ML20248L788

Discusses Exercise of Enforcement Discretion & Forwards Notice of Violation Re Investigation Rept 3-96-23. Investigation Initiated to Determine If Comed Personnel Provided Matl False Statements to NRC Re RHR

ML20248L788
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	06/05/1998
From:	Paperiello C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Kingsley O COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
Shared Package
ML20248L789	List: ML20248L788 ML20248L795
References
EA-97-413, NUDOCS 9806110360
Download: ML20248L788 (5)

Text

• UNITED STATES

1. g Grog'o, ,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ o' REGloN 111 y 801 WARRENVILLE ROAD

'f 2 lisle,ILLINOls 60532-4051

%g*****,/ June 5, 1998 l

EA 97-413 Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley President, Nuclear Generation Group Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN: Regulatory Services Executive Towers West ill 1400 Opus Place, Suite 500 Downers Grove,IL 60515

SUBJECT:

EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC Letter to the Licensee dated September 17,1997 and Office of Investigations Report Number 3-96-023)

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

This refers to the investigation conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations at Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed) Quad Cities Station. The investigation was initiated to determine if Comed personnel assigned to the Quad Cities Station provided material false statements to the NRC regarding the Residual Heat Remova! (RHR) comer room structural steel configuration and the function of the reactor building outer metal siding. The synopsis of the NRC investigation was documented in a report that was mailed to Comed on September 17,1997. The investigation concluded that Quad Cities Station personnel had provided false written and oral material to the NRC. Due to the seriousness of this matter, a predecisional enforcement conference was conducted on November 6,1997.

The NRC has determined that two violations of NRC requirements occurred. This we based on the information developed during the investigation and the information provided by Comed during the conference. One violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the second violation is the subject of enforcement discretion and is not cited.

The violation that was the subject of enforcement discretion pertained to inaccurate and incomplete information provided orally to NRC inspectors and senior managers on May 14 and 15,1996, conceming the function of the reactor building siding'. Several days prior, tomado force winds caused considerable damage to metal panels that were installed on the inside and outside of the reactor building. Subsequent to the wind damage, the operating unit was shut down while repairs to the inner panels were completed. Members of the l Quad Cities site staff told NRC inspectors and senior managers that the outer panels were only /

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1 The related NRC assessment of the impact of the damaged reactor building siding on the operability h of secondary containment was addressed in NRC Inspection Report Numbers 50-254(265)96019 and Enforcement Action 96-530/531 9906110360 990605 PDR ADOCK 05000254 e PDR

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O. Kingsley required to protect the insulation installed between the panels from the weather and served no safety function. The verbalinformation, evidently, was based on a review of the FSAR _

description for secondary containment. When repairs to the inner panels were completed, startup was scheduled but delayed for unre'ated reasons. A subsequent NRC inspection prompted the site engineering staff to do a more extensive evaluation, which concksded that the outer panels were safety-reisted because they were needed to maintain the integrity of the secondary containment during high winds and postult:ted instmment line breaks in secondary containment. . The inaccurate information was material because the information rela?.ed to operability of safety-related components and could have' influenced subsequent NRC inspection ,

activities. Providing information to the NRC that is not complete and accurate in all material l 1

respects is a violation of 10 CFR 50.9.

The NRC has decided that this violation was the direct result of an inadequate engineering evaluation and, therefore, was not willful. However, because the oral statements were made to senior NRC management in a context where licensee officials appreciated the significance of the NRC's interest, escalated enforcement action was considered in this case. Normally, this violation would be subject to a civil penalty. However, I have been authorized after consultation with the Commission and the Director, Office of Enforcement, to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with Section Vll.B.6, " violations involving Special Circumstances," of the Enforcement Policy and not issue a Notice of Violation or propose a civil penalty in this case. The decision to apply enforcement discretion was based on consideration of the following: (1) the inaccurate information was the result of inadequate, engineering assessment of the system configuration which was the issue addressed in Enforcement Action (EA) 96-530/531 which involved a Severity Level lli problem and a $50,000 civil penalty for an inadequate safety evaluation associated with the reactor building panels, and (2) if the 01 investigation had been completed when EA 96-530/531 was issued, this issue would likely have been included with the Severity Level ill problem as another violation with no change in severity level or civil penalty assessment.

The violation described in the Notice pertains to inaccurate and incomplete written information concoming the configuration of the RHR comer room structural steel. The site engineenng staff documented the information in an Operability Determination Checklist (ODC)". The ODC, which was reviewed by NRC inspectors, clearly stated "the beams and connections had functionality interaction coefficients (FICs) less than 1.0." Based on the ODC, the NRC deferred further inquires and inspection activities because an FIC of less than 1.0 was within the operability threshold specified in the code. During subsequent inspection activities, the NRC determined that the engineering calculations showed FICs greater then 1.0 and that .

engineering Judgement was used to justify continued operability until modifications to restore design margins could be approved and implemented.

2L . The related NRC assessment of operebaty of the RHR comer room structural steel was addressed in

- NRC inspection Report Numbers 50-254(265y96005 and Erdorcement Action 96-114.

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. O. Kingsley i it is noted that while the ODC relied, in part, on engineering judgement in its operability 1 conclusion, the ODC implied that the portion of the operability ar,alysis concoming the FIC l

~ number was based on calculations. The statement regarding FICs, read in isolation, is l ' inaccurate and misleading. Read as a whole, the ODC is confusing because the FIC was in fact based on engineering judgement, not calculations. When the minutes of the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) which approved the subject ODC are read in conjunction with the ODC, it becomes clear that the statement regarding.the FICs was based on engineering judgement, not refined calculations. Since the PORC meetings minutes are quality records and they define the status of the FICs, and the ODC does not become a quality record until approved by the PORC, it does not appear under the circumstances of this case that there was an intent to mislead. Nevertheless, there is a regulatory concem because the approved ODC and PORC records are not always filed together. The NRC must depend on both records being complete and accurate. The inaccurate information was material because it

. related to the operability of safety-related components and influenced subsequent NRC inspection activities. However, the significance of the inaccurate information was reduced since the minutes for several PORC meetings documented that engineering judgement was used in concluding the FICs would be less than 1.0 if realistic design input assumptions were used.

Providing information to the NRC that is not complete and accurate in all material respects is a violation of 10 CFR 50.9. Therefore, this violation has been categorized according to NUREG-1600, " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions i

"(Enforcement Policy)," at Severity Level IV.

Another issue associated with the RHR comer room structural steel violation pertained to structural steel coupons. As part of the operability justification, the site engineering staff considered generic information indicating that the yield strength of A36 steel typically exceeded yield strength specifications by 10E This information was provided to the NRC during a March 28,1996, telephone conference and a letter dated April 1,1996. Subsequent to these communications, material test coupons were removed from the steel in question and the results formally presented to the Quad Cities engineering staff on April 2,1996. The results confirmed that A36 steel was installed. However, one of the five coupons tested did not exceed the yield strength specification by 10% Although such a result was not unexpected given the variability in A36 steel and thus, was not material to our regulatory activities, the NRC would have expected your staff to have informed us of this new information. Your staff had several opportunities to do so, including an Apri! 11th meeting. The NRC determined that the failure to share this information in a timely manner represented a mmmunication error and not a violation of 10 CFR 50.9.

During the enforcement conference, Comed acidd.eQed that complete and accurato 1 information is necessary in order to conduct open communications with the NRC. Your staff also stated that the issues associated with this enforcement action occurred because of .

communication breakdowns and that there was no intentional effort to mislead the NRC.

_ Comed's corrective actions included: (1) third-party review of 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations;

. (2) formal review of written correspondence with the NRC; and (3) training to engineering personnel, station supervisors, operations personnel, and maintenance personnel on the

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requirements 16 provide ceT@te and accurate information to the NRC pumuant to

[ 10 CFR 50.9. The NRC will continue to assess Comed performance in this area.

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, Comed is required to respond to this letter and should follow the instn5ctiorm specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use Comed's response, fri part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensere compliance with

regulatory requirernents. Additionally, the NRC expects the,t Comed will ensure that the lessons leamed from this enforcement action will be communicated to and acted 'upon,' as

necessary, by the other Comed Nuclear Power staticns and Corporate Office staff.

1 in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

Sincerely,

/

CariJ. aperielo Acting Regional Administrator Docket Nos.: 50-254;50-265 License Nos.: DPR-29; DRP-30

Enclosure:

Notice of Violation cc w/ encl: M. Wallace, Senior Vice President D. Helwig, Senior Vice President G. Stanley, PWR Vice President J. Peny, BWR Vice President D. Farrar, Regulatory Services Manager I. Johnson, Licensing Director DCD - Licensing J. Dimmette, Jr., Site Vice President W. Pearce, Quad Cities Station Manager C. C. Peterson, Regulatory Affairs Manager Rk hard Hubbard Nathan Sdiloss, Economist Office of the Attomey General State Liaison Officer Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission W. D. Leech, Manager of Nuclear MidAmerican Energy Company w__---._A--- _ , . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ - - _ - _ - - . - - - - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . - . - - - . _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ - - - . . . - _ _ - - - _ _ _

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i' DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC IE 01 l

, SECY

, CA LCallan, EDO AThadani, DEDE LChandler, OGC -

l JGoldberg, OGC SCollins, NRR RZimmerman, NRR Enforcement Coordinators Rl, Ril and RIV Resident inspector, Quad Cities

. RCapra, NRR RPulsifer, NRR JGilliland, OPA HBell, OlG GCaputo, Of TMartin, AEOD OE:ES OE:EA(2)

RAO: Rill SLO: Rill PAO: Rill OCFO/LFARB w/o encl.

DRP Docket File 110031

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