ML18128A203
| ML18128A203 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 04/25/2018 |
| From: | Susquehanna |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML18128A203 (57) | |
Text
MANUAL HARD COPY DISTRIBUTION DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL 2018-8258 USER INFORMATION:
GERLACH*ROSEY M Address: NUCSA2 Phone#:
542-3194 EMPL#:028401 CA#:
0363 TRANSMITTAL INFORMATION:
TO:
GERLACH*ROSEY M 04/25/2018 LOCATION:
USNRC FROM:
NUCLEAR RECORDS DOCUMENT CONTROL CENTER (NUCSA-2)
Page 1
THE FOLLOWING CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED TO THE HARDCOPY OR ELECTRO~IC MANUAL ASSIGNED TO YOU.
HARDCOPY USERS MUST ENSURE THE DOCUMENTS PROVIDED MATCH THE INFORMATION ON THIS TRANSMITTAL.
WHEN REPLACING THIS MATERIAL IN YOUR HARDCOPY MANUAL, ENSURE THE UPDATE DOCUMENT ID IS THE SAME DOCUMENT ID YOU'RE REMOVING FROM YOUR MANUAL.
TOOLS FROM THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE TOOL BAG SHOULD BE UTILIZED TO ELIMINATE THE CHANCE OF ERRORS.
TENTION: "REPLACE" directions do not affect the Table of Contents, Therefore no C will be issued with the updated material.
TSBl - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL REMOVE MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 04/19/2018 ADD MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 04/24/2018 CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS TYPE: TSBl ID:
TEXT 3.6.1.3 ADD:
REV: 14 REMOVE:
REV:13 of 2
CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS TYPE: TSBl ID:
TEXT 3.6.4.2 ADD:
REV: 13 REMOVE:
REV:12 CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS TYPE: TSBl ID:
TEXT LOES REMOVE:
REV:131 ADD:
REV: 132 Page 2
ANY DISCREPANCIES WITH THE MATERIAL PROVIDED, CONTACT DCS@ X3107 OR X3171 FOR ASSISTANCE.
UPDATES FOR HARDCOPY MANUALS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN 3 DAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES.*
PLEASE MAKE ALL CHANGES AND ACKNOWLEDGE COMPLETE IN YOUR NIMS INBOX UPON COMPLETION OF UPDATES.
FOR ELECTRONIC MANUAL USERS, ELECTRONICALLY REVIEW THE APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS AND ACKNOWLEDGE COMPLETE IN YOUR NIMS INBOX.
of 2
SSES MANUAL Manual Name:
TSBl Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL Table Of Contents Issue Date:
04/24/2018 Procedure Name TEXT LOES Rev 132
Title:
LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS TEXT TOC 23
Title:
TABLE OF CONTENTS Issue Date 04/24/2018 07/02/2014 Change ID Change Number
/
/
TEXT 2.1.1 6
01/22/2015
Title:
SAFETY LIMITS (SLS) REACTOR CORE SLS
)*-
/
TEXT 2.1.2 10/04/2007 < ',,
'* /
..... \\
f" '>
Title:
SAFETY LIMITS (SLS) REACTOR COOLANT ~YSTEM; '*(p.CS')',*PRESSURE S
\\, ***.
! (
\\ *,/
)
3 08/2.0./20,09' I
/., ~-
~\\ **..._ *-- //~
Title:
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION' (LCO) APPLICABILITY t""
?:
1 TEXT 3.0 TEXT 3.1.1
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL i -.. "-,,.
/
1.
\\-Q4/1'8./2;006
'*,~/
SYSTEMS SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)
,7/
-"-.,/
~---- ':.:
< *, * -o
>11/15/2002 TEXT 3.1.2
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL 'sYSTEMS REACTIVITY ANOMALIES
( (
'--,.\\ '\\ '... /
I
--~*-.\\ './;
TEXT 3.1. 3
/
3 11/16/2016
/
~-----~~
Title:
REACTIVITt CON~ROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY l
TEXT 3.1.4 5
11/16/2016
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM TIMES TEXT 3.1.5 2
11/16/2016
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM ACCUMULATORS TEXT 3.1. 6 4
11/16/2016
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ROD PATTERN CONTROL Pagel of 8
Report Date: 04/24/18
SSES MANUAL Manual Name:
TSBl
- Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3. l. 7 4
11/16/2016
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL (SLC) SYSTEM TEXT 3.l. 8 4
11/16/2016
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME (SDV) VENT AND DRAIN VALVES TEXT 3.2.1 3
11/16/2016
Title:
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)
TEXT 3.2.2 4
11/16/2016
Title:
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)
TEXT 3.2.3 3
11/16/2016
Title:
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)
TEXT 3. 3. l. 1 7
11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.l.2 4
01/23/2018
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.1 5
11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.2 3
11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION FEEDWATER MAIN TURBINE HIGH WATER LEVEL TRIP INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.1 10 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.2 2
11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM TEXT 3.3.4.1 3
11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION END OF CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (EOC-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION
- Page~
of 8
Report Date: 04/24/18
SSES MANUAL Manual Name:
TSBl Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.3.4.2 1
11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (ATWS-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.1 4
11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.2 1
11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.6.1 8
11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.6.2 5
11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.7.1 3
11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.1 3
11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION LOSS OF POWER (LOP) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.2 1
11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ELECTRIC POWER MONITORING TEXT 3.4.1 5
11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING TEXT 3.4.2 4
11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) JET PUMPS TEXT 3.4.3 3
01/13/2012
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RCS SAFETY RELIEF VALVES S/RVS TEXT 3.4.4 1
11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE Page _1 of 8
Report Date: 04/24/18
SSES MANUAL Manual Name:
TSBl Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.4.5 2
04/13/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS} RCS PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE (PIV) LEAKAGE TEXT 3.4*. 6 5
11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS LEAKAGE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.4.7 3
11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS} RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY TEXT 3.4.8 3
11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS} RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM HOT SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.4.9 2
11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR} SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM COLD SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.4.10 5
11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE (P/T} LIMITS TEXT 3.4.11 1
11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS} REACTOR STEAM DOME PRESSURE TEXT 3.5.1 5
11/16/2016
Title:
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC}
SYSTEM ECCS -
OPERATING TEXT 3.5.2 1
11/16/2016
Title:
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)
SYSTEM ECCS -
SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.5.3 5
05/31/2017
Title:
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)
SYSTEM RCIC SYSTEM TEXT 3.6.1.1 6
11/16/2016
Title:
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT TEXT 3.6.1.2 2
11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCK Page!
of 8
Report Date: 04/24/18
SSES MANUAL Manual Name:
TSBl Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3. 6. 1. 3 14 04/24/2018
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (PCIVS)
LDCN 5279 TEXT 3. 6. 1. 4 2
11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TEXT 3. 6. 1. 5 2
11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR TEMPERATURE TEXT 3.6.1.6 1
11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION CHAMBER-TO-DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS TEXT 3.6.2.1 3
11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL AVERAGE TEMPERATURE
~j TEXT 3.6.2.2 1
11/16/2016
--,=~
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.6.2.3 2
11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING TEXT 3.6.2.4 1
11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY TEXT 3.6.3.1 2
06/13/2006
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS TEXT 3.6.3.2 3
09/29/2017
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR FLOW SYSTEM TEXT 3.6.3.3 3
09/29/2017
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OXYGEN CONCENTRATION TEXT 3.6.4.1 13 04/19/2017
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Page~
of 8
Report Date: 04/24/18
SSES MANUAL Manual Name:
TSBl Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MAJ."\\JUAL TEXT 3.6.4.2 13 04/24/2018
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (SCIVS)
LDCN 5276 TEXT 3.6.4.3 6
09/15/2017
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS STANDBY GAS TREATMENT (SGT) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.1 5
11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER (RHRSW) SYSTEM AND THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (UHS)
TEXT 3.7.2 3
11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.3 3
09/15/2017
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.4 1
11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM FLOOR COOLING SYSTEM TEXT 3,. 7.5 2
11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN CONDENSER OFFGAS TEXT 3.7.6 3
11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.7 2
11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.7.8 1
11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS TEXT 3.8.1 9
02/27/2018
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES -
OPERATING TEXT 3.8.2 0
11/15/2002
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES -
SHUTDOWN Page f of.§.
Report Date: 04/24/18
SSES MANUAL Manual Name:
TSBl Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.8.3 6
12/14/2017
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DIESEL FUEL OIL, LUBE OIL, AND STARTING AIR TEXT 3.8.4 4
11/16/2016
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES -
OPERATING TEXT 3.8.5 1
12/14/2006
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES -
SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.8.6 2
11/16/2016
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BATTERY CELL PARAMETERS TEXT 3.8.7 2
11/16/2016
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS -
OPERATING TEXT 3.8.8 1
11/16/2016
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS -
SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.9.1 1
11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS REFUELING EQUIPMENT INTERLOCKS TEXT 3.9.2 2
11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS REFUEL POSITION ONE-ROD-OUT INTERLOCK TEXT 3.9.3 1
11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION TEXT 3.9.4 0
11/15/2002
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION TEXT 3.9.5 1
11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY - REFUELING TEXT 3.9.6 2
11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL {RPV) WATER LEVEL Page J..
of 8
Report Date: 04/24/18
SSES MANUAL Manual Name:
TSBl
- . Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 ~JANUAL TEXT 3.9.7 1
11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) - HIGH WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.9.. 8 1
11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) -
LOW WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.10.1 1
01/23/2008
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING OPERATION TEXT 3.10.2 1
11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS REACTOR MODE SWITCH INTERLOCK TESTING TEXT 3.10.3 1
11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL -
HOT SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.10.4 1
11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL -
COLD SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.10.5 1
11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD DRIVE (CRD) REMOVAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10.6 1
11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS MULTIPLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10.7 1
04/18/2006
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD TESTING - OPERATING TEXT 3.10.8 2
11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) TEST - REFUELING Page.§.
of.§.
Report Date: 04/24/18
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
Section Title Revision TOC B 2.0 B2.1.1 B2.1.2 B 3.0 B 3.1 B3.1.1 B3.1.2 B3.1.3 83.1.4 83.1.5 83.1.6 83.1.7 83.1.8 B 3.2 83.2.1 83.2.2 83.2.3 B 3.3 83.3.1.1 83.3.1.2 83.3.2.1 83.3.2.2 83.3.3.1 83.3.3.2 83.3.4.1 83.3.4.2 83.3.5.1 83.3.5.2 83.3.6.1 83.3.6.2 83.3.7.1 83.3.8.1 83.3.8.2 Table of Contents................................................................................................. 23 SAFETY LIMITS BASES Reactor Core SLs................................................................................................. 6 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL....................................................... 1 LCO AND SR APPLICABILITY BASES............................................................... 3 REACTIVITY CONTROL BASES Shutdown Margin (SOM)...................................................................................... 2 Reactivity Anomalies............................................................................................ 1 Control Rod OPERABILITY.................................................................................. 3 Control Rod Scram Times.................................................................................... 5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators........................................................................ 2 Rod Pattern Control.............................................................................................. 4 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System.................................................................. 4 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves..................................... 4 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR)................................... 3 Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)................................................................ 4 Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR).................................................................. 3 INSTRUMENTATION Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation.............................................. 7 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation.................................................... 4 Control Rod Block Instrumentation....................................................................... 5 Feedwater - Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation...................... 3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) lnstrumentation................................................ 1 O Remote Shutdown System................................................................................... 2 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation.................... 3 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (A TWS-RPT) Instrumentation............................................................. 1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation................................. 4 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation......................... 1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation................................................... 8 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation............................................... 5 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS).................................. 3 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation................................................. ;................ 3 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring.............................. 1 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B LOES-1 Revision 132
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
Section Title Revision B 3.4 83.4.1 83.4.2 B3.4.3 83.4.4 B3.4.5 B3.4.6 83.4.7 B3.4.8 83.4.9 83.4.10 83.4.11 83.5 B3.5.1 83.5.2 83.5.3 83.6 83.6.1.1 83.6.1.2 83.6.1.3 B3.6.1.4 83.6.1.5 B3.6.1.6 83.6.2.1 83.6.2.2 B3.6.2.3 B3.6.2.4 B3.6.3.1 B3.6.3.2 83.6.3.3 83.6.4.1 B3.6.4.2 B3.6.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES Recirculation Loops Operating............................................................................. 5 Jet Pumps
......................................................................................................... 4 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)................................................................................ 3 RCS Operational LEAKAGE............................................................................... 1 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage...................................................... 2 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation............................................................. 5 RCS Specific Activity............................................................................................ 3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown....................................................................................... 3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown..................................................................................... 2 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits...................................................... 5 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure........................................................................... 1 ECCS AND RCIC BASES ECCS - Operating................................................................................................ 5 ECCS - Shutdown............................................................................................... 1 RCIC System........................................................................................................ 5 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES Primary Containment............................................................................................ 6 Primary Containment Air Lock.............................................................................. 2 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)................................................... 14 Containment Pressure.......................................................................................... 2 Drywell Air Temperature....................................................................................... 2 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers........................................... 1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature............................................................. 3 Suppression Pool Water Level............................................................................. 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling................................. 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray..................................... 1 Not Used
......................................................................................................... 2 Drywell Air Flow System....................................................................................... 3 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration....................................................... 3 Secondary Containment...................................................................................... 13 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs).............................................. 13 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System............................................................... 6 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B LOES-2 Revision 132
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
Section Title Revision 83.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 83.7.1 Residual Heat Removal SeNice Water (RHRSW) System and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)........................................................................ 5 83.7.2 Emergency SeNice Water (ESW) System........................................................... 3 83.7.3 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS) System...................... 3 83.7.4 Control Room Floor Cooling System.................................................................... 1 83.7.5 Main Condenser Offgas....................................................................................... 2 83.7.6 Main Turbine Bypass System............................................................................... 3 83.7.7 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level.................................................................. 2 83.7.8 Main Turbine Pressure Regulation System.......................................................... 1 83.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES 83.8.1 AC Sources - Operating...................................................................................... 9 83.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown...................................................................................... O 83.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air............................................................ 6 83.8.4 DC Sources - Operating...................................................................................... 4 83.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown...................................................................................... 1 83.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters....................................................................................... 2 83.8.7 83.8.8 Distribution Systems - Operating......................................................................... 2 Distribution Systems - Shutdown......................................................................... 1 83.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 83.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks............................................................................ 1 83.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock................................................................ 1 83.9.3 Control Rod Position............................................................................................ 1 83.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication............................................................................ 0 83.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling.............................................................. 1 83.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level......................,................................ 2 83.9.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - High Water Level............................................. 1 83.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Water Level.............................................. 1 83.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS BASES 83.10.1 lnseNice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation............................................... 1 83.10.2 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing................................................................ 1 83.10.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Hot Shutdown.................................................. 1 83.10.4 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Cold Shutdown................................................ 1 83.10.5 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD) Removal - Refueling........................................ 1 83.*I0.6 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal - Refueling....................................................... 1 83.'I0.7 Control Rod Testing - Operating.......................................................................... 1 83.10.8 Shutdown Margin (SOM) Test-Refueling........................................................... 2 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B LOES-3 Revision 132
Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)
BASES BACKGROUND SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 The function of the PC IVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, including secondary containment bypass valves that are not PCIVs, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (D8As) to within limits. Primary containment isolatior;, within the time limits specified for'those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a OBA.
The OPERABILITY requirements for PCIVs help ensure that an adequate primary containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment.
Therefore, the OPERABILITY requirements provide assurance that primary containment function assumed in the safety analyses will be maintained. For PCIVs, the primary containment isolation function is that the valve must be able to close (automatically or manually) and/or remain closed, and maintain leakage within that assumed in the OBA LOCA Dose Analysis. These isolation devices are either passive or active (automatic). Manual valves, de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), blind flanges, and closed systems are considered passive devices. The OPERABILITY requirements for closed systems are discussed in Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Bases 3.6.4. Check valves, or other automatic valves designed to close without operator action following an accident, are considered active devices. Two barriers in series are provided for each penetration so that no single credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in a loss of isolation or leakage that exceeds limits assumed in the safety analyses. One of these barriers may be a closed system.
For each division of H202 Analyzers, the lines, up to and including the first normally closed valves within the H202 Analyzer panels, are extensions of primary containment (i.e., closed system), and are required to be leak rate tested in (continued)
TS I B 3.6-15 Revision 3
BASES BACKGROUND
( continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1
.Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 accordance with the Leakage Rate Test Program. The H202 Analyzer closed system boundary is identified in the Leakage Rate Test Program. The closed system boundary consists of those components, piping, tubing, fittings, and valves, which meet the guidance of Reference 6. The closed system provides a secondary barrier in the event of a single failure of the PCIVs, as described below. The closed system boundary between PASS and the H202 Analyzer system ends at the process sampling solenoid operated isolation valves between the systems (SV-12361, SV-12365, SV-12366, SV-12368, and SV-12369).
These solenoid operated isolation valves do not fully meet the guidance of Reference 6 for closed system boundary valves in that they are not powered from a Class 1 E power source.
However, based upon a risk determination, operating these valves as closed system boundary valves is not risk significant. These.
valves also form the end of the Seismic Category I boundary between the systems. These process sampling solenoid operated isolation valves are normally closed and are required to be leak rate tested in accordance with the Leakage Rate Test Program as part of the closed system for the H202 Analyzer system. These valves are "closed system boundary valves" and may be opened under administrative control, as delineated in Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Bases 3.6.4. Opening of these valves to permit testing of PASS in Modes 1, 2, and 3 is permitted in accordance with TRO 3.6.4.
Each H202 Analyzer Sampling line penetrating primary containment has two PCIVs, located just outside primary containment. While two PCIVs are provided on each line, a single active failure of a relay in the control circuitry for these valves, could result in both valves failing to close or failing to remain closed. Furthermore, a single failure (a hot short in the common raceway to all the valves) could simultaneously affect all of the PCIVs within a H202 Analyzer division. Therefore, the containment isolation barriers for these penetrations consist of two PCIVs and a closed system. For situations where one or both PC IVs are inoperable, the ACTIONS to be taken are similar to the ACTIONS for a single PCIV backed by a closed system.
(continued)
TS I B 3.6-15a Revision O
BASES BACKGROUND
( continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 The drywell vent and purge lines are 24 inches in diameter; the suppression chamber vent and purge lines are 18 inches in diameter. The containment purge valves are normally maintained closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure the primary containment boundary is maintained. The outboard isolation valves have 2 inch bypass lines around them for use during normal reactor operation.
The RHR Shutdown Cooling return line containment penetrations
{X-13A(B)}are provided with a normally closed gate valve
{HV-151F015A(B)} and a normally open globe valve
{HV-151F017A(B)} outside containment and a testable check valve {HV-151 F050A(B)} with a normally closed parallel air operated globe valve {HV-151F122A(B)} inside containment. The gate valve is manually opened and automatically isolates upon a containment isolation signal from the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System or RPV low level 3 when the RHR System is operated in the Shutdown Cooling Mode only. The LPCI subsystem is an operational mode of the RHR System and uses the same injection lines to the RPV as the Shutdown Cooling Mode.
The design of these containment penetrations is unique in that some valves are containment isolation valves while others perform the function of pressure isolation valves. In order to meet the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J leakage testing requirements, the HV-151 F015A(B) and the closed system outside containment are the only barriers tested in accordance with the Leakage Rate Test Program. Since these containment penetrations {X-13A and X-138} include a containment isolation valve outside containment that is tested in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J requirements and a closed system outside containment that meets the requirements of USNRC Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 (September 1975), paragraph 11.3.e, the containment isolation provisions for these penetrations provide an acceptable alternative to the explicit requirements of 1 O CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 55.
Containment penetrations X-13A(B) are also high/low pressure system interfaces. In order to meet the requirements to have two (2) isolation valves between the high pressure and low pressure systems, the HV-151 F050A(B), HV-151 F122A(B),
151130 and HV-151 F015A(B) valves are used to meet this requirement and are tested in accordance with the pressure test program.
(continued)
TS/ B 3.6-15b Revision 3
BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 The PCIVs LCO was derived from the assumptions related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establishing the primary containment boundary during major accidents. As part of the primary containment boundary, PCIV OPERABILITY supports leak tightness of primary containment. Therefore, the safety analysis of any event requiring isolation of primary containment is applicable to this LCO.
The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material within primary containment are a LOCA and a main steam line break (MSLB). In the analysis for each of these accidents, it is assumed that PCIVs are either closed or close within the required isolation times following event initiation. This ensures that potential paths to the environment through PCIVs (including primary containment purge valves) and secondary containment bypass valves that are not PCIVs are minimized. The closure time of the main steam isolation valves (MS IVs) for a MSLB outside primary containment is a significant variable from a radiological standpoint. The MSIVs are required to close within 3 to 5 seconds since the 5 second closure time is assumed in the analysis. The safety analyses assume that the purge valves were closed at event initiation.
Likewise, it is assumed that the primary containment is isolated such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled.
The OBA analysis assumes that within the required isolation time leakage is terminated, except for the maximum allowable leakage rate, La.
The single failure criterion required to be imposed in the conduct of unit safety analyses was considered in the original design of the primary containment purge valves. Two valves in series on each purge line provide assurance that both the supply and exhaust lines could be isolated even if a single failure occurred.
The primary containment purge valves may be unable to close in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, each of the purge valves is required to remain closed during MODES 1, 2, and 3 except as permitted under Note 2 of SR 3.6.1.3.1. In this case, the single failure criterion remains applicable to the primary containment purge valve TS I B 3.6-16 (continued)
Revision 2
BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)
LCO SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 due to failure in the control circuit associated with each valve. The primary containment purge valve design precludes a single failure from compromising the primary containment boundary as long as the system is operated in accordance with this LCO.
Both H202 Analyzer PCIVs may not be able to close given a single failure in the control circuitry of the valves. The single failure is caused by a "hot short" in the cables/raceway to the PCIVs that causes both PCIVs for a given penetration to remain open or to open when required to be closed. This failure is required to be considered in accordance with IEEE-279 as discussed in FSAR Section 7.3.2a. However, the single failure criterion for containment isolation of the H202 Analyzer penetrations is satisfied by virtue of the combination of the associated PC IVs and the closed system formed by the H202 Analyzer piping system as discussed in the BACKGROUND section above.
The closed system boundary between PASS and the H202 Analyzer system ends at the process sampling solenoid operated isolation valves between the systems (SV-12361, SV-12365, SV-12366, SV-12368, and SV-12369). The closed system is not fully qualified to the guidance of Reference 6 in that the closed system boundary valves between the H202 system and PASS are not powered from a Class 1 E power source. However, based upon a risk determination, the use of these valves is considered to have no risk significance. This exemption to the requirement of Reference 6 for the closed system boundary is documented in License Amendment No. 195.
PC IVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (Ref. 2)
PCIVs form a part of the primary containment boundary, or in the case of SCBL valves limit leakage from the primary containment.
The PCIV safety function is related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establishing the primary containment boundary during a OBA.
The power operated, automatic isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO are listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-1 and Table B 3.6.1.3-2.
(continued)
TS I B 3.6-17 Revision 2
BASES LCO (continued)
Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 The normally closed PCIVs, including secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-2 that are not PCIVs, are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic valves are in their closed position, blind flanges are in place, and closed systems are intact. These passive isolation valves and devices are those listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-1.
Leak rate testing of the secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table 3.6.1.3-2 is permitted in Modes 1, 2 & 3 as described in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
Purge valves with resilient seals, secondary containment bypass valves, including secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-2 that are not PCIVs, MSIVs, and hydrostatically tested valves must meet additional leakage rate requirements. Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," as Type B or C testing.
This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a OBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, most PCIVs are not required to be (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS/ B 3.6-17a Revision 1
BASES APPLICABILITY
( continued)
- ACTIONS SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 OPERABLE and the primary containment purge valves are not required to be closed in MODES 4 and 5. Certain valves, however, are required to be OPERABLE to prevent inadvertent reactor vessel draindown. These valves are those whose associated instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation."
(This does not include the valves that isolate the associated instrumentation.)
The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.
A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.
The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable PCIV (e.g., an Emergency Core Cooling System subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are exceeded. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions are not required even when the associated LCO is not met. Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper actions be taken.
A.1 and A.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable except for purge valve leakage not within limit, TS I B 3.6-18 (continued)
Revision 0
BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)
Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 the affected penetration flow paths must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured. For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available valve to the primary containment. The Required
. Action must be completed within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for main steam lines). The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration a*nd the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. For main steam lines, an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is allowed. The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for the main steam lines allows a period of time to restore the MS IVs to OPERABLE status given the fact that MSIV closure will result in isolation of the main steam line(s) and a potential for plant shutdown.
For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is.necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, and no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those devices outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment" is appropriate because the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the devices inside primary containment, the time period specified "priorto entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the devices and other administrative controls ensuring that device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-19 Revision 0
BASES ACTIONS SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 A.1 and A.2 (continued)
Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two PCIVs except for the H202 Analyzer penetrations. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. For the H202 Analyzer Penetrations, Condition D provides the appropriate Required Actions.
Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.
8.1 With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable except for purge valve leakage not within limit, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de--activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.
Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PC IVs except for the H202 Analyzer penetrations. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. For the H202 Analyzer Penetrations, Condition D provides the appropriate Required Actions.
C.1 and C.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path (continued)
TS I B 3.6-20 Revision 1
BASES ACTIONS SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 C.1 and C.2 (continued)
Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time. The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. The closed system must meet the requirements of Reference 6. For conditions where the PCIV and the closed system are inoperable, the Required Actions of TRO 3.6.4, Condition B apply. For the Excess Flow Check Valves (EFCV), the Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is reasonable considering the instrument and the small pipe diameter of penetration (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.
Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV. For penetration flow paths with two PCIVs and the H202 Analyzer Penetration. Conditions A, B and D provide the appropriate Required Actions.
Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.
(continued)
TS/ B 3.6-21 Revision 2
BASES ACTIONS (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 0.1 and 0.2 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 With one or more H202 Analyzer penetrations with one or both PCIVs inoperable, the inoperable valve(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action 0.1 must be completed within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time. The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering the unique design of the H202 Analyzer penetrations. The containment isolation barriers for these penetrations consist of two PCIVs and a closed system. In addition, the Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action 0.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.
When an H202 Analyzer penetration PCIV is to be closed and deactivated in accordance with Condition D, this must be accomplished by pulling the fuse for the power supply, and eitl1er determinating the power cables at the solenoid valve, or jumpering of the power side of the solenoid to ground.
The OPERABILITY requirements for the closed system are discussed in Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Bases 3.6.4.
In the event that either one or both of the PC IVs and the closed system are inoperable, the Required Actions of TRO 3.6.4, Condition B apply.
(continued)
TS I B 3.6-22 Revision 1
BASES ACTIONS SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 D.1 and D.2 (continued)
Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Condition D is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to the H202 Analyzer penetrations.
With the secondary containment bypass leakage rate not within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis may not be met.
Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within limit within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to restore the leakage by isolating the penetration and the relative importance of secondary containment bypass leakage to the overall containment function.
F.1 In the event one or more containment purge valves are not within the purge valve leakage limits, purge valve leakage must be restored to within limits. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable, considering that one containment purge valve remains closed, except as controlled by SR 3.6.1.3.1 so that a gross breach of containment does not exist.
- G.1 and G.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are
. reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
(continued)
TS I B 3.6-22a Revision 0
BASES ACTIONS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 H.1 and H.2 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended or valve(s) are restored to OPERABLE status. If suspending an OPDRV would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the valve(s) to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve.
SR 3.6.1.3.1 This SR ensures that the primary containment purge valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason. If a purge valve is open in violation of this SR, the valve is considered inoperable. If the inoperable valve is not otherwise known to have excessive leakage when closed, it is not considered to have leakage outside of limits. The SR is also modified by Note 1, stating that primary containment purge valves are only required to be closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, the purge valves may not be capable of closing before the 'pressure pulse affects systems downstream of the purge valves, or the release of radioactive material will exceed limits prior to the purge valves closing. At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during handling of irradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are allowed to be open. The SR is modified by Note 2 stating that the SR is not required to be met when the purge valves are open for the stated reasons. The Note states that these valves may be opened for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open. The vent and purge valves are capable of closing in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for (continued)
TS/ B 3.6-23 Revision 1
BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 SR 3.6.1.3.1 (continued)
Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 limited periods of time. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.6.1.3.2 This SR verifies that each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits.
This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.
Rather, it involves verification that those PCIVs outside primary containment, and capable of being mispositioned, are in the correct position. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these PCIVs, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing.
SR 3.6.1.3.3 This SR verifies that each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise (continued)
TS I B 3.6-24 Revision 1
BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 SR 3.6.1.3.3 (continued)
Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits. For PCIVs inside primary containment, the Frequency defined as "prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate since these PCIVs are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing. Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since the primary containment is inerted and access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these PCIVs, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open.
SR 3.6.1.3.4 The traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. Surveillance of explosive charge continuity provides assurance that TIP valves will actuate when required. Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, must be followed. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verifying the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic PCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. MSIVs may be excluded from this SR since MSIV (continued)
TS I B 3.6-25 Revision 1
BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 SR 3.6.1.3.5 (continued)
Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 full closure isolation time is demonstrated by SR 3.6.1.3.7. The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the Final Safety Analyses Report. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the requirements of the lnservice Testing Program.
SR 3.6.1.3.6 For primary containment purge valves with resilient seals, the Appendix J Leakage Rate Test Interval of 24 months is sufficient.
The acceptance criteria for these valves is defined in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, 5.5.12.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
The SR is modified by a Note stating that the primary containment purge valves are only required to meet leakage rate testing requirements in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, purge valve leakage must be minimized to ensure offsite radiological release is within limits.
At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during handling of irradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are not required to meet any specific leakage criteria.
SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verifying that the isolation time of each MSIV is within the specified limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in the OBA analyses. This ensures that the calculated radiological consequences of these events remain within regulatory limits. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the lnservice Testing Program.
(continued)
TS I B 3.6-26 Revision 3
BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 SR 3.6.1.3.8 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Automatic PCIVs close on a primary containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment following a OBA. This SR ensures that each automatic PCIV will actuate to its isolation position on a primary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.1.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.6.1.3.9 This SR requires a demonstration that a representative sample of reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valves (EFCV) are OPERABLE by verifying that the valve actuates to check flow on a simulated instrument line break. As defined in FSAR Section 6.2.4.3.5 (Reference 4), the conditions under which an EFCV will isolate, simulated instrument line break, are at flow rates, which develop a differential pressure of between 3 psid and 10 psid.
This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will perform its design function to check flow. No specific valve leakage limits are specified because no specific leakage limits are defined in the FSAR. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Confrol Program. The representative sample consists of an approximate equal number of EFCVs such that each EFCV is tested at-least once every 10 years (nominal). The nominal 10 year interval is based on other performance-based testing programs, such as lnservice Testing (snubbers) and Option B to 1 O CFR 50, Appendix J. In addition, the EFCVs in the sample are representative of the various plant configurations, models, sizes and operating environments. This ensures that any potential common problems with a specific type or application of EFCV is detected at the earliest possible time.
EFCV failures will be evaluated to determine if additional testing in that test interval is warranted to ensure overall reliability and that failures to isolate are very infrequent. Therefore, testing of a representative sample was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint (Reference 7).
TS I B 3.6-27 (continued)
Revision 3
BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.6.1.3.10 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.6.1.3.11 This SR ensures that the leakage rate of secondary containment bypass leakage paths is less than the specified leakage rate. This provides assurance that the assumptions in the radiological evaluations of Reference 4 are met. The secondary containment leakage pathways and Frequency are defined by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This SR simply imposes additional acceptance criteria.
A note is added to this SR, which states that these valves are only required to meet this leakage limit in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In the other MODES, the Reactor Coolant System is not pressurized and specific primary containment leakage limits are not required.
SR 3.6.1.3.12 The analyses in References 1 and 4 are based on the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each MSIV must be ::;:; 100 scfh for any one MSIV and ::;:; 300 scfh for total leakage through the MS IVs combined with the Main Steam Line Drain Isolation Valve, HPCI Steam Supply Isolation Valve and the RCIC Steam Supply Isolation Valve. The MSIVs can be tested at either~ Pt (24.3 psig) or Pa (48.6 psig). Main Steam Line Drain Isolation, HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Isolation Valves, are tested at Pa (48.6 psig). A note is added to this SR, which states that these valves are only required to meet this leakage limit in MODES 1, 2, and 3.
In the other conditions, the Reactor Coolant System is not pressurized and specific primary containment leakage limits are not required. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-28 Revision 8
BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
REFERENCES SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 SR 3.6.1.3.13 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Surveillance of hydrostatically tested lines provides assurance that the calculation assumptions of Reference 2 are met. The acceptance criteria for the combined leakage of all hydrostatically tested lines is 3.3 gpm when tested at 1.1 Pa, (53.46 psig). The combined leakage rates must be demonstrated in accordance with the leakage rate test Frequency required by the Primary Containment Leakage Testing Program.
As noted in Table B 3.6.1.3-1, PCIVs associated with this SR are not Type C tested. Containment bypass leakage is prevented since the line terminates below the minimum water level in the Suppression Chamber. These valves are tested in accordance with the 1ST Program. Therefore, these valves leakage is not included as containment leakage.
This SR has been modified by a Note that states that these valves are only required to meet the combined leakage rate in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since this is when the Reactor Coolant System is pressurized and primary containment is required. In some instances, the valves are required to be capable of automatically closing during MODES other than MODES 1, 2, and 3. However, specific leakage limits are not applicable in these other MODES or conditions.
- 1.
FSAR, Chapter 15.
- 2.
Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
- 3.
10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.
- 4.
FSAR, Section 6.2.
- 5.
NED0-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System,"
March 1988.
- 6.
Standard Review Plan 6.2.4, Rev. 1, September 1975
- 7.
NED0-32977-A, "Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Relaxation," June 2000.
TS I B 3.6-29 Revision 2
Plant System Valve Number Containment 1-57-193 (d)
Atmospheric 1-57-194 (d)
Control HV-15703 HV-15704 HV-15705 HV-15711 HV-15713 HV-15714 HV-15721 HV-15722 HV-15723 HV-15724 HV-15725 HV-15766 (a)
HV-15768 (a)
HV-157113 (d)
HV-157114 (d)
SV-157100A SV-157100 B SV-157101 A SV-157101 B SV-157102A SV-157102 B SV-157103A SV-157103 B SV-157104 SV-157105 SV-157106 SV-157107 SV-15734 A (e)
SV-15734 B (e)
SV-15736 A (e)
SV-15736 B (e)
SV-15737 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Pac1e 1 of 11)
Valve Description Type of Valve ILRT Manual ILRT Manual Containment Purge Automatic Valve Containment Purge Automatic Valve Containment Purge Automatic Valve Containment Purge Automatic Valve Containment Purge Automatic Valve Containment Purge Automatic Valve Containment Purge Automatic Valve Containment Purge Automatic Valve Containment Purge Automatic Valve Containment Purge Automatic Valve Containment Purge Automatic Valve Suppression Pool Cleanup Automatic Valve Suppression Pool Cleanup Automatic Valve Hardened Containment Vent Power Operated (Air)
Hardened Containment Vent Power Operated (Air)
Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve Syst Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve Syst Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve Syst Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve Syst Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve Syst Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve Syst Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve Syst Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve Syst Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve Syst Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve Syst Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve Syst Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve Syst Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Nitrogen Makeup Automatic Valve TS I B 3.6-30 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.
(Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
N/A N/A 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15) 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15) 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15) 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15) 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15) 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15) 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15) 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15) 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15) 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15) 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15) 2.b, 2.d (30) 2.b, 2.d (30)
N/A N/A 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b,2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d, 2.e Revision 2
Plant System Valve Number Containment SV-15738
~tmospheric SV-15740 A (e)
Control SV-15740 B (e)
(continued)
SV-15742 A (e)
SV-15742 B (e)
SV-15750 A (e)
SV-15750 B (e)
SV-15752 A (e)
SV-15752 B (e)
SV-15767 SV-15774 A (e)
SV-15774 B (e)
SV-15776 A (e)
SV-15776 B (e)
SV-15780 A (e)
SV-15780 B (e)
SV-15782 A (e)
SV-15782 B (e)
SV-15789 Containment 1-26-072 (d)
Instrument Gas 1-26-074 (d) 1-26-152 (d) 1-26-154 (d) 1-26-164 (d)
HV-12603 SV-12605 SV-12651 SV-12654A SV-12654 B SV-12661 SV-12671 Core Spray HV-152F001 A (b)(c)
HV-152F001 B (b)(c)
HV-152F005 A HV-152F005 B HV-152F006 A HV-152F006 B HV-152F015 A (b)(c)
HV-152F015 B (b)(c)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 2 of 11)
Valve Description Type of Valve Nitrogen Makeup Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Nitrogen Makeup Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve Nitrogen Makeup Automatic Valve Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve Containment Instrument Gas Power Operated Containment Instrument Gas Power Operated Containment-Instrument Gas Automatic Valve Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve CS Suction Valve Power Operated CS Suction Valve Power Operated CS Injection Power Operated CS Injection Valve Power Operated CS Injection Valve Air Operated Check Valve CS Injection Valve Air Operated Check Valve CS Test Valve Automatic Valve CS Test Valve Automatic Valve TS I B 3.6-31 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.
(Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
2.b, 2.d, 2.e 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d, 2.e 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d, 2.e N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.c, 2.d (20) 2.c, 2.d 2.c, 2.d N/A N/A 2.b, 2.d 2.b, 2.d N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.c, 2.d (80) 2.c, 2.d (80)
Revision 3
Plant System Valve Number Core Spray HV-152F031 A (b)(c)
(continued)
HV-152F031 B (b)(c)
HV-152F037 A HV-152F037 B XV-152F018 A XV-152F018 B HPCI 1-55-038 (d) 155F046 (b)(c)(d) 155F049 (a)(d)
HV-155F002 HV-155F003 HV-155F006 HV-155F012 (b)(c)
HV-155F042 (b)(c)
HV-155F066 (a)
HV-155F075 HV-155F079 HV-155F100 XV-155F024 A XV-155F024 B XV-155F024 C XV-155F024 D Liquid Radwaste HV-16108A1 Collection HV-16108A2 HV-16116A1 HV-16116A2 Demin Water 1-41-017 (d) 1-41-018 (d)
Nuclear Boiler 141F010 A (d) 141 F010 B (d)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 (continued)
Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 3 of 11)
Valve Description Type of Valve CS Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated CS Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated CS Injection Power Operated (Air)
CS Injection Power Operated (Air)
Core Spray Excess Flow Check Valve Core Spray Excess Flow Check Valve HPCI Injection Valve Manual HPCI Minimum Flow Check Valve Manual Check HPCI Turbine Exhaust Valve Manual Check HPCI Steam Supply Valve Automatic Valve HPCI Steam Supply Valve Automatic Valve HPCI Injection Valve Power Operated HPCI Minimum Flow Valve Power Operated HPCI Suction Valve Automatic Valve HPCI Turbine Exhaust Valve Power Operated HPCI Vacuum Breaker Isolation
~utomatic Valve Valve HPCI Vacuum Breaker Isolation
~utomatic Valve Valve HPCI Steam Supply Valve
~utomatic Valve HPCI Valve Excess Flow Check Valve HPCI Valve Excess Flow Check Valve HPCI Valve Excess Flow Check Valve HPCIValve Excess Flow Checl<
Valve Liquid Radwaste Isolation Valve
~utomatic Valve Liquid Radwaste Isolation Valve
~utomatic Valve Liquid Radwaste Isolation Valve
~utomatic Valve Liquid Radwaste Isolation Valve
~utomatic Valve Demineralized Water Manual Demineralized Water Manual Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check TS I B 3.6-32 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.
(Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g (50) 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g (50)
NIA NIA 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g (115)
NIA 3.b, 3.d (15) 3.b, 3.d (15) 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g (6)
NIA NIA NIA NIA 2.b, 2.d (15) 2.b, 2.d (15) 2.b, 2.d (15) 2.b, 2.d (15)
Plant System Valve Number Nuclear Boiler 141 F039 A (d)
(continued) 141F039 B (d) 141818A(d) 141818 B (d)
HV-141F016 HV-141F019 HV-141F022A HV-141F022 B HV-141F022 C HV-141F022 D HV-141 F028 A HV-141F028 B HV-141F028 C HV-141F028 D HV-141F032 A HV-141F032 B
)(V-141F009 XV-141F070A XV-141F070 B XV-141F070 C XV-141F070 D XV-141F071 A XV-141F071 B XV-141F071 C XV-141F071 D SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 (continued)
Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 4 of 11)
Valve Description Type of Valve Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check MSL Drain Isolation Valve Automatic Valve MSL Drain Isolation Valve Automatic Valve MSIV
~utomatic Valve MSIV
!Automatic Valve MSIV
~utomatic Valve MSIV
~utomatic Valve MSIV
~utomatic Valve MSIV
!Automatic Valve MSJV
~utomatic Valve MSIV Automatic Valve Feedwater Isolation Valve Power Operated Check Feedwater Isolation Valve Power Operated Check Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check Valve TS I B 3.6-33 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.
(Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
NIA NIA NIA NIA 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (10) 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (15) 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5) 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5) 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5) 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5) 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5) 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5) 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5) 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)
NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA Revision 1
Plant System Valve Number Nuclear Boiler XV-141F072A (continued)
XV-141F072 B XV-141F072 C XV-141F072 D XV-141F073 A XV-141F073 B XV-141F073 C XV-141 F073 D Nuclear Boiler XV-14201 Vessel Instrumentation XV-14202 XV-142F041 XV-142F043 A XV-142F043 B XV-142F045 A XV-142F045 B XV-142F047 A XV-142F047 B XV-142F051 A XV-142F051 B XV-142F051 C XV-142F051 D XV-142F053 A XV-142F053 B SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 Table 8 3.6.1.3-1 (continued)
Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 5 of 11)
Valve Description Type of Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Checl<
Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow Check
~alve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve TS I B 3.6-34 Rev. 14 PCIVs 83613 Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.
(Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA Revision 0
Plant System Valve Number Nuclear Boiler XV-142F053 C Vessel Instrumentation XV-142F053 D (continued)
XV-142F055 XV-142F057 XV-142F059 A XV-142F059 B XV-142F059 C XV-142F059 D XV-142F059 E XV-142F059 F XV-142F059 G XV-142F059 H XV-142F059 L XV-142F059 M XV-142F059 N XV-142F059 P XV-142F059 R XV-142F059 S XV-142F059 T XV-142F059 U XV-142F061 RBCCW HV-11313 HV-11314 HV-11345 HV-11346 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 (continued)
Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 6 of 11)
Valve Description Type of Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow Check Valve RBCCW Automatic Valve RBCCW Automatic Valve RBCCW Automatic Valve RBCCW Automatic Valve TS I B 3.6-35 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.
(Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA N/A NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA 2.c, 2.d (30) 2.c, 2.d (30) 2.c, 2.d (30) 2.c, 2.d (30)
Revision 0
Plant System Valve Number RCIC 1-49-020 (d) 149F021 (b)(c)(d) 149F028 (a)(d) 149F040 (a)(d)
FV-149F019 (b)(c)
HV-149F007 HV-149F008 HV-149F013 HV-149F031 (b)(c)
HV-149F059 (a)
HV-149F060 (a)
HV-149F062 HV-149F084 HV-149F088 XV-149F044 A XV-149F044 B XV-149F044 C XV-149F044 D RB Chilled HV-18781 A1 Water System HV-18781 A2 HV-18781 B1 HV-18781 B2 HV-18782A1 HV-18782A2 HV-18782 B1 HV-18782 B2 HV-18791 A1 HV-18791 A2 HV-18791 81 HV-18791 B2 HV-18792 A1 HV-18792A2 HV-18792 B1 HV-18792 B2 Reactor 143F013 A (d)
Recirculation 143F013 B (d)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 Table 8 3.6.1.3-1 (continued)
Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 7 of 11)
Valve Description Type of Valve RCIC INJECTION Manual RCIC Minimum Recirculation Flow Manual Check RCIC Vacuum Pump Discharge Manual Check RCIC Turbine Exhaust Manual Check RCIC Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated RCIC Steam Supply
~utomatic Valve RCIC Steam Supply V\\utomatic Valve RCIC Injection Power Operated RCIC Suction Power Operated RCIC Turbine Exhaust Power Operated RCIC Vacuum Pump Discharge Power Operated RCIC Vacuum Breaker lt\\utomatic Valve RCIC Vacuum Breaker
~utomatic Valve RCIC Steam Supply lt\\utomatic Valve RCIC Excess Flow Check Valve RCIC Excess Flow Check Valve RCIC Excess Flow Check Valve RCIC Excess Flow Check Valve RB Chilled Water lt\\utomatic Valve RB Chilled Water V\\utomatic Valve RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve RB Chilled Water V\\utomatic Valve RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve RB Chilled Water lt\\utomatic Valve RB Chilled Water V\\utomatic Valve RB Chilled Water lt\\utomatic Valve RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve RB Chilled Water lt\\utomatic Valve RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve Recirculation Pump Seal Water Manual Check Recirculation Pump Seal Water Manual Check TS I B 3.6-36 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.
(Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g (20) 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g (20)
NIA NIA NIA NIA 4.b, 4.d (10) 4.b, 4.d (10) 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g (12)
NIA NIA NIA NIA 2.c, 2.d (40) 2.c, 2.d (40) 2.c, 2.d (40) 2.c, 2.d (40) 2.c, 2.d (12) 2.c, 2.d (12) 2.c, 2.d (12) 2.c, 2.d (12) 2.b, 2.d (15) 2.b, 2.d (15) 2.b, 2.d (15) 2.b, 2.d (15) 2.b, 2.d (8) 2.b, 2.d (8) 2.b, 2.d (8) 2.b, 2.d (8)
NIA NIA Revision 1
Plant System Valve Number Reactor XV-143F003 A Recirculation (continued)
XV-143F003 B XV-143F004 A XV-143F004 B XV-143F009 A XV-143F009 B XV-143F009 C XV-143F009 D XV-143F010 A XV-143F010 B XV-143F010 C XV-143F010 D XV-143F011 A XV-143F011 B XV-143F011 C XV-143F011 D XV-143F012 A XV-143F012 B XV-143F012 C XV-143F012 D XV-143F017 A XV-143F017 B XV-143F040 A SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 (continued)
Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 8 of 11)
Valve Description Type of Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Checl<
Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Recirculation Pump Seal Water Excess Flow Check Valve Recirculation Pump Seal Water Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve TS I B 3.6-37 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.
(Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA Revision 0
Plant System Valve Number Reactor XV-143F040 B Recirculation
( continued)
XV-143F040 C XV-143F040 D XV-143F057 A XV-143F057 B HV-143F019 HV-143F020 Residual Heat HV-151F004A (b)(c)
Removal HV-151F004 B (b)(c)
HV-151 F004 C (b)(c)
HV-151 F004 D (b)(c)
HV-151F007 A (b)(c)
HV-151F007 B (b)(c)
HV-151F008 HV-151F009 HV-151F011 A(b)(d)
HV-151F011 B (b)(d)
HV-151 F015 A (f)
HV-151F015 B (f)
HV-151F016A(b)
HV-151F016 B (b)
HV-151F022 HV-151F023 HV-151F028 A (b)
HV-151F028 B (b)
HV-151 FOSO A (g)
HV-151F050 B (g)
HV-151F103 A (b)
HV-151F103 B (b)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 (continued)
Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 9 of 11)
Valve Description Type of Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow Check Valve Reactor Coolant Sample
!Automatic Valve Reactor Coolant Sample
[Automatic Valve RHR - Suppression Pool Suction Power Operated RHR-Suppression Pool Suction Power Operated RHR - Suppression Pool Suction Power Operated RHR - Suppression Pool Suction Power Operated RHR-Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated RHR-Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated RHR - Shutdown Cooling Suction
!Automatic Valve RHR - Shutdown Cooling Suction Automatic Valve RHR-Suppression Pool Manual Cooling/Spray RHR-Suppression Pool Manual Cooling/Spray RHR - Shutdown Cooling Power Operated Return/LPCI Injection RHR - Shutdown Cooling Power Operated Return/LPCI Injection RHR - Drywell Spray Automatic Valve RHR - Drywell Spray Automatic Valve RHR - Reactor Vessel Head Spray Automatic Valve RHR - Reactor Vessel Head Spray Automatic Valve RHR - Suppression Pool Automatic Valve Cooling/Spray RHR - Suppression Pool Automatic Valve Cooling/Spray RHR - Shutdown Cooling IAir Operated Check Retum/LPCI Injection Valve Valve RHR - Shutdown Cooling Air Operated Check Retum/LPCI Injection Valve Valve RHR Heat Exchanger Vent Power Operated RHR Heat Exchanger Vent Power Operated TS I B 3.6-38 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.
(Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.b (9) 2.b (2)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.a, 6.b, 6.c (52) 6.a, 6.b, 6.c (52)
N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.c, 2.d (90) 2.c, 2.d (90) 2.d, 6.a, 6.b, 6.c (30) 2.d, 6.a, 6.b; 6.c (20) 2.c, 2.d (90) 2.c, 2.d (90)
Plant System Valve Number Residual Heat HV-151 F122 A (g)
Removal (continued)
HV-151F122 B (g)
PSV-15106 A (b)(d)
PSV-15106 B (b)(d)
PSV-151F126 (d)
XV-15109A XV-15109 B D<V-15109 C XV-15109 D RWCU HV-144F001 (a)
HV-144F004 (a)
XV-14411 A XV-14411 B XV-14411 C XV-14411 D XV-144F046 HV-14182A HV-14182 B SLCS 148F007 (a)(d)
HV-148F006 (a)
TIP System C51-J004 A (Shear Valve)
C51-J004 B (Shear Valve)
C51-J004 C (Shear Valve)
C51-J004 D (Shear Valve)
C51-J004 E (Shear Valve)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 {continued)
Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 10 of 11)
Valve Description Type of Valve RHR - Shutdown Cooling Power Operated Retum/LPCI Injection Valve (Air)
RHR - Shutdown Cooling Power Operated Return/LPCI Injection Valve (Air)
RHR - Relief Valve Discharge Relief Valve RHR - Relief Valve Discharge Relief Valve RHR - Shutdown Cooling Suction Relief Valve RHR Excess Flow Check Valve RHR Excess Flow Check Valve RHR Excess Flow Check Valve RHR Excess Flow Check Valve RWCU Suction Automatic Valve RWCU Suction Automatic Valve RWCU Excess Flow Check Valve RWCU Ex.cess Flow Check Valve RWCU Excess Flow Check Valve RWCU Excess Flow Check Valve RWCU Excess Flow Check Valve RWCU Return Isolation Valve Power Operated RWCU Return Isolation Valve Power Operated SLCS Manual Check SLCS Power Operated Check Valve TIP Shear Valves Squib Valves TIP Shear Valves Squib Valves TIP Shear Valves Squib Valves TIP Shear Valves Squib Valves TIP Shear Valves Squib Valves TS I B 3.6-39 Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.
(Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NIA 5.a, 5.b, 5.c, 5.d, 5.f, 5.g (30) 5.a, 5.b, 5.c, 5.d, 5.e, 5.f, 5.g (30)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Revision 2
Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 11 of 11)
Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1 3 Isolation Signal LCD 3.3.6.1 Function No.
(Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
TIP System C51-J004 A (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5)
(continued)
Valve)
C51-J004 B (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5)
Valve)
C51-J004 C (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5)
Valve)
C51-J004 D (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5)
Valve)
C51-J004 E (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5)
Valve)
(a)
Isolation barrier remains water filled or a water seal remains in the line post-LOCA, isolation valve is tested with water. Isolation valve leakage is not included in 0.60 La total Type B and C tests.
(b)
Redundant isolation boundary for this valve is provided by the closed system whose integrity is verified by the Leakage Rate Test Program. This footnote does not apply to valve 155F046 (HPCI) when the associated PCIV, HV155F012 is closed and deactivated. Similarly, this footnote does not apply to valve 149F021 (RCIC) when it's associated PCIV, FV149F019 is closed and deactivated.
(c)
(d)
Containment Isolation Valves are not Type C tested. Containment bypass leakage is prevented since the line terminates below the minimum water level in the Suppression Chamber. Refer to the 1ST Program.
LCO 3.3.3.1, "PAM Instrumentation," Table 3.3.3.1-1, Function 6, does not apply since these are relief valves, check valves, manual valves or deactivated and closed.
(e)
The containment isolation barriers for the penetration associated with this valve consists of two PCIVs and a closed system. The closed system provides a redundant isolation boundary for both PCIVs, and its integrity is required to be verified by the Leakage Rate Test Program.
(f)
Redundant isolation boundary for this valve is provided by the closed system whose integrity is verified by the Leakage Rate Test Program.
(g)
These valves are not required to be 10 CFR 50, Appendix J tested since the HV-151 F015A(B) valves and a closed system form the 10 CFR 50, Appendix J boundary. These valves form a high/low pressure interface and are pressure tested in accordance with the pressure test program.
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-40
- Revision 6
Table B 3.6.1.3-2 Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage Isolation Valves (Not PCIVs)
(Page 1 of 1)
Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve Residual Heat HV-151F040 RHR - RADWASTE LINE IB ISO Automatic Valve Removal VLV HV-151F049 RHR - RADWASTE LINE OB ISO Automatic Valve VLV 1-51-136 RHR - COND TRANSFER OB SCBL Check Valve CHECK VALVE 1-51-137 RHR - COND TRANSFER IB SCBL Check Valve CHECK VALVE SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-40a Rev. 14 PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Isolation Signal L.CO 3.3.6.1 Function No.
(Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
2.a, 2.d (45) 2.a, 2.d (20)
N/A N/A Revision 1
Rev. 13 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)
BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The function of the SC IVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (Ref. 1). Secondary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment into secondary containment following a OBA, or that are released during certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE or take place outside primary containment, are maintained within the secondary containment boundary.
The OPERABILITY requirements for SCIVs help ensure that an adequate secondary containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. These isolation devices consist of either passive devices or active (automatic) devices. Manual valves or dampers, de-activated automatic valves or dampers secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), and blind flanges are considered passive devices.
Automatic SCIVs close on a secondary containment isolation signal to establish a boundary for untreated radioactive material within secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents.
Other non-sealed penetrations which cross a secondary containment boundary are isolated by the use of valves in the closed position or blind flanges.
The SCIVs must be OPERABLE to ensure the secondary containment barrier to fission product releases is established. The principal accidents for which the secondary containment boundary is required are a loss of coolant accident (Ref. 1) and a fuel handling accident inside secondary containment (Ref. 2).
The secondary containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events, but the boundary (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS/ B 3.6-91 Revision 3
BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)
LCO Rev.13 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 established by SCIVs is required to ensure that leakage from the primary containment is processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System before being released to the environment.
Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.
SC IVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).
SC IVs that form a part of the secondary containment boundary are required to be OPERABLE. Depending on the configuration of the secondary containment only specific SCIVs are required. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs.
The _automatic isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal.
The valves covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in Table B 3.6.4.2-1.
The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic SCIVs are deactivated and secured in their closed position, or blind flanges are in place. These passive isolation valves or devices are listed in Table 83.6.4.2-2. Penetrations closed with sealants are considered part of the secondary containment boundary and are not considered penetration flow paths.
Certain plant piping systems (e.g., Service Water, RHR Service Water, Emergency Service Water, Feedwater, etc.) penetrate the secondary containment boundary. The intact piping within secondary containment provides a passive barrier which maintains secondary containment requirements. When the SOHR and temporary chiller system piping is connected and full of water, the piping forms the secondary containment boundary and the passive devices in TS Bases Table 83.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for these systems since the piping forms the barrier. During certain plant evolutions, piping systems may be drained and breached within secondary containment. During the pipe breach, system isolation valves can be used to provide secondary containment isolation. The isolation valve alignment will be controlled when the piping system is breached.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-92 Revision 3
Rev. 13 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES (continued)
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a OBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. Therefore, the OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.
ACTIONS In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES.
Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.
The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device.
In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.
The second Note provides clarification that for the purpose of this LCO separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable SCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable SCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.
The third Note ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable SCIV.
A.1 and A.2 In the event that there are one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoperable, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic SCIV, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. For penetrations isolated in (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-93 Revision 2
BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)
Rev. 13 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available device to secondary containment.
The Required Action must be completed within the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time.
The specified time period is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration, and the probability of a OBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time is very low.
For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, but no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. The Completion Time of once per 31 days is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that the affected penetration remains isolated.
Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two SCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.
Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to devices located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted.
Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.
With two SCIVs in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The method of isolation must (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-94 Revision 1
BASES ACTIONS 8.1 (continued)
Rev. 13 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the probability of a OBA, which requires the SC IVs to close, occurring during this short time, is very low.
The Condition has been modified by a Note stating that Condition B is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two isolation valves. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.
C.1 and C.2 With one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration.
Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time.
The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is reasonable considering the relative stability of the system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting secondary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3.
In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated.
The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS/ B 3.6-95 Revision 1
BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)
Rev. 13 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.
Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one SCIV. For penetration flow paths with two SCIVs, Conditions A and 8 provide the appropriate Required Actions.
Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted.
Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.
D.1 and D.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
E.1, E.2, and E.3 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, CORE AL TERA TIONS and the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS/ B 3.6-96 Revision 1
BASES ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E.1, E.2, and E.3 (continued)
Rev. 13 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Required Action E.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving fuel while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.
SR 3.6.4.2.1 This SR verifies that each secondary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.
The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits.
This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification (typically visual) that those required SC IVs in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by' administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these SC IVs, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.
A second Note has been included to clarify that SC IVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the SCIVs are open.
( continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-97 Revision 3
BASES Rev. 13 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SCIVs with maximum isolation times specified in Table B 3.6.2.4-1 are tested to verify that the isolation time is within limits to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Automatic SCIVs without maximum isolation times specified in Table B 3.6.4.2-1 are tested under the requirements of SR 3.6.4.2.3. The isolation time test ensures that the SCIV will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses.
REFERENCES SR 3.6.4.2.3 Verifying that each automatic required SCIV closes on a secondary containment isolation signal is required to prevent leakage of radioactive material from secondary containment following a OBA or other accidents.
This SR ensures that each automatic SCIV will actuate to the isolation position on a secondary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
- 1.
FSAR, Section 6.2.
- 2.
FSAR, Section 15.
- 3.
Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-98 Revision 2
Reactor Building Zone I
I I
II II II Ill Ill Ill Ill Ill Ill N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NIA N/A NIA N/A Table B 3.6.4.2~1 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Automatic Isolation Dampers
{Page 1 of 1)
Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve HD-17586 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17524A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17576A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27586 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27524 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27576 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17564A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17514 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17502 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27564A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27514 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27502 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17534A Zone 3 Airlock 1-606 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-175348 Zone 3 Airlock 1-611 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17534D Zone 3 Airlock 1-803 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17534E Zone 3 Airlock 1-805 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17534F Zone 3 Airlock 1-617 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-17534H Zone 3 Airlock 1-618 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27534A Zone 3 Airlock 11-606 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27534D Zone 3 Airlock 11-803 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27534E Zone 3 Airlock 11-805 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27534G Zone 3 Airlock C-806 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-27534H Zone 3 Airlock 11-618 Automatic Isolation Damper HD-275341 Zone 3 Airlock 11-609 Automatic Isolation Damper SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-99 Rev. 13 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds) 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 14.0 6.5 6.0 14.0 6.5 6.0 N/A NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA Revision 2
Device Number X-29-2-44 X-29-2-45 110176 110186 110180 110181 110182 110187 210186 210187 210191 210192 210193 X029-2-46 X-29-2-47 X-29-5-95 X-29-5-96 X-29-5-91 X-29-5-92 187388 187389 187390 187391 X-28-2-3000 X-29-2-48 X-33-2-3000 X-28-2-3000 X-29-2-48 X-33-2-3000 X-29-3-54 X-29-3-55 X-29-5-97 X-27-6-92 X-29-7-4 X-30-6-72 X-30-6-1002 X-30-6-1003 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 1 of 4)
Device Description Area/Elev.
SOHR System to Fuel Pool Cooling Yard/670 SOHR System to Fuel Pool Cooling Yard/670 SOHR Supply Drain Viv 29/670 SOHR Discharoe Drain Viv 29/670 SOHR Supply Vent Viv 29/749 SOHR Discharge Fill Viv 27/749 SOHR Discharge Vent Viv 27/749 SOHR Supply Fill Viv 29/749 SOHR Supply Drain Viv 33/749 SOHR Supply Vent Viv 33/749 SOHR Discharge Vent Viv 30/749 SOHR Discharoe Drain Viv 30/749 SOHR Discharoe Vent Viv 33/749 Temporarv Chiller to RBCW Yard/670 Temporarv Chiller to RBCW Yard/670 Temporarv Chiller to Unit 1 RBCW 29/749 Temporarv Chiller to Unit 1 RBCW 29/749 Temporary Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW 33/749 Temporary Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW 33/749 RBCWTemp Chiller Discharge lso Viv 29/670 RBCW Temp Chiller Supply lso Viv 29/670 RBCW Temp Chiller Suoolv Drain Viv 29/670 RBCWTemo Chiller Discharoe Drain Viv 29/670 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell Yard/670 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bav Yard/670 Utility Penetration to Unit 2 East Stairwell Yard/670 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell 28/670 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bav 29/670 Utility Penetration to Unit 2 East Stairwell 33/670 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area 27/683 Utilitv Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area 27/683 Utilitv Penetration from Unit 1 RR Bav to Unit 2 Elev. 749 33/749 Instrument Tubino Stubs 271779' 1" Spare Conduit Threaded Plug 29/818' Instrument Tubino Stubs 30/779' Stairwell #214 Rupture Disc 30/779' Airlock 11-609 Rupture Disc 30/779' SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-100 Rev. 13 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Required Position/ Notes Blind Flanged / Note 1 Blind Flanged / Note 1 Closed Manual lso Valve/ Note 1 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 1 Closed Manual lso Valve/ Note 1 Closed Manual lso Valve/ Note 1 Closed Manual lso Valve/ N'ote 1 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 1 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 1 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 1 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 1 Closed Manual lso Valve/ Note 1 Closed Manual lso Valve/ Note 1 Blind Flanoed / Note 2 Blind Flanged / Note 2 Blind Flanged / Note 2 Blind Flanged / Note 2 Blind Flanged / Note 2 Blind Flanged / Note 2 Closed Manual lso Valve/ Note 2 Closed Manual lso Valve/ Note 2 Closed Manual lso Valve/ Note 2 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 2 Blind Flanoed / Note 3 Capped I Note 5 Blind Flanged / Note 4 Blind Flanged / Note 3 Capped I Note 5 Blind Flanoed / Note 4 Blind Flanged / Note 6 Blind Flanoed I Note 6 Capped Capped Installed CaPoed Installed Intact Installed Intact Revision 7
Device Number X-25-6-1 008 X-29-4-D1-B X-29-4-D1-A X-29-4-D 1-B X-29-4-D1-A HD17534C HD27534C XD-17513 XD-17514 XD-12301 XD-22301 161827 161828 161829 161830 261820 261821 261822 1LRWl810U 1LRWl810V 1LRWl810W 1LRWl810X 1LRWl810Y 1LRW1810Z 1LRWl810FF 1LRWl810GG 1LRWl810HH 1LRW1810JJ 1LRWl810KK 1LRWl615A 1LRWl100A 1LRWl100B 1LRWl100C 1LRWl100D 1LRWl100E 1LRWl100F 1LRWl100G Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 2 of 4)
Device Description Area/Elev.
Airlock 1-606 Rupture Disc 25/779' Penetration at Door 4330 29/719' Penetration at Door 4330 29/719' Penetration at Door 404 33/719' Penetration at Door 404 33/719' Airlock 1-707 Blind Flange 28/799' Airlock 11-707 Blind Flange 33/799' Isolation damper for Railroad Bay Zone Ill HVAC Supply 29/799' Isolation damper for Railroad Bay Zone Ill HVAC Exhaust 29/719' PASS Air Flow Damper 11/729' PASS Air Flow Damper 22/729' HPCI Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 25/645' RCIC Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 28/645'
'A' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 29/645'
'B' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 28/645' RCIC Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 33/645'
'I\\ RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 34/645'
'B' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 33/645' Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29,818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-779 Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-1 OOa Rev. 13 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Required Position/ Notes Installed Intact Blind Flanqe Installed Blind Flanqe Installed Blind Flange Installed Blind Flange Installed Blind Flange Installed Blind Flanae Installed Position is dependent on Railroad Bav alianment Position is dependent on Railroad Bav alianment Closed Damper Closed Damper Closed Manual lso Valve/ Note 3 Closed Manual lso Valve/ Note 3 Closed Manual lso Valve/ Note 3 Closed Manual lso Valve / Note 3 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 4 Closed Manual lso Valve/ Note 4 Closed Manual lso Valve/ Note 4 Plugged / Note 7 Plugged / Note 7 Pluaaed / Note 7 Pluaaed / Note 7 Pluaaed / Note 7 Plugged / Note 7 Pluaaed / Note 7 Pluqged / Note 7 Plugged / Note 7 Pluaaed / Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Plugged / Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Plugged I Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Plugged / Note 7 Pluaaed / Note 7 Pluaaed / Note 7 Pluaaed I Note 7 Revision 6
Device Number 2LRWl810L 2LRWl810M 2LRWl810N 2LRWl810R 2LRWl810S 2LRWl703A 2LRW1615A 2LRWl100A 2LRWl100B 2LRW1100C 2LRWl100D 2LRWl100E 2LRWl100F 2LRWl100G 257328 OR 257336 157328 OR 157336 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 3 of 4)
Device Description Area/Elev.
Zone Ill Floor Drain 34-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 34-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 34-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 34-818 Zone Ill Floor Drain 34-818 Zone II Floor Drain 34-799 Zone II Floor Drain 34-779 Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 HCVS Rupture Disc Burst Connection Isolation Valves 21/686' HCVS Rupture Disc Burst Connection Isolation Valves 21/686' SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-1 OOb Rev. 13 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Required Position / Notes Pluaaed / Note 7 Pluqaed / Note 7 Pluaaed / Note 7 Pluaaed / Note 7 Pluaaed / Note 7 Pluaaed / Note 7 Plugged/ Note 7 Pluaaed / Note 7 Pluaaed / Note 7 Pluaaed / Note 7 Pluqaed / Note 7 Plugged/ Note 7 Pluaaed / Note 7 Pluaged / Note 7 Closed Manual lso Valve / Note 4 Closed Manual lso Valve/ Note 3 Revision 6
Table B 3.6.4.2=2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 4 of 4)
Rev. 13 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Note 1: The two blind flanges on the SOHR penetrations (blind flanges for device number X-29-2-44 and X-29-2-45) and all the closed manual valves for the SOHR system (110176, 110186, 110180, 110181, 110182, 110187, 210186, 210187, 210191, 210192, 210193) can each be considered as a separate secondary containment isolation device for the SOHR penetrations. If one or both of the blind flanges is removed and all the above identified manual valves for the SOHR system are closed, the appropriate LCO should be entered for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. With the blind flange removed, the manual valves could be opened intermittently under administrative controls per the Technical Specification Note. When both SOHR blind flanges are installed, opening of the manual valves for the SOHR system will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. When the manual valves for the SOHR system are open in this condition, the appropriate LCO should be entered for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. When the SOHR system piping is connected and full of water, the piping forms the secondary containment boundary and the above listed SCIVs in Table 83.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for this system since the piping forms the barrier.
Note 2: Due to the multiple alignments of the RBCW temporary chiller, different devices will perform the SCIV function depending on the RBCW configuration. There are three devices/equipment that can perform the SCIV function for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration. The first SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration is the installed blind flange on penetration X-29-2-47. The second SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration is isolation valve 187389. The third SCIV for the temporary RBCW chiller supply penetration is closed drain valve 187390 and an installed blind flange on penetrations X-29-5-92 and X-29-5-96. Since there are effectively three SC IVs, any two can be used to satisfy the SCIV requirements for the penetration.
Removal of one of the two required SC IVs requires entry into the appropriate LCO for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SC IVs. Opening of drain valve 187390 and operation of blank flanges X-29-5-96 and X-29-5-92 will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. These three SCIVs prevent air leakage. The isolation of the penetration per the Technical Specification requirement is to assure that one of the above SCIVs is closed so that there is no air leakage.
There are three devices/equipment that can perform the SCIV function for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration. The first SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration is the installed blind flange on penetration X-29-2-46. The second SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration is isolation valve 187388. The third SCIV for the temporary RBCW chiller return penetration is closed drain valve 187391 and an installed blind flange on penetrations X-29-5-91 and X-29-5-95. Since there are effectively three SC IVs, any two can be used to define the SCIV for the penetration. Removal of one of the two required SC IVs requires entry into the appropriate LCO for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. Opening of drain valve 187391 and operation of blank flanges X-29-5-91 and X-29-5-95 will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones.
These three SC IVs prevent air leakage. The isolation of the penetration per the Technical Specification requirement is to assure that one of the above SC IVs is closed so that there is no air leakage.
When the RBCW temporary chiller piping is connected and full of water, the piping inside secondary containment forms the secondary containment boundary and the above listed SCIVs in Table 83.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for this system.
Note 3: These penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone I to a No-Zone. When Secondary Containment Zone I is isolated from the recirculation plenum, the above listed SCIVs in Table 83.6.4.2-2 are no longer required.
Note*4: These penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone II to a No-Zone. When Secondary Containment Zone II is isolated from the recirculation plenum, the above listed SCIVs in Table 83.6.4.2-2 are no longer required.
Note 5: These penetrations connect the Railroad Bay to a No-Zone. When the Railroad Bay is a No-Zone, the above listed SCIVs in Table 83.6.4.2-2 are no longer required.
Note 6: These penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone I to the Railroad Bay. The above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are not required if the Railroad Bay is a No-Zone and Zone I is isolated from the recirculation plenum OR if the Railroad Bay is aligned to Zone I.
Note 7: Due to a drain header containing multiple floor drains in different ventilation zones, drain plugs were installed in all of the drain header floor drains. To provide the passive Secondary Containment boundary only drain plugs in one ventilation zone are required to be installed.
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.6-100c Revision 0