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See also: [[followed by::IR 05000280/1980039]]


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:' * .. *.~ .. ;:~ ~-:. t r. * ** ;.1,1 -.* -VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER. COMPANY RICHMOND,VIRGIN.IA  
{{#Wiki_filter:'
23261 * r.: " Io . . J i.1 :_ ._. * '-: December 17, 1980 \: .. .... 00 Serial No. 971 NO/RMT:ms
                                                              .. *.~. ;:~ ~-:. t   r.
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection  
                                                        *     ** ;.1,1 -.*   -
and Enforcement  
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER. COMPANY RICHMOND,VIRGIN.IA 23261
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory  
                                                    . .J* r.:
Commission  
i.1 :_ " ._. Io * '-:
Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Docket Nos. 50-280 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 DPR-37 Dear Mr. O'Reilly:  
                                                                                      \:
We have reviewed your letter of November 25, 1980 in reference  
00 December 17, 1980 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director                                         Serial No. 971 Office of Inspection and Enforcement                                     NO/RMT:ms U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                     Docket Nos. 50-280 Region II                                                                                  50-281 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100                                          License Nos. DPR-32 Atlanta, Georgia    30303                                                                  DPR-37
to the inspection  
 
conducted  
==Dear Mr. O'Reilly:==
at Surry Power Station on September  
 
2 through October 3, 1980 and reported in IE Inspection  
We have reviewed your letter of November 25, 1980 in reference to the inspection conducted at Surry Power Station on September 2 through October 3, 1980 and reported in IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-280/80-39 and 50-281/80-43.
Report Nos. 50-280/80-39  
Our responses to the specific infractions are attached.
and 50-281/80-43.  
We have determined that no proprietary information is contained in the reports. Accordingly, the Virginia Electric and Power Company has no objection to these inspection reports being made a matter of public disclosure.
Our responses  
Very truly yours,
to the specific infractions  
                                                              ./,1 ,.!* '\/
are attached.  
                                                          / >;t . ;             /;i: ..
We determined  
B. R. Sylvia Manager - Nuclear Operations and Maintenance Attachment cc:  Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing
that no proprietary  
 
information  
Attachment Page 1 SURRY POWER STATION RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION REPORTED IN APPENDIX A OF IE REPORT 50-280/80-39 AND 50-281/80-43 NRC COMMENTS:
is contained  
A. As required by 10 CFR 50.59 and Section 14 of the VEPCO NPS QA Manual, the licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the FSAR, provided that records of these changes are maintained and include a written safety evaluation which determined that the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question. In addition, Section 14 of the QA Manual requires the maintenance of the Jumper Log Book and forms, listing the status of each installed jumper or temporary modification for jumpers not installed by an approved procedure.
reports. Accordingly, the Virginia Electric and Power Company objection  
Contrary to the above, on September 12, 1980 the inspector observed that the Unit 2 Safeguards Valve Pit Sump piping had been modified by the installation of jumper hose on the piping valve 2-DA-43, and no record, safety evaluation, procedure, or jumper log entry for the installation has been completed. The jumper, with 2-DA-43 open, apparently led to the inadvertent diversion of Unit 1 and 2 containment sump water into the Unit 2 Safeguards Building Valve Pit (basement), where several feet of radioactive standing water was observed.
to these inspection  
This is an infraction and applies to Unit 2.
reports being made a matter of disclosure.  
 
have Attachment
===RESPONSE===
cc: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating
The item is correct as stated. The jumper discussed above is a hose from the discharge of a temporary sump pump.     This was installed due to failures of both installed sump pumps.     All water transfers were within the enclosed building. A jumper had been issued and implemented in January of 1980 to accomplish the job of pumping the valve pit.         A new temporary pump was installed in September; however, the jumper log was not amended.         During reviews of the log it was assumed the jumper was installed as originally approved.
Reactors Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing
: 1. Corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved:
Very truly yours, ./,1 ,.!* '\/ / >;t .. ; /;i: .. B. R. Sylvia Manager -Nuclear Operations  
The out of date jumper lQg was terminated and a new jumper log was issued to reflect the existing conditions. The discharge hose was moved to a floor drain which directs water to the Liquid Waste System. The standing water was pumped and processed. Maintenance has been completed on the installed pumps and the system returned to its proper configuration.
and Maintenance  
: 2. Corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further non-compliance:
in the has no public 
Operational personnel were instructed as to the requirements of jumpers .
* * * SURRY POWER STATION RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION  
This includes proper notification, logging, and documentation.
REPORTED IN APPENDIX A OF IE REPORT 50-280/80-39  
: 3. The date when full compliance will be achieved:
AND 50-281/80-43  
Full compliance has been achieved.
Attachment
 
Page 1 NRC COMMENTS:  
Attachment Page 2 NRC COMMENT:
A. As required by 10 CFR 50.59 and Section 14 of the VEPCO NPS QA Manual, the licensee may make changes to the facility as described  
B. As required by Technical Specification 3.10.A.l, the containment equip-ment door (hatch) shall be properly closed during refueling conditions.
in the FSAR, provided that records of these changes are maintained  
Contrary to the above, on September 24, 1980 the inspector observed that the Unit 1 containment escape hatch was not installed in the equipment door and the blank metal flange installed on the equipment door to substitute for the escape hatch was not properly sealed during refueling operations.
and include a written safety evaluation  
This is an infraction and applies to Unit 1.
which determined  
 
that the change does not involve an unreviewed  
===RESPONSE===
safety question.  
This is correct as stated. The intent of containment integrity is to estab-lish a gas-tight envelope during fuel movement operations. The containment was in a sub-atmospheric condition at all times with only exhaust ventilation equipment in operation.
In addition, Section 14 of the QA Manual requires the maintenance  
: 1. Corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved:
of the Jumper Log Book and forms, listing the status of each installed  
When the situation was identified, refueling was stopped until the door was sealed temporarily to establish a gas-tight seal.
jumper or temporary  
: 2. Corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further non-compliance:
modification  
A more permanent sealing was installed during a period when no fuel movement was in progress. The refueling procedure has been revised to insure this hatch is properly sealed prior to fuel movement.
for jumpers not installed  
: 3. The date when full compliance will be achieved:
by an approved procedure.  
Full compliance has been achieved.}}
Contrary to the above, on September  
12, 1980 the inspector  
observed that the Unit 2 Safeguards  
Valve Pit Sump piping had been modified by the installation  
of jumper hose on the piping valve 2-DA-43, and no record, safety evaluation, procedure, or jumper log entry for the installation  
has been completed.  
The jumper, with 2-DA-43 open, apparently  
led to the inadvertent  
diversion  
of Unit 1 and 2 containment  
sump water into the Unit 2 Safeguards  
Building Valve Pit (basement), where several feet of radioactive  
standing water was observed.  
This is an infraction  
and applies to Unit 2. RESPONSE:
The item is correct as stated. The jumper discussed  
above is a hose from the discharge  
of a temporary  
sump pump. This was installed  
due to failures of both installed  
sump pumps. All water transfers  
were within the enclosed building.  
A jumper had been issued and implemented  
in January of 1980 to accomplish  
the job of pumping the valve pit. A new temporary  
pump was installed  
in September;  
however, the jumper log was not amended. During reviews of the log it was assumed the jumper was installed  
as originally  
approved.  
1. 2. 3. Corrective  
steps which have been taken and the results achieved:  
The out of date jumper lQg was terminated  
and a new jumper log was issued to reflect the existing conditions.  
The discharge  
hose was moved to a floor drain which directs water to the Liquid Waste System. The standing water was pumped and processed.  
Maintenance  
has been completed  
on the installed  
pumps and the system returned to its proper configuration.  
Corrective  
steps which will be taken to avoid further non-compliance:  
Operational  
personnel  
were instructed  
as to the requirements  
of jumpers . This includes proper notification, logging, and documentation.  
The date when full compliance  
will be achieved:  
Full compliance  
has been achieved.
NRC COMMENT: Attachment
Page 2 B. As required by Technical  
Specification  
3.10.A.l, the containment ment door (hatch) shall be properly closed during refueling  
conditions.  
Contrary to the above, on September  
24, 1980 the inspector  
observed that the Unit 1 containment  
escape hatch was not installed  
in the equipment  
door and the blank metal flange installed  
on the equipment  
door to substitute  
for the escape hatch was not properly sealed during refueling  
operations.  
This is an infraction  
and applies to Unit 1. RESPONSE:
This is correct as stated. The intent of containment  
integrity  
is to lish a gas-tight  
envelope during fuel movement operations.  
The containment  
was in a sub-atmospheric  
condition  
at all times with only exhaust ventilation  
equipment  
in operation.  
1. Corrective  
steps which have been taken and the results achieved:  
When the situation  
was identified, refueling  
was stopped until the door was sealed temporarily  
to establish  
a gas-tight  
seal. 2. Corrective  
steps which will be taken to avoid further non-compliance:  
A more permanent  
sealing was installed  
during a period when no fuel movement was in progress.  
The refueling  
procedure  
has been revised to insure this hatch is properly sealed prior to fuel movement.  
3. The date when full compliance  
will be achieved:  
Full compliance  
has been achieved.
}}

Latest revision as of 01:16, 3 February 2020

Responds to NRC 801125 Ltr Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Repts 50-280/80-39 & 50-281/80-43.Corrective Actions:Maint Completed on Installed Pumps & Refueling Procedure Revised
ML18139A987
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 12/17/1980
From: Sylvia B
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18139A986 List:
References
971, NUDOCS 8101160696
Download: ML18139A987 (3)
v • d • e


Text

'

.. *.~. ;:~ ~-:. t r.

  • ** ;.1,1 -.* -

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER. COMPANY RICHMOND,VIRGIN.IA 23261

. .J* r.:

i.1 :_ " ._. Io * '-:

\:

00 December 17, 1980 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Serial No. 971 Office of Inspection and Enforcement NO/RMT:ms U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docket Nos. 50-280 Region II 50-281 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 License Nos. DPR-32 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 DPR-37

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

We have reviewed your letter of November 25, 1980 in reference to the inspection conducted at Surry Power Station on September 2 through October 3, 1980 and reported in IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-280/80-39 and 50-281/80-43.

Our responses to the specific infractions are attached.

We have determined that no proprietary information is contained in the reports. Accordingly, the Virginia Electric and Power Company has no objection to these inspection reports being made a matter of public disclosure.

Very truly yours,

./,1 ,.!* '\/

/ >;t . ; /;i: ..

B. R. Sylvia Manager - Nuclear Operations and Maintenance Attachment cc: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing

Attachment Page 1 SURRY POWER STATION RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION REPORTED IN APPENDIX A OF IE REPORT 50-280/80-39 AND 50-281/80-43 NRC COMMENTS:

A. As required by 10 CFR 50.59 and Section 14 of the VEPCO NPS QA Manual, the licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the FSAR, provided that records of these changes are maintained and include a written safety evaluation which determined that the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question. In addition, Section 14 of the QA Manual requires the maintenance of the Jumper Log Book and forms, listing the status of each installed jumper or temporary modification for jumpers not installed by an approved procedure.

Contrary to the above, on September 12, 1980 the inspector observed that the Unit 2 Safeguards Valve Pit Sump piping had been modified by the installation of jumper hose on the piping valve 2-DA-43, and no record, safety evaluation, procedure, or jumper log entry for the installation has been completed. The jumper, with 2-DA-43 open, apparently led to the inadvertent diversion of Unit 1 and 2 containment sump water into the Unit 2 Safeguards Building Valve Pit (basement), where several feet of radioactive standing water was observed.

This is an infraction and applies to Unit 2.

RESPONSE

The item is correct as stated. The jumper discussed above is a hose from the discharge of a temporary sump pump. This was installed due to failures of both installed sump pumps. All water transfers were within the enclosed building. A jumper had been issued and implemented in January of 1980 to accomplish the job of pumping the valve pit. A new temporary pump was installed in September; however, the jumper log was not amended. During reviews of the log it was assumed the jumper was installed as originally approved.

1. Corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved:

The out of date jumper lQg was terminated and a new jumper log was issued to reflect the existing conditions. The discharge hose was moved to a floor drain which directs water to the Liquid Waste System. The standing water was pumped and processed. Maintenance has been completed on the installed pumps and the system returned to its proper configuration.

2. Corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further non-compliance:

Operational personnel were instructed as to the requirements of jumpers .

This includes proper notification, logging, and documentation.

3. The date when full compliance will be achieved:

Full compliance has been achieved.

Attachment Page 2 NRC COMMENT:

B. As required by Technical Specification 3.10.A.l, the containment equip-ment door (hatch) shall be properly closed during refueling conditions.

Contrary to the above, on September 24, 1980 the inspector observed that the Unit 1 containment escape hatch was not installed in the equipment door and the blank metal flange installed on the equipment door to substitute for the escape hatch was not properly sealed during refueling operations.

This is an infraction and applies to Unit 1.

RESPONSE

This is correct as stated. The intent of containment integrity is to estab-lish a gas-tight envelope during fuel movement operations. The containment was in a sub-atmospheric condition at all times with only exhaust ventilation equipment in operation.

1. Corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved:

When the situation was identified, refueling was stopped until the door was sealed temporarily to establish a gas-tight seal.

2. Corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further non-compliance:

A more permanent sealing was installed during a period when no fuel movement was in progress. The refueling procedure has been revised to insure this hatch is properly sealed prior to fuel movement.

3. The date when full compliance will be achieved:

Full compliance has been achieved.

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