05000364/LER-2011-001, Unit 2 Regarding Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperable
| ML112690242 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 09/22/2011 |
| From: | Stinson L Southern Nuclear Operating Co, Southern Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-11-1845 LER 11-001-00 | |
| Download: ML112690242 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(6) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(6) |
| 3642011001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Post Office Drawer 470 Ashford. Alabama 36312 SOUTHERN A September 22, 2011 COMPANY ElIugy to S~rv~ Your World""
Docket No:
50-364 NL-11-1845 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2011-001-00 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperable Ladies and Gentlemen:
In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report.
This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Doug McKinney at (205) 992-5982.
Sincerely, A?R~....-_...
L. M. Stinson Vice President - Farley LMSIWDO
Enclosure:
Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2011-001-00
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-11-1845 Page 2 cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO Mr. J. T. Gasser, Executive Vice President Ms. P. M. Marino, Vice President - Engineering RTYPE: CFA04.054 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. V. M. McCree, Regional Administrator Mr. R. E. Martin, NRR Project Manager - Farley Mr. E. L. Crowe, Senior Resident Inspector - Farley Mr. P. G. Boyle, NRR Project Manager
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2011-001-00 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperable Enclosure Unit 2 Licensee Event Report
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 315().{)104 EXPIRES: 1013112013 (1()'2010) the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 13. PAGE Joseph M Fartey Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 05000364 1 OF 4
- 14. TITlE Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Inoperable
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 07 07 2011 2011 - 001 - 00 09 22 2011 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check aU that apply) o 20.2201 (b) o 20.2203(a)(3)(i) o 50.73(a)(2)(ij(C) o SO.73(a)(2)(vii) 1 o 20.2201 (d) o 2O.2203(a)(3)(ii) o 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)(A) o SO.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) o 2O.2203(a)(1) o 20.2203(a)(4) o 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(6) o 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) o 20.2203(a)(2)(i) o SO.36(c)(l )(i)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(iii) o SO.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL o 2O.2203(a)(2)(il) o 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) o 50. 73(a)(2)(x) o 2O.2203(a)(2)(iii) o 50.36(c)(2) o 5O.73(a)(2)(v)(A) o 73.71(a)(4) o 2O.2203(a)(2)(iv) o 50.46(a)(3)(ii) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) o 73.71(a)(5) 100 o 2O.2203(a)(2)(v) o SO.73(a)(2)(i)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) o OTHER o 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 181 50.73(a)(2)(i)(6) 181 50.73(a)(2)(v)(O)
Specity in Abstract below or in
Safety Assessment
The Farley onsite standby power source is provided from four EDGs (1-2A, 1 B, 2B, and 1C). The continuous service rating of 1 C EDG is 2,850 kW and 4,075 kW for EDGs 1-2A, 1 B, and 2B. EDG 1-2A and 1-C are A-Train and EDGs 1 Band 2B are B-Train. Farley also has a fifth diesel generator (2C) that serves as a station blackout diesel which can be manually aligned to supply B-Train power to either unit and power Loss of Site Power (LOSP) loads. The diesel generator 2C can provide backup power to the buses supplied by 1 B EDG. Procedures are in place and operators are trained on starting the 2C diesel generator for alignment to the B-Train emergency buses.
The AFW System consists of two motor driven AFW pumps and one steam turbine driven pump configured into three trains. The pumps are equipped with recirculation lines to prevent pump operation against a closed system. Each motor driven AFW pump is powered from an independent Class 1 E power supply and feeds all steam generators through a common header. The steam turbine driven AFW pump receives steam from two main steam lines upstream of the main steam isolation valves. The turbine driven AFW pump supplies a common header capable of feeding all steam generators via Direct Current (DC) solenoid air operated control valves actuated by the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS). Thus, the requirement for diversity in motive power sources for the AFW System is met. Two of the three AFW pumps are required to ensure the flow demand for the most limiting DBAs and transients is satisfied.
With the Unit 2 TDAFWP unknown to be inoperable and an EDG out of service for more than four hours; per Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1,
- AC Sources - Operating," Required Action Statement (RAS), the train related MDAFWP would be considered inoperable due to the combination of its inoperable emergency power supply and inoperable redundant equipment (TDAFWP). However, in each instance when an EDG was removed from service for routine maintenance, the corresponding train related MDAFWP remained available. While the EDG was out of service, no work was performed on opposite train class 1 E electrical systems that could have threatened the remaining operable MDAFWP. In addition, the TDAFWP could have been operated by procedure in local manual control if necessary.
In the short time during which the B-train 2B MDAFWP was actually out of service, the A-train 2A MDAFWP remained operable.
No adverse weather conditions threatened Farley's offsite power systems during this period of time.
No events occurred to adversely affect operations and Unit 2 remained at 100% power while the TDAFWP was inoperable. At no point was the safety and health of the public challenged.
Therefore, the safety and health of the public was not adversely affected while two of three trains of AFW were inoperable.
Corrective Action
The Unit 2 TDAFWP wiring was restored to the correct configuration and subsequent surveillance testing was completed satisfactory.
The IDAFWP wiring drawings for both Unit 1 and 2 were found in error and will be corrected by October 15, 2011.
A root cause (CR 333399) was initiated and additional corrective actions were identified. These actions to reinforce periormance expectations, assess training needs, and to improve processes will be tracked to closure in the corrective action system.
Additional Information
Similar Events:
LER 2010-002-01 August 20, 2010 Two Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Inoperable LER 2009-002-00 May 26,2009 TDAFWP Inoperable Due to Internal Flooding Concerns NRC FORM 36eA (11)-2010)