IR 05000280/2021011
| ML21306A114 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/2021 |
| From: | Scott Shaeffer Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Lawrence D Dominion Energy Virginia |
| References | |
| IR 2021011 | |
| Download: ML21306A114 (16) | |
Text
November 1, 2021
SUBJECT:
SURRY POWER STATION - TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2021011 AND 05000281/2021011
Dear Mr. Lawrence:
On October 8, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Surry Power Station. On October 7, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Surry Power Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect (CCA) assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Surry Power Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 05000280 and 05000281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000280 and 05000281
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000280/2021011 and 05000281/2021011
Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-011-0048
Licensee:
Dominion Energy Virginia
Facility:
Surry Power Station
Location:
Surry, VA
Inspection Dates:
September 20, 2021 to October 08, 2021
Inspectors:
L. Jones, Senior Reactor Inspector
W. Monk, Senior Reactor Inspector (Team Lead)
J. Montgomery, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Singletary, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a triennial fire protection team inspection (FPTI) at Surry Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Inadequate Corrective Actions for Incorrect OMA Step in FCA Operating Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000280/2021011-01 Open
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.21N.
The NRC identified a Green Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Surry Unit 1 OLC 3.I, Fire Protection, for the licensees failure to implement adequate corrective actions for an inadequate Fire Contingency Action (FCA) operating procedure.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and industry standards. Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19),inspectors were directed to begin teleworking. In addition, regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21N.05 - Fire Protection Team Inspection (FPTI)
Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) Credited for Fire Prevention, Detection, Suppression, or Post-Fire Safe Shutdown (SSD) Review (IP Section 03.01)===
The inspectors verified that components and/or systems will function as required to support the credited functions stated for each sample. Additional inspection considerations are located in the fire hazards analysis (FHA) or safe shutdown analysis (SSA).
a. Review deficiencies or open fire protection impairments for the selected system, including any temporary modifications, operator workarounds, or compensatory measures.
b. Verify that operator actions can be accomplished as assumed in the licensees FHA, or as assumed in the licensees fire probabilistic risk assessment (FPRA) analysis and SSA.
c. Review repetitive or similar maintenance work requests which could be an indicator of a design deficiency and could affect the ability of the components to perform their functions, when needed.
d. Ensure that post maintenance and/or surveillance activities are performed as scheduled.
e. Perform a walkdown inspection to identify equipment alignment discrepancies. Inspect for deficient conditions such as corrosion, missing fasteners, cracks, and degraded insulation.
f. Ensure the selected SSCs that are subject to aging management review (AMR) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 54 are being managed for aging (e.g., loss of material, cracking, reduction of heat transfer) in accordance with appropriate aging management programs. Verify that the licensees aging management program activities (such as, Fuel Oil Analysis or Selective Leaching Aging Management Program) associated with FP equipment are being implemented.
g. If a review of operating experience issues will be completed for the selected inspection sample, verify that the licensee adequately reviewed and dispositioned the operating experience in accordance with their processes.
- (3) SSC #3 (SSD): U1 & U2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) System and Emergency Power System Bus
- (4) SSC #4 (SSD): Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System
Fire Protection Program Administrative Controls (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors verified that the selected control or process is implemented in accordance with the licensees current licensing basis. If applicable, ensure that the licensees FPP contains adequate procedures to implement the selected administrative control. Verify that the selected administrative control meets the requirements of all committed industry standards.
- (1) Fire Protection Admin Program #1: Fire Protective Equipment Surveillance Program
- (2) Fire Protection Admin Program #2: Fire Brigade Drills and Training Program
Fire Protection Program Changes/Modifications (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors verified the following:
a. Changes to the approved FPP do not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown.
b. The adequacy of the design modification, if applicable.
c. Assumptions and performance capability stated in the SSA have not been degraded through changes or modifications.
d. The FPP documents, such as the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, fire protection report, FHA, and SSA were updated consistent with the FPP or design change.
e. Post-fire SSD operating procedures, such as abnormal operating procedures, affected by the modification were updated.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Inadequate Corrective Actions for Incorrect Operator Manual Action Step in FCA Operating Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000280/2021011-01 Open
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.21N.0 The NRC identified a Green Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Surry Unit 1 OLC 3.I, Fire Protection, for the licensees failure to implement adequate corrective actions for an inadequate Fire Contingency Action (FCA) operating procedure.
Description:
On May 13, 2021, the licensee discovered that step 20 d) of fire SSD procedure 1-FCA-3.00, Limiting Cable Vault and Cable Tunnel Fire, referenced the incorrect breaker for de-energizing the U1 480V J motor control centers (MCCs). The step called for operators to open breaker 1-EP-BKR-14J1-3. The correct breaker to de-energize the 480V J MCCs is breaker 1-EP-BKR-14J1-4. Breaker 1-EP-BKR-14J1-3 is for an alternate feeder to a filter exhaust fan, and this breaker is normally maintained racked out during normal plant operations. The procedure directed operators to take steps to de-energize the U1 480V 'J' MCC because it removes power from various motor operated valves (MOVs) in order to assure the MOVs remain in their required SSD position to assure adequate charging flow to the Reactor Coolant System and Auxiliary Feedwater flow to the steam generators. Upon discovery, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 1172768 and the issue was characterized as a condition adverse to quality. The initial actions taken were to notify supervision, and to submit the issue to the sites Feedback Incorporation Process (FIP). The FIP process was not a part of the sites CAP program, and actions taken within the FIP process are not officially tracked or monitored as a part of the CAP. Additionally, the CR did not contain any other corrective actions nor note any other compensatory measures taken.
On October 4, 2021, during an inspection walkdown, inspectors discovered that step 20 d) of procedure 1-FCA-3.00 was still incorrect. Inside the FIP process, the proposed change was qualitatively given a priority of six months for the stations procedures group to respond, and no justification for this timeframe was required to be given. Additionally, in June 2021, plant personnel erroneously interpreted an all procedures freeze request from the stations training group to mean that the FCA (among other site Emergency Operating Procedures and Abnormal Operating Procedures) should not be updated until at least September 2021.
Corrective Actions:
- Operations department to update 1-FCA-3.00.
- Operations department to review Lessons Learned for timeliness of FIP submittal process and implementation.
- Extent of condition review of the site's other FCAs.
Corrective Action References:
- CR 1181961, NRC issuing Green NCV for Timeliness of Implementation, 10/05/2021
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to correct an operator manual action (OMA)step error in 1-FCA-3.00, Limiting Cable Vault & Cable Tunnel Fire as soon as practical was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to correct the OMA step error as soon as practical allowed an error that reduced the reliability of an FCA procedure to exist for over five months.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. Using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, the inspectors determined the issue was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not increase the likelihood of a fire, delay detection of a fire, or result in a more significant fire than previously analyzed such that the credited safe shutdown strategy could be adversely impacted (Question 1.4.1-A).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. H.14 (Conservative Bias) - Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. Individuals did not use decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable because when the FCA error was initially discovered no immediate corrective actions were taken nor any compensatory measures were put in place. Additionally, prompt and corrective action to correct the Fire SSD procedure was not taken.
Enforcement:
Violation: Surry Unit 1 Operating License Condition 3.I requires, in part, that the licensee shall implement and maintain in effect the provisions of the approved fire protection program, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Section 9.10.1 of the FSAR states, in part, that the Surry Power Station satisfies the regulatory criteria set forth in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 and that compliance with this criteria is contained within, among other documents, the Dominion fleet Fire Protection Program document. Section 3.11 of the Fire Protection Program document CM-AA-FPA-100 states, in part, that all aspects of the fire protection program shall be implemented in accordance with Topical Report DOM-QA-1, Dominion Nuclear Facility Quality Assurance Program Description (QAPD). Section 16.1 of DOM-QA-1 states, in part, that the Company has established and implements corrective action programs, procedures, and processes to assure that conditions adverse to quality at Company nuclear facilities are promptly identified and corrected. Section 16.4 states that the Company commits to meeting the standards for corrective action of NQA-1-1994, Part I, Basic Requirement 16. Basic Requirement 16 of Part 1 to NQA-1-1994 states that conditions adverse to quality shall be identified promptly and corrected as soon as practical.
Contrary to the above, from May 13, 2021 to October 4, 2021, the licensee failed to assure that a condition adverse to quality was corrected as soon as practical.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV),consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained nor documented in this report.
- On October 7, 2021, the inspectors presented the triennial Appendix R fire protection team inspection (FPTI) results to Mr. Doug Lawrence, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
THIRD PARTY REVIEWS
Inspectors reviewed one Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) report, in reference to an inspection sample which was issued before the inspection period. No other third-party reviews were conducted.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
0-EPT-0904-05
SMOKE AND THERMAL DETECTOR
CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST
Rev. 21
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1096345
The 6 fire protection piping in MER 2 is corroded and
blistering
05/02/2018
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1098380
Inattentive Hot Work Fire Watch
05/25/2018
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1112720
Fire Watches Required Due to Potential Spurious
Actuation of CO2 in CV&T
2/19/2018
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1121959
Sprinkler Actuated Above 2A2-2 and 2C2-2 MCCs
4/27/2019
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1123110
FME cover found in fire protection piping
5/12/2019
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1133589
Documentation for Exiting TRM 3.7.1 24-Hour Action
Statement
10/19/2019
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1135940
Documented Appendix R Design Basis for SG PORV
Spurious Operation Is Not Correct
11/14/2019
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1141708
Smoke detector failed to activate in SAS Halon System
2/20/2020
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1150473
COVID Plexiglas Wall at Warehouse Counter Blocks
Sprinkler Heads
06/25/2020
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1152534
Transient Stored in Unit 2 Safeguards Valve Pit without
TFLR
07/29/2020
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1156906
Fire Protection Piping has Thru Wall Leak
10/02/2020
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1172768
Incorrect mark number for breaker in 1-FCA-3.00
05/13/2021
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1177199
App R Concern ID with Cable Separation Associated with
U1&U2 EDG and Emergence Bus Operation
07/20/2021
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1177390
Apparent Appendix R Non-Compliance Identified at NAPS
07/22/2021
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1180502
Appendix R Assumptions for EPS Supply Breakers not
Consistent with Industry Guidelines
09/12/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR 581390
NRC Violation for Design Control Deficiencies Within the
6/3/2015
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
CR1165692
Electrical connection arcing and smoking
2/12/2021
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
RAS 7492729
Rev. 3
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 1180958
Head on 1-ELT-LF-052 does not Illuminate
09/20/2021
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 1181134
Fire Team SCBA Bottle Pressure Found <4000 psi, NRC
Identified
09/22/2021
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 1181135
Expired Batteries Noted During Walkdown by NRC
09/22/2021
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 1181201
Transient Combustible in MER 3 Not in Compliance with
CM-AA-FPA-101
09/23/2021
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 1181229
1-BS-DR-40/41 Door Sweeps Do Not Fully Contact the
Floor for the Full Width of Door
09/23/2021
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 1181234
Error Identified in Appendix R Report Table 4.1a and b
09/23/2021
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 1181613
Deluge Valve High Trim Pressure
09/29/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 1181907
Light to Medium Loading on Turbine Building Sprinkler
Heads
10/04/2021
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 1181961
NRC Issuing GREEN NCV for Timeliness
10/05/2021
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 1182015
Fire Treated Wood in MER 1
10/05/2021
71111.21N.05 Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 1182143
NRC TFPI Team Observation - No Documented Eval for
PM Strategy on MSVH Smoke Detectors
10/07/2021
71111.21N.05 Drawings
11448-FAR-202
Equipment Location - App R MSVH Area Plan Surry
Power Station - Unit 2
Rev. 8
71111.21N.05 Drawings
11448-FE-1AA
Appendix R Evaluation, Electrical One Line Diagram,
Surry Power Station Unit 1
Revision 28
71111.21N.05 Drawings
11448-FE-1D
4160V One Line Diagram, Surry Power Station Unit 1
Revision 31
71111.21N.05 Drawings
11448-FE-90AA
Appendix R Block Diagram, Auxiliary Feedwater System,
Surry Power Station Unit 1
Revision 3
71111.21N.05 Drawings
11448-FE-90EA
Appendix R Block Diagram, Emergency Electrical
Distribution System, Surry Power Station Unit 1
Revision 8
71111.21N.05 Drawings
11448-FE-90EB
Appendix R Block Diagram, Emergency Diesel Control
Isolation System, Surry Power Station Unit 1
Revision 4
71111.21N.05 Drawings
11448-FE-90EF
Appendix R Block Diagram, Emergency Diesel Control,
Surry Power Station Unit 1
Revision 5
71111.21N.05 Drawings
11448-FM-068A
Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram, Feedwater
System, Surry Power Station Unit 1
Revision 65
71111.21N.05 Drawings
11548-FE-1AA1
One Line Diagram, Appendix R Evaluation, Surry Power
Station Unit 2
Revision 30
71111.21N.05 Drawings
11548-FE-90AA
Appendix R Block Diagram, Auxiliary Feedwater System,
Revision 2
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Surry Power Station Unit 2
71111.21N.05 Drawings
11548-FM-068A
Flow/Valve Operating Numbers Diagram, Feedwater
System, Surry Power Station Unit 2
Revision 62
71111.21N.05 Engineering
Changes
SU-16-00108
U2 AFW MOV Hot-Short Resolution
Rev. 8
71111.21N.05 Engineering
Changes
SU-16-00109
U1 AFW MOV Hot-Short Resolution
Rev. 12
71111.21N.05 Engineering
Changes
SU-18-00112
Charging SW Fire Protection Pipe Replacement
Rev. 3
71111.21N.05 Engineering
Evaluations
ETE-CEP-2011-
0012
Appendix R Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO)
Identification - Surry
Revision 3
71111.21N.05 Engineering
Evaluations
ETE-SU-2019-
0006
Alternate Compensatory Measures for Emergency
Switchgear Fire with Carbon Dioxide Release
Rev. 0
71111.21N.05 Engineering
Evaluations
NE-1200
Key Operator Actions Assumed in the Safety Analyses
Rev. 19
71111.21N.05 Engineering
Evaluations
PA 3069154
Evaluate IN 17-04 as it Applies to Surry
2/20/2019
71111.21N.05 Miscellaneous
Supplement 1 to Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report
Dated September 19, 1980
9/18/1980
71111.21N.05 Miscellaneous
Submittal Documenting Surry Power Station Fire
Protection Modifications
10/29/1980
71111.21N.05 Miscellaneous
Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report
September
19, 1979
71111.21N.05 Miscellaneous
Cable Routing
Evaluation for
Unit 1 AFW
Injection Valves
71111.21N.05 Miscellaneous
DOM-QA-1
Nuclear Facility Quality Assurance Program Description
Revision 29
71111.21N.05 Miscellaneous
Fire Protection Information Relating to Appendix A to BTP
9.5-1, 1979 FP-SER and National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) Codes
6/30/1999
71111.21N.05 Miscellaneous
Individual Plant
Examination of
Non-Seismic
December
1994
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
External Events
and Fires
71111.21N.05 Miscellaneous
Private Fire Brigades
Code of
Record 1975
71111.21N.05 Miscellaneous
Section 9.10 - Fire Protection
Rev. 52
71111.21N.05 Miscellaneous
Surry Power
Station
Generic Hot Work Fire Watch Lesson Plan
Rev. 3
71111.21N.05 Miscellaneous
Surry Power
Station Appendix
R Report
Revision 44
71111.21N.05 Miscellaneous
Surry Power
Station Updated
Final Safety
Analysis Report
Revision
2.06
71111.21N.05 Procedures
0-AP-48.00
Fire Protection - Operations Response
Revision 38
71111.21N.05 Procedures
0-DRP-049
Time Critical Operator Actions
Rev. 21
71111.21N.05 Procedures
0-FCA-1.00
Limiting MCR Fire
Rev. 58
71111.21N.05 Procedures
0-FCA-7.00
Limiting Mechanical Equipment Room 3 or 4 Fire
Revision 14
71111.21N.05 Procedures
0-LSP-FP-036
SECURITY HALON SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST
Rev. 5
71111.21N.05 Procedures
0-OSP-TCA-001
Time Critical Action Validation and Verification
Rev. 26
71111.21N.05 Procedures
1-FCA-3.00
Limiting Cable Vault and Cable Tunnel Fire
Revision 26
71111.21N.05 Procedures
1-FCA-4.00
Limiting ESGR Number 1 Fire
Revision 26
71111.21N.05 Procedures
1-FCA-5.00
Limiting Safeguards Area Fire
Revision 13
71111.21N.05 Procedures
1-OSP-ZZ-001
AUXILIARY SHUTDOWN PANEL FUNCTIONAL
SURVEILLANCE
Rev. 17
71111.21N.05 Procedures
2-FCA-3
Limiting Cable Vault and Cable Tunnel Fire
Rev. 27
71111.21N.05 Procedures
Technical Procedure Process Control
Rev. 14
71111.21N.05 Procedures
CM-AA-FPA-10
Fire Protection/Appendix R (Fire Safe Shutdown) Program
Rev. 5
71111.21N.05 Procedures
CM-AA-FPA-100
Fire Protection/Appendix R (Fire Safe Shutdown) Program
Rev. 16
71111.21N.05 Procedures
CM-AA-FPA-101
Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials
Rev. 15
71111.21N.05 Procedures
CM-AA-FPA-102
Fire Protection and Fire Safe Shutdown Review and
Preparation Process and Design Change Process
Rev. 10
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21N.05 Procedures
ER-AA-AMP-103
Scoping and Screening of License Renewal Aging
Management Components
Rev. 0
71111.21N.05 Procedures
ER-AA-AMP-104
Aging Management Review for License Renewal
Systems, Structures, and Components
Rev. 0
71111.21N.05 Procedures
Corrective Action
Rev. 36