ML17118A075

Revision to Technical Specification Bases Manual

ML17118A075
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Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	04/20/2017
From:	Susquehanna
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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{{#Wiki_filter:MANUAL HARD COPY DISTRIBUTION DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL 2017-5968 USER INFORMATION: GERLACH*ROSEY M Address: NUCSA2 Phone#: 542-3194 EMPL#: 028401 CA#: 0363 TRANSMITTAL INFORMATION: TO: GERLACH*ROSEY M 04/20/2017 LOCATION: USNRC FROM: NUCLEAR RECORDS DOCUMENT CONTROL CENTER (NUCSA-2) Page 1 THE FOLLOWING CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED TO THE HARDCOPY OR ELECTRONIC MANUAL ASSIGNED TO YOU. HARDCOPY USERS MUST ENSURE THE DOCUMENTS PROVIDED MATCH THE INFORMATION ON THIS TRANSMITTAL. WHEN REPLACING THIS MATERIAL IN YOUR HARDCOPY MANUAL, ENSURE THE -UPDATE DOCUMENT ID IS THE SAME DOCUMENT ID YOU'RE REMOVING FROM YOUR MANUAL. TOOLS FROM THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE TOOL BAG SHOULD BE UTILIZED TO ELIMINATE THE CHANCE OF ERRORS. ~TENTION: "REPLACE" directions do not affect the Table of Contents, Therefore no )C will be issued with the updated material. TSBl - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL REMOVE MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 04/06/2017 ADD MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 04/19/2017 CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS ID: TEXT 3.6.4.1 ADD: REV: 13 REMOVE: REV:12 TYPE: TSBl Aool NfZR of 2

CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS TYPE: TSBl ID: TEXT 3.6.4.2 ADD: REV: 12 REMOVE: REV:ll CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS TYPE: TSBl ID: TEXT LOES ADD': REV: 125 REMOVE: REV:l24 Page 2 ANY DISCREPANCIES WITH THE MATERIAL PROVIDED, CONTACT DCS@ X3107 OR X3171 FOR ASSISTANCE. UPDATES FOR HARDCOPY MANUALS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN 3 DAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES. PLEASE MAKE ALL CHANGES AND ACKNOWLEDGE COMPLETE IN YOUR NIMS INBOX UPON COMPLETION OF UPDATES. FOR ELECTRONIC MANUAL USERS, ELECTRONICALLY REVIEW THE APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS AND ACKNOWLEDGE COMPLETE IN YOUR NIMS INBOX. of 2

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TS Bl ~ranual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT l MANUAL Table Of Contents Issue Date: 04/19/2017 Procedure Name Rev Issue Date Change ID Change Number TEXT LOES 125 04/19/2017

Title:

LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS TEXT TOC 23 07/02/2014 /,.,----., ( <~\\) /') "-.,,,_ "'-,./ ,//A v'/ t t' / >.V

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TABLE OF CONTENTS "</) / ("' ~'-.._,/' TEXT 2.1.l 6 01/22/2015

Title:

SAFETY LIMITS (SLS) REACTOR CORE SLS TEXT 2.1.2 1 " ' /' 10/04/2007 0" ~,::,//

Title:

SAFETY LIMITS (SLS) REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM '('-R:7.)";PRESSURE S 0*.. *0V TEXT 3.0 3 08/20/2100*9 "\\ ~' \\,.__.,..

Title:

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIO::Y-{LG:O')".lIBPLICABILITY /,,) l__ TEXT 3.1.1 /<'" *, r---J 1 // (04/'J..8{2006 / "'....

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYST*EMS SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) ., / /----~' v "*"'- "'-.o--~ __ )11I15 I 2 o o 2

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTR~SYS~~MS REACTIVITY ANOMALIES TEXT 3.1.2 I r---,, \\ V~ ) 11/16/2016 TEXT 3. 1. 3 /~ / 3 If../ A

Title:

REACTIVITY\\CONTR0L SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY \\ \\, ) J \\ '~ ) "-,_______,/ TEXT 3.1.4 5 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM TIMES TEXT 3.1.5 2 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM ACCUMULATORS TEXT 3.1.6 4 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ROD PATTERN CONTROL Pagel of 8 Report Date: 04/19/17

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl ~anual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL =*=.: *.' TEXT 3.1.7 4 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL (SLC) SYSTEM TEXT 3.1. 8 4 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME (SDV) VENT AND DRAIN VALVES TEXT 3.2.1 3 11/16/2016

Title:

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR) TEXT 3.2.2 4 11/16/2016

Title:

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) TEXT 3.2.3 3 11/16/2016

Title:

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) .. *: 't'EXT 3. 3. 1. 1 7 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.1.2 3 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.1 5 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.2 3 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION FEEDWATER MAIN TURBINE HIGH WATER LEVEL TRIP INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.1 10 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.2 2 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM TEXT 3.3.4.l 3 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION END OF CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (EOC-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION Pagel of 8 Report Date: 04/19/17

J SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl

anual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.3.4.2 1 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (ATWS-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.1 4 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.2 1 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.6.1 8 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.6.2 5 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION 'EXT 3. 3. 7. 1 3 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS).SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.1 3 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION LOSS OF POWER (LOP) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.2 1 11/16/2016

Title:

INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ELECTRIC POWER MONITORING TEXT 3.4.1 5 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING TEXT 3.4.2 4 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) JET PUMPS TEXT 3.4.3 3 01/13/2012

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RCS SAFETY RELIEF VALVES S/RVS TEXT 3.4.4 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE Pagel of 8 Report Date: 04/19/17

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl -Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.4.5 2 04/13/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE (PIV) LEAKAGE TEXT 3.4.6 5 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS LEAKAGE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.4.7 3 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY TEXT 3.4.8 3 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM HOT SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.4.9 2 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM COLD SHUTDOWN 'r:'EXT 3.4.10 5 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE (P/T) LIMITS TEXT 3.4.11 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) REACTOR STEAM DOME PRESSURE TEXT 3.5.l 5 11/16/2016

Title:

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM ECCS - OPERATING TEXT 3.5.2 1 11/16/2016

Title:

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM ECCS - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.5.3 4 11/16/2016

Title:

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM RCIC SYSTEM LDCN 5307 TEXT 3. 6. 1. 1 6 11/16/2016

Title:

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT TEXT 3.6.1.2 2 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCK Page_! of 8 Report Date: 04/19/17 I \\.

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl [anual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT l MANUAL TEXT 3.6.l.3 13 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (PCIVS) TEXT 3.6.1.4 2 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TEXT 3.6.1.5 2 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR TEMPERATURE TEXT 3.6.1.6 1 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION CHAMBER-TO-DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS TEXT 3.6.2.1 3 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL AVERAGE TEMPERATURE ~EXT 3. 6. 2. 2 1 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.6.2.3 2 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING TEXT 3.6.2.4 1 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY TEXT 3.6.3.1 2 06/13/2006

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS TEXT 3.6.3.2 2 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR FLOW SYSTEM TEXT 3.6.3.3 2 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OXYGEN CONCENTRATION TEXT 3.6.4.1 13 04/19/2017

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Page~ of 8 Report Date: 04/19/17

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl . ~anual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.6.4.2 12 04/19/2017

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (SCIVS) LDCN 5240 TEXT 3.6.4.3 5 11/16/2016

Title:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS STANDBY GAS TREATMENT (SGT) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.1 5 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER (RHRSW) SYSTEM AND THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (UHS) TEXT 3.7.2 3 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.3 2 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) SYSTEM "EXT 3.7.4 1 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM FLOOR COOLING SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.5 2 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN CONDENSER OFFGAS TEXT 3.7.6 3 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.7 2 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.7.8 l 11/16/2016

Title:

PLANT SYSTEMS TEXT 3.8.l 8 11/16/2016

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.2 0 11/15/2002

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES - SHUTDOWN Page.§. of 8 Report Date: 04/19/17 I..

I 'l' SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl ranual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.8.3 5 11/16/2016

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DIESEL FUEL OIL, LUBE OIL, AND STARTING AIR TEXT 3.8.4 4 11/16/2016

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.5 1 12/14/2006

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.8.6 2 11/16/2016

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BATTERY CELL PARAMETERS TEXT 3.8.7 2 11/16/2016

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - OPERATING 'EXT 3. 8. 8 1 11/16/2016

Title:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.9.1 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING o'PERATIONS REFUELING EQUIPMENT INTERLOCKS TEXT 3.9.2 2 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS REFUEL POSITION ONE-ROD-OUT INTERLOCK TEXT 3.9.3 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION TEXT 3.9.4 0 11/15/2002

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION TEXT 3.9.5 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY - REFUELING TEXT 3.9.6 2 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER LEVEL Page']_ of 8 Report Date: 04/19/17

SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSBl Manual

Title:

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.9.7 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) - HIGH WATER.LEVEL TEXT 3.9.8 1 11/16/2016

Title:

REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) - LOW WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.10.l 1 01/23/2008

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING OPERATION TEXT 3.10.2 1 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS REACTOR MODE SWITCH INTERLOCK TESTING TEXT 3.10.3 1 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - HOT SHUTDOWN ~iJ 'i:'EXT 3.10.4 1 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - COLD SHUTDOWN

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TEXT 3.10.5 1 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD DRIVE (CRD) REMOVAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10.6 1 11/16/2016 Tit.le: SPECIAL OPERATIONS MULTIPLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10.7 1 04/18/2006

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD TESTING - OPERATING TEXT 3.10.8 2 11/16/2016

Title:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) TEST - REFUELING Page~ of 8 Report Date: 04/19/17

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES) Section Title Revision TOC B 2.0 82.1.1 82.1.2 B 3.0 B 3.1 83.1.1 83.1.2 83.1.3 83.1.4 83.1.5 83.1.6 83.1.7 83.1.8 8 3.2 83.2.1 83.2.2 83.2.3 8 3.3 83.3.1.1 83.3.1.2 83.3.2.1 83.3.2.2 83.3.3.1 83.3.3.2 83.3.4.1 83.3.4.2 83.3.5.1 83.3.5.2 83.3.6.1 83.3.6.2 83.3.7.1 83.3.8.1 83.3.8.2 Table of Contents................................................................................................. 23 SAFETY LIMITS BASES Reactor Core SLs................................................................................................. 6 Reactor Coolant System. (RCS) Pressure SL....................................................... 1 LCO AND SR APPLICABILITY BASES............................................................... 3 REACTIVITY CONTROL BASES Shutdown Margin (SOM)...................................................................................... 2 Reactivity Anomalies............................................................................................ 1 Control Rod OPERABILITY.................................................................................. 3 Control Rod Scram Times.................................................................................... 5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators........................................................................ 2 Rod Pattern Control.............................................................................................. 4 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System.................................................................. 4 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves..................................... 4 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR)................................... 3 Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)................................................................ 4 Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR).................................................................. 3 INSTRUMENTATION Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation.............................................. 7 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation.................................................... 3 Control Rod Block Instrumentation....................................................................... 5 Feedwater - Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation...................... 3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) lnstrumentation................................................ 10 Remote Shutdown System...........................'........................................................ 2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation.................... 3 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) lnstrumentation............................................................. 1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation................................. 4 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation......................... 1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation................................................... 8 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation............................................... 5 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS).................................. 3 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation.................................................................. 3 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring.............................. 1 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I 8 LOES-1 Revision 125

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES) Section Title Revision B 3.4 83.4.1 83.4.2 83.4.3 83.4.4 83.4.5 83.4.6 83.4.7 83.4.8 83.4.9 83.4.10 83.4.11 83.5 83.5.1 83.5.2 83.5.3 83.6 83.6.1.1 83.6.1.2 83.6.1.3 83.6.1.4 83.6.1.5 83.6.1.6 83.6.2.1 83.6.2.2 83.6.2.3 83.6.2.4 83.6.3.1 83.6.3.2 83.6.3.3 83.6.4.1 83.6.4.2 83.6.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES Recirculation Loops Operating............................................................................. 5 Jet Pumps ......................................................................................................... 4 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)................................................................................ 3 RCS Operational LEAKAGE............................................................................... 1 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage...................................................... 2 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation............................................................. 5 RCS Specific Activity............................................................................................ 3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown....................................................................................... 3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown..................................................................................... 2 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits...................................................... 5 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure........................................................................... 1 ECCS AND RCIC BASES ECCS - Operating................................................................................................ 5 ECCS - Shutdown............................................................................................... 1 RCIC System........................................................................................................ 4 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES Primary Containment............................................................................................ 6 Primary Containment Air Lock.............................................................................. 2 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)................................................... 13 Containment Pressure.......................................................................................... 2 Drywell Air Temperature....................................................................................... 2 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers........................................... 1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature............................................................. 3 Suppression Pool Water Level............................................................................. 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling................................. 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray..................................... 1 Not Used ................. ~....................................................................................... 2 Drywell Air Flow System....................................................................................... 2 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration....................................................... 2 Secondary Containment...................................................................................... 13 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs).............................................. 12 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System............................................................... 5 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B LOES-2 Revision 125

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES) Section Title Revision B3.7 B3.7.1 B3.7.2 B3.7.3 B3.7.4 B3.7.5 B3.7.6 B3.7.7 B3.7.8 B3.8 B3.8.1 B3.8.2 B3.8.3 B3.8.4 B3.8.5 B3.8.6 83.8.7 B3.8.8 B3.9 83.9.1 83.9.2 83.9.3 B3.9.4 83.9.5 83.9.6 83.9.7 83.9.8 B3.10 83.10.1 83.10.2 83.10.3 83.10.4 83.10.5 83.10.6 83.10.7 83.10.8 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)...... :................................................................. 5 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System........................................................... 3 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS) System...................... 2 Control Room Floor Cooling System.................................................................... 1 Main Condenser Offgas....................................................................................... 2 Main Turbine Bypass System............................................................................... 3 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level.................................................................. 2 Main Turbine Pressure Regulation System.......................................................... 1 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES AC Sources - Operating...................................................................................... 8 AC Sources - Shutdown...................................................................................... O Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air............................................................ 5 DC Sources - Operating...................................................................................... 4 DC Sources - Shutdown.......................................,.............................................. 1 Battery Cell Parameters....................................................................................... 2 Distribution Systems - Operating......................................................................... 2 Distribution Systems - Shutdown......................................................................... 1 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES Refueling Equipment Interlocks............................................................................ 1 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock................................................................ 1 Control Rod Position............................................................................................ 1 Control Rod Position Indication............................................................................ 0 Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling.............................................................. 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level....................................................... 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - High Water Level............................................. 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Water Level........................ :..................... 1 SPECIAL OPERATIONS BASES lnservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation............................................... 1 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing................................................................ 1 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Hot Shutdown.................................................. 1 Single Control Rod Withdrawal. - Cold Shutdown................................................ 1 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD) Removal - Refueling........................................ 1 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal - Refueling....................................................... 1 Control Rod Testing - Operating.......................................................................... 1 Shutdown Margin (SOM) Test - Refueling........................................................... 2 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B LOES-3 Revision 125

Rev. 13 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment BASES BACKGROUND The secondary containment structure completely encloses the primary containment structure such that a dual-containment design is utilized to limit the spread of radioactivity to the environment to within limits. The function of the secondary containment is to contain, dilute, and hold up fission products that may leak from primary containment into secondary containment following a Design Basis Accident (OBA). In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and closure of certain valves whose lines penetrate the secondary containment, the secondary containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products prior to release to the environment and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during certain operations that take place inside primary containment, when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE, or that take place outside primary containment (Ref. 1). The secondary containment is a structure that completely encloses the primary containment and reactor coolant pressure boundary components. This structure forms a control volume that serves to hold up and dilute the fission products. It is possible for the pressure in the control volume to rise relative to the environmental pressure (e.g., due to pump and motor heat load additions). The secondary containment boundary consists of the reactor building structure and associated removable walls and panels, hatches, doors, dampers, sealed penetrations and valves. Certain plant piping systems (e.g., Service Water, RHR Service Water, Emergency Service Water, Feedwater, etc.) penetrate the secondary containment boundary. The intact piping within secondary containment provides a passive barrier which maintains secondary containment requirements. Breaches of these piping systems within secondary containment will be controlled to maintain secondary containment requirements. The secondary containment is divided into Zone I, Zone II and Zone Ill, each of which must be OPERABLE depending on plant status and the alignment of the secondary containment boundary. Specifically, the Unit 1 secondary containment boundary can be modified to exclude Zone II. Similarly, the Unit 2 secondary containment boundary can be modified to exclude Zone I. Secondary containment may consist of only Zone Ill when in MODE 4 or 5 during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during handling of irradiated fuel within the Zone Ill secondary containment boundary. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-84 Revision 4

BASES BACKGROUND (continued) APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO Rev. 13 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 To prevent ground level exfiltration while allowing the secondary containment to be designed as a conventional structure, the secondary containment requires support systems to maintain the control volume pressure at less than the external pressure. Requirements for the safety related systems are specified separately in LCO 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System." When one or more zones are excluded from secondary containment, the specific requirements for support systems will also change (e.g., required secondary containment isolation valves). There are two principal accidents for which credit is taken for secondary containment OPERABILITY. These are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) (Ref. 2) and a fuel handling accident inside secondary containment (Ref. 3). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis and that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structure will be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment. Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4). An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment. For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained. The leak tightness of secondary containment must also ensure that the release of radioactive materials to the environment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis. For example, secondary containment bypass leakage must be restricted to the leakage rate required by LCO 3.6.1.3. The secondary containment boundary required to be OPERABLE is dependent on the operating status of both units, as well as the configuration of walls, doors, hatches, SCIVs, and available flow paths to the SGT System. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-85 Revision 2

BASES (continued) APPLICABILITY Rev. 13 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE AL TERA TIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. ACTIONS A.1 If secondary containment is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours. The 4 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal. A temporary (one-time) Completion Time is connected to the Completion Time Requirements above (4 hours) with an "OR" connector. The Temporary Completion Time is 48 hours and applies to the replacement of the Reactor Building Recirculating Fan Damper Motors. The Temporary Completion Time of 48 hours may only be used once, and expires on December 31, 2005. B.1 and B.2 If secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-86 Revision 4 _ _J

BASES ACTIONS (continued) C.1, C.2, and C.3 Rev. 13 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS, and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause fission product release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the environment. CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the secondary containment boundary is sufficiently leak tight to preclude exfiltration under expected wind conditions. Expected wind conditions are defined as sustained wind speeds of less than or equal to 16 mph at the 60m meteorological tower or less than or equal to 11 mph at the 1 Om meteorological tower if the 60m tower wind speed is not available. Changes in indicated reactor building differential pressure observed during periods of short-term wind speed gusts above these sustained speeds do not by themselves impact secondary containment integrity. However, if secondary containment integrity is known to be compromised, the LCO must" be entered regardless of wind speed. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-87 Revision 2

BASES Rev. 13 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3 Verifying that secondaf"Y containment equipment hatches, removable walls and one access door in each access opening required to be closed are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. Verifying that all such openings are closed also provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur. In this application, the term "sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. An access opening typically contains one inner and one outer door. Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in each access opening to secondary containment zones is closed. In some cases (e.g., railroad bay), secondary containment access openings are shared such that a secondary containment barrier may have multiple inner or multiple outer doors. The intent is to maintain the secondary containment barrier intact, which is achieved by maintaining the inner or outer portion of the barrier closed at all times. However, brief, inadvertent, simultaneous opening of the inner and outer secondary containment doors for personnel entry and exit is allowed. Intentional or extended opening of both doors simultaneously, even for personnel entry

• and exit, is not permitted and will result in Secondary Containment being declared INOPERABLE. All secondary containment access doors are normally kept closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit or when maintenance is being performed on an access opening.

(continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-88 Revision 4

BASES Rev. 13 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS When the railroad bay door (No. 101) is closed; all Zone I and Ill hatches, removable walls, dampers, and one door in each access opening connected to the railroad access bay are closed; or, only Zone I removable walls and/or doors are open to the railroad access shaft; or, only Zone Ill hatches and/or dampers are open to the railroad access shaft. When the railroad bay door (No. 101) is open; all Zone I and Ill hatches, removable walls, dampers, and one door in each access opening connected to the railroad access bay are closed. The truck bay hatch is closed and the truck bay door (No. 102) is closed unless Zone II is isolated from Zones I and Ill. The access openings between secondary containment zones which are not provided with two doors are administratively controlled to maintain secondary containment integrity during exit and entry. This Surveillance is modified by a Note that allows access openings with a single door (i.e., no airlock) within the secondary containment boundary (i.e., between required secondary containment zones) to be opened for entry and exit. Opening of an access door for entry and exit allows sufficient administrative control by individual personnel making the entries and exits to assure the secondary containment function is not degraded. When one of the zones is not a zone required for secondary containment OPERABILITY, the Note allowance would not apply. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-88a Revision 4

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 REQUIREMENTS Rev. 13 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 (continued) The SGT System exhausts the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment equipment. To ensure that all fission products are treated, SR 3.6.4.1.4 verifies that the SGT System will rapidly establish and maintain a pressure in the secondary containment that is less than the pressure external to the secondary containment boundary. This is confirmed by demonstrating that one SGT subsystem will draw down the secondary containment to :::::: 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge in less than or equal to the maximum time allowed. This cannot be accomplished if the secondary containment boundary is not intact. SR 3.6.4.1.5 demonstrates that one SGT subsystem can maintain :::::: 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge for at least 1 hour at less than or equal to the maximum flow rate permitted for the secondary containment configuration that is operable. The 1 hour test period allows secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions. As noted, both SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 acceptance limits are dependent upon the secondary containment configuration when testing is being performed. The acceptance criteria for the SRs based on secondary containment configuration is defined as follows: SECONDARY MAXIMUM DRAWDOWN TIME(SEC) MAXIMUM FLOW RATE (CFM) CONTAINMENT (SR 3.6.4.1.4 (SR 3.6.4.1.5 TEST CONFIGURATION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA) ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA) Group 1 Zones I, II and Ill (Unit 1

300 Seconds

5:5400 CFM Railroad Bay aligned to (Zones I, II, and Ill)

(From Zones I, II, and Ill) Secondary Containment). Zones I and Ill (Unit 1 Railroad

300 Seconds

3900 CFM Bay aligned to Secondary (Zones I and Ill)

(From Zones I and Ill) Containment). Group 2 Zones I, II and Ill (Unit 1

300 Seconds

5300 CFM Railroad Bay not aligned to (Zones I, II, and Ill)

(From Zones I, II, and Ill) Secondary Containment). Zones I and Ill (Unit 1 Railroad

300 Seconds

5:3800 CFM Bay not aligned to Secondary (Zones I and 111)

(From Zones I and Ill) Containment). Only one of the above listed configurations needs to be tested to confirm secondary containment OPERABILITY. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-89 Revision 6

BASES Rev. 13 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS A Note also modifies the Frequency for each SR. This Note identifies that each configuration is to be tested every 60 months. Testing each configuration every 60 months assures that the most limiting configuration is tested every 60 months. The 60 month Frequency is acceptable because operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance and all active components are tested more frequently. Therefore, these tests are used to ensure secondary containment boundary integrity. The secondary containment testing configurations are discussed in further detail to ensure the appropriate configurations are tested. Three zone testing (Zones, I, II and Ill aligned to the recirculation plenum) should be performed with the Railroad Bay aligned to secondary containment and another test with the Railroad Bay not aligned to secondary containment. Each test should be performed with each division on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Two zone testing (Zones I and Ill aligned to the recirculation plenum) should be performed with the Railroad Bay aligned to secondary containment and another test with the Railroad Bay not aligned to secondary containment. Each test should be performed with each division on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The normal operating fans of the non-tested HVAC zone (Zone II fans 2V202A&B, 2V205A&B and 2V206A&B) should not be in operation. Additionally, a controlled opening of adequate size should be maintained in Zone II Secondary Containment during testing to assure that atmospheric conditions are maintained in that zone. The Unit 1. Railroad Bay can be aligned as a No Zone (isolated from secondary containment) or as part of secondary containment (Zone I or Ill). Due to the different leakage pathways that exist in the Railroad Bay, the Railroad Bay should be tested when aligned to secondary containment and not aligned to secondary containment. It is preferred to align the Railroad Bay to Zone Ill when testing with the Railroad Bay aligned to secondary containment since Zone Ill is included in all possible secondary containment isolation alignments. Note that aligning the Railroad Bay to either Zone I or Ill is acceptable since either zone is part of secondary containment. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-90 Revision 4

BASES Rev. 13 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

1. FSAR, Section 6.2.3.

2. FSAR, Section 15.6.

3. FSAR, Section 15. 7.4.

4. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-90a Revision 1

Rev. 12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) BASES BACKGROUND The function of the SCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (Ref. 1 ). Secondary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment into secondary containment following a OBA, or that are released duling certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE or take place outside primary containment, are maintained within the APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES secondary containment boundary. The OPERABILITY requirements for SCIVs help ensure that an adequate secondary containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. These isolation devices consist of either passive devices or active (automatic) devices. Manual valves or dampers, de-activated automatic valves or dampers secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), and blind flanges are considered passive devices. Automatic SCIVs close on a secondary containment isolation signal to establish a boundary for untreated radioactive material within secondary containment following a OBA or other accidents. Other non-sealed penetrations which cross a secondary containment boundary are isolated by the use of valves in the closed position or blind flanges. The SCIVs must be OPERABLE to ensure the secondary containment barrier to fission product releases is established. The principal accidents for which the secondary containment boundary is required are a loss of coolant accident (Ref. 1) and a fuel handling accident inside secondary containment (Ref. 2). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events, but the boundary (continued) SUSQUEHANNA'- UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-91 Revision*3

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) LCO Rev.12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 established by SCIVs is required to ensure that leakage from the primary containment is processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System before being released to the environment. Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment. SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3). . SCIVs that form a part of the secondary containment boundary are required to be OPERABLE. Depending on the configu~ation of the secondary containment only specific SCIVs are required. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs. The automatic isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation. signal. The valves covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in Table B 3.6.4.2-1. The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic SCIVs are deactivated and secured in their closed position, or blind flanges are in place. These passive isolation valves or devices are listed-in Table 83.6.4.2-2. Penetrations closed with sealants are considered part of the secondary containment boundary and are not COf!Sidered penetration flow paths. Certain plant piping systems {e.g., Service Water, RHR Service Water, Emergency Service Water, Feedwater, etc.) penetrate the secondary containment boundary. The intact piping within secondary containment provides a passive barrier which maintains secondary containment requirements. When the SOHR and temporary chiller system piping is connected and full of water, the piping forms the secondary containment boundary and the passive devices in TS BasE!S Table 83.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for these systems since the piping forms the barrier. During certain plant evolutions, piping systems may be drained and breached within secondary containment. During the pipe breach, system isolation valves can be used to provide secondary containment isolation. The isolation valve alignment will be controlled when the piping system is breached. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS/ B 3.6-92 Revision 3

Rev. 12 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES (continued) APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and :?. a OBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. Therefore, the OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required. ACTIONS In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences.of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitation~ in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of. irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated 9perator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated. The second Note provides clarification that for the purpose of this LCO separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable SCIV. Complying with the Reql!irecj

• Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable SCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The third Note ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable SCIV. A.1 and A.2 In the event that there are one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoper~ble, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic SCIV, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. For penetrations isolated in (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-93 Revision 2

BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) Rev. 12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4;2 accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available device to secondary containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 8 hour Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration, and the probability of a OBA, which requires the SCJVs to close, occurring during this short time is very low. For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic _basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, but no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. The Completion Time of once per 31* days is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that the affected penetration remains isolated. Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two SCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to devices located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. With two SCIVs in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 4 hours. The method of isolation must (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-94 Revision 1

BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) Rev.12 SC IVs B 3.6.4.2 include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de..:activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the probability of a OBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time, is very low. The Condition has been modified by a Note stating that Condition B is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two isolation valves. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. C.1 and C.2 With one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolatior:i must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 4 hour Completion Time. The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable considering the relative stability of the system {hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting secondary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the (continued) SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-95 Revision 1

BASES. ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) Rev. 12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only. applicable to penetration flow paths with only one SCIV. For penetration flow paths with two SCIVs, Conditions A and B provide the appropriate Required Actions. Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. D.1 and D.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without chal!enging plant systems. E.1, E.2. and E.3.

• if any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

(continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS /:B 3.6-96 Revision 1

BASES ACTIONS E.1. E.2. and E.3 (continued) Rev. 12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 Required Action E.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving fuel while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, iri either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS...

• This SR verifies that each secondary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.

The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification (typically visual) that those required SCIVs in secondary containment that are capable of be!ng mispositioned are in the correct position. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these SCIVs, once they have been verified to be in the* proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that SCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the r SCIVs are open. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-97 Revision 3

BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUfREMENTS (continued) REFERENCES SR 3.6.4.2.2 Rev. 12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 SCIVs with maximum isolation times specified in Table B 3.6.2.4-1 are tested to verify that the isolation time is within limits to demonstrate*

• OPERABILITY. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Automatic SCIVs without maximum isolation times specified in Table B 3.6.4.2-1 are tested under the requirements of SR 3.6.4.2.3. The isolation time test ensures that the SCIV wili isolate in a time period Jess than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses.

SR 3.6.4.2.3 Verifying that each automatic required SCIV closes on a secondary containment isolation signal is required to prevent leakage of radioactive material from secondary containment following a OBA or other accidents. This SR ensures that each automatic SCIV will actuate to the isolation position on a secondary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

1.

FSAR, Section 6.2.

2.. FSAR, Section 15.

3.

Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132). SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 TS/ B 3.6-98 Revision 2

Reactor Building Zone I I I II II II Ill Ill Ill Ill lll Ill N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NIA NIA N/A N/A NIA N/A Table B 3.6.4.2-1 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Automatic Isolation Dampers (P~ge 1of1) Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve HD-17586 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17524 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17576A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers. Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27586 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Darriper HD-27524 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27576 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17564A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17514 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17502A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27564 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27514 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27502 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17534A Zone 3 Airlock 1-606 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-175348 Zone 3 Airlock 1-611 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-175340 Zone 3 Airlock 1-803 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17534E Zone 3 Airlock 1-805 Automatic lsolatioi:i Damper HD-17534F . Zone 3Airlock1-617 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17534H Zone 3 Airlock l-61 B Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27534A Zone 3 Airlock 11-606 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-275340 Zone 3 Airlock 11-803 Automatic Isolation Damp.er HD-27534E Zone 3 Airlock 11-805 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-275348 Zone 3 Airlock C-806 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27534H Zone 3 Airlock 11-618 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-275341 Zone 3 Airlock 11-609 Automatic Isolation Damper SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 TSJ B 3.6-99 Rev.12 SCIVs. B 3.6.4.2 Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds) 1.0.0 10.0* 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 14.0 6.5 6.0 14.0 6.5 6.0 N/A NIA N/A N/A N/A N/A NIA NIA NIA N/A NIA N/A Revision 2

Device Number X-29-2-44 X-29-2-45 110176 110186 110180 110181 110182 110187 210186 210187 210191 210192 210193 X-29-2-46 X-29-2-47 X-29-5-95 X-29-5-96 X-29-5-91 X-29-5-92 187388 187389 187390 187391 X-28-2-3000 X-29-2-48 X-33-2-3000 X-28-2-3000 X-29-2-48 X-33-2-3000 X-29-3-54 X-29-3-55 X-29-5-97 X-27-6-92 X-29-7-4 X-30-6-72 X-30-6-1002. X-30-6-1003 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Jsolation Valves or Devices *- (Page 1 of 4) Device Description Area/Elev. SOHR Svstem to Fuel Pool Cooling Yard/670 SOHR Svstem to Fuel Pool Coolina Yard/670 SDHR Suoolv Drain Viv 29/670 SOHR Discharae Drain Viv 29/670 SOHR Suoolv Vent Viv 29/749 SOHR Discharae RI! Viv 27/749 SOHR Discharge Vent Viv 27/749 SOHR Supply Fill Viv 29/749 SOHR Supply Drain Viv 33/749 SDHR Supply Vent Viv 33/749 SOHR Discharge Vent Viv 30/749 SOHR Dlscharae Drain Viv 301749 SOHR Discharae Vent Viv 331749 TemooraryChillerto RBCW Yard/670 Temoorary Chiller to RBCW Yard/670 Temoorary Chiller to Unit 1 RBCW 29/149 Temoorarv Chiller to Unit 1 RBCW 29/749 Temoorarv Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW 33/749 Temnorary Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW 33/749 RBCW Temp Chiller Discharge Jso Viv 29/670 RBCW Temo Chiller Supply !so Viv 29/670 RBCW Temo Chiller Supply Drain Viv 29/670 RBCW Temo Chnler Discharae Drain Viv 29/670 Utmtv Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell Yard/670 Utilitv Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bav Yard/670 Utilitv Penetration to Unit 2 East Stairwell Yard/670 UHlitv Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell 28/670 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bav 29/670 Ulilitv Penetration to Unit 2 East Stairwell 33/670 Utilllv Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area 27/683 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area 27/683 Utility Penetration from Unit 1 RR Bav to Unit 2 Elev. 749 331749 Instrument Tubing Stubs 27/779' 1" Soare Conduit Threaded Plua 29/818' Instrument Tubino Stubs 30/779' Stairwell #214 Rupture Disc 30/779' Airlock 11-609 Rupture Disc 30/779' SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-100 Rev.12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 Required Position I Notes Blind Flanged I Note 1 Blind Flanaed I Note 1 Closed Manuar Isa Valve/ Note 1 Closed Manual Isa Valve I Nole 1 Closed Manual Isa Valve I Note 1 Closed Manual Isa Valve I Note 1 Closed Manuaf Isa Valve I Note 1 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 1 Closed Manual Isa Valve I Nole 1 Closed Manual Isa Valve I Note 1 Closed Manual Isa Valve I Note 1 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 1 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 1 Blind Flanoed I Note 2 Blind Flanoed I Note 2 Bl!nd Flanged I Note 2 Blind Ranged I Note 2 Blind Flanged I Note 2 Blind Flanoed I Note 2 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 2 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 2 Closed Manual [so Valve I Note 2 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 2 Blind Flanged I Note 3 Canned I Note 5 Blind Flanged I Note 4 Blind Flanaed I Note 3 Caooed I Note 5 Blind Ftanged I Note 4 Blind Flanaed I Note 6 Blind Flanged I Note 6 Canned Canned Installed Canoed Installed Intact Installed Intact Revision 7

Device Number X-25-6-1008 X-29-4-01-B X-29-4-01-A X-29-4-01-B X-29-4-01-A HD17534C HD27534C XD-17513 XD-17514 XD-12301 XD-22301 161827 161828 161829 161830 261820 261821 261822 1LRWl810U 1LRWl810V 1LRW1810W 1LRWl810X 1LRW1810Y 1LRWl810Z 1LRWl810FF 1LRWl810GG 1LRW1810HH 1LRW1810JJ 1LRWl810KK 1LRWl615A 1LRWl100A 1LRWl100B 1LRWl100C 1LRWl100D 1LRW110DE 1LRWl100F 1LRW1100G Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System

• Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 2 of 4)

Device Description Area/Elev. Airlock 1-606 Rupture Disc 25/779' Penetration at Door 4330 291719' Penetration at Door 4330 291719' Penetration at Door 404 33/719' Penetration at Door 404 33/719' Airlock 1-707 Bllnd Flanae 28/799' Airlock 11-707 Blind Flanae 33/799' Isolation damper for Railroad Bay Zone Ill HVAC Supply 29/799' Isolation damper for Railroad Bay Zone Ill HVAC Exhaust 291719' PASS Air Flow Damper 11/729' PASS Air Flow Damper 22/729' HPCl Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 25/645' RCIC Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 28/645' 'A'. RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 29/645' 'B' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 28/645' RCIC Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 33/645' 'A' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 34/645' 'B' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 33/645' Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone 111 Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-779 Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Zone I. Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Zone l, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Zone I, Zone Hf, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-100a Rev.12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 Required Position I Notes Installed Intact Blind Flanoe Installed Blind Flanoe Installed Blind Flanoe Installed Blind Flanoe Installed Bltnd Flanoe Installed Blfnd Flange Installed Position is dependent on Railroad Bay alii:mment Position is dependent on Railroad Bay alianment Closed Damper Closed Damper Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 3 Closed Manual Isa Valve I Note 3 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 3 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 3 Closed Manual Isa Valve I Note 4 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 4 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 4 Pluooed I Note 7 Plu~med I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Plu1:10ed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluooed I Note 7 Pluooed I Note 7 Pluooed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluaaed/ Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Plum1ed I Note 7 Plugged I Note! 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Nole 7 Plum:ied I Note 7 Revision 6

• Device Number 2LRWl810L 2LRWl810M 2LRWl81QN 2LRWl810R 2LRWl810S 2LRWl703A 2LRWl615A 2LRWl100A 2LRW1100B 2LRWl100C 2LRW1100D 2LRW1100E 2LRWl100F 2LRWl100G 2573280R 257336 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 3of4)

Device Description Area/Elev. Zone Ill Floor Drain 34-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 34-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 34-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 34-818 Zone 111 Floor Drain 34-818 Zone II Floor Drain 34-799 Zone II Floor Drain 34-779 Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Zone If Floor Drain 34-670 Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 HCVS Rupture Disc Burst Connection Isolation Valves 21/686' SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-100b Rev. 12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 Required Position I Notes Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Nole 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Ph 1aned I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 4 Revision 5

Table s 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 4 of 4) Rev.12 SC IVs B 3.6.4.2 Note 1: The two blind flanges on the SOHR penetrations (blind flanges for device number X-29-2-44 and X-29-2-45) and all the closed manual valves for the SOHR system (110176, 110186, 110180, 110181, 110182, 110187, 210186, 210187, 210191, 210192, 210193) can each be considered as a separate secondary containment Isolation device for the SDHR penetrations. If one or both of the blind flanges is removed and all the above Identified manual valves for the SOHR system are closed, the appropriate LCO should be entered for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. With the blind flange removed, the manual valves could be opened intermittently under administrative* controls per the Technical Specification Note. When both SOHR blind flanges are installed, opening of the manual valves for the SOHR system will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. When the manual valves for the SDHR system are open in this coriditlon, the ap'propriate LCD should be entered for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration fiow path with two SC IVs. When the SDHR system piping is connected and full of water, the piping forms the secondary containment boundary and the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer requlred for this system since the piping forms the barrier. Note 2: Due to the multiple alignments of the RBCW temporary chiller, different devices will perform the SCIV function depending on the RBCW configuration. There are three devices/equipment that can perfonn the SCIV function forthe RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration. The first SCIV for the RBCW temporary chil!er supply penetration is the Installed blind flange on penetration X-29-2-47. The second SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration is Isolation valve 187389. The third SCIV for the temporary RBCW chiller supply penetration Is closed draln valve 187390 and an installed blind flange on penetrations X-29-5-92 and X-29-5-96. Since there are effectively three SCJVs, any two can be used to satisfy the SCIV requirements for the penetration. Removal of one of the two required SCIVs requires entry into the appropriate LCD for one inoperable SQIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. Opening of drain valve 187390 and operation of blank flanges X-29-5-96 and X-29-5-92 will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. These three SCIVs prevent air leakage. The isolation of the penetration per the Technical Specification.requirement is to assure that one of the above SCIVs is closed so that there Is no air leakage. There are three devices/equipment that can perform the SClV function for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration. The first SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration is the Installed blind flange on penetration X-29-2-46. The second SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration is isolation valve 187388. The third SCIV for the temporary RBCW chiller return penetration is closed drain valve 187391 and an installed blind flange on penetrations X-29-5-91 and X-29-5-95. Since there are effectively three SCIVs, any two can be used to define the SCIV for the penetration. Removal of one of the two required SCIVs requires entry into the appropriate LCO for one Inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SC IVs. Opening of drain valve 187391 and operation of blank flanges X-29-5-91 and X-29-5-95 wlll be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. These three SCIVs prevent air leakage. The isolation of the penetration per the Technical Specification requirement is to assure that one of the above SCIVs is closed so that there is no air leakage. When the RBCW temporary chiller piping Is connected and full of water, the piping inside secondary containment forms the secondary containment boundary and the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for this system. Note 3: These penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone I to a No-Zone. When Secondary Containment Zone I is isolated from the recirculation plenum, the above listed SCIVs In Table 83.6.4.2-2 are no longer required. Note 4: TheSe penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone II to a No-Zone. When Secondary Containment Zone II is isolated from the recirculation plenum, the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required. Note 5: These penetrations connect the Railroad Bay to a No-Zone. When the Railroad Bay ls a No-Zone, the above listed SCIVs In Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required. Note 6: These penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone I to the Railroad Bay. Tlie above listed SGIVs in Table 83.6.4.2-2 are not required if the RaUroad Bay is a No-Zone and Zone I is isolated from the recirculation plenum OR if the Railroad Bay is aligned to Zo.ne I. Note 7: Due to a drain header containing multiple floor drains in different ventilation zones, drain plugs were installed in all of the drain header floor drains. To provide the passive Secondary Containment boundary only drain plugs In one ventilation zone are required to be installeCl. SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1-TS I B 3.6-1 OOc

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