IR 05000280/2019001

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000280/2019001 and 05000281/2019001

ML19130A018
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	05/10/2019
From:	Lundy Pressley NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4
To:	Stoddard D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
IR 2019001
Download: ML19130A018 (19)

Text

SUBJECT:

SURRY UNITS 1, 2 - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2019001 AND 05000281/2019001

Dear Mr. Stoddard:

On March 31, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Surry Units 1, 2. On April 17, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Fred Mladen and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC resident inspector at Surry. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Lundy F. Pressley, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 05000280 and 05000281 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000280/2019001 and 05000281/2019001

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000280 and 05000281 License Numbers: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Report Numbers: 05000280/2019001 and 05000281/2019001 Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-001-0028 Licensee: Virginia Electric & Power Co.

Facility: Surry, Units 1 and 2 Location: Surry, VA 23883 Inspection Dates: January 01, 2019 to March 31, 2019 Inspectors: B. Lin, Acting Senior Resident Inspector C. Read, Acting Senior Resident Inspector D. Bacon, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 71111.11B)

M. Meeks, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 71111.11B)

Approved By: Lundy F. Pressley, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Quarterly inspection at Surry Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.

List of Findings and Violations Failure to Enter Turbine Building Degradation in the Corrective Action Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green [H.13] - 71153 FIN 05000280,05000281/2019001-01 Consistent Open/Closed Process A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to document, evaluate and implement adequate corrective actions in accordance with PI-AA-200, Corrective Action Program (CAP), upon discovery of the degraded turbine building (TB) roof. Subsequently, TB roofing material contacted the A reserve service station transformer (RSST) during Tropical Storm Michael on October 11, 2018, which caused electrical isolation of the A RSST, the D transfer bus and the 1J 4kV emergency bus.

Additional Tracking Items Type Issue Title Report Status number Section LER 05000280, LER 2018-002-00 for Surry Power Station, Unit 1, 71153 Closed 05000281/ Regarding Windblown Debris Caused 2018-002- Transformer Fault Resulting in Auto-Start of 00 Emergency Diesel Generator.

LER 05000280, LER 2018-003-00 for Surry Power Station, Unit 1 71153 Closed 05000281/ Regarding Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel 2018-003- Generators Due to Pilot Wire Lockout on 'C'

00 Reserve Station Service Transformer.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPE

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02)

From January 30 to February 1, 2019, the inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal freezing temperatures for the following systems and components:

• condensate storage tanks

• auxiliary feedwater systems

• fire protection system

• emergency diesel generators

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system on January 23, 2019, while the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was unavailable

(2) Unit 1 charging pumps' service water and component cooling water systems on March 16, 2019

(3) Unit 1 outside recirculation spray (RS) System on March 20, 2019, following lowered inventory in the 'A' RS pump seal head tank

(4) Units 1 and 2 uninterruptable power supplies and batteries for vital loads on March 29, 2019

71111.05A - Fire Protection (Annual) Annual Inspection (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated fire brigade performance on February 7, 2019.

71111.05Q - Fire Protection Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) 'A' and 'B' fuel oil pump house CO2 system testing on January 29, 2019

(2) 1-FS-FP-142, Rev. 1, Main Steam Valve House (MSVH) on January 3, 2019

(3) Compensatory measures for fire protection piping replacement project in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine buildings on February 14, 2019

(4) 0-OPT-FP-008, Fire Pump Flow Rate Test, on the diesel-driven fire pump on March 1, 2019

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 02.02a.)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine building basements, including water level detection, alarms, automatic controls, and flooding response procedures Inspection Activities - Underground Cables (IP Section 02.02c.) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in:

Unit 2 alleyway in cable vault 1-EP-MH-2 and at the Unit 2 trackbay in cable vaults 1-EP-MH-3E and 1-EP-MH-3W

71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04)

Biennial Requalification Written Examinations The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered in March of 2018.

Annual Requalification Operating Tests The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees annual requalification operating test.

Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.

Requalification Examination Security The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised.

Remedial Training and Re-examinations The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee, and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.

Operator License Conditions The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses.

Control Room Simulator The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.

Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve problems associated with licensed operator performance.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 power reduction to 98 percent and high pressure heater drain pump swaps on February 6, 2019 and March 13, 2019.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

On February 5, 2019, the inspectors observed and evaluated a scenario in which a main steam flow transmitter fails, an electrical bus is lost, emergency diesel generators fail to start and load, and the station loses all offsite power.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) Main control room chiller service water pumps, including replacement of the 'B' main control room chiller service water pump on February 19, 2019

(2) On the 'A' emergency service water pump, alignment of the motor due to a degraded concrete pedestal on February 20, 2019, and replacement of the oil cooler on February 21, 2019, after foreign material caused a through-wall leak

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

(1) Unit 2 yellow risk due to intake canal level logic testing concurrent with the '1B' circulating water pump being out for maintenance, on February 5, 2019

(2) Unit 2 unplanned orange risk during plant heatup when transitioning from the site shutdown risk model to the probabilistic risk assessment model on December 3, 2018

(3) Unit 2 risk during replacement of the 'A' bearing cooling heat exchanger, including flooding mitigation and movement of the heat exchanger beside sensitive equipment, on March 5-6, 2019

(4) Unit 1 and Unit 2 risk during emergency diesel generator #2 testing with transformer

1. 1 and Bus 5 tagged out for maintenance in the switchyard, on March 11, 2019

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Sample (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) CR 1115210, NRC identified foreign material in relay 2-EP-86-25H6 (CH PUMP 1C LOCKOUT RELAY)

(2) CR 1113542, K-10 CERPI indication erratic during performance of 1-OPT-RX-005, retested on 1/9/2019

(3) CR 1114684, Service Water piping low pipe wall thickness on January 25, 2019.

(4) CRs 1111789 and 1112113, 'A' main feedwater pump breaker closed in test without entering technical specifications

(5) CR 1116136, safeguards exhaust fan rotating backwards while secured with opposite fan running

71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing Post Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) 1-OPT-RX-005, Control Rod Assembly Partial Movement, following erratic Computer Enhanced Control Rod Position Indication (CERPI) indications and corrective maintenance, on January 9, 2019

(2) 0-OPT-VS-002, Auxiliary Ventilation Filter Train Test, after preventative maintenance and pressure switch calibration for the 'A' Auxiliary Building filtered exhaust fan, on February 13, 2019.

(3) 1-OSP-IA-001, Instrument Air Compressor 1-IA-C-1 Performance Test, following controller reprogramming and modification to testing strategy, on February 19, 2019

(4) 0-OPT-SW-001, Emergency Service Water Pump 1-SW-P-1A, performance test following motor alignment and oil cooler replacement, on February 21, 2019.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: In Service Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) 2-OPT-CS-002, Containment Spray System Test, on February 26, 2019

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

(1) 2-OPT-EG-001, Number 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Start Exercise Test, Revision 77 on January 15, 2019

(2) 1-OPT-FW-002, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-3B, Revision 36 on January 3, 2019

(3) 0-OSP-AAC-001, Quarterly Test of 0-AAC-DC-0M, alternate AC Diesel Generator, Revision 45 on March 18, 2019

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation Drill and/or Simulator-Based Licensed Operator Requalification Training (IP Section 02.01)

On March 26, 2019, the inspectors evaluated a full-scale emergency preparedness drill that involved a flammable atmosphere in the emergency service water pump house leading to an Alert declaration, followed by a loss of fuel clad barrier and loss of coolant accident outside of containment leading to a General Emergency declaration.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01) ===

(1) Unit 1 (January 1 to December 31, 2018)

(2) Unit 2 (January 1 to December 31, 2018)

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02)

(2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1 to December 31, 2018)

(2) Unit 2 (January 1 to December 31, 2018)

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03)

(2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1 to December 31, 2018)

(2) Unit 2 (January 1 to December 31, 2018)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

A review of recent actuations of thermal overload protection devices on breakers for plant equipment and other condition reports related to design adequacies of thermal overloads.

These issues were chosen due to the importance the thermal overload devices. Failures can prevent plant equipment from performing safety functions. These issues were reviewed for deficiencies in maintenance and engineering. Specifically, inspectors reviewed the issues for deficiencies in maintenance practices, preventative maintenance schedules, foreign material exclusion practices, design attributes, and change management.

71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports which can be accessed at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:

(1) LER 05000280, 05000281/2018-002-00, Windblown Debris Caused Transformer Fault Resulting in Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generator (ADAMS accession:

ML18351A089). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in the Results section.

(2) LER 05000280, 05000281/2018-003-00, Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generators due to Pilot Wire Lockout on 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer (ADAMS accession: ML19016A133). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in the Results section.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Enter Turbine Building Degradation in the Corrective Action Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green [H.13] - 71153 FIN 05000280,05000281/2019001-01 Consistent Open/Closed Process A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to document, evaluate and implement adequate corrective actions in accordance with PI-AA-200, Corrective Action Program (CAP), upon discovery of the degraded turbine building (TB)roof. Subsequently, TB roofing material contacted the A reserve service station transformer (RSST) during tropical storm Michael on October 11, 2018, which caused electrical isolation of the A RSST, the D transfer bus and the 1J 4kV emergency bus.

Description:

On October 11, 2018, degraded TB roofing material contacted the A RSST and caused a pilot wire lockout signal which resulted in an undervoltage condition on the 1J 4kV emergency bus and subsequent automatic start of the #3 emergency diesel generator (EDG). At the time of the event, the site was experiencing rain and winds (approximately 55 miles per hour (mph)) associated with tropical storm Michael. The licensee evaluated this issue with a level of effort evaluation, CA 7407559. This evaluation determined, in part, that documentation and tracking of deficiencies associated with the TB roof, as identified in vendor inspection reports, have not been tracked in the CAP. The TB roof was determined to be degraded during a roof inspection by a vendor in 2016 and again in June of 2018. The vendor estimated the overall remaining life of the TB roof as 2 to 4 years following the roof inspections in 2016 and 2018, while noting specific deficiencies associated with loose flashing and loose or degraded fasteners. While the licensee did not track the TB roof condition in the CAP, the TB roof replacement project was tracked with the stations long range plan and originally planned to begin in 2017. It was subsequently rescheduled for 2019. The inspectors concluded that the licensee did not adequately evaluate the condition of the TB roof following the vendor inspections or implement a bridging strategy/interim corrective actions before the TB roof could be replaced. This was due in part, because the issue was not tracked in the stations CAP.

The licensee informed the NRC of the event on October 11, 2018 with licensee event report (LER) 05000280, 05000281/2018-002-00, Windblown Debris Caused Transformer Fault Resulting in Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generator in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and also made an 8-hour non-emergency event notification (EN#53662) on October 12, 2018.

Corrective Actions: The licensee conducted inspections and tests of the A RSST and restored the normal alignment of the #3 EDG and the 1J emergency bus. TB roof repairs were made so that the damaged materials were replaced and new anchoring strips and fasteners were installed. The frequency of roof inspections has been increased until the roof is replaced, and all deficiencies are being entered into the CAP. The TB roof replacement project was scheduled to begin in 2020.

Corrective Action Reference: CR1107393

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to document, evaluate and implement adequate corrective actions upon discovery of TB roof degradation in accordance with the corrective action program. Specifically, licensee procedure PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Rev. 34 paragraph 3.1.4 required, in part, a condition report (CR) for any issue or concern that does not meet specific requirements of procedures, policies, management expectations, or accepted industry standards.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone. Specifically, as a result of the PD and high winds at the site, degraded TB roofing material contacted the A RSST and caused a pilot wire lockout signal which resulted in an undervoltage condition on the 1J emergency bus and subsequent automatic start of the #3 emergency diesel generator (EDG) on October 11, 2018.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At - Power Situations. This finding was determined to be Green, very low safety significance, because the finding did not involve the complete or partial loss of a support system that contributed to the likelihood of, or cause, an initiating event that also affected mitigation equipment.

Cross-cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Consistent Process in the Human Performance area because; while the licensee has conducted TB roof inspections, they were controlled informally and were not conducted or tracked by a procedure or preventive maintenance (PM) task/assignment.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

Observation 71153 The licensee conducted a level of effort evaluation (LEE) and determined the cause of the failed underground splice was poor craftsmanship by a company transmission team in 2009. To detect degradation of cabling, including splices, tan delta testing is performed on a six-year frequency.

The splice that failed had been tan delta tested satisfactorily in 2009 and 2012. During testing in 2018, a few days before the fault occurred, two separate test sets were used, both producing erratic results. These results were attributed to issues with the testing equipment. The licensee deferred the tan delta testing based on recommendations from electrical subject matter experts given tan delta testing was not required as a part of the reserve station service transformer (RSST)replacement project. The inspectors determined that cable splice degradation was identified by the erratic results and further testing could have identified the degraded splice prior to returning the RSST to service. After the cable fault and RSST lockout, all plant safety systems responded as designed. This observation was associated with closure of Licensee Event Report (LER) 2018-003-00, Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generators Due to Pilot Wire Lockout on 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On February 7, 2019, the inspector presented the Telephonic Exit Meeting for Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Inspection (IP 71111.11B) to F. Mladen, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.

• On April 17, 2019, the inspector presented the Quarterly Resident Inspector Exit Meeting to Mr. Fred Mladen and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.01 Procedures 0-OP-ZZ-021 Severe Weather Preparation Rev. 21

71111.04 Corrective Action CR1088426

Documents CR1111368

CR1111510

CR1093547

CR1111509

CR1053312

CR1118589

CR1114023

71111.04 Drawings 11448-FE-11B Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Dist Pnls 1-II & 1-IV Unit 1 Rev. 44

11448-FE-1G 125V DC One Line Diagram Unit 1 Rev. 42

11448-FM-071B Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Circulating and Sheet 1 Rev.

Service Water System Unit 1 63, Sheet 2

Rev. 39

11548-FE-11B Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Dist Pnls 2-II & 2-IV Unit 2 Rev. 36

11548-FE-1G 125V DC One Line Diagram Unit 2 Rev. 37

11548-FM-075D Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Compressed Air Rev. 39

System Surry Power Station Unit 2

71111.04 Procedures 0-OP-SW-002A Emergency Service Water System Alignment Rev. 10

1-OP-51.5A Charging Pump CC and SW Systems Valve Alignment Rev. 20

1-OP-RS-001A Outside Recirc Spray System Alignment Rev. 10

2-OP-FW-001A Auxiliary Feedwater System Valve Alignment Rev. 8

71111.04 Work Orders 38103676030

38103774764

203871003

203875616

204179424

71111.05A Procedures SA-AA-115 Conduct of Fire Drills Rev. 4

71111.05Q Corrective Action CR1115033

Documents CR1090227

71111.05Q Drawings 11448-FB-047B Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Fire Protection Sheet 2 Rev.

System 25, Sheet 3

Rev. 27

71111.05Q Fire Plans 1-FS-FP-142 Emergency Switchgear Room Rev. 1

71111.05Q Miscellaneous N/A Compensatory Measures for TRM Hose Stations in U2 2/14/2019

Turbine Building, Compensatory Measures for TRM Hose

Stations in U1 Turbine Building

71111.05Q Procedures 0-LPT-FP-022 Operability Test of Fuel Oil Pump Houses High Pressure Rev. 12

CO2 System

71111.05Q Procedures 0-LSP-FP-102 Establishment of Hose House or Hose Station Rev. 1

Compensatory Measures

71111.05Q Procedures 0-OPT-FP-008 Fire Pump Flow Rate Test Rev. 24

71111.06 Corrective Action CR1115416

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

71111.06 Drawings 11448-ESK-11M Elementary Diagram Circulating Water Flooding Trip Rev. 11

71111.06 Procedures 0-AP-13.00 Turbine Building or MER 3 Flooding Rev. 31

71111.06 Procedures 0-AP-13.01 Uncontrollable Turbine Building Flooding Rev. 10

71111.06 Procedures 1-ECM-0102-01 Turbine Building Flood control Novus Micro 1000 UPS Rev. 6

Inverter and Battery Maintenance

71111.06 Procedures 1-EPM-0805-01 Turbine Building Flood Control Testing Rev. 11

71111.06 Work Orders 38103850377

71111.11B Miscellaneous 1. 10 Licensed Operator Medical Records

71111.11B Miscellaneous 2. Qualification Revocation/Reinstatements (TR-AA-600 Att.

4) and Remedial Training Plans (TR-AA-400 Attachment 5)

for seven (7) Licensed Operators from 2018 examinations

3. Shift B Licensed Operator RQ 17.1-17.7 Training

Attendance Records

4. Shift B Licensed Operator RQ 18.1-18.7 Training

Attendance Records

71111.11B Miscellaneous 5. Shift B Licensed Personnel Quarterly Proficiency Time

Records (OP-AA-103 Att. 7)

Job Aid 030 Simulator Steady State (ANSI09), tests performed on Rev. 2

05/31/18, 06/01/18, and 06/02/18

71111.11B Miscellaneous Job Aid 030 Simulator Steady State (ANSI09), tests performed on Rev. 0

11/11/16, 11/12/16, and 01/05/17

Job Aid 033 Simulator Simultaneous Trip of All Main Steam Isolation Rev. 1

Valves (ANSI12), test performed on 09/23/18

Job Aid 036 Simulator Main Turbine Trip From Maximum Power Level Rev. 1

(<10%) That Does Not Result in Immediate Reactor Trip

(ANSI15), test performed on 10/9/18.

Job Aid 037 Simulator Maximum Rate Ramp (5%/min) From 100% Rev. 2

Down To 75% (ANSI16), test performed on 07/25/18.

Job Aid 043 Simulator Real Time and Repeatability (ANSI20), tests Rev. 1

performed on 08/03/18

JPM LO18-01 Locally Operate a 4160V AC Breaker Rev. 16

JPM LO23-04 Respond to a Secondary System Transient Rev. 25

JPM LO26-02 Locally Isolate the AFW Header Rev. 13

JPM LO26-05C Locally Swap AFW Pump Supply to Fire Water Rev. 4

JPM LO26-12 Establish Alternate Feed Source to SGs Using FR-H.1 Rev. 7

JPM LO52-03B Transfer SI System to Hot Leg Recirculation Rev. 11

JPM LO81-04 Load AAC Diesel Onto Unit One J Bus Rev. 23

JPM LO88-34 Classify a Station Event IAW EPIP-1.01 Rev. 4

JPM LO88-44 Classify a Station Event IAW EPIP-1.01 Rev. 4

JPM LO99-20C Evaluate Critical Safety Function Status Trees Rev. 4

RQ-18.2-XB-5 Biennial Written Examination (RO and SRO) Rev. 0

Scenario Based Requalification Scenario RQ-19.1-SE-3, LBLOCA with Rev. 0

Test (SBT) Records Multiple ECCS Failures, Test performed on 12/06/2018

Scenario Based Requalification Scenario RQ-19.1-SE-4, LOCA Outside Rev. 0

Test (SBT) Records Containment From Charging Line, Test performed on

2/06/2018

Scenario RQ-19.1- LBLOCA with Multiple ECCS Failures Rev. 0

SE-3

71111.11B Miscellaneous Scenario RQ-19.1- LOCA Outside Containment From Charging Line Rev. 0

SE-4

Scenario RQ-19.1- Ruptured and Faulted Steam Generator Rev. 0

SE-7

Scenario RQ-19.1- Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Rev. 0

SE-8

71111.11B Procedures DTS-001 Test and Exam Security Rev. 3

NISP-TR-01 Systematic Approach to Training Process Rev. 1

OP-AA-103 Operator Qualifications Rev. 7

SA-AA-122 Medical Evaluation Rev. 7

TR-AA-10 Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) Process Rev. 4

TR-AA-101 Conduct of Training Rev. 13

TR-AA-710 NRC Exam Security Requirements Rev. 8

TR-AA-730 Licensed Operator Biennial and Annual Operating Rev. 11

Requalification Exam Process

TR-AA-740 Administrative Requirements for Application and Rev. 2

Maintenance of Operator Licenses

TR-AA-750 Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation Rev. 10

TR-AA-SIM-100 Simulator Modification Process Rev. 9

TR-AA-SIM-101 Simulator Configuration Control Committee Rev. 5

TR-AA-SIM-200 Simulator Hardware Management Rev. 4

71111.11B Procedures TR-AA-SIM-300 Simulator Software Management Rev. 4

TR-AA-SIM-400 Simulator Performance Testing Rev. 8

71111.12 Corrective Action CR1046703

Documents CR1064874

CR1116581

CR1116585

CR1104834

CR568763

71111.12 Procedures 0-MCM-0101-01 Ingersoll-Rand Inliner Pump Overhaul Rev. 12

0-MCM-0101-01 Ingersoll-Rand Inliner Pump Overhaul Rev. 11

0-MCM-0210-01 Control Room Chillers Performance Checks Rev. 30

71111.12 Work Orders 38103749617

38103777224

38103808936

38103807372

203876621

203876579

204182357

203875791

38103807372

38103749612

203575885

71111.13 Corrective Action CR1111789

Documents CR1112489

71111.13 Drawings 11548-FM-088B Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Chemical and Rev. 49

Volume Control System

71111.13 Miscellaneous N/A EOOS Scheduler's Evaluation of Surry Power Station,

February 5-10, 2019

N/A High Risk Plan Actions for Unit 2 Bearing Cooling Heat 3/4/2019

Exchanger Replacement

71111.13 Procedures 2-PT-8.5 Consequence Limiting Safeguards Logic (Hi-Hi Train) Rev. 34

WM-AA-20 Risk Assessment of Maintenance Activities Rev. 2

WM-AA-301 Operational Risk Assessment Rev. 20

71111.15 Corrective Action CR1115210

Documents CR1116136

CR1112113

71111.15 Drawings 11448-FB-006D Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram Auxiliary Sheet 1 Rev.

Ventilation System 14, Sheet 2

Rev. 18

71111.15 Engineering ETE-SU-2014-1017 Safety Re-Classification of Auxiliary Ventilation System Rev. 0

Evaluations Components

71111.15 Procedures 2-MOP-CN-002 Returning Secondary Systems to Service Rev. 20

2-OP-FW-004 Main Feedwater System Operation Rev. 21

2-OP-FW-004A Main Feedwater System Alignment Rev. 13

OP-AA-1500 Operational Configuration Control Rev. 19

71111.15 Procedures OP-AA-200 Equipment Clearance Rev. 31

OP-AA-2000 Tagging Administration Rev. 9

71111.15 Work Orders 38204194067

71111.19 Corrective Action CR1116581

Documents CR1116585

CR1116455

71111.19 Corrective Action CR1116455

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

71111.19 Procedures 0-OPT-SW-001 Emergency Service Water Pump Operation Rev. 48

71111.19 Procedures 0-OPT-VS-002 Auxiliary Ventilation Filter Train Test Rev. 31

71111.19 Procedures 1-OPT-RX-005 Control Rod Assembly Partial Movement Test Rev. 37

1-OSP-IA-001 Instrument Air Compressor 1-IA-C-1 Performance Test Rev. 21

2-LOG-TB-001R U2 Turbine Building Operations Normal Default Tour Rev. 173

2-OSP-IA-001 Instrument Air Compressor 2-IA-C-1 Performance Test Rev. 16

71111.22 Corrective Action CR1116811

Documents CR1117565

71111.22 Procedures 0-OSP-AAC-001 Quarterly Test of 0-AAC-DG-0M, Alternate AC Diesel Rev. 45

Generator

1-OPT-FW-002 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-3B Rev. 36

2-OPT-CS-002 Containment Spray System Test Rev. 18

2-OPT-EG-001 Number 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Start Exercise Rev. 77

Test

71111.22 Work Orders 38204195718

71114.06 Corrective Action CR1119402

Documents CR1119470

CR1118062

71114.06 Procedures 0-AP-35.02 Response to Potential Toxic, Corrosive, Asphyxiant, or Rev. 3

Flammable Atmosphere

1-E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Rev. 74

EPIP-1.03 Response to Alert Rev. 23

EPIP-1.05 Response to General Emergency Rev. 25

71114.06 Procedures EPIP-1.06 Protective Action Recommendations Rev. 12

EPIP-2.01 Notification of State and Local Governments Rev. 44

71151 Miscellaneous NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Rev. 7

Q4/2018 dated

Performance 3/8/2019

Indicators - Surry 1

and 2 - Unplanned

Power Changes per

7000 Critical Hours

Q4/2018 dated

Performance 3/8/2019

Indicators - Surry 1

and 2 - Unplanned

Scrams per 7000

Critical Hours

71151 Miscellaneous Q4/2018 dated

Performance 3/8/2019

Indicators - Surry 1

and 2 - Unplanned

Scrams with

Complications

71152 Corrective Action CR1088022

Documents CR1110299

CR1110296

CR1091318

CR1056169

CR1063590

CR1117624

CR1116277

CR1115665

CR1113049

CR1113030

CR1116277

CR1115665

71152 Procedures 1-DRP-007 Motor Operated Valve Operating Bands Rev. 46

71152 Work Orders 38203871020

203874647

204195738

71153 Corrective Action 1110265

Documents

71153 Miscellaneous N/A Vendor Inspection Report of Surry Turbine Building Roof dated

6/21/2018

19