TXX-8811, Final Deficiency Rept CP-87-133 Re High Energy Line Break Analysis.Initially Reported on 871218.Mods Required Will Be Identified & Scheduled for Implementation in General Const Schedule by 880811

Final Deficiency Rept CP-87-133 Re High Energy Line Break Analysis.Initially Reported on 871218.Mods Required Will Be Identified & Scheduled for Implementation in General Const Schedule by 880811

ML20195J205
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	01/18/1988
From:	Counsil W TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
CP-87-133, TXX-88118, NUDOCS 8801260457
Download: ML20195J205 (3)

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l EE lo # TXX-88118 L C Fi e # 10110 ,

2 903.6 '

Ref. # 10CFR50.55(e)

M/ELECTR/C IO,"Sdd,,, January 18, 1988 V. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK ANALYSIS-SDAR: CP-87-133 (FINAL REPORT)

Gentlemen:

On December 18, 1987, we verbally notified your Mr. R. F. Warnick of a 4

deficiency involving multiple examples of potentially significant conditions concerning our High Energy Line Break (HELB) Analysis. After further evaluation we have determined that this item is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). The required information follows.

l Description l' The original HELB analysis was an evaluation of the effects of postulated high i

energy line breaks, conducted under the Pipe Rupture Damage Study Instruction No. ME 1 (last revised in October,1984).

In the past, several deficiencies pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) (SDAR CP-85-20, CP-85-46, CP-86-13, CP-87-53, CP-87-57, and CP-87-58) have been identified concerning various areas of the original HELB analysis. In addition, the Design Adequacy Program (DAP) identified several deficiencies that were not identified in previous SDARs (DAP report IRR-DAP-E-M-501). Our evaluation and calculations associated with the HELB analysis has recently been completed.

This evaluation concludes that the combination of deficiencies (previous SDARs i and other deficiencies identified in the DAP report) represents a significant i inadequacy in the performance of the original HELB analysis.

3 The following SDARs previously reported identify significant deficiencies in various areas of the original HELB analysis. This report (SDAR CP-87-133) now

, envelopes these SDARs. Future corrective action taken to resolve the j following deficiencies will be reported herein.

8801260457 880118 gDR ADOCK0500g5 9 }1

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TXX-88118 January 18, 1988 Page 2 of 3 SDAR CP-85-20: Containment Spray Headers - Feedwater Line Break SDAR CP-85-46: Damage Study Evaluation of Westinghouse Analyzed Piping SDAR CP-86-13: Jet Impingement Load Review SDAR CP-87-53: Pipe Whip Restraint Design Methodology SDAR CP-87-57: Computer Modeling Error - Compare Mod 1A SDAR CP-87-58: Computer Modeling Error - Relap - 3 The following SDARs will be consolidated under this report and no longer addressed separately:

a. SDAR CP-85-20, TXX-6435, dated May 13, 1987;

b. SDAR CP-85-46, TXX-6435, dated May 13, 1987;

c. SDAR CP-87-57, TXX-6929, dated November 16, 1987; [

d. SDAR CP-87-58, TXX 6951, dated November 16, 1987.

These deficiencies were apparently caused by a failure to perform the ilELB analysis, conducted under the Pipe Rupture Damage Study Program, in a manner which complies with FSAR/ Regulatory Requirements.

Safety implication Inadequate performance of the HELD analysis results in the inability to ensure the safe shutdown capability of the plant in the event of a postulated line break. This is due to the significant number of areas affected by the llELO analysis, specifically:

) a. Jet impingement load calculations  ;

. b. Jet impingement area projections '

, c. Pipe whip zones of influence

d. Identification of safety-related targets

e. Environmental parameters

f. Failure modes and effects analyses Corrective Action

. Corrective Action for this issue will be performed in two phases. Phase 1, ,

The Design Validation Phase, began with the implementation of procedure

, ECE 2.24, "Systems Interaction Program," and development of the Design Basis Document DBD-ME-007, "Pipe Break Postulation and Effects." These documents form the basis for validating the ori Using DBD-ME-007 and Systems Interaction Program (SIP)ginal procedures llELB analysis.

established under ECE 2.24 the following has been developed:

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a. Safe Shutdown Logic Diagrams i b. Pipe Whip and Jet Zones of Influence Sketches

c. Pipe Break location Sketches S

d. Environmental Analyses  :

) e. Pipe Rupture Analyses  ;

, f. Essential Equipment Lists t 1

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TXX-88118 January 18, 1988 Page 3 of 3 The above documentation will be utilized in Phase 2 of the corrective action, Post Construction Hardware Validation Phase. In phase 2 we will identify pipe l break interactions with essential equipment in order to determine hardware modifications necessary to ensure safe shutdown capability of the plant is-maintained during a postulated HELB.

Hodifications required as a result of our evaluation will be identified and scheduled for implementation in-the general construction schedule no later than August 11, 1988.

Very truly yours, ML)

W. G. Counsil HAM /grr c-Hr. R. D. Hartin, Region IV .

Resident inspectors CPSES (3) t l

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