IR 05000280/2022011
| ML22187A009 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/2022 |
| From: | Matthew Fannon Division Reactor Projects II |
| To: | Stoddard D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| IR 2022011 | |
| Download: ML22187A009 (17) | |
Text
July 6, 2022
SUBJECT:
SURRY POWER STATION - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2022011 AND 05000281/2022011
Dear Mr. Stoddard:
On May 26, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Surry Power Station. On May 26, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with David Wilson and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations corrective action program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
One finding of very-low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Surry Power Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Surry Power Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Matthew S. Fannon, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000280 and 05000281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000280 and 05000281
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000280/2022011 and 05000281/2022011
Enterprise Identifier: I-2022-011-0025
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Facility:
Surry Power Station
Location:
Surry, VA
Inspection Dates:
May 09, 2022 to May 26, 2022
Inspectors:
J. Seat, Senior Project Engineer
K. Carrington, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Merzke, Senior Reactor Operations Engineer
M. Schwieg, Senior Reactor Inspector
B. Towne, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Matthew S. Fannon, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Surry Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Transient Combustible Stored in a Restricted Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000280/2022011-01 Open/Closed
[P.5] -
Operating Experience 71152B An NRC identified finding of very-low safety significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of License Condition 3.I, Fire Protection, associated with the licensee's failure to implement and maintain in effect, the provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), which resulted in storage of a transient combustible within a restricted or combustion free zone.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)
- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees corrective action program (CAP), use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.
- Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees CAP in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors conducted an in-depth corrective action program review of the auxiliary feedwater, service water, and fire protection systems. The inspectors also conducted a review of chilled water system deficiencies identified within the past five years or more.
- Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience.
- Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
- Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment 71152B
1. Corrective Action Program Effectiveness
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance in each of the following areas adequately supported nuclear safety, and in general, met the requirements in licensee procedure PI-AA-200, "Corrective Action," and other self-imposed standards.
Problem Identification: The inspectors determined that the licensee was effective in identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program and that there was generally a low threshold for entering issues into the corrective action program.
Problem Prioritization and Evaluation: Based on the review of condition reports, the inspectors concluded that problems were prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the condition report significance determination guidance in procedure PI-AA-200. Inspectors determined that adequate consideration was given to system or component operability and associated plant risk. The inspectors determined that plant personnel had conducted cause evaluations in compliance with CAP procedures and that causal determinations were appropriate, and considered the significance of the issues being evaluated.
Corrective Actions: The team concluded that the licensee was generally effective in developing CAs that were appropriately focused to correct the identified problem, and to address the root and contributing causes for significant conditions adverse to quality, to preclude repetition. The licensee generally completed corrective actions in a timely manner and in accordance with procedural requirements, commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. For NRC-identified issues, the team determined that the licensee generally assigned CAs that were effective and timely.
2. Operating Experience
The licensee routinely screened industry and NRC Operating Experience information for station applicability, as prescribed by PI-AA-100-1007, Operating Experience Program. Based on these initial screenings, the licensee-initiated actions in the CAP to fully evaluate any potential station impact. When applicable, actions were developed and implemented in a timely manner, to prevent similar issues from occurring. Operating Experience lessons-learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations.
3. Self-Assessments and Audits
The inspectors determined that the licensee effectively performed self-assessments and audits to identify issues at a low level, properly evaluate those issues, and resolve them commensurate with their safety significance. Self-assessments were generally detailed and critical. The inspectors verified that corrective action documents were initiated to document areas for improvement and findings resulting from self-assessments and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations. Quality assurance program audits appropriately assessed performance and identified areas for improvement.
4. Safety Conscious Work Environment
Based on safety culture interviews with approximately 20 plant personnel, reviews of the latest safety culture survey results, and interviews with employee concerns program (ECP)personnel, the inspectors found no evidence of challenges to the safety conscious work environment. Employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
Transient Combustible Stored in a Restricted Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000280/2022011-01 Open/Closed
[P.5] -
Operating Experience 71152B An NRC identified finding of very-low safety significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of License Condition 3.I, Fire Protection, associated with the licensee's failure to implement and maintain in effect, the provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), which resulted in storage of a transient combustible within a restricted or combustion free zone.
Description:
On May 12, 2022, the inspectors conducted a walkdown of the Unit 1 auxiliary building 13-foot elevation. The inspectors identified an unattended, partially filled, oil drum within a few feet of the Unit 1 charging pump exterior wall.
The inspectors reviewed the transient fire loading report posted on the nearby wall. The report did not identify any flammable/combustible liquids in the area. Additionally, in Section 2, Work Area Preparation and Precautions, it was checked to observe the restrictions in fire zones listed in Attachments 8 or Attachment 9 or obtain variance.
The inspectors reviewed CM-AA-FPA-101, Attachment 9, Surry Power Station Transient Combustible Loading Limits and Restrictions, which includes a restriction for the auxiliary building general area that states, No transient within 10 ft. of exterior wall of charging pump cubicles on elev. 2 ft. and 13 ft."
The inspectors determined the unattended oil drum was located within a restricted area and the station had failed to establish any variance or compensatory actions associated with a transient combustible stored within a restricted area or combustion free zone.
Corrective Actions: On May 26, 2022, the licensee removed the oil drum from the restricted area and the licensee is reviewing additional corrective actions.
Corrective Action References: CR1200410
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors found that the licensees failure to implement the fire protection program in accordance with licensee procedure CM-AA-FPA-101, which resulted in the storage of a transient combustible within a restricted or combustion free zone, was a performance deficiency within the licensees ability to foresee and prevent.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the transient combustible was stored within a restricted or combustion free zone, which affected the zones function to prevent the spread of fire near the Unit 1 charging pumps. The inspectors used IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, dated January 1, 2021, to inform answers to the more than minor screening questions and found this condition consistent with more than minor Example 4.j.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. This finding was determined to be of very-low safety significance (Green) because the transient combustible was stored in an approved container and had a low degradation grading in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix F,
2. Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.5 - Operating Experience: The organization systematically and
effectively collects, evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. The inspectors found that the licensee did not implement relevant internal operating experience related to the NRC 2nd Quarter 2021 Green NCV due to a transient fire load incident.
Enforcement:
Violation: License Condition 3.I, Fire Protection, states in part, The licensee shall implement and maintain in effect the provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report UFSAR Section 9.10.1, Design Bases, states in part, Compliance with these criteria is contained in the following documents Fire Protection Program document and the associated Administrative Procedures describe the administrative and technical controls. Licensee procedure CM-AA-FPA-101, Attachment 9, Surry Power Station Transient Combustible Loading Limits and Restrictions, which includes a restriction for the auxiliary building general area that states, No transient within 10 ft. of exterior wall of charging pump cubicles on elev. 2 ft. and 13 ft.
Contrary to the above, from May 12, 2022 to May 22, 2022, the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect, the provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the UFSAR, resulting in noncompliance with the fire protection program document, CM-AA-FPA-100, and the associated administrative procedure, CM-AA-FPA-101, which describe the administrative and technical controls of transient combustibles. Specifically, the licensee stored a transient combustible within the auxiliary building restricted or combustion free zone.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Minor Violation 71152B Minor Violation: The NRC identified a minor violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter a condition adverse to quality (CAQ) associated with the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) fire main connection tell-tale drain into the corrective action program.
NRC inspectors performed a system walkdown of the AFW system for both units on May 12, 2022. The inspectors noted that the AFW fire main connection line to the AFW pump suction header had a tell-tale drain that was covered by a foreign material exclusion (FME)cover. The FME cover, which was not required for a vertical downward opening, had the potential to prevent detection of leakage from the drain. The issue was reported to station operators and the condition was promptly corrected, though a condition report was not entered into the CAP. The condition can reasonably be viewed as a condition adverse to quality, and per station procedure PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, should have resulted in a condition report for the purpose of tracking and resolving the issue. Although the condition was promptly corrected, the ability to track and trend the condition across the station was not possible without an entry into the CAP. On May 24, 2022, the issue was brought up to Surry Licensing during a daily debrief for the PI&R Inspection, and a CR was entered into the CAP.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors determined that this issue was minor in accordance with NRCs inspection manual chapter (IMC) 0612, Issue Screening, IMC 0612, App. B, Additional Issue Screening Guidance" and IMC 0612, App. E, Examples of Minor Issues. Specifically, the performance deficiency could not be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event; if left uncorrected, would not have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern and did not adversely affect the mitigating systems cornerstone objective.
Enforcement:
The licensee initiated a CR to capture the improper instillation of the FME cover. This failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On May 26, 2022, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to David Wilson and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calculations
CALC-0114-0130-
CALC-001
CW System Transient Hydraulic Analysis
Rev. 0
Corrective Action
Documents
CA8117061
White Finding for 2-FW-142 not Meeting Inservice Testing
Requirements of ASME Code
07/30/2020
CA8166318
CA8166321
CA8166323
CA8166324
CA8166325
CA8166327
CA8166328
CA8166331
CA8166332
ACA-1: Ensure all CVCM plans are accessible in Doctop
10/12/2020
CA8166333
CA8166334
ACA-3: Incorporate IST activities into work management
software
10/12/2020
CA8354712
LEE to Engineering for TRM surveillances not performed for
fire-related barriers
03/16/2021
CA8576750
CA8601602
Level of Effort Evaluation
10/14/2021
CA9162869
Perform a Performance Gap Analysis for manual valve
operation
11/23/2021
CR1094534
CR1125376
CR1150701
CR1151545
CR1152247
OC-18 in effect greater than two weeks
07/24/2020
CR1152249
OC-18 in effect more than two weeks
07/24/2020
CR1152636
Notice of Violation (White) received for 11/19/2019 TDAFW
pump check valve failure event
07/31/2020
CR1152857
LER 2020-001-00 for Surry Power Station Unit 2, Loss of
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Containment Cooling Affecting Partial Pressure Indication
CR1153258
CR1154065
LER 2020-001-00 for Surry Power Station Unit 2, Loss of
Containment Cooling Affecting Partial Pressure Indication
CR1154513
2-FW-P-3A ('A' MDAFW Pump) Control Switch Abnormal
Operation
09/01/2020
CR1155733
CR1157426
NRC Identified Potential issue of 2-FW-139 Drain Line Pipe
Cap Interference
10/06/2020
CR1158530
CR1158885
2-FW-139 'A' AFW Header Drain Line Seismic Interference
10/20/2020
CR1159061
Coatings not applied at welds on AFW piping
10/22/2020
CR1161543
CR1162361
CR1163031
1-VS-AC-6 not running after changing red indication LED
2/28/2020
CR1163387
CR1165891
CR1166392
CR1166441
Damage/Corrosion found on U1 B AFW Booster Pump
Piping
2/24/2021
CR1166865
CR1167077
CR1167156
NRC Resident question about Drainage from 2-FW-T-2 (U2
Terry Turbine) Common Drain Line
03/08/2021
CR1168515
Active Boric Acid Leak on CS Piping with AFW Booster
Suction Piping as Target
03/24/2021
CR1168526
U1 AFW Booster Pump Suction Piping Coating Degraded
and Missing
03/24/2021
CR1169561
CR1170487
CR1172375
1-RM-RI-162 Exceeded CM Criteria
05/09/2021
CR1172611
CR1173255
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR1173255
CR1173652
MRule: Function IA004 Exceeded Condition Monitoring
Performance Criteria
05/24/2021
CR1176202
CR1176203
CR1177055
CR1177065
CR1177495
CR1177537
NRC 2nd Quarter 2021 Exit Meeting Results - 1 Green NCV
due to transient fire load incident
07/26/2021
CR1177578
OC-18 to log U1 A MFP vibrations has been open for >2
weeks
07/26/2021
CR1178422
CR1179974
OC-18 in effect greater than 2 weeks for 1-RC-P-1B
09/03/2021
CR1180114
CR1180294
OC-18 in effect greater than 2 weeks
09/09/2021
CR1181818
OC-18 for Warehouse Fire Panel in effect for greater than 2
weeks
10/02/2021
CR1182150
CR1182240
CR1183416
Unit 2 AFW Crosstie Piping Minor Exterior Corrosion
10/21/2021
CR1183992
CR1184741
CR1185570
Unit 2 High level Differential Measurement OC-18
11/11/2021
CR1186728
CR1187117
CR1187191
CR1187259
2-CN-TK-1 Level Lowering Faster than AFW Pump Seal
Leakage
2/05/2021
CR1187623
CR1188592
OC-18 for Cardox tank bleeding off CO2
01/01/2022
CR1189577
1-FW-P-2 Load Reject test During 1-OPT-FW-003 Extended
Valve Operating Time
01/19/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR1189589
1-FW-625 TDAFW Full Flow Recirc Valve difficult to Operate
1/19/2022
CR1189686
CR1191800
CR1192369
CR1192697
Through wall leak was discovered while excavating 01-FP-70
03/02/2022
CR119300
Four Burrs on the 45 degree AFW Enclosure Mating Surface
03/07/2022
CR1194071
CR1194173
U1 Backup heat detection calculation in alarm due to C RCP
upper thrust bearing temperature point
03/19/2022
CR1198536
CR550366
1-CD-P-1C motor field cable brittle and deteriorated
05/28/2014
CR552987
LEE CR1174831
PIR1180430
PIR1198741
PIR1198747
RCE 8117061
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR1199368
NRC Enhancement for 1-OPT-FW-003
05/13/2022
CR1199378
NRC Identified Degraded Coatings on Unit 1 AFW Piping
05/13/2022
CR1200197
NRC Identified FME cover on telltale drain 1-FW-119
05/24/2022
CR1200236
Exhaust buildup on 1-SW-P-1B
05/24/2022
CR1200410
NRC Identified: Transient combustible concern near the 1-
CH-P-1C Cubicle
05/26/2022
CR1200420
NRC Identified a CR was not submitted in PAMS
05/26/2022
Engineering
Evaluations
0-NAT-M-004
Engineering Acceptance Test
Combustible Loading Analysis - Surry Power Station, Units 1
and 2
ETE-SU-2015-
26
Aging Management License Renewal Requirements for
General Condition Monitoring Inspections and System
Walkdowns
Rev 0
Miscellaneous
Surry Work Order Back Log for the last five years
Non-Intrusive Check Valve Testing Dominion Power Surry
Nuclear Plant
05/30/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
System Health Report - Service Water, 2Q2021
Examination of Surry Buried Fire Protection Pipe Adjacent to
1-FP-70
04/14/2022
System Health Report - Service Water, 4Q2021
VEOC Situational Awareness Unit-Surry Nuclear Power
Station Quarterly Siren Test Procedures
11/16/2020
CM-AA-FPA-101
Transient Fire Loading Report - AAC Diesel
04/29/2022
CR576301
CVCM Plan 1-
018a
CVCM Plan 2-047
IA004 Tracking
(a)(1) Action Plan 1-IA-C-3 Found belt broke while 2-IA-C-3
tagged OOS
Rev 0
LEE CA8324576
Service Water (SW) temperature to Main Control Room
(MCR) chiller 1-VS-E-4A could
not be adjusted within the specified range
03/04/2021
LEE CA9178967
Failure Analysis of Starter, Timing Switch and Relay for
Diesel Engine
2/02/2022
Q2-2021 SURR
Common AFW-
Auxiliary
System Health Report
Q4-2020 SURR
Common AFW-
Auxiliary
System Health Report
Q4-2021 SURR
Common AFW-
Auxiliary
System Health Report
RM009 Tracking
(a)(1) Action Plan - 1-RM-RI-162 Exceeded CM Criteria
Rev 0
U1 Operations
Aggregate Impact
U1 Operations Aggregate Impact Reports (monthly, 8/2020 -
present)
U2 Operations
U2 Operations Aggregate Impact Reports (monthly, 8/2020 -
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Aggregate Impact
present)
VS010 Tracking
(a)(1) Action Plan - Emergency Switchgear Room Air
Handing Units
Rev 1
Operability
Evaluations
CR1171138
CR1171157
CR1171160
OD-CA8521833
Unit 2 'D' CW Line Pipe Supports
07/16/2021
Procedures
VEOC Situational Awareness Unit - Surry Power Station
Quarterly Siren Test Procedures
07/07/2021
0-ECM-0706-01
ESW Diesel Starter Replacement
Rev. 5
0-FCA-8.00
Limiting Auxiliary Building Fire
Rev 25
0-OP-FP-003
Administrative Control of 1-FP-36 or 1-FP-37
Rev 23
0-OPT-FP-007
OPERABILITY TEST OF FIRE PROTECTION VALVES
INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA
0-OPT-SW-002
Emergency Service Water Pump 1-SW-P-1B
Rev. 75
1-NPT-LR-002-
547 Day Freq. PT: LR GCM Review (Auxiliary Feedwater) -
Unit 1 Areas Outside of Cont
04/21/2021
1-NPT-LR-002-
547 Day Freq PT: LR GCM Review (Condensate) - U1 Areas
Outside Cont
04/26/2021
1-OPT-FW-003
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-2
1/19/2022
1-OPT-FW-003
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-2
4/11/2022
CM-AA-FPA-101
Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials
Operations Aggregate Impact
Rev 8
Level of Effort Evaluation
Work Management
Self-Assessments CO-AUDIT-IA-IA-
19-05
Corrective Actions, Independent Review, and License
Commitments
07/22/2019
CO-AUDIT-IA-IA-
20-10
Maintenance, North Anna Power Station and Surry QC
Inspection
01/25/2021
CO-AUDIT-IA-IA-
21-03
Measuring & Test Equipment and North Anna Power Station
Refueling
06/03/2021
CO-AUDIT-IA-IA-
21-05
Corrective Action, Independent Review, and License
Commitments
08/27/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CO-AUDIT-IA-IA-
21-07
Inservice Inspection, Inservice Testing, and Appendix J
Programs
10/07/2021
PIR 1144740
Operations Configuration Control
PIR 1144740
Configuration Control
PIR 1144752
Work Observation
PIR 1144752
Work Observation Program
PIR 1147091
Trending
PIR 1149802
Temporary Equipment Labeling
PIR 1150992
Maintenance and Technical Training
PIR 1150992
Comprehensive Training Self-Assessment Effectiveness
Review
PIR 1151088
Electrical, I&C, Chemistry, and Engineering Training
PIR1155421
Electrical, I&C, Chemistry, and Engineering Training
Work Orders
38103650490
HYDRANT REPLACEMENT
204186322
BONNET REPLACEMENT (LR)
R)(DC/ETE NEEDED) Feeder Cable Replacement
05/28/2014
Valve Overhul (R/R)
2/24/2020
Valve Overhaul (R/R)
2/24/2020
Perform Coating Repairs (LR)
06/12/2020
Indicator Plate Investigation/Replacement
09/01/2020
Valve and Piping Rotation (DC SU-21-00108)
10/07/2020
Prep and Coat Pipe Support (3"-WAPD-82-601)
10/23/2020
Prep and Coat AFW Booster Pump Suction Piping
03/25/2021
Recoated U1 AFW Booster Pump Suction Piping
03/25/2021
U1 AFW Booster Pump Suction Piping Coating Degraded
and Missing
03/25/2021
Clean/Prep/Coat Piping
10/21/2021
Leak Seal Enclosure Installation
Investigate/Repair Valve/Handwheel