ML20236C782
| ML20236C782 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1975 |
| From: | Hirons T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236A877 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-87-214 NUDOCS 8707300192 | |
| Download: ML20236C782 (12) | |
Text
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1 DOCKET NOS: 50-275 AE 50-323 i l APPLICANT: PACIFIC GAS Am H2CTRIC OCNPANY (PG4E) , 4 l FACILITY: DIAND CANYON ECLEAR PONER STATICN, UNITS 1 Am 2 1 1 l SIM4ARY OF ACRS SJBOGNITTEE MEETIE HELD ON MAY 23,1975 l 1 l An ACRS hher=mittee Meeting r Station was held in Ins Angeles, Cal the Diablo Canyon helear Ptmar j on May'23, 1975. h agenda ' for the meeting is attached as Enclosure No. 1. A complete list of attandmas is given in b elosure No. 2. i
! Project Rariew Summary and Status Report i
The staff presented an update on the unresolved / outstanding items in the I i
' safety rerior. This list of items had been mammarized in hyplasset No.
2 to the SER; in addition to the 13.raamining outstanding items listed in this supplement, water hammer, and insulation used inside containment were also included as matters requiring resolution on Diablo Canyon. For this total list of 15 items, the staff (later in the meeting) indicated that 7 of these were generic in nature, and would be resolved
.princip11y on a generic basis. Another 2 of the 15 (geology-seismology j and tsunmais caused by near-shore generators) are not scheduled for resolution until later this year. Of the remaining 6 items, the staff stated that 4 cf these (pipe break outside contaimant, physical separation in the process analog systas, design modifications to the -
auxiliary building,' and inedation used inside containment) would ? probably be resolved by July 1,1975. Finally, as part of the jact status report, the staff reviewed the concerns and questions ra i by ACRS in the construction permit letters for Units l' and 2 dated i December 20, 1967 and October 16,'1969, respectively. Many of these questions and concerns harve been addressed in detail during the operating license review. Tornado Characteristics / Criteria j PG4B presented the results of tornado capability studies which they had undertaken at the request of the staff. The staff indicated tlat they had found the tornado rotection to be acceptable for those > systans required for safe s!1utdown, e.g. , -isy power system, { I iN ' O\ 8707300192 870721 PDR FOIA PDR s CONNOR87-214
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2-anv414=y feedwater system, etc. At the some time, it was stated that the plant does not most all of the r iraments of Regulatory Qaide 1.76. Dr. Okrant asked that the prwide, at the next Diablo Canyon meeting, s' asanary statement which better describes the bases which the staff used to emclude that tornado protection for Diablo Canyon is acceptable. Water Hammer / Slug Flow /Claaging/ Percolation Effects J. Cermak of Westinghouse made a detailed presentation regarding steam generator slug flow issues (see Transcript, starting page 62). Con-siderable discussion ensued (a this subjwt, with a Isrge number of questions being raised by the ACRS consultants. It was generally i agreed all those present (Westinghouse, ACRS consultants, and the staff) slug flow is a very complex problem. R. Laverty of PG6B then presented an werview of the feedwater hamanr problems that have been experienced at othamplants, and what relation-i ship these problems have to Diablo Canyon (see TiMpt, starting
! page101). He indicated that PG6B had sodified the Diablo Canyon i feedwater pip to preclude a damaging water hammer of the type- .; which at Indian Point. Dr. Roldt of Westinghouse added that i
tle modifications ande on the Diablo Canyon piping simuld prwent. q l any destructive hammer, based on past experience with other Westin@ne plants. The staff 4~ticated that all plants (not only Westinghouse) are being armined with regard to this plannmanon, and that letters ) l 'have been sent requesting additional information. It is a generic ;) problaa, and the staff has not yet reached a final position. ,
- Systems Interactions Questions t
With regard to questions related to loss of a-c power, Mr. Herrers of PGGE made a presentation regarding the reliability of tla Diablo Canyon offsite pmer system and the effects of loss of offsite power and loss i
, of all a-c power (see Transcript, starting page 122). He emphasized i that they had thoroughly researched system outages, but had not l attempted to calculate the probability of loss of offsite power at ! Diablo Canyon. :
i i Mr. Lindblad of PG4B then discussed the question of effects of turbine 'l building fires on the operation of the diesel generators (see Transcript, l s l __ ___o
s , JUN.I 7 W D i i . ! starting page 147). lie stated that PGGE felt that the pmbability of a ccaron mode failure which would make all of the diesels inoperative was extremely low, considering the potential fire hazards and the fire ' protection pmvided in the turbine building. The staff indicated
! that the water fire protection system for Diablo Canyon, which is !
located in the auxiliary building, is Category I, and that hose
! connections to this system can be ranchad and bmught into the turbine building to put out fires, if necessary. The potential prob 1ms in the vital switchgear rooms due to fires were also discussed briefly.
t. Mr. Ibch of PG6B made a presentation regarding the effects of failure ; of redundant safety-related services in a ron-II)CA situation requiring slutdom (see Transcript, starting page 165). Such services include pmps for auxiliary feedwater, component cooling water, auxiliary i saltwater, etc. lie discussed the rormal operating configuration for !
! cach of these and the proposed corrective action ard time available j to inplement this action if ra rM ant trains should fail. He concluded i that for failures of such peps and their bach ==, the plant can be i
brought to a safe and stable condition. schfollowedthispresentation I with a discussion of the effects of a prolonged loss of all a-c power. Ilis asseptions incitdal total loss of a-c Ixwer and the inability ; to restart or repair any of the diesel generators. Tim analysis l considered the effects of this loss on such things as auxiliary feed- : water initiation, containment heatup and integrity, control of reactor cooldown, etc. lie concluded that the reactor could be bmught;to hot staniby and maintained there for appmximately six hours, and that during this time, there would be a high probability of restoring either offsite power or at least one of the diesel generators. Dr. Peacock of Westinghouse then made a presentation regarding heat transport paths during a small II)CA (see Transcript, starting page 195). Considerable discussion ensued on this subject, with Mr. Ebersole asking numemus questions regarding the heat transport paths. t The other questions listed urder agenda item III.A (see Enclosure No.1) were eitler sumarized briefly by Mr. Lindblad or else discussion was , deferred until a later meeting. The cpestion of insulation used inside l i containment was subsequently discussed in some detail later in the l j meeting. l i i
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JUN. I 71975 4 Fire Protection Desian Mr. Nielsen of PGEE made a presentation regarding materials and design I used in electrical equipment and electrical distribution systems for li ,mrposes of fire psotection (see Transcript, starting page 211). Mref=1=* refence was made to the ens encountered at Browns Ferry. He concluded that their or 1 pewisions for fire protection
. were superior to those for the Brooms Ferry Plant. h staff indicated i
that a complete account of the Biotens Ferry fire had bsen placed in l the Public n====t Hoca, and that this ar-me contains t w final . report of the TVA Internal Amiit Ommaittee. Reactor Dr. Peacock and Mr. Little of Westinghouse mamerized several of the
! agenda itans listed under Reactor, h se included s scant design I
changes since the CP stage, status of the 17 x 17 des verification / I review, Ba:S/IDCA - Appendix K evaluations, and the method for power distribution control. PeacockindicatedthattheMastingsuesEDC5 i model had been apptwed by the staff.
! Pamk and Little then followed with a detailed presentation on the Westinghouse Augmented Startup Pr'ogram Propsal (see Transcript,.
starting page 231). They indicated that tiis program was fonarlated partially in response to previous ACRS concerns regarding high-power i i density reactors, and that the program would ammedate additional
. data in the core physics area under steady state and transient conditions. Little stated that the program would combine both 15 x 15 and 17 x 17 fuel designs. The staff indicated that they had discussed {
the Westinghouse program, and felt that it was a step in the right l diiection.with regard to additional in-core flux measurements. 1 Industrial Security Tha Diablo Canyon Industrial Security Plan was discussed in a closed i sussion. Original Signed By -{ ' Dennis P. Allisoll Thomas J. Hirong Light Water Reactors 1
. Project Bhnch 1-3 Division of Reactor Licensing ;
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JUN. I 71975 - l, i 5-Enclosure No.1: f Detailed Agenda Belosure M. 2: ) Attendace List cc w/mml: Mr. Jolm C. Morrissey Philip A. Crans, Jr., Esq. Andrew J. Skaff, Esq. Mr. Prederick Eissler i Ms. Elizabeth E. Apfelberg Ms. Sandra A. Silver Mr. Jolm Forstar j
; Mr. William P. Cornws11 l j Mr. W. J. Lindblad i Mr. Gordon Silver i i
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ENCIDSURE NO.1
- DETAILED AGENDA -
DIABID CAWON SUBC0f4IITEE MEETING MAY 23,1975 - IDS ANGELES, CALIPORNIA Principal Spokesmen: PG6E - William Liniblad, Project Engineer DRL - Dennis Allison', Project Manager Project Review Rmmry arxl Status Report (DRL) (30 min) I. A. Update on Unresolved / Outstanding Items B. Resolution / Status of ACRS CP Letter Items (30 min) II. Site Characteristics A. Torrado Characteristics / Criteria (PG6E)
- 1. PG6E Presentation (DRL)
- 2. Conformance to Current Criteria Systems for Safe Shutdown Weakly (PG6E) 3.
Protected (PG6E) B. Other Site Characteristics
- 1. Meteorology, Hydrology, Demography III. Systats Interactions _ (PG6E/_W/DRL)
(4 hrs) i A. Qaestions raised at Subcommittee meeting of 2/18/75 and 2/19/75. B. Water Hanmer/ Slug Flow / Chugging / ($ Percolation Effects
- 1. Similarities between Diablo 6 Indian Point-2/ San Onofre
- 2. WCAP-7832 Analyses Design for Fire Protection (PG6E/DRL)
C. JUN.1 7 1975 f
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- Diablo Canyon - Agenda 5/23/75 (45 min) IV. . Reactor A. Brief Description of Major Fectures/ (KSE)
Comparison with Existing Designs. B. ECCS/LOCA - Appendix K Evaluations- J 4 2
- 1. Unit 1/ Unit 2 Results - Comparison (PG6E/$
with Fxisting Designs
- 2. Limiting F{ Calculated for Unit 1/
Unit 2
- 3. Status /&M1e for Completion (PG6F/DRL)
C. Pwr. Distr. Control Method - Excore/ (PG6E/DRI/$ APINS/COAC D. Significant Ch..sges' in Design Since (PG6E) CP Stage E. Status of 17 x 17 Design Verification / Q/DRL) Review F. Augmented Startup Program Proposd @/PG6E) l (15 min) ) (PG6E) ! V. Plant Items A. Brief Description of Plant Arrangement , B. Major Design Changes Since CP Stage C. Other Lessons Learned from Operating Experience and Related Design Changes. VI. Other Additional specific items may be discussed at the discretion of the Subcommittee Chairman (15 min) VII. Industrial Security (CIDSED SESSION) (PGGE) . JON. t 719'I5 4
. , , i ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS - AGENDA ITEM III A 1 i
DIABLO CANYON SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING MAY 23, 1975 - LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA i DRL TRANSCRIPT MEETING St'MMARY QUESTION // ADDRESSED TO PAGE # PAGE # TOPIC
- 1. PG&E/DRL 237 14-#1 Effects of turbine building. fires -
238 possible common mode failure 243 mechanism
- 2. PG&E 243-248 14-#2 Effects of failur.s of redundant safety-related services (not ESF) in a si,tuation (not LOCA) requiring shutdown
- 3. DRL 248-250 15-03 Status of review of analysis of effects of pro 19nged AC power lo:s
- 4. PG&E/DRL 251-262 15-#4 Heat transfer during small LOCA 289
- 5. PG&E/DRL 275-283 16-#1 Efi'tets of phosphate buildup on valde closure
- 6. DRL 283-284 17-#2 Steam Generator design envelope (LOCA reaction forces, jet forcer, seismic loading)
- 7. PG&E 287 17-#4 Control Room environment / hazards during seismic event - seismic vulnerability,of fluorescent lighting 8 DRL 314-315 - Number of emergency diesel genera-tors required for shutdown under various conditions 9 PG&E/DRL 315-318 18 Reliability of AC/DC electric power ,
326-327 systems ; 1 1 JUN.171975 i
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.,- 1 DRL TRANSCRIPT MEETING
SUMMARY
ADDRESSED TO PAGE # PAGE # TOPIC QUESTION #
- 10. PG&E/DRL 319-320 Possibic effects due to load shed- -
ding and/or sequential loading cf emergency diesel generators not being l accomplished as planned / expected. i
- 11. PG&E 320 - Hammer blow required /available sten needed-to begin isolation valve j l '
movement.
- 12. DRL 328-331 19 Effects of failure / malfunction 't. j diesel fuel oil systea
- 13. PG&E 334 Distances / barriers / times involved in operating locked-out ESF valves.
14 PG&E 354-355 20-02 Degree of compliance with 1974 ASME Section XI Differences between 1971/1972/19~- versions
)
- 15. PG6E/DRL 355-359 20-#3 Possible safety-related ef fects c f failure of non-safety-related and/cr-non-seismic Cat. I ele.ctrical systems
- 16. PG&E 340-341 - Question concerning self-destructing valve 17 PG&E/DRL 360-372 21 Required instrumentation / procedures for satisfactorily diagnosing the severity and course of an accident 18 DRL 370-378 22-#6 Similarities / differences between D1ablo and San Onofre/ Indian Point-2 designs as pertinent to probler.s experienced in those other plants (e.g. waterhammer/feeduater line rupture / containment lines bulge) 19 W/DRL 378-379 22-#7 Slug flow and/or water hammer effect:
for a LOCA downstream of S. G. - U ~ treatment /DRL review
. DRL 380 22-#8 Review of insulation used and poss-ible effect on containment sump.
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JUN.171975
ENCIDSURE NO. 2 ATTENDANCE LIST' DIABID CANYON ACRS SUBC0fefITTEE MEETING, ACRS Dr. D. Okrent Dr. W. Kerr. Dr. W. Stratton ACRS CONSULTANTS Dr. - S. Siegel- (Atomics International - retired) Dr. M.. Plasette (Cal Tech) Dr. I. Catton' (UCLA) Mr. J. Ebersole (on leave from WA) ACRS STAFF J. Conran PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (PGSE) W. J. Lindblad J. B. Hoch W. K. Brunot H. J. Gormly E. P. Wollak V. J. Ghic D. Nielsen R. A. Young R. R.. Fray J. C. Carroll J. R. Herrera P. A. Crane R. Ramsay J. Shiffer ' R. Patterson R. M. Laverty JUN.171975
J l Enclosure No. 2 i WESTINGHOUSE D. W. Peacock j J. W. Dorrycott ( A. J. Abels i P. Blau J. Cermak W. Gangloff J. Little R. Roidt l NRC - STAFF D. P. Allison T. J. Hirons
- 0. D. Parr C. G. Long D. G. Mcdonald L. E. Phillips M. S. Dunnenfeld L. D. Davis i
l l l I JUN. I 7197$ 1 l
l 4 l 1 1 Distribution: i Docket Fil S. Varga j NRC PDR R. W. Klecker i Local PDR F. Schroeder { NRR Reading (M. Groff) R. Tedesco ! LWR 1-3 File V. Stello l R. C. DeYoung R. Maccary V. A. Moore H. Denton D. Skovholt V. Benaroya D. Muller G. Lainas { R. Denise J. Collins K. Goller D. Ross W. Butler T. Ippolito l J. Stolz J. Knight l R. Clark S. Pawlicki l l T. Speis L. Shao D. Vassallo B. Grimes { K. Kniel W. Gamill 1
- 0. Parr R. Ballard i A. Schwencer P. Fine R. Purple T. Novak D. Zienann M. Spangler P. Collins J. Kastner G. Knighton EP Project Manager - W. Ross G. Dicker Project Manager - D. Allison B. You rSlood Attorney, ElB .
l W. H. ' an, Jr. IE (3) ! R. Vo au .r V. H. Wilson ) W. HL Jn ACRS (14) I G. Lear T. J. Hirons l C. Long J. Wetnote l D. G. Mcdonald L. E. Phillips M. S. Dunnenfeld L. D. Davis I 1 J l l l l
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