i in Attachment 1 (at Section I.A., Reason for Denial, Subsection A),

and listed briefly below:

Visual inspections.

Dielectric voltage-withstand tests.

Calibration tests.

Short circuit tests.

Attachment 2

' Alleged Violation I - Inadequate Control and Installation of Purchased Equipment Page 5

e. Seismic qualification was assessed and considered adequate based on the like-for-like replacement of the existing breakers. As noted above, the documentation received from ITE supported this conclusion. That documentation stated:

The 480V UL labeled breakers did not contain any " structural or electrical" changes from the 600V UL labeled breakers previously manufactured.

The breakers delivered today with a 480V UL label are "the same as those produced" previously with the 600V UL label.

The breakers with the 480V UL label "can be safely used in lieu of" the 60(/! UL labeled breakers for replacement purposes.

f. Alabana Power Company also inspected the breakers upon receipt and performed its own trip tests on each of these breakers prior to installation (only nine of these breakers were installed, six in <

safety-related applications).

Alabama Power Company submits that the above actions satisfied the applicable provisions of Appendix B, Criterion VII, as implemented by the QA Program approved for the Farley Nuclear Plant. In particular, '

Alabama Power Company obtained " objective evidence of quality furnished by the contractor" at the Farley plant prior to installation of the breakers. Further, Alabama Power Company appropriately examined the products through inspection upon receipt and performance of trip tests prior to use.

In summary, contrary to the NRC's conclusion in the NOV, Alabama Power Company's efforts related to the procurement of these breakers satisfied applicable portions of 10CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII.

B. iteasures Undertaken Subsequent to the NRC Staff Inspection Reconfirmed Conclusions Reached During the Procurement Process.

As noted in Attachment 1 (at Section I.A., Reason for Denial, Subsection B), during the Staff inspection ITE transmitted a letter to Alabama Power Company dated June 3,1987, to clarify its prior correspondence concerning the 480V UL labeled breakers. Although reconfirming its original conclusion that it was appropriate to use the 480V UL labeled breakers for 600V applications, ITE noted that its prior letter should not be used to justify the use of the breakers in a " nuclear environment." ITE specifically cautioned that it did not intend for its prior letter to suggest that tMre had been no changes to the breakers that may impact seismic or nuclear aging considerations.

Attachment 2

• Allbged Violation I - Inadequate Control and Installation of Purchased Equipment Page 6 Upon learning of the June 3,1987 letter 5/, Alabama Power Company promptly undertook additional measures to assess possible implications for the prior determination made by Satin, which had relied on ITE's original response, concerning seismic qualification. As discussed below, those measures reconfirmed the original determination.6_/

As noted in Attachment 1 (at Section I.A., Reason for Denial, Subsection B), immediately upon learning of NRC questions concerning these breakers Alabama Power Company requested that Telemecanique Inc. evaluate all manufacturing changes that had occurred to this breaker type to determine I if any changes affected their seismic qualification. The division of ITE that performed the seismic qualification of the 5600 Series MCCs and the breakers within these MCCs, including the HE-frame breakers, originally supplied to Farley Nuclear Plant became Telemecanique. Representatives of Alabama Power Company and the Farley Architect Engineer, Bechtel, met the following day in Telemecanique's office. Telemecanique performed the evaluation and concluded that there had been no changes which would have a detrimental impact on the seismic performance of these breakers. In short, Telemecanique confirmed Satin's conclusion regarding seismic qualification, resolving possible uncertainty created by the June 3,1987 ITE letter.

-5/ The NRC does not identify this letter in the NOV. Thus, it is unclear whether it was intended to serve as a basis for any of the conclusions in the NOV findings. In any event, the adequacy of Alabama Power Company's original procurement process must be judged by the information available at the time. To the extent ITE subsequently provided new information (in conflict with direct and unqualified information provided previously),

that information does not implicate the adequacy of the initial procurement process. What is relevant is Alabama Power Company's prompt assessment of the letter's implications and effort to obtain additional assurance of seismic qualification. Alabama Power Company also notes that in a subsequent inspection of Satin by the NRC, Satin's qualification efforts related to the Farley breakers were examined. Although making observations regarding certain aspects of that process, the NRC did not include this matter within either of the two identified nonconformances.

Rather, it was included as part of "other findings or comments." (See NRC l Letter to Satin American, dated September 8,1987.)

i

-6/ To the extent the ITE letter addressed environmental qualification matters, e.g., aging, it was irrelevant to the subject breakers in that they were neither intended nor procured for use in harsh environments.

Alabama Power Company notes that ITE was notified in the initial inquiry from Ecotech on behalf of Satin that the information requested was for use in assessing the breakers for " application in a nuclear power plant" (Ecotech letter dated September 10, 1986).

. Attachment 2 Alleged Violation I - Inadequate Control and Installation of Purchased Equipment Page 7 C. Summary The above facts and circumstances demonstrate that the procurement process as applied to the subject circuit breakers satisfied Appendix B, Criterion VII and applicable Alabama Power Company procedures. Further, Alabama Power Company promptly reconfirmed the seismic qualification of the breakers upon receipt of new information in ITE's June 3,1987, letter.

This effort served not only to address the potential uncertainty created by that letter but provided an opportunity to validate the original conclusions regarding seismic qualification. Accordingly, Alabama Power Company requests that the Staff withdraw this alleged violation.

II. The NRC Inappropriately Aggregated and Classified the Findings Set Forth in Sections I.A and I.B. of the NOV A. The Aggregation is Inconsistent with NRC Enforcement Practice

1. NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual The NRC provides guidance regarding aggregation of proposed violations in the NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Chapter 0400, 505.06 (4 /24 /85) . This NRC procedure states, in applicable part, as follows:

2. Several violations stemming from the same cause or problem area may be assessed a single civil penalty. Those violations will be evaluated in the aggregate and assigned one severity level.

(See Section 05.03(d))

3. If more than one cause or problem area is identified, separate civil penalties [or violations if a lower severity level] should be assessed for each.

(a) The determination of whether there is more 1,an one cause or problem area can be made by evaluating whether corrective action for one violation should prevent occurrence of the other violation.

(b) If corrective action is required in more than one area, separate civil penalties should be assessed.

- Attachment 2 Alleged Violation I - Inadequate Control and Installation of Purchased Equipment Page 8 i

2. The NOV Inappropriately Aggregated the Alleged Violations In the first instance, the information presented above demonstrates'that i there was no violation of NRC requirements concerning finding I. A. Thus, '

it is not appropriate for the NRC Staff to utilize those findings in I aggregation with others (finding I.B.) to escalate its enforcement action. ,

l l In any event, Alabama Power Company submits that irrespective of the'.

Staff's disposition.of Alabama Power Company's denials of violations, the  ;

findings of Items I.A. and I.B. should not have been aggregated as a  !

single violation. First, the NRC recognized the underlying dissimilarity of these findings when it cited separate and distinct regulatory provisions as having been violated in each case. To assure satisfaction of these different provisions, virtually by inspection but also confirmed by the above discussions and reflected in Attachment 1, necessitates corrective action in different areas. Different personnel and different organizations are involved in the underlying corrective actions. Thus, separate civil penalties may be appropriate if the severity of each violation so warrants. [ Enforcement Manual S50.06 supra], but aggregation .

of Items I.A. and I.B. was not appropriate.

Accordingly, Alabama Power Company submits that these findings should be assessed independently. In addition, as discussed below, when properly viewed as separate and distinct matters, they should be classified as no greater than Severity Level IV Violations.

B. The Classification of the Alleged Violation is Inappropriate Under the NRC Enforcement Policy

1. NRC Enforcement Policy

.The NRC's Enforcement Policy (" General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10CFR Part 2, Appendix C (" Enforcement Policy")) provides guidance concerning the classification of enforcement actions. In Section III of the Enforcement Policy, severity levels are described. As provided therein, " violations are categorized in terms of five levels of severity . . . Severity Level I has been assigned to violations that are most significant and Severity Level V violations are the least significant." Severity Levels III through V are described specifically, as follows:

1. Severity Level III violations are cause for significant concern.

2. Severity Level IV violations are less serious but are of more than minor concern; i .e., if left uncorrected they could lead to a more serious concern.

3. Severity Level V violations are of minor safety or environmental concern.

1 Attachment 2

Alleged Violation I - Inadequate Control and Installation of Purchased Equipment Page 9 As indicated, the intent of the severity classification scheme is to premise enforcement action on the safety significance of the particular finding, even where a violation of a requirement may have occurred.

Additionally, guidance regarding severity level classification is provided in Supplement 1 to the Enforcement Policy through the use of examples.

This guidance also reflects the safety significance classification.

2. Findings Made in Items I. A. and I.B. Fall Within the Scope of Severity Level IV or V Violations j

The findings made with respect to items I. A. and I.B., even if retained as violations despite Alabama Power Company's arguments, should be classified as Severity Level IV or V violations.7/ Evaluations or actions taken by Alabama Power Company and described aEove or in Attachment 1 demonstrated  !

that no condition was identified with actual safety significance. No adverse findings were made regarding the actual condition of the i components involved. As demonstrated above, upon close scrutiny, the  ;

actual condition of those components was satisfactory from a safety s tandpoint. .

i While we do not minimize the importance of proper quality documentation, in light of the foregoing, these findings warrant no greater than a Severity Level IV, or, arguably Severity Level V Violation. We note that a violation -involving a " failure to meet regulatory requirements that have more than minor safety or environmental significance" is presented as an example of a Severity Level IV Violation in the Enforcement Policy. A l Severity Level V Violation is described as of minor safety or  ;

environmental significance (Enforcement Policy, Supplenent 1, Item D.3.).

We also note that the absence of safety significance also precludes categorizing these findings under Severity Level III (see Enforcement Policy, Supplement 1, Item C.7 ". . . and which have safety significance.").

I l

3. Summary

)

1 The alleged violations addressed in Items I. A. and I.B. do not constitute a Severity Level III Violation as determined in the NOV. The findings should not have been aggregated and, in any event, lack the requisite safety significance necessary to justify the Severity Level III classification.

7/ To the extent Alabama Power Company prevails in its argunents regarding denial, those findings should, of course, be withdrawn.

l l

l

Attachment 2 Alleged Violation 'I'- Inadequate Control and Installation of Purchased Equipment Page'10 III. Alabama Fuer Company Maintains That to the Extent the Staff Does Not Withdraw the Proposed Civil Penalty, In Any. Event, the Nature of and Alabatua Power Company's Actions .Regarding Proposed Violation I Warrants Com91ete Mitigation of the Proposed Civil Penalty In its November 3,1987, letter transmitting the _ NOV, the Staff states that the base civil penalty'of $50,000 for this proposed Severity Level III Violation was mitigated 50% because of " prior good performance."

However, it was not fully' mitigated "because of the extent of the weakness in management controls in the general area ,of procurement demonstrated by '

the number of examples cited." (Transmittal Letter at 2) Alabama Power Company maintains that based on its discussion in Sections I and II above, the examples cited by the Staff in support of Violation I have been substantially reduced in both number and severity. Accordingly, Alabama Power Company maintains that the Staff's reason for not fully :tigating the civil penalty is no longer applicable and any remaining civil penalty should be fully mitigated.

To support further a full mitigation.of the civil penalty, Alabama Power Company maintains that its prompt and extensive corrective action taken in response to the proposed . violation warrants full and complete mitigation.

(See Section V.B.2 of Appendix C to 10CFR Part 2) These corrective actions are set forth fully in Attachment 1, Sections I. A., Action Taken to Reinforce Continued Compliance and I.B., Alabama Power Company Response, and incorporated herein by reference.

ALLEGED VIOLATION II - Inadequate Corrective Actions and Inspections Introduction The second alleged violation is premised on the ' aggregation -of two separate and distinct findings, noted as Items II. A. and II.B. in the NOV. The first finding concerns activities alleged to be in violation of 10CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Action) and is based on five instances in which the Staff contends Alabama Power Company failed to implement adequate corrective action (Items II . A.1 through II . A.5) . The second finding concerns activities allegedly in violation of Criterion X (Inspection) and is based.on concerns regarding: the installation and mounting of both Train B,125V Service Water l Battery Racks.

l l With respect to the first finding (II.A.), Alabama Power Company protests one L item (II. A.4) and denies two others (II. A.2 and II. A.5). In addition, Alabama Power Company asserts that the alleged violations II.A. and II.B. involve separate and distinct : conditions not appropriate for aggregation under applicable Commission enforcement guidance and that when considered separately, constitute at most lesser severity violations not warranting imposition of a civil penalty. Finally, Alabama Power Company demonstrates that even if the violation is sustained, further mitigation of the assessed civil penalty is warranted.

Attpchment 2 Alleged Violation II - Inadequate Control and Installation of Purchased Equipment Page 11

1. Alabama Power Company Protests Item II. A.4 of Alleged Violation II. A.

Alabama Power Company protests violation II. A.4, to which it previously admitted. This violation was identified as a Severity Level IV Violation in the July 30, 1987 NRC Inspection Reports Nos. 50-348/87-14 and 50-364/

87-14. On August 25, 1987, Alabama Power Company, in a Reply to Notice of Violation, admitted to tha violation, offered the reason for the violation, explained the corrective action taken and the results achieved, explained the corrective action taken to avoid a further violation, and reported the full compliance date.

The violation identified in Item II. A.4 of the November 3,1987 Notice of Violation is based on the Severity Level IV Violation identified in the July 30, 1987 Inspection Report. That previous violation was subsequently resolved. Therefore, it is inappropriate, and inconsistent with NRC enforcement policy, for the November 3,1987 Notice of Violation to include this violation in a Severity Level III violation because the NRC already has cited it as a Severity Level IV Violation in the July 30, 1987 Notice of Violation. As acknowledged by the NRC, the imposition of two penalties on the basis of the same set of facts would result in an " undue overlapping of the penalties imposed." In the Matter of Atlantic Research Corporation, 7 N.R.C. 701, 708 (1978) (footnote omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 9 N.R.C. 611 (1979). l II. Alabama Power Company Denies Items II. A.2 and II. A.5 of Alleged Violation II. A.

A. Denial of Item II. A.2 Alabama Power Company denies Item II. A.2, which ostensibly involves a failure to inspect other safety-related systems. The Staff maintains that  !

this constitutes a violation of Criterion XVI of Appendix B to 10CFR Part i

50. Alabama Power Company denies the allegation and incorporates by reference Section II. A., Alabama Power Company Re.sponse, Instance 2 of  !

Attachment 1 in its response. I A 10CFR Part 21 notification was issued by the Anchor / Darling Valve Company in June 1985 detailing failures with tilting disk check valve hinge pin bushings. The Auxiliary Feedwater valves were the only safety-related valves installed in Farley Nuclear Plant subject to the 10CFR Part 21 notification. No other safety-related valves at Farley Nuclear Plant were subject to the 10CFR Part 21 notification.

l Accordingly, the Staff has no basis for asserting that Alabama Power Company did not take adequate corrective action by failing to inspect other safety-related systems and thus, its basis for finding a violation of Appendix B, Criterion XVI is inappropriate.

._______ _______ ______ a

Attachment 2 Alfeged Violation II - Inadequate Corrective Actions and Inspections Page 12 B. Denial of Item II.A.5 l Alabama Power Company denies Item II.A.5, which ostensibly involves a failure to respond to cracking of battery cells at Farley Nuclear Plant in '

April 1986 by not upgrading one of three electrical maintenance procedures to reflect that hydrocarbon-based solvents can cause the cracking, as noted in IE Information Notice 84-83. The Staff maintains that this constitutes a violation of Criterion XVI of Appendix B to 10CFR Part 50.

Alabama Power Company denies the allegation and incorporates by reference Section II.A., Alabama Power Company Response, Instance 5 of Attachment 1 in its response.

IE Information Notice 84-83, Various Battery Problems, was issued by the NRC Staff on November 19, 1984. It discussed overloading of D.C. buses and solvent-induced battery case cracking. The notice detailed three cases in which battery case cracking had occurred. The notice attributed the cracking in two cases to the use of a solvent -- trichlorethylene --

to clean battery posts. It attributed the third case of cracking to the application of a hydrocarbon-based grease to the vinyl straps on the battery racks to facilitate the installation of the cells. IE Information Notice 84-83 states that "[1]icensees may wish to review their maintenance and surveillance procedures for station batteries to ensure that the use of solvents in the vicinity of batteries is carefully monitored and in accordance with procedures approved by the battery manufacturer's service department." The Information Notice offered no recommendation for the use of any particular cleaners.

The electrical maintenance procedures at Farley Nuclear . l ant for battery cleaning have always required, in the material section, the use of bicarbonate soda, thus restricting use of hydrocarbon solvents, as suggested by the IE Notice. The use of bicarbonate soda for battery cleaning is also included in the training of maintenance personnel. Based on the use of these procedures, there is not a problem associated with use of hydrocarbon solvents for battery cleaning at Farley Nuclear Plant.

In summary, well before both the battery cracking incident at Farley Nuclear Plant in 1986 and issuance of IE Notice 84-83, Alabama Power Company provided adequate procedural guidance for battery cleaning which, in effect, restricted use of hydrocarbon solvents. Accordingly, the Staff has no basis for asserting that Alabama Power Company did not take adequate corrective action to avoid use of hydrocarbon cleaning solvents for batteries and there is no basis for a violation of Appendix B, Criterion XVI.

- _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - _ - - - _ - - _ - _ - _ - - _ - - - _ _ _ - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A

i

. Attachment 2 Alleged Violation II - Inadequate Corrective Actions and Inspections Page 13 III. The NRC Inappnpriately Aggregated and Classified the Findings Set Forth in Sections II .A. and II.B of the NOV A. The Aggregation is Inconsistent With NRC Enforcement Practice

1. NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual The NRC provides guidance regarding aggregation of proposed violations in NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Chapter 0400, 505.06 (4/24/85).

This NRC procedure states that, x * * *

2. Several violations stenning from the sane cause or problem area may be assessed a single civil penalty. Those violations will be evaluated in the aggregate and assigned one severity level.

(See Section 05.03(d))

3. If more than one cause or problem area is identified, separate civil penalties [or violations if a lower severity level] should be assessed for each.

(a) The determination of whether there is more than one cause or problem area can be made by evaluating whether corrective action for one violation should prevent occurrence of the other violation.

(b) If corrective action is required in more than one 1rea, separate civil penalties should be assessed.

2. The NOV Inappropriately Aggregated the Alleged Violations ,

Alabama Power Company notes initially that certain of the findings in Items II.A. and II.B. are denied or protested as constituting violations of the cited NRC requirements. Thus, it is Alabama Power Company's position that these findings should be excluded from the scope of the viol ation.

In any event, Alabama Power submits that irrespective of the Staff's disposition of Alabama Power Company's denials of violations, the findings of Items II. A. and II.B. should not have been aggregated as a single violation. First, the NRC recognized the underlying dissimilarity of these findings when it cited separate and distinct regulatory provisions as having been violated in each case. To assure satisfaction of these

Attachment 2

• All'eged Violation 11'- Inadequate Corrective Actions and Inspections Page 14 different provisions, virtually by inspection but also confirmed by the above discussions and reflected in Attachment 1 (at Sections II.A. and II.B.), necessitates corrective action in different areas. Al so ,

different personnel and different organizations are involved in the underlying corrective actions. Thus, separate civil penalties may be appropriate if the severity level of each violation so warrants.

[ Enforcement Manual 55.06 supra], but aggregation of Items II.A. and II.B. was not appropriate.  ;

Accordingly, Alabama Power Company submits that these findings should be assessed independently. In addition, as discussed below, when properly viewed as separate and distinct matters, they should be classified as no greater than Severity Level IV Violations.

B. The Classification of the Alleged Violation is Inappropriate Under the NRC Enforcement Policy

1. NRC Enforcement Policy The principal provisions of the NRC Enforcement Policy related to classification of severity levels were discussed previously in Section III.B.1 of the discussion related to alleged violations I.A and I.B. We refer to and adopt that discussion here. Further, we note that the Enforcement Policy, (Supplement I), states that a Severity Level III Violation could involve, for example, "[a] system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being able to perform its intended function under certain conditions . . . ." (Supplement I, SC.2). The Enforcement Policy also provides as one example of a Severity IV f Violation, "[f]ailure to meet regulatory requirements [following plant procedures] that have more than minor safety . . . significance."

(Supplement I, 50.3). Further, the Supplement I example of a Severity Level V Violation states, " Violations that have minor safety or environmental significance".

2. The Alleged Violations Identified in Item II. A. Should be Classified as Severity Level IV or V As discussed above, the NRC incorrectly aggregated the separate and distinct conditions addressed in Items II.A and II.B. contrary to the NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual. Further, Items II. A.2, 4, and 5 were i shown either not to constitute violations or otherwise to have been incorrectly included in this NOV. Thus, Items II.A.1 and 3 should stand alone as distinct findings, l

i i

__m_ ___.-_m______- _ _ _ _ _

i Attachment 2 i lifeged Violation II - Inadequate Corrective Actions and Inspections Page 15 4

Moreover, standing alone, those three items should only be categorized as a Severity Level V or. a . Severity Level IV violation because none of the three items involved a safety issue of the significance contemplated for I Severity Level III Violations, e.g., important safety systems "not being able to perform its intended function". As discussed in Attachment 1 I (Section II.A, Alabama Power Company Response, Instances 1 and 3),

additional evaluations or inspections performed with respect to Item II.A.I demonstrated the findings involved had little safety significance.

Regarding Item II.A.3, the underlying issue involved only the absence of a l single item from a manual which was of no safety significance as measures l were in place which would have prevented the condition from occurring in the first instance.

3. The Alleged Violation Identified as Item II.B. ,

(Service Water Battery Rack Mountings) Posed '

No Actual or Potential Safety Problem and Should Not Be Classified as Greater Than a Severity Level IV Violation i As discussed in Attachment 1 (at Section II.B., Reason for Violation),

Alabama Power Company determined that the as-found configurations of the battery racks did not involve a safety significant issue, notwithstanding l

the discovered position of the nuts. Thus, the observed condition had l only minor, if any, safety or environmental significance. Therefore, in I

accordance with the Enforcement Policy, at most a Severity Level IV Violation should apply to this condition. '

4. Summary The alleged violations addressed in Items II.A. and 11.8. do not constitute a Severity Level III Violation as determined in the NOV. The findings should not have been aggregated and, in any event, are lacking in safety significance justifying a Severity Level III classification.

h__u.-.__ -. __ .-

Attachment 2

'^11eged Violation II - Inadequate Corrective Actions and Inspections Page 16 IV. Alabama Power Company Maintains That to the Extent the Staff Does Not Withdraw the Proposed Civil Penalty, In Any Event, the Nature of and Alabama Power Company's Actions Regarding Proposed Violation II Warrants Complete Mitigation of the Proposed Civil Penalty In its November 3,1987, letter transmitting the NOV, the Staff states 1 that the base civil penalty of $50,000 for this proposed Severity Level III Violation was mitigated 50% because of " prior good performance."

However, it was not fully mitigated "because of the extent of the weakness in management controls in the general area of procurement demonstrated by the number of examples cited." (Transmittal Letter at 2) Alabama Power Company maintains that based on its discussion in Sections I, II, and III, above, the examples cited by the Staff in support of Violation II have been substantially reduced in both number and severity. Accordingly, Alabama Power Company maintains that the Staff's reason for not fully mitigating the civil penalty is no longer applicable and any remaining civil penalty should be fully mitigated.

To further support a full mitigation of the civil penalty, Alabama Power Company maintains that its prompt and extensive corrective action taken in response to the proposed violation warrants full and complete mitigation.

(See Section V.B.2 of Appendix C to 10CFR Part 2) These corrective actions are set forth fully in Attachrr.ent 1, Sections II.A., Alabama Power Company Response and II.B., Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations.

. _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _