PLA-6266, Proposed License Amendment No. 285 for Unit 1, License No. NPF-14 & Proposed License Amendment No. 253 for Unit 2, License No. NPF-22, Extended Power Uprate Application Regarding Change to Technical Specification SR 3.7.1 - RHRSW and UHS
| ML072480182 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/2007 |
| From: | Mckinney B Susquehanna |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| PLA-6266 SR 3.7.1 | |
| Download: ML072480182 (53) | |
Text
Britt T. McKinney PPL Susquehanna, LLC Sr. Vice President &Chief Nuclear Officer 769 Salem Boulevard I Berwick, PA 18603 '. 'ii.' -
Tel. 570.542.3149 Fax 570.542.1504 btmckinney@pplweb.com AUG 2 8 2007 PP.'U.- -
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Stop OP 1-17 Washington, DC 20555 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 285 FOR UNIT 1 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-14 AND PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 253 FOR UNIT 2 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-22 EXTENDED POWER UPRATE APPLICATION REGARDING CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SR 3.7.1 -
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER (RHRSW) SYSTEM AND THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (UHS) Docket Nos. 50-387 PLA-6266 and 50-388
Reference:
- 1. PPL Letter PLA-60 76, B. T. McKinney (PPL)to USNRC, "ProposedLicense Amendment Numbers 285for Unit 1 OperatingLicense No. NPF-14 and 253for Unit 2 Operating License No. NPF-22 ConstantPressurePower Uprate,"dated October 11, 2006.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, PPL Susquehanna LLC (PPL) requested in the above Reference 1 approval of amendments to the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES)
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operating Licenses and Technical Specifications (TS) to increase the maximum power level authorized from 3489 megawatts thermal (MWt) to 3952 MWt, an approximate 13% increase in thermal power. The proposed Constant Pressure Power Uprate (CPPU) represents an increase of approximately 20% above the Original Licensed Thermal Power (OLTP).
The purpose of this letter is to revise the proposed change to Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1 contained in Reference 1 based on discussions held with the NRC staff on August 23, 2007.
Awl
Document Control Desk PLA-6266 contains the basis for the revision to TS 3.7.1. Enclosure 2 contains the marked-up Technical Specification pages for Section 3.7.1 for Units 1 & 2, which supersede those pages that were transmitted in Reference 1. Enclosure 3 contains the revised marked-up Technical Specification Bases pages for Section B3.7.1 for Units 1 & 2 that are provided for information.
There are no new regulatory commitments associated with this submittal.
PPL has reviewed the "No Significant Hazards Consideration" and the "Environmental Consideration" submitted with Reference 1 relative to the Attachments. We have determined that there are no changes required to the "Environmental Consideration" of the "No Significant Hazards Consideration".
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Michael H. Crowthers at (610) 774-7766.
I declare under perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on: __'__r,07 B. T. McKinney - TS 3.7.1 Revision Basis - Revised Technical Specification Pages for Section 3.3.1.1 Units 1 & 2 (Mark-ups) - Revised Technical Specification Bases Pages for Section B3.3.1.1 Units 1 & 2 (Mark-ups - For Information Only) - TS 3.7.1 Implementation Table Copy: NRC Region I Mr. R. V. Guzman, NRC Sr. Project Manager Mr. R. R. Janati, DEP/BRP Mr. F. W. Jaxheimer, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector to PLA-6266 TS 3.7.1 Revision Basis
Enclosure 1 to PLA 6266 Page 1 of 7 Proposed Revision
Description:
Based on discussions with NRC staff on August 23, 2007, it was agreed that the proposed changes to TS 3.7.1 provided in Reference 1 would be revised. The TS 3.7.1 proposed changes with the revision is provided in Enclosure 2.
The revision adds the following new Required Action (RA).
"Establish an open flow path to the UHS."
The proposed Completion Time (CT) is 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> (from entry into Condition "A").
A double bubble on the markup pages provided in Enclosure 2 surrounds the added RA and CT. to this Enclosure demonstrates sufficient spray capacity is provided when in the applicable LCO 3.7.1 Condition "A" configurations.
Proposed Revision Basis:
The proposed changes to TS 3.7.1 impact three systems. These systems are:
- 3. Emergency Service Water The Emergency Service Water (ESW) system cools safety related equipment. The pumps automatically start when the associated diesel generator receives a start signal.
The Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) system is manually placed in service to support heat removal from the associated RHR heat exchanger. The ESW and RHRSW systems share the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) as a water source and the return piping that includes the large spray array, small spray array, and the spray array bypass header. The normal lineup has all pumps shutdown with the return path aligned through the spray array bypass header. The motor operated spray array bypass valve is normally open. It receives an open signal on any pump start and when the last pump is shut down.
The large and small spray array valves are manually opened and receive a close signal when the last pump is shut down. Operation of the large spray array, small spray array, and bypass valves are directed by plant operating procedures to maintain the UHS temperature based on meteorological and plant conditions.
These systems are considered OPERABLE when they are determined to be capable of perforning their specified safety functions. For a given TS condition, completion times (CT) are specified in the TS to limit the time that the Condition exists. A 72-hour
Enclosure 1 to PLA 6266 Page 2 of 7 completion time is applicable when the remaining OPERABLE equipment is capable of performing its specified safety function. A 72-hour completion time is assigned to the proposed Condition "A" changes because the RHRSW and UHS, when in that condition, are capable of performing their specified safety function. The revision proposed herein to add the new RA provides assurance that the plant will be in a configuration that supports the 72-hour completion time.
Addition of the proposed RA provides a TS action to establish a flow path for the ESW system and establish a flow path for RHRSW that otherwise would not be required by the TS's as proposed in Reference 1. This action maintains the plant configuration such that it is in a configuration that is capable of mitigating the consequences of an accident consistent with the design basis analysis presented in Reference 1. Once this RA is taken, ESW can be considered OPERABLE since it requires a flow path capable of returning flow to the UHS, and the UHS can be considered OPERABLE since it has sufficient spray capacity.
The design basis analysis for the UHS demonstrating existing spray capacity is summarized in Reference 1, Attachment 4, Section 4.5.1. The figures that follow the below discussion of the analysis depict the flow paths that are assumed for the UHS design base analysis. These analyses demonstrate the UHS has sufficient spray capacity.
The Minimum Heat Transfer Cases assume meteorological conditions that maximize peak pond temperature. The Maximum Water Loss Case assumes meteorological data that maximizes water loss.
For all cases, a LOCA and simultaneous shutdown of the other unit is assumed. A loss of offsite power to both units is also assumed. UHS temperature is maintained below the 97°F UHS design maximum temperature for the entire 30-day transient for all cases. In addition, all cases demonstrate that adequate UHS inventory exists to provide cooling for 30 days without makeup.
Enclosure 1 to PLA 6266 Page 3 of 7 Minimum Heat Transfer Analysis Motor Operated Bypass Valve Inoperable Case For this case, a motor operated bypass valve is assumed to be inoperable in the open position in one UHS return loop ("affected" loop). Heat is rejected to the UHS through both bypass lines at the beginning of the transient. On the unaffected loop, from the control room, the large spray array valve is opened and the motor operated bypass valve is closed at 10 minutes to establish spray cooling. On the affected loop, flow continues through the bypass line for three hours. At three hours, the large spray array valve on the affected loop is opened and the manual bypass valve is closed to establish spray cooling.
Spray cooling using the two large spray arrays continues for the balance of the transient.
Minimum Heat Transfer Analysis Bypass Valve Inoperable Case Peak UHS Temperature = 95.1 F at 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> Bypass Large Array A (B) Loop (Unaffected)
Close manual bypass valve Bypass Bypass I Large Array B (A) Loop (Affected)
I I 0 10 Min 3 Hrs Time
Enclosure I to PLA 6266 Page 4 of 7 Minimum Heat Transfer Analysis Large Spray Array Valve Inoperable Case For this case, a large spray array valve is assumed to be inoperable in the closed position
("affected" loop). Heat is rejected to the UHS through both bypass lines at the beginning of the transient. On the unaffected loop, the large spray array valve is opened and the motor operated bypass valve is closed at 10 minutes to establish spray cooling. On the affected loop, flow continues through the bypass line for three hours. At three hours, RHRSW and ESW flow are reduced on the affected loop, the small spray array valve is opened and the motor operated bypass valve is closed to establish spray cooling. Spray cooling using a large spray array on one loop and a small spray array on the other loop continues for the balance of the transient.
Minimum Heat Transfer Analysis Large Spray Array Valve Inoperable Case Peak UHS Temperature = 95.5 0 F at 44 hours5.092593e-4 days <br />0.0122 hours <br />7.275132e-5 weeks <br />1.6742e-5 months <br /> Bypass Large Array A (B) Loop (Unaffected)
Reduce RHRSW and ESW flow Bypass Bypass I Small Array B (A) Loop (Affected) 10 Mm3r 0 10 Min 3 Hrs Time
Enclosure 1 to PLA 6266 Page 5 of 7 Minimum Heat Transfer Analysis One Loon Inooerable Case For this case, an entire loop of RHRSW and ESW is assumed to be inoperable ("affected" loop). No flow is assumed to exist in the affected loop for the entire transient. On the unaffected loop, heat is rejected to the UHS through the bypass line at the beginning of the transient. At 10 minutes, the large spray array valve is opened and the motor operated bypass valve is closed to establish spray cooling. Spray cooling using the large spray array continues until the small spray array valve is opened in order to conserve water inventory. Spray operation continues using both spray arrays in the same loop for the balance of the transient.
Minimum Heat Transfer Analysis One Loop Inoperable Case Peak UHS Temperature = 95.80 F at 45 hours5.208333e-4 days <br />0.0125 hours <br />7.440476e-5 weeks <br />1.71225e-5 months <br /> Large Army and Small Array (for inventory Bypass Large Array conservation)
A (B) Loop (Unaffected)
No flow B (A) Loop (Affected-Inoperable) 0 10 Min -4.5 days Time
Enclosure 1 to PLA 6266 Page 6 of 7 Maximum Water Loss Case All equipment is assumed to be OPERABLE for this case. Heat is rejected to the UHS through both bypass lines at the beginning of the transient. At 10 minutes, the large spray array valves are opened and the motor operated bypass valves are closed to establish spray cooling on both loops. Spray operation continues on both loops using the large spray arrays until actions are taken to reduce spray evaporation and drift losses. These actions involve the use of the small spray array on one loop (in addition to the large spray array) and the use of the bypass line on the other loop (no sprays). Under worst case conditions, these actions will take place in approximately 3 days. Operation will continue in this configuration for the balance of the transient.
Maximum Water Loss Case Peak UHS Temperature = 66.7°F at 7 days 3 hrs Remaining Inventory = 0.97E+6 Gallons at 30 Days Bypass Large Array Bypass (for inventory conservation)
A Loop Large Army Bypass Large Array and Small Array (for inventory conservation)
B Loop 0 10 Min 3 Days Time Operating Procedures:
All operator actions assumed in the analysis discussed above are defined in operating procedures. The new action to close the manual bypass header valve has no impact on existing action times. The ESW system is automatically started and the RHRSW system is manually initiated from the control room.
Enclosure I to PLA 6266 Page 7 of 7 The ESW System operating procedure has a precaution to ensure a return flow path to the UHS through the bypass header, large spray array and/or small spray array when an ESW pump is started.
Specific procedural direction is provided in the RHRSW operating procedures to address the possible UHS return path configurations since a return path established through a large spray array can accommodate the maximum loop flow from ESW and RHRSW system operation, but the small spray array can only accommodate the flow from the ESW loop and one RHRSW subsystem (1 pump) at maximum flow.
The RHRSW System operating procedure ensures a return path is open to the UHS through the bypass header, large spray array and/or small spray array when the pumps are being started. The procedure has a table that identifies the applicable flow rates as a function of the available UHS return path.
The emergency plan provides direction to monitor UHS conditions and utilize UHS spray capacity to maintain water level and water temperature within limits accounting for actual meteorological and system configurations.
==
Conclusion:==
This analysis for the UHS described above demonstrates that sufficient spray capacity is provided when in LCO 3.7.1 Condition "A" with a UHS return loop that has an inoperable or a combination of inoperable flow path valves. Attachment 1 provides in a tabular format an evaluation of the various plant configurations of the proposed TS 3.7.1 Condition "A" demonstrating acceptability and consistency with the design basis analysis. As a result, the proposed TS changes delineated in Enclosure 2 are acceptable.
Attachment 1 to PLA-6266 TS 3.7.1 Implementation Table
Attachment 1 to PLA-6266 Page 1 of 5 X = Inoperable Not all possible actions for all possible configurations are discussed in the last column.
Case A L A Sm A B LG B Sm B B Applicable Condition Possible actions to No. Array Array Manual Array Array Bypass Manual Iand CT establish open flow Valve Valve Bypass Valve Valve Bypass path in affected loop.
X [ [Condition A - Assuming the large
- Declare the U1 and and small spray array U2 A RHRSW valves are failed in the subsystems closed position, the inoperable. bypass valve, which is normally open, would
- Completion Time is need to be de-72 hours, since energized in the open adequate cooling position within 8 capability exists via hours. With the large spray arrays in the or small spray array unaffected loop.
valves failed in the open position, the large or small spray array valves could be de-energized in the open position to meet this required action.
1.1- W-- - W W tLCO 3.0.3 inboth units would be entered Not relevant.
since no condition in the TS to address this configuration.
D-- K][----] W [II ] W i l] [111] W Same as 1. Assuming the large spray array and bypass valves are failed in the closed position, the small spray array valve would be opened and de-energized within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. With the large spray array or bypass valve failed in the open position, the large spray array or bypass valve could be de-energized in the open position to meet this required action.
Attachment 1 to PLA-6266 Page 2 of 5 Case A LG ASmI A A B LG B Sm B B Applicable Condition Possible actions to INo.I Array Array Bypas Manual Array Array Bypass Manual [and CT establish open flow Valve Valve Bypass Valve Valve Bypass path in affected loop.
Fny1ss x ISame as I Assuming the large spray array and manual bypass valves are failed in the closed position, the small spray array valve would be opened and de-energized within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. With the large spray array valve failed in the open position, the large spray array valve could be de-energized in the open position.
- W-------W W 1-'--
W -II WSameasl aIs Assuming the small spray array and bypass valves are failed in the closed position; the large spray array valve would be opened and de-energized within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. With the small array valve and bypass valve failed open, the small spray array or bypass valves could be de-energized in the open position to meet this required action.
[--*
--l -l[ ---IIlT -ix 1 -- -- 1 II I Same asl-. Assuming the small spray array and bypass valves are failed in the closed position, the large spray array valve would need to be opened and de-energized within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. With the small array valve failed in the open position, the small spray array valve could be de-energized in the open position to meet this required action.
Attachment 1 to PLA-6266 Page 3 of 5 Case A LG ASmj A A B LG B Sm B B Applicable Condition Possible actions to
[o. Array Array Ba Manual Array Array Manual and CT establish open flow Valve Valve Bypass Valve Valve Bypass path in affected loop.
WF 7 *WSameas W I Assuming the bypass valves are failed in the closed position, the large and/or small array valves would be opened and de-energized within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. With the valves failed in the open position, the motor operated bypass valve could be de-energized to meet this required action.
F6.1 W- ll W 11111W xLII I LCO 3.0.3 in both units would be entered Not relevant.
since no condition in the TS to address this configuration.
Same as 1. Assuming the valves are failed closed, one of the affected valves would need to be opened and de-energized to meet the required action.
71W-]- LI IIW W W II II1 LCO 3.0.3 in both Not relevant.
units would be entered since no condition in the TS to address this configuration.
W-[-- WV* WI W W I W 11111 IW Same as 1. Assuming the valves are failed closed, one of the affected valves would need to be opened and de-energized to meet the required action.
L L--- W- W W I ] WIll] W IKSameas1. Assuming the large spray array and bypass valves are failed in the closed position, the small array valve would need to be opened and de-energized within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
Attachment 1 to PLA-6266 Page 4 of 5 Case A LG A Sm A A B LG B Sm IB B Applicable Condition Possible actions to No. Array Array Byasmanual Array Array ByasManual Iand CT establish open flow Valve Valve Bypass Valve Valve Bypass path in affected loop.
10 I x LSame as 1.iX Assuming the small spray array valve and bypass valves are failed in the closed position, the large array valve would need to be opened and de-energized within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
1____
11- -[-*1II x I LCO 3.0.3 in both Not relevant.
units would be entered since no condition in the TS to address this configuration.
F12 Zj-ISame as 1. Assuming the large array valve is failed in the closed position, the bypass line which is normally open, would need to be de-energized in the open position within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
F13 Sameas . Assuming the small spray array valve is failed in the closed position, the bypass line which is normally open, would need to be de-energized in the open position within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
F14W Same as1.X Assuming the bypass valve is failed in the closed position, the large and/or small spray array valves would need to be opened and de-energized within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
Attachment 1 to PLA-6266 Page 5 of 5 Case A LG A Sm A A B LG B Sm B B Applicable Codtn Possible actions to
. Array Array Bsmanual Array Array IBypass M and CT establish open flow Valve Valve Bypass Valve Valve Bypass path in affected loop.
-15 ISameas W 1. Assuming the bypass valve is failed in the closed position, the large and/or small spray array valves would need to be opened and de-energized in the open position within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
Enclosure 2 to PLA-6266 Revised Technical Specification Pages for Section 3.7.1 Units 1 & 2 (Mark-ups)
RHRSW System and UHS 3.7.1 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)
LCO 3.7.1 Two RHRSW subsystems and the UHS shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS Enter applic-ble Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown," for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by RHRSW System.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. - ----------. NOTE -............- A.1 Declare the associated Immediately Separate Condition entry is RHRSW subsystems allowed for each valve. inonn~rable ANDA3)
One valve in Table 3.7.1-1 inoperable. A(D)VRestore the inoperable valve(s) 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> from an the of to OPERABLE status. discovery OR, inoperable RHRSW subsystem in the One valve in Table 3.7.1-2 opposite loop from the inoperable. inoperable valve(s) 2-V5 4UI~SA cr, pý,-l AND 79 hn.-ir TS I3.7-1
- UNIT 1 1SUSQUEHANNA 7j 'Ie
RHRSW System and UHS 3.7.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.1.1 Verify the water level is greater than or equal to 678 feet 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 1 inch above Mean Sea Level.
SR 3.7.1.2 Verify the average water temperature of the UHS is: 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a.-- NOTE-.-.-.........-
Only applicable with both units in MODE 1 or 2, or with either unit in MODE 3 for less than twelve (12) hours.
< 85oF; or
- b. ------------------ NOTE- -.---..........-----------
Only applicable when either unit has been in MODE 3 for at least twelve (12) hours but not more than twenty-four (24) hours.
< 87oF; or c .------ ------------NO T E - - - - - -..-.--.-...... .....
Only applicable when either unit has been in MODE 3 for at least twenty-four (24) hours.
< 88oF SR 3.7.1.3 Verify each RHRSW manual, power operated, and 31 days automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / 3.7-3 n en 5A Ilse, 7-]A
Insert 3.7-3A SR 3.7.1.4 Verify that valves HV-01222A and B (the spray array 92 days bypass valves) close upon receipt of a closing signal and open upon receipt of an opening signal.
SR 3.7.1.5 Verify that valves HV-01224A1 and B1 (the large spray 92 days array valves) close upon receipt of a closing signal and open upon receipt of an opening signal.
SR 3.7.1.6 Verify that valves HV-01 224A2 and B2 (the small spray 92 days array valves) close upon receipt of a closing signal and open upon receipt of an opening signal.
SR 3.7.1.7 Verify that valves 01 2287A and 01 2287B (the spray array 92 days bypass manual valves) are capable of being opened and closed.
RHRSW System and UHS 3.7.1 TABLE 3.7.1-1 Ultimate Heat Sink Sprayýýrray Valves VALVE NUMBER VALVE DESCRIPTION HV-01224A1 Loop A large spray array valve HV-01224B1 Loop B large spray array valve 1 -~
SUSQUEHANNA -UNIT 1 TS / 3.7-3a
RHRSW System and UHS 3.7.1 TABLE 3.7.1 4 Ultimate Heat Sink Spray Bypass Valves I
VALVE NUMBER VALVE DESCRIPTION HV-01222A Loop A spray array bypass valve HV-01222B Loop B spray array bypass valve SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS /3.7-3 b en 4 t2
RHRSW System and UHS 3.7.1 TABLE 3.7.
Ultimate Heat Sink Spray Bypass Valves VALVE NUMBER VALVE DESCRIPTION HV-01222A Loop A spray array bypass valve HV-01222B Loop B spray array bypass valve SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / 3.7-3 b en t2
Insert 3.7-3bA TABLE 3.7.1-3 Ultimate Heat Sink Spray Array Bypass Manual Valves VALVE NUMBER VALVE DESCRIPTION 012287A Loop A spray array bypass manual valve 012287B Loop B spray array bypass manual valve
PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS 3.7.1 3,7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)
LCO 3.7.1 Two RHRSW subsystems and the UHS shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS
NOTE---...
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown," for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by RHRSW System.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ------ NOTE------ A.1 Declare the associated Immediately Separate Condition entry is RHRSW subsystems allowed for each valve. inoperable.
One valve in Table 3.7.1-1 inoperable.
OR AND One valve in Table 3.7.1-2 A. A Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status.
8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> from the inoperable. discovery of an inoperable RHRSW subsystem in the opposite loop from the inoperable valve(s)
AND 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />
- USQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / 3.7-1 dn9 nt 1)(,
% Am 7801
PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS 3.7.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.1.1 Verify the water level is greater than or equal to 678 feet 1 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> inch above Mean Sea Level.
SR 3.7.1.2 Verify the average water "Lemperature of the UHS is: 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a.NO E. . . .. . . . .. . . .
Only applicable with both units in MODE 1 or 2, or with either unit in MODE 3 for less than twelve (12) hours.
< 85°F; or
- b. .. - ------.---------- NOTE--------------- -...... .----
Only applicable when either unit has been in MODE 3 for at least twelve (12) hours but not more than twenty-four (24) hours.
< 87oF; or
- c. NOT-Only applicable when either unit has been in MODE 3 for at least twenty-four (24) hours.
< 88oF.
SR 3.7.1.3 Verify each RHRSW manual, power operated, and 31 days automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / 3.7-3 Am dine Jrse ?.2-M
Insert 3.7-3A SR 3.7.1.4 Verify that valves HV-01222A and B (the spray array 92 days bypass valves) close upon receipt of a closing signal and open upon receipt of an opening signal.
SR 3.7.1.5 Verify that valves HV-01224A1 and B1 (the large spray 92 days array valves) close upon receipt of a closing signal and open upon receipt of an opening signal.
SR 3.7.1.6 Verify that valves HV-01224A2 and B2 (the small spray 92 days array valves) close upon receipt of a closing signal and open upon receipt of an opening signal.
SR 3.7.1.7 Verify that valves 012287A and 012287B (the spray array 92 days bypass manual valves) are capable of being opened and closed.
PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS 3.7.1 TABLE 3.7.1-1 A Ultimate Heat Sink SprayCý -Array Valves VALVE NUMBER VALVE DESCRIPTION HV-01224A1 Loop A large spray array valve HV-01224B1 Loop B large spray array valve
'I/'-O/.Z2 A-'14 2"4",/: ""/*
f/V-cr?^, mL4*L 5 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / 3.7-3a en
. e t1 (Y
PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System AND UHS 3.7.1 TABLE 3.7.1-2 (PAGE 1 OFF 1) A-'f' %
Ultimate Heat Sink Spra yypass Valvess VALVE NUMBER VALVE DESCRIPTION HV-01222A Loop A spray array bypass valve HV-01222B Loop B spray array bypass valve SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / 3.7-3b
Insert 3.7-3bA TABLE 3.7.1-3 Ultimate Heat Sink Spray Array Bypass Manual Valves VALVE NUMBER VALVE DESCRIPTION 012287A Loop A spray array bypass manual valve 012287B Loop B spray array bypass manual valve
Enclosure 3 to PLA-6266 Revised Technical Specification Bases Pages for Section B3.7.1 Units 1 & 2 (Mark-ups - For Information Only)
PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)
BASES BACKGROUND The RHRSW System is designed to provide cooling water for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System heat exchangers, required for a safe reactor shutdown following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. The RHRSW System is operated whenever the RHR heat exchangers are required to operate in the shutdown cooling mode or in the suppression pool cooling or spray mode of the RHR System.
The RHRSW System consists of two independent and redundant subsystems. Each subsystem is made up of a header, one pump, a suction source, valves, piping, heat exchanger, and associated instrumentation. Either of the two subsystems is capable of providing the required cooling capacity to maintain safe shutdown conditions. The two subsystems are separated so that failure of one subsystem will not affect the OPERABILITY of the other subsystem. One Unit 1 RHRSW subsystem and the associated (same division) Unit 2 RHRSW subsystem constitute a single RHRSW loop. The two RHRSW pumps in a loop can each, independently, be aligned to either Unit's heat exchanger. The RHRSW System is designed with sufficient redundancy so that no single active component failure can prevent it from achieving its design function.
The RHRSW System is described in the FSAR, Section 9.2.6, Reference 1.
Cooling water is pumped by the RHRSW pumps from the UHS through the tube side of the RHR heat exchangers. After removing heat from the RHRSW heat exchanger, the water is discharged to the spray pond (UHS) by way of the UHS return loops. The UHS return loops direct the return flow to a network of sprays that dissieate the heat to the atmosphere or directly to the UHS via a bypass The system is initiated manually from the control room . he system can
- e the LCA signal is manually overridden or clears*./
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.7-1 (/R D
PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 BASES BACKGROUND The ultimate heat sink (UHS) system is composed of a 350,000 cubic foot (continued) spray pond and associated piping and spray risers. Each UHS return loop contains a bypass line, a large spray array and a small spray array. The purpose of the UHS is to provide both a suction source of water and a return path for the RHRSW and ESW systems. The function of the UHS is to provide water to the RHRSW and ESW systems at a temperature less than the 970 F design temperature of the RHRSW and ESW systems.
UHS temperature is maintained less than the design temperature by introducing the hot return fluid from the RHRSW and ESW systems into the spray loops and relying on spray cooling to maintain temperature. The UHS is designed to supply the RHRSW and ESW systems with all the cooling capacity required during a combination LOCA/LOOP for thirty days without fluid addition. The UHS is described in the FSAR, Section 9.2.7 (Reference 1).
APPLICABLE The RHRSW System removes heat from the suppression pool to limit the SAFETY suppression pool temperature and primary containment pressure following ANALYSES a ,LOCA. This ensures that the primary containment can perform its function of limiting the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a LOCA. The ability of the RHRSW System to support long term cooling of the reactor or primary containment is discussed in the FSAR, Chapters 6 and 15 (Refs. 2 and 3, respectively). These analyses explicitly assume that the RHRSW System will provide adequate cooling support to the equipment required for safe shutdown. These analyses include the evaluation of the long term primary containment response after a design basis LOCA.
_pray rybzzle Ieessur6s on thk affecto'd loopAs discussed in the AR, Section 6.2.2 (Ref. 2) for these analayses, manual initiation of the OPERABLE RHRSW subsystem and the associated RHR System is %W I_A assame~to.*¢*,0.. ir4etes~afte ra-DBA .- 1n4his-aSe3"1e maximum suppression chamber water temperature and pressure are analyzed to be below the design temperature of 220°F and maximum allowable pressure of 53 psig.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.7-2 6ý;ýD
PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 BASES
/subsym and o*; ESW Vfop to the rVHS. The mall spray /trrays do meeyt *e1CF 0.36 cr't eda for in 6sion into te Technicl /
Spe fications nd are *t include. As a res t, no credit's taken frI ex gtenceo salpray a rr ys. /*
The RHRSW System, together with the U , satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (Ref. 4)
LCO Two RHRSW subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads, assuming the worst case single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.
An RHRSW subsystem is considered OPERABLE when:
- a. One pump is OPERABLE; and
- b. An OPERABLE flow path is capable of taking suction from the UHS and transferring the water to the RHR heat exchanger and returning it to the UHS at the assumed flow rate, and
The OPERABILITY of the UHS is based on having a minimum water level at the overflow weir of 678 feet 1 inch above mean sea level and a maximum water temperature of 85 0 F; unless either unit is in MODE 3. If a unit enters MODE 3, the time of entrance into this condition determines the appropriate maximum ultimate heat sink fluid temperature. If the earliest unit to enter MODE 3 has been in that condition for less than twelve (12) hours, the peak temperature to maintain OPERABILITY of the ultimate heat sink remains at 85 0 F. If either unit has been in MODE 3 for more than twelve (12) hours but less than twenty-four (24) hours, the OPERABILITY temperature of the ultimate heat sink becomes 87°F. If either unit has been in MODE 3 for twenty-four (24) hours or more, the OPERABILITY temperature of the ultimate heat sink becomes 88 0 F.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.7-3
Insert B 3.7-3A The UHS design takes into account the cooling efficiency of the spray arrays and the evaporation losses during design basis environmental conditions. The spray array bypass header provides the flow path for the ESW and RHRSW system to keep the spray array headers from freezing. The small and/or large spray arrays are placed in service to dissipate heat returning from the plant. The UHS return header is comprised of the spray array bypass header, the large spray array, and the small spray array.
The spray array bypass header is capable of passing full flow from the RHRSW and ESW systems in each loop. The large spray array is capable of passing full flow from the RHRSW and ESW systems in each loop. The small spray array supports heat dissipation when low system flows are required.
For Information Only PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 LCO In addition, the OPERABILITY of the UHS is based on having sufficient (continued) pray capacity in the UHSxreturn IoopsQt(eig-5-i
<,ýt._e-upby-th Suffiijie t spray capacity is
-e=R-SW-andE.W-;systems:'
-definedas one large spray. arrayg tefe aeý ssia n This OPERABILITY definition is supported by analysis and evaluations performed in accordance with the guidance given in Regulatory Guide 1.27.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the RHRSW System and the UHS are required to be OPERABLE to support the OPERABILITY of the RHR System for primary containment cooling (LCO 3.6.2.3, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Suppression Pool Cooling," and LCO 3.6.2.4, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray") and decay heat removal (LCO 3.4.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown"). The Applicability is therefore consistent with the requirements of these systems.
In MODES 4 and 5, the OPERABILITY requirements of the RHRSW System are determined by the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem(s) it supports (LCO 3.4.9, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown"; LCO 3.9.7, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) -
High Water Level"; and LCO 3.9.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Water Level").
In MODES 4 and 5, the OPERABILITY requirements of the UHS is determined by the systems it supports.
ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.4.8, be entered and Required Actions taken if the inoperable RHRSW subsystem results in inoperable RHR shutdown cooling (SDC) (i.e., both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHRSW pumps in a loop are inoperable resulting in the associated RHR SDC system being inoperable). This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 because the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.1 do not adequately compensate for the loss of RHR SDC Function (LCO 3.4.8).
Condition A is modified by a separate note to allow separate Condition entry for each valve. This is acceptable since the Required Action for this Condition provides appropriate compensatory actions.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.7-4 Revision 2
PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 ACTIONS (continued)
- .)The 72-hur compeo t ime sbsdo hT-ttaatog adequate UHS spray loop capability exists during this time period, both units are affected and an additional single failure results in a system configuration that will not meet design basis accident requirements.
If an additional RHRSW subsystem on either Unit is inoperable, cooling capacity less than the minimum required for response to a design basis event would exist. Therefore, an 8-hour Completion Time is appropriate.
The 8-hour Completion Time provides sufficient time to restore inoperable equipment and there is a low probability that a design basis event would occur during this period.
B._1 Required Action B. 1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if one Unit 1 RHRSW subsystem is inoperable. Although designated and operated as a unitized system, the associated Unit 2 subsystem is directly connected to a common header, which can supply the associated RHR heat exchanger in either unit. The Unit 2 subsystems are considered capable of supporting Unit 1 RHRSW subsystem when the Unit 2 subsystem is OPERABLE and can provide the assumed flow to the Unit 1 heat exchanger. A Completion time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, when one Unit 2 RHRSW subsystem is not capable of supporting the Unit 1 RHRSW subsystems, is allowed to restore the Unit 1 RHRSW subsystem to OPERABLE status. In this configuration, the remaining OPERABLE Unit 1 RHRSW subsystem is adequate to perform the RHRSW heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE RHRSW subsystem (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.7-5
Insert B 3.7-5A With one spray array loop bypass valve not capable of being closed on demand, the associated Unit I and Unit 2 RIRSW subsystems cannot use the spray cooling function of the affected UHS return loop. As a result, the associated RHRSW subsystem must be declared inoperable.
With one spray array loop bypass valve not capable ofb'eing opened on demanhe .
...iiat Ut I and U.nit '2...........
R-i
. t m's-a d-ESW-stbsyse-a.e-not-pr .fv.fdeda-r.t*,-.p - .IS,. As a result, the associated RHRSW subsystems an "SW
- must be declared inoperable.
With one spray array bypass manual valve not capable of being closed, the associated Unit I and Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems cannot use the spray cooling function of the affected UHS return path if the spray array bypass valve fails to close. As a result, the associated RHRSW subsystems must be declared inoperable.
With one spray array bypass manual valve not open,A h " " -14ni;t4-
- sandrW-subsystem~are-ot-pro*,,ided-ir-et-um-at-h-t ot-he-14HSt As i--,-a result, the associated RHRSW subsystems -md ESAN-snbsy*tc must be declared inoperable.
With one large spray array valve not capable of being opened on demand, the associated Unit I and Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems cannot use the full required spray cooling capability of the affected UHS return path. With one large spray array valve not capable of being closed on demand, the associated Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems cannot use the small spray array when loop flows are low as the required spray nozzle pressure is not achievable for the small spray array. As a result, the associated RHRSW subsystems must be declared inoperable.
With one small spray array valve not capable of being opened on demand, the associated Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems cannot use the spray cooling function of the affected UHS return path for low loop flow rates. For a single failure of the large spray array valve in the closed position, design bases LOCA/LOOP calculations assume that flow is reduced on the affected loop within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> after the event to allow use of the small spray array. With one small spray array valve not capable of being closed on demand, the associated Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems cannot use the large spray array for a flow path as the required nozzle pressure is not achievable for the large spray array. As a result, the associated RHRSW subsystems must be declared inoperable.
Insert B 3.7-5B With any UTHS return path valve listed in Tables 3.7.1-1, 3.7.1-2, or 3.7.1-3 inoperable, the UHS return path is no longer single failure proof.
Insert B 3.7-5C For combinations of inoperable valves in the same loop, the UHS spray capacity needed to support the OPERABILITY of the associated Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems is affected. As a result, the associated RHRSW subsystems must be declared inoperable.
The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> completion time to establish the flow path provides sufficient time to open a path and de-energize the appropriate valve in the open position.
For Information Only PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.1.3 (continued)
Verifying the correct alignment for each manual, power operated, and automatic valve in each RHRSW subsystem flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for RHRSW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be realigned to its accident position. This is acceptable because the RHRSW System is a manually initiated system.
This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.
The 31-day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.
SR 3.7.1.4 The UHS spray array bypass valves are required to actuate to the closed position for the UHS to perform its design function. These valves receive an automatic signal to open upon emergency service water (ESW) or residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) system pump start and are required to be operated from the control room or the remote shutdown panel. A spray bypass valve is considered to be inoperable when it cannot be closed on demand. Failure of the spray bypass valve to close on demand puts the UHS at risk to exceed its design temperature. The
(.Oc~vqsý 4,A"failure of the spray bypass valve to open on demand-is Ye--q, '4 the no aseteb*'aUeiop-e-'Eable.- This SIR*'
-orwould
- I_. o demonstrates that the valves will move to their required positions when V'010\ required. The 92-day Test Frequency is based upon engineering J -judgment and operating/testing history that indicates this frequency gives c', adequate assurance that the valves will move to their required positions e C hen required.
I/ (( ,§' *'\*S,
/SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.7-6b (continued)
Revision 0
)
PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The'rAfn, large spray array valves are required to open in order for the HS to perform its design function. These valves are manually actuated from either the control room or the remote shutdown panel, under station operating procedure, when the RHRSW system is required to remove energy from the reactor vessel or suppression pool.-A leF, demarrd,-'d~et*{3the,-vakl-m ust-be-o pened,-te-atlew-sp ray-ceetiej-to eecur.-- This SR demonstrates that the valves will move to their required positions when required. The 92-day Test Frequency is based upon engineering judgment and operating/testing history that indicates this frequency gives adequate assurance that the valves will move to their
- required positions when required.
REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 9.2.6.
- 2. FSAR, Chapter 6.
- 3. FSAR, Chapter 15.
- 4. Final Policy Statement on Technica I Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.7-6c (Y ý
Insert B 3.7-6cA SR 3.7.1.6 The small spray array valves HV-01221*4A2 and B2 are required to be-
-eb*e&in order for the UHS to perform its design function. These valves are manually actuated from the control room or the remote shutdown panel, under station operating procedure, when the RHRSW system is required to remove energy from the reactor vessel or suppression pool. A-sazLss 7aW affay-alve-is-'ern; side red,ineperable-ifit~carnrotb.exlosed-wher* =required-, e
.supportdesign-,lba-Sesxaaalyses-lineupsý-T-he,,small,,spray~array,.alver-has7.to=.
- ,apaeity. This SR demonstrates that the valves will move to their required -- '
positions when required. The 92-day Test Frequency is based upon engineering judgment and operating/testing history that indicates this frequency gives adequate assurance that the valves will move to their required positions when required.
-* The spray array bypass manual valves 01 2287A and B are required to-.3e c pe£v-*l9 Ied inthe event of a failure of the spray array bypass valves to close in
- order for the UHS to perform its design function. A w pi eas4h e-eeqsuiernel4n perasble-iis-net,,eafaSleSef-eingtsiesen.R-a-,.S t imel~y~man er-a~seseribede4imthe~design4bases-a nalysesý-3-heu*saffrorT.t~he, ti me~the,.spray-array'bypass,,valve,-fails-to-,clese--ad-t-thet.JHS-4tem.perature,.
.exeeeds,-the-requireme~ntsi m.SR,3R7,.4--.)-
PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)
BASES BACKGROUND The RHRSW System is designed to provide cooling water for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System heat exchangers, required for a safe reactor shutdown following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. The RHRSW System is operated whenever the RHR heat exchangers are required to operate in the shutdown cooling mode or in the suppression pool cooling or spray mode of the RHR System.
The RHRSW System consists of two independent and redundant subsystems. Each subsystem is made up of a header, one pump, a suction source, valves, piping, heat exchanger, and associated instrumentation. Either of the two subsystems is capable of providing the required cooling capacity to maintain safe shutdown conditions. The two subsystems are separated so that failure of one subsystem will not affect the OPERABILITY of the other subsystem. One Unit I RHRSW subsystem and the associated (same division) Unit 2 RHRSW subsystem constitute a single RHRSW loop. The two RHRSW pumps in a loop can each, independently, be aligned to either Unit's heat exchanger. The RHRSW System is designed with sufficient redundancy so that no single active component failure can prevent it from achieving its design function.
The RHRSW System is described in the FSAR, Section 9.2.6, Reference 1.
Cooling water is pumped by the RHRSW pumps from the UHS through the tube side of the RHR heat exchangers. After removing heat from the RHRSW heat exchanger, the water is discharged to the spray pond (UHS) by way of the UHS return loops. The UHS return loops direct the return flow to a network of sprays that ate the heat to the atmosphere or directly to the Ui-S via a bypass~tý The system is initiated manually from the control room The system can be started any time the LOCA signal is manually overridden or clears.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.7-1
PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 BASES (continued)
BACKGROUND The ultimate heat sink (UHS) system is composed of a 350,000 cubic foot (continued) spray pond and associated piping and spray risers. Each UHS return loop contains a bypass line, a large spray array and a small spray array. The purpose of the UHS is to provide both a suction source of water and a return path for the RHRSW and ESW systems. The function of the UHS is to provide water to the RHRSW and ESW systems at a temperature less than the 97oF design temperature of the RHRSW and ESW systems. UHS temperature is maintained less than the design temperature by introducing the hot return fluid from the RHRSW and ESW systems into the spray loops and relying on spray cooling to maintain temperature. The UHS is designed to supply the RHRSW and ESW systems with all the cooling capacity required during a combination LOCAILOOP for thirty days without fluid addition. The UHS is described in the FSAR, Section 9.2.7 (Reference 1).
APPLICABLE The RHRSW System removes heat from the suppression pool to limit the SAFETY suppression pool temperature and primary containment pressure following a ANALYSES LOCA. This ensures that the primary containment can perform its function of limiting the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a LOCA. The ability of the RHRSW System to support long term cooling of the reactor or primary containment is discussed in the FSAR, Chapters 6 and 15 (Refs. 2 and 3, respectively). These analyses explicitly assume that the RHRSW System will provide adequate cooling support to the equipment required for safe shutdown. These analyses include the evaluation of the long term primary containment response after a design basis LOCA.
The safety analyses for long term cooling were performed for various V" combinations of RHR Snthem failureste he worst case single failurLhat would affePRA e performance of th eRSW Systed is any fs6r-that aprray bypass "would disble one UHS retumW~p. Te failure of the valsprso close resul in thw ability of one UHS retur edop to perform its results in inadequatet,,
Slegign function becaus ailure of this valve to cI "sra c.az medoz~zlenre-pressu~sonI'heafctdlo.
r3 mnutesat hiSW . aSey finth-e sAdiscussed m axiuFSAR.
Section .. 2(e.Ztor tese anays, m'anual initiation o~f the OPERABLE RHRSW subsystem and the associated RHR System IS*
- -o ac L-0 0:" g g~ fe . r_aD B,* = %wetse- e maxim um suppression chamber water temperature and pressure are analyzed to be below the design temperature of 220oF and maximum allowable pressure of 53 psig.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.7-2
PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS
- "rA,- 3--A- B3.7.1 BASES (continued),, 4 APPLICABLE The failure of the I e spray array valve to op n demand is of less SAFETY consequence t the failure of the spray ay bypass valve beca the ANALYSES small spray ay is still available. Tw mall spray arrays have e same (continued) capacity d can perform the sa unction as a single larg pray array.
Eah~fall array car, effectiviet ischarge the output of RHRSW -
suytr n n.EWI oteUS h m ray arrays do not eet te CF5.3 i,,afr nluin no echnical Specifications an ar o nld.A esln rdti nfr te existence of thej The RHRSW System, together with the UHS, satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (ReL. 4)
LCO Two RHRSW subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads, assuming the worst case single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.
An RHRSW subsystem is considered OPERABLE when:
- a. One pump is OPERABLE; and
- b. An OPERABLE flow path is capable of taking suction from the UHS and transferring the water to the RHR heat exchanger and returning it to the UHS at the assumed flow rate, and
The OPERABILITY of the UHS is based on having a minimum water level at the overflow weir of 678 feet 1 inch above mean sea level and a maximum water temperature of 85 0 F; unless either unit is in MODE 3. If a unit enters MODE 3, the time of entrance into this condition determines the appropriate maximum ultimate heat sink fluid temperature. If the earliest unit to enter MODE 3 has been in that condition for less than twelve (12) hours, the peak temperature to maintain OPERABILITY of the ultimate heat sink remains at 85 0 F. If either unit has been in MODE 3 for more than twelve (12) hours but less than twenty-four (24) hours, the OPERABILITY temperature of the ultimate heat sink becomes 87 0F. If either unit has been in MODE 3 for twenty-four (24) hours or more, the OPERABILITY temperature of the ultimate heat sink becomes 88 0F.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.7-3
Insert B 3.7-3A The UHS design takes into account the cooling efficiency of the spray arrays and the evaporation losses during design basis environmental conditions. The spray array bypass header provides the flow path for the ESW and RHRSW system to keep the spray array headers from freezing. The small and/or large spray arrays are placed in service to dissipate heat returning from the plant. The UHS return header is comprised of the spray array bypass header, the large spray array, and the small spray array.
The spray array bypass header is capable of passing full flow from the RHRSW and ESW systems in each loop. The large spray array is capable of passing full flow from the RHRSW and ESW systems in each loop. The small spray array supports heat dissipation when low system flows are required.
For Information Only 2
PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 BASES (continued) GIZThe LCO In addition, the OPERABILITY of the UHS is based on having sufficient (continued) spray capacity in the UHS return Ioopset4 ffeetiveýd pate4te-heat picý.4, he1-RS-*and-E-*SW-ygste~ms Sufficient spray capacity is defined as one large pray array availblc fer ,,e-t Jdis',-Ntoni This OPERABILITY definition is supported by analysis and evaluations performed in accordance with the guidance given in Regulatory Guide 1.27.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the RHRSW System and the UHS are required to be OPERABLE to support the OPERABILITY of the RHR System for primary containment cooling (LCO 3.6.2.3, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Suppression Pool Cooling," and LCO 3.6.2.4, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray") and decay heat removal (LCO 3.4.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown"). The Applicability is therefore consistent with the requirements of these systems.
In MODES 4 and 5, the OPERABILITY requirements of the RHRSW System are determined by the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem(s) it supports (LCO 3.4.9, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown"; LCO 3.9.7, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) -
High Water Level"; and LCO 3.9.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Water Level").
In MODES 4 and 5, the OPERABILITY requirements of the UHS is determined by the systems it supports.
ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.4.8, be entered and Required Actions taken if the inoperable RHRSW subsystem results in inoperable RHR shutdown cooling (SDC) (i.e., both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHRSW pumps in a loop are inoperable resulting in the associated RHR SDC system being inoperable). This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 because the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.1 do not adequately compensate for the loss of RHR SDC Function (LCO 3.4.8).
Condition A is modified by a separate note to allow separate Condition entry for each valve. This is acceptable since the Required Action for this Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.7-4 Revision 2
U -vC 1>
I PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 4'
'5* completion time is based on the fact that, although adequate UHS spray loop capability exists during this time period, both units are affected and an additional single failure results in a system configuration that will not meet design basis accident requirements.
If an additional RHRSW subsystem on either Unit is inoperable, cooling capacity less than the minimum required for response to a design basis event would exist. Therefore, an 8-hour Completion Time is appropriate.
The 8-hour Completion Time provides sufficient time to restore inoperable equipment and there is a low probability that a design basis event would occur during this period.
B.1 Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if one Unit 2 RHRSW subsystem is inoperable. Although designated and operated as a unitized system, the associated Unit 1 subsystem is directly connected to a common header which can supply the associated RHR heat exchanger in either unit. The Unit 1 subsystems are considered capable of supporting Unit 2 RHRSW subsystem when the Unit 1 subsystem is OPERABLE and can provide the assumed flow to the Unit 2 heat exchanger.
A Completion time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, when one Unit 1 RHRSW subsystem is not capable of supporting the Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems, is allowed to restore the Unit 2 RHRSW subsystem to OPERABLE status. In this configuration, the remaining OPERABLE Unit 2 RHRSW subsystem is adequate to perform the RHRSW heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE RHRSW subsystem (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.7-5 (aR/sin
Insert B 3.7-5A With one spray array loop bypass valve not capable of being closed on demand, the associated Unit I and Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems cannot use the spray cooling function of the affected UHS return loop. As a result, the associated RHRSW subsystem must be declared inoperable.
With one spray array loop bypass valve not capable of being op--effid o e*-emand, , 6--
ass o~ited,-~rfit-IarrdnU-ni t-,2-*R-bR,-&Wsubs yst ems-cantl*E.S Wx*suabsyste-mwar-e-znot-provvi ded-aý rtan ,path4, to,th iS. As a result, the associated RHRSW subsystems and-E-SW*
ie&yste-m- must be declared inoperable.
With one spray array bypass manual valve not capable of being closed, the associated Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems cannot use the spray cooling function of the affected UHS return path if the spray array bypass valve fails to close. As a result, the associated RHRSW subsystems must be declared inoperable.
With one spray array bypass manual valve not open, eted t 1 an- Uni--2 v-a
-~R-I-fSWityt- ded-as-;ati-.at-obhet-mIr. As a result, the associated RHRSW subsystems and&E&.W---bsys'tei-must be declared inoperable.
With one large spray array valve not capable of being opened on demand, the associated Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems cannot use the full required spray cooling capability of the affected UHS return path. With one large spray array valve not capable of being closed on demand, the associated Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems cannot use the small spray array when loop flows are low as the required spray nozzle pressure is not achievable for the small spray array. As a result, the associated RHRSW subsystems must be declared inoperable.
With one small spray array valve not capable of being opened on demand, the associated Unit I and Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems cannot use the spray cooling function of the affected UHS return path for low loop flow rates. For a single failure of the large spray array valve in the closed position, design bases LOCA/LOOP calculations assume that flow is reduced on the affected loop within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> after the event to allow use of the small spray array. With one small spray array valve not capable of being closed on demand, the associated Unit I and Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems cannot use the large spray array for a flow path as the required nozzle pressure is not achievable for the large spray array. As a result, the associated RHRSW subsystems must be declared inoperable.
Insert B 3.7-5B With any UHS return path valve listed in Tables 3.7.1-1, 3.7.1-2, or 3.7.1-3 inoperable, the UHS return path is no longer single failure proof.
Insert B 3.7-5C For combinations of inoperable valves in the same loop, the UHS spray capacity needed to support the OPERABILITY of the associated Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHRSW subsystems is affected. As a result, the associated RHRSW subsystems must be declared inoperable.
The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> completion time to establish the flow path provides sufficient time to open a path and de-energize the appropriate valve in the open position.
For A Information Only PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 BASES (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.1.3 (continued)
Verifying the correct alignment for each manual, power operated, and automatic valve in each RHRSW subsystem flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for RHRSW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be realigned to its accident position. This is acceptable because the RHRSW System is a manually initiated system.
This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.
The 31-day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.
SR 3.7.1.4 The UHS spray array bypass valves are required to actuate to the closed position for the UHS to perform its design function. These valves receive an automatic signal to open upon emergency service water (ESW) or residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) system pump start and are required to be operated from the control room or the remote shutdown panel. A spray bypass valve is considered to be inoperable when it
- cannot be closed on demand. Failure of the spray bypass valve to close on demand puts the UHS at risk to exceed its design temperature. The
- o, , failure of the spray bypass valve to open on demand t-1it-ýg-and-l therefo1'e,-wour¬-eause-the-4oopo.tGbe-inoperable. This SR
" e demonstratesst that the valves will move to their required positions when j 20Su-) required. The 92-day Test Frequency is based upon engineering
!/ k4 4.eJ judgement and operating/testing history that indicates this frequency gives
, e- adequate assurance that the valves will move to their required positions se " "when required.
- -A 'A*0 £ (continued)
Revision 0 TS/B3.7-6b TS / B 3.7-6b Revision 0
PPL Rev. 0 RHRSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 BASES (continued)
SURVEILLANCE U -
REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.1.5 (continued)
The r o large spray array valves are required to open in order for the UHS to perform its design functioni. These valves are manually actuated from either the cor i.rol room or the remote shutdown panel, under station operating procedure, when the RHRSW system is required to remove energy from the reactor vessel or suppression pool. A laFgc *pr'y -r:ay
\,al9vc il ccbegadcrd no fie-e c a eGa thea-ve- t-Ie-efedetew-spr*.e~eeli-te-eer. This SR demonstrates that the valves will move to their required positions when required. The 92-day Test Frequency is based upon engineering judgement and operating/testing history that indicates this frequency gives adequate assurance that the valves will move to their required positions when required.
rl-REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 9.2.6.
- 2. FSAR, Chapter 6.
- 3. FSAR, Chapter 15.
- 4. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
c-C SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.7-6c
<i;ýi) Isio
Insert B 3.7-6cA SR 3.7.1.6 The small spray array valves HV-0122/4A2 and B2 are required tobe-jetesed in order for the UHS to perform its design function. These valves are
' manually actuated from the control room or the remote shutdown panel, under station operating procedure, when the RHRSW system is required to remove energy from the reactor vessel or suppression pool. A eaII-SFey array-valve-isseonsidered-inoperable~ifit-aTiit-te`clsed-whenrrequire~d-to-suppo tdesi§Abases-analysesilinepps.-T-he-small-spray-array-valve-has-te-Ib-=,*=t -fer-the~arg ay-rra-to-lre-capable-of-desigbaes-eoel*Ae-Capacity. This SR demonstrates that the valves will move to their required positions when required. The 92-day Test Frequency is based upon engineering judgment and operating/testing history that indicates this frequency gives adequate assurance that the valves will move to their required positions when required.
SR 3.7.1.7 The spray array bypass manual valves 012287A and B are required to Ie-leeed in the event of a failure of the spray array bypass valves to close in
~ order for the UHS to perform its design function. Acpray orray baypasc n Lve-is-eesdefec~nepefble-iqt-is, netapabte-Gf-beipelsed
.timely-manner-asgdeseribedimth~edesignbases-analyses,(-3hotrsffrom-the-
-tieethe-spry-armyb-ypass-valy-e.,fai-lt-o clo.se,,and-the°.J S-temperatu reo exceeds-the-requiremeits-iR.SRPB.=7.*1.=,=