ML20151K690

Summary of Operating Reactors Events Meeting 88-28 on 880712.Viewgraphs & List of Attendees Encl

ML20151K690
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde, Brunswick, 05000000, Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	07/18/1988
From:	Lanning W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
OREM-88-028, OREM-88-28, NUDOCS 8808030255
Download: ML20151K690 (16)

Text

.

e JUL 18Iges g' %" 2 MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles E. Rossi, Director 3 '-}

l

• Division of Operational Events Assessment ;zb Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Wayne Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING July 12,1988 MEETING 88 28 On July 12, 1988 an Operating Reactors Events meeting (88 28) was held to brief senior managers from hRR, OSP, AE00, and Regional Offices on events which occurred since our last meeting on July 5, 1988. The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. Enclosure 3 presents a summary of reactor scrams. One significant event was identified for input to NRC's Performance Indicator Program.

03181nal 31,g g h>w D, b %

Wayne Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/Encio.:

See Next Page Ob I DISTRIBUTION y h Central r% >'

EAB Reading File II ,

Circulating Copy EAB Staff MLReardon, EAB p [ b f:gfg i

/g A !

00uainot, EAB / () @ fj (/ l LKilgore, SECY, PDR hr OFC :EAB:NRR :C:EA hkR  :  :  :  :  :

di l i

' I

. . . . . : .p..jr 4 .

f...:............:............:............:............:...........

N AM E : Mdh L 4 e:WL a r/L . . . : . :k.g n ing  :  :  :  :  ;

DATE :07//f /88 :07/)f/88  :  :  :  :  :

0FFICIAL RECORD COPY 8808030255 PDR ORG 88071v i NRRB j

ENCLOSURE 1 l

LIS1 0F ATTENDEES OPERATillG REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (68-28) I

. July 12, 1988 hAME ORGANIZAT10h NANE ORGANI2ATION B.A. Boger NRR/ADR1 W. Minners RES/DRPS D.C. Fischer NRR/00EA W. Lanning NRR/00EA R. Scholl, Jr. NRR/00EA W. Hoages NRR/ DEST J. Sniezek HRR:DD C.E. Rossi NRR/DOEA M.L. Reardon NRR/00EA 6.G. Grimes NRR/DRIS C.J. Haughtiey NRR/DRIS 0. Tondi NRR/SELB

5. Varga NRR/DRP K. Eccleston NRR/DRP P. Baranowsky likR/00EA K. Heitner NRR/PD4 B.C. Buckley NRR/P02-1 T. Collins NRR/SRXB E.G. Adensam NRR/DRP G. Gears OSP M. Davis NRR/PDS J.E. Rosenthal AE00/R0AB G. Lainas NRR/DRP T. Murley NRR:D F. Miraglia NRR/ADP i

)

i l _

ENCLOSURE 2 OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 88-28 EVENTS ASSE.S._SMENT BRANC.H LOCATION: 12-B-11 WHITE FLINT IME.SDAY, JULY 12, 1988, 11:00 A.M.

PALO VERDE i AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER EXPLOS10N BRUNSWlCK UhlTS 1 & 2 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION PROBLEMS FORT ST. VRAlh CORE SUPPORT FLOOR INTERNAL ,

PRESSURE 1

3

88-28 PALO VERDE 1 AUXILLARY TRANSFORMER _. EXPLOSION JULY 6, 1988 PROBLEM FAILURE OF PALO VERDE UNIT 1 AUXILLARY TRANSFORMER AND SUBSECUENT FIRE LEAD TO A REACTOR TRIP AND LOSS OF FORCED CIRCULATION,

.CRLSE GROUND FAULT ON 13,6 KV NONVITAL BUSS.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE LOSS OF FORCED CIRCULATION.

DISCUSSION o UNIT AT 100% POWER PRIOR TO EVENT, c AT APPROXIMATELY 12:07 (MST) ON JULY 6, 1988, UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER (AXFMR) FAILED CATASTROPHICALLY AND CAUGHT FIRE DUE TO GROUND FAULT ON ASSOCIATED NONVITAL BUSS, o AXFMR SUPPLIES TWO 13,8 KV, NONVITAL BUSES WHICH PROVIDE POWER TO VARIOUS HOUSE LOADS, l.E., ALL REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS, lHSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM, CODLING WATER SYSTEMS, o LETDOWN WAS ISOLATED DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER ON LOSS OF NORMAL CHILL WATER, c- REACTOR TRIPPED ON LOSS OF FLOW, c AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) ACTUATION ON LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER DUE TO LOW SUCTION PRESSURE, o PLANT STABILIZED IN MODE 3 WITH DECAY HEAT REMOVAL THROUGH NATURAL CIRCULATION.

o UNCONTAINED Oil FROM THE AXFMR ACCUMULATED IN YARD DRAINS AND OTHER AREAS CAUSING SEVERAL FIRES, o ALL FIRES WERE EXTINGUISHED SY 12:32 (MST),

o AT 13:02 (MST) LICENSEE ATTEMPTED TO RE-ENERGlZE THE FAULTED NONVITAL 13.6 KV DUS VIA THE UNIT 2 STARTUP TRANSFORMER, o A SECOND FIRE ERUPTED INVOLVING THE FAULTED BUS, CONTACT: N FIELDS .

REFERENCE:

50,72 # 12727, 12733, PNG-V-88-41 (DATED 07/07/86 AND UPDATED 07/08/88), MORNING REPORT 07/07/88

- ' pat 0 VE.RDE 1 0 THIS SECOND FIRE WAS MANUALLY EXTINGUISHED USING THE DELUGE SYSTEM; HOWEVER, THE BUS WAS DESTROYED, o AS A PRECAUTIONARY hEASURE, BOTH TRAINS OF SAFETY RELATED ELECTRICAL LCADS WERE PLACED ON 1 HEIR RESPECTIVE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDG) AND SEPARATED FRON THE OFFSITE POWER SOURCE, c COMPONENTS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN THE PLANT IN NATURAL CIRCULATION AND WHICH REQUIRE INSTRUMENT AIR HAVE BACKUP NITROGEN SUPPLIES, o FOLLOWING RESTORATION OF POWER TO UNAFFECTED NONVITAL BUS, LICENSEE UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTEMPTED TO CLOSE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP (RCP) CIRCUlT BREAKER.

o DC CONTROL VOLTAGE TO AGASTAT RELAY (IN RCP CIRCUIT BREAKER CONTROL CIRCUITRY WAS INSUFFICIENT TO DEVELOP REGUIRED CLOSE PERMISSIVE, c DC BATTERY BECAME DISCHARGED TO APPROXIMATELY 46V FROM 120V WHILE SUPPLYlh6 CONTR0L POWER TO VARIOUS SYSTEMS OVER THE 6-8 HOUR PERIOD IN WHICH THE NONVITAL BUSS WAS SEPARATED FROM THE OFFSITE POWER SUPPLY, o BATTERY WAS DISCONNECTED FRON DC BUS bHICH ALLOW CHARGER TO DEVELOP SUFFICIENT VOLTAGE TO MAKE UP RELAY, o AT 12:35 A.M. (PST) ON JULY 7, 1988 THE LICENSEE STARTED ONE RCP AND A CONTROLLED C00LDOWN WAS THEN COMNENCED USING FORCED CIRCULATION, FOLLOWUP o LICENSEE HAS 50-60 DAY PROGRAM TO REPLACE DAMAGED EQUlPMENT AND MAKE ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS, o LICENSEE TO REVIEW ADEQUACY OF RELAY AND BREAKER C0 ORDINATION AS PART OF ThElR FOLLOWUP EFFORT, '

o LICENSEE CONSIDERING THE INSTALLATION OF ADDITIONAL BATTERY CHARGER TO LE POWERED FROM AN ALTERNATE SOURch. i l

e 0 *

• O aa( c' .

<= t ,

Y nd

,E 3

e c -- 1 g

)-

, 3

+

^@e i #:

i fOB x

gsa u

y sp s

g m A i Efra

'm -

e

%g* dl n 5 n

f E W

35 y I y

>k ;l A .,. T $ cj "

( . o Gill!

N,elt gi g47 E

.o 5 IiV *a s gi T

i -Q v

-es "

e A- a 3

55

];

2 3 1= y v~

e

88-25 B!LUNSW X UMTS 18 2 HlGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION PROBLEMS APRll 1 THROUGH JULY 12, 1988 PROBLEM o RECENT TREND OF LARGE NUhBERS OF REPORTABLE EVENTS, o MANY OF THESE REPORTS INCLUDE SAFETY SYSTEMS, o 50,72s LARGELY DOMINATED BY HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI)

SYSTEM FAILURES AND IN0PERABillTIES, CAUSE o POSS!BILITY OF INADEQUATE HPCI DESIGN (NOT GE STANDARD),

o PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH AGING, MOV START CIRCUITRY, AND TEST AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS, SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE LOW HPCI AVAILAblLITY DUE TO FAILURES AND INOPERABILITIES PUTS THE UNITS AT A HIGHER VULNERABillTY IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT OR TRANSIENT SITUATION, D_ll_ CUSS 10N o BOTH UNITS IN 14 DAY LCO WITH flPCI CUT OF SERVICE.

c MOST RECENT EVENTS INVOLVE THE INOPERABILITY OF THE DC MOV's E41-F006A (HPCI INJECTION VALVES) ON BOTH UNITS, FAILURE OF STEAh SUPPLY VALVE E41-F001 (UNIT 1) AND NON-CONSERVATIVE SETPOINTS FOR THE STEAM LINE ISOLATION INSTRUMENTS ON ON BOTH UNITS, o SINCE 04/01/88 45% OF ALL BRUNSWILK's HAVE BEEN HPCI RELATED, c ON 06/06/88 HPC1/RCIC INOPERABLE ON BOTH UNITS SIMULTANE0USLY, o SETPOINT PROBLEMS ARE RELATED TO DATA USED IN STARTUP TESTING, ALSO HAD PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PIPING TAPS REVERSED, o REPLACED DARTON PRESSURE TRANSMITTER WITH ROSEMONT PRESSURE TRANSMITTER WITHOUT POST-MAINTENANCE TESTING, o DC VALVE OPERATOR N0 TORS AT SITE HAVE A NORMALLY ENERG12ED SHbNT FIELD - WHEN ISOLATED BY BREAKER, ENERGY DOES NOT HAVE A DISSIPATION PATH WHICH LEADS TO MOTOR DEGRADATION, c MANY VALVE PROBLEMS FOUND, CONTACT: J. RALElGH

REFERENCES:

50,/2 #s 12E97, 12721 AND MORNING REPORT 07/05/88

88-28 BR,0NSWICK 1 8 2 1 VALVE FAILED ON THERMAL BINDING WHERE MORE 10 ROUE THAN DESIGN WAS NECESSARY AFTER BEING REFURBISHED TWICE, REDUCED VOLTAGE DUE TO STARTING RESISTORS STALLING THE LIMITORGUE "HAMMER-BLOWS" WHICH UNSEATS VALVE, o LICENSEE HAS BYPASSED THE START RESISTORS, ENLARGED CABLE RUNS (T0 REDUCE LOSSES) AND INCREASED ACTUATOR GEAR RATIOS TO DEllVER MORE TORQUE TO VALVES - IN POST-MAINTENANCE TESTING PHASE, FOLLOWUP o REGION WILL PURSUE ACTION ON THE J.C.0.

o REGIONAL INSPEC110h TEAM AT Silt, o ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE 07/20/88 ON HPCI PROBLEMS,

88-28 BRUNSWICK UNIT 1 SHORT TERM OPERATING HISTORY B.ETWEEN 04/01/88 - 07/12/88 HECl RELATED 50,72 REPORTABLE EVENTS:

o 04/20/88 - HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE BECAUSE OUTBOARD SUPPRESSION P0OL SbCTION VALVE DID NOT OPEN UPON DEMAND, o 05/28/88 - HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE FAILED TO OPERATE FOR UNKNOWN REASONS, THUS RENDERING HPCI INOPERABLE, o 06/06/88 - RCIC STEAM LlhE HIGH FLOW ISOLATION SETPOINTS WERE LESS C0ilSERVATIVE THAN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. RCIC hAS DECLARED INOPERABLE AND WITH HPCI OUT-0F-SERVICE FOR VALVE REPAIRS A REACTOR SHUTDOWN WAS COMMEUCED, o Ub/30/88 - HPCI WAS ISOLATED AN DECLARED INOPERABLE WHEN IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE SETPOINTS FOR THE 300% STEAM LINE ISOLATION SETPOINTS WERE SET NONCONSERVATIVELY, o 07/01/88 - HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE FAILED TO OPEN AND ITS ASSOCIATED BREAKER TRIPPED FOR UNKNOWN REASONS, o 07/05/88 - OPERABILITY OF THE HPCI INJECTION VALVES (DC MOV'S) IS CUESTIONABLE IN A SEVERELY DEGRADED DC VOLTAGE CONDifl0N DUE TO THE TORCUE RELulREMENTS EXCEEDING THE CAPACITY OF THE STARTING MOTOR IN SUCH CONDITIONS, l

l I

l

. 88-28 BRUNSWICK UNIT 2 SHORT TERM OPERATING HISTORY BETWEEN 04/01/88 - 07/12/88 HPCI RELATED_50.72 REPORTABLE EVENTS o 04/Z9/88 - HPCI WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE AND ISOLATED IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DUE TO A PERSONNEL ERROR WHILE INSTALLING INSULATION, 0 05/13/88 - HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DECAUSE THE MINIMUM FLOW VALVE STROKE TIME 01D NOT MEET FSAR REQUIREMENTS, c 06/06/88 - RCIC STEAM LINE HIGH FLOW ISOLATION SETPOINTS WERE LESS CONSERVATIVE THAN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION RECLslREMENTS, RCIC WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE AND WITH HPCI OUT-0F-SERVICE FOR VALVE REPAIRS A REACTOR SHUTDOWN WAS COMMENCED, o Ub/L'4/88 - HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE AFTER DISCOVERING THAT ONE HPCl

$1EAM LINE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRANSMITTER HAS HAD ITS HIGH AND LOW PRESSURE LINE REVERSED SINCE CONSTRUCTION, o 06/26/88 - HPCl INBOARD STEAM SUPPLY VALVE FAILED TO OPEN BECAUSE THE BREAKER WAS TRIPPING ON THERMAL OVERLOAD; THEREFORE, HPCI WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE, o 06/30/88 - HPCI WAS ISOLATED AND DECLARED INOPERABLE WHEN IT WAS DETERhlNED THAT THE SETPOINTS FOR THE 300% STEAM LINE ISOLATION SETPOINTS WERE SET NONCONSERVATIVELY, THE 2A CORE SPRAY SYSTEM WAS OUT-0F-SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE BUT WAS RESTORED WITHIN 30 MINUTES, o 07/05/88 - OPERABILITY OF THE HPCI INJECTION VALVES (DC MOV'S) IS QUESTIONALLE IN A SEVERELY DEGRADED DC VOLTAGE CONDITION DUE TO THE TORCUE REGUIREMENTS EXCEEDING THE CAPACITY OF THE STARTING MOTOR IN SUCH COND!i!0NS, l

l I

I i

__----___-_____________-____-__-_____________________________-______________________________-_____-_D

1 l

. 88-28 l

l EORT ST, VRAIN CORE SUPPORT FLOOR INTER.NAL PRESSUR.E JULY 12, 1988 PROBLEM VALVE IN CORE SUPPORT FLOOR (CSF) VENT SYSTEM hAS FOUND IN MID-POSITION WHICH WOULD HAVE PREVENTED CSF PRESSURE CCl, TROLLER FROM CONTROLLING PRESSURE WITHIN CSF.

CAUSE PROBABLY HUMAN ERROR,

. SAFETY SIGNIElCANCE o DEFORMATION OF CSF STEEL CASING COULD CAUSE SIDEWALL LINER TO SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRICT THE PRIMARY COOLANT FLOW PATH.

o TOP LINER COULD BUCKLE CAUSING POSSIBLE CORE DISARRAY, DISCUSSION o NON-SAFETY VENT SYSTEM MAINTAINS CSF PRESSURE LESS THAN 60 PSIG, o DURING NORMAL OPERATION PRIMARY COOLANT PRESSURE IS 700 PSIG.

O hlTH VENT VALVE CLOSED, CSF PRESSURE COULD COME IN EQUILlBRIUM Wi1H PRIMARY SYSTEM PRESSURE, o FOLLOWING RAP f lEPRESSURIZATION OF PRIMARY COOLANT, A 700 PSID COULL BE EXERic6 ACROSS CSF CASING, l o SAME SYSTEM BRIEFED april 12, 1988 (BRIEFING 88-15).

FOLLOWUP l REGION IV IS FOLLOWING UP, I

1 CONTACT: 1, GREENE

REFERENCE:

50,72 # 12730

UPDATED FSAR Revision 2 e ,,

C E E 3U $.

Iiii s! H il s i i  !! il s

Y

\\ \\ .- :--

\ \

"""'QTm""" :, 8

- pQ.

, p;.- 5_. .

a n

gf 1

. .]

=

• - ~~ m R g g -

j -

my. _ gvgm9mvvsmsg .

g e x m _o _ 2 .. ,

j u :- - .{ L i_:  ; W g 0 oi 0\0:'

o) fr 1 -

a) i 1 -

g " i0 0- - o ) '.

r 5

/0 Q '

)

s 0;0 v < c

f. .

E 0, Oi I - _

4 k0rfN0r'0'r-fN O L. D -

6 e 0[0 00 V 1 *) '

9 E- 5

• E h

,\ ( 0.'O 0. $-

\-

l

[ n . .

1 i g

( ( ^- 0.0 ( f.OD f0 6toro <

' s. ' '*

l 5 g .

+

• \ r \

^

r '-r 9%Cr'O'0 Or0 -

0 0; A-D g g Q 8 a

f f f CD r i; . - .

t

s 0 kOf0

./

u. %.

i i a>0 0, s ,

, s 1 ,

s 1 1 1 o e i .- . l

/ / f .w.' _ ,.L)

)

1

/ / - -

4 '>

y.

1 , , ,-.3-- ..- --- m w

8 1

W / \ / \

i

/ / V i

\

" fa si 1 te i

i

[ v i

e

. 5.

. h w u

si<6-o x x fu.qs.

e,. t W- > i 4

q g

ui s

io n .

' Z  !

10 w y

i O

E hg E N CC 1

a 8 cx$.rhe o

cc jn......og=[

S f

o n,

=Y g X f CL D

i g .. ....og g y) g I DE-*

ru o

L X,' o A

. Foit,T S T LIliA lh]

COP.E SUPDORT FLOOR / COL'Jm VE'lt SYSTEM -

I l

1 s s s

s

s. PCRY LI'iED

, s s . HIERSPACE

_Q

- - 1 -

c iz 1 1 1 . , z 1 l

l YbN, "Co * "'

, CSF FLOOR VEN ( '

F '

s

[ ,

'] ] . --

i -

I s *

, u .

- (

j g i s

AA,gotg e

s

{. u_, e

.i ge .

1 ,, , , , = 1 ,

r gs,

l m

- - ~

5 L ' b, '

l

, 0, *

. csp lit;gq ,

, /, 3 ' { <

BAFFLE PLATE 2 -

l p 1 Z4. .; s ,

p

• y f sj s - , -

9 9 s

- \, .

s

's -

, s l ,

s ,

s I

h "

j "

CSF SUPPORT COLums L.

i g

N i y . .

= -  %

%j -

~ - *

( , ,,

i s - -

.e .

' 3g rl 6e e , , *6 \ -

~  ;. g6 & ie ,

tC '

m y -- -

X u a w ,, w I i COLUM.N VE'lis

J QK - -

k< = Q

scLar::'i vn vEs ,

Qi .j b- -b

El1 CLOSURE 3 tEACTOR SCRAM

SUMMARY

NEEK ENDIN8 07/10/88

!. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA DATE SITE UNIT PONER S!6hAL CAU5i COMPLI- YTD VfD YiB CAT 10NS A80VE BELON TOTAL 151 151 07/05/98 DCONEE 1 100 A PERSONNEL N0 1 0 1 07/06/88 PALO VERDE 1 100 A EBUIPMENT E0 3 1 4 07/10/88 DIABLO CANYON 1 0A UENOWN N0 1 1 2 i

J

Page No. 1 07/15/23 FERFORPA%CE lhD!CATOR5 SIGN!FICANT EVENTS PLANT NA"E EVINT EVEhi ItsrRIPi!CN GTR SIGN!FICAN:E

A'E F '. C '.E::E ! 07/06/i9 FA! LURES OF AUI!LIARf TRA%5FOR?ER A%; N;NV!7AL 13,$Ky pg5 0 scgAg g[ig ccpfttcaircg; DLE 10 BRML F A'.'LT.

1 l

l