ML20247A897
| ML20247A897 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde, Surry, North Anna, Turkey Point, Vermont Yankee, Vogtle, McGuire, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 03/16/1989 |
| From: | Lanning W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| IEIN-84-81, IEIN-86-074, IEIN-86-74, OREM-89-011, OREM-89-11, NUDOCS 8903290223 | |
| Download: ML20247A897 (18) | |
Text
_ - - - _ - _ - - - - - - - - - -
g_..
MARL'8 W.
MEMORANDUM FOR:.
Charles E..Rossi, Director.
Division of. Operational: Events Assessment FROM:
Wayne D. Lanning', Chief-Events Assessment Branch
. Division of Operational Events Assessment
SUBJECT:
THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING March'15, 1989 - MEETING 89 11-On March 15, 1989, an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89-11) was held to.-
~
brief senior managers from NRR, AE00, RES, Commission Staff, and Regional Offices on events which occurred since our last meeting on March 8,1989.
The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.
The events discussed and the significant elements of-these events are presented in Enclosure 2. includes'four significant events identified for input to NRC's performance indicator program'and a summary of reactor scrams for -
the week ending 02/12/89.
,,L ad te e
n..
Wayne D. Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment
Enclosures:
As stated' 0 [r*[
cc w/ Encl.:-
See..Next Page
,O-3 ',
k) k DISTRIBUTION
- Central F11e?i.
EAB Reading File p
l l
4 j9 f l l' Circulating Copy, EAB Staff MLReardon, EAB
.e D0udinot, EAB K lgore, SECY
- r/
I l
F C
8903290223 890316
[
PDR ORG NRRBPNV DFC :EAB/ DOE 4
- C:EA DEA :
.....:.4 g a....:..
NAME :MLReardon
- WDLanning DATE' :03/h /89
- 03///o/89 rr OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
_a___--____-.
i
V..
v.
L-1:
cc:
T. Murley, NRR-D. Hood, NRR F. Miraglia, NRR D. Matthews, NRR J. Sniezek, NRR T. Chan. NRR-E. Jordan, AEOD G. Knighton, NRR
' J. Taylor,.EDO J. Hopkins, NRR E. Beckjord, RES L.~Engle, NRR W. Russell, RI M. Fairtile', NRR M. Ernst, RII R. Wessman, NRR B. Davis, RIII
' B. Buckley, NRR R. D. Martin, RIV H. Berkow, NRR J. B. Martin, RV G. Edison, NRR
. W. Kane, RI L. Reyes, Rll E. Greenman, RIII L. Callan, RIV D. Kirsch, RV S. Varga, NRR D. Crutchfield, NRR B. Boger, NRR G. Lainas, NRR G. Holahan, NRR-L. Shao, NRR.
B. Grimes NRR F. Congel, NRR E.' Weiss, AE0D T. Martin, EDO J. Lieberman, OE J. Guttmann, SECY A. Thadani~, NRR S. Rubin, AE0D J. Forsyth, lhP0 R. Barrett, NRR M. Harper, AE0D R. Newlin, GPA
~
--__m__-
.[.
UNITED STATES h
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION q
5
- j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
\\.....j D
i s igp MEMORAllDUM FOR:
Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment FROM:
Wayne D. Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment SUEJECT:
THE OFERATING REACTORS EVENTS HEETING March 15, 1989 - MEETING 89-11 On March 15, 1989,'an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89-11) was held to i
brief senior managers from NRR, AE00, RES, Cornission Staff, and Regional Offices on events which occurred since our last meeting on March 8, 1989.
The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.
The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. includes four significant events identified for input to f;RC's performance indicator program and a sumary of reacter scrams for the week ending 03/12/89.
]
Wayre D. Lanning, i
Events Assessment i
Division of Operationi.1 Events Assessment
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ Enc.l. :
See hext Page l
l f
1
V I
ENCLOSURE 1 i
I LIST OF ATTENDEES' OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (89-11)
Harch 15, 1989 NAME ORGANIZATION NAME
-ORGANIZATION C. Rossi NRR/DOEA S..Varga NRR/DRP W. Minners
.RES/DSIR E. Adensam NRR/DRP B. Grimes NRR/DRIS C. Patel NRR/FDP-2 C. Haughney NRR/DRIS T. Daniels NRR/ADSP J. Bongarra NRR/DLPQ D. Hood NRR/PD2-3 M. Davis NRR/PD5 G. Lainas NRR/DRP R. Lobel NRR/DOEA J. Carter NRR/D0EA T. Martin OEDO H. Conrad NRR/MTEB W. Lyon NRR/SRXB P. Bobe AEOD/DSP B. Buckley NRR/PD2-2 J. Hopkins NRR/DRP F.. Borchardt OEDO L. Norrholm OCM/KC H. Berkow NRR/PD2-2 K. Dempsey NRR/PD2-2 B. Boger NRR/ADR1 W. Lanning NRR/DOEA L. Engle NRR/PD2-2 P. Baranowsky NRR/DOEA l
b[.'
I' ENCLOSURE 2
'e i
r OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 89-11 EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH LOCATION:
-12B-11, WHITE FLINT WEDNESDAY, MARCH 15, 1989, 11:00 A.M.
MCGulRE UNIT 1 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE (AIT UPDATE - VERBAL, NO SLIDE)
PALO VERDE UNIT 3 MULTIPLE EQUIPMENT FAILURES FOLLOWING LOAD REJECT'(AIT UPDATE VERBAL, NO SLIDE)
V0GTLE UNIT'2 RHR LOOP 3 COLD LEG INJECTION-CHECK VALVE FAILURES NORTH AhNA UNIT 1 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK UPDATE LVERMONT YANKEE INADVERTENT DRAINING OF REACTOR CCOLANT SURRY UNITS 1 8 2 UNQUALIFIED SAFETY-RELATED PARTS TURKEY POINl Li;IT 4 OPEN VALVE INSIDE CONTAINMENT DURING RCS REFILL a--_m--______-.-. _ _ _a
89-11 V0GTLE UNIT 2 RHR LOOP 3 COLD LEG It!JECTION CHECK VALVE FAILURES MARCH 10, 1989 EROBLEB BOTH CHECK VALVES FOR THE LOOP 3 RHR COLD LEG lilJECTION FAILED.
LhDEE PREllflINARY INVESTIGATION INDICATES A HIGH RATE OF WEAR AND GOUGING ON THE LOOP 3 10" CHECK VALVE.
NO DEFICIENCIES ON THE 6" CHECK VALVE OBSERVED.
SAFETY SIGNJflCANCE o
FAILURE OF THESE CHECK VALVES CAN EXPOSE THE RHR SYSTEM L PIPING TO HIGH PRESSURES (EVENT V-TYPE FAILURES),
o CPENINC OF THE RWST/RHR ISOLATION VALVES PROVIDES A RELEASE PATH OF THE RCS COOLANT TO THE ATMOSPHERE VIA THE RWST.
PISCUSS10f; o
THE LICEf1SEE ON MARCil 9 hAS PREPARINb TO DEPRESSURIZE AND C00LDOWN lHE RHR SYSTEM lh PREPARATION FOR ENTRY INTO MODE 2.
EHR WAS PLACED lh RECIRC MODE OF OPERATION.
(RCS PRES. APPROX 900 PSI 445*F).
o THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR NOTICED THAT RHR PRESSURE WAS REMAINING AB0VE JE0 PS), HE ORDERED Tile TWO RWST-RHR ISCLATION VALVES TO DE OPENED.
(VALVES REMAINED OPEN FOR ABOUT 15 HOURS).
o WHILE IN MOLE 3 AND DURING HEATUP OF THE RCS, TWO (IN SERIES)
COLD LEG INJECTION RHR CHECK VALVES FAILED A REQUIRED LEAKAGE TEST PR10E TO MODE 2 ENTRY.
e LICENSEE ENTERED T/S 3.03 15 HOURS AFTER THE ISOLATION VALVES j
WERE OPENED - CLOSED BOTH ISOLATI0h VALVES, AND OPEhED A VENT PATli TO THE RWST o
Tile LEAKAGE WAS 1L-15 GPM AS EETERMlf1ED FROM THE VCT fiAKEUP DATA AND bY THE AS-VEASURED FLOW DATA FROM PCST-EVENT TESTING Cf THE VALVES.
(ChlACT:
J.
THOMPSON SIGEVENJ:
YES fiEFEREhtL; 10 CFR 50.7; 6 14982, hLillNG REPOET 3-1C-ES
V0GTLE. UNIT 2 -
89 -
c THE VCT WAS BEING MADEUP EVERY 90 MIN FOR A PERIOD OF 15 HOURS.
O LEAK TESTIhG 0F THE LOOP 3 CHECK VALVES REVEALED THAT THE VALVES WERE.LEAKlNG BY AT LEAST 10 GPM,
- o. INSPECTION OF THE 10" CHECK VALVE REVEALED SIGNIFICANT WEAR AND G0UGING IN THE AREA 0F.THE FLAPPER DISC-TC-HINGE PIN.
320 DEGREE LEAKAGE WAS DESERVED AROUND THE VALVE SEAT.
c INSPECTION OF THE 6" VALVE REVEALED N0 IDENTIFIED DEGRADATION.
O THE 10" CHECK VALVE IS A WESTINGHOUSE SWING CHECK VALVE (N0 DEL NC. 00001CS99CC0000).
O WESTINGHOUSE IS ONSITE TO ASSIST IN ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS AND SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.
o LICENSEE IS INSPECTING ALL OTHER PRIMARY CHECK VALVES FOR SIMILAR PRCELEMS.
EfilDlVE THE REGION AND PM ARE FOLLOWlhC LICENSEE'S ROOT CAUSE I.NALYSIS AND PROGRESS.
s I
l i
g i
4.e
_I
- @#[ Ih_
~
l!j.*!
~
ew:.L i
i 3
2 ok!
j
=?
fJ. :.3.!.
a
\\
g s
0 3$
T--O h
u I
5.?
l oR*x L4E! X g
i s
a f*'
+
i+-
a,m, v
s g
a
-a s,. -
I
~
v)
&4 m m J
L Y
NI N!
le'8 F
e E
o 3
s r
f(
e,Q o
~
of*
$ E,"I GS fo35 z
J s sss s ss s u s s i w
8
\\NNNN.W W TNNNsNN
=
e 3
O U
o wa 3
s e
e
,1 O
O mE a
N
+
i~~~
ii g
7_
k 4y ee a
pJ a
v g
. M.
I II V
8 f
a m
a I
i I
I v-
.4[
_l __ _
~ l_.
1 8
I I
s e
i-w I
9 i
Mc
+
1 5
1 1
I l
<L 1
,5 I
i a
W D
89-11 NORTH ANNA UNIT 1 SIEAB_LEEERATOR TUBE LEAK UPDATE FEBRUARY 25, 1989 PROBLEB AFTER A REACTOR TRIP, THE PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE INCREASED FROM AN ESTINATED 0.59 GPD TO APPR0XIMATELY 75 GPM.
EhDBE THE LEAK RATE MAY HAVE INCREASED DUE TO DEGRADATION OF A STEAM GENERATOR (SG) TUBE PLUG IN STEAM GENERATOR "C".
THE LICENSEE HAS NOT DETERMINED WHETHER DEGRADATIOff CF THE PLUG WAS RELATED TO THE REACTOR TRIP.
SAFETY SIGNIFICahff POTENTIAL DEGRADATION OF STEAM GENERATOR TUEE PLUG.
DISCUSSION o
HIGHLIGHTS OF 3/1/89 BRIEFING:
REACTOR TRIPPED ON STEAM FLOW /FEEDWATER FLOW MISf1ATCH WHEN "C" SG MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATOF VALVE FAILED CLOSED.
AFTER THE TRIP, THE PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE INCEEASED i
FROM AN ESTIMATED 0.59 GPD TO APPROXIMATELY 75 GPM.
THE STEAM GENERATOR TUDE LEAK (SGTL) WAS IDENTIFIED IN SG "C".
(SG "C" ALSO HAD A SGTR ON JULY 15, 1987, WITH G37 GPM LEAK RATE.)
o DURING SG DRAINDOWh, LICENSEE ESTIMATEL TUBE LEAK AT 7TH (TOP)
SUPPORT PLATE VIA LEAK. RATE VS SG LEVEL MONITORING.
o LICENSEE IDENTIFIED LEAKING TUEE AS R0W 3 COLUMN 60 (R3 CEC).
o THE LICENSEE TESTED THE AFFECTED SG ("C") FOR MULTIPLE TUEE LEAKS EY INSTALLlhG A TEMPORARY PLUG IN TULE R3C60 AND PRESSURIZING THE SECCNLARY SIDE.
THEY FOUhD ChE ADDITIONAL LEAKING PLUG IN R0W 24 COLUMN 8 (R:408).
o VIDEO CAMERA, PLACED AT CHANNEL HEAD OF SG "C" HOT LEG, INDICATED A BROKEN MECHANICAL PLUG AT R3C6C.
1 C0hTACl:
A. CILEERT SIGEVEhT:
_lES_
REFERENLES:
10 CFR 50.72 #5 1485b, 14E59, MORNING REPORT 02/27/89, AND DAILY HithLlGHT 03/0E/89 l
l
L~
'NORTIANNAUNIT'l
!2 -
~89-11 I
o LICENSEE HAS REMOVED THE INTACT PLUG ON COLD LEG SIDE'AND HAS REMOVED ABOUT 75% 0F THE:BR0 KEN PLUG'IN TUBE R3C60 VIA THE SG H0T LEG SIDE USING A " SPEARING" PROCESS AND HYDRAULIC AID.
THE REMAINING'25% IS BELIEVED TO BE LODGED NEAR THE 7TH SUPPORT PLATE ON THE COLD LEG. SIDE.
EXTRACTION ATTEMPTS OF THIS REMNANT FROM THE' COLD LEG SIDE WILL1 CONTINUES HOWEVER EXTRACTION FROM THE HOT LEG SIDE MAY BE NECESSARY.
O REMOVAL 0F THE THE LEAKING PLUG ON THE HOT LEG WILL BE ATTEMPTED THIS WEEK.
THE INTACT PLUG IN TUBE R24C8 ON THE COLD LEG WAS RETRIEVED TODAY.
o.0NCE-THE PLUGS ARE RETRIEVEE, THE LICENSEE WILL' SEND THEM'TO WESTINGHOUSE FOR METALLURGY TESTS TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF FAllVRE AND WHETHER THE FAllVRE WAS SUCDEN OR SLOW TO PROPAGATE.
WESTINGHOUSE BELIEVES THAT THERE ARE CASES WHERE STEAM GENERATOR TUEE PLUGS MAY-HAVE BEEN IMPROPERLY TREATED FOR RESISTANCE TO PURE WATER STRESS CORROSION CRACKING.
0 EDDY CURRENT TESTING WILL BEGIN AFTER THE 4 PLUGS ARE REMOVED
.(THE HOT AND COLD LEG PLUGS IN TUBES R3CG0 AND R24C8), PROBABLY THIS WEEK.
O LICENSEE PLANS TO EXTRACT TUBE R3CCO.
O B8W HAS SUBMITTED, PRIOR TO THIS EVENT, A PART 21 FOR IMPROPERLY TREATED B8W PLUCS..
c LICENSEE IS CONTINUING INVESTIGATION TO VERIFY CAUSE OF PLUG FAILURE.
O REPCI, TING REGUlf:EMENTS UNEER PART 21 IS-BEING CONSIDERED BY THE LICENSEE.
FOLLOWUP o
NRR TECHNICAL STAFF (EMTB) IS CLOSELY FOLLOWING LICENSEE ACTIONS DURING INVESTIGATION.
c AFTER THE LICENSEE HAS TO DETERMINED THE FAILURE MECHANISM, A GENERIC COMMUNICATION WILL BE CONSIDERED.
gg_yy a
VERMONT YANKEE INADVERTENT DRAINING OF REACTOR COOLANT MARCH 10, 1989
)
PROBLEB UNPLANNNED DECREASE IN REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL.
ChDSL PERSONNEL ERROR DURING. MAINTENANCE LED TO OPENING VALVES AND PATH I
T0 TORUS.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE DECREASING WATER LEVEL COULD, IF UNCHECKED, CAUSE HIGH RADIATION LEVELS ON OPERATING FLCOR AND TOP 1/3 0F FUEL IN REACTOR TO BE UNC0VERED.
DISCUSSION o
REACTOR SHUTDOWN FOR REFUELINC.
o WATER LEVEL IN REACTOR VESSEL DECREASED FROM 290" TAF TO 220" TAF.
O LEVEL DECREASE OF 1.5 FT NOTICED BY OPERATORS ON REFUELINC FLOOR.
o WITHIN 25 MINUTES, MANUAL BLOCK val.VES WERE CLOSED TO TERMINATE DRAINAGE.
o M0 VATS TESTING OF VALVES IN "A" RHR LOOP.
o OPERATORS DIC NOT VERIFY POSITIOW OF "0THER" VALVES PRIOR TO TESTING.
o RHR SHOULD' ISOLATE ON LOW LEVEL.
o NO NOTED INCREASE IN RADIATION LEVELS; WATER LEVEL WELL ABOVE FUEL.
O LICENSEE IS MODIFYING PROCEDURES, c
DISCUSSED IN INFORMATION NOTICES E4-81 AND 86-74.
EDM DVUP RESIDENT TO REVIEl! LICENSEE'S ACTIONS CONTACT:
J. CARTEF SICEVENT:
_ED_
REFERENCE:
10 CFL 5C.72 // 14SEE
7 1
t 5
3 n
0 l
e42 m7
~
h - t c6s a8u t
g tNu A
' Q c.
8Q AIA 4
0 F
7) 5 SN
(
)
r 00 E
F V/
L 6 4
4 73 M6 A0 0
0 0
VF F
F RTA HH 2
H1 2 3 4(
R X
T E
+
A P
A A
,, +
740 F
C I
5 TAM E
+
H g 3 C
S T
q j
P N
_ 2 R
E RH V
)
E VA rd' P
o Y
N T
C W
A B
6 0
O T
)
B 0
0
(
~
D N 6 2
0 0
0
~
F F
E /
I F
M R#
~
N O
I W#
hf I
R A
EN
^
B R
( '
l D
UN g
I 7
P T
C OO g
A TC I
4 4
J^
A A
0 0
0 A
7 4
0 7
h
=
2 2
F 0
U F
I 1
0 N
F F
I F
O T
!lj A
L U
N R
IO C
l l
i I
S l
C S
f-E SR A
E L
R R
T P
g 0
g 9
O Cn V
TI UP )L g
0 R O p
F U
A O O S
E P
L R
il I
l.
l il!
ill; ;
fI.'
j 8
- ! I l 3
)
3, y
2, 1
~
~
89-11 fN ggggy UNITS'1 & 2 llEllallflED SAFETY-RELATED PARTS MARCH 10, 1989-
~
h, PROBLEd:
UNQUALIFIED SAFETY-RELATED PARTS G1LSE:- INADECUATE QUALITY ASSURANCE.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:
POTENTIALLY INCPERABLE SAFETY SYSTEMS.
DISCUSSION o
ON MARCH 10, 1989,. LICENSEE FOR SURRY 1 8 2 REPORTED UNCUAllFIED-PARTS FOUND ON SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS.
O LICENSEE LOUGHT HUNDREDS OF SAFETY-RELATED PUMP AND VALVE PARTS FRCM NON-ORIGINAL ECUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS (0 ems), STURM MACHIllE CO. AND DEAVCO, BETEEEN 1975 AND 1983.
OEM WAS BINGHAM - WILLAMETTE.
o VENDORS WERE QUALIFIED BY AUDIT AND PLACED ON APPROVED VENDORS LIST.
o.DURING AUDIT OF MANUFACTURERS IN 19E3 LICENSEE FOUND DISCREPANCIES LETWEEk PARTS AND MANUFACTURING DOCUMENTS (MATERIAL, DIMENSIONS...).
O LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT ALL NON-CEh PARTS SUPPLIED BY STURM MACHINE AND BEAVC0 WERE POTENTIALLY UNQUALIFIED.
O LICENSEE PURGED WAREHOUSE OF ALL THESE NON-0EM PARTS AND REPLACED THEM WITH OEM PARTS.
c IN NOVEMBER 1988, DURINE hORK ON INSIDE RECIRC SPRAY PUMP, LICEl;SEE FOUND A " STORM MACHINE C0" PART.
o LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT SOME NON-0EM PARTS HAD BEEN LEFT IN THE WAREHOUSE IN 1963.
-0 LICENSEE INITIATED REVIEW 0F ALL PURCHASE ORDERS AND TRACED ALL PARTS INVOLVED.
o AS DETAILED IN REPORT PER 10 CFR 50.72 ON MARCH 10, 1989, UNQUALIFIED NON-0EM PARTS STILL INSTALLED IN SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEVF ARE TO BE REPLACED DURING PRESENT REFUELING OUTAGE.
c UNIT 1 WAS IN OPERATION FOR ABOUT 1 MONTH WITH UNQUALIFIED NON-0EM SHAFT SLEEVES INSTALLEE IN "A" AND "B" INSIDE RECIRC SPRAY PUMPS.
f011.0K1!f o
VENDOR DRANCH TO ASSESS GENERIC IMPLICATIONS OF PROBLEM.
o INFChl'.AT10l: NOTICE DEING CONSIDERED.
CONTACT:
D. OUEINCT SIGEVENT:
_Jff_
REFERENCE:
EC.72 #149ES
2 89-11 TURKEY POINT UNII_h DPEN VAiVE INSIDE CONTAINMENT DURING RCS REFILL MARCH 9, 1989 PROBL_EM' OPEff VALVELINSIDE CONTAINMENT FOUND DURING.RCS REFILL.
-fAUSE UNDER INVESTIGATION.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE MINIMAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.
DISCUSSION o ' MARCH S,'1989, REACTOR IN MODE 5 WITH ALL NEW FUEL LOADEC.
o WITH. REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM FILLING IN PROGRESS PRIOR TO THE START OF REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS, RATE OF SYSTEM PRESSURIZATION SLOWER THAt: ANTICIPATED.
- c. AN OPERATOR, DISPATCHED TO CONTAINMENT T0 INVES11 GATE, FOUND A-TYGON TUEE ABOUT 25 FT LONG ATTACHED TO A DRAIN VALVE ON LETDOWN LINE.
O THE 3/4 INCH VALVE WAS LOCATED BETWEEN THE LETDOWN ORIFICE AND THE CONTAINMENT WALL PENETRATION.
o THE FREE END OF THE TUBE WAS SUBMERGED IN THE CONTAINMENT SUMP AND THEREFORE NO WATER FLOW WAS OBSERVED.
c lHE OPERATCR FOUND THE DRAlH VALVE IN THE OPEN POSITION.
o THE VALVE HAD LEEN INDEPENDENTLY CHECKED OFF AS CLOSED BY TWO CPERATORS.
o THE CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION WAS OUT OF SERVICE
( NOT REGUlRED IN MGCE 5), LEAKAGE WAS CALCULATED TO HAVE BEEN BETUEEh 10 GPM AND ?9 GPM FOR A PERIOD OF 2 HCURS AND 15 MINUTES.
l c
LICENSEE DECLARED AN UNUSUAL FVFNT, ELT BECAUSE OF AN INOPERABLE ENS LINE, KAS UNABLE TO NOTIF~
IHE STATE WITHlh 15 MINUTES AS RECulRED BY RECULATION.
l 0
STATE CONT ACTED REGIONAL OFFICE TO REGISTER A COMPLAINT.
i CONTI.CT :
N. FIELDE SIGEVENT:
_hD_
l REFEhENCE:
10 CFR 5C.72 EVENT REPORT NO. 14S74 L
' f-
..i 2: -
89-11 TURKEY POINT >
FULLOWUP-Jo LICENSEE IS. INVESTIGATIt'G REASON 7 VALVE-WAS LEFT OPEN.
U
-0 EAB-CONTEMPLATES NO ADDITIONAL FOLLOW P sI
)
i
____________-----m.--__m.._-.__--_
l.
Page Ng.
' 1 L
- 03/j4/B9
. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS SIGNIFICAN1 EVENTS ENCLOSURE 3
~ '
PLANT NAME EVENT EVENT DESCRIPTION OTR SIGNIFICANCE, IATE NORTH ANNA 1 02/25/89 A STEAM BENERATOR TUBE PLU6 FAILED. PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY l POTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL DE6RADATION
[ ~-
LEAK RATE REACHED APPR01 500 GPM. CAUSE OF PLUG FAILURE OF PRIMARY COOLANT PRESSURE IS STILL UNDER INVESTIGATION.
B0UNDARY.
PALD UERDE 3 03/03/09 UNIT 3 HAD SEVERAL EQUIPMENT FAILURES FOLLOWING A LCAD 0 SCRAM NITH COMPLICAT]DNS.
REJECT: FAILURE OF FAST TRANSFER TO REACTOR CODLANT PUMFS, FAILURE OF ADVs TO OPEN DN 10SS OF CONDENSER, FAILURE OF SEVERAL DRAIN VALVES AND LEAKABE IN RCP SEAT.
(AliTOSITE) t
- SURR7 1 & 2 03/10/89 UNQUALIFIED SAFETY-RELATED FARTS SUPPLIED BY NON-DR161NAL 0 PDTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL DEGRADATION-EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER.
OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT.
V06TLE 2 03/09/89 TWO RHR. COLD LE6 INJECTION VALVES FAILED WITH A FLON PATH 0 POTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL DE6RADAT10N TO RNST OPEN.
OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT.
t e
m O
l i
EEACTOR ECRA9 $UMMARY
^
WEEL EN!!NS 03/12/E9 J. PLANT SFICIF]C DATA LATE 5!TE Uhli F0 DER SIENAL CAJ5E COMPLI-YTD YTD '
YTD CATICNS AB NE EELOW TOTAL 151 151 0?/06/fi ffA!:W: 0 1
97 A EQUIPlENT ND 1
0 1
03/0!!E9 CCCNEE 3 1(0 A E0DIFMENT ND 1
0 1
03/07/E7FEF".1 2
91 P EDU!? MENT h3 2
0 2
03/07/E9 ?:SJ1RE 1 100 P E3UIPMENT YES 1
0 1
03/12/5i SALE
- 2 100 A EDIFMEhi N
2 0
2 l
SU"" art CF CCM:LICAi!Eh5 EliE UNIT 00MFLICAilh!
1 Uk:EFTA;NTY IN FEC:EUEEE T: IE FOLLOWED FDR EE00VERY FR0" A CI:Ehi M:5;I:E I
1 I
l L_ __
A D.
4 ECTFS 1.
PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW 0F 50.72 REPORTS.
FOR THE WEEK OF INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH MIDNIGHT SUNDAY. SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN RCD MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE. THERE ARE III REACTORS HOLDING AN OPERATING LICENSE.
2.
COMPLICATIONS: RECOVERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERS0llNEL ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.
3.
PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLE!!S INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STEAli GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEMS.
4.
"0ThER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAliS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES (LIGHTNING), SYSTEM DESIGN, OR UNKNOWN CAUSE.
l
- - - - _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _