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{{#Wiki_filter:REGUL 1 t'NFORMATION DISTRIt3UT YSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR: 8509100061-DOC~DATE: 85/09/04 NOTARIZED:=
{{#Wiki_filter:REGUL           1           t'NFORMATION DISTRIt3UT                 YSTEM               (RIDS)
NO DOCKET''ACIL'.50.
ACCESSION NBR: 8509100061-                                   DOC DATE: 85/09/04
410 Nine Mile Point Nuclear"Stationi Unit 2E: Niagar a Moha 05000410 AUTHI,NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MANGANECO-Vs=
                                                                    ~                      NOTARIZED:= NO 410 Nine             Mile Point Nuclear "Stationi Unit 2E: Niagar a                                         Moha             05000410 DOCKET''ACIL'.50.
Niagara Mohawks,Power Corp'.RECIPONAMEt RECIPIENT:
AUTHI,NAME                         AUTHOR               AFFILIATION MANGANECO-Vs=                   Niagara Mohawks,Power Corp'.
AFFILIATION BUTLER'S'j1t
RECIPONAMEt BUTLER'S'j1t ~ 'icensing.           RECIPIENT: AFFILIATION Branch 2" SUBJECT! Forwards                   FSAR changes requested by Singh Changes. provided to close out SER Open I.teip" 12'.re'lternate) shutdown capability..
~'icensing.
Futuret amend of FSAR will incorpot'ate changes; DISTRIBUTION CODE: S001D Licensing Submittal0'SAR/FSAR Amdts COPIES   RECEIVEDILiTR 8,
Branch 2" SUBJECT!Forwards FSAR changes requested by Singh Changes.provided to close out SER Open I.teip" 12'.re'lternate) shutdown capability..
J'NCL Related JCo>re'spondence
Futuret amend of FSAR will incorpot'ate changes;DISTRIBUTION CODE: S001D COPIES RECEIVEDILiTR J'NCL J.01ZE:l"'p'ITLE".Licensing Submittal0'SAR/FSAR Amdts 8, Related Co>re'spondence NOTES: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAtlEl NRR/OL/ADL NRR" LB2'A COPIES RECIPIENT LTTR ENCLi.ID CODE/NAME' 0 NRR LB2 BC 1 0 HAUGHEYiM 01 COPIES LT'TR ENCL" 1 0 1 l~INTERNAL: ACRS 41 ELO/HDS3>>IE/DEPER/EPB 36'RR ROE'AL'RR/DE/CEB 11'RR/OE/EQB 131 NRR/DE/MEB 18 NRR/DE/SAB 24 NRR/DHFS/HFEB40.
                                                                                                                      .01ZE:l "'
NRR/DHFS/PSRB NRR/OSI"/AEB
p'ITLE".
'26 NRR/OSI/CPB 10 NRR/DSI/ICSB 16 NRR/DS I'/PSB 19 NRR/DSI/RSB 23>>RGN1 EXTERNAL:?4X DMB/OSS (AMOTS).NRC PDR 02!PNLi GRUEL'ER 6 6 1 0 1~1" 1 1 2 2" 1 1 1 1<<1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1.1 1 1 1 1 1 ADA/LFMB IE".F ILE'E/DQAVT/QAB21 NRR/DE/AEAB NRR/DE/EHEB NRR/DE/GB 28 NRR/DE/MTEB 17 NRR/DE/SGEB 25 NRR/DHFS/LQB 32" NRR/DL/SSPB NRR/DSI/ASB NRR/DSI/CSB 09'RR/DSI/METB 12" NRR'AB 22'4 RM/ODAMI/MI B BNL(AMOTS ONLY)LPOR'03~NSIC 05 0" 1.1~1 1 1 0 1 1 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1"1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 52 ENCL' I ivp Ik r<<k(4~<<'l-4'("'I rgvr" 4 4'"Il I"<<'(v," iY t l r 4&4<<<<444 vI (f 4 I rk<<4~4 g~I'f)Vf<<4<<vl Y, f 4 V 4 F 4 k ,~HT V v Ij LI T NIIINRA A V MOHAWK NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE.N,Y.13202/TELEPHONE (315)474-1511 September 4, 1985 (NMP2L 0486)Mr.Walter Butler, Chief Licensing Branch No.2 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, OC 20555
NOTES:
RECIPIENT                                 COPIES              RECIPIENT                            COPIES ID CODE/NAtlEl                             LTTR ENCLi   . ID CODE/NAME'                         LT'TR ENCL" NRR/OL/ADL                                              0     NRR   LB2     BC                           1     0 NRR"  LB2'A                                      1     0     HAUGHEYiM            01                    1     l~
INTERNAL: ACRS                           41                     6      6      ADA/LFMB                                        0" ELO/HDS3>>                                       1      0      IE".F                                      1. 1 ~
IE/DEPER/EPB             36'RR 1 ~    1"          ILE'E/DQAVT/QAB21                    1      1 1      1      NRR/DE/AEAB                                1    0 ROE'AL'RR/DE/CEB 11                                 NRR/DE/EHEB                                1      1 131 'RR/OE/EQB 2      2"    NRR/DE/GB            28                          21 NRR/DE/MEB                 18                   1            NRR/DE/MTEB          17                  1      1 NRR/DE/SAB               24                                   NRR/DE/SGEB          25 NRR/DHFS/HFEB40.
NRR/DHFS/PSRB 1<<1 1      1 NRR/DHFS/LQB NRR/DL/SSPB 32" 1
1 1     0 1
1 1     1 NRR/OSI"/AEB '26                                1      1      NRR/DSI/ASB                                1' NRR/OSI/CPB                10                    1      1      NRR/DSI/CSB                                      1 NRR/DSI/ICSB 16                                  1      1                            12" 09'RR/DSI/METB 1    1 NRR/DS I'/PSB              19                    1      1      NRR         'AB     22'4                 1    1 NRR/DSI/RSB 23>>                                  1     1                                                 1     1 RGN1                                                    3      RM/ODAMI/MIB                              1     0 EXTERNAL: ?4X                                                  1     1     BNL(AMOTS ONLY)                            1     1 DMB/OSS          (AMOTS).                      .1     1     LPOR'               03~                  1     1 NRC  PDR                  02!                    1     1     NSIC                05                    1   "1 PNLi GRUEL'ER                                    1     1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR                                       52   ENCL'


==Dear Mr.Butler:==
I ivp          Ik r
Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket No.50-410 Enclosed are changes requested by Mr.Singh of your staff.The changes are provided to close out Safety Evaluation Report Open Item 12.These changes will be incorporated into a future amendment of the Final Safety Analysis Report.Very truly yours, C.V.Mangan Senior Vice President BB/rla Enclosure 0925G xc: R.A.Gramm, NRC Resident Inspector Project File (2)8509i'00061 850904'PDR ADOCK 050004i0 E'.PDR'  
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Nine Mile Point Un'AR 7.4 SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN 7.4.1 Description This section discusses the instrumentation and controls of the following systems which can be used for safe plant shutdown: 1.Reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC).2.Standby liquid control system{SLCS).3.RHR shutdown cooling mode (RSCM).4.Remote shutdown system{RSS).The sources that supply power to the safe shutdown systems originate from onsite ac/dc safety-related buses.Refer to Chapter 8 for a complete discussion of the safety-related power sources.7.4.1.1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System S stem Function The RCIC system is designed to assure that sufficient reactor water inventory is maintained in the reactor vessel thus assuring continuity of core cooling.Reactor vessel water is maintained or supplemented by RCIC system during the following conditions:
LI T NIIINRA A V MOHAWK NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE. N,Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 September 4, 1985 (NMP2L 0486)
1.When the reactor vessel is isolated and maintained in the hot standby condition.
Mr. Walter  Butler, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,  OC 20555
When the reactor vessel is isolated and accompanied by a loss of normal coolant flow from the reactor feedwater system.When a complete plant shutdown under conditions of loss of normal feedwater system is started before the reactor is depressurized to a level where the reactor shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system can be placed into operation.
S stem 0 eration Schematic arrangements of system mechanical equipment and instrumentation and a description of system design and operation are provided in Section S.4.6.The instrumentation specifications are listed in Table 7.4-1'.The control logic is shown on Figure 7.4-1.7.4-1
~0 4 k Res on As shown on FSAR Figure 9B.4-2, the approach used for NMP2 is similar to that described above.The reactor is either manually or automatically scramed.Then one of four trains are used to provide makeup water and decay heat removal.Either HPCS or RCIC is used for high pressure makeup.If a blowdown were to occur either through the ADS or relief valves, makeup would be provided using the lowpressure systems (LPCS or LPCI);Additionally, decay heat removal is provided by the RHR system.In the event of a fire in the control room or relay room which forces evacuation of the control room, sufficient equipment to enable hot and cold shutdown is provided at the remote shutdown panels (FSAR Section 7.4)and through the use of local control.Viability of these circuits is assured by the use of transfer switches whicn electrically isolate the control room and transfer control to the local panels and the remote shutdown panels.Redundant and isolated fuses are provided (in the emer gency switchgear rooms)to maintain the power source to these circuits.12.The description of the systems or portions ther eof used to provide the shutdown capability and modifications required to achieve alternate shutdown capability if required.~Res ense Appendix 98 and Section 7.4 of the FSAR provide descriptions of the shutdown systems and modifications and alternate shutdown capability from the remote shutdown room.  


ATTACHMENT le 0 Hi h/Low Pressure Interfaces S tern Boundaries OER-Reactor Building Equipment Drain 2OER~V128 MSS-Main Steam 2MSS*MOV112 2MSS+HYV6A,B,C,D 2HSS+HYV7A,B,C,D RHS-Residual Heat Removal 2RHS*MOV22A, B 2RHSAOV80A, B 2RHS*MOV113 2RHS*MOV67A,B 2RHS*MOV32A,B WCS-Reactor Water Cleanup 2WCS-MOV106 2WCS-MOV107 2WCS-AOV26A,B,C,O 2WCS-AOV28A,B,C,O 2WCS-AOV29A,B,C,O 2WCS-AOV30A,B,C,O 2WCS-AOV44A,B,C,D 2WCS-AOV51A,B,C,O 2WCS-AOV52A,B,C$
==Dear Mr. Butler:==
0 2WCS-AOV53A,B,C,O 2WCS-AOV54A,B,C,O 2WCS-AOV61A,B,C,O Notes: Descri tion WCS Drain Valve Main Steam Drain Main Steam Isolation Hain Steam Isolation Steam Supply to RHS*El Steam Supply to RHS*El Shutdown Cooling Suction Shutdown Cooling Return RHS*El Return to ICS Drain to Liquid Waste Drain to Main Condenser Demineralizer Vent/Drain Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Demineralizer Vent/Drain Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Demineralizer Vent/Drain Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Demineralizer Vent/Drain Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Resolution Note 1 Note 1 Note 3 Note 3 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 1)2)3)At least one valve is de-energized and disconnected from power source (breaker open)during normal plant operation.
 
No single fire could cause sufficient spurious operations to violate the high/low pr essure interface in this flow path since these valves are controlled from local panels which are located in a separate fire area from the control room.These valves are normally open.In the event of a control room fire, as defined by the Appendix R criteria, they are closed by the operator and subsequently disconnected from their.power source to ensure no spurious operation.  
Re: Nine  Mile Point Unit      2 Docket No. 50-410 Enclosed are changes requested by Mr. Singh of your staff. The changes are provided to close out Safety Evaluation Report Open Item 12 .
@II'l~}}
These changes  will be  incorporated into      a future  amendment    of the Final Safety Analysis Report.
Very  truly yours, C. V. Mangan Senior Vice President BB/rla Enclosure 0925G xc: R. A. Gramm,  NRC Resident Inspector Project File (2) 8509i'00061 850904' PDR E
ADOCK    050004i0 PDR'
 
Nine Mile Point  Un'AR 7.4    SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN 7.4. 1  Description This section discusses the instrumentation and controls of the following systems which can be used for safe plant shutdown:
: 1. Reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC).
: 2. Standby    liquid control  system {SLCS).
: 3. RHR  shutdown cooling mode (RSCM).
: 4. Remote shutdown system {RSS)        .
The    sources that supply power to the safe shutdown systems originate from onsite ac/dc safety-related buses. Refer to Chapter 8 for a complete discussion of the safety-related power sources.
7.4.1.1    Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System S stem Function The RCIC system is designed to assure that sufficient reactor water inventory is maintained in the reactor vessel thus assuring continuity of core cooling.
Reactor vessel water is maintained or supplemented by RCIC system    during the following conditions:
: 1. When the reactor vessel is isolated and maintained in the hot standby condition.
When the reactor vessel is isolated and accompanied by a loss of normal coolant flow from the reactor feedwater system.
When    a complete plant shutdown under conditions of loss of normal feedwater system is started before the reactor is depressurized to a level where the reactor shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system can be placed into operation.
S  stem 0  eration Schematic      arrangements    of system mechanical equipment and instrumentation      and  a  description    of system design and operation        are    provided      in      Section S.4.6. The instrumentation      specifications  are    listed    in Table 7.4-1'.
The control logic is shown on Figure 7.4-1.
7.4-1
 
~0 k
4 Res on As shown on FSAR      Figure 9B.4-2, the approach used for          NMP2  is similar to that described above.        The  reactor is either manually or automatically scramed.        Then one  of four trains are      used  to provide makeup  water and decay heat removal.          Either  HPCS  or  RCIC    is used for high pressure makeup.        If a  blowdown were    to occur either through the ADS or  relief  valves,    makeup would be    provided using the lowpressure systems  (LPCS  or LPCI); Additionally, decay heat removal is provided by the  RHR system.
In the event  of  a  fire  in the control room or relay room which forces evacuation of the control room,          sufficient  equipment to enable hot and  cold shutdown is provided at the remote shutdown panels                (FSAR Section 7.4) and through the use of local control.              Viability of these  circuits is    assured  by the use  of transfer switches whicn electrically isolate      the control room and transfer control to the local panels    and  the remote shutdown panels.        Redundant    and  isolated fuses are provided (in the        emer gency switchgear    rooms)  to maintain the power source to these        circuits.
: 12. The  description of the systems or portions ther eof            used  to provide the shutdown capability and modifications required to achieve alternate shutdown capability          if required.
        ~Res ense Appendix 98 and Section 7.4        of the  FSAR  provide descriptions of the shutdown systems      and modifications    and  alternate  shutdown    capability from the remote shutdown room.
 
ATTACHMENT   le 0 Hi h/Low Pressure   Interfaces S   tern Boundaries                           Descri  tion                    Resolution OER-Reactor       Building Equipment Drain 2OER~V128                               WCS  Drain Valve                Note 1 MSS   -   Main Steam 2MSS*MOV112                             Main Steam Drain                Note 1 2MSS+HYV6A,B,C,D                         Main Steam Isolation            Note 3 2HSS+HYV7A,B,C,D                         Hain Steam Isolation            Note 3 RHS   -   Residual Heat Removal 2RHS*MOV22A, B                           Steam Supply to RHS*El          Note 1 2RHSAOV80A, B                           Steam Supply to RHS*El          Note 1 2RHS*MOV113                             Shutdown Cooling Suction        Note 1 2RHS*MOV67A,B                           Shutdown Cooling Return        Note 1 2RHS*MOV32A,B                           RHS*El Return to ICS            Note 1 WCS   -   Reactor Water Cleanup 2WCS-MOV106                             Drain to Liquid Waste          Note 1 2WCS-MOV107                             Drain to Main Condenser        Note 1 2WCS-AOV26A,B,C,O                       Demineralizer  Vent/Drain      Note 2 2WCS-AOV28A,B,C,O                       Oemineralizer  Vent/Drain      Note 2 2WCS-AOV29A,B,C,O                       Demineralizer  Vent/Drain      Note 2 2WCS-AOV30A,B,C,O                       Oemineralizer  Vent/Drain      Note 2 2WCS-AOV44A,B,C,D                       Demineralizer  Vent/Drain      Note 2 2WCS-AOV51A,B,C,O                       Oemineralizer  Vent/Drain      Note 2 2WCS-AOV52A,B,C$ 0                     Oemineralizer  Vent/Drain      Note 2 2WCS-AOV53A,B,C,O                     Demineralizer  Vent/Drain      Note 2 2WCS-AOV54A,B,C,O                     Oemineralizer  Vent/Drain      Note 2 2WCS-AOV61A,B,C,O                     Oemineralizer   Vent/Drain     Note 2 Notes:
: 1)     At least one valve is de-energized and disconnected from power source (breaker open) during normal plant operation.
: 2)      No single fire could cause sufficient spurious operations to violate the high/low pr essure interface in this flow path since these valves are controlled from local panels which are located in a separate fire area from the control room.
: 3)    These valves are normally open.     In the event of a control room fire, as defined by the Appendix R   criteria,   they are closed by the operator and subsequently disconnected from their. power source to ensure no spurious operation.
 
@II' l ~}}

Latest revision as of 15:15, 3 February 2020

Forwards FSAR Changes Requested by Singh.Changes Provided to Close Out SER Open Item 12 Re Alternate Shutdown Capability. Future Amend of FSAR Will Incorporate Changes
ML18038A051
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/04/1985
From: Mangan C
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To: Butler W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
(NMP2L-0486), (NMP2L-486), NUDOCS 8509100061
Download: ML18038A051 (10)


Text

REGUL 1 t'NFORMATION DISTRIt3UT YSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8509100061- DOC DATE: 85/09/04

~ NOTARIZED:= NO 410 Nine Mile Point Nuclear "Stationi Unit 2E: Niagar a Moha 05000410 DOCKETACIL'.50.

AUTHI,NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MANGANECO-Vs= Niagara Mohawks,Power Corp'.

RECIPONAMEt BUTLER'S'j1t ~ 'icensing. RECIPIENT: AFFILIATION Branch 2" SUBJECT! Forwards FSAR changes requested by Singh Changes. provided to close out SER Open I.teip" 12'.re'lternate) shutdown capability..

Futuret amend of FSAR will incorpot'ate changes; DISTRIBUTION CODE: S001D Licensing Submittal0'SAR/FSAR Amdts COPIES RECEIVEDILiTR 8,

J'NCL Related JCo>re'spondence

.01ZE:l "'

p'ITLE".

NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAtlEl LTTR ENCLi . ID CODE/NAME' LT'TR ENCL" NRR/OL/ADL 0 NRR LB2 BC 1 0 NRR" LB2'A 1 0 HAUGHEYiM 01 1 l~

INTERNAL: ACRS 41 6 6 ADA/LFMB 0" ELO/HDS3>> 1 0 IE".F 1. 1 ~

IE/DEPER/EPB 36'RR 1 ~ 1" ILE'E/DQAVT/QAB21 1 1 1 1 NRR/DE/AEAB 1 0 ROE'AL'RR/DE/CEB 11 NRR/DE/EHEB 1 1 131 'RR/OE/EQB 2 2" NRR/DE/GB 28 21 NRR/DE/MEB 18 1 NRR/DE/MTEB 17 1 1 NRR/DE/SAB 24 NRR/DE/SGEB 25 NRR/DHFS/HFEB40.

NRR/DHFS/PSRB 1<<1 1 1 NRR/DHFS/LQB NRR/DL/SSPB 32" 1

1 1 0 1

1 1 1 NRR/OSI"/AEB '26 1 1 NRR/DSI/ASB 1' NRR/OSI/CPB 10 1 1 NRR/DSI/CSB 1 NRR/DSI/ICSB 16 1 1 12" 09'RR/DSI/METB 1 1 NRR/DS I'/PSB 19 1 1 NRR 'AB 22'4 1 1 NRR/DSI/RSB 23>> 1 1 1 1 RGN1 3 RM/ODAMI/MIB 1 0 EXTERNAL: ?4X 1 1 BNL(AMOTS ONLY) 1 1 DMB/OSS (AMOTS). .1 1 LPOR' 03~ 1 1 NRC PDR 02! 1 1 NSIC 05 1 "1 PNLi GRUEL'ER 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 52 ENCL'

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LI T NIIINRA A V MOHAWK NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE. N,Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 September 4, 1985 (NMP2L 0486)

Mr. Walter Butler, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, OC 20555

Dear Mr. Butler:

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket No. 50-410 Enclosed are changes requested by Mr. Singh of your staff. The changes are provided to close out Safety Evaluation Report Open Item 12 .

These changes will be incorporated into a future amendment of the Final Safety Analysis Report.

Very truly yours, C. V. Mangan Senior Vice President BB/rla Enclosure 0925G xc: R. A. Gramm, NRC Resident Inspector Project File (2) 8509i'00061 850904' PDR E

ADOCK 050004i0 PDR'

Nine Mile Point Un'AR 7.4 SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN 7.4. 1 Description This section discusses the instrumentation and controls of the following systems which can be used for safe plant shutdown:

1. Reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC).
2. Standby liquid control system {SLCS).
3. RHR shutdown cooling mode (RSCM).
4. Remote shutdown system {RSS) .

The sources that supply power to the safe shutdown systems originate from onsite ac/dc safety-related buses. Refer to Chapter 8 for a complete discussion of the safety-related power sources.

7.4.1.1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System S stem Function The RCIC system is designed to assure that sufficient reactor water inventory is maintained in the reactor vessel thus assuring continuity of core cooling.

Reactor vessel water is maintained or supplemented by RCIC system during the following conditions:

1. When the reactor vessel is isolated and maintained in the hot standby condition.

When the reactor vessel is isolated and accompanied by a loss of normal coolant flow from the reactor feedwater system.

When a complete plant shutdown under conditions of loss of normal feedwater system is started before the reactor is depressurized to a level where the reactor shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system can be placed into operation.

S stem 0 eration Schematic arrangements of system mechanical equipment and instrumentation and a description of system design and operation are provided in Section S.4.6. The instrumentation specifications are listed in Table 7.4-1'.

The control logic is shown on Figure 7.4-1.

7.4-1

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4 Res on As shown on FSAR Figure 9B.4-2, the approach used for NMP2 is similar to that described above. The reactor is either manually or automatically scramed. Then one of four trains are used to provide makeup water and decay heat removal. Either HPCS or RCIC is used for high pressure makeup. If a blowdown were to occur either through the ADS or relief valves, makeup would be provided using the lowpressure systems (LPCS or LPCI); Additionally, decay heat removal is provided by the RHR system.

In the event of a fire in the control room or relay room which forces evacuation of the control room, sufficient equipment to enable hot and cold shutdown is provided at the remote shutdown panels (FSAR Section 7.4) and through the use of local control. Viability of these circuits is assured by the use of transfer switches whicn electrically isolate the control room and transfer control to the local panels and the remote shutdown panels. Redundant and isolated fuses are provided (in the emer gency switchgear rooms) to maintain the power source to these circuits.

12. The description of the systems or portions ther eof used to provide the shutdown capability and modifications required to achieve alternate shutdown capability if required.

~Res ense Appendix 98 and Section 7.4 of the FSAR provide descriptions of the shutdown systems and modifications and alternate shutdown capability from the remote shutdown room.

ATTACHMENT le 0 Hi h/Low Pressure Interfaces S tern Boundaries Descri tion Resolution OER-Reactor Building Equipment Drain 2OER~V128 WCS Drain Valve Note 1 MSS - Main Steam 2MSS*MOV112 Main Steam Drain Note 1 2MSS+HYV6A,B,C,D Main Steam Isolation Note 3 2HSS+HYV7A,B,C,D Hain Steam Isolation Note 3 RHS - Residual Heat Removal 2RHS*MOV22A, B Steam Supply to RHS*El Note 1 2RHSAOV80A, B Steam Supply to RHS*El Note 1 2RHS*MOV113 Shutdown Cooling Suction Note 1 2RHS*MOV67A,B Shutdown Cooling Return Note 1 2RHS*MOV32A,B RHS*El Return to ICS Note 1 WCS - Reactor Water Cleanup 2WCS-MOV106 Drain to Liquid Waste Note 1 2WCS-MOV107 Drain to Main Condenser Note 1 2WCS-AOV26A,B,C,O Demineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV28A,B,C,O Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV29A,B,C,O Demineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV30A,B,C,O Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV44A,B,C,D Demineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV51A,B,C,O Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV52A,B,C$ 0 Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV53A,B,C,O Demineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV54A,B,C,O Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV61A,B,C,O Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 Notes:

1) At least one valve is de-energized and disconnected from power source (breaker open) during normal plant operation.
2) No single fire could cause sufficient spurious operations to violate the high/low pr essure interface in this flow path since these valves are controlled from local panels which are located in a separate fire area from the control room.
3) These valves are normally open. In the event of a control room fire, as defined by the Appendix R criteria, they are closed by the operator and subsequently disconnected from their. power source to ensure no spurious operation.

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