Text

Proposed License Amendment Numbers 272 for Unit 1 Operating License No. NTF-14 and 241 for Unit 2 Operating License No. NPF-22, Power Range Neutron Monitor System Digital Upgrade PLA-5880
	ML051870394
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	06/27/2005
From:	Mckinney B; Susquehanna
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	PLA-5880
	Download: ML051870394 (259)
	v • d • e

-

Britt T. McKlnney PPL Susquehanna, LLC Vice President-Nuclear Site Operations 769 Salem Boulevard iX

Berwick, PA 18603 "

Tel.570.542.3149 Fax 570.542.1504 * *#

JUN 2 7 2005 btmckinney~pplweb.com U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Stop OPI-17 Washington, DC 20555 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT NUMBERS 272 FOR UNIT 1 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NTF-14 AND 241 FOR UNIT 2 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-22 POWVER RANGE NEUTRON MONITOR SYSTEM DIGITAL UPGRADE Docket Nos. 50-387 PLA-5880 and 50-388 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, PPL Susquehanna, LLC (PPL), hereby requests approval of the following amendments to the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS), as described in the enclosure. The proposal would change Technical Specifications for Reactor Protection System and Control Rod Block Instrumentation, Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Instrumentation, Recirculation Loops Operating, Shutdown Margin Test - Refueling, and the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR).

The proposed change is needed to allow modification of the existing Power Range Neutron Monitor (PRNM) system by installation of the General Electric (GE) Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control (NUMAC) PRNM system. The Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) detectors and signal cables would not be replaced. The existing OPRM system hardware would be replaced. The OPRM trip function would be integrated into the NUMAC PRNM system.

The modification of the PRNM system replaces analog technology with a more reliable digital upgrade and simplifies the management and maintenance of the system.

The SSES PRNM system installation is planned in two phases. Phase 1 (this amendment) includes a full PRNM installation that retains the current "non-Average Power Range Monitor/Rod Block Monitor/ Technical Specifications" ["non-ARTS"] version of the Rod Block Monitor (RBM). Phase 2 (separate amendment) includes minor modification to the PRNM equipment to incorporate the "ARTS" logic in the RBM and implement associated setpoint modifications for RBM and Average Power Range Monitor equipment. This change would improve the design function of the Rod Block Monitor in support of Extended Power Uprate.

The Technical Specification change request in this letter is specifically to support licensing review of Phase 1 of the PRNM modification with current "non-ARTS." A separate Average Power Range Monitor/Rod Block Monitor/Technical Specifications change request letter with associated Technical Specification mark-ups will be prepared for Phase 2.

As demonstrated in the enclosed evaluation, the proposed amendments do not involve a significant hazard consideration.

Document Control Desk PLA-5880 Precedent licensing submittals have been approved by NRC for Nine Mile Point Unit 2, Browns Ferry Units 2 and 3, Hatch Units 1 and 2, Fermi Unit 2, Limerick Units 1 and 2, Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3, and Brunswick Units 1 and 2. These precedents are discussed in the Background section of the Licensee Evaluation of proposed changes.

The PRNM system is scheduled for installation on Unit 1 in the Spring of 2006, and installation on Unit 2 in the Spring of 2007. To support this schedule, PPL requests approval of the proposed amendments by February 1, 2006. PPL requests that the approved amendments be issued with the Unit 1 amendment effective upon issuance with implementation prior to startup following the U1-14 refueling outage and the Unit 2 amendment effective upon issuance with implementation prior to startup following the U2-13 refueling outage. is the Technical Specifications mark-up. Attachment 2 is the associated Technical Specification Bases mark-up, for information.

There are no regulatory commitments associated with the proposed changes.

The need for the changes has been discussed with the SSES NRC Project Manager.

The proposed changes have been reviewed by the SSES Plant Operations Review Committee and by the Susquehanna Review Committee. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b), PPL Susquehanna, LLC is providing the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with a copy of this proposed License Amendment request.

If you have any questions or require additional. information, please contact Mr. John M. Oddo at (610) 774-7596.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on: 705 B. T. McKinney

Enclosure:

PPL Susquehanna Evaluation of the Proposed Changes Attachments: - Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-up) - Changes to Technical Specifications Bases Pages (Mark-up, Provided for Information)

Copy: NRC Region I Mr. A. J. Blamey, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. R. V. Guzman, NRC Project Manager Mr. R. Janati, DEP/BRP

ENCLOSURE TO PLA-5880 PPL SUSQUEHANNA EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: 3.3.1.1 "REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION"; 3.3.1.3 "OSCILLATION POWER RANGE MONITOR (OPRM) INSTRUMENTATION"; 3.3.2.1 "CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION"; 3.4.1 "RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING"; 3.10.8 "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) TEST-REFUELING"; 5.6.5 "CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)"

FOR INSTALLATION OF UPGRADED POWER RANGE NEUTRON MONITOR SYSTEM AND REVISED THERMAL-HYDRAULIC STABILITY OPTION III

1. DESCRIPTION

2. PROPOSED CHANGE

3. BACKGROUND

4. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

5. REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS 7.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration 7.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria

6. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

7. PLANT-SPECIFIC EVALUATION REQUIRED BY NUMAC PRNM RETROFIT PLUS OPTION III STABILITY/ TRIP FUNCTION TOPICAL REPORT (NEDC-3241OP-A)

8. REFERENCES

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 1 of 81 PPL EVALUATION

SUBJECT:

PPL SUSQUEHANNA EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: 3.3.1.1 "REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION";

3.3.1.3 "OSCILLATION POWER RANGE MONITOR (OPRM)

INSTRUMENTATION"; 3.3.2.1 "CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION"; 3.4.1 "RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING"; 3.10.8 "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) TEST-REFUELING"; 5.6.5 "CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)" FOR INSTALLATION OF UPGRADED POWER RANGE NEUTRON MONITOR SYSTEM AND REVISED THERMAL-HYDRAULIC STABILITY OPTION III

1. DESCRIPTION The proposal would change the PPL Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (PPL)

Technical Specifications for Reactor Protection System and Control Rod Block Instrumentation, Oscillation Power Range Monitor Instrumentation (OPRM),

Recirculation Loops Operating, Shutdown Margin Test - Refueling, and the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR).

The proposed change is needed to allow modification of the existing Power Range Neutron Monitor (PRNM) system, excluding the Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) detectors and signal cables, by installation of the General Electric (GE) Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control (NUMAC) PRNM system. The existing OPRM system hardware would be replaced. The OPRM trip function would be integrated into the NUMAC PRNM system.

The PRNM system is scheduled for installation on Unit 1 in the Spring of 2006, and installation on Unit 2 in the Spring of 2007. To support this schedule, PPL requests approval of the proposed amendments by February 1, 2006. PPL requests that the approved amendments be issued with the Unit 1 amendment effective upon issuance with implementation prior to startup following the U1-14 refueling outage and the Unit 2 amendment effective upon issuance with implementation prior to startup following U2-13 refueling outage.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 2 of 81

2. PROPOSED CHANGE The proposal would change Technical Specifications Sections 3.3.1.1, 3.3.1.3, 3.3.2.1, 3.4.1, 3.10.8, 5.6.5, and their associated Bases, allowing modification of the existing Power Range Neutron Monitoring (PRNM) system and Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) system by installation of a digital Power Range Neutron Monitor (PRNM) system. These changes are consistent with the NRC approved GE Licensing Topical Report (LTR) NEDC-324I OP-A, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function" and its Supplement 1 (Here-in both referred to as NUMAC PRNM LTR)

(References 1 and 2). A PPL Susquehanna specific evaluation was performed.

The existing PRNM system and OPRM system will be replaced with GE's Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control (NUMAC) PRNM system, which will perform the same plant-level functions as the currently installed systems, including the OPRM Stability Option III functions. The NUMAC PRNM system incorporates the functions of the current PRNM's Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) system, Rod Block Monitor (RBM) system, Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) and the current OPRM. The modification of the Power Range Neutron Monitor system replaces analog technology with a more reliable digital upgrade and simplifies the management and maintenance of the system.

The Units I and 2 Technical Specification changes (mark-ups) associated with the following proposed changes are included as Attachment 1. These changes are in accordance with the NUMAC PRNM LTRs. Any change, deviating from, or not addressed in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs will be further described and justified in Section 4 Technical Analysis. Attachment 2 is the associated Technical Specification Bases mark-up, for information. The Bases have been revised to reflect the Technical Specification changes and provide supporting information and references. Some reference to the Bases changes is made in Section 2.1 where additional information is deemed appropriate. The proposed significant changes are:

2.1. Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation - APRM Related RPS Instrumentation Functions Functions

The APRM "Neutron Flux - High, Setdown" scram is retained but the name is changed to APRM "Neutron Flux - High (Setdown)".

The APRM "Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High" scram is retained but the name is changed to APRM "Simulated Thermal Power -

High."

The APRM "Fixed Neutron Flux - High" scram is retained but the name is changed to APRM "Neutron Flux - High."

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 3 of 81

The APRM "Inop" trip is retained but is changed somewhat to reflect the new NUMAC PRNM system equipment and to delete the minimum LPRM detector count from this trip. The minimum LPRM detector count will be retained in the APRM "Trouble" alarm function.

A new APRM "pseudo function" entitled "2-out-of4 Voter" is added to Technical Specifications to facilitate minimum operable channel definition and associated actions.

The OPRM Trip Function (called an OPRM Upscale in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs) is added to the Technical Specifications under APRM Functions.

This function replaces the function currently covered by LCO 3.3.1.3 at SSES.

Minimum Number of Operable APRM/OPRM Channels

The required minimum number of operable APRM channels will change from four (2 per RPS trip system) to three channels.

The required minimum number of operable OPRM channels will be three channels.

The new 2-out-of4 Voter Function will have a requirement that all four Voter channels must be operable (2 per RPS trip system).

Note: The following two bullets are Technical Specification Bases information and are provided as additional detail and are described in the NUMAC PRNM LTR. This information was previously moved to the Technical Specification Bases as part of the Improved Standard Technical Specification program which, was reviewed and approved by the NRC.

The minimum number of operable LPRMs per APRM channel required for APRM channel operability will increase from 14 to 20 per APRM channel and from 2 to 3 for each of the four LPRM axial levels per APRM channel.

The number of inoperable LPRMs is managed administratively.

A new maximum number of LPRMs per APRM channel that may become inoperable (and bypassed) between APRM gain calibrations will be added.

The new limit is 9 LPRMs per APRM channel. This is an administrative limit.

The OPRM setpoints and settings, such as minimum number of LPRMs per OPRM cell, are presently maintained in the TRM section 3.3.9, "OPRM Instrumentation Configuration." OPRM Plant Specific settings information outlined in the NUMAC PRNM LTR section 8.4.2.2 will continue to be maintained in the TRM.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 4 of 81 Applicable Modes of Operation

The new APRM 2-out-of-4 Voter Function will be required to be operable in Modes 1 (RUN) and 2 (STARTUP), the same as the current APRM Inop function.

The applicable Modes of operation for the remainder of the APRM functions will be unchanged from the current design.

The OPRM Trip Function will be required to be operable when Reactor Power 2 25% RTP and is unchanged from the current OPRM system.

Channel Check Surveillance Requirements

The Channel Check requirement for the APRM scram functions will be the same except the frequency will be reduced from once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

The new APRM 2-out-of-4 Voter Function will have Channel Check requirements of once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

A Channel Check requirement for the OPRM Trip Function at a frequency of once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months will be included. The current OPRM system has no Channel Check requirement.

Channel Functional Test Surveillance Requirements

APRM Neutron Flux--High (Setdown)

The requirement will be changed from a frequency of every 7 days to every 184 days (6 months).

APRM Simulated Thermal Power--High The requirement will be changed from a frequency of every 92 days to every 184 days (6 months). The Channel Functional Test includes the flow input function, excluding the flow transmitters.

APRM Neutron Flux--High The requirement will be changed from a frequency of every 92 days to every 184 days (6 months).

APRM Inop The requirement will be changed from a frequency of every 92 days to 184 days (6 months).

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 5 of 81

2-Out-of-Four Voter The requirement for a frequency of every 184 days (6 months) is included, the same rate as for the APRM and OPRM functions supported by the Voter.

OPRM Trip The OPRM Trip Function will have a Channel Functional Test requirement with a frequency of every 184 days (6 months) and is the same as the frequency for the current OPRM system. The Channel Functional Test for the OPRM Trip Function includes the flow input function, excluding the flow transmitters.

Channel Calibration Surveillance Requirements

APRM Neutron Flux--High (Setdown)

The Channel Calibration frequency will be changed from every 184 days to every 24 months.

APRM Simulated Thermal Power--High The Channel Calibration frequency will be changed from every 184 days to every 24 months. Calibration of the flow hardware will be included in overall Channel Calibration of this function at 24-month intervals. The current requirement (i.e. SR 3.3.1.1.14) to verify the APRM Simulated Thermal Power -- High time constant is < 7 seconds every 24 months is being deleted.

APRM Neutron Flux--High The Channel Calibration frequency will be changed from every 184 days to every 24 months.

APRM Inop No change in requirement (i.e., no calibration applies).

OPRM Trip The OPRM Trip Function will have a Channel Calibration requirement with a frequency of every 24 months and is the same as the frequency for the current OPRM system. The OPRM Trip Function will have a surveillance requirement with a frequency of every 24 months, to confirm that the OPRM auto-enable setpoints are correctly set and is the same as for the current OPRM system.

Recirculation Drive Flow / Reactor Core Flow Alignment A new surveillance, which requires alignment of recirculation drive flow and reactor core flow, is added to better define the frequency of this

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 6 of 81 adjustment. That SR will apply to the APRM Simulated Thermal Power --

High Function and to the new OPRM Trip Function.

Response Time Testing Surveillance Requirements

The LPRM detectors, APRM channels, OPRM channels, and 2-out-of-4 Voter channels digital electronics are exempt from response time testing.

The requirement for response time testing to the RPS logics and RPS contactors (50ms) will be retained by including a response time testing requirement for the new 2-out-of-4 Voter logic.

The response time testing requirement for existing APRM "High" functions will be deleted.

A new response time testing requirement for the 2-out-of-4 Voter Function will be added. The Response Time Testing requirement for this new scram function will be < 0.05 seconds. Response time will be measured from activation of the 2-out-of-4 Voter output relay.

Insert NOTE 3 to identify for Function 2.e, "n" equals 8 channels.

Logic System Functional Testing (LSFIT) Surveillance Requirements

The LSFT requirements for all APRM "High" functions will be deleted.

The 2-out-of-4 Voter Function will have an added LSFT requirement with a frequency of every 24 months.

Setpoints and Allowable Values No changes have been made to the Technical Specification Setpoints and Allowable Values.

Table 3.3.1.1-1 Notes

Change Note (b) from "0.58 W + 57% RTP" to "0.58 (W-AW) + 62% RTP" when reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculating Loops Operating." The value of AW is 5%/0.58.

Add new Note (c) "Each APRM channel provides inputs to both trip systems."

2.2 OPRM Instrumentation, LCO 3.3.1.3

The completion time for LCO 3.3.1.3 Condition A, has been changed from 30 days to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (LCO 3.3.1.1, Condition A).

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 7 of 81

LCO 3.3.1.3 is deleted and the OPRM trip function is added to LCO 3.3.1.1 as Function 2.f to remain consistent with the OPRM implementation in the NUMAC PRNM LTR.

SR 3.3.1.3.2 calibration of the local power range monitors occurs with performance of SR 3.3.1.1.8.

SR 3.3.1.3.6, "Verify the RPS Response Time is within limits" is deleted for the OPRM.

OPRM LCO Conditions and Required Actions

LCO 3.3.1.1 Condition A, and the associated Required Actions apply to the added OPRM Trip function (Function 2.) the same as for the APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b., 2.c and 2.d in the new PRNMS.

Required Action A.2 and Condition B do not apply to Function 2.f.

LCO 3.3.1.1 Conditions I and J will be defined with associated Required Actions and Completion Times. These Conditions apply when the OPRM channel LCO 3.3.1.1 Condition A (and associated follow through Actions B, C, and D) Required Actions and associated Completion Times are not met, when the OPRM Trip function is not available due to less than two Operable OPRM Channels, or when the OPRM Trip function is not available due to a design problem that renders all OPRM Channels inoperable. These conditions replace the LCO 3.3.1.3 Conditions B and C.

Required Action I.1 allows a Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to initiate alternate methods of detecting and suppressing instabilities.

Required Action I.2 allows a Completion Time of 120 days to restore the OPRM Operability.

Condition J applies if the Completion Times for Required Actions 1.1 or I.2 are not met. The Required Action J.1 will allow 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to be less than 25% RTP.

The alternate method for detection and suppression required by Required Action I.1 replaces the LCO 3.3.1.3 Condition B.1 and is controlled by the Technical Requirements Manual rather than Technical Specifications.

Required Actions I.1 and I.2 are the same as the present OPRM 3.3.1.3 Required Actions B11 and B2.

The new LCO 3.3.1.1 Required Actions I.1, I.2 and J.1, applicable only to the OPRM Trip Function and modified Required Actions for Conditions A, B and C, replace the deleted LCO 3.3.1.1 Required Actions B.1, B.2, and

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 8 of 81 C.1. (Note: Technical Specification section 3.3.1.3 for the current OPRM is being deleted and existing requirements are being incorporated into Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.)

2.3 PRNM Control Rod Block Instrumentation Functions, LCO 3.3.2.1 RBM Functions

There are no changes to the RBM Functions.

For recirculation single loop operation, table 3.3.2.1-1 Note (b) has been changed from "' 0.58 W + 50%" to "S 0.58 (W-AW) + 55%."

The value of AW is 5%/0.58.

RBM Surveillance Requirements, SR 3.3.2.1.1

The only Surveillance Requirement change for the rod block functions is a change in the required frequency for the Channel Functional test surveillance for the Rod Block Monitor.

The required frequency will be changed from every 92 days to every 184 days.

2.4 Recirculation Loops Operating, LCO 3.4.1

The reference to the "APRM Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power -

High" scram will be replaced with "APRM Simulated Thermal Power -

High."

2.5 Shutdown Margin Test - Refueling, LCO 3.10.8

In the LCO statement and one SR, LCO 3.3.1.1 Function "2.e" is added to recognize that the APRM 2-out-of-4 Voter Function needs to be operable.

This has no effect on LCO 3.10.8 logic or requirements.

2.6 Reporting Requirements, Core Operating Limits, Section 5.6.5

The change to Section 5.6.5, COLR, identifies the change for OPRM setpoints for Specifications from Section 3.3.1.3 to Section 3.3.1.1.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 9 of 81

3. BACKGROUND PPL is planning a modification to upgrade the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 and 2, Power Range Neutron Monitoring (PRNM) system and Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) system. With the modification, the existing PRNM System, including OPRM, will be replaced with GE's Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control (NUMAC) PRNM system, which will perform the same plant-level functions as the currently installed systems, including the OPRM Stability Option III functions.

The NUMAC PRNM system incorporates the functions of the current PRNM's Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) system, Rod Block Monitor (RBM) system, Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) and the current OPRM.

The PRNMS modification is in support of Extended Power Uprate. The digital PRNMS modification replaces analog technology with a more reliable digital upgrade and simplifies management and maintenance of the system.

The digital upgrade, combined with future implementation of the "Average Power Range Monitor/Rod Block Monitor/Technical Specifications/Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis (ARTS/MELLLA), provides the capability for re-assignment of LPRM inputs to the Rod Block Monitor (RBM). This would improve RBM responsiveness to a design basis control rod withdrawal error event, resulting in improved fuel operating margins needed for operation at uprated power levels. Future improvements will be addressed, as applicable, in separate licensing submittals.

The planned modification consists of replacing the existing APRM, RBM, LPRM, OPRM, and recirculation flow processing equipment, all part of the existing PRNM system. The modification excludes the LPRM detectors and signal cables, which will be retained with the NUMAC PRNM replacement.

GE Licensing Topical Reports (LTR) NEDC-32410P-A, Volumes 1 & 2, and NEDC-3241OP-A Supplement 1 "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC-PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function,"

(References 1 and 2) describe in detail, the generic NUMAC PRNM design including the OPRM functions (Stability Option III) and several plant-specific variations and plant-specific actions.

The currently installed SSES OPRM system implements the "Reactor Stability Long Term Solution Option III" as described in NEDO-31960-A (including Supplement 1),

"BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology" (Reference 3). The currently installed OPRM system has some separate hardware, but functions logically with the APRM system and receives inputs from the PRNM system.

With the replacement NUMAC PRNM system, the existing OPRM hardware is removed and the function is digitally integrated within the PRNM equipment. The NUMAC PRNM LTRs NEDC-32410P-A and NEDC-3241OP-A Supplement 1 discuss implementation of the OPRM functions within the PRNM equipment.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 10 of 81 FSAR Sections containing description of the current PRNM system are:

Section 7.1, Instrumentation and Controls "Introduction"

Section 7.2, "Reactor Trip System (Reactor Protection System) Instrumentation and Controls"

Section 7.6, "All Other Instrumentation Systems Required for Safety"

Section 7.7, "Control Systems Not Required for Safety" Precedent licensing submittals have been approved by NRC for Nine Mile Point Unit 2, Browns Ferry Units 2 and 3, Hatch Units 1 and 2, Fermi Unit 2, Limerick Units 1 and 2, Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3, and Brunswick Units 1 and 2.

Of these precedents, Nine Mile Point Unit 2, Browns Ferry Units 2 and 3, as well as Fermi Unit 2 have a similar APRM design. Limerick Units 1 and 2 have the same Reactor Vessel and Core Geometry as Susquehanna, as well as a similar NUMAC APRM design.

Section 7 of this evaluation specifies how the NUMAC PRNM LTRs apply to SSES, identifies which configurations discussed in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs apply to SSES, identifies SSES-specific variations from the descriptions in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs, and provides additional justification, where necessary, for differences between the SSES design and the generic design.

3.1 Power Range Neutron Monitoring Functions:

All power range neutron monitoring functions are retained, including LPRM detector signal processing, LPRM averaging, and APRM trips.

In some cases, the existing functions will be improved with additional filtering or modified processing. These include LPRM filtering and, for some functions, APRM filtering. The LPRM signal input filtering is improved using advanced digital processing methods. The digital filtering provides improved noise rejection for AC power related noise and some non-nuclear type transients without affecting the system response to real neutron flux signals. For the APRM, a filtered APRM flux signal called "simulated thermal power (STP)" is generated using a 6-second (nominal value) first order filter. The APRM flow-biased scram trip (and the associated clamp) will continue to operate from STP to provide the same response characteristics as the current system. In the NUMAC PRNM, STP is also used for APRM calibration against core thermal power to provide a better indication of actual average flux and for the APRM upscale rod block trips. APRM unfiltered flux signal supplies reference signal input to the RBM, the same as the current system. If the APRM is indicating less than the low power range setpoint, the RBM is automatically bypassed. The APRM upscale scram trip will continue to operate from unfiltered APRM flux to meet the trip response time assumptions in the safety analyses. Both filtered APRM flux (STP) and unfiltered APRM flux are displayed for the operator. The filtered APRM flux provides the best indication of true average power while the unfiltered flux provides a real-time indication of APRM flux changes.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 11 of 81 The current 6-APRM channel configuration is replaced with four APRM channels, each using 1/4 of the total LPRM detectors. The outputs from all 4-APRM channels go to four independent 2-out-of-4 Voter channels. Two of the four Voter channels are assigned to either RPS trip system A or trip system B.

The APRM scram trip function will be retained, but four 2-out-of4 Voter channels are added between the APRM channels and the input to the RPS.

The trip outputs from all four APRM channels are sent to each 2-out-of-4 Voter channel, so that each of the inputs to the RPS is a voted result of all four APRM channels.

Recirculation flow signal processing, previously accomplished using separate hardware within the existing PRNM control panels, is integrated into the APRM chassis in the new PRNMS. The existing 4-channel recirculation flow processing system (4 flow transmitters on each recirculation loop) is retained. In the current system, two flow channels provide inputs to the 3 APRM channels in one RPS trip system while the other two flow channels provide inputs to the APRM channels in the second RPS trip system. In the replacement PRNMS, each flow channel provides inputs to one of the 4 APRM channels. Therefore, each APRM channel also provides the signal processing for one flow channel in the replacement PRNM. The APRM hardware also performs the recirculation upscale flow alarm function.

The basic RBM logic will remain the same as in the current system, except that the LPRM signals and recirculation flow signals will be provided digitally from the APRM channels. However, the NUMAC RBM chassis provides some additional surveillance capability that allows testing of functions in all plant conditions. The same hardware, which performs the RBM logic (the RBM chassis), will also perform the recirculation flow comparison alarm function in the replacement system. In the replacement system, this function compares the recirculation flow values from each of the four flow channels.

Low voltage power supply (LVPS) functions are retained except that the post-modification configuration provides additional redundancy against loss of RPS AC power. In the current PRNMS, each APRM and RBM channel is powered by a single channel of RPS AC power busses, either channel A or channel B. In the replacement PRNMS, each APRM channel and each RBM channel is powered from independent (from the other channels), redundant LVPS units, one operating from each of the RPS AC busses. Therefore, if one RPS AC power input is lost, full APRM and RBM signal processing and indication continues to be available.

Further, if an individual LVPS power supply fails, the associated channel continues to operate normally on the second LVPS. The final trip outputs from the APRM and RBM to the RPS and reactor manual control systems, however, still operate from one RPS AC input, so loss of one RPS AC input will still result in RPS 1/2 scram and rod block inputs the same as the current PRNMS.

The existing level of electrical separation, between components and redundant channels, is maintained or improved through extensive use of fiber-optic cables

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 12 of 81 for inter-channel communications and optically coupled relay devices for interface connections to other systems.

Interface functions between the PRNMS and other systems are unchanged from the current design, except for data to the plant computer and data to the plant operator's panel. Most plant computer data is changed to multiplexed form and includes addition of "download" information from the plant computer to the PRNM, but a few direct analog signals are retained. The plant operator's panel will use the digital display outputs for most information displays.

3.2 OPRM Trip Function:

The OPRM Option III Stability Trip Function is digitally incorporated into the PRNM equipment. The OPRM function continues to satisfy the same NRC approved requirements as the currently installed OPRM equipment. Changes in the existing OPRM logic are the assignment of LPRM inputs to new OPRM cell assignments and trip logic from the 2-out-4 Voter module. The current OPRM cell assignments are selected for compatibility with the current PRNM's 6-APRM, 2-LPRM channel configuration. The replacement system's OPRM cell assignments are selected for compatibility with the 4-APRM configuration of the NUMAC PRNM. Both configurations are included in the NRC reviewed and approved BWROG Licensing Topical Reports, applicable to the OPRM Stability Option III.

The existing OPRM trip logic is the l-out-of-2 taken twice which is being revised to input to the 2-out-of-4 voter logic. This logic is in accordance with and discussed in the reviewed and approved PRNM system NUMAC PRNM LTR.

3.3 Plant Process Computer Impact:

The new PRNM system will modify the means by which the system's data is transmitted to the plant process computer; however all existing information (i.e.,

LPRM, APRM, trip status, etc.) will be maintained. The present APRM system sends digitized data to Plant Integrated Computer System (PICSY) via the present OPRM module. Some analog data goes through hardwire connection. The new system will transmit PRNM data digitally through a serial fiber-optic link to the new Multi-Vendor Data (acquisition system) (MVD) interface unit. Essentially, the data transmission path has changed from going through hardwire and OPRM module, to all process data going through the MVD module. The MVD will in turn transfer the information on an Ethernet bus to the plant process computer.

Similarly, plant computer calculated LPRM gain values and calculated core thermal power (to be used by APRM to adjust the APRM gains) are transmitted via the Ethernet bus to the MVD, and on to the PRNMS. The sequence of events (SOE) data points from the PRNM system will be provided as needed from the MVD.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 13 of 81 Minor configuration changes to the plant computer software will allow it to process the PRNM interface data. Plant process computer displays will be modified to reflect the new PRNM system's channel/logic configuration.

The Plant Process Computer provides the interface to the Core Monitoring Computer (Powerplex). Data transfer between the two units will be upgraded as part of the modification.

3.4 Interface function for APRM inputs and outputs to systems other than the RPS:

The APRM interface function of the Logic Module is provided to match the existing plant circuits to the replacement PRNM. It is included in the Logic Module to simplify overall equipment packaging. The following functions are provided:

Acts as an electrical connector adapter between field cables or panel wiring and compact APRM chassis connectors, and provides electrical isolation.

Provides a mounting location for solid-state relays that interface between the APRM and the equipment outside the PRNMS panel.

Implements and maintains the trip, rod block and alarm bypass states independent of the associated APRM chassis.

The APRM interface functions are associated directly with one APRM. Electrical signals are received from or sent to the associated APRM. Local logic in the Logic Module controls the state of outputs to annunciators, RMCS, and other interfaces when an APRM chassis is removed from service.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 14 of 81

4. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS The proposed Technical Specification changes to Unit 1 and Unit 2 are consistent with GE Licensing Topical Report LTR NEDC-32410P-A, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function," which was approved by the NRC in a letter dated September 5, 1995, and GE LTR NEDC-32410P-A, Supplement 1, which was approved by the NRC in a letter dated August 15, 1997. Section 7 to this enclosure provides an evaluation of the plant-specific actions required by LTR NEDC-3241OP-A, and Supplement 1, including descriptions and justifications for deviations from the NUMAC PRNM LTRs, as well as changes that are not addressed in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs.

The methods, standards, data, and results, as described in the NUMAC PRNM LTR for a GE BWR 4 larger core plant, are applicable to the SSES plants. The bases for the Technical Specification changes found in Section 2.0 of this enclosure are documented in Section 8.0 of NEDC-32410P-A, including Supplement 1 with exceptions as follows:

4.1 Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Functions Section 8.3.1.4 of the NUMAC PRNM LTR requires deleting the APRM Downscale function if currently used. This function is not currently in SSES Technical Specifications and therefore no change is provided.

4.2 Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Functions - Minimum Number of Operable APRM Channels Section 8.3.2.4 of the NUMAC PRNM LTR specifies deleting a note requiring removing shorting links. This note is not used at SSES, and therefore no change is provided.

4.3 Technical Specification SR 3.3.1.1.12 Channel Functional Test Section 8.3.4.2.4 of the NUMAC PRNM LTR requires adding a notation to the Bases for the APRM Simulated Thermal Power -- High function that the test shall include the recirculation flow input processing, excluding the flow transmitters.

For SSES, this notation has been added to the Channel Functional Test SR (3.3.1.1.12) and has been expanded from the NUMAC PRNM LTR to also apply to the OPRM trip function (to cover OPRM Trip enable).

4.4 Technical Specification SR 3.3.1.1.18 Channel Calibration Section 8.3.4.3.4 of the NUMAC PRNM LTR requires adding notation to the Bases to the Channel Calibration for the APRM simulated Thermal Power -- High and OPRM Trip functions to include requirements for calibration of the recirculation flow transmitters and flow processing function. For SSES this notation has also been included in the Channel Calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.18) and has been expanded from the NUMAC PRNM LTR to also include the OPRM Trip function.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 15 of 81 4.5 Technical Specification SR 3.3.1.1.20 Reactor Core Flow/Recirc Drive Flow Alignment An additional SR (SR 3.3.1.1.20) that addresses reactor core flow/recirculation drive flow alignment has been added. SR 3.3.1.1.20 is not discussed in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs. The NUMAC PRNM LTR assumes that drive flow/core flow alignment is accomplished as a "flow channel" calibration while performing the APRM Simulated Thermal Power and OPRM channel calibrations. However, drive flow/core flow alignment needs to be physically performed when the unit is in 'run' and the system has reached even flow conditions. This requirement cannot be accomplished during a refueling outage, which is the time when the APRM channel calibration would normally be performed. Separating this flow SR from the APRM channel calibration recognizes that the performance of this part of the channel calibration may be performed at a different time than the calibration of the APRM flow processing functions, and eliminates the potential need to maintain administrative control of a "partially completed" surveillance.

Addition of the separate SR does not constitute a new surveillance requirement, but rather separates out a part of a currently defined calibration surveillance.

4.6 Technical Specification SR 3.3.1.1.17 Response Time Testing Consistent with the NUMAC PRNM LTRs, the only APRM Function to which SR 3.3.1.1.17 will apply is Function 2.e (Voter). However, while the NUMAC PRNM LTRs justified reduced response time testing frequency for Function 2.e, no TS mark-ups were included with the NUMAC PRNM LTR to implement an "n" greater than 4 (the total number of Voter channels). Therefore, a note has been added to the SSES SR 3.3.1.1.17 to define that "n=8" for Function 2.e.

As described in the expanded Bases, (Insert B 13) that rate will result in testing each APRM related RPS relay every 4 cycles, twice the rate justified in the NUMAC PRNM LTR. This testing rate (compared to the justification in the NUMAC PRNM LTR) has been selected to simplify the record keeping for the SR. Without this notation, rigorous interpretation of four voter channels would result in a value of "n=4" for this SR.

The PRNM modification includes redundant APRM trip and redundant OPRM trip outputs from each 2-out-of-4 Voter channel. One of the OPRM outputs and one of the APRM outputs are connected in series to the coil of one RPS interface relay. The second OPRM output and the second APRM output from the 2-out-of-4 Voter channel are connected in series with the coil to a second RPS interface relay. There are 8 total RPS interface relays.

The NUMAC PRNM LTR Supplement 1 justified response time testing at a rate that tested one RPS Interface relay every plant operating cycle, with tests using the APRM output for one cycle and the OPRM output for the next cycle. This yields a testing rate once per 8 operating cycles.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 16 of 81 The response time testing proposed in the SSES Technical Specification will test both of the redundant OPRM or both of the redundant APRM trip outputs from each Voter during one application of the SR. This testing is consistent with the sequencing described in NUMAC PRNM LTR Supplement 1, but at twice the rate for all components. In addition, because this sequencing may be confusing, a description of the RPS Response Time Testing requirement for the Voter Function 2.e has been added to the SR 3.3.1.1.17 Bases, including a table showing an acceptable testing sequence. The specific tests will be defined in SSES procedures.

4.7 Technical Specification SR 3.3.1.1.19 OPRM - related RPS Trip Functions -

Channel Functional Test The present OPRM section 3.3.1.3, SR 3.3.1.3.5 requirement, has been transferred to the new section 3.3.1.1, SR 3.3.1.1.19, and is consistent with section 8.4.4.2.4 (Revised per NUMAC PRNM LTR Supplement 1) of the NUMAC PRNM LTR.

SR 3.3.1.1.19 is a "confirm auto-enable region" surveillance requirement and requires confirmation that the OPRM Trip output auto-enable (not bypassed) setpoints remain correct.

The SR 3.3.1.1.19 Bases wording is similar to that in the NUMAC PRNM LTR, but the wording has been modified and Reference 5 added to clarify that the setpoints are nominal values. References to two related SRs have also been added. The discussion of the use of APRM Simulated Thermal Power and drive flow for the setpoints (vs. Thermal Power and core flow) has been omitted from the SR 3.3.1.1.19 Bases, because that same information is presented in the OPRM Trip (Function 2.f) Bases discussion.

The specific OPRM Trip enabled region flow limit is presented slightly differently from that in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs. The upper flow limit is stated as "< value equivalent to the core flow value defined in the COLR" vs. < 60%

stated in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs. The term "value equivalent to the core value defined in the COLR" shows that this value, 65 Mlb/Hr, is presently maintained in the COLR. In addition, the value 65 Mlb/HR is the value presently found in SR 3.3.1.3.5 which is being replaced with SR 3.3.1.1.19. The value represented in the NUMAC PRNM LTR is not sufficient for the design of the SSES core.

The representation of "<" versus "<" as found in the NUMAC PRNM LTR is conservative, and is being maintained to reflect the present Technical Specification SR 3.3.1.3.5 requirement. The change to replace the drive flow value with a reference to the COLR supports PPL's process of reconfirming the upper limit of the trip-enable region on a cycle-specific basis, and to identify the limit in the COLR in terms of core flow. The actual setpoint will still be entered as the drive flow value nominally equivalent to the core flow limit.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 17 of 81 Use of the term "rated drive flow" has been omitted from the SR wording shown in the NUMAC PRNM LTR to avoid potential confusion on performance of the SR. The intent of the SR is to confirm the flow value as indicated on the APRM equipment.

These changes have no effect on the actual SR, as originally defined in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs, since the intent of the SR to require reconfirmation of the setpoints in the APRM hardware remains unchanged from the NUMAC PRNM LTR.

4.8 Technical Specification SR 3.3.1.1.18 OPRM - Related RPS Trip Functions -

Channel Calibration Consistent with section 8.4.4.3.4, a Channel Calibration requirement, SR 3.3.1.1.18 (corresponds to SR 3.3.1.1.13 in the NUMAC PRNM LTR), for the OPRM Trip Function has been relocated from Technical Specification Section 3.3.1.3 to Section 3.3.1.1 which, is also in accordance with NUMAC PRNM LTR Supplement 1, but with some additional changes not included in the NUMAC PRNM LTR as discussed below:

An additional note is provided for SR 3.3.1.1.18 and to the corresponding Bases, applicable to Functions 2.b and 2.f, to state that SR 3.3.1.1.18 includes calibrating the associated recirculation loop flow channel.

The NUMAC PRNM LTR, Supplement 1 does not identify any additional changes to the Bases for OPRM Trip Channel Calibration requirements (beyond those required for the other APRM Functions). However, reviews of the Bases wording identified two aspects that should be clarified: 1) the wording should recognize that drive flow is also used as an input to the OPRM Trip auto-enable function, and 2) that alignment of reactor core flow with recirculation drive flow was necessary for proper system operation. Therefore, the SR 3.3.1.1.18 Bases discussion has been modified from that shown in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs (SR 3.3.1.1.13 in the NUMAC PRNM LTR) to include discussion of the OPRM Trip auto-enable function and to address the alignment of reactor core flow with recirculation drive flow (including a reference to the added drive flow alignment SR 3.3.1.1.20, which is not included in the NUMAC PRNM LTR).

These changes do not change any of the intent of the NUMAC PRNM LTRs or affect the associated NUMAC PRNM LTR justifications.

4.9 Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 During recirculation single loop operation, a correction factor is applied to estimate the back flow contribution in the non-operable recirculation loop.

The new NUMAC PRNM system has the capability to physically enter this correction value as part of the system operation so that it no longer needs to be maintained manually as is done for the present system.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 18 of 81 The Allowable Value has not been revised. Instead the formula has been re-organized as shown below which, allows the value of AW to be more apparent.

Equating the existing Allowable Value to the reorganized Allowable Value shows:

0.58W + 57% =0.58 (W - AW) + 62%

equals:

0.58W + 57% = 0.58W - 0.5 8AW + 62%

And if AW, in terms of flow = 5%/0.58 Then: 0.58W + 57% = 0.58W - 5% + 0.62%

0.58W + 57% = 0.58W + 57%

The recirculation single loop operating values are presently provided as a Note to the Technical Specifications. The Allowable Values provide a 5% offset between the recirculation two loop (62%) and single loop (57%) operation.

For two loop operation, AW =0, and the Allowable Value remains 0.58W + 62%

RTP. Therefore, the introduction of AW has not changed the Allowable Values.

Note (c) has been added for APRM channel input clarification.

4.10 Technical Specification 3.3.1.3 OPRM Instrumentation Technical Specification 3.3.1.3 was established to support the implementation of the current OPRM Stability Option III system. With the implementation of the NUMAC PRNM with OPRM, the Option III stability solution is digitally integrated within the APRM functions in LCO 3.3.1.1 and corresponding Bases, so this specification is no longer needed. Specification 3.3.1.3, along with its associated Bases, has been deleted in its entirety in the proposed Technical Specification.

The major change from the existing OPRM LCO 3.3.1.3 to the replacement OPRM LCO 3.3.1.1 is the completion time for Condition A. In the replacement OPRM system, the allowed Completion Time for the Required Action with a Condition of one or more required OPRM channels not operable but with trip capability still maintained is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (LCO 3.3.1.1, Condition A) compared to the 30 days for the similar Condition for the currently installed OPRM system (LCO 3.3.1.3, Condition A). However, for the replacement OPRM system, one OPRM channel can be bypassed and this condition would not normally occur until a second OPRM channel became inoperable. This change for the current LCO 3.3.1.3 requirement is conservative relative to safety, is judged to have no adverse impact on plant operations, and maintains consistency between the replacement OPRM system Technical Specification requirements and those reviewed and approved by the NRC via the NUMAC PRNM LTRs.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 19 of 81 SR 3.3.1.3.6, "Verify the RPS Response Time is within limits," is deleted for the OPRM. The NUMAC PRNM LTR Supplement 1, sections 3.3.2 and 8.4.4.4.3, provide discussion and justification for deleting the response time testing for the OPRM. Essentially, the OPRM is now a digital function of the replacement PRNM. In section 4.6, it is shown that the response time testing has been assigned to the 2-out-of-4 Voter logic including the APRM Flux Trip output relay and the OPRM Trip output relay. The testing of the OPRM output relay will be on an alternating basis also described in section 4.6.

The proposed change will replace the currently installed and NRC approved OPRM Option m long-term stability solution with an NRC approved Option III long-term stability solution digitally integrated into the PRNM equipment. The PRNM hardware incorporates the OPRM Option III detect and suppress solution reviewed and approved by the NRC in the References 1, 2, 3 and 4 Licensing Topical Reports, the same as the currently installed OPRM system. The replacement OPRM meets the GDC 10, "Reactor Design," and 12, "Suppression of Reactor Power Oscillations," requirements by automatically detecting and suppressing design basis thermal-hydraulic oscillations prior to exceeding the fuel MCPR Safety Limit.

The NUMAC PRNM LTR, Section 8.4, "OPRM Related RPS Trip Functions,"

describes a transition period between installation of an initial OPRM system to when the system is "armed" and operational. This transition period is intended to allow an initial period of operation with the first use of the OPRM function in order to validate its design basis and confirm initial design assumptions. The initial startup period for the current OPRM system demonstrated the algorithm to be robust and not sensitive to system settings within the range of values described in NEDO-32465-A. Based on the data received during the transition period for the currently "armed" and operating digital OPRM system, and review of the design and operating experience of the GE NUMAC OPRM system, the replacement OPRM will be installed and activated without an additional transition period for evaluation.

4.11 Technical Specification 3.3.2.1 The formula in table 3.3.2.1-1 Note (b) has been reorganized, using the same philosophy as Note (b) to table 3.3.1.1-1, to show the recirculation single loop correction with AW. The value of AW allows adjustment in the replacement NUMAC PRNM.

SR 3.3.2.1.1 Channel Functional Test required frequency will be changed from every 92 days to every 184 days as prescribed in the NUMAC PRNM LTR.

4.12 Technical Specification 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating The NUMAC PRNM LTR does not include any discussion of the Recirculation changes. This Technical Specification section has been revised to be consistent with the APRM Function noun name Technical Specification changes implemented with PRNM.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 20 of 81 4.13 Technical Specification LCO 3.10.8 Shutdown Margin Test - Refueling An administrative change was made to LCO 3.10.8 to reflect the LCO 3.3.1.1 Functions numbering changes. Function "2.e" is added to recognize the APRM 2-out-of-4 Voter function.

4.14 Reporting Requirements, Core Operating Limits, Section 5.6.5 The change to Section 5.6.5, COLR, identifies the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.1.3 (OPRM) were removed and relocated to Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 (RPS).

4.15 APRM Non-Coincidence Mode Scram (not a Technical Specification function)

The existing system has a neutron monitoring system "non-coincidence trip" function, which is activated when the "shorting links" are removed in the manual scram trip logic into the RPS. The purpose of the removal of the shorting links, when used, is to put the Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) trips all in non-coincidence mode when the plant is not in the RUN mode, with the net effect that any single channel of IRM trip will cause a scram trip. The trip is activated during some refueling and test conditions only.

Because of the design of the current IRM/APRM RPS interface logic, removal of these shorting links also puts the APRM channels in non-coincidence mode.

There is no functional or licensing requirement for this mode for the APRM channels and no functional benefit since each APRM channel already monitors the entire core. It occurs only as a consequence of the specific APRM and IRM interconnections in the RPS interface logic (the output trips are wired in series).

To maintain the APRM/RPS plant interface unchanged for the NUMAC PRNM architecture, the Voter channel trip outputs from the Logic Module will connect to the RPS input circuits in the same way as the current APRM trip outputs.

Consequently, with the new PRNM installation, removal of the RPS shorting links will put the 2-out-of-4 Voter channel outputs in non-coincidence mode. The APRM channel outputs will continue to be voted the same as when the shorting links are installed. The replacement of the APRM non-coincidence mode trip in the current PRNM with a 2-out-of-4 Voter channel non-coincidence mode for the new PRNM has no functional significance because there will be either no trip outputs from the Voters or trip outputs from all of the Voters. The IRM non-coincidence mode capability will remain unchanged.

4.16 Conclusion The proposed Technical Specification changes are consistent with the referenced NRC approved GE NUMAC PRNM LTRs. No exceptions have been taken to the safety bases of the referenced GE NUMAC PRNM LTRs. The NUMAC PRNM

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 21 of 81 system, including replacement of the existing OPRM Stability Option mll functions, provides an increase in reliability of the system as a result of new system designed redundancy. The new NUMAC PRNM system is designed and installed so as not to degrade the existing LRPM, APRM, OPRM, or RPS system. The new NUMAC PRNM system retains all of the safety functions of the existing system.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 22 of 81

5. REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS 5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration PPL Susquehanna has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed change, by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The probability (frequency of occurrence) of DBAs occurring is not affected by the PRNM system, as the PRNM system does not interact with equipment whose failure could cause an accident. Compliance with the regulatory criteria established for plant equipment will be maintained with the installation of the upgraded PRNM system. Scram setpoints in the PRNM system will be established so that all analytical limits are met.

The unavailability of the new system will be equal to or less than the existing system and, as a result, the scram reliability will be equal to or better than the existing system. No new challenges to safety-related equipment will result from the PRNM system modification. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change will replace the currently installed and NRC approved OPRM Option m long-term stability solution with an NRC approved Option mII long-term stability solution digitally integrated into the PRNM equipment. The PRNM hardware incorporates the OPRM Option m detect and suppress solution reviewed and approved by the NRC in the References 1, 2, 3 and 4 Licensing Topical Reports, the same as the currently installed separate OPRM system. The OPRM meets the GDC 10, "Reactor Design," and 12, "Suppression of Reactor Power Oscillations,"

requirements by automatically detecting and suppressing design basis thermal-hydraulic oscillations prior to exceeding the fuel MCPR Safety Limit. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Based on the above, the operation of the new PRNM system and replacement of the currently installed OPRM Option m stability solution with the Option III OPRM function integrated into the PRNM equipment will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 23 of 81 The components of the PRNM system will be supplied to equivalent or better design and qualification criteria than is currently required for the plant. Equipment that could be affected by PRNM system has been evaluated. No new operating mode, safety-related equipment lineup, accident scenario, or system interaction mode was identified. Therefore, the upgraded PRNM system will not adversely affect plant equipment.

The new PRNM system uses digital equipment that has "control" processing points and software controlled digital processing compared to the existing PRNM system that uses mostly analog and discrete component processing (excluding the existing OPRM). Specific failures of hardware and potential software common cause failures are different from the existing system. The effects of potential software common cause failure are mitigated by specific hardware design and system architecture. Failure(s) on the system level has the same overall effect. No new or different kind of accident is introduced.

Therefore, the PRNM system will not adversely affect plant equipment.

The current OPRM Option III plant design is replaced with an OPRM function digitally integrated into the PRNM. The currently installed Power Range Monitor system is replaced with a PRNM system that performs all of the existing PRNM functions plus OPRM. Failure of neither the APRM nor OPRM functions in the replacement system can cause an accident of a kind not previously evaluated in the SAR.

Based on the above, the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No The upgraded PRNM system will not involve a reduction in a margin of safety, as loads on plant equipment will not increase, and reactions to, or results of transients and hypothetical accidents, will not increase from those presently evaluated.

No change has been made to the Analytical Limits or Technical Specification Allowable Values. The present system characteristics such as drift, calibration setpoint, and accuracy envelop the new system requirements.

The upgraded PRNM system response time and operator information is either maintained or improved over the current Power Range Neutron Monitor system.

The upgraded PRNM system has improved channel trip accuracy compared to the current system.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 24 of 81 The current safety analyses demonstrate that the existing OPRM Option III related Technical Specification requirements are adequate to detect and suppress an instability event. There is no impact on the MCPR Safety Limit identified for an instability event. The replacement OPRM system integrated into the new PRNM equipment implements the same functions per the same requirements as the currently installed system and has equivalent Technical Specification requirements. Therefore, the margin of safety associated with the MCPR Safety Limit is still maintained.

Based on the above, the proposed change will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements / Criteria 5.2.1 Analysis SSES FSAR Sections 3.1, "Conformance with NRC General Design Criteria," and 3.13, "Compliance with NRC Regulatory Guides," provide detailed discussion of SSES compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements and guidance. The proposed TS amendment:

(a) Does not alter the design or function of any reactivity control system; (b) Does not result in any change in the qualifications of any component; and (c) Does not result in the reclassification of any component's status in the areas of shared, safety related, independent, redundant, and physical or electrical separation.

5.2.2 Conclusion Based on the analyses provided in Section 4.0 Technical Analysis, the proposed change is consistent with all applicable regulatory requirements and criteria. In conclusion, there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the approval of the proposed change will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 25 of 81

6. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) identifies certain licensing and regulatory actions that are eligible for categorical exclusion from the requirement to perform an environmental assessment. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility does not require an environmental assessment if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant hazards consideration; (2) result in a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; or (3) result in a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. PPL Susquehanna has evaluated the proposed change and has determined that the proposed change meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Accordingly, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),

no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment needs to be prepared in connection with issuance of the amendment. The basis for this determination, using the above criteria, follows:

1. As demonstrated in the No Significant Hazards Consideration Evaluation, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

2. There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite. The NUMAC PRNM modification and associated changes to the Technical Specifications involve equipment that is designed to detect the symptoms of certain events or accidents and mitigating actions. No failure of the system can cause an accident or result in a significant change in the types or a significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released. The NUMAC PRNM system is designed to perform the same operations as the existing PRNM system and as such, does not increase the consequences of any previously evaluated accident.

3. There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure, because the technical specification changes do not result in a new mode of operation that would cause additional occupational exposure.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 26 of 81

7. PLANT-SPECIFIC EVALUATION REQUIRED BY NUMAC PRNM RETROFIT PLUS OPTION III STABILITY TRIP FUNCTION TOPICAL REPORT (NEDC-32410P-A).

7.1 Plant Specific Actions Required by NEDC-3241OP-A Enclosed Safety Evaluation Report Section 5.0.

The information that follows is the response to the six (6) plant specific actions requested in Section 5.0 of the "Safety Evaluation Report by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NEDC-32410 Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function."

1) Confirm the applicability of NEDC-32410, including clarifications and reconciled differences between the specific plant design and the topical report design description.

Response: All clarifications and reconciled differences between the plant design and the topical report are included in Section 4.0 and in the table in the following Section 7.2. This table is arranged so the responses for clarifications and/or differences to a specific topical report section are identified with that section.

2) Confirm the applicability of BWROG topical reports that address PRNMS and associated instability functions, set points, and margins.

Response: SSES is a GE BWRI4 Mark-II large containment. The BWROG topical reports that address PRNMS and associated instability functions, setpoints, and margins are applicable as such. The tabular information found in Section 7.2 outlines the specific clarifications or differences to the NEDC-3241OP-A NUMAC PRNM LTR and its Supplement. SSES currently has installed an OPRM system covered by LCO 3.3.1.3 that incorporates Stability Option III, the same OPRM function that is described in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs and BWROG LTRs. The NUMAC PRNM modification incorporates the OPRM Option III function into the PRNM equipment as described in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs.

Therefore LCO 3.3.1.3 is being deleted and an OPRM Trip Function (same as the "OPRM Upscale Function in the NMAC PRNM LTRs) has been added to the SSES Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1.1 as an "APRM Function" (Function 2.), consistent with NUMAC PRNM LTR Supplement 1, Appendix H. A footnote for Function 2.f (not shown in the NUMAC PRNM LTR) has been added to document that the period based detection algorithm (PBDA) setpoint limits are defined in the COLR.

Additions to the Technical Specification Bases for Function 2.f have also been incorporated consistent with the NUMAC PRNM LTR but with some rewording to more clearly present the information, and with additions to completely address OPRM related setpoints and adjustable parameters.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 27 of 81

3) Provide plant-specific revised Technical Specifications (TS) for the PRNMS functions consistent with NEDC-32410, Appendix H.

Response: Attachment 1 to this submittal is the plant-specific Technical Specifications (TS) mark-ups for the PRNMS functions and is consistent with NEDC-3241OP-A.

4) Confirm that the plant specific environmental conditions are enveloped by the PRNMS equipment environmental qualification values.

Response: All plant specific environmental conditions enveloped by the PRNMS equipment environmental qualification values are presented in the table in the following Section 7.2. This table is arranged so the responses for clarifications and/or differences to a specific topical report section are identified with that section.

5) Confirm that administrative controls are provided for manually bypassing APRM/OPRM channels or protective functions, and for controlling access to the panel and the APRMIOPRM channel bypass switch.

Response: NEDC-32410P-A, Sections 5.3.13 and 5.3.18, "Security Considerations" and "User Interface and Controls," outline the hardware security measures associated with the new PRNMS. In addition, physical access to the plant control room (APRM Bypass switch) and lower relay room (PRNMS cabinet) are controlled by plant security keycard access. Administrative controls such as those implemented by the Work Control Center during procedural surveillance testing and maintenance access are as presently existing with the current PRNM system and OPRM hardware.

6) Confirm that any changes to the plant operator's panel have received human factors reviews per plant-specific procedures.

Response: Human Factors Engineering is part of the Technical Procurement Specification and will be addressed during the design modification process. Current Plant Information Computer System (PICSY) based OPRM displays will be retained. In addition, regarding OPRM Stability Option Iml, Operator cycle specific training has been performed that both 1)Reviewed the OPRM system and

2) Performed two different demonstrations of OPRM responses in the control room simulator. It is also planned, starting in the April 2005 Operator cycle specific training, to review the OPRM Technical Specifications Technical Requirements Manual and Operating Events (OE) report outlining Nine Mile Point 2 and Perry plant OPRM events.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 28 of 81 7.2 Plant Specific Actions Required by NEDC-32410P-A The information included in the following table is the SSES-specific response to the "Utility Actions Required" items in the NUMAC PRNM Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function Topical Report NEDC-3241OP-A including Supplement 1. The Utility Action Required identified in the table below is as stated in the Base NUMAC PRNM LTR except where noted as "Modified by Supplement 1." The section numbers and Utility Actions Required listed below are from the Topical Report. In addition to the SSES-specific information, the table also includes additional justification information where the Topical Report does not specifically cover the SSES configuration. Responses apply for both SSES Unit 1 and SSES Unit 2. This information is specifically requested under sections entitled "Utility Action Required" per the indicated NEDC-32410P-A sections.

The SSES PRNM system installation is planned in two phases. Phase 1 includes a full PRNM installation that retains the current "non-Average Power Range Monitor/Rod Block Monitor /Technical Specifications" ["non-ARTS"] version of the Rod Block Monitor (RBM). Phase 2 includes minor modification to the PRNM equipment to incorporate the "ARTS" logic in the RBM and implement associated setpoint modifications for RBM and Average Power Range Monitor equipment. The Technical Specification change request in this letter is specifically to support licensing review of Phase 1 of the PRNM modification with current "non-ARTS." A separate Average Power Range Monitor/Rod Block Monitor /Technical Specifications change request letter with associated Technical Specification mark-ups will be prepared for Phase 2.

For SSES Unit 1, Phase 1 is planned for incorporation during the Spring 2006 outage with Phase 2 to follow at a separate time, while, for SSES Unit 2, Phase 1 and Phase 2 are planned to be incorporated during the Spring 2007 outage.

Note: Phase 1 documentation does not include licensing documentation required for ARTS implementation.

The following Table is additional SSES-specific information included to support the licensing review of the PRNM project. The information includes evaluations and justifications addressing aspects of the SSES PRNM project not otherwise included in the Topical Reports or expansion of information included in the Topical Reports.

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2.1.1.2 OPRM Instability Trip An OPRM Option III instability trip The instability trip function defined by system compliant with the BWROG the BWROG as OPRM Option III detect Licensing Topical Reports is currently and suppress function is being added for installed, armed, and operating at SSES.

the plant along with applicable plant This system was made operable after an operator's panel display functions. extensive pre-operational observation (NOTE: The first cycle of operation will and tuning period, intended to adjust be used as an evaluation period. During parameters to the characteristics of the that period, all OPRM functions will be SSES operating core. Based on installed, but the final automatic trip will operating experience with the SSES not be connected. Evaluation of system, the lack of extensive changes to performance will be done off line using the operating core characteristics, and data automatically collected, This off PPL's review of operating experience of line evaluation assures no confusion for the GE NUMAC OPRM system at other the operator during the performance BWRs. PPL plans to implement the assessment period). OPRM Technical Specification changes and arm the OPRM trips with the initial installation without an additional evaluation period as described in the NUMAC PRNM LTR.

2.3.4 Plant Unique or Plant-Specific Aspects The actual, current plant configuration and the proposed replacement PRNM Confirm that the actual plant are included in the N`UMAC PRNM configuration is included in the LTR sections listed as follows:

variations covered in the Power Phase 1:

Range Neutron Monitor (PRNM) Current Proposed Licensing Topical Report (LTR) APRM 2.3.3.1.1.2 2.3.3.1.2.2

[NEDC-32410P-A, Volumes 1 & 2 and RBM 2.3.3.2.1.1 2.3.3.2.2.1 Supplement 1], and the configuration Flow Unit 2.3.3.3.1.2 2.3.3.3.2.2 alternative(s) being applied for the Rod Control 2.3.3.4.1.2 2.3.3.4.2.2 replacement PRNM are covered by the ARTS 2.3.3.5.1.4 2.3.3.5.2.2 NUMAC PRNM LTR. Document in the Panel Interface 2.3.3.6.1.1 2.3.3.6.2.2 plant-specific licensing submittal for the PRNM project the actual, current plant GE NUMAC PRNM LTR section 2.3.3 configuration of the replacement does not specifically identify the OPRM PRNM, and document confirmation that function as a current configuration those are covered by the NUMAC variation. SSES differs from this PRNM LTR. For any changes to the section of the NUMAC PRNM LTR in plant operator's panel, document in the that it presently has an ABB OPRM submittal the human factors review interface to APRM. This OPRM is actions that were taken to confirm being revised as proposed in the GE compatibility with existing plant NUMAC PRNM LTR.

commitments and procedures.

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Human Factors Engineering has been identified as part of the Design Inputs to the Technical Procurement Specification and will be addressed during the design process.

3.4 System Functions 1) The current flow channel configuration consists of four flow As part of the plant-specific licensing channels, eight transmitters, submittal, the utility should document NUMAC PRNM LTR 3.2.3.2.1. No the following: change in the configuration is planned other than the PRNM

1) The pre-modification flow channel implementation described in configuration, and any changes NUMAC PRNM LTR Section planned (normally changes will be 3.2.3.2.2. However, the present either adding two channels to reach 10-50 mA output transmitters will be four or no change planned) replaced with transmitters providing a 4-20 mA output, the more common NOTE: If transmitters are added, the present day current loop standard.

requirements on the added transmitters This change is necessary to should be: interface, without special design, with the NUMAC PRNM

Non-safety related, but qualified equipment.

environmentally and seismically to operate in the application The NUMAC PRNM LTRs address environment. the case of adding transmitter

Mounted with structures channels to bring a 2-channel system equivalent or better than those up to a 4-channel system, but not the for the currently installed case of replacing existing channels. transmitters solely for the purpose of

Cabling routed to achieve establishing signal interface separation to the extent feasible compatibility.

using existing cableways and routes. The replacement transmitters will be classified safety-related, the same as

2) Document the APRM trips currently the currently installed transmitters.

applied at the plant. If different from those documented in the 2) APRM trips currently applied at the NUMAC PRNM LTR, document plant are listed below along with plans to change to those in the changes planned. The "post-NUMAC PRNM LTR. modification" trips will be the same as those identified in the NUMAC

3) Document the current status related PRNM LTR:

to ARTS and the planned post

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modification status as: * "Neutron Flux - High, Setdown": Retained with

ARTS currently implemented, slightly modified name "Neutron and retained in the PRNM Flux - High (Setdown)" (same

ARTS will be implemented as described in NUMAC PRNM concurrently with the PRNM LTR)

(reference ARTS submittal) * "Flow Biased Simulated

ARTS not implemented and will Thermal Power - High":

not be implemented with the Retained and renamed PRNM "Simulated Thermal Power -

ARTS not applicable High" (same as described in NUMAC PRNM LTR).

"Fixed Neutron Flux - High":

Retained and renamed "Neutron Flux - High" (same as described in NUMAC PRNM LTR).

"Downscale": Deleted (same as described in NUMAC PRNM LTR paragraph 3.2.6). This function is not discussed in the current Technical Specifications.

"Inop": Retained, except the logic is modified slightly (same as described in NUMAC PRNM LTR paragraph 3.2.10).

APRM "Non-coincidence" trip capability: Deleted (same as described in NUMAC PRNM LTR paragraph 3.2.7). This function is not discussed in the current Technical Specifications.

3) Phase 1: ARTS is not currently implemented and will not be implemented with Phase 1 of the PRNM modification. For Phase 1, the RBM functions in SSES LCO 3.3.2.1 will be unchanged.

4.4.1.11 Regulatory Requirements for the A review of the SSES requirements Replacement System - System Design confirms that the regulatory requirements addressed in the NUMAC The NUMAC PRNM LTR identifies PRNM LTR encompass the related I requirements that are expected to SSES requirements.

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encompass most specific plant commitments relative to the PRNM NOTE: The following response reflects replacement project, but may not be applicability to the information provided complete and some may not apply to all in NUMAC PRNM LTR section 4.0 plants. Therefore, the utility must Design Bases and Regulatory confirm that the requirements identified Requirements. The statement "NUMAC in the NUMAC PRNM LTR address all PRNM LTR clarification applies" is of those identified in plant intended to acknowledge the commitments. The plant-specific information found in this section of the licensing submittal should identify the NUMAC PRNM LTR. Each listed specific requirements applicable for the requirement has clarification.

plant, confirm that any clarifications included in the NUMAC PRNM LTR Some items indicate that SSES is not apply to the plant, and document the committed to the indicated requirement.

specific requirements that the This statement just clarifies that the replacement PRNM is intended to meet. requirement is not part of SSES's original design and that the requirement The specific requirements applicable to has been enveloped by the GE PRNM SSES are listed below. system design.

General Functional Requirements NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification (IEEE-279 Paragraph 4.1) applies.

Single Failure Criteria (IEEE-279 NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification Paragraph 4.2) applies except for the discussion of "two flow channels." SSES has four flow channels.

Quality of Components and Modules NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification (IEEE-279 Paragraph 4.3) applies.

Equipment Qualification (IEEE-279 NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification Par. 4.4) applies.

Channel Integrity (IEEE-279 Par. 4.5) NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification applies.

Channel Independence (IEEE-279 NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification Par. 4.6) applies.

Control and Protection System NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification Interaction (IEEE-279 Par. 4.7) applies.

Derivation of System Inputs (IEEE-279 NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification Par. 4.8) applies.

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Capability for Sensor Checks NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification (IEEE-279 Par. 4.9) applies.

Capability for Test and Calibration NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification (IEEE-279 Par. 4.10) applies.

Channel Bypass or Removal from NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification Operation (IEEE-279 Par. 4.11) applies.

Operating Bypasses (IEEE-279 NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification Par. 4.12) applies.

Indication of Bypasses (IEEE-279 NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification Par. 4.13) applies.

Access to Means for Bypassing NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification (IEEE-279 Par. 4.14) applies. SSES administrative procedures control access to the bypass controls.

Multiple Set Points (IEEE-279 NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification Par. 4.15) applies. SSES administrative procedures control adjustment of Simulated Thermal Power setpoint values for single loop operation and to compensate for peaking factors, in accordance with the applicable Technical Specifications and TRM.

Completion of Protective Action Once It NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification Is Initiated (IEEE-279 Par. 4.16) applies.

Manual Actuation (IEEE-279 Par. 4.17) NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification applies.

Access to Setpoint Adjustments, NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification Calibration, and Test Points (IEEE-279 applies. SSES administrative Par. 4.18) procedures control access to setpoint and calibration controls and test points.

Identification of Protective Actions NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification (IEEE-279 Par. 4.19) applies.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 34 of 81 NEDC-32410P-A Utility Action Required per NEDC- Utility Response Section 32410P-A ItilityResponse No. _

Information Readout (IEEE-279 NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification and Par. 4.20) discussion of the digital operator's display applies to SSES. The normal design process includes human factors review of any operator's panel changes.

System Repair (IEEE-279 Par. 4.21) NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification applies.

US NRC Reg. Guide 1.97 - 1980 NUMAC PRNM LTR clarification applies.

US NRC Reg. Guide 1.152 - 1985 SSES is not committed to Reg.

Guide 1.152. However, the PRNM modification complies as discussed in Appendix A of the NUMAC PRNM LTR.

IEEE 74.3.2 - 1993 SSES is not committed to IEEE 7-4.3.2

- 1993. However, the PRNM system design complies as discussed in Appendix A of the NUMAC PRNM LTR.

ANSI NQA 2, Part 2.7 SSES is not committed ANSI NQA 2, Part 2.7. However, the PRNM system design complies as discussed in Appendix A of the NUMAC PRNM LTR.

US NRC Reg. Guide 1.75, Rev. 2 SSES is committed to Reg. Guide 1.75, Rev. 1, Jan 1975. The clarification in the NUMAC PRNM LTR applies.

The replacement system meets SSES commitments.

Reg. Guide 1.22, Rev 0, Periodic SSES is committed to Reg. Guide 1.22, Testing of Protection System Actuation February 17, 1972, Rev. 0. The Functions replacement system meets SSES commitments.

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Reg. Guide 1.29, Rev. 3, Seismic SSES is committed to Reg. Guide 1.29, Design Rev. 2. The replacement system meets SSES commitments.

Reg. Guide 1.47, Rev. 0, Bypassed and SSES is committed to Reg. Guide 1.47, Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Rev. 0. The replacement system meets Power Plant Safety Systems SSES commitments.

Reg. Guide 1.53, Rev. 0, Application of SSES is committed to Reg. Guide 1.53, Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear 6/73, Rev. 0. The replacement system Power Plant Protection Systems meets SSES commitments.

Reg. Guide 1.63, Rev. 2, Electrical SSES is not committed to Reg.

Penetration Assemblies in Containment Guide 1.63, Rev. 2.

Structures for Nuclear Power Plants The SSES construction permit was issued November 1973, therefore the design of the electric penetration assemblies is in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.63 dated October 1973, Rev. 0 (which implements IEEE 317-1972).

Reg. Guide 1.68, Rev. 2, Initial Test SSES is committed to Reg. Guide 1.68, Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Rev. 1, Jan. 1977. The replacement Power Plants system meets SSES commitments.

Reg. Guide 1.70, Rev. 3, Standard Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Format and Content of Safety Analysis (UFSAR) changes resulting from this Reports for Nuclear Power Plants modification will be implemented using the current SSES format, so the current SSES UFSAR commitments for this Regulatory Guide are unaffected.

Reg. Guide 1.105, Rev. 1, Instrument The replacement PRNM system meets Setpoints for Safety-Related Systems the SSES commitments for Reg. Guide 1.105, Revision 1.

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Reg. Guide 1.118, Rev. 2, Periodic SSES is committed to Reg. Guide 1.118, Testing of Electric Power and Protection June 1976, Rev. 0. The replacement Systems system meets SSES commitments.

IEEE 336-1971, Standard Installation, The replacement PRNM system meets Inspection, and Testing Requirements the SSES USFAR commitments for for Power, Instrumentation, and Control IEEE 336-1971.

Equipment at Nuclear Facilities IEEE 338-1971, Standard Criteria for The replacement PRNM system meets the Periodic Surveillance Testing of the SSES USFAR commitments for Nuclear Power Generating Station IEEE 338-1971.

Safety Systems IEEE 379-1972, Standard Application of The replacement PRNM system meets the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear the SSES USFAR commitments for Power Generating Station Safety IEEE 379-1972.

Systems IEEE 384-1974, Standard Criteria for SSES is committed to IEEE 384-1974 Independence of Class IE Equipment only as invoked by and committed for and Circuits Reg. Guide 1.75.

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4.4.2.2.1.4 Regulatory Requirements for the The PRNM electronics are qualified for Replacement System -Equipment continuous operation under the Qualification - Temperature and following temperature conditions: 5 to Humidit 50'C [41 to 122YF]. The SSES heating, ventilation, and air conditioning Plant-specific action will confirm that (HVAC) system is designed to maintain the maximum control room temperatures the temperatures in the rooms where the plus mounting panel temperature rise, PRNM equipment is mounted at no allowing for heat load of the PRNM more than 80 F and no less than 60 F.

equipment, does not exceed the The heat rise within the PRNM cabinet temperatures presented in the NUMAC is expected to be less than 150F. The PRNM LTR, and that control room resulting 950 F temperature within the humidity is maintained within the limits cabinet is well below the 1220 F stated in the NUMAC PRNM LTR. qualification level of the electronic This evaluation will normally be equipment.

accomplished by determining the operating temperature of the current The PRNM electronics is qualified for equipment, which will be used as a continuous operation under the bounding value because the heat load of following relative humidity conditions:

the replacement system is less than the 10 to 90% (non-condensing). The SSES current system while the panel structure, relative humidity requirement for the and thus cooling, remains essentially the rooms where the PRNM equipment is same. Documentation of the above mounted 10 - 60%, which is within the action, including the specific method range for which the PRNM equipment is used for the required confirmation qualified.

should be included in plant-specific licensing subinittals.

4.4.2.2.2.4 Regulatory Requirements for the The PRNM electronics are qualified Replacement System - Equipment for continuous operation under Qualification - Pressure the following pressure conditions:

13 - 16 psia. The SSES pressure Plant-specific action will confirm that requirements for the equipment, the maximum control room pressure 0 - 0.125" wg, are within these limits.

does not exceed the limits presented in the NUMAC PRNM LTR. Any pressure differential from inside to outside the mounting panel is assumed to be negligible since the panels are not sealed and there is no forced cooling or ventilation. Documentation of this action and the required confirmation should be included in plant-specific licensing submittals.

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4.4.2.2.3.4 Regulatory Requirements for the The PRNM electronics are qualified for Replacement System - Equipment continuous operation under the Qualification - Radiation following conditions: Dose Rate < 0.001 Rads (carbon)/hr and Total Integrated Plant-specific action will confirm that Dose (TID) S 1000 Rads (carbon). The the maximum control room radiation applicable SSES dose rates and TID are levels do not exceed the limits presented within the qualified ranges.

in the NUMAC PRNM LTR.

Documentation of this action and the required confirmation should be included in plant-specific licensing submittals.

4.4.2.3.4 Regulatory Requirements for the Evaluations to confirm that the Replacement System - Seismic maximum seismic accelerations at the Qualification mounting locations of the equipment do not exceed qualification limits of the Plant-specific action or analysis will equipment will be completed as part of confirm that the maximum seismic the normal design change process.

accelerations at the mounting locations The seismic qualification results will of the equipment (control room floor be documented in a plant-specific acceleration plus panel amplification) "Qualification Summary."

for both OBE and SSE spectrums do not exceed the limits stated in the NUMAC PRNM LTR. Documentation of this action and the required confirmation should be included in plant-specific licensing submittals.

4.4.2.4.4 Regulatory Requirements for the SSES procedures specifically require Replacement System - EMI evaluation of EMI/RFI susceptibility Qualification and the impact of the proposed modification on the plant. EPRI TR-The utility should establish or document 102323, Rev. 1, and Reg. Guide 1.180 practices to control emission sources, are used as the basis. Based on the maintain good grounding practices and requirements of that process, EMI maintain equipment and cable susceptibility and emissions separation. requirements have been established for

1) Controlling Emissions the PRNM equipment. Evaluation of equipment qualification levels to a) Portable Transceivers (walkie- confirm compliance with the EMI talkies): Establish practices to requirements will be documented in a prevent operation of portable plant-unique Qualification Summary.

transceivers in close proximity of equipment sensitive to such EM environment surveys have been completed at SSES within the lower

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emissions. (NOTE: The relay rooms to support installation of the qualification levels used for the current OPRM. At that time, the NUMAC PRNM exceed those environment at the point of installation expected to result from portable was found to be within the EPRI transceivers, even if such TR-102323-R1 recommended levels.

transceivers are operated immediately adjacent to the The following factors are considered in NUMAC equipment.) the process.

b) ARC Welding: Establish 1) Controlling Emissions practices to assure that ARC welding activities do not occur in The qualification levels used for the the vicinity of equipment NUMAC PRNM system exceed sensitive to such emissions, those expected to result from particularly during times when portable transceivers, even if such the potentially sensitive transceivers are operated equipment is required to be immediately adjacent to NUMAC operational for plant safety. equipment. SSES generally (NOTE: The qualification levels prohibits operation of portable used for NUMAC PRNM transceivers near sensitive minimize the likelihood of equipment, and if warranted requires detrimental effects due to ARC positions of warning signs at critical welding as long as reasonable locations throughout the plant.

ARC welding control and Placement of warning sign will be shielding practices are used.) evaluated as part of the modification process.

c) Limit Emissions from New The qualification levels used for the Equipment: Establish practices NUMAC PRNM system minimize for new equipment and plant the likelihood of detrimental effects modifications to assure that they due to ARC welding as long as either do not produce reasonable ARC welding control and unacceptable levels of emissions, shielding practices are used. ARC or installation shielding, filters, welding is only performed at SSES grounding or other methods with specific work orders and prevent such emissions from directions, and is known to have the reaching other potentially potential to affect operation of I&C sensitive equipment. These equipment at a number of locations practices should address both in the plant. Therefore, ARC radiated emissions and welding activity is only performed conducted emissions, particularly when any potential effect on I&C conducted emissions on power equipment is tolerable relative to lines and power distribution plant operation.

systems. Related to power

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distribution, both the effects of EMI emissions from new equipment new equipment injecting noise installed at SSES are evaluated as on the power system and the part of the normal design power system conducting noise modification process described in to the connected equipment SSES procedures.

should be addressed. (NOTE:

The qualification of the PRNM 2) Grounding Practices equipment includes emissions testing.) The PRNM system equipment is being installed in place of existing Power Range Monitor Neutron

2) Grounding Practices (PRNM) system electronics, which are generally more sensitive to EMI a) Existing Grounding System: The than the NUMAC equipment. The specific details and effectiveness replacement system will interface of the original grounding system with the same cables and wiring at in BWRs varied significantly. the panel interfaces as the current As part of the modification system, including ground bus process, identify any known or connections. No problems have been likely problem areas based on identified with the current PRNM previous experience and include system related to grounding or in the modification program grounding practices. The original either an evaluation step to installation included specific determine if problems actually grounding practices designed to exist, or include corrective action minimize performance problems.

as part of the modification. The replacement PRNM system is less sensitive to grounding issues (NOTE: The PRNM equipment than is the current system and is being installed in place of includes specific actions in the existing PRNM electronics wiring inside the panel to maximize which is generally more sensitive shielding and grounding to EMI than the NUMAC effectiveness.

equipment. As long as the plant has experienced no significant 3) Equipment and Cable Separation problems with the PRM, no problems are anticipated with the The original PRNM system cable PRNM provided grounding is installation requirements met this done in a comparable manner.) objective. The replacement PRNM system uses the same cable routes b) Grounding Practices for New and paths at comparable energy Modifications: New plant levels. Since no specific problem modifications process should has been identified in the current include a specific evaluation of system, no special action will be grounding methods to be used to necessary for the PRNM modification. The existing system

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assure both that the new cabling complies with applicable equipment is installed in a way SSES cable routing and separation equivalent to the conditions used requirements. Additionally, the in the qualification. (NOTE: modification process is performed in NUMAC PRNM equipment accordance with the existing qualification is performed in a separation criteria.

panel assembly comparable to that used in the plant.)

3) Equipment and Cable Separation Cabling: Establish cabling practices to assure that signal cables with the potential to be "receivers" are kept separate from cables that are sources of noise. (NOTE: The original PRM cable installation requirements met this objective. The replacement PRNM uses the same cable routes and paths, so unless some specific problem has been identified in the current system, no special action should be necessary for the PRNM modification.)

b) Equipment: Establish equipment separation and shielding practices for the installation of new equipment to simulate that equipment's qualification condition, both relative to susceptibility and emissions.

(NOTE: The original PRNM cabinet design met this objective. The replacement PRNM uses the same mounting cabinet, and used an equivalent mounting assembly for qualification. No special action should be necessary for the PRNM modification.)

The plant-specific licensing submittals should identify the practices that are in place or will be applied for the PRNM modification to address each of the above items.

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6.6 System Failure Analysis 1. The analysis in Reference 6 evaluated the effects of surveillance The utility must confirm applicability of frequency of RPS and RPS inputs on the failure analysis conclusions calculated RPS failure frequency.

contained in the NUMAC PRNM LTR Considered in the evaluation were by the following actions: anticipated transients, based on EPRI Report No. NP-2230, and

1. Confirm that the events defined in unanticipated transients (i.e., events EPRI Report No. NP-2230 or in of sufficiently low frequency so that Appendices F and G of Reference 11 they have insignificant contribution of the NUMAC PRNM LTR, to RPS failure frequency). Events encompass the events that are are divided in to more severe analyzed for the plant; transients that require immediate scram (i.e., Appendix F), and less

2. Confirm that the configuration severe transients that do not require implemented by the plant is within immediate scram, or may not the limits described in the NUMAC even reach scram limits (i.e.,

PRNM LTR; and Appendix G). Appendix G also discusses infrequent events, but these are not specifically listed.

3. Prepare a plant-specific 10CFR50.59 evaluation of the modification per The transients evaluated in SSES the applicable plant procedures. Chapter 15 are included in the transients identified in Appendix F These confirmations and conclusions and G of Reference 6. The should be documented in the plant- transients are encompassed by those specific licensing subminttals for the considered based on the definitions PRNM modification. [Reference 11 of in EPRI NP-2230 or, are either the NUMAC PRNM LTR is NEDC- infrequent events, or do not require 30851P-A, "Technical Specification scram. Those in the latter two Improvement Analysis for BWR categories (i.e., infrequent events or Reactor Protection System," Licensing events that do not require scram) are Topical Report, GE Nuclear Energy, identified below:

Class HI (proprietary), dated March 1988.]

Fuel Assembly Loading Error During Refueling (no scram required)

Control Rod Drop Accident (infrequent event)

Main Steam Line Break in Turbine Building (infrequent event)

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Loss of Coolant Accident Inside Containment (infrequent event)

Refueling Accident (no scram required)

2. The proposed PRNM configuration is included among the configurations described in the NUMAC PRNM LTR, as itemized under Section 2.3.4 above. The proposed configuration is being designed by GE and is within the limits described in the NUMAC PRNM LTR.

3. A plant-specific 10CFR50.59 evaluation of the modification will be prepared per the applicable plant procedures.

7.6 Impact on UFSAR Applicable sections of the UFSAR will The plant-specific action required for be reviewed and appropriate revisions of FSAR updates will vary between plants. those sections will be prepared and In all cases, however, existing FSAR approved as part of the normal design documents should be reviewed to process. Following implementation of identify areas that have descriptions the design modification, and closure of specific to the current PRNM using the the design package, the UFSAR will be general guidance of Sections 7.2 through revised as part of the routine UFSAR 7.5 of the NUMAC PRNM LTR to update.

identify potential areas impacted. The utility should include in the plant-specific licensing submittal a statement of the plans for updating the plant FSAR for the PRNM project.

8.3.1.4 APRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - 1. The current SSES Technical Functions Covered by Technical Specification does not include the Specifications APRM Downscale function, so no additional action is required.

1. Delete the APRM Downscale function, if currently used, from the 2. The SSES PRNM currently includes RPS Instrumentation "function" the APRM Simulated Thermal table, the related surveillance Power - High and the APRM Neutron Flux - High Functions (with

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requirements, and, if applicable, the slightly different names). The related setpoint, and related PRNM modification retains these descriptions in the bases sections. Functions unchanged except for minor name changes.

2. Delete the APRM Flow-biased Neutron Flux Upscale function, if 3. The APRM Neutron Flux - High currently used, from the RPS (Setdown) Trip is currently in Instrumentation "function" table, the SSES's Technical Specifications related surveillance requirements, identified as "Neutron Flux - High, and, if applicable, the related Setdown." The PRNM modification setpoint, and related descriptions in retains the Function unchanged, the bases sections. Replace these except for the slight name change.

with the corresponding entries for the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High and the APRM Neutron Flux - High functions.

Perform analysis necessary to establish setpoints for added trips.

3. Add the APRM Neutron Flux - High (Setdown) function, if not currently used, to the RPS Instrumentation "function" table, add the related surveillance requirements, and, if applicable, the related setpoints, and related descriptions in the bases sections. Perform analysis necessary to establish setpoints for added trips.

8.3.2.4 APRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - 1. The PRNM modification and the Minimum Number of Operable APRM proposed Technical Specification Channels and Bases change implement the changes as described in the NUMAC

1. For the 4-APRM channel PRNM LTR for a "larger core" plant replacement configuration, revise the (i.e., no LPRMs are currently shared RPS Instrumentation "function" between APRM channels). SSES table to show 3 APRM channels, Technical Specifications include no shared by both trip systems for each notes related to APRM calling for APRM function shown (after any removal of shorting links, so no additions or deletions per NUMAC related note changes are required.

PRNM LTR Paragraph 8.3.1.4). Similarly, SSES does not have any Add a "2-out-of-4 Voter" function shared LPRM inputs (between with two channels under the APRM channels), so no note changes "minimum operable channels". For related to "LPRMs from 'other' plants with Technical Specifications APRMs" are necessary.

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that include a footnote calling for removing shorting links, remove the 2. Action statement changes in the references to the footnote related to proposed Technical Specification APRM (retain references for SRM change are consistent with the and IRM) and delete any references NUMAC PRNM LTR described to APRM channels in the footnote. changes for plants utilizing ISTS.

For smaller core plants, delete the SSES has previously switched to the notes for and references to special ISTS format and implemented the conditions related to loss of all "Reference 6" (Reference 11 in the LPRMs from the "other" APRM. NUMAC PRNM LTR) changes.

2. Review action statements to see if 3. The proposed Technical changes are required. If the Specification Bases changes include improvements documented in revisions to the descriptions of the Reference 11 of the NUMAC architecture, consistent with the PRNM LTR have not been NUMAC PRNM LTR. In several implemented, then changes will areas, the specific wording of the likely be required to implement the Tech Spec Bases changes differs 12-hour and 6-hour operation times somewhat from that in the NUMAC discussed above for fewer than the PRNM LTR for improved clarity and minimum required channels. If completeness.

Improved Technical Specifications are applied to the plant, action statements remain unchanged.

3. Revise the Bases section as needed to replace the descriptions of the current 6- or 8-APRM channel systems and bypass capability with a corresponding description of the 4-APRM system, 2-out-of-4 Voter channels (2 per RPS system), and

+

allowed one APRM bypass total. 4 8.3.3.4 APRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - 1), 2), 3) 4) The current SSES Applicable Modes of Operation Technical Specifications and Bases already includes these Functions, with

1) APRM Neutron Flux - High slightly different names for the flux (Setdown) trips, with "Mode of Operation" requirements consistent with the Change Technical Specification NUMAC PRNM LTR. The PRNM "applicable modes" entry, if modification changes the names of the required, to be Mode 2 (startup). Functions only to be consistent with the Delete references to actions and NUMAC PRNM LTR. The proposed surveillance requirements Technical Specification and Bases associated with other modes.

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Delete any references to notes changes are consistent with this name associated with "non-coincidence" change and the NUMAC PRNM LTR.

mode and correct notes as required.

Revise Bases descriptions as required.

2) APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Retain as is unless this function is being added to replace the APRM Flow-biased Neutron Flux Trip. In that case, add requirement for operation in Mode 1 (RUN) and add or modify Bases descriptions as required.

3) APRM Neutron Flux - High Retain as is unless this function is being added to replace the APRM Flow-biased Neutron Flux Trip. In that case, add requirement for operation in Mode 1 (RUN) and add or modify Bases descriptions as required.

4) APRM Inop Trip Delete any requirements for operation in modes other than Mode 1 and Mode 2 (RUN and STARTUP). Revise the Bases descriptions as needed.

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8.3.4.1.4 APRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - a) The SSES Technical Specifications Channel Checks/ Instrument Checks currently include a once-per-12-hour Channel Check requirement for the a) For plants without Channel Check APRM Functions (except for Inop) requirements, add once per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and for other RPS Functions. The or once per day Channel Check or APRM Function Channel Check Instrument Check requirement for requirements will be changed to once the three APRM flux based per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , consistent with the functions. No Channel Check NUMAC PRNM LTR. The requirements are added for APRM proposed Technical Specification Inop function. Plants with once per and Bases changes for the Channel 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or once per shift Check SR are consistent with the requirements may change them to NUMAC PRNM LTR.

once per day.

b) SSES currently has 4 full b) For plants with 4 full recirculation recirculation flow channels.

flow channels and with Technical Associated surveillances have been Specifications that call for daily or included in those for the APRM other channel check requirements Simulated Thermal Power - High, for flow comparisons under APRM and the OPRM Trip Functions (the Flow Biased Simulated Thermal latter because of the OPRM Trip Power Trip, delete those enable function). The proposed requirements. Move any note Technical Specification and Bases reference related to verification of changes for the recirculation flow flow signals to Channel Functional related SRs are consistent with the Test entry. NUMAC PRNM LTR but with some expansion to clarify that the recirculation flow functions also support the OPRM Trip enable.

8.3.4.2.4 APRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - The current SSES Technical Channel Functional Tests Specification includes implementation of the surveillance improvements in a) Delete existing channel functional Reference 6 and a weekly surveillance test requirements and replace with a of the scram contactors independent of requirement for a Channel APRM (SR 3.3.1.1.5) applicable only to Functional Test frequency of each the Manual Scram Function, consistent 184 days (6 months) [delete any with the SR as shown in the NUMAC specific requirement related to PRNM LTR.

startup or shutdown except for the APRM Neutron Flux - High a) The proposed Technical (Setdown) function as noted in Specification and Bases changes Paragraph 8.3.4.2.2(1) of the related to Channel Functional Tests NUMAC PRNM LTR. Add a are consistent with the NUMAC notation that both the APRM PRNM LTR, but with some

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channels and the 2-out-of-4 Voter expansion of the Bases for channels are to be included in the clarification.

Channel Functional Test. b) The proposed Technical b) Add a notation for the APRM Specification and Bases changes to Simulated Thermal Power - High Channel Functional Tests for the function that the test shall include APRM Functions include a notation, the recirculation flow input applicable to the Simulated Thermal processing, excluding the flow Power - High (Function 2.b) and the transmitters. OPRM Trip (Function 2.),

consistent with the NUMAC PRNM CAUTION: Plants that have not LTR requirements, that the SR implemented the APRM surveillance includes the recirculation flow input improvements of Reference 11 of the processing, excluding the flow NUMAC PRNM LTR, or those that transmitters. However, the NUMAC have continued to use a weekly PRNM LTR includes this notation surveillance of scram contactors, may only in the Bases. For the SSES need to implement or modify Technical Specification, the notation surveillance actions to continue to has been included in the Channel provide a once per week functional test Functional Test SR (SR 3.3.1.1.12),

of scram contactors. (Prior to changes and has been expanded from that in defined in Reference 11, the weekly the NUMAC PRNM LTR to also APRM functional test also provides a apply to the OPRM Trip Function (to weekly test of all automatic scram cover OPRM Trip enable).

contactors.)

The proposed Bases change includes discussion of the scope of the APRM Channel Functional Test to clarify that the test covers primarily hardware rather than firmware.

The functional test surveillance procedure tests all of the hardware required to produce the trip functions, but not to directly re-test software-only (firmware-only) logic. The APRM automatic self-test function monitors the integrity of the Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories (EPROMs) storing all of the firmware so that if a hardware fault results in a "change" to the firmware (software), that fault will be detected by the self-test logic. The J L continued operation of the self-test

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procedures is monitored by the built-in "watch-dog timer" function, so if for some unforeseen reason the self-test function (lowest priority in the instrument logic) stops running, that failure also will be detected automatically. To provide further assurance that the self-test function continues to operate, the daily APRM Channel Check surveillance confirms that self-test is still running. The APRM Channel Check surveillance will also include a step to confirm that the RBM self-test is still running since the RBM hardware performs the recirculation flow comparison checks.

A surveillance finding that the self-test is not operating in both RBMs (meaning the recirculation flow-comparison function may not be available) will not automatically result in any APRM channel being declared inoperable, but will result in an increased rate of "flow comparison" manual surveillance. For this condition, the flow-comparison will be performed as part of the Channel Check SR for APRM Functions 2.b and 2.f, the two functions that depend on flow.

8.3.4.3.4 APRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - a) The proposed Technical Channel Calibrations Specification and Bases changes related to Channel Calibration for the a) Replace current calibration interval APRM Functions include an increase with either 18 or 24 months except in the interval to 24 months, with no for APRM Inop. Retain Inop calibration required for the Inop requirement as is (i.e., no Function, consistent with the requirement for calibration). NUMAC PRNM LTR.

b) Delete any requirement for flow b) Prior to the PRNM modification, the calibration and calibration of the 6 SSES Technical Specifications second time constant separate from included both an SR for calibration overall calibration of the APRM of the recirculation flow functions

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Simulated Thermal Power Upscale (SR 3.3.1.1.3) and a requirement for Trip. verification of the "7-second" time constant for the Simulated Thermal c) Replace every 3 day frequency for Power (SR 3.3.1.1.14). (Note: this calibration of APRM power against time constant is the same as the 6-thermal power with a 7 day second time constant discussed in b).

frequency if applicable. Consistent with the NUMAC PRNM LTR requirements, the proposed d) Revise Bases text as required. Technical Specification and Bases changes delete both of these surveillances and add a notation applicable to the Channel Calibration for the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High and OPRM Trip Functions to include requirements for calibration of the recirculation flow transmitter and flow processing function. However, the NUMAC PRNM LTR includes recirculation flow transmitter notation only in the Bases. For the SSES Technical Specification, the notation has been included in the Channel Calibration SR (SR 3.3.1.1.18), and has been expanded from that in the NUMAC PRNM LTR to also apply to the OPRM Trip Function (to cover OPRM Trip enable).

In addition, an additional SR (SR 3.3.1.1.20) that addresses reactor core flow/recirculation drive flow alignment has been added.

SR 3.3.1.1.20 is not discussed in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs. The NUMAC PRNM LTR assumes that drive flow/core flow alignment is accomplished as part of the "flow channel" calibration, part of the APRM Simulated Thermal Power and OPRM channel calibrations.

However, drive flow/core flow alignment cannot reasonably be accomplished during a refueling

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outage, the time when the APRM channel calibration would normally be performed. Separating this SR from the APRM channel calibration recognizes that the performance of this part of the flow channel calibration may be performed at a different time than the calibration of the APRM flow processing functions, and eliminates the potential need to maintain administrative control of a "partially completed" surveillance. Addition of the separate SR does not constitute a new surveillance requirement, but rather separates out a part of a currently defined surveillance.

c) The current SSES Technical Specifications include a "once-per-7-day" frequency for the calibration of APRM power against calculated plant thermal power so no change in that frequency is required to be consistent with the NUMAC PRNM LTR and no change is planned.

d) The proposed Technical Specification Bases changes related to Channel Calibrations are consistent with the NUMAC PRNM LTR, with some expanded text to address the use of drive flow for OPRM Trip enable, and to address the alignment of reactor core flow and recirculation drive flow, and in some areas to improve clarity.

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8.3.4.4.4 APRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - The proposed Technical Specification Response Time Testing and Bases changes related to Response Time Testing (SR 3.3.1.1.17) are Delete response time testing requirement consistent with the justification in the from Technical Specifications or plant NUMAC PRNM LTR Supplement 1 procedures, as applicable, for the APRM except that the RPS relays will be tested functions. Replace it with a response at twice the frequency justified.

time testing requirement for the 2-out-of-4 Voter "pseudo" function, to include Consistent with the NUMAC PRNM the output solid-state relays of the Voter LTRs, the only APRM Function to channel through the final RPS trip which SR 3.3.1.1.17 will apply is channel contactors. Function 2.e (Voter). However, while the NUMAC PRNM LTRs justified Frequency of response time testing shall reduced response time testing frequency be determined using four 2-out-of-4 for Function 2.e, no TS markups were Voter channels, but tests may alternate included to implement an "n" greater use of 2-out-of-4 Voter outputs provided than 4 (the total number of Voter each APRM/RPS interfacing relay is channels). Therefore, a note has been tested at least once per eight refueling added to the SSES SR 3.3.1.1.17 to cycles (based on a maximum 24 month define that "n=8" for Function 2.e. As cycle), and each RPS scram contactor is described in the expanded Bases, that tested at least once per four refueling rate will result in testing each APRM cycles. Each 2-out-of4 Voter output related RPS relay every 4 cycles, twice shall be tested at no less than half the the rate justified in the NUMAC PRNM frequency of the tests of the APRMIRPS LTR. This testing rate (compared to the interface relays. Tests shall alternate justification in the NUMAC PRNM such that one logic train for each RPS LTR) has been selected to simplify the trip system is tested every two cycles. record keeping for the SR. Without this notation, rigorous interpretation of the TS would result in a value of "n=4" for this SR.

The PRNM modification includes redundant APRM trip and redundant OPRM trip outputs from each 2-out-of-4 Voter channel. One of the OPRM outputs and one of the APRM outputs are connected in series to the coil of one RPS interface relay. The second OPRM output and the second APRM output from the 2-out-of-4 Voter channel are connected in series with the coil to a second RPS interface relay. There are 8 total RPS interface relays.

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The NUMAC PRNM LTR Supplement 1 justified response time testing at a rate that tested one RPS Interface relay every plant operating cycle, with tests using the APRM output for one cycle and the OPRM output for the next cycle. This yields a testing rate once per 8 operating cycles for each RPS interface relay and once per every 16 operating cycles for the APRM or OPRM output.

The response time testing proposed in the SSES Technical Specification will test both of the redundant OPRM or both of the redundant APRM trip outputs from each Voter during one application of the SR. This testing is consistent with the sequencing described in NUMAC PRNM LTR Supplement 1, but at twice the rate for all components.

In addition, because this sequencing may be confusing, a description of the RPS Response Time Testing requirement for the Voter Function 2.e has been added to the SR 3.3.1.1.17 Bases, including a table showing an acceptable testing sequence. The specific tests will be defined in SSES 9 4 procedures.

8.3.5.4 APRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - Consistent with the NUMAC PRNM Logic System Functional Testing LTR, the proposed Technical (LSFI) Specification change deletes the requirement for LSFT surveillances for Revise Technical Specifications to all APRM Functions except the 2-out-change the interval for LSFT from of-4 Voter, Function 2.e. The LSFT 18 months to 24 months unless the requirement for that Function is utility elects to retain the 18-month included at a 24-month interval.

interval for plant scheduling purposes.

Delete any LSFT requirements associated with the APRM channels and move it to the 2-out-of-4 Voter channel.

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Include testing of the 2-out-of-4 voting logic and any existing LSFTs covering RPS relays.

8.3.6.1 APRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - ARTS has not previously been Setpoints implemented at SSES and will not be implemented with Phase 1 of the PRNM Add to or delete from the appropriate Modification.

document any changed RPS setpoint The PRNM Allowable Values have not information. If ARTS is being been changed in Technical implemented concurrently with the Specifications. The operation efficiency PRNM modification, either include the of the replacement system is equal to or related Technical Specification better than the existing system.

submittal information with the PRNM Therefore, the setpoints have not been information in the plant-specific revised. Any in-house calculation of submittal, or reference the ARTS PRNM setpoints and Allowable Values submittal in the PRNM submittal. In the will be re-calculated or confirmed using plant-specific licensing submittal, SSES's approved calculation program.

identify what changes, if any, are being The Setpoints for the APRM RPS implemented and identify the basis or Functions will be included in the method used for the calculation of Technical Specifications or the COLR, setpoints and where the setpoint comparable to what is currently in the information or changes will be recorded. SSES Technical Specifications and consistent with the NUMAC PRNM LTR. Rod block values will be included in the Technical Specification, the COLR or Technical Requirements Manual equivalent to those in the current SSES documents.

The Allowable Value (AV) for the Simulated Thermal Power - High for single recirculation loop operation (in accordance with LCO 3.4.1) in both Technical Specification Table 3.3.1.1-1 and in the COLR is currently shown with an "offset" change. The representation of the expression for the AV for single loop operation has been modified to be in the form of xx.x(W-AW) + yy where "yy" is the same value as for two loop operation, similar to the form used in the equivalent ISTS specification. This change does not affect the effective AV, but lines up

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better with the method used to implement the adjustment in the replacement PRNM.

See the SSES Technical Specification and Bases markup for the specific changes.

8.4.1.4 OPRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - SSES currently has installed an OPRM Functions Covered by Technical system covered by LCO 3.3.1.3 that Specifications incorporates Stability Option III, the same OPRM function that is described Add the OPRM Upscale function as an in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs and "APRM function" in the RPS BWROG LTRs. The NUMAC PRNM Instrumentation "function" table. Also modification incorporates the OPRM add the related surveillance Option III function into the PRNM requirements and, if applicable, the equipment as described in the NUMAC related setpoint, and the related PRNM LTRs. Therefore LCO 3.3.1.3 is descriptions in the bases sections. being deleted and an OPRM Trip Perform analysis necessary to establish Function (same as the "OPRM Upscale setpoints for the OPRM Upscale trip. Function in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs)

Add discussions related to the OPRM has been added to the SSES Technical function in the Bases for the APRM Specification LCO 3.3.1.1 as an "APRM Inop and 2-out-of-4 Voter functions. Function" (Function 2.f), consistent with NUMAC PRNM LTR, Supplement 1, NOTE: The markups in Appendix H of Appendix H. However, a footnote for Supplement 1 to the NUMAC PRNM Function 2.f (not shown in the NUMAC LTR show the OPRM Upscale as an PRNM LTR) has been added to APRM sub-function. However, document that the period based individual plants may determine that for detection algorithm (PBDA) setpoint their particular situation, addition of the limits are defined in the COLR.

OPRM to the RPS Instrumentation table separate from the APRM, or as a Additions to the Technical Specification separate Technical Specification, better Bases for Function 2.f have also been meets their needs. In those cases, the incorporated consistent with the basis elements of the Technical NUMAC PRNM LTR but with some Specification as shown in this rewording to more clearly present the Supplement would remain, but the information, and with additions to more specific implementation would be completely address OPRM related different. setpoints and adjustable parameters.

The NUMAC PRNM LTR Supplement 1 included some additional wording for Function 2.e (Voter) to address independent voting of the

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OPRM and APRM signals. The corresponding SSES Bases additions for Function 2.e are modified somewhat from those shown in the NUMAC PRNM LTR, Supplement 1. These modifications are conservative in that they delete any discussion of a "partially OPERABLE" Voter Function. These changes are made for simplicity, based on the conclusion that the added alternatives discussed in the NUMAC PRNM LTR are complicated to evaluate, and are very unlikely to ever be applied. The modified Bases text does include some added discussion (not included in the NUMAC PRNM LTR) of the hardware that implements the Voter Function. The added wording clarifies that operability of parts of the hardware that are not related to the Voter Function do not need to be considered in determining operability of the Voter Function.

See the SSES Technical Specification and Bases markup for the specific changes.

8.4.2.4 OPRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - A minimum operable channels Minimum Number of Operable OPRM requirement of three, shared by both Channels trip systems has been included in the Technical Specification for the For the OPRM functions added (Section OPRM Trip Function (LCO 3.3.1.1, 8.4.1), include in the OPRM Technical Function 2.). This addition, as well as Specification a "minimum operable addition of Required Action statements channels" requirement for three OPRM and Bases descriptions, is consistent channels, shared by both trip systems. with the NUMAC PRNM LTR and NUMAC PRNM LTR Supplement 1.

Add the same action statements as for Specific Bases wording has been revised the APRM Neutron Flux - High function somewhat to improve clarity.

for OPRM Upscale function. In addition, add a new action statement for See the SSES Technical Specification OPRM Upscale function unavailable per and Bases markup for the specific Paragraph 8.4.2.2 of the NUMAC changes.

PRNM LTR.

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Revise the Bases section as needed to add descriptions of the 4-OPRM system with 2-out-of-4 output Voter channels (2 per RPS Trip System), and allowed one OPRM bypass total.

8.4.3.4 OPRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - Relocated the Modes of Operation Applicable Modes of Operation requirement of 2 25% RTP, consistent with the NUMAC PRNM LTR Add the requirement for operation of the Supplement 1 to Table 3.3.1.1.-i. This OPRM Upscale function in Mode 1 requirement is presently an operability (RUN) when Thermal Power is > 25% requirement for SSES's current OPRM RTP, and add Bases descriptions as function as documented in LCO 3.3.1.3 required. (which is deleted with the incorporation of the OPRM function in LCO 3.3.1.1).

The specific wording included in the Function 2.f Bases discussion for Modes of Operation has been modified somewhat from the NUMAC PRNM LTR proposed text for improved clarity of the intent.

See the SSES Technical Specification and Bases markup for the specific changes.

8.4.4.1.4 OPRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - A Channel Check requirement of once Channel Check per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been included for the OPRM Trip Function, consistent Add once per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or once per day with the NUMAC PRNM LTR Channel Check or Instrument Check Supplement 1.

requirements for the OPRM Upscale function. See the SSES Technical Specification markup for the specific changes.

8.4.4.2.4 OPRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - A "confirm auto-enable region" Channel Functional Test surveillance requirement, SR 3.3.1.1.19, Add Channel Functional Test has been added to require confirmation requirements with a requirement for a that the OPRM Trip output auto-enable test frequency of every 184 days (not bypassed) setpoints remain correct.

(6 months), including the 2-out-of-4 The SR 3.3.1.1.19 Bases wording is Voter function. similar to that in the NUMAC PRNM Add a "confirm auto-enable region" LTR, but the wording has been modified surveillance on a once per outage basis and Reference 5 added to clarify that the

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up to 24 month intervals. setpoints are nominal values.

References to two related SRs have also been added. The discussion of the use of APRM Simulated Thermal Power and drive flow for the setpoints (vs. Thermal Power and core flow) has been omitted from the SR 3.3.1.1.19 Bases because that same information is presented in the OPRM Trip (Function 2.f Bases discussion. The specific OPRM Trip enabled region flow limit is slightly different from that in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs. The upper flow limit is

"< value equivalent to the core flow value defined in the COLR" vs. < 60%

in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs. This minor change from "<" to "<" reflects the present Technical Specifications and is conservative, and is being made to align the specification with the actual equipment to simplify comparison of surveillance results with the acceptance criteria. The change to replace the drive flow value with a reference to the COLR supports PPL's process of reconfirming the upper limit of the trip-enable region on a cycle-specific basis, and to identify the limit in the COLR in terms of core flow. The actual setpoint will still be entered as the drive flow value nominally equivalent to the core flow limit.

Use of the term "rated drive flow" has been omitted from the SR wording shown in the NUMAC PRNM LTR to avoid potential confusion on performance of the SR. The intent of the SR is to confirm the flow value as indicated on the APRM equipment.

These changes have no effect on the actual SR as originally defined in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs since the intent

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of the SR, to require reconfirmation of the setpoints in the APRM hardware, remains unchanged from the NUMAC PRNM LTR.

A Channel Functional Test requirement with a test frequency of every 184 days (SR 3.3.1.1.12) has been added for the OPRM Trip and 2-out-of-4 Voter Functions consistent with the NUMAC PRNM LTR, Supplement 1. A note to SR 3.3.1.1.12 (not included in the NUMAC PRNM LTR) has been included to clarify that the SR also applies to the flow input function, except the transmitters.

No change is shown in the NUMAC PRNM LTR Supplement 1 for the Channel Functional Test (SR 3.3.1.1.11 in the NUMAC PRNM LTR) Bases (from that for the APRM Functions) to cover the OPRM Trip Function. For the SSES proposed change, the Bases discussion for SR 3.3.1.1.12 has been modified slightly to clarify that the recirculation drive flow is used for the auto-enable of the OPRM Trip as well as for the APRM STP - High trip Allowable Value.

See the SSES Technical Specification and Bases markup for the specific changes.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 60 of 81 NEDC-3241OP-A Utility Action Required per NEDC- Utility Response Section 32410P-A No.

8.4.4.3.4 OPRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - A Channel Calibration requirement, Channel Calibration SR 3.3.1.1.18 (corresponds to SR 3.3.1.1.13 in the NUMAC PRNM LTR),

Add calibration interval requirement of for the OPRM Trip Function has been every 24 months for the OPRM Upscale added consistent with the NUMAC function. PRNM LTR Supplement 1, but also with some additional changes not Revise Bases text as required. included in the NUMAC PRNM LTR as discussed below.

An additional note is provided for SR 3.3.1.1.18 and to the corresponding Bases, applicable to Functions 2.b and 2.f, to state that SR 3.3.1.1.18 includes calibrating the associated recirculation loop flow channel.

The NUMAC PRNM LTR, Supplement 1 does not identify any additional changes to the Bases for OPRM Trip Channel Calibration requirements (beyond those required for the other APRM Functions). However, reviews of the Bases wording identified two aspects that should be clarified:

1) the wording should recognize that drive flow is also used as an input to the OPRM Trip auto-enable function, and

2) that alignment of reactor core flow with recirculation drive flow was necessary for proper system operation.

Therefore, the SR 3.3.1.1.18 Bases discussion has been modified from that shown in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs (SR 3.3.1.1.13 in the NUMAC PRNM LTR) to include discussion of the OPRM Trip auto-enable function and to address the alignment of reactor core flow with recirculation drive flow (including a reference to the added drive flow alignment SR 3.3.1.1.20, which is not included in the NUMAC PRNM LTR).

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 61 of 81 NEDC-32410P-A Utility Action Required per NEDC- Utility Response Section 32410P-A No.

8.4.4.4.4 OPRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - These changes do not change any of the Response Time Testing intent of the NUMAC PRNM LTRs or affect the associated NUMAC PRNM Modify as necessary the response time LTR justifications.

testing procedure for the 2-out-of-4 Voter function to include the Voter See the SSES Technical Specification OPRM output solid-state relays as part and Bases markup for the specific of the response time tests, alternating changes.

testing of the Voter OPRM output with the Voter APRM output. See response to 8.3.4.4.4. That response also addresses OPRM.

8.4.5.4 OPRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - The LSFI (SR 3.3.1.1.15) for the Logic System Functional Testing OPRM Trip Function is the same as for (LSFI) the APRM, a test of the 2-out-of-4 Voter only. Consistent with the NUMAC Add requirement for LSFT every PRNM LTR Supplement 1, the only refueling cycle, 18 or 24 months at the change required to implement the utility's option based on which best fits OPRM "LSFT" is the addition of "and plant scheduling. OPRM" in the Technical Specification Bases and revision of the related plant procedures to include testing of the OPRM Trip outputs from the 2-out-of-4 Voter. The procedure changes will be made as part of the normal modification process.

See the SSES Technical Specification Bases markup for the specific changes.

8.4.6.1 OPRM-Related RPS Trip Functions - There are four "sets" of OPRM related Setpoints setpoints and adjustable parameters:

a) OPRM trip auto-enable (not Add setpoint information to the bypassed) setpoints for ST? and drive appropriate document and identify in the flow; b) period based detection plant-specific submittal the basis or algorithm (PBDA) confirmation count method used for the calculation and and amplitude setpoints; c) period based where the setpoint information will be detection algorithm tuning parameters; recorded. and d) growth rate algorithm (GRA) and amplitude based algorithm (ABA) setpoints.

The first set, the setpoints for the "auto-enable" region for OPRM, as discussed in the Bases for Function 2.f and the new SR 3.3.1.1.19, will be treated as

9, Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 62 of 81 NEDC-32410P-A Utility Action Required per NEDC- Utility Response Section 32410P-A No.

nominal setpoints with no additional margins added. These setpoints are the entry values for the digital OPRM protective action enabling function. A deadband area is further defined to ensure setpoint stability. The setpoints are based on licensing methodology and are nominal values. The settings are defined (limit values) in the Technical Specification SR 3.3.1.1.19. The SR is the same as shown in the NUMAC PRNM LTRs except that, to provide for cycle specific confirmation or modification, the upper flow limit will be defined in the COLR.

The second set, the PBDA trip setpoints, will be established in accordance with the BWROG LTR 32465-A (Reference 4) methodology, previously reviewed and approved by the NRC, and will be documented in the COLR.

The third set, the PBDA "tuning" parameter values, are established in accordance with and controlled by the SSES Technical Requirements Manual.

The fourth set, the GRA and ABA setpoints, consistent with the BWROG submittals, are established as nominal values only, and controlled by SSES procedures.

To document the handling of OPRM setpoints, the SSES Technical Specification Bases markup for Function 2.f has been expanded and modified somewhat from that shown in the NUMAC PRNM LTR Supplement 1.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 63 of 81 NEDC-32410P-A Utility Action Required per NEDC- Utility Response Section 32410P-A UtilityResponse No. _ _

8.5.1.4 APRM-Related Control Rod Block See the SSES Technical Specification Functions - Functions Covered by Bases markup for the specific changes.

Technical Specifications SSES Technical Specifications currently If ARTS will be implemented do not contain any APRM rod block concurrently with the PRNM functions. They have been moved to the modification, include or reference those SSES TRM. The APRM rod block changes in the plant-specific PRNM functions are as discussed in the submittal. Implement the applicable NUMAC PRNM LTR and unchanged portion of the above described changes for SSES except that unlike the current via modifications to the Technical SSES PRNM system, the NUMAC Specifications and related procedures PRNM used Simulated Thermal Power and documents. In the plant-specific for all rod block and APRM downscale subbmittal, identify functions currently in trips to reduce nuisance alarms and false the plant Technical Specifications and rod block trips when the plant is which, if any, changes are being operating near the rod block limits. The implemented. For any functions deleted margin between rod block setpoints and from Technical Specifications, identify the associated RPS scram setting is where setpoint and surveillance sufficient so that this change does not requirements will be documented. reduce the effectiveness of the rod block NOTE: A utility may choose not to function in avoiding inadvertent scrams.

delete some or all of the items identified The reduction in nuisance rod block in the NUMAC PRNM LTR from the alarms will reduce potential distractions plant Technical Specifications. for the operator.

ARTS has not previously been implemented at SSES and will not be implemented with Phase 1 of the PRNM Modification.

SSES Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2.1 currently has the following RBM rod block functions:

1. Low Power Range - Upscale

2. Inop

3. Downscale For Phase 1, these functions will be retained unchanged.

The NUMAC PRNM LTRs do not include specific Technical Specification or Bases changes for ITS plants without

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 64 of 81 NEDC-32410P-A Utility Action Required per NEDC- Utility Response Section 32410P-A No.

ARTS. For SSES, the only change to the LCO 3.3.2.1 Bases is a clarification of the APRM power signal provided by the APRMs to the RBMs for auto-bypass of the function.

8.5.2.4 APRM-Related Control Rod Block See 8.5.1.4 above. No additional Functions - Minimum Number of confirmation of action is required Operable Control Rod Block Channels relative to minimum operable channels as shown in the Technical Specifications Change the minimum number of APRM beyond that required by 8.5.1.4 above.

channels to three, if APRM functions are retained in Technical Specifications. The APRM rod block functions are No additional action is required relative listed in the TRM. In the TRM, the to minimum operable channels beyond minimum number of APRM channels that required by Paragraph 8.5.1.4 of the will be changed to three.

NUMAC PRNM LTR.

8.5.3.4 APRM-Related Control Rod Block See 8.5.1.4 above. No additional Functions - Applicable Modes of confirmation of action is required Operation relative to applicable modes of operation as shown in the Technical Specifications No action required relative to modes beyond that required by 8.5.1.4 above.

during which the function must be available beyond that required by The APRM rod block functions are Paragraph 8.5.1.4 of the NUMAC listed in the TRM. Current operability PRNM LTR unless APRM functions are requirements in Mode 5 for the APRM retained in Technical Specifications and rod block functions are being deleted in include operability requirements for the TRM, consistent with the NUMAC Mode 5. In that case, delete such PRNM LTRs.

requirements.

8.5.4.1.4 APRM-Related Control Rod Block SSES Technical Specifications currently Functions - Required Surveillances and do not contain any APRM rod block Calibration - Channel Check functions, or any Channel Check requirements for the RBM rod block Delete any requirements for instrument functions. Therefore, no change to or channel checks related to RBM and, SSES Technical Specifications is where applicable, recirculation flow rod required to implement the NUMAC block functions (non-ARTS plants), and PRNM LTR requirements.

APRM functions. Identify in the plant-specific PRNM submittals if any checks The TRM currently includes a once per are currently included in Technical 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Channel Check requirement for Specifications, and confirm that they are the APRM rod block functions.

being deleted.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 65 of 81 NEDC-32410P-A Utility Action Required per NEDC- Utility Response Section 32410P-A No.

Consistent with the NUMAC PRNM LTRs, that requirement is being deleted from the TRM for APRM rod block functions.

8.5.4.2.4 APRM-Related Control Rod Block The proposed Technical Specification Functions - Required Surveillances and change changes the RBM rod block Calibration - Channel Functional Test Channel Functional Test frequency to Change Channel Functional Test once per 184 days.

requirements to identify a frequency of every 184-days (6 months). SSES Technical Specifications currently do not contain any APRM rod block In the plant-specific licensing submittal, functions. The Channel Functional Test identify current Technical Specification frequency for the APRM rod block test frequencies that will be changed to functions will be changed to once per 184 days (6 months). 184 days in the TRM.

8.5.4.3.4 APRM-Related Control Rod Block The current SSES Technical Functions - Required Surveillances and Specification RBM rod block Channel Calibration - Channel Calibrations Calibration frequency is once per 24 months, which will be retained.

Change channel calibration requirements to identify a frequency of SSES Technical Specifications currently every 24 months. In the plant-specific do not contain any APRM rod block licensing submittal, identify current functions. The Channel Calibration Technical Specification test frequencies frequency for the APRM rod block that will be changed to 24 months. functions is currently once per 24 months in the TRM, which will be retained.

8.5.4.4.4 APRM-Related Control Rod Block SSES Technical Specifications currently Functions - Required Surveillances and do not contain any APRM rod block Calibration - Response Time Testing functions. There currently are no None. response time testing requirements in the TRM and none will be added.

8.5.5.4 APRM-Related Control Rod Block SSES Technical Specifications currently Functions - Required Surveillances and do not contain any APRM rod block Calibration - Logic System Functional functions. There currently are no Testing (LSFT) APRM Control Rod Block LSFT requirements in the TRM, and none will None. be added.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 66 of 81 NEDC-32410P-A Utility Action Required per NEDC- Utility Response Section 32410P-A No.

8.5.6.1 APRM-Related Control Rod Block ARTS has not previously been Functions - Required Surveillances and implemented at SSES and will not be Calibration - Setpoints implemented with Phase 1 PRNM Modification.

Add to or delete from the appropriate document any changed control rod block RBM and APRM rod block setpoints are setpoint information. If ARTS is being based on setpoint calculations performed implemented concurrently with the using SSES's calculation program. The PRNM modification, either include the actual Allowable Values and setpoints related Technical Specification are defined in the Technical submittal information with the PRNM Specification (some of the RBM values),

information in the plant-specific COLR, or TRM.

submittal, or reference the ARTS submittal in the PRNM submittal. In the For Phase 1, no change in the method of plant-specific submittal, identify what documenting the rod block setpoints is changes, if any, are being implemented planned.

and identify the basis or method used for calculation of setpoints and where the setpoint information or changes will be recorded.

8.6.2 Shutdown Margin Testing - Refueling The proposed Technical Specification and Bases change includes changes to As applicable, revise the Shutdown Specification 3.10.8, Shutdown Margin Margin Testing - Refueling (or Test - Refuel, to be consistent with the equivalent Technical Specification) post-modification PRNM architecture LCO(s), action statements, surveillance and functions.

requirements and Bases as required to be consistent with the APRM Technical Specification changes implemented for PRNM.

None Specification 3.3.1.3. OPRM Specification 3.3.1.3 was established to Instrumentation support the implementation of the current " OPRM Stability Option III" No action identified in the NUMAC system. With the implementation of PRNM LTR. the NUMAC PRNM with OPRM, the Option III stability solution is integrated within the APRM functions in LCO 3.3.1.1, so this specification is no longer needed. Specification 3.3.1.3, along with its associated Bases, has been deleted in its entirety in the proposed Technical Specification.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 67 of 81 NEDC-32410P-A Utility Action Required per NEDC- Utility Response Section 3241OP-A No.

None Specification 3.4.1. Recirculation Loops The only change to LCO 3.4.1 is a Operatin change in the name of the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High No action identified in the NUMAC Function to agree with the PRNM PRNM LTR. modification. The Bases for LCO 3.4.1 is similarly changed and also slightly modified to replace a reference to LCO 3.3.1.3 for OPRM with a reference to LCO 3.3.1.1.

See the SSES Technical Specification and Bases markup for the specific changes.

None Core Operating Limits Report Requirements for OPRM setpoints in 5.6.5a have been modified to replace No action identified in the NUMAC reference to LCO 3.3.1.3 with reference PRNM LTR. to LCO 3.3.1.1.

See the SSES Technical Specification markup for the specific changes.

None Technical Requirements Manual 3.3.9. TRM Requirement 3.3.9 was established OPRM Instrumentation to support the implementation of the OPRM Stability Option III. The TRM No action identified in the NUMAC controls the OPRM-related setpoints and PRNM LTR. parameter settings and defines the actions required for the "alternate procedures" to be implemented when the OPRM function is not available (as required by the current LCO 3.3.1.3).

TRM 3.3.9 will be modified slightly to reference LCO 3.3.1.1 and, where necessary, to correctly reflect the OPRM Stability Option III function integrated into the APRM system, but will otherwise be retained unchanged.

9.1.3 Utility Quality Assurance Program Quality assurance requirements for work performed at SSES are defined and As part of the plant-specificlicensing described in PPL Quality Assurance submittal, the utility should document Plans.

the established program that is applicable to the project modification. For the PRNM modification, PPL has The submittal should also document for contracted with GE to include the the project what scope is being following PRNM scope: 1) design,

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 68 of 81 NEDC-32410P-A Utility Action Required per NEDC- Utility Response Section 3241OP-A No.

performed by the utility and what scope 2) hardware/software, 3) licensing is being supplied by others. For scope support, 4) training, 5) O&M manuals supplied by others, document the utility and design documentation, 6) EMI/RFI actions taken or planned to define or qualification of equipment, and 7) NMS establish requirements for the project, to setpoint calculation inputs.

assure those requirements are compatible with the plant-specific On-site engineering work to incorporate configuration. Actions taken or planned the GE-provided design information into by the utility to assure compatibility of an Engineering Change Request (ECR) the GE quality program with the utility or to provide any supporting, interface program should also be documented. design changes will be performed per requirements of applicable PPLJSSES Utility planned level of participation in procedures. Modification work to the overall V&V process for the project implement the design change will be should be documented, along with utility performed per PPIJSSES procedures or plans for software configuration PPL /SSES-approved contractor management and provision to support procedures. PPL has participated and any required changes after delivery will continue to participate in should be documented. appropriate reviews of GE's design and V&V program for the PRNM modification.

For software delivered in the form of hardware Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories (EPROMs), PPL will have GE maintain post delivery configuration control of the actual source code and handle any changes.

PPL will then handle any changes in the EPROMs as hardware changes under its applicable hardware modification procedures.

Phase 2, ARTS implementation, of the planned modification, will be as a post-installation (of Phase 1, for Unit 1 only) change. All changes required to implement Phase 2 will undergo the same level of V&V as the Phase 1 design.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 69 of 81 7.3 Additional SSES-Specific Information Regarding OPRM Replacement As part of the NUMAC PRNM modification, SSES will be replacing the currently installed OPRM system with an equivalent OPRM system integrated into the PRNM equipment. The replacement OPRM system implements the same OPRM algorithms as currently installed, but due to the 4-channel design of the NUMAC PRNM, the replacement system will implement an alternate OPRM "cell assignment" compared to that implemented in the current system. Both the currently installed OPRM system and the replacement system satisfy the requirements in LTR NEDO-32465-A, "Reactor Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology for Reload Applications" (Reference 4), including OPRM cell assignment, as clarified in the discussion below. With the potential exception of some of the tuning parameters, the settings and setpoints planned for the OPRM algorithms in the replacement system will be the same as those in the currently installed system. Adequacy of the setpoints for the modified OPRM cell assignments will be confirmed in accordance with the requirements of LTR NEDO-32465-A.

LTR NEDO-32465-A describes the licensing basis methodology for the Option III long-term stability solution. The licensing basis for this solution is the period based detection algorithm (PBDA), which relies on the fact that OPRM "cells", composed of closely spaced local power range monitors (LPRMs), can be used to distinguish between thermal-hydraulic instabilities and stable reactor operation. During normal, steady state reactor operation, LPRM signals are comprised of a broad range of frequencies that are typically present in a boiling water reactor (BWR). These LPRM signals become more coherent displaying a characteristic frequency in the 0.3 to 0.7 Hertz (Hz) range with the onset of thermal-hydraulic instability. The PBDA uses the difference in LPRM signal coherence to detect instabilities. The coherence persists when signals from closely spaced LPRMs are combined in OPRM cells.

Specifically, the OPRM combines signals from LPRMs assigned to the OPRM cell and determines each successive pair of OPRM cell maxima and minima. If the maxima/minima occur at a frequency in the range of 0.3 to 0.7 Hz, the base period is set.

If the subsequent maxima/minima occur within a specified tolerance band of the base period, the oscillation is considered to be a single period confirmation. Subsequent maxima/minima that fall within the specified base period tolerance range cause the PBDA continuous period confirmation (CPC) counter to be incremented by one. This process continues until a maxima/minima is found to be outside the specified base period tolerance range, at which time the CPC counter is reset to zero. The last CPC count prior to resetting is termed the maximum continuous period confirmation (MCPC) count.

The CPC for each OPRM cell is evaluated simultaneously. During normal plant operation with large stability margin, non-zero CPC count values are expected due to the random nature of normal core neutron-flux noise. Based on basic principles and confirmed by the results of OPRM "tuning" studies at plants that have previously installed the OPRM function, the largest frequency of occurrence is a MCPC of 1, with rapidly decreasing frequency of occurrence of higher MCPC counts. The OPRM tuning process is intended to optimize the setting values of various OPRM tuning parameters so

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 70 of 81 that the PBDA is sufficiently sensitive to detect actual core oscillations while not unnecessarily tripping on normal core neutron-flux noise.

The OPRM instrumentation configuration, setpoints, and settings are presently outlined in TRM section 3.3.9 and Table 3.3.9-1 respectively. Any changes as a result of the continued design process to these requirements will be processed in accordance with standard requirements to TRM changes. Both the current OPRM system and the planned replacement OPRM system satisfy the requirements in LTR NEDO-32465-A.

To help maintain operability assurance and preclude human factors related events, regarding OPRM Stability Option III, Operator cycle specific training has been performed. An OPRM system lecture was presented during Licensed Operator Re-qualification (LOR)

Cycle 04-05. A simulator demonstration was performed during cycles 04-05 and 04-06.

In addition, the OPRM system technical specifications and technical requirements will be covered in LOR Cycle 05-04. Operating experience involving Nine Mile Point Unit 2 and Perry's scrams will also be covered in LOR Cycle 05-04.

Enclosure to PLA-5880 Page 71 of 81

8. REFERENCES

1. Licensing Topical Report NEDC-32410P-A Volumes 1 and 2, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC-PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function," dated October 1995.

2. Licensing Topical Report NEDC-32410P-A Supplement 1, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC-PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function," dated November 1997.

3. Licensing Topical Report NEDO-31960-A including Supplement 1, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology,"

dated November 1995.

4. Licensing Topical Report NEDO-32465-A, "Reactor Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology for Reload Application,"

dated August 1996.

5. BWROG Letter 96113, K. P. Donovan (BWROG) to L.E. Phillips (NRC),

"Guidelines for Stability Option III 'Enable Region' (TAC M92882),"

dated September 17, 1996. (Also see "Bases Reference 21")

6. NEDC-30851P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Reactor Protection System," Licensing Topical Report, GE Nuclear Energy, Class III (proprietary,), dated March 1988. (Referred to as 'Reference 11 of the NUMAC PRNM LTR')

Attachment 1 to PLA-5880 Changes To Technical Specification

Unit 1 Technical Specification Mark-ups

Attachment 2 to PLA-5880 Changes To Technical Specification Bases For Information

Unit 1 Technical Specification Bases Mark-ups For Information

Unit 2 Technical Specification Mark-ups

Unit 2 Technical Specification Bases Mark-ups For Information

Attachment 1 to PLA-5880 Changes To Technical Specification

Unit 1 Technical Specification Mark-ups

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1.1-1.

ACTIONS

- NOTE Separate Condition entry is allowed for each chann CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in trip. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months channels inoperable.

OR

< ,Xhansdinoerable, r B.2 Place one trip system in trip 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months C. One or more C.1 Restore RPS trip capability. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Functions with RPS trip capability not maintained. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT I 3.3-1 Amendment 178 INSERT 1: A.2 ------- NOTE ------- Not applicable for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f. Place associated trip system in trip. INSERT 2: B. ------- NOTE ------- Not applicable for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f. One or more Functions with one or more required channels inoperable in both trip systems. PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 Enter the Condition referenced Immediately associated in Table 3.3.1.1-1 for the Completion Time of channels. Condition A, B, or C not met. E. As required by E.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Required Action D.1 <30% RTP. and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1. F. As required by F.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1. G. As required by G.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1. H. As required by H.1 Initiate action to fully insert all Immediately Required Action D.1 insertable control rods in core and referenced in cells containing one or more fuel Table 3.3.1.1-1. assemblies. P :f4 ( SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.3-2 Amendment 178 INSERT 3: I. As required by I.1 Initiate alternate method to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Required Action D.1 detect and suppress thermal and referenced in hydraulic instability Table 3.3.1.1-1. oscillations. AND 1.2 Restore required channels 120 days to OPERABLE. J. Required Action and J.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition I not met. <25% RTP. 1 PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Jg U

1. Refer to Table 3.3.1.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RPS Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required .

Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months k .ntz - -DL J I r-Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER 2 25% RTP. Verify the absolute difference between the average 7 days power range monitor (APRM) channels and the calculated power is < 2%RTP plus any gain adjustment required by LCO 3.2.4, "Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Setpoints" while operating at Ž 25% RTP. r e v7i A_..sjfal.5~ -- juW ch3nfil to f~orm tib c/ e filow _ 7 _ /r SR 3.3.1.1.4 -a NOTE-- Not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2. Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 7 days (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.3-3 Amnendment 178 INSERT 3A: SR 3.3.1.1.2. Perform CHANNEL CHECK l24 hours PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

I'dI.,W- I- - - -- --

K IAT=O -- -

SR 3.3.1.1.11 LOJ

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.

2. For Function 1.a knot required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

)isir U Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 184 days

/ SR 3.3.1.1.13 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months SR 3.3.1.1.15 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months SR 3.3.1.1.16 Verify Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and Turbine 24 months Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is > 30% RTP.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA -UNIT 1 3.3-5 Amendment 178

INSERT 4:

SR 3.3.1.1.12. --------------------NOTES --------------

1. For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

2. For Functions 2.b and 2.f, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST includes the recirculation flow input processing, excluding the flow transmitters.

184 days Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST_______

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.17 -- O NOTES

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.

2. For FuncUon 5 'n' equals 4 channels for the purpose of determining the STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency (e~,

Verify the RPS RESPONSE TIME is within limits. 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.3-6 Amendment 191

INSERT 5:

3. For Function 2.e, 'n' equals 8 channels for the purpose of determining the STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency. Testing of APRM and OPRM outputs shall alternate.

INSERT 6:

SR 3.3.1.1.18. --------------------NOTES --------------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.

2. For Functions 2.b and 2.f, the recirculation flow transmitters that feed the APRMs are included.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION 24 months SR 3.3.1.1.19 Verify OPRM is not bypassed when APRM 24 months Simulated Thermal Power is 2 30% and recirculation drive flow is < value equivalent to the core flow value defined in the COLR.

SR 3.3.1.1.20 Adjust recirculation drive flow to conform 24 months to reactor core flow.

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDTTIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Intermediate Range Monitors

a. Neutron 2 3 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 S 122/125 divisions F1ux--igh SR 3.3.1.1.4 of full scale SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(aI 3 H SR 3.3.1.1.1 s 122/125 divislons SR 3.3.1.1.5 of full scale SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3,1.1.15

b. Inop 2 3 G SR 3.3.1.1A NA SR 3.3.1.1.15 5"(s 3 H SR 3.3.1.1.5 NA SR 3.3.2.2.15

2. Average Power Range Monitors

a. Neutron 2 I ') G SR 3.3.1.1.12Z s 20% RTP Flux-4-igbrC SR 9.5.l.H. I"

( Setdown) SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.8 p B.3, I.I.IL Sp- 3,'311

b. -TW1 s-- I / 3 (C) F -9R-,1.1.4-1' S 0.58W Simulated SR 3.3.1.12 + 62% RTPO') and Thermal SR 3.3.1.1.3 S115.5% RTP Power-High SR 3.3.1.1.8 cSPonlinued)

SP /

~117 conitnmd (a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containqna one or more fuel assembles.

(b+ 0.58W iS7e , Rrseges-Opera3 rt,1e Yt- 17 (yc V\Av 5EYA SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.3-7 Amendment 178

INSERT 7:

(b) 0.58(W-AW) + 62% RTP when reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating." For single loop operation the value of AW =

5%/0.58. For two loop operation, the value of AW = 0.

(c) Each APRM channel provides inputs to both trip systems.

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 2 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEiLLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. Averaoe Power Range Monitors (continued) (C)

c. 3 Neutron 1 /3 F SR 3.3.1.1 1 <120% RTP Flux-4igh SR 3.3.1.1.2---

SR 3.3.1.1.

SR-i3.1+/-14iv-_______________

(C-) GP 1,2

3. Reactor Vessel 1.2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.9 5 1093 psig Steam Dome SR 3.3.1.1.10 Pressure-High SR 3.3.1.1.15 I

4. Reactor Vessel 1.2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 2 11.5 inches Water Level-Low, SR 3.3.1.1.9 Level 3 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.15 I

5. Main Steam 1 8 F SR 3.3.1.1.9 S 11% closed Isolation Valve- SR 3.3.1.1.13 Closure SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.17

6. Drywell Pressure- 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.9 S 1.88 psig High SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.15 (continued)

(/~

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / 3.3-8 Amendment 191

INSERT 8:

e. 2-Out-Of-4 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.2 NA Voter SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.17

f. OPRM Trip 2 25% 3 (c) I SR 3.3.1.1.2 (d)

RTP SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.3.1.1.18 SR 3.3.1.1.19 SR 3.3.1.1.20 INSERT 9:

Cc) Each APRM channel provides inputs to both trip systems.

(d) See COLR for OPRM period based detection algorithm (PBDA) setpoint limits.

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 3 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR. REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

7. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level-High

a. Level 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.9 S 66 gallons Transmitter SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 5("' 2 H SR 33.1.1.9 S 66 gallons SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15

b. Floal Switch 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.9 S 62 gallons SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 5"') H SR 3.3.1.1.9 S 62 gallons SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15

8. Turbine Stop 2 30% RTP E SR 3.3.1.1.9 S 7% dosed Valve-Closure SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.17

9. Turbine Control 2 30% RTP E SR 3.3.1.1.9 2 460 psig Valve Fast Closure, SR 3.3.1.1.13 Trip Oil Pressure- SR 3.3.1.1.15 LOW SR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.17 10 Reactor Mode 1.2 G SR 3.3.1.1.W 3 NA Switch- Shutdown SR 3.3.1.1.15 Position 5"a) H SR 3.3.1.I1.A NA SR 3.3.1.1.15

11. Manual Scram 1.2 G SR 3.3.1.1.5 NA SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(a) 2 H SR 33.1.1.5 NA SR 3.3.1.1.15 (a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assembfles.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.3-9 Amendment 178

PPL Rev. O Instrumentation -.

3.3.1.3

/ 3.3 INS TRUMEI I I

Ii I

I O

. I. trip j in trip i

I Initiate alternate me to 30 days detect and suppr sthermal

. 00 hydraulic in ity oscillations.

Ini' e alternate method to I ,.etect and suppress thermal 11 I hydraulic instability oscillations.

I A,

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT T I 3.3-1 5a TS Amendment 217

PPL Rev. 0 \

01PRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.3 I ACTIONS (cont ed/ 7.,

NDITION REQ rED ACTION X MPLETION TIME I i -C. Required Action and 0.1 Reduce THERMAL POw to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months associated <25% RTP.

Completion Time no /

met.7 iII I-'7 I SURVEILLA REQUIREMENTS I i

___- KI ^TF!

1 F..

Whf channel is placed in a operable status solely for p. nance of required

,S'rveillances, entry into as ciated Conditions and Requir Actions may be delay or up to

. hours provided the 0P System maintains trip capity. I 7 7 Z

- SURVEILLA E FREQUENCY ,.r SJR' 3.3.1.3.1 Perform CHA EL FUNCTIONAL TE ' 184 days 7 SR 3.3.1.3.2 Ca te the local power ra egonitors. 1 0/WD I MT average core exposure SR 3.'3.1.3.3 ------.NOTE------

Neutrfretectors are excluded. TET wPromCHANNEL CALIBR N. 24 month /

SR 3.3,1.3.4 Perform LOGICSE FUNCTIONAL TEST. mnths

/ z7 .M.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT I TS / 3.3-1 5b Amendment 217

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / 3.3-15c Amendment 217 PPL Rev. 0 Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

--NO T NOTES

1. Refer to Table 3.3.2.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Control Rod Block Function.

2. When an RBM channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains control rod block capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

SR 3.3.2.1.2 NOTE Not required to be performed until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after any control rod is withdrawn at

10% RTP in MODE 2.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.2.1.3 - NTNOTE Not required to be performed until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after THERMAL POWER is < 10% RTP in MODE 1.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.2.1.4 NOTE T--

Neutron detectors are excluded.

Verify the RBM Trip Functions are not bypassed when 24 months THERMAL POWER is 2 30% RTP.

SR 3.3.2.1.5 Verify the RWM is not bypassed when THERMAL POWER 24 months is

10% RTP.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.3-1 8 Amendment 178

PPL Rev. 0 Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 Table 3.32.1-1 (page 1 of 1)

Control Rod Block Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Rod Block Monitor

a. Low Power 1its 2 SR 3.32.1.1 S 0.58W+55%0)

Range- SR 3.32.1.A Upscale SR 3.32.1.7

b. Inop 2 SR 3.32.1.1 NA SR 3.32.1 A

c. Downscale 1" 2 SR 3.32.1.1 2 3/125 divislons of SR 332.1 A full scale SR 332.1.7

2. RodWorth 1 t2"c' 1 SR3.32.12 NA Minimizer SR 3.32.1.3 SR 3.32.1.5 SR 3.32.1.8

3. Reactor Mode (d) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.6 NA Switdc-Shutdown Position (a) When THERMAL POWER Is 2 30% RPT

/ 45l ereset forsin eration per 3.1, r on Loops (C) With THERMAL POWER S 10% RTP.

(d) Reactor mode switch In the shutdown position. Jr'J5' l r/Z)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.3-20 Amendment 178

INSERT 10:

(b) 0.58(W-AW) + 55% RTP when reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating." For single loop operation the value of AW =

5%/0.58. For two loop operation, the value of AW = 0.

PPL Rev. 2 Recirculating Loops Operating 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating LCO 3.4.1 Two recirculation loops with matched flows shall be in operation. I OR One recirculation loop may be in operation provided the following limits are, applied when the associated LCO is applicable: I

a. LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," single loop operation limits specified in the COLR;

b. LCO 3.2.2, 'MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," single loop operation limits specified in the COLR;

c. LCO 32.3, "LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)," single loop operation limits specified in the COLR, and

d. LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation,"

Function 2.b (Average Power Range M onit ors rs~--

Simulated Thermal Power-High), Allowable Value of Table 3.3.1.1-1 is reset for single loop operation.

e. Recirculation pump speed is < 80%.

Note Required limit and setpoint resets for single recirculation loop operation may be delayed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after transition from two recirculation loop operation to single recirculation loop operation.

APPLICABILITY: Mc DES I and 2.

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 1 TS /3.4-1 A endpnent W8,

4, 2,X5, 217

PPL Rev. 0 SDM Test - Refueling 3.10.8 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS 3.10.8 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test - Refueling LCO 3.10.8 The reactor mode switch position specified in Table 1.1-1 for MODE 5 may be changed to include the startup/hot standby position, and operation considered not to be in MODE 2, to allow SDM testing, provided the following requirements are met:

a. LCO 3.3.1.1, OReactor Protection System Instrumentation," MODE 2 requirements for Functions 2and 2 Table 3.3.1.1-1;

b. 1. LCO 3.3.2.1, 'Control Rod Block Instrumentation,' MODE 2 requirements for Function 2 of Table 3.3.2.1-1, with the banked position withdrawal sequence requirements of SR 3.3.2.1.8 changed to require the control rod sequence to conform to the SDM test sequence.

OR

2. Conformance to the approved control rod sequence for the SDM test is verified by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff;

c. Each withdrawn control rod shall be coupled to the associated CRD;

d. All control rod withdrawals that are not in conformance with the BPWS shall be made in notch out mode;

e. No other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress; and

f. CFD charging water header pressure 2940 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with the reactor mode switch in startup/hot standby position.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3.1 0-20 Amendment 178

PPL Rev. 0 SDM Test - Refueling 3.10.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. NOTE - -NOTE Separate Condition entry Rod worth minimizer may be is allowed for each control bypassed as allowed by LCO rod. 3.3.2.1, 'Control Rod Block Instrumentation," if required, One or more control rods to allow insertion of not coupled to its inoperable control rod and associated CRD. continued operation.

A.1 Fully insert inoperable 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months control rod.

AND 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months A.2 Disarm the associated CRD.

B. One or more of the above B.1 Place the reactor mode Immediately requirements not met for switch in the shutdown reasons other than or refuel position.

Condition A.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.8.1 Perform the MODE 2 applicable SRs for LCO According to the applicable 3.3.1.1, Functions 2.a~and 2.14of Table 3.3.1.1-1. SRs SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT I 3.1 0-21 Amendment 178

PPL Rev. 3 Reporting Requirements 5.6 5.6 Reporting Requirements (continued) 5.6.4 Monthly Operating Reports Routine reports of operating statistics and shutdown experience, including documentation of all challenges to the main steam safety/relief valves, shall be submitted on a monthly basis no later than the 15 th of each month following the calendar month covered by the report.

5.6.5 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)

a. Core operating limits shall be established prior to each reload cycle, or prior to any remaining portion of a reload cycle, and shall be documented in the COLR for the following:

1. The Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate for Specification 3.2.1;

2. The Minimum Critical Power Ratio for Specification 3.2.2;

3. The Linear Heat Generation Rate for Specification 3.2.3;

4. The Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Gain and Setpoints for Specification 3.2.4; &:3

5. The Shutdown Margin for Specification 3.1.

b. The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC.

When an initial assumed power level of 102 percent of rated power is specified in a previously approved method, this refers to the power level associated with the design basis analyses, or 3510 MWt. The power level of 3510 MWt is 100.6% of the rated thermal power level of 3489 MWt. The RTP of 3489 MWt may only be used when feedwater flow measurement (used as input to the reactor thermal power measurement) is provided by the Leading Edge Flow Meter (LEFMI/) as described in the LEFM/TM Topical Report and supplement referenced below. When feedwater flow measurements from the LEFMITM system are not available, the core thermal power level may not exceed the originally approved RTP of 3441 MWt, but the value of 3510 MWt (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / 5.0-21 Amendment t8M 1t4o 21-5, 217

INSERT 1:

6. Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Trip setpoints, for Specification 3.3.1.1.

Unit 2 Technical Specification Mark-ups

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1.1-1.

ACTIONS SprtCodinetyialw rac c-NOTE---l.

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in trip. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months channels inoperable.

OR eAe as ,12 ated hours B. _ ne or snore B.1 Place channel in one trip system 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Fu ons wit e or in trip.

ore re red OR b yB.2 Place one trip system in trip. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months C. One or more C.1 Restore RPS trip capability. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Functions with RPS trip capability not maintained.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 3.3-1 Amendment 151

INSERT 1:

A.2 ------- NOTE -------

Not applicable for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f.

Place associated trip system in trip.

INSERT 2:

B. ------- NOTE -------

Not applicable for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f.

One or more Functions with one or more required channels inoperable in both trip systems.

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 Enter the Condition referenced Immediately associated in Table 3.3.1.1-1 for the Completion Time of channels.

Condition A, B, or C not met.

E. As required by E.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Required Action D.1 < 30% RTP.

and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

F. As required by F.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

G. As required by G.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

H. As required by H.1 Initiate action to fully insert all Immediately Required Action D.1 insertable control rods in core and referenced in cells containing one or more fuel Table 3.3.1.1-1. assemblies.

r$t

<3 SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 3.3-2 Amendment 151

INSERT 3:

I. As required by I.1 Initiate alternate method to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Required Action D.1 detect and suppress thermal and referenced in hydraulic instability Table 3.3.1.1-1. oscillations.

AND I.2 Restore required channels 120 days to OPERABLE.

J. Required Action and J.I Reduce THERMAL POWER to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months associated Completion <25% RTP.

Time of Condition I not met.

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

_ __-----------______-NOTES- ------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.1.1-ito determine which SRs apply for each RPS Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months A----------NOTE--- a - -

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER > 25% RTP.

Verify the absolute difference between the average 7 days power range monitor (APRM) channels and the calculated power is <2% RTP plus any gain adjustment required by LCO 3.2.4, "Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Setpoints" while operating at > 25% RTP.

R 3.. u shannel to omto lowa

'toow.

SR 3.3.1.1.4 -------- ---- NOTE--------------

Not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 7 days (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 3.3-3 Amendment 151

I

.. INSERT 3A:

SR 3.3.1.1.2. Perform CHANNEL CHECK 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.5 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 7 days SR 3.3.1.1.6 Verify the source range monitor (SRM) and intermediate Prior to fully range monitor (IRM) channels overlap. withdrawing SRMs from the core.

SR 3.3.1.1.7 --- -- -- NOTE ----

Only required to be met during entry Into MODE 2 from MODE 1.

Verify the IRM and APRM channels overlap. 7 days SR 3.3.1.1.8 Calibrate the local power range monitors. 1000 MWD/MT average core exposure SR 3.3.1.1.9 -- ---------- NOTE---- ----

A test of all required contacts does not have to be performed.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.1.1.10 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 92 days (continued)

C2i2.>

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 3.3-4 Amendment 151

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE --FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.11 NOTES

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.

2. For Function 1.4g; ot required to be performed when entering ODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 184 days

_I-SR 3.3.1.1.4 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months SR 3.3.1.1.13 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months S5'*.i'.iA'4 Ve thPR Flo Biased SJhulate he ,247'2~

owe HIgI(iim'6onstant 1$ 7 sepdhds7 .11 SR 3.3.1.1.15 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months SR 3.3.1.1.16 Verify Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and Turbine Control 24 months Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 30% RTP.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 3.3-5 Amendment 151

INSERT 4:

SR 3.3.1.1.12. ------- NOTES --------------

1. For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

2. For Functions 2.b and 2.f, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST includes the recirculation flow input processing, excluding the flow transmitters.

PerformCHA~NNELFUNCTIONALTEST 184 days

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.17 ---- ---------NOTES--------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.

2. For Function 5 Wnd equals 4 channels for the purpose of determining the STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency Verify the RPS RESPONSE TIME is within limits. 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 3.3-6 Amendment 166

INSERT 5:

3. For Function 2.e, In' equals 8 channels for the purpose of determining the STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency. Testing of APRM and OPRM outputs shall alternate.

INSERT 6:

SR 3.3.1.1.18. --------------------NOTES --------------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.

2. For Functions 2.b and 2.f, the recirculation flow transmitters that feed the APRMs are included.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION 24 months SR 3.3.1.1.19 Verify OPRM is not bypassed when APRM 24 months Simulated Thermal Power is > 30% and recirculation drive flow is < value equivalent to the core flow value defined in the COLR.

SR 3.3.1.1.20 Adjust recirculation drive flow to conform 24 months to reactor core flow.

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REFERENCED REILLANE A LE MODHESR REQUIRED FROM REQUIRED SRELAC LOAL FUNCTION SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER ACTION DA RQI.1NS AU CONDITONS TRIP SYSTEM

1. Intermediate Range Monitors

a. Neutron 2 3 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 S 1221125 divisions Flux-High of full scale SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(8) 3 H SR 3.3.1.1.1 S 1221125 divisions SR 3.3.1.1.5 of full scale SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.15

b. Inop 2 3 G SR 3.3.1.1.4 NA SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(m) 3 H SR 3.3.1.1.5 NA SR 3.32.2.15

2. Average Power Range Monitors

a. Neutron 9 2

,e3 (a) G SR 3.3.1;1.7'2 20o%RTP Flux-Hit 5- S-1 ntAA1 (Setoown) SR 3.3117 ,s I 1 SR 3.3.1.1.8

__ _ _ _M.3I.

_ _ 3 I b-Rew-84ese 1 X3 co) F .9R--

5. 4 4 4 4D S 0.58 W Simulated SR 3.3.1.12 + 62% RrPM) and Thermal SR 3.3.1.1.3 S 115.5% RTP Power-High SR 3.3.1.1.8 _

-SR-33 7 1154543 1i 2C R 2.1.1.174 Iv.onflngjfi (a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cetl containing one or more fuel assemblies.

(b) W4 RT.z.wfres lei glo o I era~on o 1 .4 nLs SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT2 ; 3.3-7 Amendment 151 CC l reCT

INSERT 7:

(b) 0.58(W-AW) + 62% RTP when reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating." For single loop operation the value of AW =

5%olO.58. For two loop operation, the value of AW = 0.

(c) Each APRM channel provides inputs to both trip systems.

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 2 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR CONDITIONS OTHER REQUIRED REFERENCED FUNCTION SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER FROM REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE CONDITIONS TRIP SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. Average Power Range Monitors (continued)

(C )

1 F SR 3 . 3 .1 . 1/ 7 A S 1200% RTP Neutron SR 3.3.1.1,! 3 Flux-High . SR 3.3.1.1.8 Sfl 33^. Ia1 ii' Sf%.111 En -.. lI-lw

8. Inop 1,2 3(C) G / NA

3. Reactor Vessel 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.9 < 1093 psig Steam Dome SR 3.3.1.1.10 Pressure-High SR 3.3.1.1.15

4. Reactor Vessel 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 2 11.5 Inches Water Level- SR 3.3.1.1.9 Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.15 I

5. Main Steam I 8 F SR 3.3.1.1.9 S 11% dosed Isolation SR 3.3.1.1.13 Valve-Closure SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.17

6. Drywell 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.9 S 1.88 psig Pressure-High SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.15 (continued) nsert 9 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS/3.3-8 Amendment 166

INSERT 8:

e. 2-Out-Of-4 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.2 NA Voter SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.17

f. OPRM Trip 2 25% 3(C) I SR 3.3.1.1.2 (d)

RTP SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.12 SR 3.3.1.1.18 SR 3.3.1.1.19 SR 3.3.1.1.20 INSERT 9:

(c) Each APRM channel provides inputs to both trip systems.

(d) See COLR for OPRM period based detection algorithm (PBDA) setpoint limits.

PPL Rev. 0 PPL Rev. ORPS Instrumentation 3.3.1 .1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 3 ol 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR CONDmONS OTHER REQUIRED REFERENCED FUNCTION SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER FROM REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE CONDITIONS TRIP SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

7. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level-High

a. Level 1.2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.9 S 66 gallons Transmitter SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(a) 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.9 S 66 gallons SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15

b. Float Sw4tch 1t2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.9 S 62 gallons SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(a) 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.9 S 62 gallons SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15

8. Turbine Stop 2 30% RTP 4 E SR 3.3.1.1.9 S7% closed Valve-Closure SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.17

9. Turbine Control 2:30%/ RTP 2 E SR 3.3.1.1.9 2460psig Valve Fast SR 3.3.1.1.13 Closure. Trip SR 3.3.1.1.15 Oi Pressure- SR 3.3.1.1.16 Low SR 3.3.1.1.17

10. Reactor Mode 1,2 2 SR 3.3.11 /.l NA Switch- SR 3.3.1.1.15 Shutdown Position

/4) 5(a 2 H SR 3.3.1.1. ) NA SR 3.3.1.1.15

11. Manual Scram 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.5 NA SR 3.3.1.1.15 5(s) 2 H SR 3.3.1.1.5 NA SR 3.3.1.1.15 (a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 3.3-9 Amendment 151

PPL Rev. 0 OPRM Instrumentation X 3.3.1.3 i 3.3 INSTRUMENTAlFaN I 3.3.1.3 Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Instr entation i

i LCO 3.3!1'3 Four channels of the OPRM i trumentation shall be OPERABLE within I the limits as specified in t COLR.

i II II APPLICABILITY: THERMAL POW 225% RTP.

I (7"'

I ACTIONS I

I II Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel. /

i A_ _ _ _ _ _ s _ c _ _ _ _ _ __

Of CONDITION R UIED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I -I r

A.,

One or more required A)1 Place channel in trip. 30 days channels inoperable.

OR A.2 Place associated RPS trip 30 days system in trip OR A.3 Initiate altern method to 30 days detect and uppress thermal hydr instability oscillations.

/.

/B. OPRM trip capability B.1 itate alternate method to 1 ours I / not maintained. detect and suppress thermal hydraulic instability oscillation AND B.2 Restore OPRM capability 120 days (I (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / 3.3-15Sa Amendment 192

PPL Rev. 0 OPRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION - - REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months associated < 25% RTP.

Corn .ietion Time not _

II SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associate&Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6hours provided the OPRM S5stem maintains trip capability.

_ ___ _ 7_ _ __ ____ _ ___A *_

Ix"

/ SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3 X1.3.1Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONALTEST. 184 days SR 3.3.1.3.2 Calibrate the local power ra monitors. 1000 MWD / MT average core exposure SR 3.3.1.3.3 ---- NOTE--

lNeutyn detectors are excluded.

IyPerform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24 months SR 3,3.1.3.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNC TEST. 24months (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / 3.3-1 5b Amendment 192

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / 3.3-15c Amendment 192 PPL Rev. 0 Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

1. Refer to Table 3.3.2.1-ito determine which SRs apply for each Control Rod Block Function.

2. When an RBM channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains control rod block capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.2.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

SR 3.3.2.1.2 -------- -NOTE --------

Not required to be performed until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after any control rod is withdrawn at < 10% RTP in MODE 2.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days SR 3.3.2.1.3 ------------------------NOTE--- ------------

Not required to be performed until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after THERMAL POWER is

10% RTP in MODE 1.

92 days Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

SR 3.3.2.1.4 ------ ------- NOTE---------------

Neutron detectors are excluded.

Verify the RBM trip functions are not bypassed when 24 months THERMAL POWER is > 30%.

SR 3.3.2.1.5 Verify the RWM is not bypassed when THERMAL 24 months POWER is < 10% RTP.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 3.3-1 8 Amendment 151

PPL Rev. 0 Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2.1-1 (page 1 of 1)

Control Rod Block Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDmONS CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Rod Block Monitor 1

a. Low Power Range- 2 SR 3.3.2.1.1 S 0.58W+55%o Upscale SR 3.3.2.1 A SR 3.3.2.1.7

b. Inop 13) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.1 NA SR 3.32.1.A

c. Downscale 1(2) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.1 2 31125 divslons of SR 3.32.14A fun scale SR 3.32.1.7

2. Rod Worth Minimizer 2°c I SR 3.32.1.2 NA SR 3.32.1.3 SR 3.32.1.5 SR 3.3.2.1.8

3. Reacor Mode Switch- (d) 2 SR 3.3.2.1.6 NA Shutdown Position (a) When THERMAL POWER Is 2 30% RPT

<o.R TY +enwP~e rc~fr igl p (c) With THERMAL POWER S 10% RTP.

(d) Reactor mode switch In the shutdown positon.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 3.3-20 Amendment 151

INSERT 10:

(b) 0.58(W-AW) + 55% RTP when reset for single loop operation "Recirculation Loops Operating." per LCO 3.4.1, For single loop operation the 5%IbO.58. For two loop operation, value of AW =

the value of AW = 0.

PPL Rev. 2 Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating LCO 3.4.1 Two recirculation loops with matched flows shall be in operation. I OR One recirculation loop may be in operation provided the following limits are applied when the associated LCO is applicable: I

a. LCO 3.2.1, AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR),' single loop operation limits specified in the COLR;

b. LCO 3.2.2, MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR),'

single loop operation limits specified in the COLR;

c. LCO 3.2.3, LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR),'

single loop operation limits specified in the COLR, and

d. LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS)JnstrnimnLation,"

Function 2.b (Average Power Range Moniitorr Simulated Thermal Power-High), Allowable Value of' Table 3.3.1.1-1 is reset for single loop operation.

e. Recirculation pump speed is S 80%.

Note------

Required limit and setpoint resets for single recirculation loop operation may be delayed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after transition from two recirculation loop operation to single recirculation loop operation.

APPLICABILITY: MC )DES 1 and 2.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / 3.4-1 Amendment 15t,

-I-5%, 1, 192

PPL Rev. 0 SDM Test - Refueling 3.10.8 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS 3.10.8 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test - Refueling LCO 3.10.8 The reactor mode switch position specified in Table 1.1-1 for MODE 5 may be changed to include the startup/hot standby position, and operation considered not to be in MODE 2, to allow SDM testing, provided the following requirements are met:

a. LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System Instrumentation," MODE 2 requirements for Functions 2.a and 2 Table 3.3.1.1-1;

b. 1. LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation," MODE 2 requirements for Function 2 of Table 3.3.2.1-1, with the banked position withdrawal sequence requirements of SR 3.3.2.1.8 changed to require the control rod sequence to conform to the SDM test sequence.

OR

2. Conformance to the approved rod sequence for the SDM test is verified by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff;

c. Each withdrawn control rod shall be coupled to the associated CRD;

d. All control rod withdrawals that are not in conformance with the BPWS shall be made in notch out mode;

e. No other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress; and

f. CFD charging water header pressure > 940 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with the reactor mode switch in startup/hot standby position.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 3.10-20 Amendment 151

PPL Rev. 0 SDM Test - Refueling 3.10.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ---------NOTE------- -- ---- NOTE--

Separate Condition entry Rod worth minimizer may be is allowed for each control bypassed as allowed by LCO rod. 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block

. --- _--___ Instrumentation," if required, One or more control rods to allow Insertion of not coupled to its inoperable control rod and associated CRD. continued operation.

A.1 Fully insert inoperable 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months control rod.

AND 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months A.2 Disarm the associated CRD.

B. One or more of the above B.1 Place the reactor mode Immediately requirements not met for switch in the shutdown reasons other than or refuel position.

Condition A.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.8.1 Perform the MODE 2 applicable SRs for LCO According to the applicable 3.3.1.1, Functions 2.aand 2. of Table 3.3.1.1-1. SRs SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 3.1 0-21 Amendment 151

PPL Rev. 3 Reporting Requirements 5.6 5.6 Reporting Requirements (continued) 5.6.4 Monthly Operating Reports Routine reports of operating statistics and shutdown experience, including documentation of all challenges to the main steam safety/relief valves, shall be submitted on a monthly basis no later than the 15th of each month following the calendar month covered by the report.

5.6.5 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)

a. Core operating limits shall be established prior to each reload cycle, or prior to any remaining portion of a reload cycle, and shall be documented in the COLR for the following:

1. The Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate for Specification 3.2.1;

2. The Minimum Critical Power Ratio for Specification 3.2.2;

3. The Linear Heat Generation Rate for Specification 3.2.3; 4 The Average Power Fange Monitor (APRM) Gain and Setpoints for Specification 3.2.4;" y > ;g

5. The Shutdown Margin for Specification 3.1 (7 6 JPRsetpointsf0- i]te3~.J I

b. The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC.

When an initial assumed power level of 102 percent of rated power is specified in a previously approved method, this refers to the power level associated with the design basis analyses, or 3510 MWt. The power level of 3510 MWt is 100.6% of the rated thermal power level of 3489 MWt. The RTP of 3489 MWt may only be used when feedwater flow measurement (used as input to the reactor thermal power measurement) is provided by the Leading Edge Flow Meter (LEFM/r) as described in the LEFMV MTopical Report and supplement referenced below.

When feedwater flow measurements from the LEFM/Tm system are not available, the (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS 1 5.0-21 Amendment 169-190 192

INSERT 1I:

6. Oscillation Power Range Specification 3.3.1.1. Monitor (OPRM) Trip setpoints, for

Attachment 2 to PLA-5880 Changes To Technical Specification Bases For Information

Unit 1 Technical Specification Bases Mark-ups For Information

PPL Rev. 0 APRM Gain and Setpoints B 3.2.4 BASES APPLICABILITY sufficient margin to these limits exists below 25% RTP and, therefore, (continued) these requirements are only necessary when the reactor is operating at 2 25% RTP.

ACTIONS A.1 If the APRM gain or setpoints are not within limits while the MFLPD has exceeded FRTP, the margin to the fuel transient mechanical design limit (PAPT) may be reduced. Therefore, prompt action should be taken to restore the MFLPD to within its required limit or make acceptable APRM adjustments such that the plant is operating within the assumed margin of the safety analyses.

The 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Completion Time is normally sufficient to restore either the MFLPD to within limits or the APRM gain or setpoints to within limits and is acceptable based on the low probability of a transient or Design Basis Accident occurring simultaneously with the LCO not met.

tl'r APRM Blo ow Biautron is con ed in uirent I Block I strumentstTon. -

B.1 If MFLPD cannot be restored to within its required limits within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, THERMAL POWER is reduced to < 25% RTP within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to c 25% RTP in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.2.4.1 and SR 3.2.4.2 REQUIREMENTS The MFLPD is required to be calculated and compared to FRTP or APRM gain or setpoints to ensure that the reactor (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 1 B 3.2-1 8 Revision 0

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT BI:

The APRM setpoints include the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High RPS scram setpoint, LCO 3.3.1.1 "RPS Instrumentation," Function 2.b, and APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High rod block setpoint, Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) TRO 3.1.3 "Control Rod Block Instrumentation", Function L.b.

PPL Rev. 0 APRM Gain and Setpoints B 3.2.4 BASES SURVEILLANC E SR 3.2.4.1 and SR 3.2.4.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENWFs is operating within the assumptions of the safety analysis. These SRs are only required to determine the MFLPD and, assuming MFLPD is greater than FRTP, the appropriate gain or setpoint, and is not intended

. -hl1 to be a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the APRM gain or flow pv -

biased neutron flux scranfidrpt$ The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency of SR 3.2.4.1 is chosen to coincide wit the determination of other thermal limits, specifically those for the APLHGR (LCO 3.2.1). The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is based on both engineering judgment and recognition of the slowness of changes in power distribution during normal operation. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance after THERMAL POWER 2 25% RTP is achieved is acceptable given the large inherent margin to operating limits at low power levels and because the MFLPD must be calculated prior to exceeding 50% RTP unless performed in the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . When MFLPD is greater than FRTP, SR 3.2.4.2 must be performed. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency of SR 3.2.4.2 requires a more frequent verification when MFLPD is greater than the fraction of rated thermal power (FRTP) because more rapid changes in power distribution are typically expected.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 10, GDC 13, GDC 20, and GDC 23.

2. FSAR, Section 4.

3. FSAR, Section 15.

4. ANF-89-98(P)(A) Revision 1 and Revision 1 Supplement 1, t Generic Mechanical Design Criteria for BWR Fuel Designs,'

Advanced Nuclear Fuels Corporation, May 1995.

5. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.2-19 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 APPLICABLE P'owieqeMon~t6 ()

SAFETY ANALYSES, 2.a. Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-Hiahetdown)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY eAPR chaaels rec e input4gnalsom I localower r ge (continued) donito,(LP s) with the relorcor topr ide a indicati of pow~ distrution an local p wer ch ges. he A M chaOels erage tse LPM signal to pro e a coinuoi indica ion of aserageactor ower om a fe ercen o reatr tha TP. For operation at low power (i.e., MODE 2), the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-Hlighs-(Setdown)Function is capable of generating a trip signal that prevents fuel damage resulting from abnormal operating transients In this power range.

For most operation at low power levels, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High (Setdown)Function will provide a secondary scram to the Intermediate Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High Function because of the relative setpoints. With the IRMs at Range 9 or 10, it is possible that the e) Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-HigahSetdown)Function will provide the primary trip signal for a corewide increzse' in power.

¶Ks/% Qr.

No specific safety analyses take direct credit for the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-Higphetdow Function. However, this Function Indirectly ensures that before ~he reac or mode switch is placed in the run position, reactor power does not exceed 25% RTP (SL 2.1.1.1) when operating at low reactor pressure and low core flow. Therefore, it indirectly prevents fuel damage during significant reactivity increases with THERMAL POWER <25% RTP.

The AP Sy is divid into twodrip systems.th three "RM cp tnnell inp to ea rip syste . The sys is desig to allow ne chanel in ch trip stem to b2,8ypassed. y one AP chann in a tri system can se the ass ated trip stem to trip our cha els of erage P er Range itor Neutr Flux-Hi , Setdown ith two hannels ach trip syst are req d to be OPABLE tonsure at no sin failure willeclude a am from thi unction a valid ignal. In ditiony to provi adequate verage of entire cog at lea 14 LPR nputsSre i requd for each ARM han ith at lea two v (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / 8 3.3-7 Revision 1

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B2:

Average Power Range Monitor (APRM)

The APRM channels provide the primary indication of neutron flux within the core and respond almost instantaneously to neutron flux increases. The APRM channels receive input signals from the local power range monitors (LPRMs) within the reactor core to provide an indication of the power distribution and local power changes. The APRM channels average these LPRM signals to provide a continuous indication of average reactor power from a few percent to greater than RTP.

Each APRM channel also includes an Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM)

Upscale Function which monitors small groups of LPRM signals to detect thermal-hydraulic instabilities.

The APRM trip System is divided into four APRM channels and four 2-out-of-4 Voter channels. Each APRM channel provides inputs to each of the four voter channels. The four voter channels are divided into two groups of two each with each group of two providing inputs to one RPS trip system. The system is designed to allow one APRM channel, but no voter channels, to be bypassed. A trip from any one unbypassed APRM will result in a ~half-trip in all four of the voter channels, but no trip inputs to either RPS trip system.

APRM trip Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d are voted independently from OPRM Trip Function 2.f. Therefore, any Function 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, or 2.d trip from any two unbypassed APRM channels will result in a full trip in each of the four voter channels, which in turn results in two trip inputs into each RPS trip system logic channel (Al, A2, Bi, and B2), thus resulting in a full scram signal. Similarly, a Function 2.f trip from any two unbypassed APRM channels will result in a full trip from each of the four voter channels.

Three of the four APRM channels and all four of the voter channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure will preclude a scram on a valid signal. In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core consistent with the design bases for the APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c, at least [201 LPRM inputs with at least three LPRM inputs from each of the four axial levels at which the LPRMs are located must be OPERABLE for each APRM channel, with no more than (9], LPRM detectors declared inoperable since the most recent APRM gain calibration. Per Reference 23, the minimum input requirement for an APRM channel with 43 LPRM inputs is determined given that the total number of LPRM outputs used as inputs to an APRM channel that may be bypassed shall not exceed twenty-three (23). Hence, (20) LPRM inputs needed to be operable. For the OPRM Trip Function 2.f, each LPRM in an APRM channel is further associated in a pattern of OPRM cells, as described in References 17 and 18. Each OPRM cell is capable of producing a channel trip signal.

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2,. Average Power Range Monitor Neutrnn FliIx-Hk h1 etdown)'

SAFETY (continued)

ANALYSES, LCO, and fath ePRM_

APPLICABILITY I The Allowable Value is based on preventing significant increases in power when THERMAL POWER is < 25% RTP.

The Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-Hig etdown)Function must be OPERABLE during MODE 2 when control rods may be withdrawn since the potential for criticality exists. In MODE 1, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-igh Function provides protection against reactivity transients and the RWM protects against control rod withdrawal error events.

2 h Average Power Ranqe Monitorm5Sim ilted Thernmaal Power-Hilgh The Average Power Range Monito( ;W13Simulated Thermal Power-High Function monitors neutron flux to approximate the THERMAL POWER being transferred to the reactor coolant. The APRM neutron flux is electronically filtered with a time constant representative of the fuel heat transfer dynamics to generate a signal proportional to the THERMAL POWER In the reactor. The trip level Is varied as a function of recirculation drive flow (i.e., at lower core flows, the setpoint is reduced proportional to the reduction in power experienced as core flow is reduced with a fixed control rod pattem) but is clamped at an upr limit that is always lower than the Average Power Range MonitorJeutronFlux-High Function Allowable Value. The Average Power Range MonStorSimulated Thermal Power-High Function is not credited in plant Safety Analyses. The Average Power Range Monito Simulated Thermal Power -

High Function is set above the APRM Rod Block to provide defense in depth to the APRM&)Neutron Flux - High for transients where THERMAL POWER increases slowly (such as loss of feedwater heating event). During these events, the THERMAL POWER increase does not significantly lag the neutron flux response and, because of a lower trip setpoint, will initiate a scram before the high neutron flux scram. For rapid neutron flux increase events, the THERAL POWER lags the neutron flux and the Average Power Range MonItorGRDNeubron Flux-High Function will provide a scram signal before the Average (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS /B 3.3-8 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2 b Average Power Range Monitor(;)Similated Thermal SAFETY Power-Higb (continued)

ANALYSES, LCO, and Power Range Monitol 3)Simulated Thermal Power-High APPLICABILITY Function setpoint is exceeded.

The APRM Sypem Is div ed into o tip sys ms with ee APRM inputs to j FJc (G3 each tnp sy m. The ster imdesigned allow oneI anneVeach trip system ts bypas d. Any ne APRM annel in trp sysm can caye the a lated tri ystem trip. Fou channels Avera Power Ra e MBorFlowB sed Silated The alPowe igh twochan Is in chtnp marrasedinaon ut-of- logic arequired to e OPERAB to ense that no hgle Ins ent fail e will precl e a scram from Functio on a valid gnal. In ddition, t rovide ad uate coy ge of entire cor at least LPRM i uts are reg ired for each Mcha ewithattM sttwo inp fromeach the four axi evels at ich the LP Ms are ted. E APRM nnel receiv o totald eflowsig repr ntativeof talcore fl The total d flow sig are gen ted by rflow untwoofw supply signastothe ijfp system A RMs, le the oa r two supp signals to the p system B APRMs. ch flow u signal Is rovided by rnmiing up t flow sign from th o recircation loop. To obtai e most cons tive ref nce signa t tota ow signal rom the flow units (a ociated wi a trp s masde nbed aboy6) are rout toa low au circuit as cated each M. Ea APRM's a on crcuit s cts the low of the tw ow unit nals for e as the spam trip refer ce for that rticular AP M.

Each r uired Av ge Poweyange Monit Flow Bias imulated The al Power igh cha el only requis an input fr one OP BLE fi unit, be se the fu ion is not dited in the fety Analys and the individual RM chan I will perforthe intende unction only one OPE E flow u input.-d standards e.g., IEEE- 9-1971) requir hat a s m be singlallure proof* performs rotective fun on (e.g., itigate an 'dent descri d in the SA . A review the S Aely Ma es describ in the FS emonstrate at the APR Flow iased Siulated Th al Power- gh scram is I credited. nce the flow-bi ed scram not credited does not neeo meet sin failure crite . Theref , an inopera flow unit d not require at the a scated tri system be de ared Inoperab . However, oth flow its in iven trip ystem becom inoperable, t n one of the require verage Power ge Monitor F Biased Sim ated Therma hower-gh chann s in the asso& ed trip syste must be consdered in erable.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B3.3-9 Revision 2

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B3:

The Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power - High Function uses a trip level generated based on recirculation loop drive flow (W) representative of total core flow. Each APRM channel uses one total recirculation drive flow signal. The total recirculation drive flow signal is generated by the flow processing logic, part of the APRM channel, by summing the flow calculated from two flow transmitter signal inputs, one from each of the two recirculation drive flow loops. The flow processing logic OPERABILITY is part of the APRM channel OPERABILITY requirements for this Function.

The adequacy of drive flow as a representation of core flow is ensured through drive flow alignment, accomplished by SR 3.3.1.1.20.

A note is included, applicable when the plant is in single recirculation loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, which requires reducing by AW the recirculation flow value used in the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High Allowable Value equation.

The Average Power Range Monitor Scram Function varies as a function of recirculation loop drive flow (W). AW is defined as the difference in indicated drive flow (in percent of drive flow, which produces rated core flow) between two loop and single loop operation at the same core flow. The value of AW is established to conservatively bound the inaccuracy created in the core flow/drive flow correlation due to back flow in the jet pumps associated with the inactive recirculation loop. This adjusted Allowable Value thus maintains thermal margins essentially unchanged from those for two-loop operation.

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2 t, Average Power Range MonitnRfESim imlattd Therrnma SAFETY Power-High (continued)

ANALYSES, LCO, and The THERMAL POWER time constant of < 7 seconds is based on the fuel I APPLICABILITY heat transfer dynamics and provides a signal proportional to the THERMAL POWER. The simulated thermal time constant is part of tI l that simulates the relationship between neutron flux and core thermal EowerY" Ctsf%, 4oQasAz W-Am The Average Power Range Monitor Thermal l'Simulated Power-High Function ncAWi eneo N w torri-af required to I be OPERABLE in M DE I when there Is the possibility of generating excessive THERMAL POWER and potentially exceeding the SL applicable to high pressure and core flow conditions (MCPR SL). During MODES 2 and 5, other IRM and APRM Functions provide protection for fuel cladding integrity.

2 cvemg Power Rsnoe Mnnitnjra NpuimnFt x-Ilg

M ~anfepdhndimQfin -n--tousr to-lieu bn1Wi The Average Power Range Monitor)Neutron Flux-High Function is capable of generating a trip signal to prevent fuel damage or excessive RCS pressure. For the overpressurization protection analysis of Reference 4, the Average Power Range MonitorgoNeutron Flux-High Function Is assumed to terminate the main steam Isolation valve (MSIV) closure event and, along with the safety/relief valves (S/RVs), Ilmit$Irpeak reactor pressure vessel (RPV) pressure to less than the ASME Code limits. The control rod drop accident (CRDA)analysis (Ref. 5) takes credit for the Average Power Range MonitorNeutron Flux-High Function to terminate the CRDA.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 1 TS I B 3.3-1 0 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.c. Average Power Ranqe Monitor RNeutron Flux-High SAFETY (continued)

ANALYSES, LCO, and /Avee Pow ange Monitor Fixed N tron Flux-High with two cPannels APPLICABILITY in ach trip ystem a ged in a onut-of-two lo are require o be

{ ,OPERE to en re that no sike instrumeInwure will prude a scra /

from is Functio on a valid nal. Inaddrn, to provid dequate cverage of ce entire corat least 14 WRM inputs required fo ach /

- PRM ch nel, with at ast two LPf3M inputs fro ach of the fo r axial /

levels at hich the L Ms are locat d. ir The CRDA analysis as me'hat reactor scram occurs on Average Power Range MonitorQ31\Neutron Flux - High Function.

The Average Power Range Monitor@HNeutron Flux-High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1where the potential consequences of the analyzed transients could result inthe SLs (e.g., MCPR and RCS

~ssure) being exceeded. Although the Average Power Range Monitor (fie Neutron Flux-High Function Isassumed in the CRDA analysis, which isapplicable In MODE 2,the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High LSetdown)Function conservatively bounds the assumed trip and,

.togeher with the assumed IRM trips, provides adequate protection.

Therefore, the Average Power Range MonitorEgNeutron Flux-High Function isnot required in MODE 2.

2.d. Average Power Ranae Monitor-InoD accident anysis, but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA -UNIT 1 TS / B3.3-11 Revision 2

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B4:

Three of the four APRM channels are required to be OPERABLE for each of the APRM Functions. This Function (Inop) provides assurance that the minimum number of APRM channels are OPERABLE.

For any APRM channel, any time its mode switch is not in the Operate, position, an APRM module required to issue a trip is unplugged, or the automatic self-test system detects a critical fault with the APRM channel, an Inop trip is sent to all four voter channels. Inop trips from two or more unbypassed APRM channels result in a trip output from each of the four voter channels to its associated trip system.

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.d. Average Power Range Monitor-Inop (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, Fo han s of A rage Power RangPMonito Inop wjtwo cjaii f and tr systej.n4re 7ch reqWditobeJ(PERAB to ewe thos APPLICABILITY fail will pRblude a p6am fromihis Furtion on valid signal.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required.

3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-High An increase in the RPV pressure during reactor operation compresses the steam voids and results in a positive reactivity insertion. This causes the neutron flux and THERMAL POWER transferred to the reactor coolant to increase, which could challenge the integrity of the fuel cladding and the RCPB. This trip Function is assumed in the low power generator load rejection without bypass and the recirculation flow controller failure (increasing) event. However, the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-High Function initiates a scram for transients that result in a pressure increase, counteracting the pressure increase by rapidly reducing core power. For the overpressurization protection analysis of Reference 4, reactor scram (the an conservatively assume scram on the Average Power Range Monitoi eutron Flux-High signal, not the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-High signal), along with the S/RVs, limits the peak RPV pressure to less than the ASME Section III Code limits.

High reactor pressure signals are initiated from four pressure' instruments that sense reactor pressure. The Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-High Allowable Value is chosen to provide a sufficient margin to the ASME Section III Code limits during the event.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-High Function, with two channels in each trip system arranged in a one-out-of-two logic, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. The Function is (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-12 Revision 1

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B5:

2.e. 2-out-of-4 Voter The 2-out-of-4 Voter Function provides the interface between the APRM Functions, including the OPRM Trip Function, and the final RPS trip system logic. As such, it is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required and is necessary to support the safety analysis applicable to each of those Functions. Therefore, the 2-out-of-4 Voter Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2.

All four voter channels are required to be OPERABLE. Each voter channel includes self-diagnostic functions. If any voter channel detects a critical fault in its own processing, a trip is issued from that voter channel to the associated RPS trip system.

The Two-Out-Of-Four Logic Module includes both the 2-out-of-4 Voter hardware and the APRM Interface hardware. The 2-out-of-4 Voter Function 2.e votes APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d independently of Function 2.f. This voting is accomplished by the 2-out-of-4 Voter hardware in the Two-Out-Of-Four Logic Module. The voter includes separate outputs to RPS for the two independently voted sets of Functions, each of which is redundant (four total outputs). The analysis in Reference 15 took credit for this redundancy in the justification of the 12-hour Completion Time for Condition A, so the voter Function 2.e must be declared inoperable if any of its functionality is inoperable. The voter Function 2.e does not need to be declared inoperable due to any failure affecting only the APRM Interface hardware portion of the Two-Out-Of-Four Logic Module.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

2.f. Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Trip The OPRM Trip Function provides compliance with GDC 10, 'Reactor Design, and GDC 12, 'Suppression of Reactor Power Oscillaitons, thereby providing protection from exceeding the fuel MCPR safety limit (SL) due to anticipated thermal-hydraulic power oscillations.

References 17, 18 and 19 describe three algorithms for detecting thermal-hydraulic instability related neutron flux oscillations: the period based detection algorithm (confirmation count and cell amplitude), the amplitude based algorithm, and the growth rate algorithm. All three are implemented in the OPRM Trip Function, but the safety analysis takes credit only for the period based detection algorithm. The remaining algorithms provide defense in depth and additional protection against unanticipated oscillations. OPRM Trip Function OPERABILITY for Technical Specification purposes is based only on the period based detection algorithm.

The OPRM Trip Function receives input signals from the local power range monitors (LPRMs) within the reactor core, which are combined into 'cells' for evaluation by the OPRM algorithms. Each channel is capable of detecting thermal-hydraulic instabilities, by detecting the related neutron flux oscillations, and issuing a trip signal before the MCPR SL is exceeded. Three of the four channels are required to be OPERABLE.

(continued next sheet)

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B5 (continued):

The OPRM Trip is automatically enabled (bypass removed) when THERMAL POWER is 2 30% RTP, as indicated by the APRM Simulated Thermal Power, and reactor core flow is 5 the value defined in the COLR, as indicated by APRM measured recirculation drive flow. This is the operating region where actual thermal-hydraulic instability and related neutron flux oscillations are expected to occur. Reference 21 includes additional discussion of OPRM Trip enable region limits.

These setpoints, which are sometimes referred to as the xauto-bypassO setpoints, establish the boundaries of the OPRM Trip enabled region. The APRM Simulated Thermal Power auto-enable setpoint has 1% deadband while the drive flow setpoint has a 2% deadband. The deadband for these setpoints is established so that it increases the enabled region once the region is entered.

The OPRM Trip Function is required to be OPERABLE when the plant is at 2 25%

RTP. The 25% RTP level is selected to provide margin in the unlikely event that a reactor power increase transient occurring without operator action while the plant is operating below 30% RTP causes a power increase to or beyond the 30%

APRM Simulated Thermal Power OPRM Trip auto-enable setpoint. This OPERABILITY requirement assures that the OPRM Trip auto-enable function will be OPERABLE when required.

An APRM channel is also required to have a minimum number of OPRM cells OPERABLE for the Upscale Function 2.f to be OPERABLE. The OPRN cell operability requirements are documented in the Technical Requirements Manual, TRO 3.3.9, and are established as necessary to support the trip setpoint calculations performed in accordance with methodologies in Reference 19.

An OPRM Trip is issued from an APRM channel when the period based detection algorithm in that channel detects oscillatory changes in the neutron flux, indicated by the combined signals of the LPRM detectors in a cell, with period confirmations and relative cell amplitude exceeding specified setpoints. One or more cells in a channel exceeding the trip conditions will result in a channel OPRM Trip from that channel. An OPRM Trip is also issued from the channel if either the growth rate or amplitude based algorithms detect oscillatory changes in the neutron flux for one or more cells in that channel. (Note: To facilitate placing the OPRM Trip Function 2.f in one APRM channel in a stripped state, if necessary to satisfy a Required Action, the APRM equipment is conservatively designed to force an OPRM Trip output from the APRM channel if an APRM Inop condition occurs, such as when the APRM chassis keylock switch is placed in the Inop position.)

There are three Wsets of OPRM related setpoints or adjustment parameters:

a) OPRM Trip auto-enable region setpoints for STP and drive flow; b) period based detection algorithm (PBDA) confirmation count and amplitude setpoints; and c) period based detection algorithm tuning parameters.

The first set, the OPRM Trip auto-enable setpoints, as discussed in the SR 3.3.1.1.19 Bases, are treated as nominal setpoints with no additional margins added. The settings are defined in the Technical Requirements Manual, TRO 3.3.9, and confirmed by SR 3.3.1.1.19. The second set, the OPRM PBDA trip setpoints, are established in accordance with methodologies defined in Reference 19, and are documented in the COLR. There are no allowable values for these setpoints. The third set, the OPRM PBDA ~tunings parameters, are established or adjusted in accordance with and controlled by requirements in the Technical Requirements Manual, TRO 3.3.9.

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, Level 1 provide sufficient protection for level transients in all other MODES.

and APPLICABILITY

5. Main Steam Isolation Valve-Closure MSIV closure results in loss of the main turbine and the condenser as a heat sink for the nuclear steam supply system and indicates a need to shut down the reactor to reduce heat generation. Therefore, a reactor scram is initiated on a Main Steam Isolation Valve-Closure signal before the MSIVs are completely closed in anticipation of the complete loss of the normal heat sink and subsequent overpressurization transient. However, for the overpressurization protection analysis of Reference 4, the Average Power Range Monito Neutron Flux-High Function, along with the SIRVs, limits the peak RPV pressure to less than the ASME Code limits. That is, the direct scram on position switches for MSIV closure events is not assumed in the overpressurization analysis. Additionally, MSIV closure is assumed in the transients analyzed in Reference 7 (e.g.; low steam line pressure, manual closure of MSIVs, high steam line flow). The reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and, along with the actions of the ECCS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

MSIV closure signals are initiated from position switches located on each of the eight MSIVs. Each MSIV has two position switches; one inputs to RPS trip system A while the other inputs to RPS trip system B. Thus, each RPS trip system receives an input from eight Main Steam Isolation Valve-Closure channels, each consisting of one position switch. The logic for the Main Steam Isolation Valve-Closure Function is arranged such that either the inboard or outboard valve on three or more of the main steam lines must close in order for a scram to occur.

The Main Steam Isolation Valve-Closure Allowable Value is specified to ensure that a scram occurs prior to a significant reduction in steam flow, thereby reducing the severity of the subsequent pressure transient.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.3-14 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 8. Turbine Stop Valve-Closure (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, the transients that would result from the closure of these valves. The LCO, and Turbine Stop Valve-Closure Function is the primary scram signal for the APPLICABILITY turbine trip event analyzed in Reference 7. For this event, the reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and, along with the actions of the End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) System, ensures that the MCPR SL is not exceeded. Turbine Stop Valve-Closure signals are initiated from position switches located on each of the four TSVs.

Two independent position switches are associated with each stop valve.

One of the two switches provides input to RPS trip system A; the other, to RPS trip system B. Thus, each RPS trip system receives an input from four Turbine Stop Valve-Closure channels, each consisting of one position switch. The logic for the Turbine Stop Valve - Closure Function is such that three or more TSVs must be closed to produce a scram. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER > 30% RTP. This is accomplished automatically by pressure instruments sensing turbine first stage pressure.

Because an increase in the main turbine bypass flow can affect this function non-conservatively, THERMAL POWER is derived from first stage pressure.

The main turbine bypass valves must not cause the trip Function to be bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 30% RTP.

The Turbine Stop Valve-Closure Allowable Value is selected to be high enough to detect imminent TSV closure, thereby reducing the severity of the subsequent pressure transient.

Eight channels (arranged in pairs) of Turbine Stop Valve-Closure Function, with four channels in each trip system, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function if any three TSVs should close. This Function is required, consistent with analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER is 2Ž30% RTP. This Function Is not required when THERMAL POWER is

< 30% RTP since the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-High and the Average Power Range Monitorl3Neutron Flux-High Functions are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-1 7 Revision I

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 9. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trio Oil Pressure-Low SAFETY ANALYSES, Fast closure of the TCVs results in the loss of a heat sink that produces LCO, and reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited.

APPLICABILITY Therefore, a reactor scram is initiated on TCV fast closure in anticipation of (continued) the transients that would result from the closure of these valves. The Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Function is the primary scram signal for the generator load rejection event analyzed in Reference 7. For this event, the reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and, along with the actions of the EOC-RPT System, ensures that the MCPR SL is not exceeded.

Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low signals are initiated by the electrohydraulic control (EHC) fluid pressure at each control valve. One pressure instrument is associated with each control valve, and the signal from each transmitter is assigned to a separate RPS logic channel.

This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER 2 30% RTP. This is accomplished automatically by pressure instruments sensing turbine first stage pressure. Because an increase in the main turbine bypass flow can affect this function non-conservatively, THERMAL POWER is derived from first stage pressure. The main turbine bypass valves must not cause the trip Function to be bypassed when THERMAL POWER is > 30% RTP.

The Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Allowable Value is selected high enough to detect imminent TCV fast closure.

Four channels of Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Function with two channels in each trip system arranged in a one-out-of-two logic are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single Instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal.

This Function is required, consistent with the analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER Is2 30% RTP. This Function is not required when THERMAL POWER is < 30% RTP, since the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-High and the Average Power Range Monitorl Neutron Flux-High Functions are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.3-1 8 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 11. Manual Scram (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are and mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

APPLICABILITY Four channels of Manual Scram with two channels in each trip system arranged in a one-out-of-two logic are available and required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, since these are the MODES and other specified conditions when control rods are withdrawn.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPS instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RPS instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable RPS instrumentation channel.

A.1 and A.2 Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals and the s ~'I redundancy of the RPS design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable lei" to permit restoration of any

' inoperable channel to OPERABLEausI. However, this out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function's inoperable channel is in one trip system and the Function still maintains RPS trip capability (refer to Required Actions B.1, B.2, and C.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel or the associated trip system must be placed in the tripped (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / 8 3.3-20 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) condition per Required Actions A.1 and A.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip (or the associated trip system in trip) would conservatvely compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternatively, if it is not desired to place the channel (or trip system) in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in a full scram), Condition D must be entered and its Required Action taken.

B.l and B.2 Condition B exists when, for any one or more Functions, at least one required channel is inoperable in each trip system. In this condition, provided at least one channel per trip system is OPERABLE, the RPS still maintains trip capability for that Function, but cannot accommodate a single failure in either trip system.

Required Actions B.1 and B.2 limit the time the RPS scram logic, for any Function, would not accommodate single failure in both trip systems (e.g.,

1. de-e ce one-out-of-one and one-out-of-one arrangement for a typical four channel

_Function). The reduced reliability of this logic arrangement was not 9)evaluated lfor the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time. Within the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months aassociated Function will have all required channels OPERABLE or in trip (or any combination) in one trip system.

Completing one of these Required Actions restores RPS to a reliability level D o equivalent to that evaluated in ce t which justified a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months fZ-e .ev e M cs2S A allowable out of service time as presented in Condition A. The trip system in the more degraded state should be placed in trip or, alternatively, all the inoperable channels in that trip system should be placed in trip (e.g., a trip system with two inoperable channels could be in a more degraded state than a trip system with four inoperable channels if the two inoperable channels are in the same Function while the four inoperable channels are all in different Functions). The decision of which trip system is in the more degraded state should be based on prudent judgment and take into account current plant conditions (i.e., what MODE the plant is in).

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-21 Revision 1

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B6:

2.c, 2.d.

A.2 is not applicable for APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, systems.

As noted, Action both trip required APRM channel affects or 2.f. Inoperability of one Action A.1 must be satisfied, and is the only For that condition, Required OPERABILITY) that will restore capability to action (other than restoring Inoperability of more than one required APRM accommodate a single failure. results in loss of trip capability and entry channel of the same trip function entry into Condition A for each channel.

into Condition C, as well as

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

If this action would result in a scram, it is permissible to place the other trip system or its inoperable channels in trip.

The 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Completion Time is judged acceptable based on the remaining capability to trip, the diversity of the sensors available to provide the trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of a scram.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the inoperable channels (or one trip system) in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the Inoperable channel or associated trip system in trip would result in a scram), Condition D must be entered and its Required Action taken.

Required Action C.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same trip system for the same Function result in the Function not maintaining RPS trip capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining RPS trip capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system is in trip),

such that both trip systems will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. For the typical Function with one-out-of-two taken twice logic, this would require both trip systems to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system in trip). For Function 5 (Main Steam Isolation Valve-Closure), this would require both trip systems to have each channel associated with the MSIVs in three main steam lines (not necessarily the same main steam lines for both trip systems) OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system in trip).

For Function 8 (Turbine Stop Valve-Closure), this would require both trip systems to have three channels, each OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system in trip).

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT I TS / B3.3-22 Revision 1

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B7:

As noted, Condition B is not applicable for APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f. Inoperability of an APRM channel affects both trip systems and is not associated with a specific trip system as are the APRM 2-out-of-4 Voter (Function 2.e) and other non-APRM channels for which Condition B applies. For an inoperable APRM channel, Required Action A.1 must be satisfied, and is the only action (other than restoring OPERABILITY) that will restore capability to accommodate a single failure. Inoperability of a Function in more than one required APRM channel results in loss of trip capability for that Function and entry into Condition C, as well as entry into Condition A for each channel.

Because Conditions A and C provide Required Actions that are appropriate for the inoperability of APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f, and because these Functions are not associated with specific trip systems as are the APRM 2-out-of-4 Voter and other non-APRM channels, Condition B does not apply.

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

D.1 Required Action D.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1. The applicable Condition specified in the Table is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition A, B, or C and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition D will be entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

If the channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip (or the associated trip system placed in trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the specified condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without cha ing plant systems. In addition, the Completion Time of Required E consistent with the Completion Time provided in LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUMJZRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR). A H.1 If the channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip (or the associated trip system placed in trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by immediately initiating action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-23 Revision I

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS H.1 (continued)

,t 54 z x wthe reactivity of the core and are, therefore, not required to be inserted.

Action must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted.

SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RPS instrumentation REQUIREMENTS Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.1.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Re uired Actions taken. This Note is 1s4$. %i l A Cl4 A based on the reliability analysis assumption of the average time required to perfom channel aufvilance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RPS will trip when necessary.

SR 3.3.1.1.1 c 5 Q3.i J Performance of the CHANNEL CHECKoeo mnsures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-24 Revision I

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B8:

1.1 and I.2 Required Actions 1.1 and I.2 are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if more than two inoperable or bypassed OPRM channels result in not maintaining OPRM trip capability.

In the 4-OPRM channel configuration, any 'two' of the OPRM channels out of the total of four and one 2-out-of-4 voter channels in each RPS trip system are required to function for the OPRM safety trip function to be accomplished. Therefore, three OPRM channels assures at least two OPRM channels can provide trip inputs to the 2-out-of-4 voter channels even in the event of a single OPRM channel failure, and the minimum of two 2-out-of-4 voter channels per RPS trip system assures at least one voter channel will be operable per RPS trip system even in the event of a single voter channel failure.

References 15 and 16 justified use of alternate methods to detect and suppress oscillations under limited conditions, The alternate methods are consistent with the guidelines identified in Reference 20. The alternate-methods procedures require increased operator awareness and monitoring for neutron flux oscillations when operating in the region where oscillations are possible. If operator observes indications of oscillation, as described in Reference 20, the operator will take the actions described by procedures, which include manual scram of the reactor. The power/flow map regions where oscillations are possible are developed based on the methodology in Reference 22. The applicable regions are contained in the COLR.

The alternate methods would adequately address detection and mitigation in the event of thermal hydraulic instability oscillations. Based on industry operating experience with actual instability oscillations, the operator would be able to recognize instabilities during this time and take action to suppress them through a manual scram. In addition, the OPRM system may still be available to provide alarms to the operator if the onset of oscillations were to occur.

The 12-hour allowed Completion Time for Required Action 1.1 is based on engineering judgment to allow orderly transition to the alternate methods while limiting the period of time during which no automatic or alternate detect and suppress trip capability is formally in place.

Based on the small probability of an instability event occurring at all, the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is judged to be reasonable.

The 120-day allowed Completion Time, the time that was evaluated in References 15 and 16, is considered adequate because with operation minimized in regions where oscillations may occur and implementation of the alternate methods, the likelihood of an instability event that could not be adequately handled by the alternate methods during this 120-day period was negligibly small.

The primary purpose of Required Actions 1.1 and I.2 is to allow an orderly completion, without undue impact on plant operation, of design and verification activities required to correct unanticipated equipment design or functional problems that cause OPRM Trip Function INOPERABILITY in all APRM channels that cannot reasonably be corrected by normal maintenance or repair actions. These Required Actions are not intended and were not evaluated as a routine alternative to returning failed or inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status.

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Agreement criteria which are determined by the plant staff based on an Investigation of a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, may be used to support this parameter comparison and include indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the Instrument has drifted outside its limit, and does not necessarily indicate the channel is Inoperable.

( ;fch Fr u up6 p6tin~.,'ren ha etonstae E3 8 A- h a el fail~ is.re,.The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.1.1.Y' To ensure that the APRMs are accurately indicating the true core average power, the APRMs are calibrated to the reactor power calculated from a heat balance. LCO 3.2.4, "Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Gain and Setpoints," allows the APRMs to be reading greater than actual THERMAL POWER to compensate for localized power peaking. When this adjustment is made, the requirement for the APRMs to indicate within 2% RTP of calculated power is modified to require the APRMs to indicate within 2% RTP of calculated MFLPD times 100. The Frequency of once per 7 days is based on minor changes in LPRM sensitivity, which could affect the APRM reading between performances of SR 3.3.1.1.8.

A restriction to satisfying this SR when < 25% RTP is provided that requires the SR to be met only at > 25% RTP because it is difficult to accurately maintain APRM indication of core THERMAL POWER consistent with a heat balance when < 25% RTP. At low power levels, a high degree of accuracy is unnecessary because of the large, inherent margin to thermal limits (MCPR, LHGR and APLHGR). At > 25% RTP, the Surveillance is required to have been satisfactorily performed within the last 7 days, In accordance with SR 3.0.2. A Note is provided which allows an increase in THERMAL POWER above 25% if the 7 day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after reaching or exceeding 25% RTP. Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.3-25 Revision 1

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B8A:

The Frequency of once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for SR 3.3.1.1.1 is based upon operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare. The Frequency of once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for SR 3.3.1.1.2 is based upon operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare and the evaluation in References 15 and 16.

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1. (continued)

REQUIREMENTS consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.

/Pertigh ncin use t e recir uaton loopdv flows to~r the trp\

Sepoint. Tp Rv feit prper op aton of the loop drj-eflow signals Ita from th rive flow us used to0 ry the setpor of the APSES The com nents ope ion is verie in two step The first sWp is a CH NEL CK perfo ed by readi the output the four drie flow unit. This

/gross ch ensures tha I drive flow its are withi a toleran defined by station aft. The seco d step is a v ication thatpe flow si al from the AP readout (whi is the lowes ow signal f two ass ated drive fib u ) is conservaye with resp to the total fe 1fowdri flow elationship. is two step ensures at the dri flow signal is consistent the actual t I core flow. I he flow u signal is not hin the limit ne required AP M that receives an input om the inoper le flow unit Mpdst be declare noperable. If i r6uments are found withip 4olerance, adjis ents arenrequired.

The Frequer of 7 days is b ed on engi ering judgment, operating experiencand the reliabji of this Inst 1mentation. /

SR 3.3.1.1.4 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function.

As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.4 is not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1, since testing of the MODE 2 required IRMWL

.5 Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links. This allows entry into MODE 2 if the 7 day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT I TS I B 3.3-26 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS between SRMs and IRMs similarly exists when, prior to fully withdrawing the SRMs from the core, IRMs are above mid-scale on range I before SRMs have reached the upscale rod block.

As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.7 is only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1. That is, after the overlap requirement has been met and indication has transitioned to the IRMs, maintaining overlap is not required (APRMs may be reading downscale once in MODE 2).

If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g., IRM/APRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate channel(s) declared inoperable. Only those appropriate channels that are required in the current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable.

A Frequency of 7 days is reasonable based on engineering judgment and the reliability of the IRMs and APRMs.

SR 3.3.1.1.8 LPRM gain settings are determined from the local flux profiles that are either measured by the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) System at all functional locations or calculated for TIP locations that are not functional. The methodology used to develop the power distribution limits considers the uncertainty for both measured and calculated local flux profiles. This methodology assumes that all the TIP locations are functional for the first LPRM calibration following a refueling outage, and a minimum of 25 functional TIP locations for subsequent LPRM calibrations. The calibrated LPRMs establish the relative local flux profile for appropriate representative input to the APRM System. The 1000 MWDIMT Frequency is based on operating experience with LPRM sensitivity changes.

SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.1 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-28 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.1i

,* 'V (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Intended function. The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.9 is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 9.

SR 3.3.1.1.9 is modified by a Note that provides a general exception to the definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. This exception is necessary because the design of instrumentation does not facilitate functional testing of all required contacts of the relay which input into the combinational logic.

(Reference 10) Performance of such a test could result in a plant transient or place the plant in an undo risk situation. Therefore, for this SR, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST verifies acceptable response by verifying the change of state of the relay which inputs into the combinational logic.

The required contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST are tested under the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.1.1.15.

This is acceptable because operating experience shows that the contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST normally pass the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and the testing methodology minimizes the risk of unplanned transients.

1T)

The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.0*is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.1.1.10. SR3.3.1.1.11 /2R 3.3.1.1.13k A CHANNEL CALIBRATION verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

at neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal. Changes in neutron detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the 7 day calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.171 and the 1000 MWD/MT LPRM (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B3.3-29 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3. 1.1 BASES(X SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.13 (continued) < S 331 .

REQUIREMENTS calibration against the TIPs (SR 3.3.1.1.8). A i Note is provethat requires theQtlRM SRs to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1. Testing of the MODE 2 APRM and IRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE I without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.

4 ({Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.

z$ The Frequency" 61~ 11;'TW ~nn i ~ar SR 3.3.1.1.15 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The functional testing of control rods (LCO 3.1.3), and SDV vent (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.3-30 Revision 2

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B9:

A second note is provided for SR 3.3.1.1.18 that requires that the recirculation flow (drive flow) transmitters, which supply the flow signal to the APRMs, be included in the SR for Functions 2.b and 2.f. The APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function (Function 2.b) and the OPRM Trip Function (Function 2.f) both require a valid drive flow signal. The APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function uses drive flow to vary the trip setpoint. The OPRM Trip Function uses drive flow to automatically enable or bypass the OPRM Trip output to the RPS. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the APRM drive flow signal requires both calibrating the drive flow transmitters and the processing hardware in the APRM equipment. SR 3.3.1.1.20 establishes a valid drive flow / core flow relationship. Changes throughout the cycle in the drive flow / core flow relationship due to the changing thermal hydraulic operating conditions of the core are accounted for in the margins included in the bases or analyses used to establish the setpoints for the APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function and the OPRM Trip Function.

INSERT B10:

SR 3.3.1.1.12 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. For the APRM Functions, this test supplements the automatic self-test functions that operate continuously in the APRM and voter channels. The scope of the APRM CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is that which is necessary to test the hardware. Software controlled functions are tested as part of the initial verification and validation and are only incidentally tested as part of the surveillance testing.

Automatic self-test functions check the EPROMs in which the software-controlled logic is defined. Changes in the EPROMs will be detected by the self-test function and alarmed via the APRM trouble alarm. SR 3.3.1.1.1 for the APRM functions includes a step to confirm that the automatic self-test function is still operating.

The APRM CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST covers the APRM channels (including recirculation flow processing -- applicable to Function 2.b and the auto-enable portion of Function 2.f only), the 2-out-of-4 Voter channels, and the interface connections into the RPS trip systems from the voter channels.

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 184-day Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.12 is based on the reliability analyses of References 15 & 16. (NOTE: The actual voting logic of the 2-out-of-4 Voter Function is tested as part of SR 3.3.1.1.15. The auto-enable setpoints for the OPRM Trip are confirmed by SR 3.3.1.1.19.)

A Note is provided for Function 2.a that requires this SR to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1. Testing of the MODE 2 APRM Function cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers or lifted leads. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.

A second Note is provided for Functions 2.b and 2.f that clarifies that the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for Functions 2.b and 2.f includes testing of the recirculation flow processing electronics, excluding the flow transmitters.

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.15 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS and drain valves (LCO 3.1.8), overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

IW The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform portions of this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.1.1.16 This SR ensures that scrams initiated from the Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 30% RTP.

This is performed by a Functional check that ensures the scram feature is not bypassed at 2Ž30% RTP. Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this function nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from turbine first stage pressure), the opening of the main turbine bypass valves must not cause the trip Function to be bypassed when Thermal Power is > 30% RTP.

If any bypass channel's trip function is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are bypassed at Ž 30% RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valve(s) or other reasons), then the affected Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions are considered inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypass condition, this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.

The Frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgment and reliability of the components.

SR 3.3.1.1.17 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. This test may be performed in one (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 TS I B 3.3-31 Revision 2

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT BIi:

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST for APRM Function 2.e simulates APRM and OPRM trip conditions at the 2-out-of-4 Voter channel inputs to check all combinations of two tripped inputs to the 2-out-of-4 logic in the voter channels and APRM related redundant RPS relays.

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.17 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS measurement or in overlapping segments, with verification that all components are tested. The RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 11.

(RPS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on an 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Note 3 requires STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency to be determined based on 4 channels per trip system, in lieu of the 8 channels specified inp7 I Table 3.3.1.1-1 forthe MSIV Closure Function because channels are'

- arranged in pairs~ This Frequency is based on the logic interrelationships of evaiou els required to produce an RPS scram signal. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

SR 3.3.1.1.17 for Function 2.n irms the response time of that function, s rand also confirms the response time of components to Function 2. and 3 A_ other RPS functions. (Reference 14)

REFERENCES " 1. FSAR, Figure 7.2-1.

I 2. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).

3. NEDO-23842, 'Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal in the Startup Range," April 18,1978.

4. FSAR, Section 5.2.2.

5. FSAR, Section 15.4.9.

6. FSAR, Section 6.3.3.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-32 Revision 3

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B12:

RPS RESPONSE TIME for the APRM 2-out-of-4 Voter Function (2.e) includes the APRM Flux Trip output relays and the OPRM Trip output relays of the voter and the associated RPS relays and contactors. (Note: The digital portion of the APRM, OPRM and 2-out-of-4 Voter channels are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because self-testing and calibration checks the time base of the digital electronics. Confirmation of the time base is adequate to assure required response times are met. Neutron detectors are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because the principles of detector operation virtually ensure an instantaneous response time. See Reference 12 and 13)

INSERT B13:

Note 3 allows the STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency for Function 2.e to be determined based on 8 channels rather than the 4 actual 2-Out-Of-4 Voter channels. The redundant outputs from the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter channel (2 for APRM trips and 2 for OPRM trips) are considered part of the same channel, but the OPRM and APRM outputs are considered to be separate channels for application of SR 3.3.1.1.17, so N = 8. The note further requires that testing of OPRM and APRM outputs from a 2-out-of-4 Voter be alternated. In addition to these commitments, References 15 & 16 require that the testing of inputs to each RPS Trip System alternate.

Combining these frequency requirements, an acceptable test sequence is one that:

a. Tests each RPS Trip System interface every other cycle,

b. Alternates the testing of APRM and OPRM outputs from any specific 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Channel

c. Alternates between divisions at least every other test cycle.

The testing sequence shown in the table below is one sequence that satisfies these requirements.

Function 2.e Testing Sequence for SR 3.3.1.1.17 24-Month Cycle Voter output tested fI Voter Al

_Sta Voter A2 Voter B1 ering Voter B2 1 RPS Trip l 1 Division l output output output output System 1 OPRM Al OPRM A 1 2 APRM Bi APRM B 1 3 rd OPRM A2 OPRM A 2 4 APRM B2 APRM B 2 5th APRM Al APRM A 1 6 OPRM B1 OPRM B 1 7 th APRM A2 APRM1 ___=_X_ A 2 OPRM B2 OPRM B 2 After 8 cycles, the sequence repeats.

Each test of an OPRM or APRM output tests each of the redundant outputs from the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter channel for that Function and each of the corresponding relays in the RPS. Consequently, each of the RPS relays is tested every fourth cycle. The RPS relay testing frequency is twice the frequency justified by References 15 and 16.

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B14:

SR 3.3.1.1.19 This surveillance involves confirming the OPRM Trip auto-enable setpoints. The auto-enable setpoint values are considered to be nominal values as discussed in Reference 21. This surveillance ensures that the OPRM Trip is enabled (not bypassed) for the correct values of APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation drive flow. Other surveillances ensure that the APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation drive flow properly correlate with THERMAL POWER (SR 3.3.1.1.2) and core flow (SR 3.3.1.1.20), respectively.

If any auto-enable setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the OPRM Trip is bypassed when APRM Simulated Thermal Power 2 30% and recirculation drive flow 5 value equivalent to the core flow value defined in the COLR, then the affected channel is considered inoperable for the OPRM Trip Function. Alternatively, the OPRM Trip auto-enable setpoint(s) may be adjusted to place the channel in a conservative condition (not bypassed). If the OPRM Trip is placed in the not-bypassed condition, this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.

For purposes of this surveillance, consistent with Reference 21, the conversion from core flow values defined in the COLR to drive flow values used for this SR can be conservatively determined by a linear scaling assuming that 100% drive flow corresponds to 100 Mlb/hr core flow, with no adjustment made for expected deviations between dore flow and drive flow below 100%.

The Frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgment and reliability of the components.

SR 3.3.1.1.20 The APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function (Function 2.b) uses drive flow to vary the trip setpoint. The OPRM Trip Function (Function 2.f) uses drive flow to automatically enable or bypass the OPRM Trip output to RPS. Both of these Functions use drive flow as a representation of reactor core flow. SR 3.3.1.1.18 ensures that the drive flow transmitters and processing electronics are calibrated. This SR adjusts the recirculation drive flow scaling factors in each APRM channel to provide the appropriate drive flow/core flow alignment.

The Frequency of 24 months considers that any change in the core flow to drive flow functional relationship during power operation would be gradual and the maintenance of the Recirculation System and core components that may impact the relationship is expected to be performed during refueling outages. This frequency also considers the period after reaching plant equilibrium conditions necessary to perform the test, engineering judgment of the time required to collect and analyze the necessary flow data, and engineering judgment of the time required to enter and check the applicable scaling factors in each of the APRM channels. This timeframe is acceptable based on the relatively small alignment errors expected, and the margins already included in the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High and OPRM Trip Function trip-enable setpoints.

PPL Rev. 0 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES REFERENCES 7. FSAR, Chapter 15.

(continued)

8. P. Check (NRC) letter to G. Lainas (NRC), 'BWR Scram Discharge System Safety Evaluation," December 1, 1980.

9. NEDO-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System:' March 1988.

10. NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Part 9900: Technical Guidance, Standard Technical Specification 1.0 Definitions, Issue date 12108186.

11. FSAR, Table 7.3-28.

12. NEDO-32291A "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.

13. NRC Safety Evaluation Report related to Amendment No. 171 for License No. NPF 14 and Amendment No. 144 for License No. NPF 22.

14. NEDO-32291-A Supplement 1 OSystem Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1999.

( zey~Tf Bls h SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.3-33 Revision 3

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B15:

15. NEDC-32410P-A, *Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function", October 1995.

16. NEDC-32410P-A Supplement 1, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function", November 1997.

17. NEDO-31960-A, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology,' November 1995.

18. NEDO-31960-A, Supplement 1, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology,' November 1995.

19. NEDO-32465-A, OBWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology And Reload Applications,,

August 1996.

20. BWROG Letter BWROG 9479, L. A. England (BWROG) to M. J. Virgilio, 1BWR Owners' Group Guidelines for Stability Interim Corrective Action", June 6, 1994.

21. BWROG Letter BWROG 96113, K. P. Donovan (BWROG) to L. E. Phillips (NRC),

'Guidelines for Stability Option III 'Enable Region' (TAC M92882),

September 17, 1996.

22. EMF-CC-074(P)(A), Volume 4, B?1R Stability Analysis: Assessment of STAIF with Input from MICROBURN-B2."

23. GE Letter to PPL, GE-2005-EMC426, "Susquehanna 1 & 2 Minimum LPRM Input Requirement for NUMAC APRM 4-Channel Design,' April 26, 2005.

PPL Rev. 0 SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 B3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The SRMs provide the operator with information relative to the neutron flux level at startup and low flux levels in the core, As such, the SRM indication is used by the operator to monitor the approach to criticality and determine when criticality is achieved. The SRMs are not fully withdrawn from the core until the SRM to Intermediate range monitor (IRM) overlap is demonstrated (as required by SR 3.3.1.1.6), when the SRMs are normally fully withdrawn from the core.

The SRM subsystem of the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) consists of four channels. Each of the SRM channels can be bypassed, but only one at any given time, by the operation of a bypass switch. Each channel includes one detector that can be physically positioned in the core. Each detector assembly consists of a miniature fission chamber with associated cabling, signal conditioning equipment, and electronics associated with the various SRM functions. The signal conditioning equipment converts the current pulses from the fission chamber to analog DC currents that correspond to the count rate. Each channel also includes indication, alarm, and control rod blocks. However, this LCO specifies OPERABILITY requirements only for the monitoring and indication functions of the SRMs.

During refueling, shutdown, and low power operations, the primary indication of neutron flux levels is provided by the SRMs or special movable detectors connected to the normal SRM circuits. The SRMs provide monitoring of reactivity changes during fuel or control rod movement and give the control room operator early indication of unexpected subcritical multiplication that could be Indicative of an approach to criticality.

APPLICABLE Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling SAFETY and low power operation is provided by LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment ANALYSES lnterlocks7; LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"; LCO 3.3.1.1,

'Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"; IRM Neutron Flux-High and Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Neutron Flux-Hift-A (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-35 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 0 SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES G APPLICABLE ( etdown)Functions; and LCO 3.3.2.1, 'Control Rod Block Instrumentation."

SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) The SRMs have no safety function and are not assumed to function during any FSAR design basis accident or transient analysis. However, the SRMs provide the only on-scale monitoring of neutron flux levels during startup and refueling. Therefore, they are being retained in Technical Specifications.

LCO During startup in MODE 2, three of the four SRM channels are required to be OPERABLE to monitor the reactor flux level prior to and during control rod withdrawal, subcritical multiplication and reactor criticality, and neutron flux level and reactor period until the flux level is sufficient to maintain the IRMs on Range 3 or above. All but one of the channels are required in order to provide a representation of the overall core response during those periods when reactivity changes are occurring throughout the core.

In MODES 3 and 4, with the reactor shut down, two SRM channels provide redundant monitoring of flux levels in the core.

In MODE 5, during a spiral offload or reload, an SRM outside the fueled region will no longer be required to be OPERABLE, since it is not capable of monitoring neutron flux in the fueled region of the core. Fueled region is a continuous area with fuel. Thus, CORE ALTERATIONS are allowed in a quadrant with no OPERABLE SRM in an adjacent quadrant provided the Table 3.3.1.2-1, footnote (b), requirement that the bundles being spiral reloaded or spiral offloaded are all in a single fueled region containing at least one OPERABLE SRM is met. Spiral reloading and offloading encompass reloading or offloading a cell on the edge of a continuous fueled region (the cell can be reloaded or offloaded In any sequence).

In nonspiral routine operations, two SRMs are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundant monitoring of reactivity changes occurring in the reactor core. Because of the local nature of reactivity changes during refueling, adequate coverage is provided by requiring one SRM to be OPERABLE in (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT I TS I B 3.3-36 Revision 1

N PPLR v.0 OPRM Instrumenta'ttn B 3.3. 1>

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATIO B 3.3.1.3 Oscillatio Power Range Monitor (OPRM)

BASES BACKG ND General Design Crite n10 (GDC 10) requires the reare and associated coola~tcontrol, and protection system be designed with appropriate mrin to assure that acceptable fu design limits are not exceeded diring any condition of normal opation including the affects of anticipated operational occurrences. ditionally, GDC 12 requires the rea~ptr core and associated coolant trol and protection system to be Oesigned to assure that power osp ations which can result in c ditions X exceeding acceptable fuel design limits are either not possi or can be l reliably and readily detece nd suppressed. The OP System provides compliance w DC 10 and GDC 12 ther providing protection from exceing the fuel MCPR safety t.

\ . References 1 and 3 describe three sep te algorithms for detecting stability re ed oscillations: the period sed detection algorithm, the amplit based algorithm, and the owth rate algorithm. The OPRM

,,P ist Thardware implements th e algorithms in microprocessor based

,anddules. These modules execute the algorithms based on LPRM inputs

.and generate alarms and trips based on these calculations. These rips

. result in tripping the R ttor Protection System (RPS) when t appropriate RPS tripogic is satisfied, as described in th ases for LCO 3.3.1.1, "RPS Instfumentation." Only the period ba detection algorithm is used in the safety analysis (Ref. 1, , & 7). The remaining algorithms provide defense-in-depth and a Ional protection against unanticipated oscillations.

The period based detection algophm detects a stability-related oscillation

,/based on the occurrence~fl- fixed number of consecutive LPRM signal

/ period confirmations followed by the LPRM signal amplitude exceeding a specified setpoint.-%tfpon detection of a stability related oscillation a trip is X generated for that OPRM channel. /

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS 18B 3.3-43a Revision 0

~ -PPL Rev. 0 OPRM Instrumentation I B 3.3.1.3 \

/BASES//

BACKGROUND Th PRM System consists/4 OPRM trip channels, each nnel I (continued) nsisting of two OPRM from LPRMs. Each OP dules. Each OPRM module r eives input module also receives input m the NMS average power rang onitor (APRM) power and fib signals to automatically ena the trip function of the OPR odule.

I Each OPRM odule is continuously tested a self-test function. On detection any OPRM module failure, e er a Trouble alarm or INOP coolantscnated. The OPRM modus to ides an INOP alarm who the rself-tfeature indicates that the fuel d odule may not be ca able of during its functional requirem pe t n APPLICABLE / It has been shown tha~lt R cores may exhibit th If-hydraulic reactor SAFETY / instabilities in high pwe and low flow portions ohe core power to flow ANALYSES/ operating doma D 10 requires the reactpfcre and associated

/coolant contr)n poeton systems to b~esigned with appropriate

/ magn to a~f htacptable fuel de itn limits are not exceeded I during ad condition of normal operawn including the effects of

/I antici ted operational occurrence .GDC 12 requires assurance that po0r oscillations which can res in conditions exceeding acceptabl f I design limits are either not possible or can be reliably and rea y III.

detected and suppressed. Tfhe OPRM System provides comp ce with i GDC 10 and GDC 12 by etecting the onset of oscillations d i suppressing them by iating a reactor scram. This asses that the II MCPR safety limit wi not be violated for anticipated cillations. I I

Ii The OPRM In rfientation satisfies Criteria 3 the NRC Policy Statement.

1 - 7 Ii LCO Fourthannels of the OPRM System are required to be OPERBE to

\ ensure that stability related oscillations are detected and supvressed to exceeding the MCP3 safety limit. Only one of th o OPRM o'rior modules is required for OPRM channel OPERABILI The minimum I

number of LPRMs requi(ed OPERABLE to maila an OPRM channel OPERABLE is consistent with the minimum number of LPRMs required to maintain the APRM system OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.1.1. I

.1I I

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS /B 3.3-43b Revision 0

(continued) The OPRM setpoints are dete ned based on the NRC approved methodology described in N 0D-32465-A (Ref 6). The Allowable Value for the OPRM Period Bs dAgorithm setpoint, (SP) is, 6nved from the analytic limit corrected ruinstrument and calIon ors as contained in the COLR/

The OPRM byp ow setpoint (SR 3.3 1.3.5 is conservatively d et and suppress neutr flux oscillations in the vent of thermal-

/draulic instabili o As scrbed in References ,2i and 3, the power/core flow regio rotected agains ted oscillations is defined by THER / POWER 30% core

/ flow 65 MLb/Hr.

The OPRM trip is equired to be enabled i thisregion, and the OPl I must be ca f enabling the trip f a result of anticip.afed transients t ce the core in that er/flow condition. ThqiKre, the OPRM is oquired to be OPERABLgwith THERMAL POWR ? 25%o RTP and at If core flows while abovetat THERMAL POWE2 It is not iII nece ary for the OPRM to be perable with THERM POWER < 25%

I RT because transients fro below this THERMA I.OWER are not 1I II ticipated to result i er that exceeds 30% P. 1 i

i I

/ I ACTIONSy A Note has beep /provided to modify t ACTIONS related to the OPRM instrumentatioichannels. Section .3, Completion Times, specifies th i once a Con ition has been enter ,subsequent divisions, subsysts, componepts, or variables expr sed in the Condition discovere o be inoperaybe or not within limit will not result in separate entry to the Condjtion. Section 1.3 ald'specifies that Required Actio of the Ii Coyition continue to apply for each additional failureih Completion Times based on initiak/ntry into the Condition. Hoever, the Required i Actions for inoperable OPRM instrumentation c nnels provide i-appropriate compensatory measures for separte inoperable channels. II I

o As such, a Note has been provided that allo~s separate Condition entry T-

"for each inoperable OPRM instrumentation channel. i A..

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / 8 3.3-43c Revision 0

PPL Rev. 0 OPRM Instrumentation

///_ B 3.3.1.3 BASES ACTIONS A.1. A.2 and A.3 (continued)

Because of the reliab ity and on-line self-teP ing of the OPRM instrumentation aa 4 the redundancy of t RPS design, an al able out of service times 30 days has been spown to be acceptab (Ref. 7) to permit restor ion of any inoperablehannel to OPERA status.

However, his out of service timeis only acceptable p vided the OPRM instwmptation still maintainsAPRM trip capability efer to Required Actions 6.1 and B.2). The maining OPERAB OPRM channels copt6nue to provide trip pability (see CondiVn B) and provide op ator information relative to ability activity. Th emaining OPRM mo les have high reliability With this high relia3bflity, there is a low pro bility of a subsequent c nnel failure withinjP allowable out of servi time. In addition, the RM modules contie to perform on-line s -testing and alert the op ator if any further stem degradation occu If the jiperable channel not be restored to OP ABLE status within

/I thea owable out of serv e time, the OPRM chartel or associated RPS t9p system must be p1 ed in the tripped condjton per Required actions MA. and A.2. Placi the inoperable OPRM , annel in trip (or the

/ associated RPS system in trip) would onservatively compensate fo

,.^' the inoperabilit ,provide the capability accommodate a single failu and allow operation to continue. Altpnately, if it is not desired to p ce the OPRNZjhannel (or RPS trip tem) in trip (e.g., as in the e where placingthe inoperable channel n trip would result in a full scr ), the alterrg'te method of detectin nd suppressing thermal h aulic

'I instability oscillations is re ired (Required Action A.3) his alternate r6ethod is described in erence 5. It consists of i reased operator I

/awareness and monit ng for neutron flux oscill ons when operating in the region where osyp lations are possible. If i ications of oscillation, as described in Refe nce 5 are observed byte operator, the operator will take the actions escribed by procedurswhich include initiating a

'I manual scra of the reactor. The pa er/flow map regions are developed based on m thodology in Referen 11. The applicable regions are containedin the COLR. 'I I

/

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.3-43d Revision 0

PPL Rev. 0 OPRM Instrumentation B..l.3 BASES ACTIONIs .1 and B.2 (contin ued) Required action B.1 intended to ensure that ap priate actions are taken if multiple, i perable, untripped OPRM annels within the same RPS trip syste esult in not maintaining OP trip capability. OPR trip capability' considered to be maintai d when sufficient OPR channels ar OPERABLE or in trip (or e associated RPS trip s tem is

/ in trip), s that a valid OPRM sig will generate a trip sign in both RPS tri systems (this would re re both RPS trip system o have at least ne OPRM channel OP ABLE or the associated PS trip system int).

ecause of the low p ability of the occurrenc of an instability, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is an accept le time to initiate the alt ate method of det ting and suppressin9Ahermal hydraulic instabi oscillations descri d in Action A.3 abve. The alternate retho of detecting and s pressing thermal hy (aulic instability oscillatio would adequately ddress

/detectio and mitigation in the ev2t of instability oscil ions. Based on indus operating experience h actual instabilit scillation, the op ator would be able to re gnize instabilities uring this time and take a tion to suppress them tHough a manual s m. In addition, the OPRM

/system may still be av ir;able to provide a rms to the operator if the onset of oscillationsere to occur. Si e plant operation is minimized i areas where oscfia ions may occurdperation for 120 days without OPRM trip cap bility is considere acceptable with implementatiof the alternate me t1od of detecting d suppressing thermal hydrac instablity scillations.

C.,

I With any Require Action and associated Co letion Time not met, THERMAL POW R must be reduced to < % RTP within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Reducing T EiMAL POWER to < 25% P places the plant in a condition where instabilities are not Ii y to occur. The 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating e erience, to reduce THERMAL POVE'R < 25% RTP from full p er conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plapt sys is.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT I TS / B 3.3-43e Revision 0

t.

BASES (con tinued) _

SURVEILLAM CE SR 3.3.1.3.1 REQUIREME :NS A CHANNEL FUI TIONAL TEST I erformed to ensure at the entire channel will peform the intended nction. A Frequency/f 184 days provides an ceptable level of stem average availa ity over the Frequency nd is based on t reliability of the cha el (Ref. 7).

SR 3.3. .2 LPD gain settings a determined from thocal flux profiles m sured b the Traversing core Probe (TIP) Sys m. This establishes e elative local flu rofile for appropriat epresentative input the OPRM System. The p00 MWDIMT Frequ cy is based on operaing experienceyfh LPRM sensitivity anges.

SR 3.3.1X.3 A C NNEL CALIBRATIN verifies that the annel responds to the mg sured parameter v in the necessary nge and accuracy.

PHiANNEL CALIB ION leaves the c nnel adjusted to account for

/instrument drifts b een successive librations. Calibration of the channel provide a check of the it al reference voltage and the internal proce or clock frequency It also compares the desired trip setpoints wit those in proces r memory. Since the OPRM is a ital system, tp internal referen voltage and processor clock fre ency are, in tum,/sed to automati y calibrate the internal analog to igital conv fters. As noted, utron detectors are excluded fr CHANNEL )

C41*IBRATION becau e they are passive devices, wi minimal drift, and II because of the diffi Ity of simulating a meaningfu ignal. Changes in I

neutron detectorep nsitivity are compensated for-y performing the 1000 MWD/MT LPRM calibration using the TIPs ( .3.1.3.2).

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B3.3-43f Revision 0

PPL Rev. 0

'RM Instrumentation pI B 3.3.1.3 II

/ BASE:S -

SUR) /EILLANCE Th requency of 24 month isbased upon the a umption of the REQIJIREMENTS gnitude of equipment ift provided by the e ipment supplier. (Ref. 7) I (Cor tinued)

SR 3.3.1.3.4 I The LOGIC SY M FUNCTIONAL T T demonstr s the OPERABILITY of the required trip loac for a specifi channel. The functional t ting of control rods, ILCO 3.1.3, ntrol Rod OPERAB lY," and scram dis carge volume V) vent and drn valves,j LCO 3.1.8, 'Scrami ischarge Vol e (SDV) Vent d Drain Valve overlaps this Surv lance to provie complete tesfg of the ass med safety function The OPRM s -test function y be utilized to pform this testing for ose componets that it is defned to monitor.

The 24 month Fre ency is base on engineerin udgement, reliabilit of the components nd operating xperience.

SR 3.3.1.3.

The SR nsures that trs initiated from e OPRM System il not be inadv ently bypas d when THERML POWER is 2 30 .fi RTP and core flow s < 65 MLb/I-JK This normal y volves calibration f the bypass c nnels. Ade tate margins for e instrument setp mt methodology are corporated i o the actual se aints (Ref. 7).

/ I I

If any byp ss channel set nt is nonconserv& e (i.e., the OPRM module, bypassed at 0% RTP and core ow is ' 65 MLb/Hr en I

the a fcted OPRM m dule is consideredf operable. Altern ely, the I bypassed channel n be manually playd in the conserv e position N (Md'nual Enable). placed in the MA AL ENABLE c dition, this So pet and the moile is considered ERABLE.

The 24 month Frequency is reliability of the components (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-43g Revision 0

PPL Rev. 6 umentation B 3.3.1.3 a less than s (Ref. 6).

stng for ter cards SE TIM clud i E TIME isure an re requency is Oilures of .

,but no

/ X f

/

FroniJ ng IA~'-

Iw I AL, mu.cus-SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT I TS /B 3.3-43h Revision 0

PPL Rev. 0 OPRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.3

/ BASES REFERENC 1. NEDO 3196 , BWR Owners G up Long-Term aility Solutions Licensin ethodology". Noveer 1995.

2. NE 31960-A, Supple ent 1 BWR Own s Group Long-Term S ability Solutions Li nsing Methodolo November 1995.

NRC Letter, A hadani to L.A. E and, "Acceptance fo Referencin f Topical Report EDO-31960, Suppleent 1, 'BWR Owners cup Long-Term bility Solutions Lice ing Methodology".

July 1994.

4. neric Letter 94. , Long-Term Solutio sand Upgrade Interim

/ /Operating Reco nfmendations forTher l-Hydraulic In ilities in Boiling Wate eactors T , July11, 1 4.

5. BWRO Letter BWROG-947 fGuidelines fotability Interim Co tive Action", June 6, 94.

6. EDO-32465-A, "BW wners Gre Reactor Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions1996. Bs Methodology and Reload

!, Applications', Au ~t 1996.//

/ 7. CENPD-400P-A, Rev ,"Generic Topical Report foythe ABB

/ Option II scillation ower Range Monitor (OPRI~',May 1995.

8. FS Table 7. -28.

9 FSAR ion 4.4.4.6. /

t / 10.

FS Section 7.2.

1. EMF-CC-074(P)(A), Volume ABWR Stability alysis: Assessment of STAIF with Input from MICROBURN-B

/ i 7/'

',1 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-43i Revision 0

PPL Rev. 1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2;1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.32.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND 'Control rods provide the primary means for control of reactivity changes.

Control rod block instrumentation includes channel sensors, logic circuitry,.

switches, and relays that are designed to ensure that specified fuel design limits are not exceeded fortpostulatbd transients and accidents. During high power operation, the rod block monitor (RBM) provides protection for control rod withdrawal error events. During low power operations, control rod blocks from the rod worth minimizer (RWM) enforce specific control rod

-sequences designed to mitigate the consequences of the'coritrdl rod drop accident (CRDA). During shutdown conditions, control rod blocks from the Reactor Mode Switch-Shutdown Position Function ensure that all control rods remain inserted to prevent inadvertent criticalities; The-purpose of the RBM-Is to limit-control'rod-Withdrawal if'localized-neutron flux exceeds a predetermined 'setpoiht during control rod rmanipulations.

The RBM supplies a trip signal to the Reactor Manual Control System (RMCS) to appropriately Inhibit control rod withdrawal during power operation above the low power range setpoint. The RBM has two channels, either of Which can initiate a control rod block when the channel output exceeds the control rod block setpoinL One'RBM channel inputs into one RMCS rod block circuit and the other RBM channel inputs into the second RMCS rod block circuit. The RBM channel signal is -generated by averaging a set of local power range monitor (LPRM) signals at various core heights surroundirii thecontrol rod being withdran.averge Y) fAL ( 6 te Bdfictannell suppliesa refrence sdnalfo in sa yste isreference signal is used to enable the RBM. If the APRM-is indicating less than the low power range setpoint, the RBM is automalically bypassed. The RBM is also automatically bypassed if a peripheral control rod is selected (Ref. 2).

The purpose of the RWM is to control rod patterns during startup, such that only specified control rod sequences and relative positions are allowed over the operating range from all control rods inserted to 10% RTP. The sequences effectively linmit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase during a CRDA. Prescribed control rod sequences are stored in the RWM, which'will initiate control rod withdrawal and insert blocks when the actual sequence deviates beyond allowances from the stored sequence. The RWM determines the actual sequence (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT I TS / B 3.3-44 Revision 2

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B16:

An APRM flux signal from one of the four redundant average power range monitor-(APRM) channels supplies a reference signal for one of the RBM channels and an APRM flux signal from another of the APRM channels supplies the reference signal to the second RBM channel.

PPL Rev. 1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued)

With the RWM inoperable during a reactor shutdown, the operator is still capable of enforcing the prescribed control rod sequence. Required Action D.l allows for the RWM Function to be performed manually and requires a double check of compliance with the prescribed rod sequence by a second licensed operator (Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator) or other qualified member of the technical staff. The RWM may be bypassed under these conditions to allow the reactor shutdown to continue.

E.1 and E.2 With one Reactor Mode Switch-Shutdown Position control rod withdrawal block channel inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate to perform the control rod withdrawal block function. However, since the Required Actions are consistent with the normal action of an OPERABLE Reactor Mode Switch-Shutdown Position Function (i.e., maintaining all control rods inserted), there is no distinction between having one or two channels inoperable.

In both cases (one or both channels inoperable), suspending all control rod withdrawal and initiating action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies will ensure that the core is subcritical with adequate SDM ensured by LCO 3.1.1. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and are therefore not required to be inserted. Action must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted.

SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each Control Rod Block REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.2.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when an RBM channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains control rod block capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.3-50 Revision 2

PPL Rev. I Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance.

REQUIREMENTS That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not (continued) significantly reduce the probability that a control rod block will be initiated when necessary.

SR 3.3.2.1.1 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed for each RBM channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. It includes the Reactor Manual Control Multiplexing System input. The Frequency a days isbased on reliability analyses SR 3.3.2.1.2 and SR 3.3.2.1.3 fQ-s. , It )

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed for the RWM to ensure that the entire system will perform the intended function. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the RWM is performed by attempting to withdraw a control rod not in compliance with the prescribed sequence and verifying a control rod block occurs and by verifying proper indication of the selection error of at least one out-of-sequence control rod. As noted in the SRs, SR 3.3.2.1.2 is not required to be performed until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after any control rod is withdrawn in MODE 2. As noted, SR 3.3.2.1.3 is not required to be performed until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after THERMAL POWER is s 10% RTP in MODE 1. This allows entry into MODE 2 for SR 3.3.2.1.2, and entry into MODE 1 when THERMAL POWER is

10% RTP for SR 3.3.2.1.3, to perform the required Surveillance if the 92 day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months allowance is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SRs. The Frequencies are based on reliability analysis (Ref. 8).

SR 3.3.2.1.4 The RBM trips are automatically bypassed when power is below a specified value and a peripheral control rod is not selected. The power Allowable Value must be verified periodically to not be bypassed when 2 30% RTP. This is performed by a Functional check. If any RBM bypass setpoint is non-conservative, then the affected RBM channel is (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT I TS I B 3.3-51 Revision I

PPL Rev. 1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 7.7.1.2.8.

2. FSAR, Section 7.6.1.a.5.7

3. NEDE-24011-P-A-9-US, "General Electrical Standard Application for Reload Fuel," Supplement for United States, Section S 2.2.3.1, September 1988.

4. "Modifications to the Requirements for Control Rod Drop Accident Mitigating Systems," BWR Owners' Group, July 1986.

5. NEDO-21231, "Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence,"

January 1977.

6. NRC SER, "Acceptance of Referencing of Licensing Topical Report NEDE-2401 1-P-A," "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, Revision 8, Amendment 17," December 27, 1987.

7. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22,1993 (58 FR 32193)

8. NEDC-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Control Rod Block Instrumentation," October 1988.

9. GENE-770-06-1, "Addendum to Bases for changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation, Technical Specifications," February 1991.

10. FSAR, Section 15.4.2.

11. NEDO 33091-A, Revision 2, Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process," April 2003.

( 5I4N~- 13Y7 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT I TS / B3.3-54 Revision 2

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B17:

12. NEDC-32410P-A,."Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function,, October 1995.

i3. NEDC-32410P-A Supplement 1, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function," November 1997.

PPL Rev. 2 Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES APPLICABLE Plant specific LOCA analyses have been performed assuming only one SAFETY operating recirculation loop. These analyses have demonstrated that, in ANALYSES the event of a LOCA caused by a pipe break in the operating recirculation (continued) loop, the Emergency Core Cooling System response will provide adequate core cooling, provided that the APLHGR limit for SPC ATRIUM'-10fuel is modified.

The transient analyses of Chapter 15 of the FSAR have also been performed for single recirculation loop operation and demonstrate sufficient flow coastdown characteristics to maintain fuel thermal margins during the abnormal operational transients analyzed provided the MCPR requirements are modified. During single recirculation loop operation, modification to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) average power range monitor (APRM) instrument setpoints is also required to account for the different relationships between recirculation drive flow and reactor core flow. The APLHGR, LHGR, and MCPR limits for single loop o eration are specified in the COLR. The APRMg f~i etpoint is in LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection A Vysteme RM) Instrumentation." In addition, a restriction on recirculation

,Ax e,e I pump speed is incorporated to address reactor vessel internals vibration

- AXE)concerns and assumptions in the event analysis.

Recirculation loops operating satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 5).

LCO Two recirculation loops are required to be in operation with their flows matched within the limits specified in SR 3.4.1.1 to ensure that during a LOCA caused by a break of the piping of one recirculation loop the assumptions of the LOCA analysis are satisfied. With the limits specified in SR 3.4.1.1 not met, the recirculation loop with the lower flow must be considered not in operation. With only one recirculation loop in operation, modifications to the required APLGHR limits (LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE"), LHGR limits (LCO 3.2.3, "LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)"), MCPR limits 32, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)"), and APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High setpoint (LCO 3.3.1.1) may be applied to allow continued operation consistent with the safety analysis assumptions.

Furthermore, restrictions are placed on recirculation pump speed to ensure the initial assumption of the event analysis are maintained.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / 8 3.4-3 Revision 3

PPL Rev. 2 Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES LCO The LCO is modified by a Note that allows up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to establish the (continued) required limits and setpoints after a change from two recirculation loops operation to single recirculation loop operation. If the limits and setpoints are not in compliance with the applicable requirements at the end of the this period, the ACTIONS required by the applicable specifications must be implemented. This time is provided to stabilize operation with one recirculation loop by: limiting flow in the operating loop, limiting total THERMAL POWER, monitor APRM and local power range monitor (LPRM) neutron flux noise levels; and, fully implementing and confirming the required limit and setpoint modifications.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 and 2, requirements for operation of the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System are necessary since there is considerable energy in the reactor core and the limiting design basis transients and accidents are assumed to occur.

In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the consequences of an accident are reduced and the coastdown characteristics of the recirculation loops are not important.

ACTIONS A.1 When operating with no recirculation loops operating in'MODE 1, the potential for thermal-hydraulic oscillations is greatly increased. Although this transient is protected for expected modes of oscillation by the OPRM system, when OPERABLE per LC . Reference 3, 4), the prudent response to the natural circulation ndition is to preclude potential thermal-hydraulic oscillations b immediately placing the mode switch in the shutdown position.

2.1 I I Recirculation loop flow must match within required limits when both recirculation loops are in operation. If flow mismatch is not within required limits, matched flow must be restored within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . If matched flows are not restored, the recirculation loop with lower flow must be declared "not in operation." Should a LOCA occur with recirculation loop flow not matched, the core flow coastdown and resultant core response may not be bounded by the LOCA analyses. Therefore, only a limited time is allowed prior to imposing restrictions associated with single loop operation. Operation with only one recirculation loop satisfies the requirements of the LCO and the initial conditions of the accident sequence.

_(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS /B 3.4-4 .Revision 3

PPL Rev. 0 SDM Test-Refueling B 3.10.8 BASES APPLICABLE CRDA analyses assume that the reactor operator follows prescribed SAFETY ANALYSES withdrawal sequences. For SDM tests performed within these defined (continued) sequences, the analyses of Reference 1 is applicable. However, for some sequences developed for the SDM testing, the control rod patterns assumed in the safety analyses of Reference I may not be met. Therefore, special CRDA analyses, performed in accordance with an NRC approved methodology, are required to demonstrate the SDM test sequence will not result in unacceptable consequences should a CRDA occur during the testing. For the purpose of this test, the protection provided by the normally required MODE 5 applicable LCOs, in addition to the requirements of this LCO, will maintain normal test operations as well as postulated accidents within the bounds of the appropriate safety analyses (Ref. 1). In addition to the added requirements for the RWM, APRM, and control rod coupling, the notch out mode is specified for control rod withdrawals that are not in conformance with the BPWS. Requiring the notch out mode limits withdrawal steps to a single notch, which limits inserted reactivity, and allows adequate monitoring of changes in neutron flux, which may occur during the test.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. SDM tests may be performed while in MODE 2, in accordance with Table 1.1-1, without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. For SDM tests performed while in MODE 5, additional requirements must be met to ensure that adequate protection against potential reactivity excursions is available. To provide additional scram protection, beyond the normally required IRMs, the APRMs are also required to OPERABLE (LCO 3.3.1.1, Functions . ugh the reactor were in MODE 2. Because multiple control rods will be withdrawn and the reactor will potential become critical, RPS MODE 2 requirements for Functions.L .d f Table 3.3.1.1-1

<' a ~(continL ied)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 1 B 3.10-34 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 0 SDM Test-Refueling B 3.10.8 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) are governed by subsequent entry into the Condition and application of the Required Actions.

B.1 With one or more of the requirements of this LCO not met for reasons other than an uncoupled control rod, the testing should be immediately stopped by placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown or refuel position. This results in a condition that is consistent with the requirements for MODE 5 where the provisions of this Special Operations LCO are no longer required.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.10.8.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the applicable SRs for LCO 3.3.1.1, Functions 2.a and 2.d will ensure that the reactor is operated within the bounds of the safety analysis.

SR 3.10.8.1, SR 3.10.8.2. and SR 3.10.8.3 LCO 3.3.1.1, Functions 2.a made applicable in this Special

( ' Ad t, Operations LCO, are required to ave applicable Surveillances met to

. . establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. However, the control rod withdrawal sequences during the SDM tests may be enforced by the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1, Function 2, MODE 2 requirements) or by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff. As noted, either the applicable SRs for the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1) must be satisfied according to the applicable Frequencies (SR 3.10.8.2), or the proper movement of control rods must be verified (SR 3.10.8.3). This latter verification (i.e., SR 3.10.8.3) must be performed during control rod movement to prevent deviations from the specified sequence. These surveillances provide adequate assurance that the specified test sequence is being followed.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 1 B 3.1 0-37 Revision 0

Unit 2 Technical Specification Bases Mark-ups For Information

PPL Rev. 0 APRM Gain and Setpoints B 3.2.4 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)

Bl 1 Puroropscale Sepntwhich ical nt chnch t m Manualq3OControl Ro ock Instuetto B.1 If MFLPD cannot be restored to within its required limits within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, THERMAL POWER is reduced to < 25% RTP within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to < 25% RTP in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.2.4.1 and SR 3.2.4.2 REQUIREMENTS The MFLPD is required to be calculated and compared to FRTP or APRM gain or setpoints to ensure that the reactor is operating within the assumptions of the safety analysis. These SRs are only required to determine the MFLPD and, assuming MFLPD is greater than FRTP, the appropriate gain or setpoint, and is not intended to be a CHANNEL FUNCTI L TEST for the APRM gain or flow biased neutron flux sCra The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency of SR 3.2.4.1 is chosen to coincide with the determination of other thermal limits, specifically those for the APLHGR (LCO 3.2.1). The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is based on both engineering judgment and recognition of the slowness of changes in power distribution during normal operation. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance after THERMAL POWER 2 25% RTP is achieved is acceptable given the large inherent margin to operating limits at low power levels and because the MFLPD must be calculated prior to exceeding 50% RTP unless performed in the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . When MFLPD is greater than FRTP, SR 3.2.4.2 must be performed. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency of SR 3.2.4.2 requires a more frequent verification when MFLPD is greater than the fraction of rated thermal power (FRTP) because more rapid changes in power distribution are typically expected.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.2-1 8 Revision 1

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT Bi:

The APRM setpoints include the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High RPS scram setpoint, LCO 3.3.1.1 "RPS Instrumentation," Function 2.b, and APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High rod block setpoint, Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) TRO 3.1.3 "Control Rod Block Instrumentation", Function L.b.

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BAS, BASES\

APPLICABLE =

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and 2.a. Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-Hihqtv APPLICABILITY ( Setdownl (continued) _

powoe distrib~ytfon and locao~wer chang Th A whnV /

ayerage t,hse LPRM silpls toprov> a continugs -niaino a'verage~eactor power from a few percent to greater tn TSFr operation at low power (i.e., MODE 2L the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-Highqoetdown)Function is capable of generating a trip signal that prevents fuel damage resulting from abnormal operating transients in this power range. For most operation at lo'y power levels, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-Higivetdow)

Function will provide a secondary scram to the Intermediate Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High Function because of the relative setpoints.

{*V&~ With the IRMs at Range 9 or 10, it ispossibIq that the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-Hig hflsetdown)runction will provide the primary trip signal for a corewide increase In power.

No specific safety analyses take direst credit for the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-Hig!'etdowq Function. However, this Function indirectly ensures that before the reactor mode switch is placed in the run position, reactor power does not exceed 25% RTP (SL 2.1.1.1) when operating at low reactor pressure and low core flow. Therefore, it indirectly prevents fuel damage during significant reactivity increases with THERMAL POWER < 25% RTP.

The APRM System is divid Id nto two trip systems with three APRM channel Iuts to each system. The s em is designed to allow one chann in each trip stem to be byp ed. Any one A6MR channel in a trip stem can se the associa trip system to,*. Four channels erage Pow ange Monito eutron Flux-", Setdown with o

/channels iach trip syste re required too OPERABLE t sure the no singl ailure will prec de a scram fr this Function o valid signal In ad ion, to provid dequatepcov ge of the entire re, at least 14 RM inputs a required fo'ech APRM cha , with at least two (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS / B3.3-7 Revision 1

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B2:

Average Power Range Monitor (APRM)

The APRM channels provide the primary indication of neutron flux within the core and respond almost instantaneously to neutron flux increases. The APRM channels receive input signals from the local power range monitors (LPRMs) within the reactor core to provide an indication of the power distribution and local power changes. The APRM channels average these LPRM signals to provide a continuous indication of average reactor power from a few percent to greater than RTP.

Each APRM channel also includes an Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM)

Upscale Function which monitors small groups of LPRM signals to detect thermal-hydraulic instabilities.

The APRM trip System is divided into four APRM channels and four 2-out-of-4 Voter channels. Each APRM channel provides inputs to each of the four voter channels. The four voter channels are divided into two groups of two each with each group of two providing inputs to one RPS trip system. The system is designed to allow one APRM channel, but no voter channels, to be bypassed. A trip from any one unbypassed APRM will result in a ~half-trip in all four of the voter channels, but no trip inputs to either RPS trip system.

APRM trip Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d are voted independently from OPRM Trip Function 2.f. Therefore, any Function 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, or 2.d trip from any two unbypassed APRM channels will result in a full trip in each of the four voter channels, which in turn results in two trip inputs into each RPS trip system logic channel (Al. A2, Bi, and B2), thus resulting in a full scram signal. Similarly, a Function 2.f trip from any two unbypassed APRM channels will result in a full trip from each of the four voter channels.

Three of the four APRM channels and all four of the voter channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure will preclude a scram on a valid signal. In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core consistent with the design bases for the APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c, at least [20]

LPRM inputs with at least three LPRM inputs from each of the four axial levels at which the LPRMs are located must be OPERABLE for each APRM channel, with no more than [9], LPRM detectors declared inoperable since the most recent APRM gain calibration. Per Reference 23, the minimum input requirement for an APRM channel with 43 LPRM inputs is determined given that the total number of LPRM outputs used as inputs to an APRM channel that may be bypassed shall not exceed twenty-three (23). Hence, (20) LPRM inputs needed to be operable. For the OPRM Trip Function 2.f, each LPRM in an APRM channel is further associated in a pattern of OPRM 'cells,' as described in References 17 and 18. Each OPRM cell is capable of producing a channel trip signal.

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation 6 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.a. Averaae Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-Hiqt SAFETY ANALYSES, (Setdown)(continued)

LCO, and_

APPLICABILITY LP m e of the fu l levsiiic leLPRfe The Allowable Value is based on preventing significant increases in power when THERMAL POWER is < 25% RTP.

The Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-Higloetdown)

Function must be OPERABLE during MODE 2 when control rods may be withdrawn since the potential for criticality exists. In MODE 1, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-High Function provides protection against reactivity transients and the RWM protects against control rod withdrawal error events.

2.b. Average Power Range Monitorj v d Simulated Thermal Power-High The Average Power Range MonitorE Simulated Thermal Power-High Function monitors neutron flux to approximate the THERMAL POWER being transferred to the reactor coolant. The APRM neutron flux is electronically filtered with a time constant representative of the fuel heat transfer dynamics to generate a signal proportional to the THERMAL POWER in the reactor. The trip level is varied as a function of recirculation drive flow (i.e., at lower core flows, the setpoint is reduced proportional to the reduction in power experienced as core flow is reduced with a fixed control rod pattern) but is clamped at an limit that is always lower than the Average Power Range Monito c a Neutron Flux-h Function Allowable Value. The Average ower Range Monito imulated Thermal Power-High Function is not credited in an lant Safety Analyses. The Average Power Range Monit F ie Simulated Thermal Power - High Function Limit is set above the Rod Block to provide defense in depth to the APRM~iNeutron Flux - High for transients where THERMAL POWER increases slowly (such as loss of feedwater heating event).

During these events, the THERMAL POWER increase does not significantly lag the neutron flux response and, because of a lower trip setpoint, will initiate a scram before the high neutron flux scram. For rapid neutron flux increase events, the THERMAL POWER lags the neutron flux and the Average Power Range Monitor~,Neutron Flux-High Function will provide a scram signal before the Average (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B3.3-8 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.b. Average Power Range Monitor(< Simulated SAFETY ANALYSES I Thermal Power-High (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Power Range Monito owBirs<d imulated Thermal Power-High Function setpoint is excee e The APRM System vied ito two trip sy tems with three APAM inputs to each tri ytem. The syste esged to allow one channel

( in each trip sy m to be bypassed. fyneARM channel in a trip system ca ~ase the associatedp sytmt rip. Four channels of Averag ~wr Range 'Monitorw Biased Simu Power-Ieldra High h two channels in e trip system arrange n a oneut-of-two lo are required to be 0 RABLE to ensure t no single instrument re will preclud a s am from this Functf on a valid signal. In addition, to provide equate coverage he entire core, at least 14 LPRM inputs required for eac PRM channel, with at least two LPRM inputs fr each of the fou ial levels at which the LP_ Ms are located. Ea APRM channel r eives two total drive flo Ignals represent ive of total core fig. The total drive flow 'nals are genera by four flow unitwo of which supply Inals to the trip syste A APRMs, while e other two supply s Ials to the trip system B AP s. Each flow u t signal is provided b summing up the flow si nals from the tw recirculation loops. o obtain the most conservative eference signa the total flow signal rom the two flow units (associated wj a trip system as d cribed above) are rout a low auction circ associated with e APRM. Each APR s auction circuit selects th lower of the two il unit signals for use s the scram trip referen for that particular PRM. Each requir Average Power Rang Monitor Flow Bia d Simulated Ther Power-High channel onl requires an Input om one OPERAB flow unit, because the function is not credi in the Safety Anyses and the individual APRM I channel will perfo the intended fu tion with only one OP LE flow unit input. Inditry standards (e IEEE-279-1 971) re ire that a system be sigle failure proof* it performs a protec e function (e.g.,

mitigate accident descried in the SAR). A r ew of the Safety Analyses described in th fSAR demonstrateoat the APRM Flow.

Biased Simulated Ther ial Power- High s;am is not credited. ince the flow-biased scra is not credited it es not need to mW single failure criteria. T refore, an inopera e flow unit does require that the associated trip system be decled inoperable. wever, if both flow units in a given trip system come inoperak, then one of the two required Average Power Ran Monitor Flow ased Simulated Thermal Power - High channels in the asso iated trip system must be L _ _

considered inoperable.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B3.3-9 Revision 2

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B3:

The Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power - High Function uses a trip level generated based on recirculation loop drive flow (W) representative of total core flow. Each APRM channel uses one total recirculation drive flow signal. The total recirculation drive flow signal is generated by the flow processing logic, part of the APRM channel, by summing the flow calculated from two flow transmitter signal inputs, one from each of the two recirculation drive flow loops. The flow processing logic OPERABILITY is part of the APRM channel OPERABILITY requirements for this Function.

The adequacy of drive flow as a representation of core flow is ensured through drive flow alignment, accomplished by SR 3.3.1.1.20.

A note is included, applicable when the plant is in single recirculation loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, which requires reducing by AW the recirculation flow value used in the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High Allowable Value equation.

The Average Power Range Monitor Scram Function varies as a function of recirculation loop drive flow (W). AW is defined as the difference in indicated drive flow (in percent of drive flow, which produces rated core flow) between two loop and single loop operation at the same core flow. The value of AW is established to conservatively bound the inaccuracy created in the core flow/drive flow correlation due to back flow in the jet pumps associated with the inactive recirculation loop. This adjusted Allowable Value thus maintains thermal margins essentially unchanged from those for two-loop operation.

PPL Rev. 1

'RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.b. Averale Power Rante Monitorn)mulated SAFETY ANALYSES, Thermal Power-High (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY The THERMAL POWER time constant of < 7 seconds is based on the fuel heat transfer dynamics and provides a signal proportional to the i_ THERMAL POWER. The simulated thermal time constant is part ofio

-- ethat simulates the relationship between neutron flux and core

-r Ve\or i~ wer.

The Average Power Range Mon Simulated Thermal Power-High Functio n per~dnsequired to be OPERABLE In M wen there is the possibility of generating excessive THERMAL POWER and potentially exceeding the SL applicable to high pressure and core flow conditions (MCPR SL). During MODES 2 and 5, other IRM and APRM Functions provide protection for fuel cladding integrity.

2.c. Averaae Power Ranae Monito6 Neutron Flux-High l Sie sfe and pond~fmosV~stant ne~ouslfto itron jkisincregses. (

The Average Power Range Monitor ediNeutron Flux-High Function is capable of generating a trip signal to prevent fuel damage or excessive RCS pressure. For the overpressurization protection analysis of Reference 4, the Average Power Range Monito( dNeutron Flux-High Function is assumed to terminate the main steam isolation valve (MSIV),plosure event and, along with the safety/relief valves (S/RVs),

limitltfie peak reactor pressure vessel (RPV) pressure to less than the ASME Code limits. The control rod drop accident (CRDA) analysis (Ref. 5) takes credit for the Average Power Range MonitoE~~Neutron Flux-High Function to terminate the CRDA.

rThe AP tystem isivided intoo trip syste !ith thre PRM cha s inputtin each trip stem. Th stem iseIgned to all o ichannel iach trip s em to be assed. one APRoNS channel in rip syste can caus e associ trip syst to trip. /

Fo(urchtnelsnof)

(lcontinued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B3.3-1 0 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.c. Average Power Range MonitordRNeutron Flux-High SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY The CRDA analysis assteIthat reactor scram occurs on Average Power Range Monito y Neutron Flux - High Function.

The Average Power Range Monito Neutron Flux-High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 where the potential consequences of the analyzed transients could result In the SLs (e.g.,

MCPR and RCS pressur eing exceeded. Although the Average Power Range Monito r1Pzw Neutron Flux-High Function is assumed in the CRDA analysis, which is applicable in MQDE 2, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux-Hi Setdown)Function conservatively bounds the assumed trip and, together with the assumed IRM trips, provide duate protection. Therefore, the Average Power Range Moni K Neutron Flux-High Function is not required in MODE 2.

2.d. Average Power Range Monitor-Inop hs sgnal provides assurance that a minimum number of APs are 2 OPERABLE. Anytime an APRM mode switch is moved to any position other than Operate" or the APRM has too few LPRM inputs (< 14), an

( inoperative trip signal will be received by the RPS, unless the APRM is bypassed. Since only one APRM in each trip system may be bypassed, only one APRM in each trip system may be inoperable without resultin in an RPS trip sigl i Fucin was not specifically credited in the accident analysis, but i is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-1 1 Revision 2

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B4:

Three of the four APRM channels are required to be OPERABLE for each of the APRM Functions. This Function (Inop) provides assurance that the minimum number of APRM channels are OPERABLE.

For any APRM channel, any time its mode switch is not in the 'Operate3 position, an APRM module required to issue a trip is unplugged, or the automatic self-test system detects a critical fault with the APRM channel, an Inop trip is sent to all four voter channels. Inop trips from two or more unbypassed APRM channels result in a trip output from each of the four voter channels to its associated trip system.

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.d. Average Power Range Monitor-Inop (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Four ch Sof Ave Power Ra nitor-Ip ffi two APPLICABILITY ch els in eac ip system ae uired to ERABLte e t thatno sin failure will prede a scrarfom this Fu ion on a valid There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required.

3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-High An increase in the RPV pressure during reactor operation compresses the steam voids and results in a positive reactivity insertion. This causes the neutron flux and THERMAL POWER transferred to the reactor coolant to increase, which could challenge the integrity of the fuel cladding and the RCPB. This trip Function is assumed in the low power generator load rejection without bypass and the recirculation flow controller failure (increasing) event. However, the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-High Function initiates a scram for transients that results in a pressure increase, counteracting the pressure increase by rapidly reducing core power. For the overpressurization protection analysis of Reference 4, reactor scram (the analyses conservatively assume scram on the Average Power Range MonitolY~eutron Flux-High signal, not the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-High signal), along with the S/RVs, limits the peak RPV pressure to less than the ASME Section III Code limits.

High reactor pressure signals are initiated from four pressure instruments that sense reactor pressure. The Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-High Allowable Value is chosen to provide a sufficient margin to the ASME Section III Code limits during the event.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-High Function, with two channels In each trip system arranged in a one-out-of-two logic, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. The Function is (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS /B 3.3-12 Revision 1

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B5:

2.e. 2-out-of-4 voter The 2-out-of-4 Voter Function provides the interface between the APRM Functions, including the OPRM Trip Function, and the final RPS trip system logic. As such, it is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required and is necessary to support the safety analysis applicable to each of those Functions. Therefore, the 2-out-of-4 Voter Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2.

All four voter channels are required to be OPERABLE. Each voter channel includes self-diagnostic functions. If any voter channel detects a critical fault in its own processing, a trip is issued from that voter channel to the associated RPS trip system.

The Two-Out-Of-Four Logic Module includes both the 2-out-of-4 Voter hardware and the APRM Interface hardware. The 2-out-of-4 Voter Function 2.e votes APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d independently of Function 2.f. This voting is accomplished by the 2-out-of-4 Voter hardware in the Two-Out-Of-Four Logic Module. The voter includes separate outputs to RPS for the two independently voted sets of Functions, each of which is redundant (four total outputs). The analysis in Reference 15 took credit for this redundancy in the justification of the 12-hour Completion Time for Condition A, so the voter Function 2.e must be declared inoperable if any of its functionality is inoperable. The voter Function 2.e does not need to be declared inoperable due to any failure affecting only the APRM Interface hardware portion of the Two-Out-Of-Four Logic Module.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

2.f. Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Trip The OPRM Trip Function provides compliance with GDC 10, "Reactor Design,' and GDC 12, 'Suppression of Reactor Power Oscillaitons' thereby providing protection from exceeding the fuel MCPR safety limit (SL) due to anticipated thermal-hydraulic power oscillations.

References 17, 18 and 19 describe three algorithms for detecting thermal-hydraulic instability related neutron flux oscillations: the period based detection algorithm (confirmation count and cell amplitude), the amplitude based algorithm, and the growth rate algorithm. All three are implemented in the OPRM Trip Function, but the safety analysis takes credit only for the period based detection algorithm. The remaining algorithms provide defense in depth and additional protection against unanticipated oscillations. OPRM Trip Function OPERABILITY for Technical Specification purposes is based only on the period based detection algorithm.

The OPRM Trip Function receives input signals from the local power range monitors (LPRMs) within the reactor core, which are combined into wcells, for evaluation by the OPRM algorithms. Each channel is capable of detecting thermal-hydraulic instabilities, by detecting the related neutron flux oscillations, and issuing a trip signal before the MCPR SL is exceeded. Three of the four channels are required to be OPERABLE.

(continued next sheet)

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT BS (continued):

The OPRM Trip is automatically enabled (bypass removed) when THERMAL POWER is 2 30% RTP, as indicated by the APRM Simulated Thermal Power, and reactor core flow is < the value defined in the COLR, as indicated by APRM measured recirculation drive flow. This is the operating region where actual thermal-hydraulic instability and related neutron flux oscillations are expected to occur. Reference 21 includes additional discussion of OPRM Trip enable region limits.

These setpoints, which are sometimes referred to as the wauto-bypass, setpoints, establish the boundaries of the OPRM Trip enabled region. The APRM Simulated Thermal Power auto-enable setpoint has 1% deadband while the drive flow setpoint has a 2% deadband. The deadband for these setpoints is established so that it increases the enabled region once the region is entered.

The OPRM Trip Function is required to be OPERABLE when the plant is at > 25%

RTP. The 25% RTP level is selected to provide margin in the unlikely event that a reactor power increase transient occurring without operator action while the plant is operating below 30% RTP causes a power increase to or beyond the 30%

APRM Simulated Thermal Power OPRM Trip auto-enable setpoint. This OPERABILITY requirement assures that the OPRM Trip auto-enable function will be OPERABLE when required.

An APRM channel is also required to have a minimum number of OPRM cells OPERABLE for the Upscale Function 2.f to be OPERABLE. The OPRM cell operability requirements are documented in the Technical Requirements Manual, TRO 3.3.9, and are established as necessary to support the trip setpoint calculations performed in accordance with methodologies in Reference 19.

An OPRM Trip is issued from an APRM channel when the period based detection algorithm in that channel detects oscillatory changes in the neutron flux, indicated by the combined signals of the LPRM detectors in a cell, with period confirmations and relative cell amplitude exceeding specified setpoints. One or more cells in a channel exceeding the trip conditions will result in a channel OPRM Trip from that channel. An OPRM Trip is also issued from the channel if either the growth rate or amplitude based algorithms detect oscillatory changes in the neutron flux for one or more cells in that channel. (Note: To facilitate placing the OPRM Trip Function 2.f in one APRM channel in a stripped state, if necessary to satisfy a Required Action, the APRM equipment is conservatively designed to force an OPRM Trip output from the APRM channel if an APRM Inop condition occurs, such as when the APRM chassis keylock'switch is placed in the Inop position.)

There are three *sets' of OPRM related setpoints or adjustment parameters:

a) OPRM Trip auto-enable region setpoints for STP and drive flow; b) period based detection algorithm (PBDA) confirmation count and amplitude setpoints; and c) period based detection algorithm tuning parameters.

The first set, the OPRM Trip auto-enable setpoints, as discussed in the SR 3.3.1.1.19 Bases, are treated as nominal setpoints with no additional margins added. The settings are defined in the Technical Requirements Manual, TRO 3.3.9, and confirmed by SR 3.3.1.1.19. The second set, the -OPRM PBDA trip setpoints, are established in accordance with methodologies defined in Reference 19, and are documented in the COLR. There are no allowable values for these setpoints. The third set, the OPRM PBDA 'tuning' parameters, are established or adjusted in accordance with and controlled by requirements in the Technical Requirements Manual, TRO 3.3.9.

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low. Level (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, Level 1 provide sufficient protection for level transients in all other and APPLICABILITY MODES.

5. Main Steam Isolation Valve-Closure MSIV closure results in loss of the main turbine and the condenser as a heat sink for the nuclear steam supply system and indicates a need to shut down the reactor to reduce heat generation. Therefore, a reactor scram is initiated on a Main Steam Isolation Valve-Closure signal before the MSIVs are completely closed in anticipation of the complete loss of the normal heat sink and subsequent overpressurization transient.

However, for the overpressurization2rtction analysis of Reference 4, the Average Power Range Monitofd3Neutron Flux-High Function, along with the SIRVs, limits the peak RPV pressure to less than the ASME Code limits. That is, the direct scram on position switches for MSIV closure events is not assumed in the overpressurization analysis.

Additionally, MSIV closure is assumed in the transients analyzed in Reference 7 (e.g., low steam line pressure, manual closure of MSIVs, high steam line flow). The reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and, along with the actions of the ECCS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

MSIV closure signals are initiated from position switches located on each of the eight MSIVs. Each MSIV has two position switches; one inputs to RPS trip system A while the other inputs to RPS trip system B. Thus, each RPS trip system receives an input from eight Main Steam Isolation Valve-Closure channels, each consisting of one position switch. The logic for the Main Steam Isolation Valve-Closure Function is arranged such that either the inboard or outboard valve on three or more of the main steam lines must close in order for a scram to occur.

The Main Steam Isolation Valve-Closure Allowable Value is specified to ensure that a scram occurs prior to a significant reduction in steam flow, thereby reducing the severity of the subsequent pressure transient.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS /B 3.3-14 Revision I

PPL Rev. 1

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 8. Turbine Stop Valve-Closure (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, the transients that would result from the closure of these valves. The and APPLICABILITY Turbine Stop Valve-Closure Function is the primary scram signal for the turbine trip event analyzed In Reference 7. For this event, the reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and, along with the actions of the End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT)

System, ensures that the MCPR SL is not exceeded. Turbine Stop Valve-Closure signals are initiated from position switches located on each of the four TSVs. Two independent position switches are associated with each stop valve. One of the two switches provides input to RPS trip system A; the other, to RPS trip system B. Thus, each RPS trip system receives an input from four Turbine Stop Valve-Closure channels, each consisting of one position switch. The logic for the Turbine Stop Valve-Closure Function is such that three or more TSVs must be closed to produce a scram. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER 2 30% RTP. This is accomplished automatically by pressure instruments sensing turbine first stage pressure. Because an increase in the main turbine bypass flow can affect this function non-conservatively, THERMAL POWER is derived from first stage pressure.

The main turbine bypass valves must not cause the trip Function to be bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 30% RTP.

The Turbine Stop Valve-Closure Allowable Value is selected to be high enough to detect imminent TSV closure, thereby reducing the severity of the subsequent pressure transient.

Eight channels (arranged in pairs) of Turbine Stop Valve-Closure Function, with four channels in each trip system, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function if any three TSVs should close. This Function is required, consistent with analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER is > 30% RTP. This Function is not required when THERMAL POWER is < 30% RTP since the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-High and the Average Power Range Monitoggol7eutron Flux-High Functions are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS /B 3.3-17 Revision I

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 9. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil SAFETY Pressure-Low ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY Fast closure of the TCVs results in the loss of a heat sink that produces (continued) reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited. Therefore, a reactor scram is initiated on TCV fast closure in anticipation of the transients that would result from the closure of these valves. The Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Function is the primary scram signal for the generator load rejection event analyzed in Reference 7. For this event, the reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and, along with the actions of the EOC-RPT System, ensures that the MCPR SL is not exceeded.

Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low signals are initiated by the electrohydraulic control (EHC) fluid pressure at each control valve. One pressure instrument is associated with each control valve, and the signal from each transmitter is assigned to a separate RPS logic channel. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER > 30% RTP. This is accomplished automatically by pressure instruments sensing turbine first stage pressure. Because an increase in the main turbine bypass flow can affect this function non-conservatively, THERMAL POWER is derived from first stage pressure. The main turbine bypass valves must not cause the trip Function to be bypassed when THERMAL POWER is Ž 30% RTP.

The Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Allowable Value Is selected high enough to detect imminent TCV fast closure.

Four channels of Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Function with two channels in each trip system arranged in a one-out-of-two logic are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. This Function is required, consistent with the analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER is,> 30% RTP. This Function is not required when THERMAL POWER Is < 30% RTP, since the Reactor Vessel St Dome Pressure-High and the Average Power Range Monito lr,)Neutron Flux-High Functions are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS / B3.3-1 8 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 11. Manual Scram (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are and APPLICABILITY mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Four channels of Manual Scram with two channels in each trip system arranged in a one-out-of-two logic are available and required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, since these are the MODES and other specified conditions when control rods are withdrawn.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPS instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RPS instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable RPS instrumentation channel.

A.1 and A.2 Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals and the redundancy of the RPS design, an allowa t of service time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months has been shown to be ag e table(. o permit restoration Kets '5 \ of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE st-a .owever, this out of Rnd / )service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function's

-/ inoperable channel is in one trip system and the Function still maintains RPS trip capability (refer to Required Actions B.1, B.2, and C.1 Bases).

If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel or the associated trip system must be placed in the tripped (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-20 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) condition per Required Actions A.1 and A.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip (or the associated trip system in trip) would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternatively, if it is not desired to place the channel (or trip system) in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in a full scram),

Condition D must be entered and its Required Action taken.

B.1 and 8.2 Condition B exists when, for any one or more Functions, at least one required channel is inoperable in each trip system. In this condition, provided at least one channel per trip system Is OPERABLE, the RPS still maintains trip capability for that Function, but cannot accommodate a single failure in either trip system.

Required Actions B.1 and B.2 limit the time the RPS scram logic, for any Function, would not accommodate'single failure in both trip systems (e.g., one-out-of-one and one-out-of-one arrangement for a typical four channel Function). The reduced reliability of this logic arrangement was

/ not evaluated ir~9~or the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time. Within e the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the associated Function will have all required V? j. er16 channels OPERABLE or in trip (or any combination) in one trip system.

Completing one of these Required Actions restores RPS to a reliability level equivalent to that evaluated e9 which justified a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months alowable out of service time as presented in Condition A. The lee4

/ e~f4C e4sc4 5 trip system in the more degraded state should be placed Intrip or, altematively, all the inoperable channels in that trip system should be placed in trip (e.g., a trip system with two inoperable channels could be in a more degraded state than a trip system with four inoperable channels if the two inoperable channels are in the same Function while the four inoperable channels are all in different Functions). The decision of which trip system is in the more degraded state should be based on prudent judgment and take into account current plant conditions (i.e., what MODE the plant is in).

(continued)

SUSOUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-21 Revision 1

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B6:

As noted, Action A.2 is not applicable for APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f. Inoperability of one required APRM channel affects both trip systems.

For that condition. Required Action A.1 must be satisfied, and is the only action (other than restoring OPERABILITY) that will restore capability to accommodate a single failure. Inoperability of more than one required APRM channel of the same trip function results in loss of trip capability and entry into Condition C, as well as entry into Condition A for each channel.

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

If this action would result in a scram, it is permissible to place the other trip system or its inoperable channels in trip.

The 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Completion Time is judged acceptable based on the remaining capability to trip, the diversity of the sensors available to provide the trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of a scram.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the inoperable channels (or one trip system) in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel or associated trip system in trip would result in a scram),

Condition D must be entered and its Required Action taken.

.. 7 .1 Required Action C.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same trip system for the same Function result in the Function not maintaining RPS trip capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining RPS trip capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system is in trip), such that both trip systems will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. For the typical Function with one-out-of-two taken twice logic, this would require both trip systems to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system in trip). For Function 5 (Main Steam Isolation Valve-Closure),

this would require both trip systems to have each channel associated with the MSIVs in three main steam lines (not necessarily the same main steam lines for both trip systems) OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system in trip).

For Function 8 (Turbine Stop Valve-Closure), this would require both trip systems to have three channels, each OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system in trip).

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-22 Revision I

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B7:

As noted, Condition B is not applicable for APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f. Inoperability of an APRM channel affects both trip systems and is not associated with a specific trip system as are the APRM 2-out-of-4 Voter (Function 2.e) and other non-APRM channels for which Condition B applies. For an inoperable APRM channel, Required Action A.1 must be satisfied, and is the only action (other than restoring OPERABILITY) that will restore capability to accommodate a single failure. Inoperability of a Function in more than one required APRM channel results in loss of trip capability for that Function and entry into Condition C, as well as entry into Condition A for each channel.

Because Conditions A and C provide Required Actions that are appropriate for the inoperability of APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f, and because these Functions are not associated with specific trip systems as are the APRM 2-out-of-4 Voter and other non-APRM channels, Condition B does not apply.

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS C1 (continued) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

D.1 Required Action D.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1. The applicable Condition specified in the Table is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition A, B, or C and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition D will be entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

E.I. F.1.(2G.1 1i -~

>td Ifthe channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip (or the associated trip system placed in trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the specified condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without chaein lant systems. In addition, the Completion Time of Required v o nconsistent with the Completion Time provided in LCO 3.2.2, A4co,,s £. "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR).'

H.1 If the channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip (or the associated trip system placed in trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by immediately initiating action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B3.3-23 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS H.1 (continued) the reactivity of the core and are, therefore, not required to be inserted.

Action must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted.

SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RPS REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.1.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and R ed Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysi Y I assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RPS will trip when necessary.

SR 3.3.1.1.

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECEg;@ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter Indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious.

A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B3.3-24 Revision 1

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B8:

I.1 and I.2 to ensure that appropriate and I.2 are intended or bypassed OPRM channels Required Actions I.1 are taken if more than two inoperable actions OPRM trip capability.

result in not maintaining channels out configuration, any 'two' of the OPRM RPS trip In the 4-OPRM channel in each of four and one 2-out-of-4 voter channels function to be of the total safety trip are required to function for the OPRN at least two OPRM system Therefore, three OPRM channels assures voter channels even accomplished.

trip inputs to the 2-out-of-4 and the minimum of two 2-channels can provide OPRM channel failure, event of a single at least one voter in the per RPS trip system assures of a out-of-4 voter channels per RPS trip system even in the event channel will be operable failure.

single voter channel methods to detect and 15 and 16 justified use of alternate The alternate methods References under limited conditions.in Reference 20. The suppress oscillations guidelines identified operator awareness and are consistent with the require increased alternate-methods procedures operating in the region for neutron flux oscillations when observes indications of monitoring If operator possible. operator will take the where oscillations are in Reference 20, the oscillation, as described manual scram of the procedures, which include are possible are actions described by map regions where oscillations reactor. The power/flow 22. The applicable methodology in Reference developed based on the in the COLR.

regions are contained detection and mitigation would adequately address oscillations. Based on The alternate methods hydraulic instability the in the event of thermal with actual instability oscillations, and operating experience during this time industry to recognize instabilities operator would be able them through a manual scram. In addition, the take action to suppress alarms to the operator if still be available to provide OPRM system may were to occur.

the onset of oscillations I.1 is based on allowed Completion Time for Required Action alternate The 12-hour to the to allow orderly transition which no automatic or engineering judgment period of time during the methods while limiting is formally in place.

suppress trip capability event occurring at all, alternate detect and of an instability Based on the small probability to be reasonable.

the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is judged evaluated in allowed Completion Time, the time that was operation The 120-day because with is considered adequate and implementation of References 15 and 16, may occur where oscillations event that could minimized in regions the likelihood of an instability the alternate methods, during this 120-day by the alternate methods not be adequately handled small.

period was negligibly and I.2 is to allow an Required Actions I.1 design The primary purpose of undue impact on plant operation, of completion, without unanticipated equipment orderly required to correct and verification activities problems that cause OPRM Trip Function design or functional cannot reasonably be corrected in all APRM channels that Required Actions are not INOPERABILITY or repair actions. These by normal maintenance alternative to returning evaluated as a routine intended and were not to OPERABLE status.

equipment failed or inoperable

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.11 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Agreement criteria which are determined by the plant staff based on an investigation of a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, may be used to support this parameter comparison and include indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit, and does not necessarily indicate the channel is Inoperable.

ea e CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.1 .1.2*

To ensure that the APRMs are accurately indicating the true core average power, the APRMs are calibrated to the reactor power calculated from a heat balance. LCO 3.2.4, "Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Gain and Setpoints," allows the APRMs to be reading greater than actual THERMAL POWER to compensate for localized power peaking. When this adjustment is made, the requirement for the APRMs to indicate within 2% RTP of calculated power is modified to require the APRMs to indicate within 2% RTP of calculated MFLPD times 100. The Frequency of once per 7 days is based on minor changes in LPRM sensitivity, which could affect the APRM reading between performances of SR 3.3.1.1.8.

A restriction to satisfying this SR when < 25% RTP is provided that requires the SR to be met only at 2 25% RTP because it is difficult to accurately maintain APRM indication of core THERMAL POWER consistent with a heat balance when < 25% RTP. At low power levels, a high degree of accuracy is unnecessary because of the large, inherent margin to thermal limits (MCPR, LHGR and APLHGR). At 2 25% RTP, the Surveillance is required to have been satisfactorily performed within the last 7 days, in accordance with SR 3.0.2. A Note is provided which allows an increase in THERMAL POWER above 25% if the 7 day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after reaching or exceeding 25% RTP.

Twelve hours is based on operating (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B3.3-25 Revision I

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B8A:

The Frequency of once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for SR 3.3.1.1.1 is based upon operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare. The Frequency of once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for SR 3.3.1.1.2 is based upon operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare and the evaluation in References 15 and 26.

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3(continued)

REQUIREMENTS experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.

Te Averae Power RnEon tor Fow Biased Sinplated Thermalry Power-High Fu uses the recirclation ~wDrive flows to vary the trip setpis SR verifies proper op -on ofthe total loop drive flow \

signalsm the drive flow units us o vary the setpoint of the APRM.

omponents operation is fed in two steps. The first step is a CHANNEL CHECK perfoed by reading the output our drive flow units. This gross ch ensures that all drive f nits are within a tolerance define y station staff. The se step is a verification that the flow si from the APRM read which is the lowest ft nal from twssociated drive flow u is conservative w pect to the to re flow/drive flow ret nship. This two stocess ensures that the drive flow signal is sistent with the act total core flow. If the flow unit signal is within the limit, on quired APRM that rec dsan input from thej perable flow unit St be declared inoper If instrum re found within tance, adjustm en ot required.

The Frequency of 7 sis based on en ing judgment, operating experience, and treliability of this instrumentation.3 SR 3.3.1.1 .4 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function.

As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.4 is not required to be performed when enteringq_

MODE 2 from MODE 1, since testing of the MODE 2 required IRNQVIF9

<FuFunctions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links. This allows entry into MODE 2 if the 7 day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B3.3-26 Revision I

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS between SRMs and IRMs similarly exists when, prior to fully withdrawing the SRMs from the core, IRMs are above mid-scale on range I before SRMs have reached the upscale rod block.

As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.7 is only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1. That is, after the overlap requirement has been met and indication has transitioned to the IRMs, maintaining overlap is not required (APRMs may be reading downscale once in MODE 2).

If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g., IRMWAPRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate channel(s) declared inoperable. Only those appropriate channels that are required in the current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable.

A Frequency of 7 days is reasonable based on engineering judgment and the reliability of the IRMs and APRMs.

SR 3.3.1.1.8 LPRM gain settings are determined from the local flux profiles that are either measured by the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) System at all functional locations or calculated for TIP locations that are not functional.

The methodology used to develop the power distribution limits considers the uncertainty for both measured and calculated local flux profiles. This methodology assumes that all the TIP locations are functional for the first LPRM calibration following a refueling outage, and a minimum of 25 functional TIP locations for subsequent LPRM calibrations.. The calibrated LPRMs establish the relative local flux profile for appropriate representative input to the APRM System. The 1000 MWD/MT Frequency is based on operatin erience with LPRM sensitivity changes. 4 SR 3.3.1.1.9andSR 3.3.1.Ij.

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.9 is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 9.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-28 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES

'4-SURVEILLANCE SR 33.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.1.1.9 is modified by a Note that provides a general exception to the definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. This exception is necessary because the design of instrumentation does not facilitate functional testing of all required contacts of the relay which input into the combinational logic. (Reference 10) Performance of such a test could result in a plant transient or place the plant in an undo risk situation.

Therefore, for this SR, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST verifies acceptable response by verifying the change of state of the relay which inputs into the combinational logic. The required contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST are tested under the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.1.1.15. This is acceptable because operating experience shows that the contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST normally pass the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and the testing methodology minimizes the risk of unplanned transients.

The 24 month Frequency of SR 3.3.1 .1,Vis based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.1.1.10. SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3 .3.1.1. 13 )

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific set oint methodology.

Note 1,aes tat neutronaetectors are excled from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive evices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a eaningful signal. Changes in neutron detector sensitivity are comp sated for by performing the 7 day calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.1. and the!nD/MT LPRM calibration against the ITPs (SR 3.3.1.1 .8).rA Note is provided that requires the yM~ IRM SRs to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of

-U rM 3 *.j 1 ) entering MODE 2 from MODE 1. Testing of the MODE 2 APRM and IRM Functions cannot be performed in Itrontnl InP SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-29 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 1

'RPSInstrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES JoD SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.10. SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.13 find By R.5/./-It>)

REQUIREMENTS (continued)

MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the S , t;

~R~.31.11nd24- -months for SR 3.3.1.1.1 ~

eeci irnfitvne in thn eltnrminnfirnn ^f tho rnnnni the setpoint analysis.

rge Power Rail h ontr Fow Bias>3ruae hra Power-High Functio Fses an eloli ron e circuit to generate a signal proportional to th~ore THERMAL VER from the ~A~Pn~utron flux signal. ThisWr circuit is repr tative of the fu at transfer dynamic at produce the ationship betw the neutron flux and core; ERMAL POW . The Surveill filter time consta st be vened to be < conds to ensuat the channel is rately reflecting thsired parame The equency of onths is based on engineering judgment considerin the reliabilitv of the cornonent SR 3.3.1.1.15 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The functional testing of control rods (LCO 3.1.3), and SDV vent and drain valves (LCO 3.1.8), overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

(6 t l The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform portions of this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-30 Revision 2

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B9:

A second note is provided for SR 3.3.1.1.18 that requires that the recirculation flow (drive flow) transmitters, which supply the flow signal to the APRMs, be included in the SR for Functions 2.b and 2.f. The APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function (Function 2.b) and the OPRM Trip Function (Function 2.f) both require a valid drive flow signal. The APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function uses drive flow to vary the trip setpoint. The OPRM Trip Function uses drive flow to automatically enable or bypass the OPRM Trip output to the RPS. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the APRM drive flow signal requires both calibrating the drive flow transmitters and the processing hardware in the APRM equipment. SR 3.3.1.1.20 establishes a valid drive flow / core flow relationship. Changes throughout the cycle in the drive flow / core flow relationship due to the changing thermal hydraulic operating conditions of the core are accounted for in the margins included in the bases or analyses used to establish the setpoints for the APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function and the OPRM Trip Function.

INSERT B10:

SR 3.3.1.1.12 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. For the APRM Functions, this test supplements the automatic self-test functions that operate continuously in the APRM and voter channels. The scope of the APRM CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is that which is necessary to test the hardware. Software controlled functions are tested as part of the initial verification and validation and are only incidentally tested as part of the surveillance testing.

Automatic self-test functions check the EPROMs in which the software-controlled logic is defined. Changes in the EPROMs will be detected by the self-test function and alarmed via the APRM trouble alarm. SR 3.3.1.1.1 for the APRM functions includes a step to confirm that the automatic self-test function is still operating.

The APRM CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST covers the APRM channels (including recirculation flow processing -- applicable to Function 2.b and the auto-enable portion of Function 2.f only), the 2-out-of-4 Voter channels, and the interface connections into the RPS trip systems from the voter channels.

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 184-day Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.12 is based on the reliability analyses of References 15 & 16. (NOTE: The actual voting logic of the 2-out-of-4 Voter Function is tested as part of SR 3.3.1.1.15. The auto-enable setpoints for the OPRM Trip are confirmed by SR 3.3.1.1.19.)

A Note is provided for Function 2.a that requires this SR to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1. Testing of the MODE 2 APRM Function cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers or lifted leads. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2.

A second Note is provided for Functions 2.b and 2.f that clarifies that the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for Functions 2.b and 2.f includes testing of the recirculation flow processing electronics, excluding the flow transmitters.

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT Bll:

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST for APRM Function 2.e simulates APRM and OPRM trip conditions at the 2-out-of-4 Voter channel inputs to check all combinations of two tripped inputs to the 2-out-of-4 logic in the voter channels and APRM related redundant RPS relays.

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.15 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.1.1.16 This SR ensures that scrams initiated from the Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 30% RTP. This is performed by a Functional check that ensures the scram feature is not bypassed at 2 30% RTP. Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this function nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from turbine first stage pressure), the opening of the main turbine bypass valves must not cause the trip Function to be bypassed when Thermal Power is > 30% RTP.

If any bypass channel's trip function is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are bypassed at > 30% RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valve(s) or other reasons), then the affected Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low Functions are considered inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass).

If placed in the nonbypass condition, this SR Is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.

The Frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgment and reliability of the components.

SR 3.3.1.1.17 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. This test may be performed in one measurement or in overlapping segments, with verification that all components are tested. The RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 11.

(cnntini iurel SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-31 Revision 1

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B12:

RPS RESPONSE TIME for the APRM 2-out-of-4 Voter Function (2.e) includes the APRM Flux Trip output relays and the OPRM Trip output relays of the voter and the associated RPS relays and contactors. (Note: The digital portion of the APRM, OPRM and 2-out-of-4 Voter channels are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because self-testing and calibration checks the time base of the digital electronics. Confirmation of the time base is adequate to assure required response times are met. Neutron detectors are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because the principles of detector operation virtually ensure an instantaneous response time. See Reference 12 and 13)

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.17 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS As noted, neutron detectors are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because the principles of detector operation virtually ensure an instantaneous response time.

RPS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on an 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Note 3 requires STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency to be determined based on 4 channels per trip system, in lieu of the 8 channels specified in Table 3.3.1.1-1 for the MSIV Closure Function because channels are arranged in pairs* This Frequency is based on the logic interrelationships of the various channels required to produce an RPS scram signal. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

\SR 3.3.1.1.17 for Function 2 nfirms the response time of that z$ BS )function, and also confirms the response time of components common to

>5 vFunction 2-jand other RPS Functions. (Reference 14)

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Figure 7.2-1.

zr' 2. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22,1993 (58 FR 39132).

3. NEDO-23842, Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal in the Startup Range," April 18,1978.

4. FSAR, Section 5.2.2.

5. FSAR, Section 15.4.9.

6. FSAR, Section 6.3.3.

7. FSAR, Chapter 15.

8. P. Check (NRC) letter to G. Lainas (NRC), mBWR Scram Discharge System Safety Evaluation," December 1, 1980.

{continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-32 Revision 2

INSERT B13:

Note 3 allows the STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency for Function 2.e to be determined based on 8 channels rather than the 4 actual 2-Out-Of-4 Voter channels. The redundant outputs from the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter channel (2 for APRM trips and 2 for OPRM trips) are considered part of the same channel, but the OPRM and APRM outputs are considered to be separate channels for application of SR 3.3.1.1.17, so N = 8. The note further requires that testing of OPRM and APRM outputs from a 2-out-of-4 Voter be alternated. In addition to these commitments, References 15 & 16 require that the testing of inputs to each RPS Trip System alternate.

Combining these frequency requirements, an acceptable test sequence is one that:

a. Tests each RPS Trip System interface every other cycle,

b. Alternates the testing of APRM and OPRM outputs from any specific 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Channel

c. Alternates between divisions at least every other test cycle.

The testing sequence shown in the table below is one sequence that satisfies these requirements.

Function 2.e Testing Sequence for SR 3.3.1.1.17 24- Voter _Sta gering _

Month output Voter Voter Voter Voter RPS Division Cycle tested Al A2 BI B2 Trip

_ output output output output System 1St OPRM Al OPRM A 1 2nd APR1 B1 APRM4 B 1 3rd OPRM A2 OPRM A 2 4th APRM B2 APRM B 2 5th APRM Al APRM A 1 6th OPRMB1 OPRM B 1 7 tb APRM A2 APRM A 2 8t OPRM b B2 OPRM B 2 After 8 cycles, the sequence repeats.

Each test of an OPRM or APRM output tests each of the redundant outputs from the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter channel for that Function and each of the corresponding relays in the RPS. Consequently, each of the RPS relays is tested every fourth cycle. The RPS relay testing frequency is twice the frequency justified by References 15 and 16.

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B14:

SR 3.3.1.1.19 This surveillance involves confirming the OPRM Trip auto-enable setpoints. The auto-enable setpoint values are considered to be nominal values as discussed in Reference 21. This surveillance ensures that the OPRM Trip is enabled (not bypassed) for the correct values of APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation drive flow. Other surveillances ensure that the APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation drive flow properly correlate with THERMAL POWER (SR 3.3.1.1.2) and core flow (SR 3.3.1.1.20), respectively.

If any auto-enable setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the OPRM Trip is bypassed when APRM Simulated Thermal Power 2 30% and recirculation drive flow

value equivalent to the core flow value defined in the COLR, then the affected channel is considered inoperable for the OPRM Trip Function. Alternatively, the OPRM Trip auto-enable setpoint(s) may be adjusted to place the channel in a conservative condition (not bypassed). If the OPRM Trip is placed in the not-bypassed condition, this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.

For purposes of this surveillance, consistent with Reference 21, the conversion from core flow values defined in the COLR to drive flow values used for this SR can be conservatively determined by a linear scaling assuming that 100% drive flow corresponds to 100 Mlb/hr core flow, with no adjustment made for expected deviations between core flow and drive flow below 100%.

The Frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgment and reliability of the components.

SR 3.3.1.1.20 The APRM Simulated Thermal Power-High Function (Function 2.b) uses drive flow to vary the trip setpoint. The OPRM Trip Function (Function 2.f) uses drive flow to automatically enable or bypass the OPRM Trip output to RPS. Both of these Functions use drive flow as a representation of reactor core flow. SR 3.3.1.1.18 ensures that the drive flow transmitters and processing electronics are calibrated. This SR adjusts the recirculation drive flow scaling factors in each APRM channel to provide the appropriate drive flow/core flow alignment.

The Frequency of 24 months considers that any change in the core flow to drive flow functional relationship during power operation would be gradual and the maintenance of the Recirculation System and core components that may impact the relationship is expected to be performed during refueling outages. This frequency also considers the period after reaching plant equilibrium conditions necessary to perform the test, engineering judgment of the time required to collect and analyze the necessary flow data, and engineering judgment of the time required to enter and check the applicable scaling factors in each of the APRM channels. This timeframe is acceptable based on the relatively small alignment errors expected, and the margins already included in the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High and OPRM Trip Function trip-enable setpoints.

PPL Rev. 1 RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES REFERENCES 9. NEDO-30851 -P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses (continued) for BWR Reactor Protection System," March 1988.

10. NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Part 9900: Technical Guidance, Standard Technical Specification 1.0 Definitions, Issue date 12/08/86.

11. FSAR, Table 7.3-28.

12. NEDO-32291-A "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.

13. NRC Safety Evaluation Report related to Amendment No. 171 for License No. NPF 14 and Amendment No. 144 License No. NPF 22.

14. NEDO 32291-A, Supplement 1, uSystem Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements,"

October 1999.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-33 Revision 2

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B15:

15. NEDC-32410P-A, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function", October 1995.

16. NEDC-32410P-A Supplement 1, 'Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function", November 1997.

17. NEDO-31960-A, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology,* November 1995.

18. NEDO-31960-A, Supplement 1, 0BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing MethodologyO November 1995.

19. NEDO-32465-A. *BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology And Reload Applications,,

August 1996.

20. BWROG Letter BWROG 9479, L. A. England (BWROG) to M. J. Virgilio, "BWR Owners' Group Guidelines for Stability Interim Corrective Action', June 6, 1994.

21. BWROG Letter BWROG 96113, K. P. Donovan (BWROG) to L. E. Phillips (NRC),

'Guidelines for Stability Option III 'Enable Region' (TAC M92882),'

September 17, 1996.

22. EMF-CC-074(P)(A), Volume 4, "BWR Stability Analysis: Assessment of STAIF with Input from MICROBURN-B2.'

23. GE Letter to PPL, GE-2005-EMC426, 'Susquehanna 1 & 2 Minimum LPRM Input Requirement for NUMAC APRM 4-Channel Design,' April 26, 2005.

PPL Rev. 0 SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The SRMs provide the operator with information relative to the neutron flux level at startup and low flux levels in the core. As such, the SRM indication is used by the operator to monitor the approach to criticality and determine when criticality is achieved. The SRMs are not fully withdrawn from the core until the SRM to intermediate range monitor I (IRM) overlap is demonstrated (as required by SR 3.3.1.1.6), when the SRMs are normally fully withdrawn from the core.

The SRM subsystem of the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) consists of four channels. Each of the SRM channels can be bypassed, but only one at any given time, by the operation of a bypass switch. Each channel includes one detector that can be physically positioned in the core. Each detector assembly consists of a miniature fission chamber with associated cabling, signal conditioning equipment, and electronics associated with the various SRM functions. The signal conditioning equipment converts the current pulses from the fission chamber to analog DC currents that correspond to the count rate. Each channel also includes indication, alarm, and control rod blocks. However, this LCO specifies OPERABILITY requirements only for the monitoring and indication functions of the SRMs.

During refueling, shutdown, and low power operations, the primary indication of neutron flux levels is provided by the SRMs or special movable detectors connected to the normal SRM circuits. The SRMs provide monitoring of reactivity changes during fuel or control rod movement and give the control room operator early indication of unexpected subcritical multiplication that could be indicative of an approach to criticality.

APPLICABLE Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling SAFETY ANALYSES and low power operation is provided by LCO 3.9.1, 'Refueling Equipment Interlocks"; LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"; LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"; IRM Neutron Flux-High and Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Neutron Flux-Higty-'

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B3.3-35 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 0 SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES A APPLICABLE i)(etdow8)unctions; and LCO 3,3.2.1, "Control Rod Block SAFET Y ANALYSES nstrumentation."

(continued)

The SRMs have no safety function and are not assumed to function during any FSAR design basis accident or transient analysis. However, the SRMs provide the only on-scale monitoring of neutron flux levels during startup and refueling. Therefore, they are being retained in Technical Specifications.

LCO During startup in MODE 2, three of the four SRM channels are required to be OPERABLE to monitor the reactor flux level prior to and during control rod withdrawal, subcritical multiplication and reactor criticality, and neutron flux level and reactor period until the flux level is sufficient to maintain the IRMs on Range 3 or above. All but one of the channels are required in order to provide a representation of the overall core response during those periods when reactivity changes are occurring throughout the core.

In MODES 3 and 4, with the reactor shut down, two SRM channels provide redundant monitoring of flux levels in the core.

In MODE 5, during a spiral offload or reload, an SRM outside the fueled region will no longer be required to be OPERABLE, since it is not capable of monitoring neutron flux in the fueled region of the core. Fueled region is a continuous area with fuel. Thus, CORE ALTERATIONS are allowed in a quadrant with no OPERABLE SRM in an adjacent quadrant provided the Table 3.3.1.2-1, footnote (b), requirement that the bundles being spiral reloaded or spiral offloaded are all in a single fueled region containing at least one OPERABLE SRM is met. Spiral reloading and offloading encompass reloading or offloading a cell on the edge of a continuous fueled region (the cell can be reloaded or offloaded in any sequence).

In nonspiral routine operations, two SRMs are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundant monitoring of reactivity changes occurring in the reactor core. Because of the local nature of reactivity changes during refueling, adequate coverage is provided by requiring one SRM to be OPERABLE in (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B3.3-36 Revision 1

PPL Rev.0 OPRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.3 B 3.3 INSTRUMENT ON B 3.3.1.3 Oscil on Power Range Monitor (OPRM) - ~ I B.ASES B <GROUND General Design Criterio DC 10) requires the reactor core and associated coolant, trol, and protection systems to be designed with appropriate mar to assure that acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded d g any condition of normal operation including the affects of anticipat operational occurrences. Additionally, GDC 12 requires the react core and associated coolant control and protection systems to be d gned to assure that power oscillations which can result in conditions xceeding acceptable fuel design limits are either not possible or can be reliably and readily detected and suppressed. The OPRM System provides compliance with GDC 10 and GDC 12 th y providing protection from exceeding the fuel MCPR sa limit.

References 1, 2, and 3 describe thr eparate algorithms for detecting I stability related oscillations: the iod based detection algorithm, the amplitude based algorithm, the growth rate algorithm. The OPRM System hardware imple ts these algorithms in microprocessor based modules. These mod s execute the algorithms based on LPRM inputs and generate alar and trips based on these calculations. These trips result in trippin e Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the appropriate S trip logic is satisfied, as described in the Bases for LCO 3.3.1.1, 5 Instrumentation." Only the period based detectio orithm is us in the safety analysis (Ref. 1, 2, 6, & 7). The rem k:?g algorithms.

pr ide defense-in-depth and additional protection anst unanticipated scillations.

The period based detection algorithm ects a stability-related oscillation based on the occurrence of a fixe mber of consecutive LPRM signal

.0I period confirmations followed specified setpoint. Upon d e LPRM signal amplitude e eding a of a stability related os ation a trip is

!ction /

generated for that O hannel.

/ ,/

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-43a Revision 0

PPL Rev.

OPRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.3

/ BASES/\

BACKGROUND he OPRM System consists of 4 OPRM trip channels, each channel (continued) consisting of two OPRM modules. Each 0 RModule receives input from LPRMs. Each OPRM module fcreceives input from the NMS average power range monitor FM) power and flow signals to automatically enable t unction of the OPRM module.

Each OPRM mo is continuously tested by a self-test function. On detection of OPRM module failure, either a Trouble alarm or INOP alarm is vaed. The OPAM module provides an INOP alarm when the self-t feature indicates that the OPRM module may not be capable of Stng its functional requirements.

APPLICABL It has been shown that BWR cores may exhibit therl- 9draulic reactor SAFETY instabilities in high power and low flow portio he core power to flow ANAL ES operating domain. GDC 10 requires the ctor core and associated coolant control and protection syste o be designed with appropriate margin to assure that acceptab el design limits are not exceeded during any condition of nor operation, including the effects of anticipated operational o urrences. GDC 12 requires assurance that power oscillations fwcan result in conditions exceeding acceptable fuel design limits fe either not possible or can be reliably and readily detected and ppressed. The OPRM System provides compliance with GDC 10 GDC 12 by detecting the onset of oscillations and suppr ing them by initiating a reactor scram. This assures t the M safety limit will not be violated for anticipated osc ns.

The OPRM Instrumentation satisfies Criter the NRC Policy Statement.

LC Four channels of the OP to exceeding the is required f ystem are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that stability r ed oscillations are detected and suppressed prior PR safety limit. Only one of the two OPRM modules PRM channel OPERABILITY. The minimum number of LPRMs r uired OPERABLE to maintain an OPRM channel OPERABLE is co stent with the minimum number of LPRMs required to maintain the

/

AHIM system OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.1.1.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-43b Revision 0

/ ~OPRM Instrumentation\

t / B 3.3.1.3 l l BASES/l (continued The OPRM setpoints are determined b onhe NRC approved methodology described in NEDO- 65-A (Ref 6). The Allowable Value for the OPRM Period Based rithm setpoint (SP) is derived from the analytic limit corrected fo strument and calibration errors as contained in the COLR.

The OPRM b ss flow setpoint (SR 3.3.1.3.5) is conservatively establish ased on the greater of 60 MLb/HrNEDO-32465-A) and the value, taed based on the NRC approve methodology described in E -CC-074(P)(A), Volume 4, (Ref.

APPLICABIL The OPRM instrumentati is required to be OPERABLE in order to detect and suppress utron flux oscillations in the event of thermal-hydraulic instabiliyAs described in References 1, 2, and 3, the power/core flo rvegion protected against anticipated oscillations is defined by THERM POWER 2 30% RTP and core flow < 65 M WIHr. The

.Z// OPRM tIris required to be enabled in this region, H e OPRM must be capab of enabling the trip function as a result Wanticipated transients th lace the core in that power/flow condV . Therefore, the OPRM is quired to be OPERABLE with THER POWER 2 25% RTP and at all core flows while'above that THERMI POWER. It is not necessary for the OPRM to be operable with THRMAL POWER 5 25% RTP because transients from below this T MAL POWER are not anticipated to result in power that exceeds ( RTP.

'>/CTIOI 1JS A Note has en provided to modify the ACTIONS rel to the OPRM instrume tion channels. Section 1.3, Completio mes, specifies that once ondition has been entered, subsequ divisions, subsystems, coionents, or variables expressed in t ondition discovered to be operable or not within limits will not suIt in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also spe5 s that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply each additional failure with Completion Times based on initial e into the Condition. However, the Required K

Actions for inopera OPRM instrumentation channels provide appropriate co ensatory measures for separate inoperable channels.

As such, a N te has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable OPRM instrumentation channel.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-43c Revision 0

~~~ PPL ev. 0\

- OPRM Instrumentation

~B 3.3.1.3\

BASE ACTIONS A.1. A.2 A.l (continued)/

B use of the reliability and on-line self-t sting of the OPRM

.istrumentation and the redundancy o e RPS design, an allowable out of service time of 30 days has be shown to be acceptable (Ref. 7) to permit restoration of any mop ble channel to OPERABLE status.

However, this out of servi time is only acceptable provided the OPRM instrumentation still m tains OPRM trip capability (refer to Required Actions B.1 and B. The remaining OPERABLE OPRM channels continue to pro Ie trip capability (see Condition B) and provide operator information ative to stability activity. The remaining 5PRM modules have hig eliability. With this high reliability, ther a low probability of a subs ent channel failure within the allowab out of service time. In ad ion, the OPRM modules continue topeorm on-line self-testing and a ert the operator if any further syste gradation occurs.

If the inoperable channel can e restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of servic ine, the OPRM channel or associated RPS trip system must be pi d inthe tripped condition per Required actions A.1 and A.2. Placi he inoperable OPRM channel in tri or the associated RPS p system intrip) would conservati compensate for the inoperabilj , provide the capability to accom date a single failure, and allow peration to continue. Alternatel is not desired to place the OPRM annel (or RPS trip system) in (e.g., as inthe case where placi the inoperable channel in tri ould result in a full scram), the al nate method of detecting suppressing thermal hydraulic inst 7scillations is required (Req d Action A.3). This alternate met is described in Reference 5 consists of increased operator reness and monitoring for ne on flux oscillations when operaf in the region where oscillations possible. If indications of os tion, as described in Reference 5 observed by the operator, toperator will take the actions desc ed by procedures which ince initiating a manual scram of the rea or. The power/flow map re ns are developed based on metho y in Reference II. Th pplicable regions are conta inedi the OR (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.3-43d Revision 0

OPRM Instrumentat n II -1 ACTIONS .1 and B.2 (continued)

Required action B.1 is nded to ensure that appropriate actions are iII taken if multiple, in rable, untripped OPRM channels within the same RPS trip syste esult in not maintaining OPRM trip capability. OPRM trip capability insidered to be maintained when sufficient OPRM channels are OP ABLE or in trip (or the associated RPS trip system is in trip),

suc at a valid OPRM signal will generate a trip sign both RPS trip stems (this would require both RPS trip syste so have at least one OPRM channel OPERABLE or the associ RPS trip system in trip).

Because of the low probability of ccurrence of an instability, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Is an acceptable time to initia e alternate method of detecting and suppressing thermal hydric instability oscillations described in Action A.3 above. The alter e method of detecting and suppressing thermal hydraulic instabili scillations would adequately address detection and mitigation in t event of Instability oscillations. Based on industry operating erience with actual instability oscillation, the petor would be abl recognize instabilities during this time angle action to sup ess them through a manual scram. In anon, the OPRM System ay still be available to provide alarms to operator if the onset of oscillations were to occur. Since pla Operation is minimized in areas where oscillations may occur, op "'ion for 120 days without OPRM trip capability is considered acce ple with implementation of the alternate method of detecting and s pressing thermal hydraulic instabili oscillations.

I With an equired Action and associat ompletion Time not met, TH AL POWER must be reduc t <25% RTP within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

ducing THERMAL POWER <25% RTP places the plant in a condition where instabilitiere not likely to occur. The 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months in reasonable, based on erating experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER < 25% RT1from full power conditions in an orderly manner an without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-43e Revision 0

/ OPRM Instrumentation t~ / B 3.3.1.3 BSS(continued)/

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1..1 REQUIREMENTS HANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is perfo d to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended functi A Frequency of 184 days provides an acceptable level of systaverage availability over the Frequency and is based on the abiity of the channel (Ref. 7).

\_SR 3.3.1.3.2_/_l LPRM gain settin re determined from the local flux profiles measured by the Traver g Incore Probe (TIP) System. This establish the relative loclux profile for appropriate representative ito the OPRM WSystem he 1000 MWD/MT Frequency is based operating experience with RM sensitivity changes.

,, aR& 3..../l A CHANNEL CALIBRATION ies that the channel responds to the measured parameter wit the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATI leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts be een successive calibrations. Calibration of the channel provides heck of the internal reference voltage and the internal processor clo frequency. It also compares the desire -trip setpoints with thoseprocessor memory. Since the OPRM I igital system, the interna eference voltage and processor cldo frequency are, in turn, lusedo automatically calibrate the internqa alog to digital converters.

As noted, neutron detectors are excluue from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices ith minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a mea gIful signal. Changes in neutron detector sensitivity are compensa for by performing the 1000 MWD/MT LPRM lcalibration using t SR 3.3.1.3.2).

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-43f Revision 0

PPL Rev.

OPRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.3 (BASES _

SURV 'EILLANCE The Frequency of months is based upon the assumption of the REQL JIREMENTS magnitude ipment drift provided by the equipmen pplier. (Ref. 7)

(coni inued)

SR . . .4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIOC TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the requirtrip logic for a specific channel. The functional testing of co rods, in LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY," a scram discharge volume (SDV) vent and drain valves, in LCO . .8, "Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves," oy aps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assu edsafety function. The OPRM self-test functirray be utilized to perm this testing for those components th s designed to monitor.

The 24 month Frequency is based engineering judgement, reliability of the components and operatin erience.

S R 3.3.1.3.5/

The SR ensure at trips initiated from the OPRM System will not be inadvertent ypassed when THERMAL POWER is > 30% RTP and core flow is w MLb/Hr. This normally involves calibration of the b cha els. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint odology are

dorporated into the actual setpoints (Ref. 7).

If any bypass channel setpoint is noncon ative (i.e., the OPRM module is bypassed at 2 30% RTP and core is 5 65 MLb/Hr), then the affected OPRM module is consed inoperable. Alternatively, the bypassed channel can be ually placed in the conservative position (Manual Enable). If pl d in the MANUAL ENABLE condition, this SR is met and the modu The 24 considered OPERABLE.

Frequency is based on engineering judgement and

/1 relia ity of the components. /I (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-43g Revision O

PPL Rev. 0 SV N ROPRM Instrumentation (I / B 3.3.3

\BASES/\

\SURVEILLANCE /3-R:33.1.3.6/ Ii UIREME itnueg This SR ensure at the individual channel respos -times are less than or equal to maximum values assumed i afety analysis (Ref. 6).

The OP self-test function may be ized to perform this testing for thos omponents it is designed monitor. The LPRM amplifier cards i tting to the OPRM are uded from the OPRM RESPONSE TIME

/testing. The RPS RESP SE TIME acceptance criteria are include in

/ Reference 8. //

As noted, ne ndetectors are excluded from RP SONSE TIME testing b use the principles of detector onion virtually ensure an insta neous response time. RPS R NSE TIME tests are co ucted on a 24 month STAG D TEST BASIS. This Frequency is ased upon operating experi e, which shows that random failures of instrumentation compon scausing serious time degradation, but not channel failure, are equent occurrences.

(continuedl SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-43h Revision 0

lBASES/

~OPRM Instrumentatio

= / B3.3.

1.3 REFERENCES

NEDO 31960-A, "BWR Owners Grw ong-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodolog. No er 1995.

2. NEDO 31960-A, Su ment 1 UBWR Owners Group Long-Termn Stability Soluti icensing Methodology", November 1995.

3. NRC Le r A. Thadani to L.A. England, "Acceptance for Referencing of T Reports NEDO-31960, Supplement Ical ' Owners Group g-Term Stability Solutions Licensing dology". July 12,1994.

4. Generic Letter 94-02, "Long-Te olutions and Upgrade of Interim Operating Recommendatio or Thermal-Hydraulic Instabilities in Boiling Water Reactor uly 11, 1994.

5. BWROG Letter OG-9479, "Guidelines for Stabili lim Corrective Aon", June 6, 1994.

6. NED 465-A, "BWR Owners Group R orStability Detect and S press Solutions Licensing Basis hodology and Reload

.2pplications", August 1996.

7. CENPD-400-P-A, Rev Generic Topical Report for the ABB Option IlIl Oscillatio ower Range Monitor (OPRM)", May 1995.

II 8. FSAR Tal

9. FS 8.

ection 4.4.4.6.

i I

FSAR Section 7.2.

11. EMF-CC-074(P)(A), Volume 4, "BWR Stability Analysis: Assessment f STAIF with Input from MICROBURN-B2."

SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-43i Revision 0

PPL Rev. I Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND Control rods provide the primary means for control of reactivity changes. Control rod block instrumentation includes channel sensors, logic circuitry, switches, and relays that are designed to ensure that specified fuel design limits are not exceeded for postulated transients and accidents. During high power operation, the rod block monitor (RBM) provides protection for control rod withdrawal error events.

During low power operations, control rod blocks from the rod worth minimizer (RWM) enforce specific control rod sequences designed to mitigate the consequences of the control rod drop accident (CRDA).

During shutdown conditions, control rod blocks from the Reactor Mode Switch-Shutdown Position Function ensure that all control rods remain inserted to prevent inadvertent criticalities.

The purpose of the RBM is to limit control rod withdrawal if localized neutron flux exceeds a predetermined setpoint during control rod manipulations. The RBM supplies a trip signal to the Reactor Manual Control System (RMCS) to appropriately inhibit control rod withdrawal during power operation above the low power range setpoint. The RBM has two channels, either of which can initiate a control rod block when the channel output exceeds the control rod block setpoint. One RBM channel inputs into one RMCS rod block circuit and the other RBM channel inputs into the second RMCS rod block circuit. The RBM channel signal is generated by averaging a set of local power range monitor (LPRM) signals at various core heights surrounding the cont rod being withdrawn.rA sign;-from gne average power rapge mprnitgr I trsstlsup es a r~eferen9rnc 'r tpsRBM clanannelin thy game tr'ppsy$ m(This reference signal-is -used to enable the RBM. If the AH-M 1s Indicating less than the low power range setpoint, the RBM is automatically bypassed. The RBM is also automatically bypassed if a peripheral control rod is selected (Ref. 2).

The purpose of the RWM is to control rod patterns during startup, such that only specified control rod sequences and relative positions are allowed over the operating range from all control rods inserted to 10% RTP. The sequences effectively limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase during a CRDA. Prescribed control rod sequences are stored in the RWM, which will initiate control rod withdrawal and (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-44 Revision 2

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP lNSERT D1I6:

An.APRM flux signal from one of the four redundant average power range monitor (APRM) channels supplies a reference signal for one of the RB4 channels and an APRM flux signal from another of the APRM channels supplies the reference signal to the second RBM channel..

PPL Rev. 1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each Control Rod REQUIREMENTS Block instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.2.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when an RBM channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains control rod block capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Re red Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis 5)assumption of the average time required to perform channel f ia ance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that a control rod

eef 4 ad A t block will be initiated when necessary.

SR 3.3.2.1.1 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed for each RBM channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. It includes the R ctor Manual Control Multiplexing System-iout. The Frequency o a s is based on reliability analyses.

SR 3.3.2.1.2 and SR .2.1.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed for the RWM to ensure that the entire system will perform the intended function. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the RWM is performed by attempting to withdraw a control rod not in compliance with the prescribed sequence and verifying a control rod block occurs and by verifying proper indication of the selection error of at least one out-of-sequence control rod. As noted in the SRs, SR 3.3.2.1.2 is not required to be performed until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after any control rod is withdrawn in MODE 2. As noted, SR 3.3.2.1.3 is not required to be performed until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after THERMAL POWER is < 10% RTP in MODE 1. This allows entry into MODE 2 for SR 3.3.2.1.2, and entry into MODE 1 when THERMAL POWER is 5 10% RTP for SR 3.3.2.1.3, to perform the required Surveillance if the 92 day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months allowance is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SRs. The Frequencies are based on reliability analysis (Ref. 8).

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B3.3-51 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation B 3.3.2.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.1.8 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The RWM will only enforce the proper control rod sequence if the rod sequence is properly input into the RWM computer. This SR ensures that the proper sequence is loaded into the RWM so that it can perform its intended function. The Surveillance is performed once prior to declaring RWM OPERABLE following loading of sequence into RWM, since this is when rod sequence input errors are possible.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 7.7.1.2.8.

2. FSAR, Section 7.6.1.a.5.7

3. NEDE-24011 -P-A-9-US, 'General Electrical Standard Application for Reload Fuel," Supplement for United States, Section S 2.2.3.1, September 1988.

4. "Modifications to the Requirements for Control Rod Drop Accident Mitigating Systems," BWR Owners' Group, July 1986.

5. NEDO-21231, 'Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence,"

January 1977.

6. NRC SER, "Acceptance of Referencing of Licensing Topical Report NEDE-2401 1-P-A," "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, Revision 8, Amendment 17," December 27, 1987.

7. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22,1993 (58 FR 32193)

8. NEDC-30851 -P-A, 'Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Control Rod Block Instrumentation," October 1988.

9. GENE-770-06-1, "Addendum to Bases for changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation, Technical Specifications," February 1991.

10. FSAR, Section 15.4.2.

e i7 g11.NEDO 33091-A, Revision 2, "Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process," April 2003. I SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.3-54 Revision 2

=

TECH SPEC BASES MARKUP INSERT B17:

12. NEDC-32410P-A,.'Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor INUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function,' October 1995.

13. NEDC-32410P-A Supplement 1, 'Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function,' November 1997.

PPL Rev. 2 Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES APPLICABLE Plant specific LOCA analyses have been performed assuming only one SAFETY operating recirculation loop. These analyses have demonstrated that, in the ANALYSES event of a LOCA caused by a pipe break in the operating recirculation loop, (continued) the Emergency Core Cooling System response will provide adequate core cooling, provided that the APLHGR limit for SPC ATRIUM'm-10 fuel Is modified.

The transient analyses of Chapter 15 of the FSAR have also been performed for single recirculation loop operation and demonstrate sufficient flow coastdown characteristics to maintain fuel thermal margins during the abnormal operational transients analyzed provided the MCPR requirements are modified. During single recirculation loop operation, modification to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) average power range monitor (APRM) instrument setpoints is also required to account for the different relationships between recirculation drive flow and reactor core flow. The APLHGR, LHGR, and MCPR limits for single IGO nare specified in the COLR.

The APR etpoint is in 6I iczte A LC 3.3-1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS)n-strumentation." In thCV-l,nQ 5addition, a restriction on recirculation pump speed is Incorporated to address reactor vessel internals vibration concerns and assumptions in the event Recirculation loops operating satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 5).

LCO Two recirculation loops are required to be in operation with their flows matched within the limits specified in SR 3.4.1.1 to ensure that during a LOCA caused by a break of the piping of one recirculation loop the assumptions of the LOCA analysis are satisfied. With the limits specified in SR 3.4.1.1 not met, the recirculation loop with the lower flow must be considered not in operation. With only one recirculation loop in operation, modifications to the required APLGHR limits (LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE'), LHGR limits (LCO 3.2.3, "LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)"), MCPR limits JLQD2.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)k), and APR is Simulated Thermal Power-High setpoint (LCO 3.3.1.1) may be applied to allow continued operation consistent with the safety analysis assumptions.

Furthermore, restrictions are pladed on recirculation pump speed to ensure the initial assumption of the event analysis are maintained.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.4-3 Revision 3

PPL Rev. 2 Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES LCO The LCO is modified by a Note that allows up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to establish the (continued) required limits and setpoints after a change from two recirculation loops operation to single recirculation loop operation. If the limits and setpoints are not in compliance with the applicable requirements at the end of the this period, the ACTIONS required by the applicable specifications must be implemented. This time is provided to stabilize operation with one recirculation loop by: limiting flow in the operating loop, limiting total THERMAL POWER, monitor APRM and local power range monitor (LPRM) neutron flux noise levels; and, fully implementing and confirming the required limit and setpoint modifications.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 and 2, requirements for operation of the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System are necessary since there is considerable energy in the reactor core and the limiting design basis transients and accidents are assumed to occur.

In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the consequences of an accident are reduced and the coastdown characteristics of the recirculation loops are not important.

ACTIONS A.1 When operating with no recirculation loops operating in MODE 1, the potential for thermal-hydraulic oscillations is greatly increased. Although this transient is protected for expected mo oscillation by the OPRM system, when OPERABLE per LC 3(Reference 3, 4), the prudent response to the natural circulation con ion is to preclude potential thermal-hydraulic oscillations by mmediately placing the mode switch in the shutdown position. Ch B.1 I Recirculation loop flow must match within required limits when both recirculation loops are in operation. If flow mismatch is not within required limits, matched flow must be restored within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . If matched flows are not restored, the recirculation loop with lower flow must be declared 'not in operation." Should a LOCA occur with recirculation loop flow not matched, the core flow coastdown and resultant core response may not be bounded by the LOCA analyses. Therefore, only a limited time is allowed prior to imposing restrictions associated with single loop operation. Operation with only one recirculation loop satisfies the requirements of the LCO and the initial conditions of the accident sequence.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS /B 3.4-4 Revision 3

PPL Rev. I SDM Test-Refueling B 3.1 0.8 BASES APPLICABLE CRDA analyses assume that the reactor operator follows prescribed SAFETY ANALYSES withdrawal sequences. For SDM tests performed within these defined (continued) sequences, the analyses of Reference 1 is applicable. However, for some sequences developed for the SDM testing, the control rod patterns assumed in the safety analyses of Reference 1 may not be met. Therefore, special CRDA analyses, performed in accordance with an NRC approved methodology, are required to demonstrate the SDM test sequence will not result in unacceptable consequences should a CRDA occur during the testing. For the purpose of this test, the protection provided by the normally required MODE 5 applicable LCOs, in addition to the requirements of this LCO, will maintain normal test operations as well as postulated accidents within the bounds of the appropriate safety analyses (Ref. 1). In addition to the added requirements for the RWM, APRM, and control rod coupling, the notch out mode is specified for control rod withdrawals that are not in conformance with the BPWS. Requiring the notch out mode limits withdrawal steps to a single notch, which limits inserted reactivity, and allows adequate monitoring of changes in neutron flux, which may occur during the test.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. SDM tests may be performed while in MODE 2, In accordance with Table 1.1-1, without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. For SDM tests performed while in MODE 5, additional requirements must be met to ensure that adequate protection against potential reactivity excursions is available. To provide additional scram protection, beyond the normally required IRMs, the APRMs are also required to be OPERABLE (LCO 3.3.1.1, Functionaso the at reactor were in MODE 2. Because muIiple control rods will be withdrawn and the reactor will potentiall become critical, RPS MODE 2 requirements for Functions .d f Table 3.3.1.1-1

=.)~an c

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 B 3.10-35 Revision 0

PPL Rev. I SDM Test-Refueling B 3.10.8 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) are governed by subsequent entry into the Condition and application of the Required Actions.

B.1 With one or more of the requirements of this LCO not met for reasons other than an uncoupled control rod, the testing should be immediately stopped by placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown or refuel position. This results in a condition that is consistent with the requirements for MODE 5 where the provisions of this Special Operations LCO are no longer required.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1 0.8.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the applicable SRs for LCO 3.3.1.1, Functions 2.a and 2.d will ensure that the reactor is operated within the bounds of the safety analysis.

SR 3.10.8.1. SR 3.10.8.2. and SR 3.10.8.3 LO 3.3.1.1, Functions made applicable in this Special Operations LCO, are required to have applicable Surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. However, the control rod withdrawal sequences during the SDM tests may be enforced by the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1, Function 2, MODE 2 requirements) or by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff. As noted, either the applicable SRs for the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1) must be satisfied according to the applicable Frequencies (SR 3.10.8.2), or the proper movement of control rods must be verified (SR 3.10.8.3). This latter verification (i.e., SR 3.10.8.3) must be performed during control rod movement to prevent deviations from the specified sequence. These surveillances provide adequate assurance that the specified test sequence is being followed.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 2 B 3.1 0-38 Revision 0

v t e Letter Sequence Other
TAC:MC7486, (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Acceptance... Supplement Administration Questions 7 November 2005 9 February 2006 Answers Results Approval, Approval Other: PLA-5880, Proposed License Amendment Numbers 272 for Unit 1 Operating License No. NTF-14 and 241 for Unit 2 Operating License No. NPF-22, Power Range Neutron Monitor System Digital Upgrade PLA-5880
MONTHYEAR2005-06-27 [Table View]

PLA-5880, Proposed License Amendment Numbers 272 for Unit 1 Operating License No. NTF-14 and 241 for Unit 2 Operating License No. NPF-22, Power Range Neutron Monitor System Digital Upgrade PLA-5880

Text

Enclosure:

SUBJECT:

1.3 REFERENCES

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