IR 05000348/2012002

IR 05000348-12-002; 05000364-12-002; and 07200042/2012001 January 1 Through March 31, 2012; Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Integrated Report

ML12122A814
Person / Time
Site:	Farley, 07200042
Issue date:	04/30/2012
From:	Frank Ehrhardt NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
To:	Lynch T Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-12-001
Download: ML12122A814 (29)

Text

April 30, 2012

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2012002; 05000364/2012002; AND 07200042/2012001

Dear Mr. Lynch:

On March 31, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 12, 2012, with you and members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The NRC reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC public document room or from the publicly available records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the public electronic reading room).

Sincerely,

/RA/ Frank Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-348, 50-364,72-042 License No.: NPF-2, NPF-8

Enclosure:

(See next page)

__ ML12122A814 ________

G SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE G FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RIII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS NSIR NSIR SIGNATURE /RA By FEhrhardt/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA By E-mail/0 /RA By E_mail/ /RA By-e-mail/ /RA By-e-mail/ NAME MMiller TLighty FEhrhardt ECrowe JSowe RCarrion JLanghlin DATE 4/27/2012 4/27/2012 4/27/2012 4/23/2012 4/23/2012 4/23/2012 4/23/2012 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO SNC 2 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000348/2012002; 05000364/2012002; and 07200042/2012001 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 05000348, 05000364, 07200042 07200042/2012001 License Nos.: NPF-2, NPF-8

Report No.: 05000348/2012002; 05000364/2012002; and 07200042/2012001 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Columbia, AL

Dates: January 1, 2012 through March 31, 2012

Inspectors: E. Crowe, Senior Resident Inspector J. Sowa, Resident Inspector R. Carrion, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 4OA5) J. Laughlin, Emergency Preparedness Inspector, (Section 1EP4)

Approved by: Frank Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000348/2012002; 05000364/2012002; and 07200042/2012001 January 1 through March 31, 2012; Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Integrated Report.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident inspectors, one senior reactor inspector and one emergency preparedness inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December, 2006. No findings were identified during this inspection period.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings were identified.

B. Licensee-identified Violations None

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 was at 100% rated thermal power (RTP) at the start of this report period. The licensee shut down Unit 1 on January 17 to install monitoring equipment on the main turbine. The license restarted Unit 1 on January 20 and achieved 100% RTP on January 23. The unit remained at or near 100% RTP until the licensee started a reactor coolant system temperature coast down on March 12 for the next refueling outage. Unit 1 remained in this mode of operation until the end of the inspection period. Unit 1 was at 78% RTP and coasting down for a refueling outage at the end of this inspection period.

Unit 2 was at 100% RTP at the start of this report period. Unit 2 remained at or near 100% RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Seasonal Readiness Review: The inspectors evaluated implementation of the licensee's cold weather contingency procedure, FNP-0-SOP-0.12, and conditions for entry into the procedure. The inspectors examined heat tracing lines on the condensate storage tanks and refueling water storage tanks to verify these protections for cold weather conditions were functional. The emergency diesel generator building and service water intake structure were also evaluated to ensure provisions were implemented to compensate for any known deficiencies. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

Impending Adverse Conditions: The inspectors evaluated implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures for the following adverse weather condition. The inspectors walked-down portions of the main steam systems, condensate storage systems, refueling water storage tanks, and emergency diesel generators. These systems were selected because their safety-related functions could be affected by freezing weather. The inspectors verified the applicable portions of procedure FNP-0-AOP-21.0, "Severe Weather," were performed. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Projected freezing temperatures for January 4, 2012 External Flooding: The inspectors reviewed the Final Safety Analysis Report and site design documents related to the probable mean precipitation event and potential upstream flooding concerns. The inspectors performed a walk-down of the site topography to ensure no changes had occurred that could adversely affect site design criteria. The inspection included tanks, outside doors and thresholds, and underground vault openings to outside areas to ensure design measures were in place to mitigate potential external flooding concerns. The inspectors determined that openings in risk significant structures, systems, and components were above projected flood levels. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial Walk-Down: The inspectors performed partial walk-downs of the following four systems to verify operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable. The inspectors attempted to identify discrepancies impacting the function of the system and therefore, potentially increasing risk. The walk-downs were performed using the criteria in licensee procedures NMP-OS-007, "Conduct of Operations," and FNP-0-SOP-0, "General Instructions to Operations Personnel." The walk-downs included reviewing the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR), plant procedures and drawings, checks of control room and plant valves, switches, components, electrical power, support equipment, and instrumentation. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

• Unit 1, A train auxiliary feedwater system motor driven pump while B train auxiliary feedwater system motor driven pump was out of service for maintenance

• Unit 1, B train containment spray system while A train containment spray system out of service

• Unit 1, B train service water system while 1A service water pump out of service for maintenance

• Unit 2, A train residual heat removal (RHR) while B Train RHR out of service for maintenance

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Quarterly Fire Protection Area Tours: The inspectors conducted a tour of the five fire areas listed below to assess material condition and operational status of the fire protection equipment. The inspectors verified combustibles and ignition sources were controlled in accordance with the licensee's administrative procedures, fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use, and passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. Additionally, inspectors verified compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with the requirements of licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-36, "Fire Surveillance and Inspection," FNP-0-AP-38, "Use of Open Flame," FNP-0-AP-39, "Fire Patrols and Watches," and associated fire zone data sheets. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1, cable spreading room, fire zone 40

• Unit 1, hot shut down panel room, fire zone 12

• Unit 1/2, service water intake structure B train 4160V switchgear room, fire zone 72B

• Unit 2, cable spreading room, fire zone 40

• Unit 2, hot shut down panel room, fire zone 15

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected risk-important plant design features and licensee procedures intended to protect the plant and its safety-related equipment from internal flooding events. The inspectors reviewed flood analysis and design documents, the UFSAR, engineering calculations, and abnormal operating procedures for licensee commitments. The inspectors walked down the area listed below to verify plant design features and plant procedures for flood mitigation were consistent with design requirements and internal flooding analysis assumptions. The inspectors reviewed flood protection barriers, which included plant floor drains, condition of room penetrations, condition of the sumps in the rooms, and condition of water-tight doors. The inspectors also reviewed CRs to verify the licensee was identifying and resolving problems. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1, charging pump 1C, room 181

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Review of Cables Located in Underground Bunkers/Manholes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted an inspection of the following four underground bunkers/manholes subject to flooding and containing cables whose failure could disable risk-significant equipment. The inspectors walked down risk-significant areas to verify cables were not submerged and that cables and/or splices appeared intact. Additionally, inspectors observed the condition of cable support structures. When applicable, the inspectors verified proper dewater device (sump pump) operation and verified level arm circuits were set appropriately, ensuring the cables would not be submerged. Where dewatering devices were not installed, the inspectors' verified drainage was provided and functioning properly.

• Unit 1, Electrical pull boxes/cable vaults A1M40

• Unit 1, Electrical pull boxes/cable vaults A1M43

• Unit 1, Train A emergency diesel generator tunnel

• Unit 2, Electrical pull boxes/cable vaults A1M41

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

a. Inspection Scope

Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (Licensed Operator Requalification): The inspectors observed portions of the licensed operator training and testing program on January 25. The inspectors verified implementation of procedures FNP-0-AP-45, "Farley Nuclear Plant Training Plan," FNP-0-TCP-17.6, "Simulator Training Evaluation/Documentation," and FNP-0-TCP-17.3, "Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program Administration." The inspectors observed operations simulator scenario 12-S1103, conducted in the licensee's simulator for a loss of the 1C charging pump and a main steam header rupture concurrent with B train main steam isolation valves failure to close. The inspectors observed high-risk operator actions, overall crew performance, self-critiques, training feedback, and management oversight to verify operator performance was evaluated against the performance standards of the licensee's scenario. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (Licensed Operator Performance): The inspectors observed control room operator performance during an elevated GREEN risk condition due to the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP) being out of service for maintenance on March 6. Inspectors observed licensed operator conduct and operations to assess the following:

• Operator compliance and use of plant procedures

• Control board/in-plant component manipulations

• Communications between crew members

• Use and interpretation of plant instruments, indications, and alarms

• Diagnosis of plant conditions based on instruments, indications, and alarms

• Use of human error prevention techniques, such as pre-job briefs and peer checking

• Documentation of activities, including initials and sign-offs in procedures, control room logs, technical specification (TS) entry and exit, and service logs entries

• Management and supervision of activities, including risk management and reactivity management

• Pre-job briefs Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

Resident Inspector Quarterly Inspection Samples

The inspectors reviewed the following two condition reports:

• CR 394283, Partial loss of Unit 1 annunciators during maintenance to annunciator power supply for panel B and panel C

• CR 401257, Unit 1 refueling water storage tank level instrument (LT502) found out of tolerance low The inspectors reviewed the condition reports for the following attributes:

• Appropriate work practices

• Identifying and addressing common cause failures

• Scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule

• Characterizing reliability issues for performance

• Trending key parameters for condition monitoring

• Charging unavailability for performance

• Classification and reclassification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2)

• Appropriateness of performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified as (a)(1).

In addition, the NRC specifically reviewed events where ineffective equipment maintenance resulted in invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems affecting the operating units. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five activities to verify appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to taking equipment out of service for maintenance. The inspectors verified risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), and were accurate and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified appropriate use of the licensee's risk assessment and risk categories in accordance with requirements in licensee procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.3, "Mode 1, 2, & 3 Risk Assessment," FNP-0-UOP-4.0, "General Outage Operations Guidance," NMP-GM-006, "Work Management," and NMP-OS-007, "Conduct of Operations."

• Unit 1, January 11, 2012, YELLOW risk condition associated with 1A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump (MDAFWP) out of service for maintenance

• Unit 2, February 8, 2012, elevated GREEN risk condition associated with 2B RHR pump out of service for maintenance concurrent with 2C auxiliary building battery charger out of service and high voltage switchyard activities

• Unit 1, February 15, 2012, elevated GREEN risk condition associated with 1A MDAFWP out of service for maintenance concurrent with 1C auxiliary battery charger and 1B containment cooler slow speed breaker out of service

• Unit 1, February 29, 2012, YELLOW risk condition associated with 1A spent fuel pool pump outage

• Unit 2, March 6, 2012, elevated GREEN risk condition associated with TDAFWP out of service for maintenance concurrent with 2C auxiliary battery charger out of service

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following six operability evaluations to verify the requirements of licensee procedures NMP-OS-007, "Conduct of Operations" and NMP-AD-012, "ODs and Functionality Assessments" were met. The scope of this inspection also included a review of the technical adequacy of the evaluations, the adequacy of compensatory measures, and the impact on continued plant operation.

• CR 389135 Unit 1, jumper left in 1B CCW train A control circuit for greater than 90 days

• CR 394663 Unit 1, A train containment spray pump motor inboard bearing found to have badly discolored oil while drawing samples

• CR399900 Unit 1, 1A diesel tunnel found to have elevated water level with the potential to expose safety related electrical cables to submerged conditions

• CR405411, Units 1 and 2, seismic panel alarm event light on panel lit and main control board annunciator light illuminated

• CR413908, Unit 2 "C" steam generator wide range level transmitter evaluated for operability following Rosemount Nuclear part 21 report identifying affected transmitters with instrument accuracy errors

• CR420129, Unit 2 TDAFWP oil samples contain high water content

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following permanent plant modification to ensure the safety functions of important safety systems were unaffected. The inspectors also verified that design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of risk-significant SSCs had not been degraded through modifications. The inspectors verified that any modification performed during a risk-significant configuration did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. The inspectors evaluated system operability, availability, configuration control, post-installation test activities, documentation updates, and operator awareness of the modification. Document reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• DCP 1091921801, Unit 1, ECCS Vent VLVS Installation at Critical Locations per GL2008-01

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the criteria contained in licensee procedures FNP-0-PMT-0.0, "Post-Maintenance Test Program," to verify post-maintenance test procedures and test activities for the following five systems/components were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability. The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed the test data to verify test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

• FNP-0-STP-26.0A, Control Room Train A Ventilation Operability Test following replacement of control room air conditioning air handler fan bearing

• FNP-1-STP-220.3, Containment Pressure Loop Calibration and Operational Test Q1E13PT0952 following repair of containment pressure transmitter PT952

• FNP-2-SOP-1.1, Reactor Coolant System, Section 4.7, PRZR Heater Operation following replacement of circuit breaker Q2R16BKREC11

• FNP-2-STP-11.2, 2B RHR Pump Quarterly Inservice Test following replacement of current to pneumatic converter on air operated discharge valve Q2E11FCV603B

• FNP-2-STP-213.23, Steam Generator 2C Q2C22FT0494 Loop Calibration and Operation Test following the declaration of Q2C22FT0494 (Steam Generator 2C flow transmitter) inoperable for lower than normal reading

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five tests and either observed the test or reviewed test results to verify testing adequately demonstrated equipment operability and met technical specification (TS) requirements. The inspectors reviewed the activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and valve alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-24, "Test Control," FNP-0-M-050, "Master List of Surveillance Requirements,"

and NMP-OS-007, "Conduct of Operations," and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

Surveillance Tests

• FNP-1-STP-16.12A, 1A Containment Spray Pump Automatic Starting Circuitry Test

• FNP-1-STP-22.2, 1B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Quarterly Inservice Test

• FNP-2-STP-10.3, Emergency Core Cooling Valves Inservice Test and PORV Block Valve Stroke Test

• FNP-2-STP-33.2B, Reactor Trip Breaker Train B Operability Test In-Service Test (IST)

• FNP-2-STP-22.16, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Quarterly Inservice Test"

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The NSIR headquarters staff performed an in-office review of the latest revision of an Emergency Plan Implementing procedure (EPIP), located under ADAMS accession number ML12061A039, as listed in the Attachment.

The licensee transmitted this procedure revision to the NRC pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section V, "Implementing Procedures." The NRC review was not documented in a safety evaluation report and did not constitute approval of licensee-generated changes; therefore, this revision is subject to future inspection. The specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the licensee's response to a routine emergency drill. The inspectors evaluated licensee performance to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in event classification, notification, and protective action recommendations. The inspectors observed emergency response center operation to verify event classification and notifications were performed in accordance with FNP-0-EIP-9.0, "Emergency Classification and Actions." The inspectors used procedure NMP-303.0, "Drill and Exercise Standards," as the inspection criteria. The inspectors also attended the licensee critiques of the drill to compare any inspector-observed weaknesses with those identified by the licensee, in order to determine whether the licensee was properly identifying issues.

• February 22, 2012 - General Emergency due to large break loss of coolant accident concurrent with a fuel failure and high dose measurements at the site boundary.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee data for the three performance indicators (PIs) listed below to verify the accuracy of the PI data reported. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline," Rev. 6, was used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

• Unplanned Scrams

• Unplanned Power Changes

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

• Emergency AC Power System

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Daily Condition Report (CR) Reviews

As required by IP 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems," and in order to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the NRC performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program (CAP). This review was accomplished by reviewing copies of CRs, attending daily screening meetings, and accessing the licensee's computerized database.

.2 Selected Issue Follow-up Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

In addition to the routine review, the inspectors selected the two issues listed below for more in-depth reviews.

• CR 361386, 2B MDAFWP failed to start during ESS/LOSP sequencer test

• CR 369262, Unit 2 MOV 8803A HHSI to RCS cold leg isolation opened unexpectedly The inspectors considered the following attributes during the review of the licensee's actions:

• Complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner

• Evaluation and disposition of operability/reportability issues

• Consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences

• Classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem

• Identification of root and contributing causes of the problem

• Identification of CRs

• Completion of corrective actions in a timely manner b. Observations

CR 361386: The licensee conducted a routine surveillance of the B2G sequencer on October 15, 2011. The surveillance tested the functionality of the sequencer to auto-start various components in response to a safety injection (SI) actuation concurrent with a loss of off-site power (LOSP). Step 5 of the sequencer failed to actuate and the 2B hydrogen cavity dilution fan and the 2B motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump did not auto-start as expected. The licensee conducted troubleshooting of the circuit and the HFA style relay which failed to actuate during step 5 of the sequencer test. The licensee's internal testing did not find a fault with the circuit or the relay. The licensee conservatively replaced the relay and successfully completed the surveillance to demonstrate operability of the B2G sequencer.

The inspectors reviewed the surveillance test procedures during which step 5 failed to auto-start the 2B MDAFWP as well as the successful surveillance following the installation of a new HFA style relay (FNP-2-STP-40.0). The inspectors also interviewed station personnel to understand the depth of troubleshooting and the apparent cause of the failure. Inspectors reviewed the ESS/LOSP sequencer schematics (drawing 207646) as well as work orders that detailed troubleshooting of the relay and subsequent installation of a new relay (SNC work orders 77088, 340011, 339687, and 340647). The inspectors did not identify any operability concerns with station equipment.

CR 369262: MOV 8803A unexpectedly opened on November 3, 2011, during a maintenance activity for the K604 slave relay in the solid state protection system. The relay was not recognized to be in a latched condition when the lead associated with MOV 8803A was landed causing the valve to stroke open. MOV 8803A was subsequently closed after about 2 minutes and power was removed to prevent another stroke. While the MOV was opened, approximately 500 gallons of borated water were inadvertently injected from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to the reactor coolant system (RCS) cold leg. The licensee made a non-emergency, telephonic notification to the NRC on November 28, 2011, in lieu of a written Licensee Event Report (LER) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

The inspectors reviewed the telephonic event report and related station documents, and interviewed engineering and maintenance personnel regarding the installation of the K604 relay. The relay was being installed as a replacement after a K604 relay had previously failed to actuate during a performance of FNP-2-STP-40.0 (Safety Injection with Loss of Off-Site Power Test). Maintenance personnel incorrectly installed the relay with the latching assembly in the latched configuration, which immediately caused MOV8803A to stroke open. The relay should have been installed in the unlatched position to ensure proper system response.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's apparent cause determination report and did not find any issues with the licensee's causal analysis or have concerns about the operability of similar components due to this issue. The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to properly install the relay in accordance with the associated work order. Because there was no actual safety consequences associated with the opening of MOV8803A, the issue was determined to be minor.

.3 Operator Work-Around Annual Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed review of the licensee's operator work-around list, operator burden list, and control room deficiency list for Units 1 and 2 in effect on March 14, 2012. The inspectors reviewed the proposed corrective actions and schedule for each item on the lists. The inspectors reviewed the compensatory actions and cumulative effects on plant operation. The inspectors verified each item was being dispositioned in accordance with plant procedure FNP-0-ACP-17.0, "Work-Around Program."

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

(Closed) LER 05000364/2011-001-00 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperable

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed information contained in the licensee's submittal of LER 05000364/2011-001-00. The inspectors reviewed station logs to identify any additional equipment which may have been out of service during the period of time the TDAFW pump was inoperable (July 7 - August 1, 2011). The inspectors identified four occasions where additional equipment was out of service which would have adversely affected the safety function of the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system. The license also identified these occasions in their LER submittal. The inspectors reviewed licensee's TS 3.7.5, Condition C which states in part, "if two AFW trains are inoperable be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and be in Mode 4 within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />." The inspectors reviewed licensee's TS 3.0.2 which states in part, "upon discovery of a failure to meet a Limiting Condition of Operability, the Required Actions, of the associated Conditions shall be met, -" The inspectors determined from their review of station documents the point of discovery occurred during the licensee's cause determination of the pump over speed event following the return of the TDAFW pump to an operable condition. The inspectors also monitored the licensee's activities at the point of discovery and determined the licensee returned the equipment to service within the time limits of TS 3.7.5, Condition A. Additionally, inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program to ensure this event was adequately captured and that pump operability had been correctly restored. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's cause determination for this event to ensure corrective actions would address the root causes of this event. The inspectors discovered the licensee had performed cause determinations for observations provided by self assessment activities which overlapped this event. The inspectors also reviewed the corrective actions from these cause determinations.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. The inspectors determined the time limits of TS 3.7.5, Condition C had been exceeded but did not identify a performance deficiency because the condition was not reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct, and therefore could not have been prevented. Integrated Inspection Report 05000348/2011005 and 05000364/2011005; and 05000364/2011014, issued January 27, 2012, documented a Green, self-revealing NCV (05000364/20110014-01) of 10CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensee's failure to correctly update their design drawing for the Unit 2 TDAFW pump electrical controls. The inspectors determined the licensee's failure to correctly update their design drawing for the Unit 2 TDAFW pump electrical controls caused TS 3.7.5, Condition C to be exceeded. This LER is closed.

4OA5 Other Activities

On-Site Fabrication of Components and Construction of an ISFSI (60853)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review of licensee and vendor activities in preparation for the concrete placement for the center sections (Pour Nos. 4-2 and 5-2, respectively) of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) pad expansion for Pads Nos.4 and 5 upon which 24 Holtec HI-STORM 100 vertical storage modules will be sited (12 on each pad) to house spent fuel generated by the licensee. The inspectors walked down the construction area of the ISFSI pad and examined the rebar installation and verified that the rebar size, spacing, splice length, and concrete coverage on the top, side, and bottom complied with licensee-approved drawings, specifications, procedures, and other associated documents, and that compliance with applicable American Concrete Institute (ACI) codes, American Society for the Testing of Materials standards, the Certificate of Compliance, and Technical Specifications was met. The inspectors also evaluated the concrete formwork installation for depth, straightness, and horizontal bracing and verified the overall dimensions and orientation for compliance with licensee-approved drawings. The inspectors interviewed licensee and contract personnel to verify knowledge of the planned work. The inspectors also observed concrete delivery, placement, and vibration of the ISFSI slab center sections and observed tests for concrete slump and air content, temperature measurements, and the collection and preparation of concrete cylinder samples for later compression tests to verify that the work was implemented according to licensee-approved specifications and procedures and referenced industry codes and standards. The inspectors also reviewed the seven-day compression test results, performed by an independent laboratory, for the concrete placements observed as well as the seven-day and twenty-eight-day compressive test results for previously completed sections to verify that the acceptance criteria as defined by the Final Safety Analysis Report were met.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

The NRC presented the inspection results to you and members of your staff on April 12, 2012. The staff acknowledged the results. The NRC confirmed proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

None ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

C. Channell, Dry Cask Storage Engineering Supervisor

J. Fitzgerald, Special Projects ISFSI Engineer

C. Gayheart, Plant Manager

J. Horn, Site Support Manager

F. Hundley, Fleet Oversight Supervisor

J. Jerkins, Corrective Action Program Supervisor

T. Lynch, Site Vice President

R. Martin, Engineering Programs Manager

W. Oldfield, Licensing Engineer

W. Phillips, Dry Cask Storage Engineer

L. Smith, Maintenance Manager

B. Taylor, Performance Improvement Supervisor

C. Thornell, Operations Manger

R. Tyler, Special Projects ISFSI Engineer

S. Varnum, Chemistry Manager

C. Westberry, Engineering Systems Manager

NRC personnel

Frank Ehrhardt, Chief, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects

E. Crowe, Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF REPORT ITEMS

Opened

None

Opened and Closed

None

Closed

05000364/2011-001-00 LER Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperable (Section 4OA3)

Discussed

None

Attachment