ML18038A051

Forwards FSAR Changes Requested by Singh.Changes Provided to Close Out SER Open Item 12 Re Alternate Shutdown Capability. Future Amend of FSAR Will Incorporate Changes

ML18038A051
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	09/04/1985
From:	Mangan C NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	Butler W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
(NMP2L-0486), (NMP2L-486), NUDOCS 8509100061
Download: ML18038A051 (10)

Text

REGUL 1 t'NFORMATION DISTRIt3UT YSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8509100061- DOC DATE: 85/09/04

~ NOTARIZED:= NO 410 Nine Mile Point Nuclear "Stationi Unit 2E: Niagar a Moha 05000410 DOCKETACIL'.50.

AUTHI,NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MANGANECO-Vs= Niagara Mohawks,Power Corp'.

RECIPONAMEt BUTLER'S'j1t ~ 'icensing. RECIPIENT: AFFILIATION Branch 2" SUBJECT! Forwards FSAR changes requested by Singh Changes. provided to close out SER Open I.teip" 12'.re'lternate) shutdown capability..

Futuret amend of FSAR will incorpot'ate changes; DISTRIBUTION CODE: S001D Licensing Submittal0'SAR/FSAR Amdts COPIES RECEIVEDILiTR 8,

J'NCL Related JCo>re'spondence

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RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAtlEl LTTR ENCLi . ID CODE/NAME' LT'TR ENCL" NRR/OL/ADL 0 NRR LB2 BC 1 0 NRR" LB2'A 1 0 HAUGHEYiM 01 1 l~

INTERNAL: ACRS 41 6 6 ADA/LFMB 0" ELO/HDS3>> 1 0 IE".F 1. 1 ~

IE/DEPER/EPB 36'RR 1 ~ 1" ILE'E/DQAVT/QAB21 1 1 1 1 NRR/DE/AEAB 1 0 ROE'AL'RR/DE/CEB 11 NRR/DE/EHEB 1 1 131 'RR/OE/EQB 2 2" NRR/DE/GB 28 21 NRR/DE/MEB 18 1 NRR/DE/MTEB 17 1 1 NRR/DE/SAB 24 NRR/DE/SGEB 25 NRR/DHFS/HFEB40.

NRR/DHFS/PSRB 1<<1 1 1 NRR/DHFS/LQB NRR/DL/SSPB 32" 1

1 1 0 1

1 1 1 NRR/OSI"/AEB '26 1 1 NRR/DSI/ASB 1' NRR/OSI/CPB 10 1 1 NRR/DSI/CSB 1 NRR/DSI/ICSB 16 1 1 12" 09'RR/DSI/METB 1 1 NRR/DS I'/PSB 19 1 1 NRR 'AB 22'4 1 1 NRR/DSI/RSB 23>> 1 1 1 1 RGN1 3 RM/ODAMI/MIB 1 0 EXTERNAL: ?4X 1 1 BNL(AMOTS ONLY) 1 1 DMB/OSS (AMOTS). .1 1 LPOR' 03~ 1 1 NRC PDR 02! 1 1 NSIC 05 1 "1 PNLi GRUEL'ER 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 52 ENCL'

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LI T NIIINRA A V MOHAWK NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE. N,Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 September 4, 1985 (NMP2L 0486)

Mr. Walter Butler, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, OC 20555

Dear Mr. Butler:

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket No. 50-410 Enclosed are changes requested by Mr. Singh of your staff. The changes are provided to close out Safety Evaluation Report Open Item 12 .

These changes will be incorporated into a future amendment of the Final Safety Analysis Report.

Very truly yours, C. V. Mangan Senior Vice President BB/rla Enclosure 0925G xc: R. A. Gramm, NRC Resident Inspector Project File (2) 8509i'00061 850904' PDR E

ADOCK 050004i0 PDR'

Nine Mile Point Un'AR 7.4 SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN 7.4. 1 Description This section discusses the instrumentation and controls of the following systems which can be used for safe plant shutdown:

1. Reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC).

2. Standby liquid control system {SLCS).

3. RHR shutdown cooling mode (RSCM).

4. Remote shutdown system {RSS) .

The sources that supply power to the safe shutdown systems originate from onsite ac/dc safety-related buses. Refer to Chapter 8 for a complete discussion of the safety-related power sources.

7.4.1.1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System S stem Function The RCIC system is designed to assure that sufficient reactor water inventory is maintained in the reactor vessel thus assuring continuity of core cooling.

Reactor vessel water is maintained or supplemented by RCIC system during the following conditions:

1. When the reactor vessel is isolated and maintained in the hot standby condition.

When the reactor vessel is isolated and accompanied by a loss of normal coolant flow from the reactor feedwater system.

When a complete plant shutdown under conditions of loss of normal feedwater system is started before the reactor is depressurized to a level where the reactor shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system can be placed into operation.

S stem 0 eration Schematic arrangements of system mechanical equipment and instrumentation and a description of system design and operation are provided in Section S.4.6. The instrumentation specifications are listed in Table 7.4-1'.

The control logic is shown on Figure 7.4-1.

7.4-1

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4 Res on As shown on FSAR Figure 9B.4-2, the approach used for NMP2 is similar to that described above. The reactor is either manually or automatically scramed. Then one of four trains are used to provide makeup water and decay heat removal. Either HPCS or RCIC is used for high pressure makeup. If a blowdown were to occur either through the ADS or relief valves, makeup would be provided using the lowpressure systems (LPCS or LPCI); Additionally, decay heat removal is provided by the RHR system.

In the event of a fire in the control room or relay room which forces evacuation of the control room, sufficient equipment to enable hot and cold shutdown is provided at the remote shutdown panels (FSAR Section 7.4) and through the use of local control. Viability of these circuits is assured by the use of transfer switches whicn electrically isolate the control room and transfer control to the local panels and the remote shutdown panels. Redundant and isolated fuses are provided (in the emer gency switchgear rooms) to maintain the power source to these circuits.

12. The description of the systems or portions ther eof used to provide the shutdown capability and modifications required to achieve alternate shutdown capability if required.

~Res ense Appendix 98 and Section 7.4 of the FSAR provide descriptions of the shutdown systems and modifications and alternate shutdown capability from the remote shutdown room.

ATTACHMENT le 0 Hi h/Low Pressure Interfaces S tern Boundaries Descri tion Resolution OER-Reactor Building Equipment Drain 2OER~V128 WCS Drain Valve Note 1 MSS - Main Steam 2MSS*MOV112 Main Steam Drain Note 1 2MSS+HYV6A,B,C,D Main Steam Isolation Note 3 2HSS+HYV7A,B,C,D Hain Steam Isolation Note 3 RHS - Residual Heat Removal 2RHS*MOV22A, B Steam Supply to RHS*El Note 1 2RHSAOV80A, B Steam Supply to RHS*El Note 1 2RHS*MOV113 Shutdown Cooling Suction Note 1 2RHS*MOV67A,B Shutdown Cooling Return Note 1 2RHS*MOV32A,B RHS*El Return to ICS Note 1 WCS - Reactor Water Cleanup 2WCS-MOV106 Drain to Liquid Waste Note 1 2WCS-MOV107 Drain to Main Condenser Note 1 2WCS-AOV26A,B,C,O Demineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV28A,B,C,O Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV29A,B,C,O Demineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV30A,B,C,O Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV44A,B,C,D Demineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV51A,B,C,O Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV52A,B,C$ 0 Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV53A,B,C,O Demineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV54A,B,C,O Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 2WCS-AOV61A,B,C,O Oemineralizer Vent/Drain Note 2 Notes:

1) At least one valve is de-energized and disconnected from power source (breaker open) during normal plant operation.

2) No single fire could cause sufficient spurious operations to violate the high/low pr essure interface in this flow path since these valves are controlled from local panels which are located in a separate fire area from the control room.

3) These valves are normally open. In the event of a control room fire, as defined by the Appendix R criteria, they are closed by the operator and subsequently disconnected from their. power source to ensure no spurious operation.

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