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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217K1051999-10-19019 October 1999 Ack Receipt of Ltr Dtd 990707,which Transmitted Rev 29 to Callaway Plant Physical Security Plan,Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(p).Based on Determination That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan,No NRC Approval Required 05000482/LER-1999-002, Forwards LER 99-002-00,re Identification of Surveillance Performed in Modes Other than Those Required by TS SR 4.6.3.2.a.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-002-00,re Identification of Surveillance Performed in Modes Other than Those Required by TS SR 4.6.3.2.a.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl 05000482/LER-1994-014, Forwards LER 94-014-00 Re Util Identification of Missed Surveillance Required by TS Prior to Changing Modes.List of Commitments Made by Licensee,Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 94-014-00 Re Util Identification of Missed Surveillance Required by TS Prior to Changing Modes.List of Commitments Made by Licensee,Encl ML20217F7481999-10-14014 October 1999 Informs That Based on Approval of Core Assessment Damage Guidance in WCAP-14696,rev 1 for Westinghouse Nuclear Power Plants,Licensee May Use WCAP-14696,rev 1 at Wolf Creek Generating Station ML20217G2071999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-483/99-10 on 990913-16.No Violations Noted.Insp Was to Review Emergency Plan & Procedures During Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise ML20217F8701999-10-13013 October 1999 Provides Summary of Meeting on 991007 with Representatives of Wolf Creek Nuclear Station in Burlington,Kansas Re Status of Licensee Radiation Protection Program.List of Meeting Attendees & Licensee Presentation Encl ML20217C1721999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-09 on 990830-0903.No Violations Noted.Purpose of Insp to Perform Routine Operational Status Insp of Emergency Preparedness Program & to Resolve Questions Re Revised Emergency Plan ML20217B5901999-10-0505 October 1999 Informs That Staff Concludes That Licensee Responses to GL 97-06 Provides Reasonable Assurance That Condition of Util SG Internals in Compliance with Current Licensing Bases for Callaway Plant,Unit 1 ML20217B5711999-10-0505 October 1999 Discusses GL 98-01 Issued by NRC on 980511 & Uec Responses for Callaway NPP Unit 1 ,990224 & 990628.Informs That Staff Reviewed Responses & Concluded That All Requested Info for GL 98-01 Provided ML20217A4881999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Changes to Plant Data Point Library,Iaw 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a.ERDS Point Affected Is RDS0001 ML20216H9291999-09-29029 September 1999 Informs That Licensee Responses to GL 97-06, Degradation of Steam Generator Internals Acceptable & Did Not Identify Any New Concerns with Condition of SG Intervals at Plant ML20212G1681999-09-24024 September 1999 Notifies NRC of Change in Status of Licensed Individual at Plant,Per 10CFR50.74.RL Acree Holds License OP-42654 at Plant,But Has Been Permanently Reassigned from Position for Which Plant Has Certified Need for RO License ML20216F9591999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards Withdrawal of Amend Request Re Ultimate Heat Sink Temp for Wolf Creek Generating Station ML20212G0221999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-483/99-11 on 990812-20.No Violations Noted.Team Found,Weakness in flow-accelerated Corrosion Monitoring Program Resulted in No Previous Insp of Pipe Segment Which Failed ML20212G5641999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-13 on 990725-0904.Three Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations 05000482/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Identification of Missed Surveillance Due to Exceeding Flow Rate Specified in TS for Ccps.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment I1999-09-17017 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Identification of Missed Surveillance Due to Exceeding Flow Rate Specified in TS for Ccps.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment I ML20212D9381999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That NRC Staff Completed Midcycle PPR of WCGS on 990818.Areas of EP & Engineering Warranted Increase in NRC Action.Nrc Plan to Conduct Add Insp Beyond Core Insp Program Over Next 7 Months to Address Listed Questions 05000482/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,re Failure to Correctly Perform TS Surveillance 4.3.3.6.Encl Identifies Actions Committed to by Util1999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,re Failure to Correctly Perform TS Surveillance 4.3.3.6.Encl Identifies Actions Committed to by Util ML20212D9341999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That on 990818,NRC Completed Midcycle PPR of Callaway Plant.In Area of Ep,C/As Taken in Response to Problems Identified During Previous Exercises Warrant More in-dept Review.Details of Insp Plan Through March 2000 Encl ML20217D5791999-09-15015 September 1999 Provides Formal Documentation of Reviews & Discussions Re Technical Ltr Rept for Proprietary Info.Review of Ltr Was Discussed in Telcon & Via e-mail Messages. Summary of Telcons as Documented on 990708,included ML20212C9211999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536, Operating Licensing Examination Data, in Response to NRC Administrative Ltr 99-03 05000482/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-01,re Identification of Failure to Enter LCO for TS 3.6.1.1 While Taking Containment Atmosphere Samples During Power Operation.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-01,re Identification of Failure to Enter LCO for TS 3.6.1.1 While Taking Containment Atmosphere Samples During Power Operation.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl ML20216F1641999-09-14014 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-12 on 990816-20.No Violation Noted.Determined That Solid Radwaste Mgt & Radioactive Matls Transportation Programs Were Properly Implemented ML20212A4921999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-483/99-08 on 990725-0904.Two Severity Level IV Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20212B1521999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-483/99-07 on 990809-13.No Violations Noted.Inspectors Used Annual Licensed Operator Requalification Exams to Assess Licensed Operator Performance ML20212A4701999-09-10010 September 1999 Rssponds to NRC 990709 RAI Re Util Relief Request to Allow Use of 1998 Edition of ASME Section Xi,Subsection Iwe. Acceptance Criteria for Liner Plate Pressure Boundary Thickness Will Be Limited to 10% Nominal Thinning 05000482/LER-1999-009, Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Util Identification of Fire Suppression Issue Affecting Safe Shutdown Components. Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in Encl LER1999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Util Identification of Fire Suppression Issue Affecting Safe Shutdown Components. Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in Encl LER ML20212A5651999-09-10010 September 1999 Informs of Completion of Review of & Encl Objectives for Wolf Creek Generating Station 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Scheduled for 991117.Determined Exercise Objectives Appropriate to Meet EP Requirements ML20211M7151999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Changes to Wolf Creek Generating Station Data Point Library.Emergency Response Data Sys Points Affected Are EJL0007 & EJL0008 05000482/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Efsa at Plant.Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in LER1999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Efsa at Plant.Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in LER ML20211K8301999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards marked-up TS Page Deleting Inequality Signs from Trip Setpoints in SR 3.3.5.3 & Reflecting Info on Calibr Tolerance Band,Per 990708 Application to Amend License NPF-42 ML20211N0081999-09-0202 September 1999 Informs That NRC Staff Has Reviewed Submittals & Concluded Util Adequately Addressed Actions Requested in GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power- Operated Gate Valves ML20211N0321999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards SE Concluding That Util Adequately Addressed Actions Requested in GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20211K1941999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Rev 31 to WCGS Physical Security Plan,Safeguards Contingency Plan & Training & Qualification Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20211H1491999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-16 on 990809-13.No Violations Noted.Insp Focused on Low as Is Reasonably Achievable Program,Training Program for Contract Radiation Protection Personnel & Radiation Protection QA Program ML20211A8581999-08-18018 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-08 on 990316-0724.One Violation Being Treated as Noncited Violation ML20211B0241999-08-18018 August 1999 Ack Receipt of Ltr Dtd 990714,transmitting Scenario for Licensee Upcoming Biennial Exercise.Based on Review,Nrc Determined That Exercise Scenario Sufficient to Meet Emergency Plan Requirements & Exercise Objectives ML20211G2201999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Exam Rept 50-482/99-301 on 990726-29.Exam Evaluated Six Applicants for SO Licenses & Three Applicants for RO Licenses ML20210U0991999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-482/99-11 on 990712-16.No Violations Noted.Insp Was to Review Radiological Environ Monitoring Program ML20210U9751999-08-13013 August 1999 Informs That Licensee Identified That Answer Key for One Question on 990720 Written Exam & Event Classification for on Job Performance Measure Required Mod.Description & Justification for Proposed Mod,Including Technical Ref,Encl ML20210T9121999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-483/99-06 on 990613-0724.One Severity Level 4 Violation Occurred & Being Treated as Ncv,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20210R7241999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards semi-annual Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data Rept for Callaway Nuclear Plant for 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d) ML20210R5621999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Wolf Creek Generating Station,Per TS 6.9.1.8 & GL 97-02.Revised Repts for Apr,May & June 1999,correcting Number of Hours Reactor Critical,Encl ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl ULNRC-04085, Forwards Rev 4 to Callaway Plant Cycle 10 COLR, Per TS 6.9.1.9.COLR Has Been Revised to Update Rod Bank Insertion (Ril) Limits,As Function of Rated Thermal Power1999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Rev 4 to Callaway Plant Cycle 10 COLR, Per TS 6.9.1.9.COLR Has Been Revised to Update Rod Bank Insertion (Ril) Limits,As Function of Rated Thermal Power ML20210P0371999-08-10010 August 1999 Forwards SE Granting Licensee 980710 Requests for Relief (ISI-13 - ISI-18) from Requirements of Section XI of 1989 Edition of ASME B&PV Code for Second 10-year Interval ISI at Plant,Unit 1 ML20210P7491999-08-0909 August 1999 Ack Receipt of ,Which Transmitted Wolf Creek Radiological Emergency Response Plan 06-002,Rev 0,under Provisions of 10CFR50,App E,Section V ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams ML20210N0061999-08-0303 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990401 RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Motor-Operated Gate Valves ULNRC-04079, Forwards 180-day Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal1999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards 180-day Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal 1999-09-03
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEAR05000482/LER-1994-014, Forwards LER 94-014-00 Re Util Identification of Missed Surveillance Required by TS Prior to Changing Modes.List of Commitments Made by Licensee,Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 94-014-00 Re Util Identification of Missed Surveillance Required by TS Prior to Changing Modes.List of Commitments Made by Licensee,Encl 05000482/LER-1999-002, Forwards LER 99-002-00,re Identification of Surveillance Performed in Modes Other than Those Required by TS SR 4.6.3.2.a.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-002-00,re Identification of Surveillance Performed in Modes Other than Those Required by TS SR 4.6.3.2.a.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl ML20217A4881999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Changes to Plant Data Point Library,Iaw 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a.ERDS Point Affected Is RDS0001 ML20212G1681999-09-24024 September 1999 Notifies NRC of Change in Status of Licensed Individual at Plant,Per 10CFR50.74.RL Acree Holds License OP-42654 at Plant,But Has Been Permanently Reassigned from Position for Which Plant Has Certified Need for RO License 05000482/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Identification of Missed Surveillance Due to Exceeding Flow Rate Specified in TS for Ccps.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment I1999-09-17017 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Identification of Missed Surveillance Due to Exceeding Flow Rate Specified in TS for Ccps.List of Util Commitments Contained in Attachment I 05000482/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,re Failure to Correctly Perform TS Surveillance 4.3.3.6.Encl Identifies Actions Committed to by Util1999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,re Failure to Correctly Perform TS Surveillance 4.3.3.6.Encl Identifies Actions Committed to by Util ML20212C9211999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536, Operating Licensing Examination Data, in Response to NRC Administrative Ltr 99-03 05000482/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-01,re Identification of Failure to Enter LCO for TS 3.6.1.1 While Taking Containment Atmosphere Samples During Power Operation.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-01,re Identification of Failure to Enter LCO for TS 3.6.1.1 While Taking Containment Atmosphere Samples During Power Operation.Commitments Made by Util Are Encl ML20217D5791999-09-15015 September 1999 Provides Formal Documentation of Reviews & Discussions Re Technical Ltr Rept for Proprietary Info.Review of Ltr Was Discussed in Telcon & Via e-mail Messages. Summary of Telcons as Documented on 990708,included ML20212A4701999-09-10010 September 1999 Rssponds to NRC 990709 RAI Re Util Relief Request to Allow Use of 1998 Edition of ASME Section Xi,Subsection Iwe. Acceptance Criteria for Liner Plate Pressure Boundary Thickness Will Be Limited to 10% Nominal Thinning 05000482/LER-1999-009, Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Util Identification of Fire Suppression Issue Affecting Safe Shutdown Components. Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in Encl LER1999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Util Identification of Fire Suppression Issue Affecting Safe Shutdown Components. Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in Encl LER ML20211M7151999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Changes to Wolf Creek Generating Station Data Point Library.Emergency Response Data Sys Points Affected Are EJL0007 & EJL0008 05000482/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Efsa at Plant.Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in LER1999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Efsa at Plant.Attachment I Identifies Actions Committed to by Licensee in LER ML20211K8301999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards marked-up TS Page Deleting Inequality Signs from Trip Setpoints in SR 3.3.5.3 & Reflecting Info on Calibr Tolerance Band,Per 990708 Application to Amend License NPF-42 ML20211K1941999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Rev 31 to WCGS Physical Security Plan,Safeguards Contingency Plan & Training & Qualification Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20210U9751999-08-13013 August 1999 Informs That Licensee Identified That Answer Key for One Question on 990720 Written Exam & Event Classification for on Job Performance Measure Required Mod.Description & Justification for Proposed Mod,Including Technical Ref,Encl ML20210R5621999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Wolf Creek Generating Station,Per TS 6.9.1.8 & GL 97-02.Revised Repts for Apr,May & June 1999,correcting Number of Hours Reactor Critical,Encl ML20210R7241999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards semi-annual Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data Rept for Callaway Nuclear Plant for 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d) ULNRC-04085, Forwards Rev 4 to Callaway Plant Cycle 10 COLR, Per TS 6.9.1.9.COLR Has Been Revised to Update Rod Bank Insertion (Ril) Limits,As Function of Rated Thermal Power1999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Rev 4 to Callaway Plant Cycle 10 COLR, Per TS 6.9.1.9.COLR Has Been Revised to Update Rod Bank Insertion (Ril) Limits,As Function of Rated Thermal Power ML20210N0061999-08-0303 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990401 RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Motor-Operated Gate Valves ULNRC-04079, Forwards 180-day Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal1999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards 180-day Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal ML20210J1371999-07-29029 July 1999 Requests NRC Approval of Methodology for Determining RCS Pressure & Temp & Overpressure Mitigation Sys PORV Limits. Attachment I Provides Proposed Changes to Improved TS ML20210H2551999-07-29029 July 1999 Provides 180-day Response to NRC Request for Info Re GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal ULNRC-04076, Informs of Implementation of Amend 131 to License NPF-30, Revising OL to Reflect Requirement in TS 3/4.7.1.7 for Four Operable ASD Lines & Associated Revs,Rather than Three Operable ASDs1999-07-28028 July 1999 Informs of Implementation of Amend 131 to License NPF-30, Revising OL to Reflect Requirement in TS 3/4.7.1.7 for Four Operable ASD Lines & Associated Revs,Rather than Three Operable ASDs ULNRC-04075, Forwards Response to NRC 990618 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of SR Motor-Operated Valves1999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990618 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of SR Motor-Operated Valves A93443, Forwards Addl Info as Committed to in Telcon Between Amerenue & NRC Personnel on 990616,re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of MOV Gate Valves1999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Addl Info as Committed to in Telcon Between Amerenue & NRC Personnel on 990616,re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of MOV Gate Valves ULNRC-04071, Informs That Util Anticipates Approx Ten Licensing Actions That Could Occur During Fys 2000 & 2001,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-021999-07-27027 July 1999 Informs That Util Anticipates Approx Ten Licensing Actions That Could Occur During Fys 2000 & 2001,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02 05000483/LER-1998-008, Forwards Amended Response to GL 81-07, Control of Heavy Loads, to Address Corrective Action Described in LER 98-008-00.Discrepancy Between Earlier Submittals of Snupps Rept on Control of Heavy Loads & TS Re RHR Sys,Resolved1999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Amended Response to GL 81-07, Control of Heavy Loads, to Address Corrective Action Described in LER 98-008-00.Discrepancy Between Earlier Submittals of Snupps Rept on Control of Heavy Loads & TS Re RHR Sys,Resolved ULNRC-04070, Forwards Rev 3 to Callaway Plant Cycle 10 COLR, IAW TS 6.9.1.9.COLR Has Been Revised to Update RAOC Axial Flux Difference (Afd) Limits,As Function of Rated Thermal Power1999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to Callaway Plant Cycle 10 COLR, IAW TS 6.9.1.9.COLR Has Been Revised to Update RAOC Axial Flux Difference (Afd) Limits,As Function of Rated Thermal Power ML20210F5931999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards semi-annual Fitness for Duty Performance Data Rept for Wcnoc,Per 10CFR26.71(d).Rept Covers Period of 990101- 0630 ML20210F5881999-07-23023 July 1999 Submits Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operator Reactor Licensing Action Estimates, ML20212A3291999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Scenario Manual Containing Description of Callaway Plant 1999 Biennial Emergency Response Plan Exercise to Be Conducted 990914.Correspondence to Satisfy 60-day Submittal Requirement ML20209H0751999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Wolf Creek Generating Station,Per TS 6.9.1.8 & GL 97-02.Max Dependable Capacity Has Been Updated from 1163 to 1170,as Determined by Calculations Based on Capacity Test Results of July 1998 ML20209H0441999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990326 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs. Summary of Util Commitments Provided in Attachment 2 ML20209G9871999-07-14014 July 1999 Informs of Changes Affecting Wolf Creek Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Encl Provides Description of Changes & Justification for Changes ML20209F3471999-07-0909 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990624 RAI to Complete NRC Review of Relief Request to Allow Use of 1998 Edition of ASME Section Xi,Subsection IWE ML20209E0611999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards Addl Pages to Rev 12 of USAR & Commitment Changes, Inadvertently Omitted from 990311 Submittal ML20209H2471999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Rev 29 to Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p). Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20209C6031999-07-0606 July 1999 Provides Applicants View as Result of 990618 Memo & Order Directing Parties to Address Proper Disposition of Existing Antitrust License Condition Attached to OL for Facility Due to Planned Changes in Ownership of Facility.With Svc List ML20196K8231999-07-0606 July 1999 Submits Kansas Electric Power Cooperative,Inc Ltr Pursuant to Commission Direction in Memo & Order CLI-99-19.Addresses Disposition of Existing Antitrust Conditions Attached to License for Wolf Creek Unit 1 Re Proposed License Transfer ML20209B7131999-07-0101 July 1999 Submits Response to NRC Request for Info Re GL 98-01, Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Response on Status of Facility Y2K Readiness Was Requested by 990701.Disclosure Encl ML20209B5151999-06-29029 June 1999 Informs That Util Completed Analyses & Modifications to Address Items Discussed in GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions ML20209C0171999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards Special Rept 99-01 Re Fifteenth Year Inservice Containment Bldg Tendon Surveillance Failure.Observed Voids in Sheathing Filler Grease Do Not Indicate Degradation of post-tensioning Sys,Based on Encl Evaluation ML20209B6851999-06-28028 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants. Disclosure Rept Encl ML20196G9681999-06-22022 June 1999 Informs NRC That BC Ryan Will Be Leaving Ks State Univ for Position with Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp,Effective 990701 ML20196G5621999-06-21021 June 1999 Informs NRC of Implementation of Amend 132 to Callaway License NPF-30 to Allows Installation of Electrosleeves for Steam Generator Tube Repair for Two Cycles Following Installation of First Electrosleeve ML20212J2441999-06-18018 June 1999 Submits Request for Alternate Exam Requirements for Plant Re ISI Program Plan.Plant Does Not Torque Bolted Connections to Stress Values Greater than 100 Ksi 05000482/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Condition in Which Wolf Creek Generating Station TS 3.3.2 Was Not Met.Commitments Made by Util Also Encl1999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Condition in Which Wolf Creek Generating Station TS 3.3.2 Was Not Met.Commitments Made by Util Also Encl ML20196A0251999-06-17017 June 1999 Requests That Written Exams for Reactor Operator & SRO for Plant Be Administered Beginning Wk of 990719 & Followed by Operating Exam During Wk of 990726 to Personnel Listed in Attachment.Proprietary Info Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld ML20195K0641999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards MOR for May 1999 for Wolf Creek Generating Station & Corrected Page 2 of 2 of Apr 1999 Mor,Adding That Unit Entered Intomode 5 for Restart During Month of Apr & Correcting Shutdown Duration Hours from 672 to 671 1999-09-03
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F SNUPPS Stenderdised Nucles' Unit Power Mont Systern 5 Choke Cherry Road Nicholas A. Petrick Rockville, Merytend 20850 Executive Director (301)809 4010 May 31, 1984 SLNRC 84- 0088 FILE: 0278 SUBJ: Request for Partial Exemption from Provisions of GDC-4 Mr.-Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Docket Nos.: STN 50-482 and STN 50-483
References:
- 1. SLNRC 83-0045, 08/03/83: Alternate Pipe Break Criteria
- 2. SLNRC 84-0054, 02/17/84: Reactor Cavity Shielding
Dear Mr. Denton:
In accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.12(a), exemption from the provisions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, is requested for the SNUPPS plants (Callaway and Wolf Creek) which would authorize utilization of the alternative pipe break criteria that have been employed in resolution of generic issue A-2 " Asymmetric Blowdown Loads on PWR Primary Systems." The requested exemption is based on the application of advanced fracture mechanics technology as evaluated in WCAP 10500 dated February 1984 entitled " Technical Bases for Eliminating Large Primary Loop Pipe Ruptures as the Structural Design Basis for Callaway and Wolf Creek Plants" (enclosed).
Specifically, it is requested that the postulated circumferential and -
longitudinal pipe breaks in the reactor coolant system primary loop be eliminated from consideration in the structural design basis of SNUPPS plants. The pipe breaks are those identified in Westinghouse q topical report WCAP-8172 for the RCS primary loop. C The bases for the requested exemption are as follows: ($S._< Nd;*
- 1. Extensive operating experience has demonstrated the integrity of the RCS primary loop including the fact that there has never i.1 tc2 been a leakage crack. -
' 2. Irf-shop, pre-service, and in-service inspections performed on
- piping for the SNUPPS plants minimize the possibility of g C ' flaws existing in such piping. The application of advanced fracture mechanics has demonstrated that if such flaws exist they will not grow to a leakage crack when subjected to the worst case loading .ondition over the life of the plant. %g n 42 I 8406070230 840531 'E C PDRADOCK05000g i
, A
p ; ~
H - SLNRC 84- 0088 Page two
!3. The application of: advanced fracture mechanics technology has demonstrated that small flaws or leakage cracks (postu-lated _or real) will remain stable and will be detected either by in-service inspection or by . leakage monitoring systems long before such flaws'can grow to critical sizes which otherwise could lead to iarge break areas such as the double-ended rupture of'the largest pipe of the reactor coolant system.
- 4. The SNUPPS plants leak detection system satisfies Regulatory Guide 1.45_ dated May 1973, entitled " Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems" as documented in SNUPPS FSAR (Table 5.2-6).
1As support for.this request, in addition to the SNUPPS plants letter reports referred to above, consideration should be given to the follow-ing correspondence on this issue:
- 1. Letter from Darrell G. Eisenhut (NRC) to E. P. Rahe (Westing-house) dated February 1,1984.
- 2. Memorandum from Darrell G. Eisenut (NRC) to All Operating PWR Licensees, Construction Permit Holders -and Applicants for Construction Permits dated February 1, 1984 -
Subject:
Safety Evaluation of Westinghouse. Topical Reports Dealing with Elimination of Postulated Pipe Breaks in PWR Primary Main Loops (Generic Letter 84-04).
- 3. Comittee for the Review of Generic Requirements resolution of generic issue A-2.
4 ACRS letter dated June 14, 1983, re " Fracture Mechanics Approach to Pipe Failure".
t
- 5. Memorandum from William J. Dircks, EDO, to ACRS dated July 29, 1983, re " Fracture Mechanics Approach to Postulated Pipe Failure".
- 6. Memorandum from Harold Denton (NRC) to Murray Edelman (AIF),
3 dated May 2, 1983.
The principal thrust of this correspondence in the short term is to
~ prepare for exemption requests to existing criteria and in the long term to modify the criteria relative to postulated pipe failure and subcom-
-partment pressurization.
4 SLNRC 84 0088 Page three. i l
Initial actions'to.be taken by the SNUPPS utilities upon granting '
N of this exemption request will _be limited to changing the shielding
- for the reactor. cavity as described in the reference letters. Ad-vantages to be-realized by use of reusable rigid shielding in lieu of water bags' include (1) a reduction of personnel exposure of approx-imately 2 man-rem per each refueling, (2) reduction of low level waste since the water bags are to be disposed of at' each refueling, (3) potentially shortened refueling cycle due to easier water filling operations, .(4) potentially-lower dose rates in containment during
. operation because rigid shielding provides a more uniform thickness of shielding material and eliminates the potential for failure of a water bag, and (5) reduced plant operating costs since bag procurements, shipping, warehousing, inventory' control, etc. costs would be eliminated.
- These advantages and estimated savings -are based on actual experience at
- Calvert Cliffs, which employs generally similar water bags for reactor cavity shielding.- A Safety Balance for this proposed change is enclosed.
At some later date, the SNUPPS Utilities may utilize the exemption to remove permanently some of the RCS pipe-whip-restraints, in order to reduce the occupational exposures associated with in-service inspections.
Prior to doing this, a specific description of the proposed actions,
, technical justification, and alafety Balance will be submitted to the NRC for review.
As the submittal contains information proprietary to Westinghouse Elec-tric Corporation,.it is supported by an affidavit signed by Westinghouse, the owners'of the information. The affidavit sets forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Comission and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in paragraph (b)(4) of'Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations.
Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the information which is proprietary to Westinghouse be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10CFR Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations.
Correspondence.with respect to the proprietary aspects of this applica-tion for. withholding or the supporting Westinghouse affidavit should reference CAW-82-67 and should be addressed to R. A. Wiesemann, Manager, Regulatory and Legislative Affairs, Westinghouse Electric Corporation P.O.. Box 355, Pittsburgh, PA. 15230 Very truly yours, mW Nicholas A. Petrick REK/FS/mjd/la20 V
Enclosures:
See page four
- [_
- 6-SLNRC 84 0088
.Page four
Enclosures:
- Safety Balance-for Change =of Reactor Cavity Annulus l shielding..
WCAP-10500 and WCAP-10501 " Technical Bases for Eliminating Large Primary Loop Pipe Ruptures as the structural Design L Basis for Callaway and Wolf Creek Plants" (Both proprietary
- and non-proprietary versions).
Westinghouse Letter " Application for Withholding Pro-
-prietary Information from Public Disclosure (CAW-84-16)".
cc: D. F. Schnell UE G. L. Koester KGE D. T. McPhee KCPL H.~ Bundy USNRC/WC J. Neisler/B. Little USNRC/ CAL B. L. Forney- USNRC/RIII E. H. Johnson USNRC/RIV c
r v
Safety Balance for Change of Reactor Cavity Annulus Shielding-Introduction The scope of.the change is limited to the shielding provided at the top of:the reacter cavity to attenuate the neutron flux from the cavity
-annulus to the upper containment. The existing shielding (ref: FSAR Section 3.8.3.1.4) consists of 30 water bags. The reasons for utilizing water bags for shielding are that (1) 12" of- water is effective shielding for high energy neutrons and (2) water bags would disperse and disintegrate following a postulated primary system pipe break in the reactor cavity (ref:-FSAR Section 6.2.1.2.3), so that subcompartment pressures and asymmetric pressure loadings on the reactor vessel would remain within acceptable limits.
If the need to postulate a primary system pipe break in the reactor cavity is eliminated, it is acceptable to provide some type of rigid shielding instead of the water bags. One design under consideration by SNUPPS consists of thin-walled stainless steel cans containing 12" depth of water, which would be placed in the same location as the water bags.
Alternative designs consist of solid shielding (e.g., Reactor Experiments Type 277, which is used in many power reactor applications) located
- either in the same location as the water bags or further down within the reactor cavity annulus. This Safety Balance justifies the use of any of
- these configurations of rigid shielding.
Advantages of Rigid Shielding Rigid shielding has a projected lifetime of at least 40 years. The existing water bags have a projected lifetime of one fuel cycle. The water bags removed at each refueling outage must be disposed of as low
- level radwaste. Replacement bags must be procured and stored under strict controls.
Rigid shielding, if placed in the same location as water bags, will
- be easier to remove and replace at refueling outages. It is anticipated, based on prototype development and pilot-type manipulation operations performed by SNUPPS, that rigid shielding can be handled using long-handled
- tools, whereas water bags require hands-on handling. As a result, radiation exposures to operations personnel will be lower for rigid
- shielding and the durations of refueling outages are expected to be shorter. Based on actual experience with handling water bags at Calvert Cliffs the estimated saving in occupational radiation exposure is 2 man-rem per refueling outage.
- Rigid shielding, by virtue of providing a uniform shielding thickness and better dimensional controls than water bags is expected to be a more effective shielding medium. This will mean lower neutron dose rates in containment. In addition, rigid shielding is expected to be less prone to f ailure during operation than water bags.
{
I Safety Assessment
.in the absence.of. a postulated primary system pipe break, the need
. for a rigorous subcompartment pressure . analysis is eliminated. The effect on reactor cavity 'subcompartment pressure has been estimated as follows. The Westinghouse analyses show that a through wall crack with a leakage rate' of 10 gpm, which is readily detectable by leakage detection: systems,'is well below the size of a crack that could propa-gate to a.RCS ' piping f ailure. To be conservative, a leakage 25 times higher or.250 gpm, has been postulated to flow directly into subcompart-ment subvolume (#42) used in the FSAR analysis of a postulated pipe break within the reactor cavity. . As a leak rate of 250 gpm is approximately one one-thousandth of the break flow postulated in the FSAR, pressuri-zation of the reactor cavity subcompartment-is negligible, i.e., less than 0.5 psi. Ther.efore subcompartment pressurization is not a safety issue.
Since potential pressurization of the reactor cavity is negligible, the rigid shielding can not be displaced upwards to become potential missiles. Therefore, missiles are not a safety iscue.
The alternative shielding design under most serious consideration is thin-walled stainless steel water cans.. Since most of the weight is water, the total weight is only 0.2 % greater than that of the water bags. The dead-weight and seismic loadings on the supports have been evaluated and determined to be within acceptable limits. Therefore,
~
the existing supports are adequate and there is no need to evaluate postulated failures of the supports. If, in the future, the alternative of all solid shielding is pursued, a comprehensive analysis of the supports will be performed and the support structures (s) will be modified as necessary to provide acceptable design margins.
Conclusion On balance, replacement of water bags with rigid shielding will provide significant advantages, in respect to reduced occupational exposures, reduced radwaste, and shorter refueling outages, with no reduction i n . s afet'y.
FS/REK/mjd/la25-26